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Form  No.   471 


i^ 


JAMES  K.  POLK 

A  POLITICAL  BIOGRAPHY 


EUGENE  IRVING  McCORMAC,  I>h.D. 

Professor  of  American   History  in    the  University  of  California 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  PRESS 

BERKELEY,  CALIFORNIA 

1922 


TO 

THE  MEMORY  OF 

MY  MOTHER 


PREFACE 

In  the  two  standard  sets  of  American  biographies— namely, 
the  American  Statesmen  Series  and  the  American  Crids  Bio- 
graphies—the name  of  James  K.  Polk  does  not  appear  in  the  list 
of  titles.  Evidently  the  editor  of  the  first  set  did  not  consider 
Mr.  Polk  to  have  been  a  statesman  Avorthy  of  serious  consideration, 
and  the  editor  of  the  second  set  seems  to  have  been  unaware  that 
Polk  had  played  a  conspicuous  part  in  any  of  the  crises  of 
American  history. 

Although  it  is  not  my  purpose  to  criticize  the  selection  made 
by  these  editors,  I  believe  that  the  character  and  success  of  Polk's 
political  career  entitled  him  to  a  place  in  eitlier  series.  I  believe 
that  the  following  pages  will  show  Mr.  Polk  to  have  been  a  con- 
structive statesman— a  statesman  possessed  of  vision,  sound  judg- 
ment, and  unusual  executive  ability.  Surely  he  was  a  "crisis" 
President.  He  extended  our  national  boundaries  to  the  Pacific 
Ocean  and  determined  the  political  destinies  of  the  future  popu- 
lation of  the  vast  area  lying  west  of  the  Louisiana  Purchase.  His 
request  for  an  appropriation  with  which  to  conduct  negotiations 
with  Mexico  called  forth  the  Wilmot  Proviso;  and  this  proviso 
precipitated  the  "irrepressible  conflict,"  which  Avas  one  of  the 
greatest  crises  in  American  history. 

When  nominated  for  the  Presidency  in  1844,  Polk  was  neither 
unknown  nor  inexperienced  in  national  affairs.  He  had  been 
selected  to  conduct  Jackson's  bank  war  in  tlie  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, and  he  had  performed  this  task  to  the  entire  satisfac- 
tion of  the  President  and  the  Democratic  party.  As  Speaker  of 
the  House  of  Representatives,  he  had  displayed  alertness  of  mind, 

[V] 


sound  judgment,  and  ability  as  a  party  leader.  And  when,  in 
1844,  Van  Buren  announced  his  opposition  to  the  annexation  of 
Texas,  General  Jackson  urged  that  Polk  be  nominated,  for,  as 
he  said.  Governor  Polk  was  the  ablest  exponent  of  Democratic 
doctrines  and  the  one  who  would  be  most  capable  of  carrying 
them  into  successful  operation.  The  General  did  not  overrate 
the  political  ability  of  his  protege.  As  President,  Polk  formulated 
his  policies  with  precision  and  confidence ;  and  despite  many 
obstacles,  he  succeeded  in  canying  them  into  effect. 

It  has  not  been  my  purpose  to  write  a  personal  biography. 
Therefore  this  volume  deals  almost  entirely  with  Polk's  political 
career.  In  the  discussion  of  the  events  of  his  administration  I 
have  attempted  to  show  the  part  played  by  the  President  in 
formulating  the  policy  of  the  nation.  In  the  field  of  foreign 
relations  I  have  been  concerned  mainly  with  the  President's  for- 
eign policy  and  with  the  motives,  viewpoints,  and  exigencies 
which  led  to  the  adoption  of  that  policy.  For  this  reason  the 
history,  policies,  and  motives  of  other  countries  concerned  have 
been  treated  incidentally  only.  Polk's  policies  were  influenced 
by  what  he  believed  to  be  the  facts  concerning  those  countries, 
and  not  by  the  facts  which  have  subsequently  been  found  to  be 
true.  For  example,  I  did  not  feel  that  a  biography  of  President 
Polk  called  for  an  exhaustive  discussion  of  conditions  in  Mexico, 
either  before  or  during  our  war  with  that  nation.  For  similar 
reasons,  thte  discussion  of  the  Oregon  question  is  confined  to  the 
official  acts  of  Great  Britain  and  to  the  interpretation  of  those 
acts  by  the  government  of  the  United  States. 

The  material  used  in  the  preparation  of  this  volume  has  been 
gathered  mainly  in  the  University  of  California  Library,  the 
Tennessee  State  Library,  and  the  Library  of  Congress.  I  am 
indebted  to  Dr.  Jolin  W.  Jordon,  Librarian  of  the  Historical 
Society  of  Pennsylvania,  for  placing  at  my  disposal  the  Buchanan 
Papers,  and  to  Professor  St.  George  L.  Sioussat  for  assistance 

[vi] 


of  various  kinds.  I  am  under  especial  obligation  to  Dr.  Gaillard 
Hunt  and  Mr.  John  C.  Fitzpatriek,  of  the  Manuscripts  Division 
of  the  Library  of  Congress.  Their  never-failing  courtesy  and 
valuable  suggestions  facilitated  my  research  work  in  many  ways. 
Dr.  Justin  H.  Smith's  valuable  work  entitled  "The  War  with 
Mexico"  was  published  soon  after  the  manuscript  of  my  volume 
had  been  completed.  Altliough  it  appeared  too  late  to  be  used 
in  the  preparation  of  my  manuscript,  I  am  gratified  to  note  tliat 
on  most  points  covered  by  the  two  works  we  have  arrived  at 
substantially  the  same  conclusions. 


Berkeley,  California, 
December,  1919. 


[viij 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Preface    i-iii 

CHAPTER  I 
Ancestry  and  Early  Life  of  James  K.  Polk 1-9 

CHAPTER  II 
Opposition  Member  op  Congress 10-25 

CHAPTER  III 
Polk  jvnd  the  Bank  of  the  United  States 2(5— Ki 

CHAPTER  IV 
Polk-Bell  Contest  for  the  Speakership 47-61 

CHAPTER  V 
Jutige  White  and  the  Prestoency 62-91 

CHAPTER  VI 
Speaker  of  the  House  under  Jackson 92-112 

CHAPTER  VII 
Speaker  of  the  House  under  Van  Buren 113-138 

CHAPTER  VIII 
Polk  versus  Cannon,  1839 139-154 

CHAPTER  IX 
Governor  of  Tennessee 155-179 

CHAPTER  X 
Defeated  by  Jones  in  1841 180-191 

CHAPTER  XI 
Polk  in  Retirement 192-211 

CHAPTER  XII 
Selection  of  Candidates,  1844 212-247 

[ix] 


CHAPTER  XIII  PAGE 

Campaign  of  1844 ' 248-283 

CHAPTER  XIV 
President-elect    284-318 

CHAPTER  XV 
Administration  and  Patronage 319-351 

CHAPTER  XVI 
Completion  of  Annexation 352-372 

CHAPTER  XVII 
Prelude  to  the  Mexican  War 373-414 

CHAPTER  XVIII 
War  in  Northern  Mexico 415-452 

CHAPTER  XIX 
Campaign  against  the  City  of  Mexico 453-486 

CHAPTER  XX 
Treaty  of  Guadalupe  Hidalgo 487-554 

CHAPTER  XXI 
Oregon   555-611 

CHAPTER  XXII 
Slavery  and  Territorial  Governments 612-655 

CHAPTER  XXIII 
Tariff,  Internal  Improvements,  and  the  Independejjt  Treas- 
ury       656-689 

CHAPTER  XXIV 
The  "Polk  Doctrine"  and  Minor  Diplomatic  Questions 690-712 

CHAPTER  XXV 

Close  op  Career 713-725 

Bibliography    726-732 

Index    733-746 


[x] 


CHAPTER  I 

ANCESTRY  AND  EARLY  LIFE  OF  JAMES  K.  POLK 

The  pedigree  of  the  Polk  family  has  been  traced  back  to 
1075 — to  Fulbert,  who  was  born  in  the  reign  of  Malcolm  III,  of 
Scotland.  In  1153  Fnlbert  was  succeeded  by  his  son  Petrius, 
who  took  the  surname  PoUok  from  the  estate  which  he  inlierited. 
In  1440  Sir  Robert  de  Pollok,  a  "younger  son"  of  the  family, 
inherited  an  Irish  estate  and  rem.oved  to  Ireland.  By  common 
usage  the  name  of  this  branch  was  soon  contractd  into  Polk. 
Sometime  between  1680  and  1687^  Robert  Bruce  Polk,  or  Pollok, 
second  son  of  Sir  Robert  II,  left  Ireland  with  his  wife,  six  sons, 
and  two  daughters,  and  settled  in  Somerset  County,  Maryland. 
Their  oldest  son,  John  Polk,  married  Joanna  Knox  and  estab- 
lished that  branch  of  the  family  whence  came  our  subject,  James 
K.  Polk. 

William  Polk,  the  only  son  of  John  and  Joanna,  after  living 
for  a  time  in  Carlisle,  Pennsylvania,  removed  with  his  family 
to  ^Mecklenburg  County,  North  Carolina.  Colonel  Ezekiel  Polk, 
the  seventh  child  of  William,  married  Mary  Wilson,  and  the 
fourth  child  of  this  union  was  Samuel  Polk,  the  father  of  the 
future  President.  The  President's  mother  was  Jane  Knox,  a 
great-grandniece  of  John  Knox,  of  Scotland.  Her  father,  James 
Knox,  of  Iredell  County,  North  Carolina,  was  a  captain  in  the 
Revolution.  Mrs.  Polk  was  a  rigid  Presbj'terian,  and  a  woman 
of  keen  intellect  and  high  character.  From  her  James  inherited 
man}'  of  his  well-known  traits.  She  lived  to  witness  the  whole  of 
his  successful  career,  and  to  assist,  during  his  last  moments,  in 
preparing  him  for  ' '  a  future  estate. '  '^ 


1  Authorities  differ  as  to  the  date. 

-  Garrett,  Pedigree  of  the  Polk  familij.  Richardson,  Messages,  IV,  371. 
Nelson,  Memorials  of  Sarah  Childress  Polk,  150  and  passim.  Cliase,  History 
of  the  Polk  Administration,  475. 


2  JAMES   K.   POLK 

James  Kuox  Polk,  oldest  of  the  ten  children  of  Saniuel  and 
Jane  Knox  Polk,  was  bom  on  November  2,  1795,  in  Mecklenburg 
County,  North  Carolina.^  The  Polk  family  had  settled  in  this 
frontier  region  some  time  before  the  Revolution,  and  tradition 
has  credited  Polk's  ancestors  with  a  leading  part  in  promulgat- 
ing the  much-mooted  Mecklenburg  Declaration  of  Independence. 
His  grandfather,  Colonel  Ezekiel  Polk,  whom  the  Whigs  in  1844 
accused  of  Toryism,  was  an  officer  in  the  Revolutionary  army. 

James's  father,  Samuel  Polk,  was  a  plain  but  enterprising 
farmer.  At  an  early  age  he  had  been  thrown  upon  his  own 
resources  and  had  met  with  the  hardsliips  incident  to  frontier 
conditions.  With  the  hope  of  improving  his  fortunes,  he  fol- 
lowed the  trend  of  emigration  westward,  and  in  the  autumn  of 
1806  settled  in  the  valley  of  the  Duck  River,  Tennessee.  He  was 
one  of  the  first  pioneers  in  a  region  then  a  wilderness;  but  the 
valley  proved  to  be  fertile  and  Mr.  Polk  in  time  was  rated  as  a 
prosperous  farmer.  He  was  an  ardent  supporter  of  Jefferson, 
and  his  faith  in  the  soundness  of  Republican  doctrines  was  in- 
herited by  his  son  James.  The  correspondence  in  the  Polk  Papers 
indicates  that  the  entire  family,  including  the  President's  mother, 
took  a  keen  interest  in  politics  and  that  all  of  tliem  were  firm 
believers  in  the  maxims  of  Jefferson. 

James  was  but  eleven  years  old  when  his  father  located  in 
Tennessee.  Had  he  possessed  a  strong  physique,  doubtless  he 
would  have  shared  the  fate  of  the  average  eldest  son  and  have 
been  trained  to  cultivate  the  family  estate.  But  he  was  not 
strong*  and  his  first  years  in  Tennessee  were  spent  in  making 


3  On  November  2,  1846,  Polk  noted  in  his  diary:  "This  is  my  birthday. 
According  to  the  entry  in  my  father's  family  Bible  I  was  born  on  the 
2nd  day  of  Nov.,  1795,  and  my  mother  has  told  mo  that  the  event  occurred, 
ag  near  as  she  could  toll  about  12  o'clock,  Meridian,  on  that  day."  (Dianj, 
II,  216.) 

4  "I  closed  my  education  at  a  later  period  of  life  than  is  usual,  in 
consequence  of  having  been  very  much  afflicted  and  enjoyed  very  bad  health 
in  my  vouth.  I  did  not  commence  the  Latin  Grammar  until  the  13tli  of 
July,  1813."     (Polk,  Diary,  IV,  160.) 


ANCESTBY  AND  EARLY  LIFE  3 

good  use  of  such  limited  educational  advantages  as  were  afforded 
in  a  pioneer  community. 

Young  Polk  was  studious  and  ambitious,,  but  Fate  seemed 
determined  to  deprive  him  of  the  opportunity  for  satisfying  his 
desire  for  an  education.  His  health  did  not  improve,  and  his 
father,  believing  that  a  more  active  life  tlian  tliat  of  a  student 
would  be  conducive  to  health,  determined  to  make  a  business 
num  of  his  son.  Accordingly,  much  to  the  son's  disgust  and  over 
his  protest,  he  was  placed  with  a  merchant  to  learn  the  business. 
After  remaining  but  a  few  weeks  with  the  merchant,  however, 
the  earnest  appeals  of  the  son  overcame  the  resistance  of  the 
father,  and  in  July,  1813,  James  was  permitted  to  continue  his 
education  under  the  guidance  of  Reverend  Robert  Henderson 
at  a  small  academy  near  Columbia,  Tennessee.  For  about  a 
year  Polk  "read  the  usual  course  of  latin  authors,  part  of  the 
greek  testament  and  a  few  of  the  dialogues  of  Lucian,"  and, 
according  to  the  testimony  of  his  preceptor,  he  "was  diligent  in 
his  studies,  and  his  moral  conduct  was  unexceptionable  &  ex- 
emplary. "^  After  spending  nine  months  at  Murfreesborough 
Academy,  where  his  "literary  merit  and  moral  worth"  won  the 
approval  of  the  rector,  Samuel  P.  Black,**  James  entered  the  Uni- 
versity of  North  Carolina  at  Chapel  Hill  in  the  autumn  of  1815. 
He  was  naturally  drawn  to  the  university  of  his  native  state, 
and  the  fact  that  his  cousin.  Colonel  William  Polk,  had  for  many 
years  been  one  of  its  trustees,  may  have  been  an  additional  reason 
for  selecting  this  institution. 

At  college  Polk  manifested  those  peculiar  traits  which  later 
characterized  his  career  as  a  statesman.  Eschewing  the  less  profit- 
able, but  usually  more  attractive,  side  of  college  life,  his  time 
was  occupied  with  hard  and  well  directed  study.     "His  ambi- 


5  A  recommendation  dated  December  31,  1814.     MS  in  Tenn.  Hist.  Soc. 
Library. 

"  Eecommendation    dated   October   5,    1815.     MS   in   Tenn.    Hist.    Soc. 
Library. 


4  JAMES  E.  POLK 

tioii  to  excel,"  wrote  one  of  his  political  friends/  "was  equalled 
by  his  perseverance  alone,  in  proof  of  which  it  is  said  he  never 
missed  a  recitation  nor  omitted  the  punctilious  performance  of 
any  duty."  Numerous  remarks  in  the  diary  written  while  he 
was  President  show  that,  in  Polk's  own  opinion,  time  spent  in 
mere  pleasure  was  so  much  time  wasted.  He  seems  to  have  been 
equally  serious-minded  during  his  college  days.  Neither  at  col- 
lege nor  at  a  later  time  did  Polk  deceive  himself  or  attempt  to 
deceive  others  by  assuming  great  native  brilliancy.  He  never 
posed  as  one  whose  genius  made  it  easy  for  him  to  decide  great 
questions  offhand.  He  never  attempted  to  conceal  the  fact  that 
his  conclusions  were  reached  as  the  result  of  unremitting  labor. 
And  if  his  conclusions  were  sometimes  attacked  as  unsound,  he 
was,  on  the  other  hand,  spared  the  embarrassment  of  ridicule, 
which  often  fell  to  the  lot  of  his  more  brilliant  competitors  during 
his  long  political  career. 

Polk  was  graduated  from  the  university  in  1818  and  enjoyed 
the  distinction  of  being  awarded  first  honors  in  both  mathematics 
and  the  classics.  He  was  very  fond  of  both  subjects,  as  each 
appealed  to  his  taste  for  industry  and  precision.  Of  his  classical 
training  he  retained  the  substantial  and  discarded  the  ornate. 
"So  carefully,"  wrote  the  friend  above  cited,  "has  Mr.  Polk 
avoided  the  pedantry  of  classical  display,  which  is  the  false  taste 
of  our  day  and  country,  as  almost  to  hide  the  acquisitions  which 
distinguished  his  early  career.  His  preference  for  the  useful  and 
substantial,  indicated  by  his  youthful  passion  for  mathematics, 
has  made  him  select  a  style  of  elocution,  which  would  perhaps  be 
deemed  too  plain  by  shallow  admirers  of  flashy  declamation." 

After  his  graduation  Polk  returned  to  Tennessee  with  health 
impaired  by  close  application,  and  early  in  1819  began  the  study 
of  law  in  the  office  of  Judge  Felix  Grundy.  A  warm  personal  and 
political  friendship  resulted,  which  was  severed  only  by  the  death 


7  Democratic  Eeview,  May,  1838.  Polk  says  that  this  sketch  was  written 
by  J.  L.  Martin,  later  charge  d'affaires  to  the  Papal  States  {Diary,  TV, 
132). 


ANCESTBY  AND  EAELY  LIFE  5 

of  Grundy  in  1810.  Tlie  pupil  studied  hard,  and  late  in  1820  he 
was  admitted  to  the  bar.  He  immediately  began  the  practice  of 
law  at  Columbia,  in  his  home  county  of  Maury,  among  friends 
and  neighbors  whose  confidence  in  his  ability  assured  him,  from 
the  beginning,  a  profitable  practice.  "His  thorough  academic 
preparation,  his  accurate  knowledge  of  the  law,  his  readiness  and 
resources  in  debate,  his  unswerving  application  to  business, 
secured  him,  at  once,  full  employment,  and  in  less  than  a  year 
he  was  already  a  leading  practitioner."^  His  account  books 
show  that  he  continued  to  enjoy  a  lucrative  practice  although 
much  of  his  time  was  spent  in  public  service.^ 

For  three  years  the  young  attorney 's  time  Avas  occupied  exclu- 
sively in  the  practice  of  his  profession.  His  only  active  participa- 
tion in  politics  was  to  serve  for  one  term  as  clerk  of  the  state 
senate.  In  1823,  however,  he  was  chosen  to  represent  his  county 
in  the  state  legislature,  and,  having  thus  entered  the  political 
arena,  he  continued  in  a  very  active,  and  for  the  most  part  suc- 
cessful, political  career  to  the  close  of  his  term  as  President. 
He  spent  two  years  in  tlie  legislature,  where  he  soon  established 
a  reputation  for  business  capacity  and  for  superiority  in  debate. 
He  took  an  active  interest  in  all  measures  for  developing  his 
state  and  gave  special  attention  to  the  providing  of  better  educa- 
tional advantages.  He  enjoyed  the  personal  and  political  friend- 
ship of  General  Jackson,  and  it  afforded  him  much  pleasure  to 
assist  by  his  vote  in  sending  that  military  hero  to  Washington  to 
represent  the  state  in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States.  Few  acts 
of  his  life  gave  him,  in  later  years,  greater  pride  than  his  partici- 
pation in  launching  Jackson  in  his  political  career;  and,  as  the 
General  was  ever  mindful  of  the  welfare  of  his  political  sup- 
porters, this  incident  was  no  impediment  to  Polk's  own  political 
advancement.  His  friendship  for  Jackson  was  natural,  although 
the  two  men  differed  widely  in  personal  characteristics  and  in 


8  Bern.  Rev.,  sup.  oit. 

9  His  account  books  are  in  the  Library  of  Congress. 


6  JAMES  E.  POLE 

their  attitude  toward  authority.  From  early  youth  Polk  had 
been  an  ardent  advocate  of  republicanism.  He  was  a  firm  believer 
in  the  teachings  of  Jefferson  and  shared  with  his  patron  an 
unbounded  faith  in  individual  freedom.  Pioneer  conditions  also 
are  conducive  to  a  strong  belief  in  practical  democracy,  and 
Jackson  seemed  to  be  a  leader  wiio  understood  the  people 's  desires 
and  sympathized  with  them. 

On  January  1,  1824,  Polk  married  Sarah  Childress,  whose 
father  w^as  a  prosperous  farmer  near  Murfreesborough,  Tenn- 
essee.^°  Mrs.  Polk  was  a  lady  of  refinement  and  ability.  Her 
sound  sense  and  personal  charm  aided  materially  the  political 
fortunes  of  her  husband  and  later  caused  her  to  be  regarded  as 
one  of  the  most  popular  ladies  of  the  White  House.  Many  who 
rated  her  husband  as  inferior,  even  contemptible,  joined  in  the 
unanimous  verdict  that  Mrs.  Polk  was  a  lady  of  culture  and 
attractive  personality.  This  fact  is  attested  by  numerous  private 
letters.  Judge  Story  was  "thunderstruck"  to  hear  of  Polk's 
nomination  in  1844,  but  he  admired  Mrs.  Polk.  When  her  hus- 
band was  leaving  Washington  in  1839  to  enter  the  campaign  for 
the  governorship  of  Tennessee,  Story  expressed  his  admiration  for 
Mrs.  Polk  in  a  poem  written  in  her  honor." 

One  of  the  young  men  who  attended  Polk  on  his  wedding  day 
was  his  law  partner,  Aaron  V.  Brown,  later  United  States  senator 
and  governor  of  Tennessee.  Their  friendship  continued  to  the 
end,  and  to  no  one  else,  except  Cave  Johnson,  did  Polk  more 
frequently  confide  his  usually  well  concealed  political  plans. 

Two  years  in  the  state  legislature  increased  the  young 
attorney's  natural  taste  for  politics,  and  his  success  in  that  field 
made  him  determine  to  seek  a  wider  opportunity  for  satisfying 
his  political  ambitions.  In  1825  he  offered  himself  as  a  candidate, 
and  in  August  of  that  year  was  chosen  to  represent,  his  district 
in  Congress.    When  elected,  he  was  not  quite  tliirty  years  of  age. 


10  Nelson,  Memorials  of  Sarah  Childress  Folk,  Yt 

11  Ibid.,  54. 


ANCESTEY  AND  EAELY  LIFE  7 

and  on  entering  Congress,  he  was,  with  one  or  two  exceptions,  the 
youngest  member  of  that  body. 

]\rrs.  Polk  did  not  accompany  her  husband  on  his  first  trip 
to  Washington.  The  journey  was  made  on  liorseback,  in  com- 
pany with  several  other  members  of  Congress.  At  Baltimore  they 
took  the  stagecoach,  leaving  their  horses  until  their  return  in 
March. 1-  On  his  second  journey  to  Washington,  Mrs.  Polk  accom- 
panied him  in  the  family  carriage.  The  money  paid  to  members 
as  mileage  in  those  early  days  was  small  compensation  for  the 
hardships  encountered  on  a  journey  from  remote  western  states. 
Still,  the  pioneer  statesmen  endured  sucli  hardships  without  com- 
plaint ;  they  even  extracted  pleasure  from  these  tedious  overland 
journeys. 

There  was  little  ostentation  in  Washington  in  this  early  period. 
The  life  of  the  average  congressman's  family  was  extremely 
simple.  It  was  customary  for  two  or  more  families  to  rent  a 
single  house  for  the  season  and  "mess"  together.^^*  Among  the 
"messmates"  of  the  Polks  were  Hugh  L.  White,  of  Tennessee, 
and  John  C.  Calhoun,  of  South  Carolina,  both  of  whom  later 
became  Polk's  bitter  political  enemies. 

Although  in  politics  a  disciple  of  Jefferson  and  an  ardent 
supporter  of  Jackson,  Polk  was  wholly  unlike  either  man  in  per- 
sonal peculiarities.  Jefferson  was  a  born  leader  of  men,  and  his 
exuberant  optimism  and  personal  charm  attracted  hosts  of  dis- 
ciples. He  advertised  his  democracy  by  extreme  informality  and 
slovenly  garb;  and  he  delighted  in  shocking  the  "well  born"  by 
disregarding  the  rules  of  social  etiquette.  Jackson,  also,  was 
a  born  leader  of  men.  He  commanded  the  multitude  because  he 
insisted  upon  doing  so,"  but  the  "plain  peoi)le'"  approved  him 

^■^  Ibid.,  27-28.  ^s  Ibid.,  30-31. 

1*  Judge  Catrou  has  given  such  an  excellent  description  of  Jackson's 
will  to  command  that  it  seems  desirable  to  rescue  his  letter  from  oblivion 
in  spite  of  its  length.  It  was  written  on  the  day  after  the  General's 
funeral. 

"One  thing  may  be  safely  said  of  Gen'  Jackson — that  he  has  written 
his  name  higher  on  the  Temple  of  fame,  than  any  man  since  Washington, 


8  JAMES  K.  POLK 

mainly  for  the  reason  that  they  regarded  him  as  one  of  them- 
selves. Polk,  on  the  contrary,  had  few  intimate  friends.  His 
associates  recognized  his  ability,  but  he  lacked  that  magnetism 
which  alone  can  attract  a  wide  personal  following.  He  was 
naturally  formal  and  punctilious,  and  he  seldom  sacrified  his 
dignity  in   the   pursuit   of   popular  applause.     While   he   was 


of  those  belonging  to  History  in  this  country.  And  what  is  more  remark- 
able in  him  than  any  other  American  is,  that  he  maintained  his  power 
from  seventy  to  eighty,  when  he  had  nothing  to  give.  This  he  did  by  the 
force  of  will  and  courage,  backing  his  thorough  out  &  out  honesty  of 
purpose.  His  intuitive  faculties  were  quick  and  strong — his  instincts 
capitally  good.  The  way  a  thing  should  be  done  struck  him  plainly — & 
he  adopted  the  plan.  If  it  was  not  the  best,  it  would  still  answer  the  pur- 
pose, if  well  executed.  Then  to  the  execution  he  brought  a  hardy  industry, 
and  a  sleepless  energy,  few  could  equal — but  this  was  not  the  best  quality 
he  brought  to  the  task.  He  cared  not  a  rush  for  anything  behind — he 
looked  ahead.  His  awful  will,  stood  alone,  &  was  made  the  will  of  all  he 
commanded;  &  command  it  he  would  and  did.  If  he  had  fallen  from  the 
clouds  into  a  city  on  fire,  he  would  have  been  at  the  head  of  the  extin- 
guishing host  in  an  hour,  &  would  have  blown  up  a  palace  to  stop  the  fire 
with  as  little  mis-giving  as  another  would  have  torn  down  a  board  shed. 
In  a  moment  he  would  have  willed  it  proper- — &  in  ten  minutes  the  thing 
would  have  been  done.  Those  who  never  worked  before,  who  had  hardly 
courage  to  cry,  would  have  rushed  to  the  execution,  and  applied  the  match. 
Hence  it  is  that  timid  men,  and  feeble  women,  have  rushed  to  onslaught 
when  he  gave  the  command — fierce,  fearless,  and  unwavering,  for  the  first 
time.  Hence  it  is  that  for  fifty  years  he  has  been  followed,  first  by  all 
the  timid  who  knew  him — and  afterwards  by  the  broad  land,  as  a  match- 
less man — as  one  they  were  ready  to  follow  wherever  he  led — who  with 
them  never  was  weary — and  who  could  sweep  over  all  opposers  abroad  or 
at  home,  terrible  and  clean  as  a  prairie  fire,  leaving  liardly  a  smoke  of  the 
ruin  behind.  Not  even  death  could  break  the  charm.  The  funeral  yester- 
day was  a  great  mass  meeting — of  women,  children,  men,  black,  white 
colored — of  every  grade,  mixed  up  by  the  acre  outside — the  House  crammed 
within.  There  was  not  a  loud  word  nor  a  smile  so  far  as  I  heard  or  saw. 
See  him  they  would  and  did — nay  they  would  see  the  cof[f]in  cased  in 
lead.  It  was  just  possible  to  have  room  for  the  sobliers,  (a  rather  tedious 
process)  they  claimed  it  as  a  right  to  see  the  thing  done.  The  [illegible] 
crowd  followed  him  to  the  Tomb;  a  stone  grave  by  the  side  of  Mrs. 
Jackson  's — laid  there  in  1828 — covered  with  a  copper  roofed  canopy  some 
ten  feet  high  resting  on  stone  pillars.  He  was  tediously  put  in,  and  the 
tomb-stone  left  off,  so  all  could  look  once  more.  It  was  a  scene  for  a 
painter  to  see  tlie  dense  crowd  at  the  particular  spot — the  slave  women 
in  an  agony  of  grief  laying  their  heads  on  the  shoulders  and  backs  of  the 
lady  friends  of  their  old  master;  leaving  laces  wet  with  tears — nor  did 
the  circumstance  elicit  a  single  remark  so  far  as  I  heard.  Death  did  not 
make  all  equal,  more  completely  than  did  this  funeral"  (Catron  to 
Buchanan,  Nashville,  June  11,  1845,  Buclianan  Papers). 


AN  CE  ST  BY  AND  FAULT  LIFE  9 

Speaker  of  the  House,  a  press  correspondent  gave  the  following 
sketch  of  his  personal  appearance : 

I  have  never  seen  a  man  preside  over  a  popular  legislative  body  with 
more  dignity  and  effect  than  Mr.  I»olk.  In  person  he  is  rather  below  the 
middle  size,  and  has  a  firm  and  upright  carriage  which  gives  great  self- 
possession  and  command  to  his  manner.  His  head  is  finely  formed,  with 
a  broad  and  ample  forehead,  and  features  indicative  of  a  character  at  once 
urbane  and  decided.  He  is  scrupulous  in  his  dress  and  always  appears  in 
the  chair  as  if  he  were  at  a  dinner  party.i^ 


15  United  States  Magazine,  quoted  by  Nashville  Union,  July  17,  1839. 


CHAPTER  II 

OPPOSITION  MEMBER  OF  CONGRESS 

On  questions  of  governmental  policy  which  divided  the  people 
of  his  day  Polk  entered  the  political  field,  as  he  left  it,  a  con- 
sistent Jeffersonian  Republican.  Like  his  illustrious  patron, 
however,  he  found,  when  entrusted  later  Math  the  highest  execu- 
tive responsibilities,  that  theories,  however  good,  must  sometimes 
yield  to  the  practical  solution  of  the  problem  in  hand.  On  such 
occasions,  as  in  his  expansion  policy,  he  did  as  Jefferson  had  done ; 
he  assumed  far-reaching  power  for  the  executive  branch  of  the 
central  government,  leaving  himself  thereby  open  to  the  same 
criticisms  which  he  and  Jefferson  had  hurled  at  the  Federalists. 

Polk  began  his  career  in  Congress  as  an  opponent  of  the 
existing  administration,  and  republicanism  is  always  most  vigor- 
ous when  relieved  of  responsibility.  During  his  first  years  in 
Congress  his  republicanism  could  have  free  play.  He  took  a 
definite  stand  at  once  on  the  side  of  the  states  and  the  people, 
and  vigorously  assailed  the  autocratic  powers  alleged  to  have 
been  assumed  by  President  Adams,  as  well  as  the  centralizing 
tendencies  of  that  administration. 

At  a  later  day  Polk's  political  opponents  ridiculed  him  as 
being  Jackson's  alter  ego  and  asserted  that  he  had  ascended  the 
political  ladder  on  the  coat-tails  of  the  "old  hero."  However 
effective  such  allegations  may  have  been  as  campaign  arguments, 
the  fact  remains  that  as  early  as  1825  Polk's  political  views  were 
already  freely  promulgated  in  Congress,  while  those  of  Jackson 
on  most  questions  were  yet  unformulated,  or  at  least  unan- 
nounced. As  to  the  tariff,  the  only  important  question  on  which 
the  General  seems  at  that  time  to  have  formed  a  definite  idea, 


OPPOSITION  MEMBER  OF  CONGRESS  11 

the  two  men  differed  widely.  That  Polk,  like  others,  humored 
the  whims  of  General  Jackson  for  political  reasons  need  not  be 
denied,  that  he  profited  by  his  friendship  is  beyond  question ;  but 
priority  in  advocating  measures  later  championed  by  both  men 
would  seem  to  absolve  Polk  from  the  charge  that  his  opinions 
were  derived  ready-made  from  his  more  conspicuous  chief.  It 
does  not  appear  that  he  gripped  more  firmly  to  the  General's 
coat-tails  than  did  others  of  his  party. 

Since  the  Tennessee  land  question  was  the  theme  of  Polk's 
first  formal  speech  in  Congress,  and  since  this  subject  was  des- 
tined to  acquire  great  political  significance,  it  seems  desirable  to 
give  a  summary  of  its  history  in  order  to  show  its  political 
importance.^ 

North  Carolina,  the  former  owner  of  Tennessee,  when  ceding 
this  territory  to  the  United  States,  had  reserved  the  right  to 
dispose  of  certain  lands  included  in  the  ceded  area.  Other  tracts 
were  reserved  for  the  Indians.  These  reservations  necessarily 
limited  the  amount  of  land  left  at  the  disposal  of  Tennessee. 
Under  the  so-called  compromise  agreement  of  1806,  much  of  the 
Indian  land  was  procured  for  the  state,  and  one-sixth  of  it  was 
to  be  reserved  for  educational  purposes.  In  1821,  however,  the 
provision  relating  to  school  lands  was  found  to  be  invalid.  As  a 
result,  the  Tennesseans  decided  to  ask  Congress  for  certain  gov- 
ernment lands  (in  Tennessee)  which  might  be  disposed  of  for 
educational  purposes.  As  the  lands  in  question  were  those  which 
settlers  had  declined  to  purchase  at  the  price  asked  by  the  fed- 
eral government,  they  were  commonly  called  "waste"  lands, 
although  they  were  far  from  being  worthless. 

Although  tlie  legislature  considered  the  subject  as  early  as 
1821,  no  definite  action  was  taken  until  1823,  when  it  was  referred 
to  a  select  committee  of  which  Polk  was  made  chairman.     From 


1  For  a  more  detailed  account,  see  Professor  Sioussat  's  interesting 
article,  "Some  Phases  of  Tennessee  Politics  in  the  Jackson  Period," 
Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  Oct.,  1908. 


12  JAMES   K.  POLK 

this  committee  the  chairman  reported  resolutions  which,  in  addi- 
tion to  asking  Congress  to  grant  the  lands  in  question,  requested 
the  senators  and  representatives  from  Tennessee  to  work  for 
this  end.^ 

In  1825,  Polk  was  transferred  from  the  state  legislature  to 
the  federal  House  of  Representatives.  Realizing  that  the  school 
land  question  was  of  prime  importance  to  the  people  of  his  state^ 
he  embraced  the  earliest  opportunity  (January  23,  1826)  to  call 
up  the  Tennessee  memorial — which  he  had  prepared  in  1823 — and 
moved  that  it  be  referred  to  a  select  committee  rather  than  to  the 
Committee  on  Public  Lands ;  and  despite  considerable  debate  this 
course  was  followed.  Polk  was  made  chairman  of  the  new  com- 
mittee.* The  bill  which  he  reported  soon  afterward  failed  to 
pass  the  House.  As  will  appear  later,  however,  this  Tennessee 
land  question  was  revived  from  time  to  time  by  both  Polk  and 
"Davy"  Crockett,  and  it  was  one  of  the  rocks  on  which  the 
Jackson  party  in  Tennessee  split  into  fragments. 

Questions  less  local  in  character  soon  presented  themselves. 
All  of  Jackson 's  supporters  asserted,  and  doubtless  many  of  them 
believed,  that  their  hero  had  been  virtually,  even  if  not  legally, 
cheated  out  of  the  Presidency  in  1824  by  "bargain  and  corrup- 
tion" on  the  part  of  Adams  and  Clay.  The  well-known  fact  that 
the  House  of  Representatives,  whenever  it  might  be  called  upon 
to  select  the  chief  magistrate,  was  intended  by  the  Constitution  to 


2  Printed  copy  of  the  resolutions  in  Colo7iel  JVm.  Folk  Papers. 

3  "You  cannot  be  too  industrious,"  wTote  one  of  his  constituents  a  year 
later,  ' '  in  endeavoring  to  effect  the  object  contemplated  in  3'our  Report 
of  the  last  session  on  the  subject  of  those  govr  n  nient  lands.  To  get  this 
matter  through  'is  a  consumation  devoutly  to  be  wished'  for  it  will  in  a 
great  measure  disarm  the  opposition."  The  writer  told  Polk  that  the 
press  did  not  tell  the  people  very  much  about  his  work  in  Congress,  and 
he  advised  Polk  to  send  personal  communications  to  many  friends  to  coun- 
teract any  assertions  by  enemies  that  he  is  inefficient.  He  also  urged 
Polk  to  make  a  ' '  thundering  speach ' '  against  Haynes '  bankrupt  bill. 
"I  do  not  know  what  your  sentiments  are  on  this  subject  but  I  think  I 
know  what  your  interest  is"  (Jim  R.  White  to  Polk,  Dec.  30,  1826,  Polk 
Papers). 

*  Megister  of  Debates,  19  Cong.,  1  sess.,  1075-1077. 


OPPOSITION  MEMBER  OF  CONGRESS  13 

liave  a  free  choice,  irrespective  of  the  poi)uhir  vote,  did  not  in 
the  least  appease  their  wrath.  They  resolved  at  once  on  two  lines 
of  policy— to  alter  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  in  order 
to  deprive  the  House  of  the  privilege  of  choosing  a  President  in 
any  case,  and  in  the  meantime  to  make  it  as  uncomfortable  as 
possible  for  the  one  who  had  been  so  chosen.  It  is  not  easy  to 
determine  the  degree  of  their  sincerity  in  the  first  part  of  their 
program,  but  in  the  second  part  they  were  in  deadly  earnest. 

The  first  move  toward  altering  the  Constitution  was  made 
by  McDuffie,  of  South  Carolina.  On  December  9,  1825,  he  offered 
resolutions  which  were  referred  to  the  Committee  of  the  Whole 
House.  His  resolutions  declared  that  the  Constitution  ought  to 
be  so  amended  that  in  electing  the  President  and  Vice-President 
of  the  United  States  "a  uniform  system  of  voting  by  Districts 
shall  be  established  in  all  the  States,"  and  in  no  case  should  the 
choice  of  these  officers  devolve  upon  the  respective  houses  of 
Congress.  The  resolutions  provided  also  that  the  subject  should 
be  referred  to  a  select  committee  "with  instructions  to  prepare 
and  report  a  joint  resolution  embracing  the  aforesaid  objects."^ 
On  December  29,  Cook,  of  Illinois,  offered  resolutions  nuieh  like 
those  of  McDuffie,  but  providing  in  addition  that  the  voters  in 
the  districts  should  vote  directly  for  both  officers.  If  by  employ- 
ing this  method  no  election  resulted,  the  choice  should  "be  made 
by  States"  from  the  two  highest  on  the  list.''  The  last  part  was 
not  clear,  for  it  did  not  specify  the  manner  in  which  the  states 
should  make  the  choice. 

The  resolutions  of  McDufifie  and  Cook  caused  considerable 
debate,  and  afforded  an  opportunity  for  others  to  air  their  views 
on  constitutional  questions.  Some  thought  that  the  people  were 
already  intrusted  with  more  power  than  they  could  use  with  intel- 
ligence, while  others  vigorously  expounded  the  doctrine  of  vox 
popiili  vox  dei.    McDuffie  was  not,  he  said, ' '  one  of  those  visionary 

5  Register  of  Debates,  19  Cong.,  1  sess.,  797. 

6  Ibid.,  866. 


14  JAMES  K.  POLE 

advocates  of  the  abstract  rights  of  man,  that  would  extend  the 
power  of  the  people  further  than  is -conducive  to  the  happiness 
of  the  political  society. ' '  Patriotic  intentions,  he  admitted,  would 
furnish  no  adequate  security  for  the  wise  selection  of  a  chief 
magistrate,  in  the  absence  of  sufficient  intelligence.  ''It  would 
be  a  vain  and  delusive  mockery,  to  invest  them  with  an  elective 
power,  which  they  could  exercise  to  the  destruction  of  that  which 
is  the  end  of  all  government — the  national  good."'  Although 
McDuffie  himself  believed  that  the  people  were  sufficiently  intel- 
ligent to  make  a  proper  choice,  the  conservatives  could  not  be 
convinced  that  he  was  not  playing  with  fire. 

Polk  spoke  to  the  resolutions  on  March  13,  1826.^  He  apolo- 
gized for  departing  from  his  usual  custom  of  giving  a  "silent 
vote,"  and  for  extending  a  debate  already  prolonged.  But  as 
the  subject  was  national  in  scope  and  vital  in  character,  he  could 
no  longer  remain  silent.  He  attempted  no  flights  of  oratory,  but 
he  displayed  at  once  more  than  ordinary  ability  as  a  debater. 
His  remarks  were  clear  and  incisive,  both  in  declaring  his  own 
views  and  in  refuting  the  arguments  of  others.  Jefferson  him- 
self never  gave  more  unqualified  endorsement  to  the  doctrine  of 
majority  rule.  The  resolutions  involved,  said  Polk,  the  question 
of  the  people's  sovereignty.  ''That  this  is  a  Government  hased 
upon  the  ivill  of  the  People;  that  all  pmver  emanates  from  them; 
and  that  a  majority  should  rule;  are,  as  I  conceive,  vital  prin- 
ciples in  this  Government,  never  to  be  sacrificed  or  abandoned, 
under  any  circumstances."  In  theory,  all  "sound  politicians" 
admit  that  "the  majority  should  rule  and  the  minority  submit," 
but  the  majority,  in  his  opinion,  did  not  always  prevail  under 
the  existing  system  of  elections. 

In  his  zeal  for  the  popular  cause  Polk  attempted  to  refute  an 
assertion  made  by  Storrs,  of  New  York,  that  it  was  not  intended 
by   tlie   framers   of   the   Constitution   to   intrust   the   choice    of 


7  Feb.  16,  1826.    Abridg.  of  Debates,  VIII,  992. 

8  Abridg.  of  Debates,  IX,  8-16. 


I  "  OPPOSITION  MEMBER  OF  CONGRESS  15 

^\  urdent  and  Vice-President  to  direct  popular  vote.  He  made  the 
rather  astonishing  statement  that,  if  Storrs  were  right,  "I  am 
free  to  admit  that  I  have  been  wholly  mistaken,  and  totally 
wrong,  in  my  conceptions  upon  this  subject."  With  a  shade  of 
sophistry  he  held  that  it  was  not  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the 
people,  having  ' '  recently  broken  the  chains  of  their  slavery,  and 
shaken  off  a  foreign  yoke,"  should  in  drafting  their  Constitution 
have  voluntarily  disfranchised  themselves.  In  spite  of  well- 
known  facts  to  the  contrary,  he  tried  to  prove  his  contention  by 
(juoting  parts  of  the  preamble,^  and  rather  unsuccessfully  from 
the  Federalist,  Randolph,  and  Monroe,  to  show  that  election  by 
the  people  had  been  intended  by  those  who  framed  the  Constitu- 
tion. He  was  on  surer  ground  when  he  asserted  that  it  mattered 
little  whether  Storrs  were  right  or  wrong,  inasmuch  as  the  ques- 
tion before  them  did  not  concern  elections  under  the  present 
provisions  of  the  Constitution  but  an  amendment  for  changing 
the  present  metliod  of  selecting  a  President. 

In  Polk's  opinion,  there  were  several  good  reasons  why  the 
President  should  never  be  chosen  by  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives. He  is  not  an  officer  of  the  House.  He  is  the  chief  magis- 
trate of  the  whole  people  and  should  therefore  be  responsible  to 
them  alone,  and  dependent  upon  them  for  reelection.  Election 
either  by  the  House  or  the  Electoral  College  always  makes  choice 
by  a  minority  possible,  and  there  is  danger  that  such  elections 
will  become  more  frequent.  Representatives  are  chosen  a  long 
time  before,  and  not  for  the  purpose  of  selecting  a  President. 
A  Representative  maj^  be  ignorant  of  the  wishes  of  his  con- 
stituents, or  he  may  willfully  ignore  their  preference.  The  long 
period  between  the  election  of  Representatives  and  their  choice 
of  a  President  affords  ample  time  to  influence  their  votes  by 
bribery  or  by  executive  patronage. 

Election  by  districts,  as  proposed  in  the  resolutions,  was,  Polk 
believed,  better  than  a  continuation  of  the  present  sj'stem  under 


9  "We,  the  People  etc.  do  ordain  and  establish  this  Constitution." 


16  JAMES   K.   POLK 

which  some  electors  were  chosen  by  state  legislatures,  others  by 
districts,  thereby  making  it  possible  for  one-fourth  of  the  people 
to  elect  a  President.  But  he  concurred  with  Livingston,  of 
Louisiana,^"  who  preferred  to  dispense  with  electors  altogether. 
"Let  the  people  vote  directly  for  the  President  without  their 
intervention  ..."  then  "...  there  can  be  no  division  between 
contending  candidates  for  elector,  in  favor  of  the  same  candidate, 
and  the  majority  of  the  people  of  each  district  can  control  and 
give  the  vote  of  that  district  .  .  .  the  sentiment  of  each  mass  of 
the  community  throughout  the  Union,  composing  a  district,  is 
fairly  elicited,  and  made  to  have  its  due  and  proportional  weight 
in  the  general  collected  sentiment  of  all  the  districts  in  the 
Union." 

Although  he  offered  no  resolution  embodying  his  ideas  he 
suggested  one^^  for  the  committee's  consideration.  His  sugges- 
tions were  more  explicit  and  covered  the  ground  more  completely 
than  the  resolutions  already  before  the  House.  Some  of  his 
arguments  on  this  subject  were  partisan  and  sophistical ;  but 
in  no  case  did  he  indulge  in  such  absurdities  as  did  one  of  his 
opponents,  Edward  Everett,  who  tried  to  convince  his  fellow- 
members  that  any  attempt  to  amend  the  Constitution  was  itself 
unconstitutional.  Each  member,  said  the  sage  from  Massachu- 
setts, had  taken  an  oath  to  support  the  Constitution  as  it  is, 
and  could  not  propose  to  alter  it  without  violating  that  oath.^- 
Neither  George  III  nor  John  Tyler  could  plead  a  more  tender 
conscience  nor  display  a  greater  respect  for  oaths  of  office  than 
Everett  did  on  this  occasion.  No  wonder  Polk  asked  if  "the 
gentleman  [were]  serious  in  this  puerile  conception?" 


10  McDuffie  favored  this  also. 

11  Each  state  was  to  be  divided  into  as  many  districts  as  it  had  members 
in  both  houses  of  Congress.  The  people  in  each  district  were  to  vote 
directly  for  President  and  Vice-President,  'without  the  intervention  of 
electors,  and  a  plurality  in  each  district  was  to  count  as  one  vote.  If  no 
election  should  result,  the  matter  was  to  be  referred  back  to  the  people, 
who  Avere  then  to  select  from  the  tAvo  highest  on  the  list  (Abridg.  of  Debates, 
IX,  16). 

i^lbid.,  18. 


OPPOSITION  MEMBER   OF  CONGRESS  17 

In  attempting  to  show  that  members  of  the  House  were  not 
the  proi)er  persons  to  ek'ct  a  President,  Polk  supported  the  ex- 
treme demoeratie  view  whieh  would  divest  a  member  of  Congress, 
even  as  a  legislator,  of  his  representative  character  and  make 
him  a  mere  delegate.  "It  has  been  openly  avowed  upon  this 
floor,"  said  he,  "that  there  is  no  connection  between  the  Repre- 
sentative here,  and  his  constituent  at  home ;  that  the  Representa- 
tive here  is  not  bound  to  regard  or  obey  the  instructions  of  those 
who  send  him  here.  For  myself,  I  have  never  entertained  such 
opinions,  but  believe,  upon  all  questions  of  expediency,  that  the 
Representative  is  bound  to  regard  and  obey  the  known  will  of 
his  constituent."  Any  other  view  would  intrust  the  rights  of 
the  people  to  "the  accidental  interest,  or  capricious  will  of  their 
public  servants."  He  no  doubt  had  Jefferson's  inaugural  in 
mind  when  he  added :  ' '  Shall  we  assume  to  ourselves  the  high 
prerogative  of  being  uncontaminated  and  incorruptible,  when 
the  same  attributes  are  denied  to  all  the  rest  of  mankind?  Is 
immaculate  purity  to  be  found  within  these  walls  and  no  other 
corner  of  the  earth?"  Whether  representatives  endowed  with 
"immaculate  purity"  or  "angels  in  the  form  of  kings "'^  can 
be  intrusted  with  the  government  of  their  fellows  may  be  open 
to  question,  but  both  Jefferson  and  Polk  must  have  known  that 
the  framers  of  the  Constitution  had  consciously  placed  more 
reliance  on  the  discretion  of  the  public  officials  than  on  the  efficacy 
of  a  count  of  heads. 

A  remark  made  by  Everett  gave  Polk  an  opportunity  to  pay 
tribute  to  General  Jackson  as  the  champion  of  the  people.  If  the 
government  were  ever  destroyed,  said  Everett,  "it  would  not  be 
by  a  President  elected  by  a  minority  of  the  people,  but  by  a 
President  elected  by  an  overwhelming  majority  of  the  people ;  by 
some  'military  chieftain'  that  should  arise  in  the  land."  "Yes, 
sir,"  answered  Polk,  "by  some  'military  chieftain,'  whose  only 
crime  it  was  to  have  served  his  country  faithfully  at  a  period 


i:^See  Jeflferson 's  inaugural  address. 


18  JAMES  E.  POLK 

when  that  country  needed  and  realized  the  value  of  his  services." 
If  the  government  were  ever  destroyed,  it  would  be,  in  his  opinion, 
by  "the  encroachments  and  abuse  of  power  and  by  the  alluring 
and  corrupting  influence  of  Executive  patronage."  This  was 
intended,  of  course,  as  a  thrust  at  President  Adams ;  but  in  lend- 
ing his  support  to  the  elevation  of  the  ' '  old  hero, ' '  Polk  was  help- 
ing to  hasten  the  demoralizing  influence  of  patronage  which  he 
so  much  feared. 

Some  of  the  northern  members  objected  to  the  proposed 
amendment  on  the  ground  that  under  it  slaves  would  be  repre- 
sented. During  his  whole  political  career,  slavery  was  a  subject 
which  Polk  avoided  whenever  possible.  It  is  interesting  to  note, 
however,  that  his  opinions  now  expressed  for  the  first  time  in 
Congress  were  never  substantially  modified.  He  regretted  ex- 
ceedingly "that  scarcely  any  subject  of  general  concern  can  be 
agitated  here,  without  having  this  important  subject  of  slavery, 
either  collaterally,  or  incidentally,  brought  into  view,  and  made 
to  mingle  in  our  deliberations."  His  views  now  expressed  were 
reiterated  in  substance  when  he  had  to  deal  with  the  Wilmot 
Proviso.  Both  now  and  later  he  was  unable  to  see  why  this 
irrelevant  topic  should  be  dragged  into  discussions  of  public 
policy. 

In  answering  his  opponents  Polk  declared  his  firm  belief  in 
state  rights.  Storrs  and  others  had  alleged  that  the  proposed 
amendment  would  tend  to  consolidate  the  people  of  the  Union. 
Polk  denied  this  and  said  that  he  would  oppose  the  amendment 
if  he  had  any  idea  that  it  would  produce  any  such  result.  "No 
man,"  said  he,  "deprecates  more  than  I  do,  any  violation  of 
rights  secured  to  the  States  by  the  Federal  Constitution,"  and 
no  one  more  fears  "the  yawning  gulf  of  consolidation.'"^' 

Polk  always  referred  to  himself  as  a  Republican,  but  it  is 
plain  that  he  was  not  a  believer  in  true  representative  govern- 


14  "When  1  speak  of  State  rights,  T  mean,  as  I  understand  the  consti- 
tution to  mean,  not  the  rights  of  the  Executives  of  the  States,  hut  1  mean 
the  rights  of  the  people  of  the  States. ' ' 


OPPOSITION  MEMBEE  OF  CONGEESS  19 

mont,  and  was  in  fact  a  democrat.'''  His  remarks  show  clearly 
the  influence  of  Jefiferson's  teaching.  He  was  an  admirer  of  Gen- 
eral Jackson,  and  used  his  influence  botli  publicly  and  privately'" 
to  promote  the  General's  interests,  but  there  is  no  evidence  that 
he  relied  on  Jackson  for  political  opinions.  On  the  contrary, 
Jackson  read  with  approval  Polk's  speech  on  the  constitutional 
amendment  and  assured  him  that  it  was  well  received  by  his 
constituents  and  would  give  him  a  strong  claim  to  their  future 
confidence.  "I  agree  with  you,"  wrote  the  General,'^  "that  the 
District  System  is  the  true  meaning  of  the  Constitution,  but  as 
this  cannot  be  obtained  any  uniform  System  ought  to  be  adopted 
instead  of  leaving  the  election  of  President  to  Congress." 

As  a  critic  of  the  Adams  administration  Polk  did  not  rise 
above  the  political  claptrap  of  the  day.  All  that  can  be  said  in 
his  favor  in  this  respect  is  that  he  spoke  less  frequently  than 
did  some  of  his  colleagues.  Even  his  private  letters  are  tinctured 
with  a  bias  and  a  bitterness  that  do  him  no  credit.  A  letter 
written  to  Colonel  William  Polk  concerning  the  subserviency  of 
the  Speaker  and  of  congressional  committees  is  of  special  interest, 
for  in  it  Polk  makes  the  same  charges  which  w^ere  later  made 
against  himself  when  he  became  the  leader  of  the  administration 
forces.  "The  'factious  opposition'  as  they  are  termed,"  said 
the  letter/^ 

Avho  really  consist  of  the  friends  of  the  Constitution,  &  who  do  not  support 
upon  the  fashionable  doctrine  of  faith  every  measure  emanatinjr  from  the 
administration,  merely  because  it  is  an  administration  measure,  are  to  tlie 
extent  of  the  poAver  of  the  administration,  and  its  friends  literally 
proscribed. ' ' 

Senate  committees  have  been  "arranged  for  effect,"  although 
there  is  but  a  small  administrative  majority  in  that  body. 


15  There  was,  of  course,  no  Democrat  party  at  this  time. 

ic  For  example,  in  a  letter  to  Colonel  William  Polk,  Dec.  14,  1826,  he 
urged  the  latter  to  induce  the  legislature  of  North  Carolina  to  give  some 
public  expression  in  favor  of  Jackson  on  January  8  {Colonel  tf'm.  Polk 
Papers). 

17  Jackson  to  Polk,  May  3,  1826,  Polk  Papers. 

18  Polk  to  Col.  Wm.  Poik,  Dec.  14,  1826,  Colonel  Wm.  Polk  Papers. 


20  JAMES  K.  POLE 

"Studied  majorities  in  favor  of  the  administration  have  been  placed  on 
each,  regardless,  it  would  seem  in  some  instances,  of  qualifications,  talents, 
or  experience.  The  selections  were  no  doubt  made,  in  conformity  to  a 
previous  secret  understanding,  among  the  favorites  at  Court. ' ' 

In  the  House,  also,  ' '  some  remarkable  changes  have  been  made  in 
committees  by  the  Speaker.  They  too  have  all  been  arranged  for 
effect."  The  power  of  patronage,  he  continued,  is  corruptly  used 
to  "sustain  an  administration,  who  never  came  into  power  by 
the  voice  of  the  people. ' '  How  could  a  man  who  felt  thus,  within 
three  short  years,  give  his  unqualified  support  to  the  administra- 
tion of  General  Jackson?  The  answer  is  simple.  Polk  was, 
despite  his  ability  and  generally  sound  judgment,  above  all  a 
party  man. 

At  the  close  of  his  first  term  in  Congress,  Polk,  in  his  appeal 
to  his  constituents  for  reelection,  laid  special  stress  on  .his  oppo- 
sition to  the  Panama  mission.  Soon  after  taking  his  seat,  he 
said  it  became  his  duty  to  act  upon  a  proposition  emanating  from 
the  executive,  "as  novel  in  its  character  as  it  was  believed  to  be 
in  consequences. '  '^^  -  Not  believing  in  entangling  alliances,  ' '  I 
was  opposed  to  the  Mission  in  every  possible  shape  in  which  it 
could  be  presented,  believing,  as  I  did,  that  the  United  States  had 
nothing  to  gain,  but  much  to  lose,  by  becoming  members  of  such 
an  extraordinary  Assembly. ' '  The  administration,  lacking  popu- 
larity, was  trying  to  extend  the  powers  of  the  federal  government 
"to  an  inordinate  and  alarming  extent  .  .  .  and  substitute 
patronage  for  public  will."  He  was  reelected  without  difficulty 
and  was,  at  the  beginning  of  the  next  session  of  Congress,  made 
a  member  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs. -° 

Throughout  the  Adams  administration  Polk  corresponded  with 
General  Jackson.  He  not  only  supplied  the  hero  of  the  Her- 
mitage with  information  on  passing  events,  but  offered  welcome 
suggestions  and  advice.     "I  feel  greatly  obliged  to  you,"  wrote 


I'J  Polk's    circular   letter   to    his    constituents,    dated    March    4,    1827, 
Printed  copy  in  Colonel  Wm.  Polk  Papers. 
^0  Jour,  of  n.  E.,  20  Cong.,  1  sess.,  25. 


OPPOSITION  MEMBER  OF  CONGEE SS  21 

Jackson  on  one  occasion,-^  "for  the  information  contained  in 
your  letter  [on  internal  improvements]  .  .  .  and  I  trnly  appre- 
ciate those  feelings  of  friendship  which  dictated  the  communi- 
cation. ' ' 

When,  in  the  spring  of  1828,  the  subject  of  Jackson's  execu- 
tion of  the  six  militia  men  was  under  investigation  in  Congress, 
Polk  and  Judge  White  procured  and  published  a  statement  from 
General  Gaines  and  a  co])y  of  Governor  Blount's  orders  to  Jack- 
son." It  was  Polk  who  first  notified  Jackson  of  his  vindication 
by  a  committee,  and  it  was  to  Polk  that  the  General  forwarded 
additional  documents  to  be  used  in  case  it  should  become  neces- 
sary.-^ Jackson  approved  Polk's  advice  that  the  attack  of  the 
opposition  relating  to  this  subject  should  be  met  by  an  active  cam- 
paign of  refutation,  but  that  there  should  be  no  defense  on  the 
Burr  episode  until  there  had  been  some  definite  charge.-*  To 
another  letter  from  Polk  ofifering  advice  on  political  matters, 
Jackson  answered :  "I  have  read  your  letter  with  great  interest 
&  attention — the  reasons  therein  contained  leaves  no  reason  to 
doubt  of  the  correctness  of  your  conclusions,  it  is  such  as  I  had 
long  since  concluded  to  pursue. '  '-^  It  is  evident  that  the  General 
already  recognized  the  soundness  of  Polk's  judgment  and  his 
shrewedness  as  a  practical  politician. 

During  the  session  of  1828-29  the  Tennessee  land  bill  again 
became  the  subject  of  animated  discussion  in  the  House.  When 
he  first  introduced  it,  in  1825,  Polk  had  the  unanimous  support 
of  the  people  of  Tennessee,  and  of  the  entire  delegation  in  Con- 
gress from  that  state.     But  it  now  met  with  opposition  from  an 


21  Jackson  to  Polk,  Dec.  4,  1826,  Polk  Papers. 

22  Polk  to  Jackson,  April  13  and  15,  1828,  Jackson  Papers. 

23  Jackson  to  Polk,  March  23,  1828,  Polk  Papers. 

2-1  The  six  militia  men  are  made  a  hobby  by  the  opposition,  said  Jack- 
son, by  which  they  "can  impose  upon  the  credulity  of  the  ignorant.  .  .  . 
The  plan  there  that  you  have  suggested  is  the  only  one  that  can  fairly 
meet,  and  effectively  put  down  their  hobby."  "I  think  your  reflections 
on  the  Burr  business  is  correct,  no  defence,  without  a  charge ' '  (Jackson 
to  Polk,  May  3,  1828,  ibid.). 

25  Jackson  to  Polk,  Sept.  16,  1828,  ibid. 


22  JAMES   E.   POLK 

unexpected  quarter — an  opposition  wliieh  resulted  in  a  bitter 
political  feud.  The  eccentric  David  Crockett,  for  reasons  best 
known  to  himself,  had  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  "waste" 
lands,  instead  of  being  sold  at  a  higher  price  for  the  support  of 
schools,  should  be  given  or  sold  at  a  nominal  price  to  poor  settlers. 
He  therefore  offered  an  amendment  to  effect  this  purpose,  and 
thus  assumed  the  role  of  champion  of  the  poor,  as  opposed  to 
the  rich  who,  as  he  said,  could  alone  afford  to  take  advantage  of 
schools.  Whatever  his  motives  may  have  been,  his  opposition 
to  a  bill  which  he  had  ardently  supported  at  the  last  sgssion  was 
at  once  attributed  to  the  influence  of  Jackson 's  political  enemies. 
The  Tennessee  delegation,  wrote  Polk,-"  were  mortified  to  think 
that  Crockett  ' '  should  have  cooperated  with  some  of  our  bitterest 
and  most  vindictive  political  enemies,  men,  some  of  them  of 
'coffin  hand  bill'  and  'six  militia  men'  memory,  and  joined  them 
in  denouncing  the  Legislature  of  his  state  on  the  floor  of  Con- 
gress."  Gales  and  other  "Adamsites, "  Polk  continued,  are  urg- 
ing him  on  and  reporting  speeches  that  he  never  made,  while  he, 
it  is  said,  will  vote  for  Gales  and  Seaton  for  public  printers  and 
against  Duff  Green.  They  are  making  a  tool  of  Crockett  in  order 
to  deal  a  blow  at  Tennessee.  Other  members  of  the  Tennessee 
delegation,  said  Polk,  will  furnish  evidence  against  Crockett,  but 
prefer  not  to  do  so,  because  the  people  might  regard  such  action 
as  persecution. 

Crockett  differed  from  his  colleagues  not  merely  on  the  land 
question ;  he  opposed,  also  the  attempt  made  by  the  Jackson  party 
to  introduce  viva  voce  voting  in  the  House  so  that  they  might 
brand  the  unfaithful.  Several  members,  including  Polk,  Judge 
White,  R.  Desha,  and  J.  C.  Mitchell  prepared  statements  con- 
cerning the  boasts  and  the  conduct  of  Crockett,  and  addressed 
them  to  Pryor  Lea,  one  of  their  colleagues.  The  statements  were 
based  largely  on  assertions  made  by  Crockett  at  White's  lodgings 
in  the  presence  of  the  men  who  had  i)i'('|)ared  tlicm.     ('rockctt 


20  Polk  to  McMillan,  Jan.  16,  1829,  ibid. 


OPPOSITION  MEMBER  OF  CONGEESS  23 

tlu'iv  produced  his  aineiulinent  ami  boasted  that  it  would  be 
adopted.  When  asked  if  he  were  willing  to  imperil  the  entire 
land  bill  by  insisting  upon  his  amendment,  he  replied  in  the 
atHrmative.  His  constituents,  he  said,  wished  the  land  bill  to 
be  killed,  for  so  long  as  the  land  continued  to  be  property  of 
the  I'nited  States  the  people  might  use  it  free  of  charge.  He 
went  so  far  as  to  avow  that,  regardless  of  his  instructions  from 
the  legislature,  he  would  support  the  measures  of  any  man  who 
would  vote  for  his  amendment.  All  agreed  that  he  had  been 
fraternizing  with  Adams  men  in  an  effort  to  procure  their  votes. 
To  Mitchell,  Crockett  openly  admitted  that  Gales  had  printed — 
under  Crockett's  name — a  speech  which  had  never  been  delivered, 
so  that  the  latter  might  distribute  it  among  his  constituents. 

As  a  result,  it  was  thought,  of  Crockett's  opposition,  the 
House  laid  the  entire  land  bill  on  the  table.  Not  satisfied  with 
his  victory,  however,  the  incorrigible  "Davy,"  after  returning 
to  his  district  in  western  Tennessee,  continued  his  attacks  upon 
his  colleagues.  In  public  addresses  he  told  the  people  that  the 
land  bill,  had  it  passed,  would  have  sacrificed  the  interests  of  the 
poor  settlers.  He  was  especially  enraged  by  what  he  termed 
Polk's  "officious  interference"  in  the  affairs  of  West  Tennessee.-^ 
Apparently,  Polk  retaliated  by  publishing  articles  hostile  to 
Crockett  in  a  local  paper  of  the  latter 's  congressional  district.-^ 

Although  Crockett  did  not  succeed  in  his  efforts  to  obtain 
cheap  land  for  his  constituents,  he  nevertheless  had  the  pleasure 
of  blocking  the  attempt  made  by  his  colleagues  to  procure  school 


2TAdam  E.  Alexander  to  Polk,  April  25;  Polk  to  Alexander,  May  1, 
1829;  ibid. 

28  In  volume  80  of  the  Polk  Papers  is  a  series  of  five  undated  articles 
in  Polk's  handwriting  headed  "Col.  Crockett  &  his  course  in  Congress." 
Thev  are  signed  ' '  Several  voters, ' '  and  as  Crockett  is  spoken  of  as  "  our 
immediate  representative,"  it  is  evident  that  they  were  to  be  understood 
as  coming  from  his  constituents.  They  were  pro])ably  written  for  ].ubli- 
cation  in  some  West  Tennessee  newspaper.  They  point  out  that  Crockett 
had  been  elected  as  a  friend  of  General  Jackson,  but  that  he  has  been 
supporting  the  old  Adams-Clay  party,  "under  the  orders  of  Daniel  Web- 
ster" and  other  Hartford  Convention  Federalists.  He  has  been  absent 
from  duty  in  the  House  and  has  done  "literally  nothing"  for  the  poor 
settlers  of  his  district. 


2i^^  JAMES  K.  POLE 

V  lands  for  their  state.-"  Until  his  defeat  bv  Adam  Huntsman  in 
•^.'^  •  1835  he  remained  in  Congress  and  continued  to  oppose  all  meas- 
ures championed  by  the  followers  of  Jackson.  The  importance  of 
his  defection  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  was  the  first  breach  in  the 
solidarity  of  the  Jackson  party  in  Tennessee.  One  of  the  chief 
critics  of  Crockett's  apostasy  in  1829  was  Judge  White,  a  man 
destined  ere  long  to  become  the  center  of  a  political  storm  that 
would  overthrow  Jackson's  supremacy  in  his  state  and  seriously 
weaken  it  in  the  nation.  For  the  time  being  Crockett  stood  prac- 
'  tically  alone.  Tennesseans  generally  were  proud  to  uphold  the 
standard  of  their  w-arrior  hero. 

As  General  Jackson  entered  the  White  House  the  specter  of 
executive  usurpation  vanished  through  the  window  and  Polk, 
like  other  critics  of  President  Adams,  now  became  a  loyal  sup- 
porter of  executive  policies.  In  a  letter  to  his  constituents,  dated 
February  28,  1829,^°  Polk  congratulated  them  on  the  recent 
political  victory,  and  dwelt  at  length  on  the  significance  of  that 
victory.  The  contest  had  been  "between  the  virtue  and  rights 
of  the  people,  on  the  one  hand  and  the  power  and  patronage  of 
their  rules  [rulers]  on  the  other."  The  people,  said  he,  have 
spoken  with  a  voice  of  warning  to  future  aspirants  who  may  seek 
to  elevate  themselves  by  bargain  and  intrigue.  The  country  is 
still  destined  to  be  divided  into  political  parties,  and  already 
there  is  evidence  that  the  partisans  of  Adams  and  Clay  are  pre- 
paring under  the  leadership  of  the  latter  to  oppose  the  incoming 
administration.  But  Jackson  has  nothing  to  fear  from  his 
enemies.  "  He  is  expected  to  produce  reform,  correct  abuses,  and 
administer  the  Constitution  in  its  purity,  and  upon  Republican 
principles  contemplated  by  its  wise  f ramers. ' '  He  has  been  chosen 
by  the  people,  and  his  administration  will  be  both  prosperous  and 
popular. 


29  By  the  acts  of  1841  and  1846  Congress  finally  granted  these  lands  to 
Tennessee  (Sioussat,  "Some  Phases  of  Tennessee  Politics  in  the  Jackson 
Period,"  Am.  Hist.  Eev.,  1908,  58). 

30  Pamphlet  in  Tenu.  State  Library. 


OPPOSITION  MEMBEE  OF  CONGEESS  25 

Having  pronoiuiewl  .tliis  encomium  on  the  new  regime,  Polk 
reminded  his  constituents  that  he  had  contributed  his  "feeble 
aid"  to  the  Jacksonian  cause  because  he  believed  the  General's 
principles  to  be  orthodox  and  his  purpose  to  be  to  serve  the  whole 
Union.  According  to  others,  however,  the  aid  which  he  had 
contributed  M^as  not  so  feeble  as  his  modesty  had  h'd  liim  to 
assume.  The  Adams  men  in  Tennessee  gave  him  "grate  credit" 
for  compassing  their  mortifying  defeat,  and  resolved,  on  that 
account,  to  defeat  him  if  possible  at  the  next  election.^^ 

Despite  efforts  of  his  enemies  Polk  was  re-elected  by  a  large 
majority.  On  his  return  to  Washington  he  soon  became  leader 
of  the  administration  forces  in  the  House  and,  as  will  appear 
in  the  following  chapter,  aicted  as  Jackson's  aide-de-camp  in 
the  war  on  the  Bank  of  the  United  States.  With  his  customary 
discretion  he  declined  to  join  with  those  who  felt  impelled  to 
give  unsolicited  advice  to  the  President  regarding  his  social  and 
his  executive  duties.  Toward  the  end  of  Jackson 's  first  year  in 
office,  and  after  political  Washington  had  been  arrayed  in  hostile 
camps  by  the  crusade  against  Mrs.  Eaton,^-  certain  members  of 
Congress  met,  by  invitation  of  C.  A.  Wickliffe,  of  Kentucky,  for 
the  purpose  of  discussing  the  situation.  Some  of  those  who 
attended  proposed  that  the  President  should  be  urged  to  remove 
Eaton  from  the  cabinet,  and  that  he  should  be  advised  to  hold 
regular  cabinet  meetings.  When  consulted,  Polk,  White,  Grundy, 
and  other  members  from  Tennessee  declined  to  participate.  They 
even  refused  to  enter  into  a  correspondence  with  Wickliffe  con- 
cerning the  subjects  which  had  been  discussed  at  the  meeting.''^ 
By  thus  declining  to  assume  the  role  of  guardian  over  the  Presi- 
dent, Polk  and  his  associates  retained  his  confidence  and  good 
will.  While  each  did  his  part  in  supporting  Jackson 's  legislative 
program,  Polk,  more  than  any  other,  aided  in  his  war  against 
the  Bank  of  the  United  States. 

31  Yell  to  Polk,  Sept.  9,  1829,  Polk  Papers. 

32  See  Parton,  Life  of  Andrew  Jackson,  III,  chap.  xvii. 

33  Letters  from  Wickliffe  to  White,  Grundy,  Polk  et  ah,  Dec.  24,  1831. 
Also  other  letters  on  this  subject  in  the  Polk  Papers. 


CHAPTEE  III 
POLK  AND  THE  BANK  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

In  the  bank  controversy  of  Jackson's  administration,  which 
Sumner  has  called  "one  of  the  greatest  struggles  between  dem- 
ocracy and  the  money  power, '  '^  Polk  bore  a  i)rominent  and  diffi- 
cult part.  It  was  a  part  which  required  a  thorough  knowledge 
of  the  subject,  alertness  of  mind,  industry,  and  sound  judgment. 
It  required,  also,  an  intimate  knowledge  of  the  plans  and  pur- 
poses of  the  President,  and  a  certainty  on  Jackson's  part  that 
his  confidence  would  not  be  misplaced.  As  this  is  a  biography 
of  Polk,  not  of  Jackson,  no  attempt  will  be  made  to  treat  the 
bank  war  in  all  of  its  phases.  Yet  it  seems  necessary  to  consider 
certain  aspects  of  this  controversy  in  order  to  make  clearer  the 
part  played  by  Polk  as  a  member  of  the  Committee  of  Ways  and 
Means.^ 

It  is  generally  held  by  historians  that  Jackson,  when  he 
became  President  in  1829,  harbored  no  special  hostility  to  the 
Bank  of  the  United  States,  but  that  he  was  later  won  over  by  his 
friends,  who  had  grievances  of  their  own  against  the  bank.  But 
if  Jackson's  memory  may  be  relied  upon,  this  belief  is  contrary 
to  the  facts  in  the  case.  In  1833,  in  reply  to  a  letter  of  inquiry 
from  Polk,  Jackson  stated  that  the  original  draft  of  his  inaugural 
address,  written  at  the  Hermitage,  contained  a  paragraph  giving 
his  views  on  the  bank,  and  another,  his  views  on  surplus  revenue. 
After  he  had  reached  Washington,  he  said,  he  was  persuaded  by 
friends  to  omit  both  of  these  paragraphs,  as  it  was  thought  that 
the  subjects  were  better  suited  to  an  annual  message  to  Congress. 


1  Sumner,  Andrew  Jackson,  227. 

-  The  summary  of  the  beginnings  of  the  bank  war,  unless  otherwise 
noted,  is  drawn  largely  from  Sumner. 


POLK  AND   THE  BANK  OF   THE    UNITED   STATES  27 

"Every  one  knows,"  lie  added,  "tliat  I  have  been  always  opposed 
to  tlie  U.  States  Bank,  nay  all  Banks.  "^ 

In  his  first  annual  message  Jackson  questioned  both  the  con- 
stitutionality and  the  expediency  of  the  existing  bank,  and 
vaguely  suggested  the  desirability  of  a  bank  "founded  on  the 
credit  of  the  government  and.  its  revenues."  This  i)art  of  the 
message  was  referred  by  each  house  to  a  regular  committee.  In 
the  Senate,  Smith,  of  Maryland,  reported  from  the  Connnittee 
on  Finance  in  favor  of  the  bank.  In  the  House,  April  13,  1830, 
^McDuflfie,  of  South  Carolina,  reported  from  the  Committee  of 
Ways  and  Means,  also  in  favor  of  the  bank.  McDuffie  declared 
that  the  constitutionality  of  the  bank  had  already  been  settled 
by  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court,  that  its  expediency  was 
beyond  question,  and  that  a  bank  modeled  on  the  President's 
suggestions  would  be  both  inexpedient  and  dangerous.  On  May 
10,  the  House,  by  a  vote  of  eighty-nine  to  sixty-six,  tabled  reso- 
lutions which  declared  that  the  House  would  not  consent  to 
renew  the  charter  of  the  bank,  and  on  May  29  it  likewise  tabled 
resolutions  calling  for  a  report  of  the  proceedings  of  the  bank. 
It  was  evident  that  Congress  would  not  support  the  President 
in  his  opposition  to  the  bank.  The  defection  of  McDuffie,  who 
had  taken  a  leading  part  in  the  attack  of  the  Jackson  forces  on 
the  Adams  administration,  made  it  necessary  for  the  President, 
when  the  time  came  for  forcing  the  bank  question  to  an  issue,  to 
look  elsewhere  for  a  leader  on  whom  he  could  rely. 

In  his  message  for  1830,  Jackson  again  proposed  a  bank  as 
a  "branch  of  the  Treasury  Department."  This  seemed  to  indi- 
cate a  desire  for  something  like  the  sub-treasury  which  was  later 
recommended  by  President  Van  Buren.  But  Jackson's  sugges- 
tions were  vague  and  Congress  gave  them  little  serious  consid- 
eration. An  attempt  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  in  July,  1831,  to 
remove  the  pension  funds  from  the  New  York  branch  of  the  bank. 


3  Polk    to   Jackson,    Dee.    23,    18.3.3.      Jackson's    reply    is    undated    and 
written  on  the  back  of  Polk's  letter  {Folic  Papers). 


28  JAMES  K.   POLK 

met  witli  opposition  and  failure.  By  the  end  of  1831  the  Presi- 
dent's message  was  more  pacific  in  tone,  and  the  report  of  his 
Secretary,  McLane,  even  spoke  in  favor  of  the  bank. 

The  tone  of  the  message  only  encouraged  his  political  oppon- 
ents, who  were  already  making  plans  for  the  next  Presidential 
election.  The  bank  took  the  initiative  by  addressing  a  memorial 
to  Congress,  asking  that  the  bank  be  rechartered.  On  January  9, 
1832,  this  memorial  was  presented  in  the  Senate  by  Dallas  and 
in  the  House  by  McDuffie,  both  "bank  Democrats."*  The  com- 
mittees of  the  two  houses  to  which  the  subject  was  referred  both 
reported  in  favor  of  a  new  charter,  but  with  certain  modifications. 
The  Jackson  supporters  now  determined  to  fight  a  recharter  with 
every  possible  weapon  and  demanded  a  searching  investigation  of 
the  bank's  conduct.  On  February  23,  Clayton,  of  Georgia,  pre- 
sented a  motion  in  the  House  asking  for  the  appointment  of  a 
select  committee  to  conduct  the  investigation.  Technical  objec- 
tions were  raised  by  friends  of  the  bank,  but  Polk  met  their 
objections  point  by  point  and  defeated  them  with  their  own 
weapons.^  In  a  speech  delivered  on  this  occasion,  Polk  con- 
demned the  bank  for  having  the  audacity  to  ask  for  a  charter 
and  then  trying  to  prevent  an  investigation.  The  inference  to 
be  drawn  from  such  shrinking  from  scrutiny,  said  he,  was  that 
there  was  something  "rotten  in  the  state  of  Denmark."  In  justi- 
fication of  his  motion  for  a  select  committee,  Clayton  presented 
two  lists  of  charges,  which  had  been  prepared  for  the  purpose 
by  Benton.®  The  first  specified  seven  instances  of  charter  viola- 
tion, involving  forfeiture ;  the  second  gave  fifteen  instances  of 
abuse,  which  required  correction,  though  not  involving  forfeiture. 
The  investigating  committee  which  the  Speaker  selected  sub- 
mitted three  reports  (that  of  the  majority  unfavorable  to  the 
bank),  but  our  present  purpose  does  not  warrant  a  discussion  of 
either  the  reports  or  the  charges. 


4  Register  of  Debates,  22  Cong.,  1  sess.,  54. 

fi  Benton,  Thirty  Years  View,  I,  236. 

c  Ibid.,  237.     Tlie  charges  are  jiiveii  on  the  next  page. 


POLK  AND   THE  BANK  OF   THE    UNITED   STATES  29 

In  the  Presidential  campaign  of  1832,  Clay,  seeing  the  avail- 
ability of  the  bank  (juestion,  made  it  a  leading  issue.  In  so  doing 
he  acted  contrary  to  the  better  judgment  of  many  friends  of  the 
bank,  including  its  president,  Nicholas  Biddle.  A  bill  passed 
Congress,  providing  for  a  recharter  of  the  bank,  and  Jackson 
must  now  either  admit  defeat  or  kill  the  bill  by  his  veto.  He 
accepted  the  challenge,  vetoed  the  bill,  and  appealed  to  the  people 
to  sustain  him.  He  was  reelected  by  a  large  majority.  Jackson's 
triumi)li  at  the  polls  was  not  in  reality  an  endorsement  of  his 
veto,  but  he  so  regarded  it  and  resolved  to  exterminate  the 
' '  monster. ' ' 

When  the  bank  question  first  became  prominent,  the  opinions 
of  the  administration  party  were  not  yet  clearly  defined.  This 
party  ' '  was  still  only  that  group  of  factions  which  had  united  in 
opposition  to  Adams.""  A  large  number  of  Jackson's  most 
enthusiastic  supporters  were  friends  of  the  bank.  Some  of  the 
political  leaders,  including  Van  Buren,  had  even  signed  petitions 
for  the  establishment  of  branch'  banks.  Many  politicians,  as  Niles 
said,  had  to  "turn  a  short  corner,"  when  Jackson  came  out 
against  the  bank.  More  independent  spirits,  like  McDuffie, 
refused  to  see  the  light  and  braved  the  executive  wrath.  Opposi- 
tion in  Congress  made  Jackson  only  the  more  determined  to  wage 
a  relentless  war  upon  the  "corrupt  institution,"  but  his  success 
would  depend,  to  a  considerable  degree,  on  the  orthodoxy  and 
ability  of  the  leaders  of  the  administration  forces  in  that  body. 
Obviously  the  administration  program  could  not  be  intrusted  to 
the  recently  converted,  whose  past  record  would  surely  be  held 
up  to  embarrass  them.  The  fight  must  be  led  by  those  whose 
record  was  unassailable.  Such  was  James  K.  Polk,  of  Tennessee, 
the  friend  and  neighbor  of  the  President.  He  gave  to  the  admin- 
istration his  unqualified  support,  and,  to  quote  his  eulogist,*  ' '  in 

"!  Sumner,  Andrew  Jackson,  248. 

8  Eulogy  delivered  at  the  time  of  Polk's  death,  by  L.  M.  Smith,  New- 
man, Ga.  {Papers  of  Mrs.  Polk,  I). 


30  JAMES  K.  POLK 

the  hour  of  darkness  and  danger,  was  unquestionably  its  chief 
reliance. ' ' 

When  Congress  convened  in  December,  1832,  Polk  was  trans- 
ferred from  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  to  the  Committee 
of  Ways  and  Means.  A  confidential  letter  written  by  Jackson 
to  Polk  on  December  16  discloses  the  temper  of  the  President 
as  well  as  the  intimate  relations  of  the  two  men: 

The  president  with  his  respects  to  Col.  J.  K.  Polk,  of  Congress,  encloses 
him  a  note  from  Mr.  Page  of  Philadelphia,  a  man  of  high  character  & 
in  whom  confidence  may  be  placed.  This  is  done  to  add  to  the  information 
heretofore  given  the  Col.  to  show  him  that  the  hydra  of  corruption  is  only 
scotched,  not  dead,  and  that  the  intent  is  thro'  Wolf's  recommendation, 
to  destroy  the  vote  of  the  people  lately  given  at  the  ballot  boxes  &  to 
rally  around  the  recharter  the  present  Session  of  Congress  two  thirds.  .  .  . 
Call  upon  the  Sec.  of  the  Treasury  who  must  agree  with  me  that  an  investi- 
gation by  Congress  is  absolutely  necessary. 

A  postscript  instructed  Polk  to  have  Sullivan,  a  government 
director,  brought  before  the  committee,  and  ended  with  a  per- 
emptory order  "Attend  to  this.""  Polk  did  "attend"  to  it,  and 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  seems  to  have  been  persuaded  that 
an  investigation  was  necessary. 

Though  Jackson  in  his  annual  message,  December  4,  1832, 
informed  Congress  that  the  report  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  "will  exhibit  the  national  finances  in  a  highly  pros- 
perous state,"  nevertheless  he  advised  the  sale  of  all  corporation 
(bank)  stocks  held  by  the  government.  He  also  urged  that  the 
safety  of  public  deposits  in  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  was 
worthy  of  "serious  investigation"  by  Congress.  In  response  to 
these  suggestions,  the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means,  of  Avhich 
Polk  was  a  member,  undertook  an  investigation  of  the  charges 
which  had  been  brought  against  the  bank.  The  directors  were 
summoned  to  Washington  and  examined  upon  oath,^°  and  other 
testimony  was  taken  to  supplement  the  information  which  had 


0  Polk  Papers. 

10  Dcm.  liev..  May,  1838. 


POLK  AND  THE  BANK  OF   THE    UNITED   STATES  31 

been  gatlierod  by  tlic  President.  Reuben  M.  Whitney,  tlie  i)olit- 
ical  scavenger  of  tlie  administration,  wrote  to  Polk  from  P>a]ti- 
niore,  Fel)ruary  9,  1833,  urging  liini  to  liaslcii  llic  investigation, 
and  warning  him  tliat  Adams  and  Sergeant  had  been  consulting 
with  members  of  the  committee.  On  February  11  Whitney 
wrote  from  Philadelphia  advising  Polk  that  the  bank  relied  much 
on  the  ability  of  Verplanck'^  to  outgeneral  his  opponents  on 
the  committee.  While  the  investigation  was  in  progress,  Polk,  on 
February  13,  reported  a  bill  to  sell  the  bank  stock  owned  by  the 
government,  but  it  failed  in  the  House  by  a  vote  of  one  hundred 
and  two  to  ninety-one.  On  March  1,  Verplanck,  for  the  majority 
of  the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means,  reported  the  bank  to  be 
sound  and  the  public  deposits  safe,  although  it  was  admitted  that 
in  interfering  with  the  plan  of  the  government  to  pay  off  the 
three  per  cent  securities  the  bank  had  exceeded  its  lawful  powers. 
This  report  was  adopted  by  the  House.  The  Globe  charged  the 
majority  with  forcing  the  adoption  of  its  report  without  having 
considered  or  presented  the  evidence  which  had  been  collected 
by  its  minority  members.  Many  members,  it  said,  who  were  not 
in  favor  of  the  bank  had  voted  for  adoption  because,  on  the  show- 
ing of  the  majority  report,  they  could  not  conscientiously  say 
that  the  bank  was  not  safe^~  Anticipating  the  character  of  the 
majority  report,  Polk  prepared  and  submitted  a  minority  report 
for  himself  and  two  other  members  of  the  connnittee.  After 
criticizing  the  majority  of  the  House  for  wishing  to  force  the 
adoption  without  adequate  consideration  of  evidence,  and  inti- 
mating with  some  justice  that  the  committee  had  passed  lightly 
over  certain  damaging  testimony,  Polk  went  with  considerable 
detail  into  the  question  of  the  "three  per  cents."  These  were 
securities  bearing  three  per  cent  interest  issued  by  the  government 

11  Chairman  of  Ways  and  Means  Committee  and  a  friend  of  the  bank. 
Whitney  urged  Polk  to  see  that  Gilmore,  another  member  of  the  committee, 
should  not  be  tampered  with.  A^erplanck,  he  said,  was  not  to  be  trusted 
and  should  not  be  permitted  to  have  access  to  the  testimony  already 
taken,  unless  accompanied  by  "one  of  our  friends"  (Polk  Papers). 

12  Washington  Globe.  March  6,  1833. 


32  JAMES   K.  POLE 

in  1792  for  accrued  interest  on  the  Eevolntionary  debt.  The 
government  had  decided  to  pay  off  about  $6,500,000  of  these,  and 
on  March  24,  1832,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  notified  the 
bank  of  his  intention  to  pay  this  amount  on  the  first  of  July. 
Biddle  requested  the  government  to  postpone  payment  until 
October  1  and  agreed  to  reimburse  the  treasury  for  the  extra 
three  months'  interest.  To  this  the  government  agreed.  When 
asking  for  postponement,  Biddle  based  his  request  largely  on  two 
special  reasons,  neither  of  which  implied  that  the  bank  wished  any 
accommodation  for  itself.  The  assigned  reasons  were :  ( 1 )  that 
$9,000,000  of  duty  bonds  would  be  payable  on  July  1,  and  mer- 
chants would  be  inconvenienced  should  the  three  per  cent  debt 
also  fall  due  on  that  date;  (2)  should  the  much  feared  cholera 
appear,  business  would  be  deranged,  and  if,  in  addition,  the  bank 
should  have  to  call  in  its  money  loaned  to  merchants,  in  order 
to  pay  off  the  three  per  cents,  great  distress  would  result. 

The  government  having  agreed  to  delay  payment,  the  bank 
made  secret  but  unsuccessful  attempts-  to  arrange  wuth  Thomas 
W.  Ludlow,  New  York  agent  of  foreign  holders,  to  postpone  pay- 
ment of  part  of  this  debt.  It  then  sent  General  Cadwallader,  a 
director  of  the  bank,  to  Europe.  He  made  an  agreement  with 
Baring  Brothers  &  Co.,  of  London,  by  which  the  Barings  were 
to  arrange  with  certificate  holders  to  postpone  payment  for  one 
year.  The  Barings  were  to  pay  all  holders  who  were  unwilling 
to  wait  and  themselves  to  assume  the  debt  to  that  amount.  As 
a  result  of  Cadwallader 's  agreement  adjustments  were  made  to 
the  extent  of  nearly  five  million  dollars.  Every  effort  was  made 
to  keep  the  transaction  a  secret,  but  it  leaked  out,  and  an  account 
of  it  was  published  in  a  New  York  paper.  Biddle  then  dis- 
avowed the  arrangement. 

In  his  minority  report  Polk  showed  conclusively  that  the  real 
reasons  for  the  bank's  desire  for  postponement  could  not  have 
been  those  assigned  by  its  president.  He  gave  a  very  clear 
analysis  of  the  evidence  which  had  been  collected  by  the  committee 


POLE  AXD  THE  BANK  OF   TEH  VNITED  STATES 


33 


urI  i.uuk-  it  plniu  tluit  (!..•  bank  had  no  intention  o£  applying  any 
„£  its  money  to  the  purpose  for  which  it  had  said  it  desired  these 
funds.  He  reached  the  inevitable  conclusion  that  the  bank  had 
desired  postponement  because  of  its  own  weakness. 

In  his  entire  report,  but  especially  in  his  arraignment  of 
Biddle    Polk  displayed  those  <iualities  which  ever  distinguished 
him  in'  debate,  and  which  fully  justified  the  confidence  reposed 
in  him  bv  General  Jaekson.    His  preparation  was  exhaustive  and 
his  arguments  clear  cut  and  logical.     His  language  was  well 
chosen  and  dignified,  but  at  the  same  time  scathing  and  merci- 
less    "When  the  President  of  the  Bank,"  said  Polk,  '  not  only 
induces  the  board  to  act  for  reasons  unknown  to  themselves,  but 
conceals  even  from  the  committees  acts  done  in  their  names  some- 
thing  stronger  than  doubt  almost  seizes  on  the  mmd.    When,  to 
the  consideration  that  the  committees  know  little  of  tlie  proceed- 
ings had  in  their  names,  is  added  the  fact  that  every  Government 
director  is  excluded  from  even  that  little,  by  being  excluded  from 
every  committee,  the  Government  at  least  has  grounds  to  doubt 
whether  its  interests  ar6  safe  in  such  keeping.    When  a  show  of 
the  strength  of  the  Bank  is  made,  consisting  of  sums  in  specie 
and  amounts  in  exchange,  while  the  debts  are  secretly  contracted 
which  have  enabled  the  Bank  to  accumulate  these  funds,  ar 
concealed  even  from  those  who  make  the  exhibition,  there  is  just 
ground  to  doubt  whether  there  be  soundness  m  the  msti  nt  on, 
or  proper  precaution  and  responsibility  in  its  management. 

When,  in  the  spring  of  1832,  Benton  prepared  his  catalogue 
of  charges  against  the  bank  for  Clayton  to  present  in  the  House 
he  strained  his  imagination  in  order  to  make  his  list  as  long  and 
as  formidable  as  possible.  Such  a  course  may  have  been  eft  etne 
for  campaign  purposes,  but  many  of  Benton's  charges  were  easily 
Iwn  to  be  exaggerated  or  unfounded.  For  this  reason  his  a  - 
raignment  lost  force  and  failed  to  convince  the  doubtful  Po  k, 
on  «ic  contrary,  confined  his  denunciation  to  points  on  which  the 
.sjeporls  of  CommUtm  23  Cong.,  2  sess.,  No.  121. 


34  JAMES  K.  POLK 

bank  could  offer  no  legitimate  defense  of  its  eondnet.  His  argu- 
ments were  then,  and  are  today,  unassailable.^*  Polk  well  knew 
that  neither  his  report  nor  his  arguments  on  the  floor  would  have 
much  weight  in  the  House,  as  a  majority  of  the  members  w^ere 
resolved  to  stand  by  the  bank  in  spite  of  its  faults.  He  was 
speaking  to  a  wider  audience  and  may  have  been  already  seeking 
popular  support  for  the  imj^ending  executive  assault  on  the  bank. 
However  this  may  have  been,  he  significantly  pointed  out  that 
the  institution  might  be  reached  by  the  executive  without  any 
assistance  from  Congress.  "Whether  the  existing  facts,"  said 
Polk  in  his  report, 

are  sufficient  to  justify  the  Executive  in  taking  any  steps  against  the 
Bank,  authorized  by  its  charter,  is  a  matter  for  the  decision  of  the  proper 
officers,  acting  upon  their  own  views  and  responsibility:  any  opinions  by 
Congress  can  make  it  neither  more  nor  less  their  duty  to  act.  Whatever, 
therefore,  the  opinions  of  the  members  of  this  committee  might  be  as  to 
the  justice  or  policy  of  any  Executive  action,  they  deem  it  unauthorized 
and  improper  to  express  them  officially. 

In  other  words,  it  was  for  the  executive  alone  to  determine 
whether  the  bank  had  violated  its  charter  or  had  been  guilty  of 
mismanagement,  and,  if  so,  to  apply  the  remedy. 

Whether,  at  the  time  Polk  made  his  report,  Jackson  had  re- 
solved upon  a  removal  of  the  deposits  from  the  bank  as  a  proper 
remedy,  we  are  unable  to  say.^^  If  he  had,  Polk,  who  was  cer- 
tainly in  his  confidence,  was  doubtless  aware  of  the  fact.  Polk's 
remarks  on  executive  responsibility  and  his  indifference  to  the 
opinions  of  Congress  seem  to  indicate  that  such  was  the  case. 
He  may  even  have  suggested  removal  of  the  deposits  to  the  Presi- 
dent, but  of  tliis  there  seems  to  be  no  direct  evidence.     It  is 


14  "Its  facts  and  reasonings,"  said  the  Glohe  (March  6,  1833),  "are 
perfectly  irresistible.  Jt  exposes  the  subterfuges  and  self -contradicted 
testimony  under  which  that  corrupt  and  corrupting  institution  has  shel- 
tered itself,  in  a  manner  so  clear  and  convincing,  that  it  must  satisfy 
every  honest  man  who  reads  it,  of  the  utter  profligacy  of  its  management.' ' 

13  To  quote  Sumner  on  this  point:  "Lewis  says  that  he  does  not  know 
who  first  proposed  the  removal  of  the  deposits,  but  that  it  began  to  be 
talked  of  in  the  inner  administration  circlej3  soon  after  Jackson's  second 
election"  (Sumner,  Jackson,  297). 


POLK  AND  THE  BANK  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES  3a 

Avorth}'  of  note,  however,  tliat  the  well-kiiown  paper  of  September 
18,  1833,  in  whieh  Jackson  announced  to  his  cabinet  his  intention 
to  remove  the  deposits,  makes  use  of  many  of  the  same  facts  and 
employs  much  the  same  reasoning  that  Polk  had  already  used 
in  his  minority  report. 

The  minority  report  arrayed  against  its  author  all  the  power 
and  the  venom  of  the  bank  party,  and  measures  were  taken  to 
prevent  his  reelection  to  Congress.  Friends  of  the  bank  held  a 
meeting  at  Nashville  and  denounced  his  report.  He  was  accused 
of  destroying  credit  in  the  West  by  proclaiming  that  the  people 
were  unworthy  of  mercantile  confidence.  Handbills  signed 
"Muhlenging"  were  circulated,  alleging  that  Polk  as  a  member 
of  Congress  had  been  opposed  to  pensioning  Revolutionary  sol- 
diers.^*' Polk  met  the  issue  squarely  as  a  foe  of  the  bank,  and 
during  the  campaign  stress  was  laid  on  the  bank  affiliations  of 
Bradford,  his  opponent.  Under  the  circumstances,  Polk's  suc- 
cess or  defeat  was  regarded  as  of  more  than  local  importance. 
"Your  friends  here,"  wrote  Douelson  from  Washington,  "take 
a  deep  interest  in  your  election  and  are  all  well  apprised  of  the 
instruments  which  are  employed  to  defeat  you.  "^^  Donelson 
showed  his  own  interest  by  inclosing  in  his  letter  evidence  to  be 
used  against  Bradford.  In  1827  Bradford  had  applied  to  Adams 
for  an  appointment  as  marshall.  His  friends  had  sent  letters  of 
recommendation  representing  him  to  be  a  friend  of  Adams  and 
an  opponent  of  Jackson.  From  the  files  in  the  State  Department, 
without  the  knowledge  of  the  Secretary,  Donelson  had  copied 
extracts,  and  now  sent  them  to  Polk,  to  be  used  at  his  discretion 
so  long  as  Donelson 's  name  was  not  mentioned.  A  speech  made 
by  Bradford  in  the  Tennessee  Senate  in  1831,  in  favor  of  rechar- 
tering  the  bank,  was  also  reprinted  and  circulated  among  his  con- 
stituents. It  was  a  spirited  contest,  but  Polk  was  reelected  by  a 
majority  of  over  three  thousand  votes. 


16  Dem.  Bev.,  May,  1838.    Polk's  "Circular  Letter"  to  his  constituents. 

17  A.  J.  Donelson  to  Polk,  May  30,  1833,  Polk  Papers.  The  letter  was 
marked  "Private  and  for  your  eye  alone."  There  is  nothing  to  indicate 
whether  Jackson  was  cognizant  of  Donelson 's  act. 


36  JAMES  K.  FOLK 

As  soon  as  he  was  safely  elected,  Polk,  with  the  assistance  of 
Cave  Johnson,  began  a  quiet  campaign  for  the  Speakership.^^ 
He  received  encouragement  from  his  political  friends,  but  the 
expected  vacancy^ ^  did  not  occur  and  he  continued  his  labors 
as  a  floor  member. 

The  adoption  by  Congress  of  Verplanck's  report  did  not  in 
the  least  alter  Jackson's  opinion  of  the  character  of  the  bank. 
On  August  31,  1833,  he-°  sent  Polk  a  confidential  letter  in  which 
he  inclosed  a  report  of  the  bank  directors.  Polk  was  authorized 
to  use  the  facts  contained  in  the  report,  but  not  to  divulge  that 
they  had  come  from  the  President.  Jackson  regarded  these  facts 
as  proof  positive  that  Biddle  had  been  using  the  people's  money 
for  purposes  of  corruption. 

By  September  Jackson  was  ready  to  carry  into  effect  his  plan 
to  deprive  the  bank  of  the  use  of  government  money.  Duane 
had  in  May  succeeded  McLane  in  the  Treasury  Department  and 
was  expected  to  do  the  bidding  of  the  President.  On  September 
18,  Jackson  read  to  his  cabinet  the  well-known  paper  in  which 
he  asserted  that  the  deposits  ought  to  be  removed.  Among  the 
reasons  assigned  for  the  proposed  action  were  the  political  activ- 
ities of  the  bank,  its  attempt  to  postpone  payment  of  the  three 
per  cents,  and  the  fact  that  it  had  come  into  existence  by  an  un- 
constitutional law.  He  would  not,  he  said,  dictate  to  the  Secre- 
tary, but  the  President  himself,  assuming  all  responsibility,  had 


i«  This  subject  will  be  considered  at  length  in  another  place. 

19  Stevenson  was  expected  to  accept  a  foreign  mission  and  not  be  a 
candidate  for  reelection.     He  resigned  later  for  this  purpose. 

20  The  signature  is  cut  off,  but  the  letter  is  in  Jackson  's  unmistakable 
hand.  He  says:  "You  will  find  from  the  inclosed  that  I  have  at  last 
thro  the  Government  Directors  got  a  Small  peep  into  their  expense  account, 
and  the  corruption  on  the  morals  of  the  people. 

"in  two  years  $80  odd  thousand  expended  to  corrupt  the  people  &  buy 
a  recharter  of  that  mamoth  of  corrujjtion.  \  think  when  these  scenes  of 
corruption  are  made  known  to  the  people  and  that  by  an  order  of  the 
board  of  directors,  the  whole  funds  of  the  Bank  are  ])laced  at  the  disposal 
of  Mr.  Biddle  to  approjiriate  as  he  pleases  [cut  out  with  signature]  most 
bold  specious  of  corruption  ever  i)racticed  by  any  body  of  people  in  the 
most  corrupt  governments"  {PolJc  Papers). 


FOLK  AND  THE  BANK  OF   THE    UNITED  STATES  37 

decided  that,  after  October  1,  government  money  should  no  longer 
be  deposited  in  the  bank,  and  that  all  money  there  on  that  date 
should  be  drawn  out  as  needed.  Duane  declined  to  give  the  neces- 
sary order  to  effect  Jackson's  purpose  and  later  refused  to  resign. 
He  was  dismissed  and  Attorney  General  Taney  commissioned  to 
take  liis  place,  September  23,  1833."^  Taney  gave  the  order,  and 
the  "hydra  of  corruption"  was  at  last  more  than  "scotched." 

Jackson's  high-handed  act  produced  much  excitement  through- 
out the  country.  The  bank  issued  a  paper--  in  reply  to  the  Presi- 
dent's  charges,  and  a  bitter  conflict  was  inevitable  as  soon  as 
Congress  should  assemble.  ' '  At  such  a  crisis  it  became  important 
to  have  at  the  head  of  the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means  a  man 
of  courage  to  meet,  and  firmness  to  sustain,  the  formidable  shock. 
Such  a  man  was  found  in  Mr.  Polk,  and  he  proved  himself  e(iual 
to  the  occasion."-^ 

Congress  met  on  December  2,  1833,  and,  as  a  result  of  the 
recent  election,  the  administration  forces  w^ere  in  unequivocal 
control  of  the  House.  Jackson's  message,  dealing  among  other 
topics  with  his  removal  of  the  deposits,  and  accompanied  by  a 
report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  on  the  same  subject,  was 
sent  to  Congress  on  the  third  of  December.  A  contest  at  once 
arose  over  the  reference  of  both  message  and  report.  Friends 
of  the  bank  wished  them  referred  to  the  Committee  of  the  Whole 
House,  wdiere  the  enormity  of  the  President's  conduct  might  be 
discussed  without  limit.  The  Jackson  supporters,  on  the  other 
hand,  wanted  them  referred  to  the  Committee  of  Ways  and 
Means,  of  which  Polk  had  recently  been  made  chairman.  On 
the  tenth,  McDuffie  succeeded  in  carrying  a  resolution  to  refer 
Taney's  report  to  the  Committee  of  the  Whole.  On  the  eleventh, 
Clay,  of  Alabama,  presented  a  resolution  to  refer  that  part  of 
the  President's  message  relating  to  finance  to  the  Committee  of 
Ways  and  Means,  but  to  this  McDuffie  and  others  offered  vigorous 

21  Mosher,  Executive  Begister,  113. 

22  Niles'  Beg.,  XLV,  248.  =3  Dem.  Eev.,  May,  1838. 


38  JAMES  E.  POLE 

objections.  On  the  same  day,  Polk  moved  a  reconsideration  of 
the  vote  which  had  referred  Taney's  report  to  the  Committee  of 
the  Whole,  and  he  was  at  once  accused  by  the  opposition  of  aim- 
ing to  have  it  referred  to  his  own  committee  so  that  he  could 
smother  the  question.  Chilton,  of  Kentucky,  who  was  especially 
opposed  to  a  reconsideration,  did  not  wish  to  see  "the  whole 
weight  of  this  massive  Goveriiment  imposed  on  the  shoulders  of 
his  friend  from  Tennessee,"'^  and  urged  that  the  question  ought 
to  be  left  with  the  larger  committee  so  that  all  might  discuss  it. 

Discussion  was  the  last  thing  which  Polk  desired,  and  prece- 
dent supported  his  contention  that  the  reference  made  under 
McDuffie's  resolution  had  been  entirely  irregular.  Never  before, 
he  said,  had  a  great  subject  of  national  policy  been  referred,  in 
the  first  instance,  to  the  Committee  of  the  Whole  on  the  state  of 
the  Union.  The  course  M^hich  he  advocated  was  simply  the  usual 
one.  In  the  argument  Polk  was  the  equal  of  any  of  his  opponents. 
When  they  told  him  that  the  Secretary's  reasons  had  been  stated 
in  his  report,  thereby  making  investigation  by  a  committee  un- 
necessary, Polk  replied  that  the  report  contained  various  state- 
ments of  fact  which  might  involve  the  bank's  charter,  and  that 
these  facts  should  be  carefully  investigated.  He  also  reminded 
them  of  their  assertions  that  the  state  banks  in  which  the  Presi- 
dent had  deposited  public  money  were  unsafe,  and  that  the  public 
faith  had  been  violated.  "Is  it  not  proper,  then,  for  a  committee 
of  the  House  to  inquire  by  which  party  the  contract  was  vio- 
lated ?"^^  After  much  discussion  the  House,  on  December  17, 
decided,  by  a  yea  and  nay  vote  of  one  hundred  and  twenty-four 
to  one  hundred  and  two,  to  reconsider  its  vote  on  McDuffie's 
resolution. 

Having  won  on  the  question  of  reconsideration,  Polk  now 
fulfilled  Chilton's  prophecy  by  moving  that  Taney's  report  be 


24  Cong.  Globe,  23  Cong.,  1  sess.,  24.  All  arguments  made  in  the  House, 
unless  otherwise  noted,  are  taken  from  the  Globe,  and  may  be  found  under 
dates  mentioned  in  the  text. 

25  Ibid.,  p.  25,  Dec.  12,  1833. 


POLK  AND   THE  BANK  OF   TEE   UNITED   STATES  39 

roforred  to  the  Committee  of  Ways  and  ]\Ieans.  McDuffie  im- 
mediately moved  that  Polk's  committee  be  instructed  to  "report 
a  joint  resolution  providing  that  the  public  revenue  hereafter 
collected  be  deposited  in  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  in  con- 
formity with  the  public  faith  pledged  in  the  charter  of  the  said 
bank."  It  is  not  at. all  likely  that  McDuffie  expected  his  motion 
to  earr>',  but  he  gained  what  was  doubtless  his  main  object — an 
opportunity  for  a  discussion  of  all  phases  of  the  question.  This 
move  on  the  part  of  the  opposition  brought  from  the  President 
a  letter  instructing  Polk  to  make  a  short  reply  and  then  to  call 
for  the  previous  question ;-"  but  two  long  months  of  debate  had 
yet  to  elapse  before  Polk's  committee  would  be  able  to  consider 
the  Secretary's  report,  unhampered  by  annoying  instructions. 

Binney,  of  Pennsylvania,  interrupted  the  discussion  on  De- 
cember 18  by  presenting  a  memorial  from  the  bank.  The  sub- 
stance of  this  document  was  a  declaration  that  the  bank  was 
entitled  to  the  deposits  unless  Congress  should  decide  otherwise. 
On  Polk's  motion,  the  memorial  was  referred  to  his  committee. 
On  the  same  day,  Chilton  moved  to  instruct  the  Committee  of 
Ways  and  Means  to  report  a  joint  resolution  directing  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Treasury  to  restore  the  deposits  to  the  bank,  but,  on 
the  request  of  McDuffie,  this  motion  was  withdrawn. 

On  the  main  question  of  referring  the  Secretary's  report  with 
instructions  to  Polk's  committee,  McDuffie  made  the  opening 
speech  (December  19).  The  gist  of  his  remarks  was  that  re- 
moval of  the  deposits  was  illegal  because  the  President  had 
usurped  authority  in  performing  it.  Even  the  President,  he 
said,  had  admitted  that  the  authority  rested  with  the  Secretary, 
and,  if  so,  Jackson  could  not  lawfully  assume  it.  On  December 
30,  Polk  replied  in  defense  of  the  administration.  As  usual  he 
had  thoroughly  prepared  himself  for  his  task.  He  was  ready 
with  authorities  and  precedents  to  support  his  own  contentions 
as  well  as  to  refute  those  of  his  opponents.     So  thorough  and 


26  Jackson  to  Polk,  Dec.  18,  1833,  Polk  Papers. 


40  JAMES  K.  FOLK 

inclusive  was  his  array  of  facts  and  arguments  that,  although 
the  debate  lasted  nearly  two  months  longer,  there  was  little  for 
any  other  administration  member  to  add.  Every  opposition  mem- 
ber who  spoke  to  the  question  devoted  most  of  his  time  to  an- 
swering the  arguments  of  Polk.  He  was  regarded  by  all  as  the 
chief  supporter,  in  the  House,  of  the  President  and  his  policies. 
Jackson  himself,  on  his  next  visit  to  Tennessee,  told  the  people 
of  Nashville  that  "Polk  for  the  hard  service  done  in  the  cause 
deserves  a  Medal  from  the  American  people. ' '-' 

So  far  as  a  reference  of  Taney's  report  to  the  Committee  of 
Ways  and  Means,  as  well  as  the  attempt  to  instruct  that  com- 
mittee, were  concerned,  Polk  showed  without  difficulty  that  the 
opposition  members  were  clearly  in  the  wrong.  The  memorial  of 
the  bank  setting  forth  its  grievances,  and  likewise  the  charges  of 
the  government  directors  against  the  bank,  had,  after  full  delib- 
eration, been  referred  by  the  House  to  the  Committee  of  Ways 
and  Means ;  there  was  consequently  no  good  reason  why  the  Sec- 
retary's  report  should  not  be  sent  to  the  same  committee.  Polk 
intimated  that  the  real  reason  for  this  attempt  to  interrupt  the 
normal  procedure  was  the  desire  of  his  opponents  to  "flood  the 
country  with  inflammatory  speeches,"  telling  the  people  that 
panic  must  result  from  the  removal  of  the  deposits.  Should  the 
committee  be  compelled,  said  Polk,  to  act  under  the  instructions 
proposed  by  McDufifie,  it  would  be  prejudging  the  question; 
investigation  would  be  superfluous,  and  a  report  made  under 
such  instructions  would  be  absurd.  The  task  of  justifying  the 
arbitrary  conduct  of  the  President  was  more  difficult.  By  manj^ 
Polk's  argument  on  this  subject  may  not  be  regarded  as  convinc- 
ing.-**    But  wiiether  Jackson  had  acted  witliin  liis  I'iglits  or  had 


27  Eobert  M.  Burton  to  Polk,  Aug.  27,  1834,  Folk  Fapers.  Polk's  speec-h 
may  be  found  in  Cong.  Deb.,  X,  2. 

28  When  Polk  was  a  candidate  for  the  Presidency,  the  National  Intel- 
ligencer (Sept.  21,  1844)  said:  "Throughout  the  whole  of  Mr.  Polk's 
course  in  Congress  in  relation  to  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  there  was 
exhibited  a  zeal  not  only  without  knowledge,  but  often,  we  must  think, 
against  conviction." 


FOLK  AND  THE  BANK   OF   THE    UNITED   STATES  -tl 

been  guilty  of  gross  usurpation,  no  one  could  have  defended  his 
course  more  ably  than  did  the  chairman  of  the  Committee  of 
Ways  and  Means.  A  slightly  new  turn  was  given  to  the  dis- 
cussion by  the  motion  of  Jones,  January  14,  1834,  to  substitute 
instructions  for  those  submitted  by  McDuffie.  McDuffie's  in- 
structions, as  Polk  had  pointed  out,  prejudged  the  whole  ques- 
tion, and  were  mandatory  as  to  the  findings  of  the  committee. 
Those  now  offered  by  Jones  simply  instructed  the  committee  to 
"inquire  into  the  expediency  of  depositing  the  revenues  here- 
after collected,"  not  in  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  but  in 
state  banks. -^  It  was  now  a  question  of  compulsory  restoration 
of  the  deposits,  on  the  one  hand ;  on  the  other,  discretion  for  the 
committee  as  to  its  findings,  after  the  expediency  of  deposit  in 
state  banks  had  been  investigated. 

While  the  question  of  reference  with  instructions  w^as  being 
debated,  memorials  from  groups  of  individuals,  some  for  and 
some  opposed  to  the  bank,  were  sent  to  the  House.  One  came 
from  the  Maine  legislature,  upholding  Jackson  and  pronouncing 
the  bank  unconstitutional.  Efforts  were  made  to  refer  some  of 
the  memorials  to  select  committees,  but,  usually,  on  Polk's  motion, 
they  were  all  sent  to  the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means.  Polk 
and  his  committee  were  therefore  the  objects  of  much  criticism 
and  even  abuse.  The  sole  purpose  of  both  Taney  and  Polk, 
according  to  Binney,  was  to  sustain  the  administration,  without 
thought  of  the  country's  welfare.  Polk's  object  in  wishing  to 
get  possession  of  Taney's  report,  in  the  opinion  of  ]Moore.  of 
Virginia,  was  to  stifle  debate,  to  put  the  stamp  of  approval  on 
the  report,  and  then  to  send  it  forth  to  deceive  the  people  and 
prejudice  them  against  the  bank.  A  motion  made  by  Hubbard 
to  refer  to  Polk's  committee  the  President's  message  on  the  re- 


29  On  February  19,  Mardis,  of  Alabama,  offered  a  resolution,  "That  the 
Committee  of  Ways  and  Means  be  instructed  to  inquire  into  the  expedi- 
ency of  reporting  a  bill  requiring  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to  deposit 
the  public  moneys  of  the  United  States  in  State  banks. ' '  There  was  Tuuch 
debate  on  this  resolution,  but,  as  it  was  later  withdrawn  by  the  mover,  it 
will  not  be  considered  in  the  present  discussion. 


42  JAMES  K.  POLK 

fusal  of  the  bank  to  surrender  its  books  and  papers  as  pension 
agent,  caused  Watmough,  of  Pennsylvania,  to  think  that  "the 
Committee  of  "Ways  and  i\Ieans  have  got  a  voracious  appetite, 
and  seem  desirous  to  devour  all  that  comes  before  the  House." 
It  was  a  question  of  law,  he  said,  and  should  be  referred  to  the 
Judiciary  Committee.  He  was  supported  by  Barringer,  of  North 
Carolina,  who  asserted  that  Polk's  committee  was'trying  to  grasp 
all  important  legislation  so  that  it  might  be  shaped  in  the  ad- 
ministration mold.  But  oppositon  was  futile ;  the  message  went 
Avith  the  memorials  to  appease  the  "voracious  appetite"  of  Polk 
and  his  colleagues.  There,  too,  went  Taney's  report,  the  main 
subject  of  discussion.  On  February  18,  1834,  the  two  months' 
debate  was  closed  by  invoking  the  previous  question,  and  Polk's 
original  motion  (of  December  17,  1833)  to  refer  to  his  own  com- 
mittee Taney's  report  on  the  removal  of  the  deposits  was  at  last 
carried  by  a  yea  and  nay  vote  of  one  hundred  and  thirty  to 
ninety-eight.  All  motions  to  instruct  the  committee  had  already 
been  voted  down,  and  the  House  now  refused  to  hear  new  reso- 
lutions for  this  purpose.  The  victory  of  the  committee  was  com- 
plete, and  it  could  proceed,  unhampered,  to  perform  its  part  in 
the  executive  program.  Polk's  successful  defense  of  the  admin- 
istration brought  him  letters  of  commendation  from  all  parts  of 
the  country,  and  especially  from  his  own  state.  Governor  Carroll 
wrote  from  Nashville  to  compliment  Polk  on  his  "temperate,  able 
and  successful  vindication  of  the  President,"  and  added  that 
"this  is  almost  the  universal  sentiment  here."^"     Polk's  services 


30  Governor  Carroll  to  Polk,  Jan.  23,  1834,  FoR-  Papers.  John  H.  Dew, 
member  of  the  Tennessee  legislature,  wrote  to  Polk,  Jan.  21:  "Your 
argument  in  defence  of  the  Executive  for  the  exercise  of  an  ordinary- 
power,  expressly  conferred  on  him  by  the  Constitution  of  the  U.  S.  and 
fully  sanctioned  by  precedent  &  custom  evinces  a  most  intimate  acquain- 
tance with  the  multifarious  movements  that  have  been  made  upon  the 
great  American  political  Chess  hoard  from  the  organization  of  the  Govern- 
ment to  the  present  Cn'.sw.  You  have  shown  most  incontestibly,  from 
laborious  research  into  public  records  and  documents  that  the  I*resident 
and  liis  Cabinet  have  in  all  things  acted  strictly  within  the  s])here  of  their 
Constitutional  duty  and  rule  of  action."  There  are  many  similar  letters 
among  the  PoUc  Papers. 


FOLK  AND  THE  BANK  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES  43 

as  guide  in  the  proposed  constitutional  convention  of  his  state 
were  eagerly  sought,  and  he  was  much  talked  about  as  a  desirable 
candidate  for  Governor  of  Tennessee,  and  for  Speaker  of  the 
national  House  of  Representatives.  Even  your  enemies  say,  said 
a  letter  from  his  home  town,  that  "you  could  be  elected  for  any- 
thing in  Maury.  "^^ 

Before  the  vote  on  the  reference  of  Taney's  report  had  been 
taken,  the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means  had  already  made  it 
quite  clear  that  nothing  favorable  to  the  bank  might  be  expected 
from  them.  On  February  11,  Polk  reported  for  the  committee 
on  Jackson's  message  against  the  bank — tlie  message  in  Avhich 
the  bank  was  denounced  for  not  surrendering  the  books  and 
money  held  by  it  in  its  capacity  as  pension  agent.-  Polk  fully 
sustained  the  President  and  refuted  every  contention  of  the  bank. 
"The  committee,"  so  read  the  report,  "cannot  condemn,  in  terms 
too  strong,  the  conduct  of  the  bank  in  this  transaction."  He 
reported  a  bill  to  the  effect  that,  in  future,  pensions  should  be 
paid  by  officers  of  the  government,  and  not  left  in  "the  hands  of 
an  irresponsible  corporation." 

By  March  7,  the  committee  was  ready  to  submit  its  opinions 
on  the  removal  of  the  deposits.  These  opinions  were  placed  be- 
fore the  House  on  that  date,  and  it  was  generally  understood 
that  they  had  been  drawn  up  by  the  chairman.  They  held  that 
both  the  removal  of  the  deposits  and  the  placing  of  this  money 
in  state  banks  were  unquestionably  legal.  The  committee  be- 
lieved the  bank  to  be  unconstitutional,  but,  even  if  it  were  not, 
its  conduct  had  been  such  that  it  ought  not  to  be  rechartered, 
and  therefore,  the  deposits  ought  not  to  be  restored.  They  ex- 
pressed full  confidence  in  the  competence  of  state  banks  to  per- 
form all  necessary  services,  for  the  government,  and  revived 
Jefferson's  well-known  arguments  to  prove  that  such  an  institu- 
tion as  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  had  never  been  contem- 


31  T.  H.  Cahal  to  Polk,  Jan.  2,  1834,  Polk  Papers.     Maury  was  Polk  'a 
county. 


44  JAMES  K.   POLK 

plated  by  the  framers  of  the  Constitution.  For  his  own  repu- 
tation, Polk  might  well  have  stopped  here ;  but  he  repeated  the 
arguments  of  the  day  that  "none  can  doubt  the  power  of  the 
bank  to  create  embarrassment,"  and  he  proceeded  to  show  that 
this  had  been  done  by  loaning  money  at  a  given  place  during  one 
month,  and  then  calling  it  in  during  the  next.  Such  action  may, 
indeed,  have  been  within  the  power  of  the  bank,  but  banking 
institutions  seldom  resort  to  that  form  of  amusement.  This  may 
have  been  one  of  the  occasions  noted  by  the  National  Intilli- 
gencer^-  on  which  Polk's  zeal  was  not  supported  by  either 
"knowledge"  or  "conviction. "  However  this  may  be,  Polk  had 
not  been  foinid  wanting  in  liis  defense  of  the  President.  His 
services  as  a  party  leader  of  the  House  were  none  the  less  effi- 
cient because  history  may  pronounce  some  of  his  arguments 
untenable. 

The  House,  on  March  12,  suspended  the  rules  so  that  Polk 
might  have  his  report  made  a  special  order  and  thereby  hasten 
its  adoption.  This  action  was  denounced  by  Adams,  who  said 
that  Polk,  acting  under  royal  prerogative,  would  soon  close  all 
debate  by  the  previous  question  and  deprive  the  minority  of  its 
constitutional  right  of  discussion.  But  Adams  could  not  very 
well  complain,  as  Polk  pointed  out,  because  Adams  himself  had 
voted  for  the  previous  question  when  the  bill  to  recharter  the 
bank  had  been  forced  through  the  House. 

Polk  did  not,  however,  immediately  call  for  the  previous  ques- 
tion, and  his  critics  made  the  most  of  the  opportunity  afforded 
them.  Instead  of  reporting  on  Taney 's  reasons  for  removing  the 
deposits,  said  Wilde,  of  Georgia  (March  19),  the  committee  had 
reported  an  argument — that  the  bank  ought  not  to  be  rechar- 
tered.  They  had  "gone  beyond  the  President  and  the  Secretary, 
in  claiming  power  for  the  Executive."  Harden,  of  Kentucky, 
admired  the  "master-stroke  of  policy"  of  the  committee  in  pro- 
nouncing against  recharter  when  that  question  was  not  before  it, 


32  National  InteUigcnccr,  Sept.  21,  1844.     See  above,  note  28. 


POLK  AND  THE  BANK  OF   THE    UNITED   STATES  45 

but  it  had  given  no  information  except  a  reecho  of  Taney's  report. 
IMcDuffie  criticized  Poll^  for  shutting  off  debate,  but  he  gave  him 
full  credit  for  acting  "with  a  tact  and  skill  and  zeal  worthy  of 
a  better  cause. '  '^^  McDufifie  concluded  his  argument  on  April  4, 
Mason  called  for  the  previous  question,  and  the  debate  on  Polk's 
report  was  closed.  Resolutions  prepared  by  the  committee,  pro- 
viding among  other  things  for  a  select  committee  to  investigate 
the  bank,  were  quickly  adopted.  The  new  committee,  appointed 
by  the  Speaker  on  the  seventh,  repaired  at  once  to  Philadelphia 
whence  Mason,  one  of  its  members,  kept  Polk  informed  of  its 
proceedings  by  confidential  letters.^*^  But  the  bank  refused  to 
submit  its  books  for  examination,  and  the  special  committee  soon 
(May  22)  reported  that  it  had  been  unable  to  perform  the  duty 
assigned  to  it  by  the  House.  While  investigation  thus  ended  in 
failure,  nothing  was  left  undone  which  in  any  way  depended 
upon  the  vigilance  or  activity  of  Polk.  On  June  13,  he  succeeded 
in  sending  to  the  table  two  joint  resolutions  from  the  Senate : 
one,  disapproving  of  the  removal  of  the  deposits;  the  other, 
directing  that  the  deposits  be  restored  to  the  Bank  of  the  United 
States. 

By  adopting  Polk's  report  the  House  had  put  its  stamp  of 
approval  on  the  President's  act  in  removing  the  deposits,  but 
the  question  of  depositing  this  money  in  state  banks  had  still  to 
be  considered.  Jackson's  opponents  had  always  contended  that, 
without  the  authority  of  Congress,  the  President  had  no  right 
to  intrust  public  money  to  such  banks.  On  April  22,  1834,  Polk 
reported  from  his  committee  a  bill  for  regulating  these  state 
deposit  banks.     It  was  based  on  the  report  of  the  Secretary  of 


33  McDuffie  said  he  had  criticized  Jackson  in  the  hope  of  bringing  out 
Jackson's  supporters.  "The  honorable  member  from  Tennessee  did  come 
out  Vjoldly  and  manfully,  took  his  position,  and,  whatever  views  I  may 
entertain  of  his  generalship,  I  am  ready  to  bear  testimony  that  the  position 
which  he  has  assumed  is  the  only  one  he  could  assume,  without  leaving 
unprotected  and  undefended  the  very  part  which  it  was  his  iluty  to  de- 
fend" (April  3,  1834).  I  have  converted  this  into  direct  discourse.  It  is 
reported  indirectly  in  the  Cong.  Globe. 

3-*  Mason  to  Polk,  May  5  and  May  10,  1834,  Polk  Papers. 


46  JAMES  E.  POLK 

the  Treasury.  Adams  (June  7)  attempted  to  filibuster  by  mov- 
ing a  resolution  to  call  on  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to  lay 
before  the  House  the  names  of  officers  and  stockholders  of  such 
banks,  as  well  as  numerous  unimportant  details.  Polk  promptly 
met  this  by  moving  an  amendment  which  required  a  similar 
statement  from  the  Bank  of  the  United  States.  A  request  made 
by  Adams  (June  13)  that  Polk  should  withdraw  his  amendment 
gave  the  latter  an  opportunity,  not  only  to  defend  the  adminis- 
tration, but  to  employ  that  sarcasm  and  scorn  which  ever  made 
him  feared  as  a  debater.  It  was  far  more  necessary,  Polk  be- 
lieved, to  require  information  from  the  old  bank  than  from  the 
new  banks,  because  the  government  was  a  stockholder  as  well 
as  a  depositor  in  the  Bank  of  the  United  States.  It  was  also 
more  necessary,  he  said,  because  that  bank 

harl  set  itself  uj)  iu  autagonistic  position  to  the  Government,  had  de- 
nounced the  Executive  as  a  tyrant,  usurper,  and  despot,  and  more  recently, 
had  denounced  and  insulted  the  representatives  of  the  people,  because  they 
had  sustained  him  in  his  measures.  But,  according  to  the  gentleman,  this 
immaculate  and  inoffensive  Bank  of  the  United  States  must  not  be  looked 
into,  though  the  affairs  of  the  State  banks  must  be  thoroughly  probed.'^ 

Polk's  bill  for  regulating  the  deposits  in  state  banks  passed  the 
House,  June  24,  1834,  by  a  vote  of  one  hundred  and  twelve  to 
ninety,  but  it  was  now  near  the  end  of  the  session  and  the  Senate 
at  its  last  meeting,  June  30,  laid  the  bill  on  the  table.  In  the 
House,  at  least,  the  friends  of  the  bank  had  been  defeated  on 
every  point,  and  the  acts  of  the  President  had  been  fully  vindi- 
cated. The  completeness  of  this  vindication  was  due,  in  no  small 
measure,  to  the  industry  and  vigilance  of  the  chairman  of  the 
Committee  of  Ways  and  Means. 


3"'  Polk  here  read  from  the  National  Gazette  an  article  in  which  the 
bank  directors  had  denounced  Jackson  and  the  House. 


CHAPTER  IV 

POLK-BELL  CONTEST  FOR  THE  SPEAKERSHIP 

During  liis  canvass  for  reelection  to  Congress  in  1833,  Polk 
seems  to  have  decided  to  become  a  candidate  for  the  Speakership 
in  the  event  of  his  success  at  the  polls.  Public  attention  liad 
recently  been  called  to  this  office  by  a  rumor  that  the  Speaker 
of  last  session,  Andrew  Stevenson,  was  to  be  given  a  diplomatic 
api)ointment  and  would  therefore  not  be  a  candidate  for  re- 
election. 

Whether  Polk's  idea  of  becoming  a  candidate  originated  with 
himself  or  was  suggested  to  him  by  friends  is  uncertain.  There 
are  among  his  papers  letters  which  show  that,  soon  after  his 
election  early  in  August,  he  began  to  sound  his  friends  on  the 
subject.  Other  letters  make  it  equally  clear  that  he  was  being 
considered  for  the  office  by  men  who  knew  nothing  of  his  own 
initiative  in  the  matter.  Cave  Johnson,  his  most  intimate  friend, 
aided  him  by  soliciting  the  support  of  their  political  associates. 

His  first  campagn  for  the  Speakership  was  soon  abandoned, 
for  Stevenson  did  not  go  abroad  as  soon  as  had  been  expected. 
However,  his  aspirations  met  with  some  encouragement.  In 
answer  to  a  letter  from  Polk  on  the  subject,  C.  C.  Clay,  of  Ala- 
bama, wrote:  "Should  the  vacancy,  of  which  you  speak,  occur, 
I  know  of  no  other  member,  whose  election  to  fill  it  would  be 
more  agreeable  to  my  own  feelings  than  yours."  On  the  same 
day  Clay  said  in  a  letter  to  Cave  Johnson :  "  I  am  pleased  with 
your  suggestion  of  Polk  as  the  successor  of  Stevenson,  and  hope 
we  may  be  able  so  to  manage,  as  to  effect  the  object."^  A  week 
later  Leavitt,  a  member  from  Ohio,  informed  Polk  of  Stevenson's 


1  Clay  to  Polk,  Aug.  19,  1833;  same  to  Johnson,  same  date,  Polk  Papers. 


48  JAMES  K.  POLE 

rumored  appointment  to  a  foreign  mission.  He  did  not  know, 
he  said,  whether  Polk  had  been  approached,  but  he  hoped  that 
he  would  be  chosen  to  fill  the  vacancy.-  Other  letters  of  similar 
imi)ort  were  received ;  one  from  Cave  Johnson^  said  that  he  had 
been  writing  letters  to  members  of  the  House  in  an  effort  to 
bring  about  concerted  action  in  Polk's  behalf. 

At  this  early  date  Jackson  seems  to  have  taken  no  special 
interest  in  Polk's  political  promotion,  although  he  was  ready  to 
give  it  his  approval.  Having  corresponded  with  the  President 
on  the  subject,  Grundy  informed  Polk*  that  he  had  ''received 
an  answer  from  the  highest  quarter  of  the  most  satisfactory  & 
encouraging  character."  He  advised  Polk  to  induce  his  friends 
to  write  to  members  of  the  House,  but  to  avoid  writing  such 
letters  himself.  James  Walker,  a  brother-in-law  of  Polk,  went 
to  Washington  in  October  in  quest  of  a  mail  contract.  After 
an  interview  with  the  President  in  relation  to  Polk's  aspirations, 
Walker  reported  that  "lie  gives  in  to  them  I  think  decidedly  and 
frankly."^  Jackson  told  Walker  that  some  persons  believed  it 
would  not  "look  very  modest"  to  solicit  the  Speakership  for 
Tennessee,  as  well  as  the  Presidency.  The  President  himself 
ridiculed  this  objection  and  assured  Walker  that  Polk's  election 
would  in  no  respect  embarrass  the  administration.  Walker  got 
the  impression,  however,  that  William  B.  Lewis  was  in  favor  of 
Bell.  Here  may  have  been  the  beginning  of  Polk's  intense  dis- 
like for  Lewis.  Another  interview  with  Jackson  convinced 
Walker  that  the  President  was  not  only  willing  but  eager  to 
have  Polk  chosen  Speaker  of  the  House.  He  was  charmed  with 
the  Vice-President  and  advised  Polk  to  make  it  known  to  Van 
Buren  that  he  would  support  him  for  the  Presidency.'' 


2  H.  H.  Leavitt  to  Tolk,  Aug.  26,  18.*?3,  ibid. 

■■i  Johnson  to  Polk,  Aug.  26,  1833,  ibid. 

•i  Grundy  to  Polk,  Sept.  13,  1833,  ibid. 

5  Walker  to  Polk,  Oct.  22,  1833,  ibid. 

0  Walker  to  Polk,  Nov.  7,  1833,  ibid.  From  Yell,  also,  came  a  letter 
(Dec.  1)  stating  that  in  his  o])inion  Van  Huron  couM  throw  the  Speaker- 
ship to  whom  he  pleased. 


FOLK-BELL  CONTEST  FOE   THE  SPEAEEESHIP  49 

The  tweutj'-tliird  Congress  convened  on  December  2,  1833, 
and  Stevenson  was  reelected  Speaker  on  the  first  ballot — vir- 
tually Avitliout  opposition.  As  Polk's  candidacy  had  been  con- 
tingent npon  Stevenson's  refusal  to  stand  for  reelection  he  ac- 
cepted the  party  program  without  evidence  of  disappointment. 
The  committees  were  announced  on  the  ninth,  with  Polk  at  the 
head  of  the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means— the  appointment 
having  been  made,  it  was  said,  upon  the  suggestion  of  General 
Jackson.  The  chairmanship  of  this  committee  is  an  important 
position  under  normal  conditions.  At  this  time,  when  the  Presi- 
dent was  preparing  for  his  last  and  greatest  contest  with  the 
bank,  it  was  undoubtedly  the  most  responsible  position  in  the 
House.  But  Polk  was  not  the  man  to  shirk  responsibility,  and 
his  success  in  outgeneraling  the  bank  party  soon  demonstrated 
that  the  administrtaion  had  been  fortunate  in  its  choice  of  a 
leader. 

Polk  had  scarcely  accepted  his  new  appointment  when  letters 
came  from  friends  at  home  urging  him  to  become  a  member  of 
the  proposed  Tennessee  constitutional  convention.  "A  great 
number  of  people,"  wrote  James  Walker,'  "will  be  satisfied  in 
no  other  way  than  for  you  to  be  in  the  Convention. 

While  there  seems  to  have  been  a  general  desire  for  Polk's 
services  in  the  convention  and  a  feeling  that  he  of  all  men  in 
the  state  was  best  fitted  to  draft  a  new  constitution,  yet  some, 
even  among  his  friends,  appear  to  have  doubted  his  ability  to 
cope  with  his  new  duties  in  Congress.  His  brother-in-law,  A.  C. 
Hayes,  wrote  from  Columbia,  Tennessee,  that  Polk 's  friends  were 
pleased,  and  his  enemies  mortified,  by  his  elevation  to  the  chair- 
manship of  the  Conunittee  of  Ways  and  Means.  But  he  added : 
''I  have,  however,  heard  it  suggested  by  some  of  your  good 
friends,  that  you  may  not  leave  the  present  congress  with  the 
same  reputation  with  which  you  entered — 'they  fear,  that  there  is 
too  great  weight  of  talent  against  you  on  the  Bank  Question.'  "* 


-  Walker  to  Polk,  Dec.  18,  1833,  Polk  Papers. 
8  Hayes  to  Polk,  Jan.  10,  1834,  ibid. 


50  JAMES   K.  POLK 

Polk  himself  had  no  such  fears,  for  self-confidence  was  one  of 
his  chief  characteristics;  difficulties  never  appalled  him  when 
party  services  were  to  be  performed.  He  was  already  occupied 
with  his  committee  and  therefore  declined  to  serve  in  the  con- 
vention. 

On  June  2,  1834,  Speaker  Stevenson  presented  to  the  House 
his  long  expected  resignation.  On  the  same  day  John  Bell,  of 
Tennessee,  was  chosen  to  succeed  him.  On  the  first  ballot  Polk 
received  forty-two  votes  to  Bell's  thirty.  Both  men  gained  as 
the  balloting  proceeded,  but  Bell's  gains — due  to  accessions  from 
the  anti-Jackson  camp — were  larger  than  those  of  his  rival. 
When  the  tenth  ballot  was  counted  the  tellers  reported  that  Bell 
had  received  one  hundred  and  fourteen  votes — more  than  enough 
to  elect — while  his  nearest  competitor,  Polk,  had  received  but 
seventy-eight. 

The  brief  official  record  of  this  day's  proceedings  which  one 
finds  in  the  Congressional  Globe  gives  not  the  slightest  hint  of 
the  heartburnings  and  bitterness  which  were  associated  with  this 
choice  of  a  Speaker.  From  this  election,  however,  resulted  a 
political  feud  which  split  the  Jackson  party  in  Tennessee,  and 
materially  weakened  it  in  other  states.  From  this  day  forth  Polk 
and  Bell  were  uncompromising  enemies — each  determined  to 
overthrow  the  political  power  of  the  other.  As  the  opponents 
of  the  President  had  helped  to  elect  Bell,  tlie  new  Speaker  was 
forced  to  ally  himself  more  and  more  with  this  element.  His 
endorsement  of  Judge  White's  candidacy  aroused  the  ire  of  the 
President.  Regarding  both  men  as  apostates  and  traitors,  Jack- 
son resolved  to  employ  every  means  at  his  disposal  for  the  purpose 
of  crushing  them.  Polk  profited  much  by  this  new  turn  of  af- 
fairs. He  was  already  fighting  the  battles  of  the  President  in 
the  war  on  the  bank.  He  had  always  enjoyed  the  confidence  and 
good  opinion  of  Jackson  ;  but  Bell's  defection  still  more  identified 
the  Speaker's  rival,  Polk,  with  the  party  of  the  President.  In 
a  greater  degree  than  ever  was  Polk  now  regarded  as  the  adminis- 
tration leader  of  the  House. 


POLK-BELL  CONTEST  FOE   THE  SPEAKEESHIP  51 

The  antecedents  of  the  Speakership  election  and  the  attitude 
of  Polk  and  Bell  toward  adhering  to  a  party  program  are  told 
in  a  statement  prepared,  at  Polk's  request,  by  Cave  Johnson. 
Johnson  Avas,  of  course,  one  of  Polk's  closest  friends,  but  his 
statement  seems  credible  and  is  corroborated  by  the  testimony  of 
other  members  of  the  House.    It  reads  as  follows : 

It  was  supposed  many  months  before  the  vacancy  actually  happened, 
that  it  would  take  place  &  several  individual  friends  of  the  administration 
were  spoken  of  as  suitable  to  fill  the  vacancy,  among  the  number  you  & 
Col.  Bell  were  esteemed  the  most  prominent.  None  seemed  to  doul)t  that 
if  so  many  friends  of  the  administration  were  run,  that  the  election  would 
be  finally  settled  by  the  votes  of  the  opponents  of  the  administration,  who 
would  of  course  cast  their  votes  upon  the  man  least  acceptable  to  the 
President  &  his  friends.  This  was  a  result  the  friends  of  the  administra- 
tion washed  to  evade — and  therefore  it  was  proposed,  that  the  friends  of 
the  administration  should  have  a  meeting  that  the  strength  of  the  several 
candidates  should  be  ascertained,  that  the  strongest  should  be  run  as  the 
candidate  of  the  administration  party  &  the  others  should  yield  their  pre- 
tensions &  support  him.  You  unhesitatingly  determined,  that  you  was 
willing  to  have  the  election  submitted  to  the  friends  of  the  administration 
&  let  them  decide  who  should  be  the  candidate  &  that  you  would  support 
the  man  thus  selected.  You  was  considered  I  believe  finally  by  all  parties 
as  the  administration  candidate  &  so  far  as  I  knew,  heard  or  believe  every 
vote  which  you  received  except  one  was  given  by  the  friends  of  the  admin- 
istration. ...  I  understood,  from  members  who  conversed  with  Col.  Bell 
upon  the  subject  whose  names  I  can  give  if  necessary,  that  he  refused  to 
submit  his  claims  to  the  Speakers  chair  to  the  friends  of  the  President,  & 
in  consequence  of  his  refusal  no  such  meeting  was  holden.  He  received 
the  votes  of  the  opponents  of  the  administration  &  was  elected  by  them 
in  conjunction  with  a  few  votes  received  by  him  among  the  friends  of  the 
administration. 9 

In  a  similar  statement,"  John  McKintry,  of  Alabama,  charged 
Bell  with  having  refused  to  submit  his  claims  to  Jackson 's  friends 
and  with  having  stated  "that  he  did  not  expect  to  be  elected  by 
the  administration  party  in  the  House,  that  he  did  not  expect  to 
get  of  that  party  more  than  25  or  30  votes,  [and]  that  he  was 
supported  by  the  opposition  &  elected  by  them."    McKintry  was 

9  Johnson  to  Polk,  Sept.  12,  1834,  ibid. 

10  McKintry  to  Polk,  Aug.  13,  1834,  ibid.  C.  C.  Clay,  of  Alabama,  in 
a  letter  to  Polk  (Sept.  13)  says  that  Bell  was  generally  considered  to  be 
an  opjjosition  candidate. 


52  JAMES  E.  POLE 

equally  positive  that  Polk  had  readily  consented  to  submit  his 
claims  to  his  party  friends  and  to  abide  by  their  decision. 

Up  to  the  time  that  Bell  became  a  candidate  for  Speaker,  he 
was  considered  to  be  a  loyal  supporter  of  General  Jackson.  He 
was  so  regarded  in  his  own  state  as  well  as  in  the  House  of  Rep- 
resentatives. When  the  rumor  that  Stevenson  would  not  be  a 
candidate  for  reelection  was  first  circulated,  it  will  be  remem- 
bered that  Jackson  was  consulted  as  to  his  attitude  toward  Polk's 
candidacy.  Although  the  President  was  willing  to  give  his  ap- 
proval, he  did  not  appear  to  have  any  special  interest  in  Polk's 
elevation.  There  is  no  evidence  that  the  General,  at  that  time, 
harbored  any  ill  feeling  toward  Bell.  Indeed,  James  Walker 
gathered  from  various  conversations  that  INIajor  Lewis  preferred 
Bell  for  Speaker.  But  Bell's  conduct  during  his  recent  cam- 
paign for  the  office  changed  all  this.  He  was  first  distrusted, 
then  openly  denounced,  by  the  President  and  his  friends. 

Congress  adjourned  shortly  after  the  election  of  a  Speaker, 
and  in  the  final  rush  of  legislation  little  attention  was  given  to 
the  contest  between  the  two  candidates.  It  was  not  apparent  at 
the  time  that  the  controversy  would  have  any  vital  significance 
in  national  politics.  The  first  important  result  of  the  victory 
of  Bell  over  Polk  was  its  effect  upon  the  influence  of  the  two  men 
in  their  home  state. 

For  some  time  past  Polk  had  been  considered  a  desirable 
candidate  for  governor,  and  after  his  defeat  by  Bell  his  friends 
in  Tennessee  renewed  their  offer  to  support  him  for  this  office. 
His  ever  loyal  brother-in-law,  James  Walker,  began  on  his  own 
initiative  to  agitate  Polk's  claims  to  the  office  and  to  assure  him 
of  the  certainty  of  success.  He  informed  Polk^^  that  he  had  not 
lost  prestige  on  account  of  his  recent  defeat,  and  that  he  could 
beat  any  man  in  Tennessee  if  he  would  consent  to  run.  Letters 
offering  support  and  encouragement  came  from  Cave  Johnson 
and  other  party  leaders  of  the  state.     James  Standifer  assured 


11  Walker  to  Polk,  June  30,  1834,  Polk  Papers. 


POLK-BELL  CONTEST  FOB   THE  SPEAKERSHIP  53 

Polk  that  he  had  not  "seen  the  first  man  but  what  says  they 
would  rather  have  James  K.  Polk's  standing  than  John  Bell's 
Speaker's  place  and  all,  the  people  are  for  the  man  that  stands 
up  boldly  for  the  President  and  his  measures,  they  are  for  no 
other  sort  of  man  these  times.  "^-  The  sentiment  expressed  in 
this  letter  was  becoming  general  in  Tennessee,  namely,  that  Polk 
and  Grundy  were  the  administration  leaders  in  the  state,  and 
that  Bell  had  deserted  to  the  enemy.  This  view  was  impressed 
upon  the  President,  who  was  then  spending  his  vacation  at  the 
Hermitage,  and  it  was  about  this  time  that  he  declared  Polk  to 
be  deserving  of  a  medal  for  "the  hard  service  done  in  the  cause." 
Much  resentment  was  aroused  in  Middle  Tennessee  by  a 
speech  delivered  by  Bell  at  Murfreesborough  on  October  6,  1834. 
The  circuit  court  was  then  in  session  and  Bell  took  advantage 
of  the  occasion  to  address  the  people  there  assembled.  There 
are  conflicting  reports  as  to  the  substance  of  this  speech,  but  in 
general  the  account  of  it  given  to  Polk  in  a  letter  from  his  brother- 
in-law,  John  "W.  Childress,  seems  to  be  corroborated  by  the  testi- 
mony of  many  who  heard  the  speech  delivered.  According  to 
this  letter^^  Bell  was  very  severe  in  his  criticism  of  all  who  had 
questioned  the  propriety  of  his  course  in  Congress,  particularly 
during  his  contest  for  the  Speakership.  He  asserted  that  all  his 
competitors  except  one  had  treated  him  in  a  gentlemanly  manner, 
leaving  it  to  be  inferred  that  Polk  had  not.  "He  vaunted 
greatly,"  said  Childress, 

his  adherence  to  principle,  his  unwavering  support  of  the  president,  and 
said  distinctly,  and  in  these  words,  that  had  he  not  been  true  and  firm  to 
the  administration,  he  could  have  changed  the  small  majority  in  the  house 
upon  the  Bank  question  by  going  over  and  taking  his  friends  with  him 
and  thereby  have  defeated  all  the  measures  of  the  President. 

His  enemies,  he  said,  had  managed  to  delay  Speaker  Stevenson's 
appointment  to  a  foreign  mission  in  the  hope  of  weakening  his 


i2Standifer   (member  of  Congress  from  Tennessee)   to  Polk,  Aug.  25, 
1834,  ibid. 

13  Childress  to  Polk,  Oct.  7,  1834,  ibid. 


54  JAMES  K.  POLK 

(Bell's)  prospects  and  strengthening  their  own  (i.e.,  Polk's),  but 
of  this  the  President  was  of  course  not  aware.  He  alleged  that 
although  other  tricks  had  been  employed  in  an  effort  to  defeat 
him,  he  still  had  the  confidence  of  the  entire  party  except  six  or 
seven  individuals.    He  said 

that  he  was  willing  to  give  Jackson's  experiment  [state  banks]  a  fair 
trial  and  if  it  did  not  answer  the  wants  of  the  people,  that  then  he  might 
be  in  favor  of  a  National  Bank.  That  he  had  no  idea  that  a  metalic 
currency  would  answer  the  purpose  of  a  circulating  medium  and  almost 
said  it  was  Demagogiiic  in  any  one  that  would  say  so. 

W.  R.  Rucker,  another  brother-in-law,  said  in  a  letter"  that  the 
speech  was  "most  intemperate  and  ill  advised"  and  that  many  of 
Bell's  friends  did  not  approve  such  "abuse"  of  Polk  and  General 
Jackson. 

Under  the  circumstances,  Bell's  speech  was  certainly  ill  ad- 
vised, even  if  every  assertion  made  in  it  had  been  true.  More- 
over, even  though  reports  of  the  speech  may  have  exaggerated 
its  abusive  character,  yet  certain  remarks  attributed  to  the  speaker 
were  of  such  a  nature  that,  if  skillfully  used,  they  would  arouse 
the  ire  of  General  Jackson  against  the  man  who  had  uttered  them. 
Protestations  of  loyalty  to  the  administration  had  an  unwelcome 
ring  in  the  General's  ears  when  accompanied  by  boasts  of  Bell's 
great  influence  over  party  members  and  of  the  ease  with  which 
he  might  have  defeated  administration  measures  in  the  House. 
The  truth  of  such  an  assertion  would  make  it  all  the  more  galling 
to  a  man  of  Jackson's  temperament.  One  can  imagine  his  exclaim- 
ing: "By  the  Eternal,  I'll  show  John  Bell !"  Then,  too.  Bell's 
remark  concerning  the  President's  expeHment,  and  his  quasi  en- 
dorsement of  a  national  bank,  were  most  unfortunate  for  any 
man  who  wished  to  retain  the  friendshii)  of  "the  old  liero." 

Polk's  answer  to  Rucker  indicated  clearly  the  use  tliat  was 
to  be  made  of  Bell's  speech.  If  the  address  has  been  accurately 
reported,  said  Polk,  "it  places  him  clearly  and  unequivocally  at 


14  Kucker  to  Polk,  Oct.  12,  1834,  ibid. 


POLK-BELL  CONTEST  FOE   THE  SPEAKERSHIP  55 

issue  with  the  policy  of  the  administration."'''  He  wished  the 
speech  to  be  reported  accurately  and  published  to  the  world ; 
then  he  would  be  fully  jirepared  to  meet  its  author  on  the  issues 
wliich  it  had  raised. 

Before  Bell's  Murfreesborougli  speech  had  been  delivered, 
Polk,  as  we  have  seen,  had  already  been  collecting  statements 
from  his  friends  concerning  Bell's  conduct  in  Congress.  Both 
men  had  also  been  exerting  themselves  to  get  control  of  the  press 
in  Middle  Tennessee.  Local  newspapers  at  that  time  wielded 
great  infiuenee,  and  the  success  of  a  politician  depended  in  a 
great  measure  on  his  control  over  the  reading  matter  of  his  con- 
stituents. 

Polk's  home  was  in  Columbia;  therefore  the  Observer,  a  local 
paper  of  that  place,  supported  its  townsman  and  criticized  Bell's 
maneuvering  in  the  late  Speakership  election.  The  two  leading 
papers  of  Nashville  at  that  time  were  the  Republican  and  the 
Banner.  The  Repuhliean  defended  Bell,  and  many  of  Polk's 
friends  promptly  administered  the  customary  punishment  of  can- 
celing their  subscriptions  to  that  paper.  One  of  these  was  Colonel 
Archibald  Yell,  an  ardent  admirer  of  Polk  and  an  orthodox  party 
man.  In  answer  to  his  protest,  Allan  A.  Hall,  editor  of  the 
Repuhliean,  defiantly  predicted  that  Polk  would  soon  lose  the 
friendship  of  Jackson,  Grundy,  and  Governor  Carroll,  and  would 
be  driven  from  power  if  he  should  dare  to  persist  in  his  opposition 
to  Bell.^« 

Bell  succeeded  in  getting  control  of  the  Banner,  also.  Until 
the  middle  of  September,  1834,  this  paper  had  been  edited  by 


15  Polk  to  Eucker,  Oct.  16,  1834,  ibid. 

16  Yell  to  Polk,  Sept.  25,  1834,  ibid.  One  part  of  Hall's  letter,  as 
quoted  by  Yell,  read:  "and  now  mark  me  Yell  for  a  prophet  in  less  than 
six  months  there  will  be  a  split  between  Carroll  &  Polk  nay  there  will 
be  a  split  between  Polk  &  the  President!!  Coming  events  cast  their 
shadows  before.  Col.  Polk  by  no  earthly  possibility  can  continue  to 
maintain  his  present  position,  iii  the  event  of  Certain  future  Contin.uencies 
which  are  obliged  to  take  jjlace."  Yell  took  this  to  mean  that  Polk  was 
to  be  driven  from  the  chairmansliip  of  the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means. 
Carroll  denied  that  he  was  hostile  to  Polk  (Carroll  to  Polk,  Dec.  19,  1834). 


56  JAMES  K.  POLE 

Samuel  H.  Laughlin,  a  friend  of  Polk,  but  who,  unfortunately 
for  both  men,  had  been  made  extremely  unreliable  by  a  passion 
for  strong  drink. ^'  His  contract  as  editor  expired  at  this  time 
and  the  proprietor.  Hunt,  formed  a  partnership  with  Bell.  A 
new  editor  was  installed  and  the  paper  henceforth  championed 
the  cause  of  the  Speaker. ^^  For  the  time  being  Polk  had  to  rely 
mainly  on  the  support  of  the  Columbia  Observer  and  the  Mur- 
freesborough  Monitor. 

Bell  seems  to  have  become  somewhat  alarmed  at  the  result  of 
his  Murfreesborough  speech,  for  both  of  his  Nashville  papers 
maintained  that  he  had  been  misquoted,  and  that  he  was  still  a 
loyal  follower  of  General  Jackson.  Thereupon,  William  Brady, 
of  Murfreesborough,  set  about  collecting  statements  from  various 
persons  who  had  heard  Bell  deliver  the  address.  These  Brady 
published  in  an  extra  number  of  the  Monitor.  Copies  of  this 
number  were  sent  to  the  President,  to  members  of  Congress,  to 
leading  political  journals,  and  to  prominent  individuals,  for  the 
purpose  of  removing  the  "veil  which  now  covers  the  political 
hypocrite  [Bell]."^'' 

Polk  and  his  associates  saw  the  necessity  of  establishing  in 
Nashville  a  paper  which  would  promulgate  their  own  views.  "I 
think  it  more  desirable,"  wrote  A.  C.  Hays,  of  Columbia,-" 

that  a  Newspaper  should  be  established  in  Nashville,  that  will  fearlessly 
speak  the  sentiments  of  the  people  of  the  State,  at  this  time  than  it  has 
ever  been,  because  I  believe  that  the  Press  is  at  this  time  more  under  the 
influence  of  the  BanTc  &  Bell  &  Foster  faction  than  it  has  ever  been. 

Laughlin  had  offered  to  serve  as  editor  of  an  administration 
journal,  but  Brady-^  was  not  alone  in  thinking  that  "poor  Sam" 
had  already  proved  himself  to  be  a  total  failure.     "The  trouble 


1"  One  becomes  accustomed  to  readiufj  in  private  letters:  "  Laujijlilin 
has  been  drunk  for  a  week." 

18  John  W.  Childress  to  Polk,  Sept.  18;  Wm.  Bradv  to  T'olk,  Dec.  2G, 
1834,  Polk  Papers. 

10  Brady  to  Polk,  as  cited  above. 

20  Hays  to  Polk,  Dec.  24,  1834,  PolJc  Papers. 

21  Brady  to  Polk,  as  cited  above. 


POLK-BELL  CONTEST  FOB   THE  SPEAKEESHIP  57 

is,"  said  ho,  "Sam  lacks  moral  courage;  and  when  the  sound  of 
the  Bugle  is  heard — and  the  enemy  shall  appear  in  force — Sam's 
in  the  straw."  In  Brady's  opinion,  some  editor  ought  to  be 
found  who  would  be  "wholly  dc  Nashvilleized/'  who  would  stand 
by  the  President  and  support  Van  Buren  as  his  successor.--  For 
his  own  purposes,  said  Brady,  Bell  is  putting  Judge  White  for- 
ward to  succeed  Jackson,  with  the  hope  of  succeeding  White  in 
the  Presidential  chair. 

Bell's  success  in  getting  control  of  the  Nashville  papers  was 
disconcerting  enough  to  Polk's  Tennessee  friends,  but  they  were 
still  more  chagrined  because  the  Washington  Globe  seemed  also 
to  be  lending  its  support  to  the  Speaker.  "How  is  it  with  the 
Globe  ? ' '  wrote  Brady  in  the  letter  above  cited, 

if  that  print  is  with  the  President  and  his  friends,  to  me  it  has  an  awk- 
ward way  of  shewing  of  it.  It  is  true  that  Blair  sanctions  the  President 
personally,  and  in  the  main  the  measures  of  his  administration;  but  how 
is  it,  that  every  apologetic  article,  which  has  appeared  in  the  Nashville 
papers  or  elsewhere,  in  relation  to  Bell's  election  to  the  Speaker's  chair, 
or  his  Murfreesboro  Speech  have  found  their  way  into  the  columns  of  the 
Globe? 

Brady  thought  that  Blair  ought  to  give  both  sides  or  neither; 
Polk  should  compel  him  to  show  his  colors  by  presenting  for 
publication  in  the  Glohe  the  account  of  Bell's  speech  which  had 
appeared  in  the  extra  Monitor.  "Why  is  the  Globe  either  silent — 
or  giving  support  to  Bell?"  asked  Childress.-^  People  in  Tenn- 
essee, he  added,  are  beginnig  to  believe  that  the  President 
prefers  Bell  to  Polk;  this  is  what  Bell's  adherents  claim,  and  the 
attitude  of  the  Globe  lends  color  to  their  assertions.  By  all 
means,  urged  Childress,  Polk  must  have  his  side  of  the  argument 
published. 

By  courting  the  enemies  of  the  administration  and  by  sub- 
sequent indiscretions.  Bell  had  engendered  feelings  of  distrust 


22  On  December  28  General  Samuel  Smith,  in  a  letter  to  Polk,  dwelt 
on  the  necessity  of  starting  a  new  paper.  Many  in  Tennessee,  said  he, 
whom  Jackson  believes  to  be  his  friends  are  in  reality  against  him. 

23  Childress  to  Polk,  Dec.  20,  1834,  Polk  Papers.  Polk  received  other 
letters  of  similar  character. 


58  JAMES   E.  POLE 

and  hostility  that  were  destined  to  involve  others  in  serious  polit- 
ical difficulties.  Polk  was  a  man  who  did  not  easily  forget,  and 
by  lending  aid  to  Bell  in  1834  Blair  was  paving  the  way  for  his 
own  downfall,  when  Bell 's  rival  became  President  ten  years  later. 
Polk's  friends  believed  that  they  saw  the  sinister  as  well  as 
successful  influence  of  the  Speaker  in  every  quarter.  Polk  him- 
self alleged  that  Bell's  exertions  in  behalf  of  Judge  White  were 
not  due  to  any  love  for  the  judge,  but  for  the  sole  purpose  of 
promoting  his  own  political  advancement.-* 

The  project  of  founding  an  administration  newspaper  in 
Nashville  now  absorbed  the  attention  of  party  leaders.  As  no 
really  suitable  man  could  be  found  to  edit  such  a  paper,  Laughlin 
was  considered,  although  not  without  misgivings.-^  ]\Iany  poli- 
ticians who  had  hitherto  shouted  for  Jackson  had  deserted  to 
White,  and  nearly  all  of  the  papers  of  Middle  Tennessee,  in- 
cluding even  the  Columbia  Ohserver,-^  had  come  out  for  the 
judge.  This  fact  made  it  all  the  more  necessary  to  have  an 
orthodox  journal  which  would  enlighten  the  people,  and  Laughlin, 
despite  his  weaknesses,  was  a  loyal  party  man.  After  many 
tribulations  capital  was  collected,  an  outfit  purchased,  and  in 
March,  1835,  Laughlin  was  installed  as  editor  of  the  Nashville 
Union.  Polk  and  Grundy  were  the  guiding  spirits  of  the  new 
paper,  and  to  them  and  Cave  Johnson  "poor  Sam"  appealed  for 
aid  in  increasing  his  subscription  list.  He  reported  to  Polk  that 
the  editor  of  the  Banner  was  "wallowing  in  the  mire,"  entirely 
under  the  influence  of  Bell  and  Foster;  and  that  efforts  were 
being  made  to  retard  the  progress  of  the  Union."-' 

During  the  excitement  which  was  created  by  Bell's  Cassedy 
letter,  Laughlin — being  "himself  again "-^ — with  his  "sharp  pen" 


24  Polk  to  James  Walker,  Dec.  24,  1834,  Poll'  Papers. 

25  Sam'l  G.  Smith  to  Polk,  Jan.  6,  1835,  ibid. 
20  James  "Walker  to  Polk,  Jan.  17,  1835,  ibid. 
2-  Laughlin  to  Polk,  April  17,  21,  1835,  ibid. 

2s  Grundy  to  Polk,  June  25,  1835,  ibid.     For  the  Cassedy  letter,  see 
p.  84. 


POLK-BELL  CONTEST  FOE   THE  SPEAKEESHIP  59 

did  effective  service  for  Polk  by  heaping  odium  upon  Bell.  ' '  That 
Cassedy  letter,"  wrote  Grundy  to  Polk,  "will  make  you  Speaker, 
I  think."-"  It  did,  indeed,  contribute  to  this  result,  but  in  Tenn- 
essee the  combined  influence  of  Bell  and  White  could  not  be 
overcome.  In  spite  of  heroic  efforts  on  the  editor's  part,  the 
Union  could  not  pay  expenses,  and  the  list  of  political  "apostates" 
was  steadily  growing.  Although  Laughlin  labored  without  salary, 
he  was  not  without  hope,^°  and  his  pungent  editorials  undoubt- 
edly aided  Polk  in  his  campaign  for  reelection. 

President  Jackson  viewed  with  alarm  the  disintegration  of 
the  administration  party  in  his  home  state.  He  was  especially 
interested  in  the  election  of  members  of  Congress.  From  his 
retreat  at  the  "Rip  Raps"  he  asked  Polk^^  for  reliable  infor- 
mation concerning  the  political  situation,  and  directed  him  to 
cooperate  with  Grundy  and  Cave  Johnson  in  combating  the 
schemes  of  Judge  White  and  John  Bell.  He  was  able  to  get 
some  news  from  the  Union,  although  it  came  irregularly;  "the 
other  Nashville  papers,  like  base  coin,  circulate  freely,  but  they 
have  become  the  mere  echo  of  Duff  Green  &  other  opposition 
prints. ' ' 

White's  candidacy  had  irrevocably  split  the  Jackson  party 
in  Tennessee.  The  President  now  considered  White,  Bell,  and 
all  their  supporters  to  be  his  political  and  personal  enemies. 
Polk,  Grundy,  and  Johnson  were  to  a  greater  degree  than  ever 
looked  upon  as  the  administration  leaders  in  the  state.  It  was 
certain  that  Polk  would  have  the  President's  backing  in  his  next 
contest  with  Bell  for  the  Speaker's  chair.  From  Washington, 
Donelson^-    wrote    to    congratulate    Polk    on    his    triumphant 


29  Ihid. 

30  "I  am  now  fairly  in  a  State  of  belligeraney  with  my  worthy  neigh- 
bors. I  have  them,  I  think,  in  a  good  way  if  I  fan  keep  them  so.  A 
gradual  but  sure  work  of  reformation  in  public  sentiment  is  in  progress 
here,  and  I  hope  the  same  work  is  going  on  throughout  the  State" 
(Laughlin  to  Polk,  July  5,  1835,  ihid.). 

31  Jackson  to  Polk,  Aug.  3,  1835,  ibid. 

32  Donelson  to  Polk,  Aug.  28,  1835,  ibid. 


60  JAMES  E.   POLE 

reelection  in  spite  of  the  "intrigues"  of  Bell,  and  he  reported 
the  President  to  be  in  good  spirits,  notwithstanding  the  defeat  of 
Governor  Carroll.  Donelson  had,  he  said,  conversed  with  many 
politicians,  all  of  whom  wished  Polk  to  be  chosen  Speaker. 

In  Nashville,  Laughlin,  through  the  columns  of  the  Union  and 
by  letters  to  individuals,  was  doing  his  utmost  to  discredit  Bell 
and  to  present  Polk's  claims  to  reward  for  his  loyalty  to  General 
Jackson.  Polk  had  been  the  intended  victim  of  Bell's  "treach- 
ery," wrote  Laughlin,  and  therefore  "ought  to  be  made  the 
instrument  of  his  defeat.  "^^ 

While  the  rivalry  between  White  and  Van  Buren  was  of 
greater  interest  in  national  politics,  yet  administration  leaders 
in  all  parts  of  the  Union  had  come  to  feel  that  Bell — the  alleged 
instigator  of  the  party  schism — was,  after  all,  more  guilty  than 
White,  and  consequently  deserving  of  punishment.  Polk,  on  the 
other  hand,  was  clearly  entitled  to  the  support  of  the  adminis- 
tration forces  in  Congress.  As  chairman  of  the  Committee  of 
Ways  and  Means  he  had  borne,  in  the  House,  the  brunt  of  the 
President's  war  on  the  bank.  In  his  home  state  he  had  done  more 
than  any  other,  with  the  possible  exception  of  Grundy,  to  oppose 
the  Bell- White  coalition  and  to  uphold  the  standard  of  General 
Jackson. 

When  Congress  convened  in  December,  Polk's  election  to  the 
Speaker's  chair  was  practically  assured,  and  he  w^as  chosen  on 
the  first  ballot  by  a  majority  of  thirty-nine  votes.  His  triumph 
over  Bell  was  regarded  by  all  as  a  distinct  party  victory.     A 


33  Laughlin  to  Polk,  Aug.  30,  18.35,  ibid.  He  quoted  several  reasons 
which  he  had  assigned  when  urging  Polk's  election,  among  them: 

"That  your  election  will  prostrate  Bell  and  the  White  influence  in  this 
State,  by  showing  to  the  people  the  true  position  of  Bell,  and  how  his 
position  is  received  by  the  Republican  party  every  where  else,  and  that 
they  are  only  sustained  now  by  the  false  opinion  which  prevails  that  they 
are  friends  of  Gen.  Jackson. 

"That  your  election  will  unmask  the  White  party  and  exhibit  them 
as  the  opponents  of  the  Administration. 

"That  much  is  due  to  you.  That  you  have  stuck  when  others  failed. 
.  .  .  That  your  confidential  relation  to  the  President  ought  to  be  consid- 
ered both  as  a  merit  and  as  a  necessary  qualification  in  a  Speaker  &e  &c." 


POLE-BELL  CONTEST  FOE   THE  SPEAKERSHIP  61 

"White"  nieinber  of  the  Tennessee  legislatnre,  when  writing  to 
congratulate  Polk  on  his  election,^'  said  that,  although  Bell's 
own  friends  hardly  expected  him  to  win,  they  did  not  think  that 
he  would  be  beaten  so  badly ;  they  ' '  attribute  Mr.  Bell 's  defeat 
to  the  influence  of  the  President."  Although  a  White  supporter, 
the  writer  said  that  Polk  had  gained  by  his  firm  stand  and  that 
he  was  now  stronger  in  his  district  than  either  White  or  Van 
Buren.  ' '  The  election  of  Speaker, ' '  wrote  Judge  Catron,"^  ' '  had 
an  uncommonly  great  effect  on  the  country  people.  They  had 
been  lead  to  believe  great  strength  existed  elsewhere — this  is  now 
admitted  to  be  a  mistake,  and  what  must  follow  [defeat  of  White] 
is  certain,  as  I  believe."  Bell  himself  had  not  been  sanguine. 
He  predicted  his  defeat  by  Polk  before  Congress  had  convened.^*' 
Before  proceeding  with  Polk 's  career  as  Speaker  of  the  House 
of  Representatives  it  seems  desirable  to  retrace  our  steps  in  order 
to  consider,  in  the  following  chapter,  Judge  White's  unsuccessful 
campaign  for  the  Presidency.  The  rivalry  between  White  and 
Van  Buren  was  the  dominant  factor  at  the  time  in  both  state  and 
national  politics.  It  played  an  important  part  in  making  Polk 
the  presiding  officer  of  the  House,  and  it  helped  to  shape  many 
of  the  issues  with  which  Polk,  as  Speaker,  had  to  deal. 


34  H.  M.  Watterson  to  Polk,  Dee.  21,  1835,  PoUc  Papers. 

35  Catron  to  Polk,  Jan.  8,  1836,  ibid.  "  The  effect  of  the  news  [Polk's 
election]  upon  the  White  cause,"  wrote  Nicholson,  December  20,  "has 
been  blighting."  Many  White  men,  said  he,  now  think  that  their  candi- 
date should  be  withdrawn. 

36  W.  H.  Polk  to  J.  K.  Polk,  Dec.  21,  1835,  Polk  Papers.  He  had  seen 
a  letter  written  by  Bell  to  Judge  Kennedy  before  the  opening  of  Congress. 


CHAPTER  V 

JUDGE  WHITE  AND  THE  PRESIDENCY 

No  biography  of  a  statesman  of  the  thirties — particularly  of 
a  prominent  Tennessean — would  be  complete  that  did  not  in- 
clude a  chapter  on  the  far-reaching  effect  of  Judge  White's  de- 
cision to  become  a  candidate  for  the  Presidency.  The  importance 
of  this  decision  lay  in  the  fact  that  General  Jackson  had  made 
other  plans.  In  the  parlance  of  the  day,  "King  Andrew"  had 
decreed  that  the  ' '  little  magician ' '  must  be  his  successor,  regard- 
less of  the  will  of  the  subjects — the  "consent  of  the  governed." 
When,  therefore,  the  friends  of  White  brought  him  forward  as 
a  rival  to  Van  Buren,  harmony  in  the  Jackson  camp  was  at  first 
threatened,  and  finally  destroyed.  "Davy"  Crockett  had  driven 
the  first  wedge  into  the  solidarity  of  the  Jackson  domination  of 
Tennessee ;  the  White  movement  split  it  asunder.  The  result 
was  the  birth  of  the  Whig  party  and  a  national  political  re- 
alignment. 

When  White  was  first  mentioned  in  connection  with  the  Presi- 
dency, Jackson 's  feelings  were  those  of  regret  that  his  old  friend 
should  have  been  deluded  by  designing  politicians ;  but  when  the 
judge  was  found  to  be  a  willing  victim — independent  even  to 
the  point  of  defying  the  President's  wishes — the  old-time  friend- 
ship changed  to  bitter  hatred.  It  was  soon  made  apparent  to 
politicians  that  they  could  not  support  Judge  White  without  for- 
feiting all  claim  of  loyalty  to  General  Jackson.  Assurances  on 
their  part  that  the  two  things  were  not  incompatible  availed 
nothing ;  all  were  forced  to  choose  between  the  two  men. 

It  is  not  easy  to  determine  just  when  and  by  whom  Judge 
White  was  first  brought  forward  as  a  candidate  for  President, 


JUDGE   WHITE  AND  THE   PEESIDENCY  63 

but  his  iioinination  for  that  office  was  considered  by  the  Ten- 
nessee legislature  as  early  as  December,  1833.  Up  to  this  time, 
so  far  as  Tennessee  polities  were  concerned.  Judge  McLean,  of 
Ohio,  seems  to  have  been  regarded  as  Van  Buren's  most  formid- 
able rival.  Some  of  the  local  papers  had  hoisted  the  McLean 
banner,  with  either  Governor  Carroll  or  Judge  White  for  Vice- 
President.^  But  before  adjourning  in  early  December,  1833,  the 
legislature  seriously  considered  the  feasibility  of  presenting  a 
Presidential  candidate  from  their  OMai  state.  A  resolution  to 
nominate  "White  was  actually  drawn  up ;  but  it  was  made  known 
by  a  member  that  White  opposed  such  a  proceeding,  and  the 
matter  was  dropped.  None  of  the  members  manifested  any 
interest  in  nominating  either  Van  Buren  or  McLean.- 

Several  causes  cooperated  in  fixing  the  attention  of  politicians 
on  White  as  a  possible  candidate.  It  was  well  known  that  Jack- 
son had  decreed  that  the  Vice-President  should  succeed  him ; 
in  spite  of  this,  however.  Van  Buren  had  never  been  popular  in 
Tennessee.  Many  of  the  President's  most  loyal  supporters  did 
not,  and  could  not,  share  his  admiration  for  the  "heir  apparent." 
State  pride  caused  many  to  feel  that,  if  possible,  another  Tenn- 
essean  should  be  chosen  to  fill  the  office,  and,  next  to  Jackson, 
White  was  generally  conceded  to  be  the  most  able  and  popular 
son  of  the  state.  It  is  probable  that  Jackson's  preference  for 
Van  Buren  would  have  been  sufficient  to  cause  a  split  in  the 
party  as  soon  as  the  White  movement  assumed  serious  propor- 
tions, but  the  rivalry  between  Polk  and  Bell,  and  the  support  of 
White  by  the  latter,  lent  an  added  bitterness  and  political  sig- 
nificance to  White's  candidacy.  The  plan  to  nominate  White 
was  alleged  to  have  been  conceived  by  Bell  for  the  purpose  of 
advancing  his  own  political  fortunes  in  both  state  and  national 
politics.  Whether  this  allegation  was  true  or  false  is  a  matter 
difficult  to  determine  ;  but  whatever  Bell's  motives  may  have  been. 


1  Yell  to  Polk,  Dec.  1,  1833,  Polk  Papers. 

2  A.  O.  P.  Nicholson  to  Polk,  Dec.  5,  1833,  Polk  Papers.    Orville  Bradley 
to  White,  Aug.  23,  1836  (Scott,  Memoir  of  Hugh  Lawson  White,  302). 


64  JAMES   E.  POLE 

it  seems  clear  that  White's  conduct  was  at  all  times  aboveboard 
and  commendable.  He  was  too  honest  to  seek  political  prefer- 
ment by  underhand  methods,  but  he  was,  also,  too  brave  and 
independent  to  step  aside  simply  because  General  Jackson  willed 
that  he  should  do  so. 

Up  to  the  time  when  White  and  Van  Buren  had  been  for- 
mally nominated  and  party  lines  definitely  drawn,  there  was 
quite  a  diversit.y  of  opinion  in  Tennessee,  even  among  Jackson's 
friends.  On  December  22,  1833,  A.  V.  Brown  wrote  to  ask  Polk 
''the  signs  as  to  the  'successorship  to  the  throne,'  "  and  spoke 
of  McLean's  popularity.  "Personally,"  said  Brown,  "I  like 
McLean  myself  but  politically  I  fear  he  is  too  far  off  from  us  in 
the  South — and  how  will  Van  Buren  help  that  matter  in  the 
least?"  Between  Clay  and  Van  Buren,  he  continued,  "might 
not  one  find  refuge  in  the  personal  worth  &  virtue  of  McLean, 
although  he  would  prefer  some  other  than  either,  if  chance  or 
destiny  had  not  thrown  him  too  far  in  the  rear  of  probable  suc- 
cess ? '  '^  Other  passages  in  the  letter  indicate  that  it  was  Calhoun 
to  whom  he  referred.  Generally,  however,  those  of  Polk's  cor- 
respondents who  were  "not  satisfied"  with  Van  Buren  were  of 
opinion  that  White  was  the  only  man  who  would  bring  success  to 
the  party.* 

On  June  2,  1834,  Bell  defeated  Polk  in  the  contest  for  the 
Speakership.  He  was  supported  by  many  who  were  openly  op- 
posed to  the  administration.  In  the  House  Polk  had,  during  the 
entire  session,  been  leading  the  battle  against  the  bank,  and  when 
Congress  adjourned  on  June  30  he  had  won  a  signal  victoi-y  for 
the  administration.  In  his  defeat  by  Bell,  Polk  could  easily  be 
made  to  assume  the  role  of  a  martyr  who  had  suffered  for  his 
loyalty  to  the  President  and  the  party.  He  seems  sincerely  to 
have  regarded  himself  as  a  victim  of  the  treachery  of  Bell,  M'ho 
had  solicited  opposition  votes. 


3  PolJc  Papers. 

*  E.g.,  John  W.  M.  Breazeale  to  Polk,  Marcli  21,  1834,  Polk  Papers. 


JUDGE   WHITE  AND  THE  PBESIDENCY  65 

As  soon  as  Congress  had  adjourned,  both  men  returned  to 
Tennessee  to  air  their  grievances  on  the  platform  and  in  the 
l)ublic  press.  Polk,  as  we  have  seen,  applied  to  his  congressional 
friends  for  statements  whicli  would  prove  the  perfidy  of  Bell, 
while  Hell  proceeded  to  get  control  of  the  Nashville  papers,  the 
Republican-  and  the  Banner,  in  order  to  defend  himself  and  to 
overthrow  the  influence  of  Polk.  Many  of  Polk's  friends  were 
desirous  of  nominating  him  for  Governor,  but  he  preferred  to 
continue  in  national  politics. 

General  Jackson,  also,  spent  his  sunnner  vacation  in  Tennessee. 
The  bank  question  was  uppermost  in  his  mind,  and  in  a  speech 
delivered  in  Nashville  he  made  it  clear  that  any  new  federal 
bank  would  be  quite  as  objectionable  as  the  one  now  in  existence. 
As  yet  he  seems  to  have  taken  no  active  interest  in  the  quarrel 
between  Bell  and  Polk,  but  he  naturally  felt  grateful  to  the  latter 
for  his  loyal  support  of  the  administration  during  the  last  sesssion. 
It  was  at  this  time  that  he  declared  Polk  to  be  deserving  of  a 
medal  from  the  American  people  for  his  services  in  Congress. 
Bell  had  not  yet  broken  with  the  party  and  gave  the  President 
new  assurances  that  he  would  continue  to  support  the  adminis- 
tration.^ Indeed  after  Jackson's  return  to  Washington  there  was, 
as  we  have  seen,  complaint  in  Tennessee  that  the  Glohe  seemed  to 
show  a  preference  for  Bell."  But  during  the  fall  of  1834  the 
political  situation  in  Tennessee  became  such  that  the  interests  of 
Polk  and  the  President  were  closeh^  identified,  while  Bell  cast  his 
lot  with  the  opponents  of  the  administration.  The  main  cause 
of  the  party  cleavage  was  the  renewed  effort  to  nominate  Judge 
AVhite  for  the  Presidency. 

While  Jackson  was  still  in  Nashville  a  caucus  was  held  in  that 
city — by  friends  of  the  bank,  it  was  said — for  the  purpose  of  con- 
sidering the  noinin-ation  of  White.'     White  was  informed  that 


5  Gen.  Sam'l  Smith  to  Polk,  Sept.  20,  1884,  Polk  Papers. 

'■'  See  above,  p.  57. 

"  Burton  to  Polk,  Aug.  27,  18:i4,  Polk  Papers. 


66  JAMES   K.   POLK 

the  President  threatened  to  denounce  him  should  he  express  a 
willingness  to  become  a  candidate.^  Jackson  doubtless  noted 
many  evidences  of  the  popularity  of  White  and  of  the  unpopu- 
larity of  Van  Buren,  but  at  this  time  it  is  probable  that  he  had 
hopes  of  preventing  disaffection. 

While  the  President  was  passing  through  East  Tennessee  on 
his  way  to  Washington,  Orville  Bradley,  a  member  of  the  legis- 
lature, told  him  of  the  attempt  made  by  the  assembly  in  1833  to 
nominate  White  —  an  attempt  which  Bradley,  acting  under 
White's  directions,  had  been  able  to  defeat.  He  told  the  Presi- 
dent, also,  that  two-thirds  of  the  legislature  had  been  unfavorable 
to  Van  Buren.  Jackson  vigorously  defended  Van  Buren.  He 
said  "that  White  could  hardly  get  a  vote  out  of  Tennessee,  and 
that  Tennessee  must  not  separate  from  the  rest  of  his  friends." 
He  was  willing  to  compromise  by  supporting  White  for  Vice- 
President,  and  it  would  be  time  enough  for  White  to  run  for 
President  after  Van  Buren  had  retired. *• 

Jackson  did  not  at  this  time  harbor  bitter  feelings  toward 
White,  personally.  These  did  not  come  until  later,  and  even 
then,  as  will  appear,  he  regarded  the  judge  more  as  a  dupe  of 
political  intriguers  than  as  his  personal  enemy.  His  feeling  in 
1834  was  one  of  annoyance  that  White  should  be  made  the  instru- 
ment in  an  attempt  to  thwart  the  plans  he  had  made  for  Van 
Buren. 

White  and  Jackson  had  long  been  close  personal  friends. 
The  judge  had  loyally  supported  the  "old  hero"  in  his  cam- 
paigns for  the  Presidency  and  during  the  first  part  of  his  admin- 
istration was  regarded  as  one  of  his  most  able  advisers.^''  But 
White  was  no  sycophant,  and  he  was  too  independent  to  follow 
any  man's  program,  even  though  the  man  might  chance  to  be 


8  White  to  Polk,  Aug.  26,  1834  (Scott,  Memoir  of  Hugh  Lawson  White, 
254). 

9  Bradley   to   White,   Aug.    23,   1836    (Scott,   Memoir  of  IJugh   Lawson 
White,  302). 

10  See  letters  of  Jackson,  Overton,  Coffee,  Polk  et  oL,  in  Scott,  Memoir 
of  Hugh  Lawson  White,  267-269. 


JUDGE   WRITE  AND  THE  PBESIDENCY  67 

General  Jackson.  As  early  as  1831,  when  Jackson  was  recon- 
structing his  cabinet  so  that  Van  Buren  might,  under  the  Presi- 
dent's own  rule,"  be  made  eligible  to  succeed  him,  he  had  invited 
White  to  become  Secretary  of  War,  while  Eaton,  the  outgoing 
Secretary,  was  to  have  White's  place  as  Senator  from  Tennessee.^' 
Thc  judge  declined  the  offer,  and  although  no  breach  between 
the  two  men  resulted,  White  was  henceforth  made  to  feel  that 
he  was  no  longer  in  good  standing  in  administration  circles.^'' 

Jackson  was  irritated  by  various  manifestations  of  White's 
independence,  and  especially  so  by  his  disregard  of  the  Presi- 
dent's wishes  when  Clay's  compromise  tariff  bill  was  before  the 
Senate  in  1833.  The  Senate  had  voted  to  refer  Clay's  bill  to 
a  select  committee.  Before  White,  their  presiding  officer,  had 
appointed  the  committee,  he  was  invited  to  a  conference  wdth 
the  President.  Preferring  Clay's  bill  to  one  which  had  been  sent 
to  the  House  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  and  anticipating 
that  Jackson  had  sent  for  him  for  the  purpose  of  dictating  the 
membership  of  the  committee,  White,  before  going  to  see  the 
President,  selected  a  committee  which  he  thought  would  support 
Clay's  measure.  A  majority,  which  included  Clayton,  of  Dela- 
ware, were  rated  as  anti-administration  men."  The  President 
was  much  ''mortified"  and  told  Grundy  in  a  letter  that  "it  is  an 
insult  to  me,  &  the  Sec.  of  the  Treasury  that  such  a  man  as 


11  This  rule  was  that  none  of  his  cabinet  should  succeed  him  if  he 
could  prevent  it. 

12  White's  testimony  before  the  House  Committee  (Scott,  Memoir  of 
Hugh  Lawson  White,  299;  Washington  Globe,  May  25,  1831). 

13  "The  true  reason  why  nothing  I  have  said  is  noticed  in  the  Globe, 
I  have  no  doubt  is,  because  I  have  never  assured  any  man  that  as  soon  as 
Gen.  Jackson  's  terms  of  service  are  at  an  end,  I  will  use  all  my  endeavors 
to  elect  the  favorite  of  those  who  direct  the  operations  of  the  paper.  I  am 
for  Gen.  Jackson;  but  am  not  either  a  Calhoun  Jackson  man,  or  a  Van 
Buren  Jackson  man,  and  therefore  it  is  pleasing  to  the  Globe  and  Tele- 
graph not  to  notice  favorably  anything  I  can  say  or  do;  and  as  I  am 
opposed  to  Mr.  Clay,  his  papers  will  of  course  speak  disrespectfully  of 
me."  White  to  F.  *S.  Heiskell,  editor  of  the  Knoxville  Register,  May  18, 
1832  (Scott,  Memoir  of  Hugh  Lawson  White,  269). 

14  Testimony  of  Judge  White  before  the  House  Committee  (Scott, 
Memoir  of  Hugh  Lawson  White,  299). 


68  JAMES   E.  POLK 

Clayton  should  be  upon  it  [the  committee]. "^^  Nevertheless, 
Jackson  held  White  in  high  esteem,  and,  despite  this  "insult" 
and  other  similar  vexations,  the  two  men  continued  amicable 
relations.  White  was  still  rated  as  a  Jackson  man.  and,  in  the 
judge's  opinion,  it  was  not  until  the  President  visited  Tennessee 
in  1834  that  he  became  convinced  that  White  would  not  support 
his  political  program.^"  Jackson  was  willing  to  compromise  by 
letting  White  have  the  Vice-Presidency,  but  the  judge  must  not 
stand  in  the  way  of  Van  Buren.  ' 

Up  to  the  time  that  Polk  returned  to  Washington  for  the 
opening  of  Congress,  there  is  nothing  in  his  correspondence, 
except  his  letter  to  White,  to  indicate  that  he  took  an  active  inter- 
est in  the  movement  to  nominate  Judge  White.  His  thoughts 
were  centered  on  Bell,  and  the  suggestion  made  by  C.  C.  Clay^'^ 
to  ''take  good  care  to  put  your  adversary  in  the  wrong"  was 
entirely  superfluous.  His  task  was  made  comparatively  easy  by 
the  indiscretions  of  the  adversary  himself.  Bell's  Murfrees- 
borough  speech^^  proved  a  boomerang  to  its  author,  for  in  it  he 
had  criticized  the  President  and  given  quasi  support  to  the 
national  bank.  Then,  too,  Hall,  of  the  Nashville  Rcpuhlican,  had 
boasted  that  there  would  be  "  a  split  between  Polk  and  the  Presi- 
dent," and  that  Polk  would  be  driven  from  power^^  by  the 
political  influence  of  Bell.  Such  arrogance,  when  duly  reported 
to  the  President,  was  sufficient  to  arouse  his  resentment,  and, 
when  it  soon  developed  that  Bell  was  one  of  the  most  ardent  sup- 
porters of  White,  he  was  denounced  as  a  political  apostate. 

The  determination  of  White's  Tennessee  friends  to  nominate 
him,  and  Jackson's  strenuous  opposition  to  sucli  a  nomination, 
placed  Polk  in  an  awkward  position.  White's  friends  have  always 


15  Jackson  to  Grundy,  Feb.  13,  1833,  Am.  Hist.  Mag.,  V,  137. 

10  "He  no  doubt  believed  that  whenever  he  and  those  he  could  control 
changed  their  creed,  I  would  change  my  creed  likewise,  and  he  was  never 
convinced  to  the  contrary,  until  after  his  attempt  upon  me  through  Mr. 
Bradley,  which  was  in  the  autumn  of  1834."  White  to  the  "  Freemen  of 
Tennessee"  (Scott,  Memoir  of  Hugh  Lmvson  White,  320). 

IT  Clay  to  Polk,  Sept.  23,  1834,  Folk  Papers. 

IS  See  above,  p.  53.  lo  Yell  to  Polk,  Sept.  25,  1834,  Polk  Papers. 


JUDGE   WHITE  AND  THE   PRESIDENCY  69 

assumed  that  Polk  treacherously  turned  against  White  simply 
to  please  General  Jackson,  and  White  himself  appears  to  have 
held  til  is  view.  Even  now,  after  Polk's  entire  correspondence 
has  become  available,  it  is  difficult  to  determine  to  what  extent 
this  charge  is  true.  His  friendship  for  Judge  White  he  never 
attempted  to  conceal,  and  that  he  desired  the  support  of  Jackson 
is  beyond  question;  but  after  his  defeat  by  Bell  the  political 
situation,  both  in  Tennessee  and  in  Congress,  was  such  that  for 
reasons  of  his  own,  and  irrespective  of  Jackson's  wishes,  he  could 
not  support  a  candidate  whose  chief  sponsor  was  his  rival,  John 
Bell.  He  liked  White  and,  like  many  of  his  Tennessee  friends, 
he  probably  did  not  share  the  President's  admiration  for  Van 
Buren ;  but  he  was  a  firm  believer  in  party  loyalty ;  and  besides, 
the  men  who  were  taking  the  lead  in  promoting  White's  interests 
were  at  the  same  time  endeavoring  to  undermine  Polk  himself. 
Polk's  habitual  reticence  adds  to  the  difficulty  of  determining 
his  thoughts  and  motives.  If  possible,  he  always  avoided  contro- 
versies which  did  not  immediately  concern  himself,  and  to  his 
best  friends  he  was  guarded  in  expressing  his  opinions.  When, 
in  1831,  there  was  discord  in  Jackson's  cabinet,  Polk  discreetly 
declined  to  participate  in  the  effort  to  force  Eaton  from  the 
cabinet,  or  even  to  discuss  the  matter  in  writing.=°  When  the 
break  between  Jackson  and  Calhoun  occurred,  he  forwarded 
Calhoun's  "defense"  to  his  friends,  but  without  disclosing  his 
own  views.  One  of  his  closest  friends  complained  that  "  I  write 
you  my  opinions'freely  as  I  am  not  disposed  with  you  to  conceal 
my  views,  but  I  must  acknowledge  that  you  have  been  more 
prudent  with  yours  for  I  am  not  able  to  even  conjecture  how  your 
feelings  are  after  all  your  long  letters. '  '-^ 

20  Several  letters  to  C.  A.  Wickliffe  declining  to  discuss  the  subject 
{Polk  Papers). 

21  A.  Yell  to  Polk,  March  13,  1831,  Polk  Papers.  Yell  expressed  his  own 
opinions  freely  enough.  He  believed  Calhoun's  defense  to  be  honest  and 
sincere,  and  that  Crawford  was  a  scoundrel.  He  had  a  "bad  impression" 
of  A^an  Buren  and  hoped  that  he  would  not  be  nominated  as  Jackson's 
successor.  The  attempt  to  force  Van  Buren  on  the  people  would  only  aid 
"Prince  Hal." 


70  JAMES  K.   POLK 

Polk  and  White  liad  long  been  personal  and  political  friends. 
There  is  nothing  to  indicate  that  their  friendship  had  been  in 
any  degree  affected  by  the  coolness  between  White  and  the  Presi- 
dent. To  this  White's  comments  on  Polk's  defeat  by  Bell  in  1834 
bear  witness.  "Both  are  to  me  like  children  ;"  he  wrote--  "there- 
fore I  took  no  part  in  the  contest."  Polk's  expression  of  "sur- 
prise and  astonishment"-^  in  September,  1834,  when  informed 
of  Jackson's  threat  to  denounce  White,  should  he  consent  to 
become  a  candidate,  was  no  doubt  unfeigned.  He  was  frequently 
evasive  or  noncommittal,  but  he  was  not  given  to  flattery.-* 

Polk  returned  to  Washington  to  assume  his  duties  in  the 
House  in  December,  1834.  Up  to  this  time  there  appears  to  have 
been  no  connection  between  his  quarrel  with  Bell  and  Jackson's 
opposition  to  White.  But  he  had  not  been  in  Washington  long 
before  these  two  controversies  became  merged  by  an  effort  on 
the  part  of  Polk's  opponents  to  bring  White  out  as  a  candidate. 
Polk 's  own  version  of  his  attitude  toward  the  judge 's  nomination 
is  stated  in  a  ''confidential"  letter  to  his  brother-in-law,  James 
Walker.  As  his  motives  in  opposing  White  have  often  been 
questioned,  it  seemes  desirable  to  insert  this  letter  in  spite  of  its 
length. 

I  have  been  so  busily  engaged  in  preparing  the  appropriation  bills — 
and  those  connected  Avith  the  Banks  that  I  have  not  heretofore  taken  leisure 
to  write  to  you.  I  have  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  management — and 
undercurrents  which  I  understand  have  been  going  on  here  in  regard  to  the 
next  Presidency.  I  have  considered  that  it  was  my  first  duty  to  attend 
to  the  important  measures  committed  to  the  committee  of  which   I  am  a 


22  To  editor  of  Knoxville  Eegister  (Scott,  Memoir  of  Hugh  Lawson 
White,  253). 

23  Polk  to  White,  Sept.  2,  1834,  ibid.,  254. 

2-t  White's  biographer  in  commenting  on  this  letter  (of  September, 
1834)  makes  the  rather  astonishing  statement  that  as  soon  as  Polk  ascer- 
tained "the  sentiments  of  Gen.  Jackson  in  regard  to  his  successor"  he 
shaped  his  "course  according  to  the  President's  wishes,  although  motives 
of  personal  jiolicy  .  .  .  decided  him  not  to  define  his  position  until  after 
his  reelection  the  ensuing  August."  She  then  goes  on  to  show  that  Polk 
and  Cave  Johnson  "had  determined  to  pick  a  quarrel"  with  White  in 
February,  1835 ! 


JUDGE   WHITE  AND  THE   PBESIDENCY  71 

member.  Tliis  I  have  done  and  shall  continue  to  do,  and  I  am  sure  my 
constituents  will  appreciate  my  services  more  than  if  I  were  engaged  in 
the  intrigues  of  politicians  with  a  view  to  my  own  personal  advancement. 
I  liave  no  doubt  that  my  constituents  feel  and  think  as  1  do,  upon  the  sub- 
ject of  the  succession, — but  still  they  have  not  commissioned  me  here — 
either  to  engage  their  votes,  to  commit  them  upon  the  subject  or  to  express 
tlieir  opinions.  As  a  citizen  I  shall  have  a  right  to  my  own  opinion, — and 
whenever  there  shall  be  occasion  shall  certainly  exercise  it.  In  regard  to  our 
countryman  Judge  White  I  have  said  this, — that  there  was  no  man  to 
whom  personally — I  have  ever  had  kindlier  feelings,  and  that  if  he  was 
brought  forward,  or  taken  up  and  run  by  our  political  party,  it  would  give 
mo  pleasure  to  support  him, — but  at  tlie  same  time  I  think  that  the  party 
now  dominant  in  the  country,  Avho  have  recently  achieved  so  signal  a  victory, 
have  fought  the  battle  to  little  purpose,  if  in  the  moment  of  this  triumph, 
they  permit  themselves  to  be  divided  &  distracted  about  men,  and  thereby 
perhaps  enable  our  political  adversaries  to  take  advantage  of  our  divisions, — 
throAV  the  election  into  the  House,  Avhen  there  is  danger  that  the  money  of 
the  Bank  and  the  patronage  of  the  Government, — would  corrupt  &  purchase 
votes  enough  to  carry  the  election  against  us.  It  must  certainly  be  the  desire 
of  our  party,  who  are  emphatically — from  the  policy  Ave  advocate,  the  party 
of  the  country,— if  possible  to  continue  united  and  not  divide  about  men. 
I  think  the  party  should  unite  if  it  be  possible  and  run  but  one  man,  and 
it  would  assuredly  give  me  pleasure  should  Judge  White  be  that  man.  Sup- 
pose Ave  divide  and  select  more  than  one  candidate, — and  suffer  the  friends 
of  our  respective  candidates  to  become  irritated  &  exci[ted]  against  each 
other;  may  not  the  opposition,  and  avlU  they  not  take  adA^antage  of  such  a 
state  of  things,  and  at  a  moment  when  it  shall  be  too  late  for  us  to  retrace 
our  steps,  and  re-unite  our  friends  in  favor  of  any  one,  suddenly  push  out  a 
candidate  of  their  oAvn,  defeat  an  election  before  the  people,  throAV  the  elec- 
tion into  the  House  and  thus  stand  a  fair  chance  to  come  into  poAver 
against  the  popular  will.  To  meet  such  a  state  of  things  I  repeat  A\'e 
should  continue  united  and  if  possible  run  but  one  man.  Should  Judge 
White  be  the  man  upon  whom  the  party  unite,  none  Avould  support  him 
with  more  pleasure  than  myself.  Upon  this  subject,  the  present  moment 
may  be  an  important  crisis.  As  soon  as  Congress  assembled, — many  of  the 
opposition  members  expressed  Avishes  that  Judge  White  should  be  brought 
out  and  announced  their  intention  to  support  him, — if  he  Avas  &c.  Their 
motive  for  this,  the  game  they  Avill  play  hereafter  or  the  subject  they  hope 
to  effect,  I  knoAv  not  except — that  they  Avould  doubtless  do  any  thing  in 
their  poAver  to  divide  &  scatter  us.  That  portion  of  our  delegation  in  W* 
Tennessee,  Avho  manifested  such  unprovoked  hostility  to  me  during  the  past 
summer — I  mean  the  Speaker,  Dickinson  &e.  probably  think  they  can  make 
something  out  of  this  state  of  things  to  my  prejudice,  and  for  their  OAvn 
purposes, — have  been  zealous,  or  pretended  to  be  so,  to  bring  Judge  White 


72  JAMES   E.  POLK 

out  at  once,  and  at  all  events,  without  waiting  to  consult  any  portion  of 
the  democratic  party — residing  in  other  states  with  whom  we  have  so 
long  acted, — and  who  have  so  long  acted  with  us  in  supporting  the  admin- 
istration of  tlie  present  Chief  Magistrate.  Ought  they  not  to  be  at  least 
consulted  before  such  a  step  is  taken?  But  that  portion  of  our  delegation 
probably  think  that  by  taking  this  course  they  will  gain  an  advantage  of 
me  in  Tennessee  and  that  by  uniting  with  the  opposition  Mr.  B[ell]  may  be 
enabled  to  retain  his  place  here  at  the  next  Congress,  in  the  same  way  he 
originally  obtained  it.  The  East  Tennessee  part  of  our  delegation  very 
honestly  and  sincerely  desire  to  see  Judge  White  elected.  On  the  day  before 
yesterday  I  was  informed  by  Col.  Standifer  that  there  was  to  be  a  meeting 
of  the  delegation, — on  the  night  following  (last  night)  upon  the  subject 
and  was  requested  to  attend.  On  yesterday  Mr.  Lea  spoke  to  me  on  the 
subject  &  told  me  the  meeting  was  to  be  at  Peyton's  room  and  urged  us  to 
attend.  I  told  him  that  my  attending  or  not  attending  was  a  matter  of  no 
consequence; — that  neither  my  own  opinions  or  that  of  my  constituents  of 
Judge  White  would  be  changed, — whether  I  attended  or  not;  that  I  had  no 
commission  from  my  constituents  to  speak  for  them;  that,  that  was  a  matter 
they  Avould  attend  to  for  themselves,  Avhen  the  time  came  for  them  to  act; 
that  I  was  very  laboriously  engaged  in  the  discharge  of  my  public  duty  as  a 
member  of  the  House;  and  that  I  did  not  regard  the  proposed  meeting  as 
any  part  of  that  duty.  I  told  him  furthermore  that  I  could  not  but  suspect 
that,  that  portion  of  our  delegation  who  are,  without  cause  given  by  me  so 
exceedingly  hostile  to  me,  were  prompted  in  this  movement  more  in  the  hope 
of  injuring  me,  than  for  any  love  they  had  for  Judge  White.  And  further- 
more I  told  him,  that  what  was  conducive  against  my  attendance  Avas  this — 
that  I  could  not  without  losing  all  self-respect  go  into  a  consultation  upon 
any  subject, —  (unless  public  duty  required  it,)  with  that  portion  of  our 
delegation, — who  had  during  the  past  summer  through  their  organs  and 
tools  so  unjustly  and  wantonly  assailed  me,  and  especially  when  I  was 
informed  that  the  meeting  was  to  take  place  at  the  room  of  a  coUeaguess 
who  was  certainly  unfriendly  in  his  feelings  towards  me,  and  had  never 
invited  me  to  come  to  it.  For  these  reasons  I  declined  and  did  not  attend. 
The  meeting  was  held,  Grundy,  Blair  &  myself  absent.  Johnson  attended — 
but  will  probably  communicate  to  the  delegation  his  views  in  writing;  they 
entirely  accord  with  mine.  I  understand  that  Dunlap  (though  I  have  not 
talked  to  him)  agrees  in  his  views  with  Johnson  and  myself.  I  write  you 
very  confidentially — that  you  may  be  apprised  of  what  is  going  on  Iiere. 
From  the  unfairness  -with  which  I  have  been  treated  in  other  things  I  liave 
reason  to  suspect  that  letters  may  be  written  homo  misrepresenting  me  upon 


25  Peyton,  who  was  White's  nephew,  had  o])i)osed  Polk  in  the  Speaker- 
ship election  and  had  given  as  his  reason,  according  to  Cave  Johnson,  that 
Polk  had  worked  with  the  NuUifiers!  (Johnson  to  Polk,  July  15,  1834, 
Polk-  Papers). 


JUDGE   WRITE  AND  THE   PRESIDENCY  73 

tliis; — probably  reprosenting  from  my  absence  from  the  meeting,  that  I  am 
unfriendly  to  Judge  White  &c. — and  I  look  for  nothing  else  than  to  see 
some  misinformation  in  regard  to  it,  through  the  Nashville  papers.  I  write 
you  to  put  you  in  possession  of  the  facts, — that  you  may  in  the  proper  way, 
and  without  using  my  letter  publicly  be  enabled  to  put  the  matter  right. 
I  wish  you  to  take  so  much  of  your  time  from  your  business — which  I  know 
to  be  pressing  upon  your  time,  as  to  write  me  your  opinion  fully  &  freely 
upon  the  subject; — and  whether  you  think  I  have  acted  prudently  or  not. 
I  have  acted  upon  my  convictions  of  what  was  proper, — and  vnih  feelings  of 
most  perfect  friendship  for  Judge  White.     Can  I  be  affected  by  it? 

James  Walker,  Esq., 

Columbia,  Tenn. 

Very  sincerely, 

Yr  friend, 

James  K.  Polkss 

This  letter  seems  to  give  ample  reasons  why  a  man  of  Polk's 
well-known  belief  in  party  loyalty  should  not  support  the  appar- 
ently hopeless  cause  of  Judge  White.  It  is  not  fair  to  assume, 
as  the  friends  of  White  have  done,  that  those  who  did  not  come 
out  for  the  judge  were  necessarily  the  abject  creatures  of  General 
Jackson.  There  was  only  one  man  whose  support  could,  by  any 
possibility,  have  elevated  White  to  the  Presidential  chair.  That 
man  was  Jackson  himself ;  and  neither  Polk  nor  those  who  acted 
with  him  could  hope,  even  if  they  had  so  desired,  to  alter  the  Presi- 
dent's  determination  to  aid  Van  Buren.  To  support  White,  as 
Polk  pointed  out,  would  result  in  splitting  the  party  and  endang- 
ering its  success,  without  benefiting  the  judge  in  any  particular. 
It  was  too  much  to  ask  of  Polk  to  cooperate  with  men  whom  he 
both  distrusted  and  despised  as  he  did  Bell  and  Peyton  in  sup- 
porting a  candidate  who  would  inevitably  be  defeated.  There 
is  no  reason  for  questioning  the  sincerity  of  Polk's  belief  that 
Bell  was  flirting  with  the  opposition,  as  he  had  done  when  he 
was  a  candidate  for  Speaker.  The  assertions  made  by  Polk, 
Grundy,  and  Johnson  that  they  would  gladly  support  White  if 
he  could  procure  the  party  nomination  were  said  by  their  oppon- 
ents to  be  pure  cant  and  of  course  there  was  no  possibility  of  his 


2«  The  letter  is  dated  Dec.  24,  18.34,  Polk  Papers. 


74  JAMES  K.  POLE 

procuring  such  a  nomination  unless  Jackson  should  change  his 
mind — but  there  is  nothing  in  their  private  correspondence  to 
indicate  that  they  did  not  really  prefer  White  to  Van  Buren. 

On  the  day  after  the  above  letter  was  written  Polk  wrote-^ 
another  "confidential"  letter  to  Walker.  Alluding  to  the  former 
letter  he  said: 

Since  then  the  fact  that  a  meeting  took  place  and  the  objects  of  it  has  been 

communicated  to  28  and  my  course  is  higlily  approved. 

The  meeting  has  attracted  attention  and  things  as  they  really  are  in  Ten- 
nessee, are  beginning  to  be  well  understood  here.  He  says  that  if  Judge 
White  should  be  united  upon  and  be  a  candidate  of  the  party — that  then  he 
should  be  supported  by  the  party — but  any  portion  of  those  professing  to 
be  the  friends  of  the  administration  who  Avould  bring  him  or  any  one  else 
out — without  consulting  the  wishes  of  the  friends  of  the  administration  in 
other  States,  ■will  eventually  not  only  destroy  him  but  themselves.  The 
storm  I  apprehended  is  to  burst  upon  us,  and  we  in  Tennessee  must  be 
I^repared  to  meet  it.  Wliatever  our  personal  preferences  for  men  may  be,  as 
patriots  we  should  go  for  the  good  of  the  country, — and  to  that  end  should 
avoid  divisions — and  preserve  if  possible  the  integrity  of  the  party. 

The  portion  of  the  letter  just  quoted  clearly  indicates  that  Polk 
declined  to  attend  the  meeting  without  having  a  consultation  with 
the  President.  Continuing,  he  told  Walker  that  the  person  to 
whom  he  has  alluded  (Jackson  ?) 

says  he  has  already  heard  that  it  has  been  dropped  out  by  some  one  of  the 
opposition,  that  the  plan  of  their  operation,  is  upon  the  Bell  system,  alluding 
to  the  Speaker's  election.  I  will  not  be  hasty  or  imprudent  in  this  matter, — 
but  may  venture  to  communicate  what  is  passing  to  you.^^ 

He  wished  to  know  whether  Tennessee  would  probably  send  dele- 
gates to  the  national  convention  of  the  party.     He  instructed 


27  Polk  to  Walker,  Dec.  25,  1834,  Polk  Papers. 

2S  Blanks  in  the  copy  in  the  Polk  collection,  but  evidently  moan  Jackson. 

-'■>  Cave  Johnson,  Polk  told  Walker,  had  written  to  the  Tennessee  dele- 
gation stating  that  he  would  not  support  White  "if  he  is  to  be  run  by 
the  opposition  Nationals  and  Nullifiers, — aided  by  a  small  portion  of  the 
Jackson  party."  Polk,  Dunla^j,  and  Blair  felt  the  same  way,  and  "Grundy 
is  more  excited  than  I  have  almost  ever  seen  him, — and  seems  almost 
ready  to  come  out  and  denounce  the  whole  movement, — as  calculated  to 
divide  and  destroy  the  party. ' ' 


JVDGE    WHITE  AND  THE  PRESIDENCY  75 

Walker  to  prevail  upon  the  Columbia  Observer  to  support  the 
regular  nominee  in  ease  its  favorite  should  fail  to  procure  the 
nomination.  To  this  Walker  replied"*"  that  he  preferred  White 
if  he  could  be  nominated  by  the  party,  but  he  feared  that  a  split 
would  make  success  doubtful.  He  promised  to  induce  the 
Observer,  if  possible,  to  support  the  national  ticket  whoever 
might  be  nominated. 

In  a  formal  statement  prepared  by  Polk^^  several  items  con- 
cerning the  meeting  of  the  Tennessee  delegation  in  Washington 
are  related  which  are  not  mentioned  in  his  letters  to  Walker. 
According  to  this  account,  on  the  Sunday  night  before  Congress 
convened,  while  Polk  was  calling  on  Grundy,  Duff  Green  came 
in  and  urged  that  the  Tennessee  members  should  come  out  for 
White.  Green  expressed  his  OAvn  readiness  to  support  the  judge. 
Polk  remained  silent,  but  Grundy  replied  that  he  was  not  pre- 
pared to  act  on  this  subject.  Although  Polk  had  declined  to  meet 
Mdth  the  other  delegates.  Lea,  of  Tennessee,  came  to  the  House 
a  few  days  after  the  meeting  had  been  held  and  handed  Polk  a 
letter  which  the  delegation  had  prepared  to  send  to  Judge  White. 
There  were  no  signatures  attached  and  Lea  explained  that  the 
delegation  had  desired  to  have  Polk  sign  it  first.     Polk  replied 

30  Jan.  12,  1835  (Poll:  Papers).  Walker  had  already  written  on  Jan- 
uary 7  that  it  had  been  reported  in  Tennessee  that  Bell  and  others  in- 
tended to  run  White  whether  he  is  chosen  by  the  national  convention  or 
not.  "I  believe  Judge  White  is  the  most  popular  man  in  Tennessee  ex- 
cept Gen.  Jackson,  but  I  do  not  think  it  is  certain  that  even  he  can  get 
the  vote  of  Tennessee  in  opposition  to  the  regular  nomination  of  the 
Eepublican  party — it  looks  like  suicide — and  how  can  we  mix  with  such 
men  as  Poindexter  and  others  of  the  same  stamp?"  He  hopes  that  White 
will  not  lend  his  name  to  the  scheme. 

31  It  is  addressed  to  J.  B.  &  Co.  (John  Bell  &  Co.),  but  is  changed  into 
a  letter  to  Cave  Johnson.  It  is  dated  January  20,  but  relates  to  events 
that  occurred  as  late  as  March  26.  It  probably  is  the  first  draft  of  his 
statement  addressed  to  Johnson  under  date  of  March  26.  In  another  letter 
to  Johnson,  dated  March  28,  Polk  gives  his  reason  for  addressing  him 
instead  of  Bell.  Bell's  criticisms  of  Polk  had  been  contained  in  a  letter 
written  to  Johnson,  and,  as  Polk  had  received  no  comnninication  directly 
from  Bell,  he  could  not  write  to  him;  or,  if  he  should  do  so,  Bell  woulil 
not  publish  the  letter.  So  it  was  sent  to  Johnson  for  publication  at  the 
proper  time. 


76  JAMES   E.   POLE 

that  he  had  nothing  against  White,  but  would  not  act  with  a 
portion  of  the  party.  A  few  days  later  Hubbard,  of  New  Hamp- 
shire, informed  Polk  that  Green  was  trying  to  interest  members 
of  Congress  in  the  establishment  of  a  White  paper  in  Washing- 
ton. Bell  had  tried  to  convince  Hubbard  that  it  would  benefit 
New  Hampshire  to  join  with  the  South  and  West  in  forming  a 
new  party,  but  Hubbard  declined  to  cooperate  with  liim.  May, 
of  Illinois,  told  Polk  that  he  had  "stumbled  on  a  caucus"  com- 
posed of  Bell,  Peyton,  and  other  Tennessee  members.  To  May's 
protests  against  dividing  the  party,  Bell  replied  that  he  saw  no 
sacrifice  of  principle  in  winning  opposition  votes.  In  all  of 
this  Polk  saw — or,  at  least,  pretended  to  see — a  plot  of  Bell, 
Green,  and  Crockett'^-  to  use  Judge  White  for  the  purpose  of 
overthrowing  the  Republican  party. 

The  other  side  of  the  story  is  told  in  letters  written  to  Cave 
Johnson  by  other  members  of  the  Tennessee  delegation.  These. 
White's  biographer  has  published  for  the  purpose  of  showing 
the  ' '  duplicity  of  Johnson  and  Polk. '  '^^  The  essential  difference 
between  these  letters  and  those  of  Polk  above  quoted  is  that  they 
state  that  Polk  and  Johnson  had  expressed  a  preference  for  White 
over  any  other  man  and  had  agreed  to  support  him  "under 
any  circumstances  that  he,  Judge  White,  would  permit  his  name 
to  be  used,"  while  Polk  maintained  that  he  had  promised  sup- 
port only  in  case  White  should  be  nominated  by  the  party.  Which 
of  the  two  statements  is  correct  we  are  unable  to  determine  with 
absolute  certainty,  but  Polk's  version  accords  with  his  invariable 
practice  of  conforming  to  the  party  program. '^^ 

While  Polk  was  declining  to  meet  with  Bell,  his  friend  Brady 
was  sending  to  Jackson  and  to  members  of  Congress  copies  of  the 


3-  Crockett  had  signeil  the  letter  to  White. 

33  Scott,  Memoir  of  Hugh  Lawson  White,  2;39-262. 

34  Standifer  asserted  tliat  the  meeting  of  the  delegation  held  for  the 
purpose  of  considering  White's  nomination  "was  a  project  of  my  own 
without  being  j)roniptetl  by  any  one."  Both  Polk  and  Grundy,  he  said, 
after  ascertaining  that  Bell  would  be  there,  declined  to  attend  the  meeting 
{ihid.,  260-262). 


JUDGE   WHITE  AND  THE  PRESIDENCY  77 

Murfreesborougli  Monitor  containing  Bell's  Murfreesborough 
speech.  He  also  urged  upon  Polk  the  necessity  of  establishing 
an  administration  paper  in  Nashville. ''•'*  The  plan  of  the  bolters, 
he  said,  was  "White  for  eight  years,  and  then  "the  Speaker  will 
graciously  condescend  to  take  upon  himself  the  burthens  of 
State." 

There  is  abundant  evidence  that  Polk's  Tennessee  friends 
really  believed  that  Bell  and  his  adherents  were  plotting  to  divide 
the  part}'.  Daniel  Graham  of  Murfreesborough  wrote-^"  that, 
M'hile  he  preferred  White  to  any  other  man,  he  distrusted  his 
supporters.  "No  one  here  doubts,"  wrote  Polk's  brother-in-law, 
W.  K.  Rucker,  "that  he  [Bell]  is  a  thorough  Bank  man  and  at 
heart  (though  a  dissembling  hypocrite)  one  of  Gen^  Jackson's 
bitterest  enemies."^'  In  the  opinion  of  James  Walker,  another 
brother-in-law.  Van  Buren  was  the  only  man  who  could  lead  the 
part}'  to  victory.  "We  justly  esteem  and  appreciate  Judge 
White,  but  cannot  consent  to  become  the  tools  of  the  opposition, 
or  to  be  associated  in  political  feeling  with  such  as  Poindexter  & 
others. ' '^-  A.  V.  Brown,  one  of  Polk 's  closest  friends,  preferred 
White  as  a  successor  to  Jackson  but  asked  the  question, 

Do  the  Whigs  really  mean  to  do  something  finally  for  him — or  is  it  a  part 
of  their  policy  to  make  a  present  shew  in  his  favor  to  effect  division  in  the 
Jackson  ranks  &  so  weaken  Mr.  Van  Buren  &  then  finally  press  some 
favorite  of  their  own  &  so  throw  the  Election  in  the  House  ?39 

Childress  informed  Polk^°  that  it  was  rumored  in  Nashville  that 
Bell  and  his  friends  were  confident  of  throwing  the  election  into 
the  House,  where  White  would  have  a  majority,  and  that  they 


35  Brady  to  Polk,  Dec.  26,  1834,  Polk  Papers. 

36  Graham  to  Polk,  Jan.  2,  1835,  Polk  Papers. 

3' Rucker  to  Polk,  Jan.  5,  1835,  Polk  Papers.  "Don't  misunderstand 
me,"  he  added,  "I  like  White  as  w-ell  as  any  of  these  peoi^le,  but  1  don't 
like  these  intriguing  friends  of  his."  He  urged  Polk  to  inform  Jackson 
of  the  intrigues. 

3s  Walker  to  Polk,  Jan.  15,  1835,  Polk  Papers. 

3!*  Brown  to  Polk,  Jan.  15,  1835,  Polk  Papers. 

•*o  Childress  to  Polk,  Jan.  23,  1835,  Polk  Papers.  Childress  was  Mrs. 
Polk  's  brother. 


78  •  JAMES  E.   POLE 

were  equally  confident  of  defeating  Polk  and  Cave  Johnson  at 
the  coming  election. 

The  anomalous  situation  in  Tennessee  Avas  aptly  put  by 
another  of  Polk's  correspondents. 

The  more  I  reflect  on  the  posture  of  affairs,  the  more  am  I  provoked  at  the 
success  of  iniquit)'.  Ahiiost  every  man  in  the  community  who  takes  part 
in  or  cares  for  public  doings,  finds  himself  occupying  a  false  position  which 
he  is  compelled  to  defend.  I  shall  find  myself  opposed  to  Judge  White, 
which  is  not  true,  so  of  Doct  Eucker  &  thousands  of  others — whilst  thousands 
will  find  themselves  opposed  to  Genl  Jackson  who  are  sincerely  with  him. 
Furthermore  Genl  Jackson  &  Judge  White  will  find  themselves  in  hostile 
attitude  before  the  scene  closes,  whatever  may  be  their  hopes  and  expectations 
now.4i 

All  agreed  that  John  Bell  was  the  man  who  had  created  this 
embarrassing  predicament. 

No  doubt  the  intriguing  of  White's  supporters  was  greatly 
exaggerated,  but  it  seemed  real  enough  to  those  who  were  striving 
to  preserve  party  solidarity.  Jackson's  determination  to  force 
upon  the  people  an  unpopular  candidate  was  after  all  the  main 
cause  of  the  difficulty,  for  many  could  not  pass  White  by  and 
support  Van  Buren  without  sacrificing  their  principles.  Party 
loyalty  alone  kept  others  from  espousing  White's  cause,  and  for 
some  time  many  of  Jackson's  friends  had  hopes  that  he  might 
yet  drop  Van  Buren  and  acquiesce  in  White's  nomination.^- 

The  President,  however,  had  no  thought  of  abandoning  his 
favorite.  He  vehemently  condemned  the  activities  of  the  Tenn- 
essee delegation,  and  he  was  beginning  to  regard  Bell  as  an 
enemy. '^  Back  of  the  encouragement  given  to  White  by  political 
opponents  was  seen  the  hand  of  Henry  Clay,  who  was  believed 
to  be  ready  to  seize  any  advantage  that  nught  result  from  throw- 
ing the  election  into  the  House.^* 


41  Daniel  Graham  to  Polk,  Jan.  29,  1835,  Polk  Papers. 

42  Gen.  Sam  '1  G.  Smith  to  Polk,  Feb.  3,  1835,  Polk  Papers. 

43  Polk  to  Walker,  Jan.  18,  1835,  Polk  Papers. 

44  Copy  of  a  letter  from  Polk  to  somebody  in  Tennessee,  dated  Feb- 
ruary 7,  1835,  Polk  Papers.  The  letter  was  probably  written  to  James 
Walker;  see  Walker  to  Polk,  Feb.  24,  ibid. 


JUDGE   WHITE  AND  THE  PEESIDENCY  79 

After  the  meeting  of  the  Tennessee  delegation,  White  of 
course  realized  that  the  members  had  divided  on  the  question 
of  supporting  him.  He  regretted  the  discord  that  had  arisen  hut 
nevertheless  declined  to  forbid  the  use  of  his  name.*'  On  Decem- 
ber 29,  1834,  the  delegation  had  addressed  him  a  letter  asking 
if  he  would  accept  a  nomination,  and  he  replied  in  the  affirma- 
tive.*" He  said  afterwards  that  he  would  never  have  consented 
to  become  a  candidate  but  for  Jackson's  threat  to  make  him 
' '  odious  to  society ' '  if  he  did.*" 

Outwardly,  at  least,  the  judge  remained  on  friendly  terms 
with  the  Tennessee  members  of  Congress  who  had  opposed  his 
nomination  until  a  controversy  arose  over  a  question  of  patron- 
age. Polk  and  Johnson  had  recommended,  and  Jackson  had 
appointed,  a  district  attorney  for  "West  Tennessee  without  con- 
sulting Senator  White.  In  a  letter  to  the  two  raen*^  White  inti- 
mated that  there  had  been  "secret  contrivance"  to  bring  about 
the  appointment.  If,  as  White's  biographer  asserts,  these  two 
Tennesseans  "had  determined  to  pick  a  quarrel  with  Judge 
White,"  they  now  had  their  opportunity — and  they  certainly 
made  the  most  of  it.  They  replied  in  a  very  caustic  letter  in 
which  they  repelled  what  they  regarded  as  insinuations  against 
themselves  and  the  President.  White's  rejoinder  was  equally 
caustic,  and  the  break  was  complete.*" 

It  is  quite  possible  that  Polk  may  have  welcomed  such  an 
excuse  for  openly  breaking  with  the  judge.  The  time  had  arrived 
when  he  must  take  a  definite  stand  for  one  side  or  the  other, 
inasmuch  as  it  was  now  certain  that  the  opposition  intended  to 


45  White  to  Alexander,  Jan.  12,  1835  (Scott,  Memoir  of  Hugh  Lawson 
White,  255). 

*6  Correspondence  in  Scott,  Memoir  of  Hugh  Lawson  White,  329-331. 

•IT  Speech  at  Knoxville,  Aug.  1,  1838  (Scott,  Memoir  of  Hugh  Lawson 
White,  359). 

48  Dated  Feb.  24,  1835  (Pom  Papers). 

49  The  correspondence  may  be  found  in  the  Polk  Papers  under  dates  of 
February  24-26.  Part  of  it  is  printed  in  Scott,  Memoir  of  Hugh  Lawson 
White,  256-259. 


80  JAMES   K.   POLK 

use  White  for  the  purpose  of  defeating  the  nomination  of  an 
administration  candidate — that  is  a  regular  Republican  nomi- 
nation/'" Such  being  the  case,  both  self-interest  and  party  loyalty 
beckoned  in  the  same  direction,  for  he  could  expect  no  favors 
from  the  men  who  were  promoting  the  campaign  for  White's 
nomination.  Bell  was  his  personal  enemy  and  political  rival; 
many  letters  warned  him  that  the  White  adherents  were  schem- 
ing, as  one  put  it,  "to  get  White  &  the  people  upon  one  side  & 
Van  Buren  &  my  friend  Col.  Polk  on  the  other.  "^^  Having  made 
the  inevitable  choice,  Polk  endeavored,  through  James  Walker 
and  other  local  leaders,  to  hold  his  constituents  in  line  for  the 
administration,  but  White's  popularity  was  already  playing 
havoc  with  party  solidarity.^-  At  a  political  meeting  held  in 
Columbia  on  February  12,  Walker,  by  resolution,  tried  to  pledge 
the  meeting  to  the  "party  candidate."  The  resolution  was  de- 
feated by  the  aid  of  many  who  had  hitherto  been  averse  to 
White's  nomination."'^  Not  long  after  this  Walker  felt  certain 
that  White  would  carry  Tennessee  and  he  cautioned  Polk  that 
"non  interference  may  be  your  true  position.""'* 

Nearly  all  the  newspapers  in  Tennessee  favored  White 's  nom- 
ination. Bell  controlled  both  Nashville  papers,  and  late  in  Feb- 
ruary F.  K.  Zollicoffer,  of  the  Columbia  Observer,  hoisted  the 
White  banner.  Polk  and  his  friends  in  Middle  Tennessee  were 
without  an  organ  of  influence  until  they  established,  a  month 
later,  the  Nashville  Union.,  which  White,  in  a  speech  in  the  Senate, 


50  Polk  to (probably  Walker),  Feb.  7,  IS.^o,  Poll-  Papers. 

51  James  H.  Thomas  to  Polk,  Feb.  12,  1885,  PoJk  Papers.  J.  W.  ChiM- 
ress  Avroto  (Jan.  23)  that  Polk  and  Johnson  had  been  marked  for  defeat. 
Similar  information  came  from  Gen.  Smith  (Feb.  13),  W.  G.  Childress  and 
James  Walker  (both  Feb.  14),  ibid. 

52  Some  in  Tennessee,  said  W.  G.  Childress  in  his  letter  of  February  14, 
"seem  to  think  or  to  say  that  Jackson,  the  Jackson  ])nrty  and  Jackson 
administration  will  soon  be  no  more,  that  the  whole  will  be  swallowed  in 
the  White  party." 

5:i  "The  small  politicians  arc  all  on  the  scent  and  expect  to  rise  on  the 
White  excitement"  (Walker  to  Polk,  Feb.  24,  1835,  Polk  Papers). 
54  Walker  to  Polk,  Feb.  28,  1835,  ibid. 


JUDGE   WHITE  AND   THE   PRESIDENCY  81 

called  a  "vehicle  of  slanders  and  falsehoods,  gotten  up  in  this 
city  [Washington]"  for  the  purpose  of  distorting  the  truth.'''' 
This  paper  was  edited  by  Samuel  II.  Laughlin ;  its  policy  was 
directed  by  Polk,  Grundy,  and  Judge  Catron,  who  were  mainly 
responsible  for  its  financial  support. 

Polk  returned  home  after  Congress  had  adjourned,  only  to 
find  White's  prospects  daily  growing  brighter.  In  a  speech  de- 
livered at  Columbia,  April  20,  he  justified  his  refusal  to  join 
other  members  of  the  delegation  in  asking  White  to  run  on  the 
ground  that  he  had  not  been  sent  to  Washington  for  the  purpose 
of  making  presidents.  His  personal  preference  had  been  for 
-White,  he  said,  if  he  could  have  been  nominated  by  the  Repub- 
lican party.''"  Grundy  approved  this  speech,  but  as  to  any  further 
discussion  of  the  subject  his  advice  to  Polk  was  that  "the 
judicious  course  is  a  plain  one — say  nothing."^' 

In  Washington,  General  Jackson  was  eagerly  awaiting  news 
from  Tennessee.  He  was  now  fully  convinced  of  Bell's  "per- 
fidy," but  apparently  he  did  not  yet  realize  the  strength  of  the 
White  movement.  In  a  long  letter^^  he  expressed  a  fear  that 
Polk's  promised  communication  had  been  delayed  by  illness, 
for  I  am  sure  the  little  noise,  and  various  meetings,  got  up 
by  the  instrumentality  of  Mr.  Bell  and  Co.  cannot  have  alarmed 
you."  After  delivering  a  homily  on  the  iniquity  of  abandoning 
principles,  and  citing  Clay,  Calhoun,  and  Burr  as  horrible  ex- 
amples, he  said  that  "Mr.  Bell,  Davy  Crockett  &  Co.  has  placed 
Judge  White  in  the  odious  attitude  of  abandoning  principle  & 
party  for  office,"  and  with  the  association  of  the  nullifiers 

The  eyes  of  the  people  soon  were  opened  to  this  Avicked  plan,  to  divide  and 
conquer  the  Democracy  of  the  union,  prostrate  the  present  administration 
by  making  it  odious  by  crying  out  corruption  and  misrule,  and  being  sup- 
ported by  office  holders,  and  corruption,  thereby  to   bring  into  power  the 


55  Scott,  Memoir  of  Hugh  Luicson  White.  292. 

56  Speech  printed  in  the  Washington  Globe,  May  29,  1835. 
5"  Grundy  to  Polk,  May  11,  1835,  Polk  Papers. 

58  Jackson  to  Polk,  May  3,  1835,  ibid.    The  letter  was  marked  "private 
for  your  own  eye — it  is  wrote  in  haste." 


82  JAMES  E.  POLK 

opposition,  recharter  the  United  States  Bank,  destroying  tlie  republican 
government  &  substitute  in  its  stead,  a  consolidated  government  under  the 
controle  of  a  corrupt  monied  monopoly. 

After  scanning  this  doleful  picture  of  a  future  possibility.  Polk 
must  have  felt  relieved  when  he  read  further  on  that  "Mr.  Bell 
&  Co.  have  not  succeeded — Virginia  is  erect  again."  "Surely," 
continued  the  President,  "Tennessee  will  never  put  herself  in 
the  false  position  of  joining  the  piedbald  opposition  of  "Whiggs, 
nullifiers,  blue  light  federalists,  and  Hartford  convention  men. 
It  cannot  be — heaven  and  every  principle  of  virtue  and  repub- 
licanism forbid  it."  Had  White  remained  wath  his  party,  said 
Jackson,  he  might  have  procured  the  Vice-Presidency,  but 

he  has  been  placed  by  Mr,  Bell  &  Co.  as  the  candidate  of  the  opposition 
under  the  odious  imputation  of  abandoning  his  old  republican  principles  & 
party,  for  office,  and  whether  he  has  or  not  the  world  has  taken  up  that 
opinion,  and  he  never  can  regain  the  confidence  of  that  party  again.  The 
opposition  never  intended  that  he  should  be  elected,  they  meant  to  divide, 
that  they  might  conquer  for  Mr.  Clay  who,  you  may  rely,  is  to  be  their 
candidate  at  last. 

He  had  hopes  that  "judge  White's  eyes  may  be  opened  and  he 
will  now  see  that  he  is  in  a  false  position  and  abandon  Bell,  Davy 
Crockett  &  Co.,  and  withdraw  himself  from  the  odious  attitude 
intriguing  apostates  have  placed  him  [in]." 

It  was  doubtless  pleasing  news  that  Jackson  thus  fixed  the 
blame  for  disrupting  the  party  upon  Polk's  own  enemies,  Bell 
and  Crockett.    Equally  pleasing  must  it  have  been  to  read  that 

You  and  Grundy,  (by  the  true  Republicans  in  Congress)  are  looked  to,  to 
take  a  firm  and  open  stand  in  favour  of  the  republican  principles,  a  national 
convention  by  the  people,  and  in  toto,  against  nullification  &  disunion — and 
against  little  caucuses,  of  a  few  apostate  members  of  congress,  &  preserve 
Tennessee  from  the  disgrace  of  uniting  with  the  piebald  opposition  to  put 
down  my  administration,  and  my  fame  with  it,  and  gi-ve  the  reigns  of 
Government  into  the  hands  of  those  who  have  recently  conspired  to  recharter 
the  Bank. 

In  this  fight  for  pi'inciples,  said  the  President,  all  must  take  a 
definite  stand;  "do  your  duty  (as  you  have  done  here)  at  home, 


JUDGE   WHITE   AND  THE   PRESIDENCY  83 

ami  you  will  stand  high  with  the  republicans  everywhere."  Sav- 
ing Tennessee  proved  to  be  a  more  diflficult  ta§k  than  Jackson 
had  anticipated,  but,  by  attempting  to  do  so,  Polk  and  Grundy 
earned  his  undying  gratitude. 

In  the  President's  opinion,  two  mutually  antagonistic  factions 
had  joined  forces  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  the  Republican 
party.  While  Bell  and  Clay  were  aiming  at  consolidated  govern- 
ment, Calhoun  and  his  friends  were  using  White's  name  "to  build 
up  a  Southern  confederacy  and  divide  the  union."  The  President 
still  spoke  of  White  with  regret  more  than  anger.  He  did  not 
charge  him  with  being  either  a  consolidationist  or  a  nullifier, 
and  he  still  had  hopes  that  the  judge  would  free  himself  from 
the  intluence  of  evil  associates. 

Jackson  was  much  encouraged  by  the  success  won  by  his  party 
in  Virginia,  Rhode  Island,  and  Connecticut.  As  to  Tennessee 
he  had  fears,  but  he  also  had  hopes.  "Can  it  be,"  he  said  in 
closing  his  letter, 

that  Tennessee  Avill  abandon  republican  principles  and  be  ranked  -with 
apostates,  nuUifiers  &  bluelight  Federalist — Tristam  Burges  says  she  will — 
forbit  it  virtue,  forbit  it  heaven — Tennessee  has  sustained  me  thus  far, 
and  I  trust  she  never  will  abandon  her  principles  for  any  person. 

In  another  long  letter  written  to  Polk  on  May  12,  Jackson  vented 
his  wrath  upon  those  who  held  political  control  of  the  state  for 
their  refusal  to  participate  in  the  national  nominating  conven- 
tion.^'' "How  it  is,"  he  asked,  "that  there  is  no  man  in  the 
Republican  ranks  to  take  the  stump,  and  relieve  Tennessee  from 
her  degraded  attitude  ? ' '  This  question  may  have  been  intended 
as  a  hint  for  a  more  aggressive  stand  on  Polk's  part.  "If  I  was 
a  mere  citizen  of  Tennessee  again,"  he  continued,  "and  wanted 


59  For  example,  the  Nashville  Banner,  denouncing  the  national  conven- 
tion, said:  "So  long  as  we  live  and  breathe  American  air,  we  v\'ill  resist 
the  insidious  proposition  (whensoever  and  wheresoever  it  may  originate), 
to  lay  at  the  feet  of  village  politicians  and  placemen,  who  most  usually  fill 
conventions,  the  inestimable  privilege  of  thinking  and  acting  for  ourselves 
in  the  choice  of  our  rulers."  Quoted  in  Niles'  Register  (March  28,  1835), 
XL VIII,  58. 


84  JAMES  K.  POLK 

everlasting  fame,  I  would  ask  no  other  theatre  to  obtain  it  than 
before  the  people  of  Tennessee.  ""^  In  this  letter  Jackson  spoke 
of  the  seceders  as  "White  Whiggs, "  and  although  both  White 
and  Bell  still  claimed  membership  in  the  Republican  party,  the 
press  of  both  parties  was  beginning  to  class  them  as  Whigs. ^^ 
It  was  becoming  the  custom  to  apply  this  name  to  the  National 
Republicans,  of  whom  Clay  was  a  recognized  leader ;  they,  Avith 
the  White  supporters,  constituted  the  new  Whig  party.®- 

The  desire  of  the  Jacksonites  to  identify  White  and  Bell  with 
the  Clay  faction  of  the  Whigs  w^as  aided  materially  by  the  dis- 
covery of  Bell's  "Cassedy"  or  "Bedford"  letter  of  May  11, 
1835.*'^  There  is  nothing  particularly  damaging  to  either  man 
in  the  letter  itself,  but  as  construed  and  placed  before  the  people 
by  their  opponents,  it  was  said  to  be  a  pledge  that  White,  if 
elected,  would  not  veto  any  law  for  rechartering  the  bank.  The 
latter   part   of   it   was   construed   as   a  suggestion   that   Polk's 


00  In  Poll'  Papers.    Jackson 's  signature  has  been  cut  from  this  letter. 

01  "Elected,  if  elected  at  all,  by  the  votes  of  the  Whigs,  he  [White] 
will  naturally  and  necessarily  select  his  councillors  from  their  ranks,  and 
modify  his  measures  according  to  their  views."  Richmond  Whig,  quoted 
by  Richmond  Enquirer,  and  reprinted  in  Washington  Globe,  May  4,  1835. 

02  In  his  letter  of  May  3  to  Polk,  above  quoted,  Jackson  spoke  of 
"modern  Whiggs."  He  often  omitted  the  h,  and  invariably  used  the 
double  g. 

03  It  was  written  to  Cliarles  Cassedy  of  Bedford  County,  Tennessee, 
and  read  as  follows: 

"Dear  Sir:  You  w'ill  receive  enclosed,  the  manifesto  of  the  White 
cause  and  party.  I  think  it  contains  our  principles  and  the  argument  upon 
which  they  may  be  sustanied  briefly  set  forth. 

* '  You  will  see  by  my  letter  all  I  know  of  Judge  White 's  views  about 
the  Bank.  He  doubtless  never  will  swerve  from  them,  but  it  w^ould  be 
most  unprecedented,  and  do  him,  and  very  justly  too,  a  great  injury,  to 
be  declaring  before  hand,  that  he  would  put  his  veto  upon  any  measure 
whatever.  It  would  be  said  to  be  an  electioneering  declaration,  and  be- 
sides Mr.  Van  Buren  has  given  no  such  pledges. 

"To  defeat  me  for  the  Speaker's  chair,  is  the  main  interest  which 
Mr.  Polk  and  Johnson  have  in  this  whole  contest,  as  I  believe. 

"It  would  not  <io  to  ask  Polk  to  vote  for  me  against  himself,  but  he 
might  be  made  to  pledge  himself  to  go  for  me  against  any  other  candidate. 
My  course  in  appointing  him  chairman  of  the  Committee  of  Ways  and 
Means  could  be  used  to  show  that  1  have  not  been  influenced  by  personal 
considerations  against  him,  when  the  country  is  concerned. 

' '  Yours  truly,  *  <  j^jjj^  g^LL. ' ' 

Printed  in  Nashville  Union,  April  5,  1839. 


JUDGE   WHITE   AND   THE   PRESIDENCY  85 

constituents  should  pledge  him  to  cast  his  vote  for  Bell  in  the 
election  of  a  Speaker.  Between  the  lines  there  was  seen  a  threat 
to  defeat  Polk  in  his  campaign  for  reelection  to  Congress  unless 
he  should  give  such  a  pledge.  The  rumored  contents — before 
its  publication — were  far  worse  than  the  letter  itself,  and  its 
appearance  in  print  failed  to  counteract  the  effect  which  the 
rumors  had  produced.*^* 

Knowing  that  the  people  still  believed  in  Jackson  des{)ite  their 
loyalty  to  Judge  White,  Bell,  who  was  himself  a  candidate  for 
reelection,  published  a  long  letter  in  the  Nashville  Republican 
denying  that  he  had  "brought  White  out"  in  the  sense  and  for 
the  reasons  claimed  by  the  Democrats.  ' '  I  am  not  against  Jack- 
son or  his  administration,"  he  wrote,  "but  I  am  opposed  to  Mr. 
Van  Buren.""^  As  a  blow  at  Polk,  however,  he  published  in  a 
]\IcMinnville  paper  extracts  from  the  correspondence  which  had 
passed  between  Cave  Johnson  and  the  Tennessee  delegation  at 
the  time  that  White  had  been  invited  to  become  a  candidate. 
Bell's  adversaries  now  published  the  entire  correspondence  in 
the  Nashville  Union,  and  that  journal  highly  commended  the 
course  which  had  been  pursued  by  Polk,  Grundy,  and  Johnson. 
From  T.  J.  Pew,  of  Kentucky,  Laughlin,  the  editor,  learned  that 
during  the  previous  autumn  Bell  had  urged  Col.  R.  M.  Johnson 
to  become  a  candidate  on  the  bank  ticket''*^  and  this  paper  now 
claimed  to  have  conclusive  proof  of  Bell's  affiliations  with  the 
bank.  His  "Cassedy"  letter  was  published  in  the  Union  on 
June  26,  and  Grundy  confidently  assured  Polk  that  "that  letter 
will  make  you  Speaker,  I  think. '  '**' 

During  this  same  month  (May  20)  Van  Buren  was  nominated 
for  the  Presidency  by  the  Baltimore  convention,  and  a  bitter 


6*  A  similar  letter  was  written  by  Bell  to  a  man  in  Giles  Couut.y 
(Kineannon  to  Polk,  June  1,  1835,  Polk  Papers).  Kincannon  said  that  he 
had  seen  the  letter. 

65  Copied  by  the  Washington  Globe,  May  28,  1835. 

06  Lau<,rhlin  to  Polk,  May  30,  1835,  Polk  Papers.  Pew  said  that  he  had 
seen  Bell's  letter  to  Johnson. 

cv  Grundy  to  Polk,  June  25,  1835,  ibid. 


86  JAMES   E.  POLE 

national  campaign  was  waged  in  Tennessee  simultaneously  with 
the  contest  for  supremacy  between  Polk  and  Bell.  Although 
Jackson  had,  in  his  "Gwin  letter,""®  asserted  that  it  was  to  be  a 
convention  ' '  fresh  from  the  people ' '  to  whose  will  all  in  the  party 
ought  to  submit,  it  was  well  known  that  this  body  had  been  called 
together  for  the  sole  purpose  of  ratifying  the  "appointment" 
already  made  by  the  President.  His  letter  to  Gwin  had  failed  to 
produce  the  desired  effect,  for  Tennessee  did  not  even  send  dele- 
gates to  the  convention  at  Baltimore.  Still  unwilling  to  believe 
that  the  people  of  his  state  could  fail  to  do  his  bidding,  Jackson 
caused  a  statement  to  be  circulated  to  the  effect  that  the  contest 
was  really  between  himself  and  White,  and  not  between  the 
judge  and  Van  Buren.*^^ 

There  was  much  vituperation  on  either  side  during  the  months 
which  preceded  the  congressional  elections  in  Tennessee.  Both 
parties  seemed  to  realize  that,  if  elected,  Polk  would  be  chosen 
Speaker  of  the  House.  Polk  was  popular  in  his  district  and  many 
of  the  "White  Whigs"  remained  loyal  to  him.  Toward  the  close 
of  the  campaign,  the  Bell  forces  became  more  moderate  in  their 
criticisms,  for  it  had  become  apparent  that  by  indulging  too 
freely  in  denunciations  they  had  strengthened  both  Polk  and 
Van  Buren.^" 

Confident  of  victory,  Jackson,  from  his  retreat  at  "Rip 
Raps,"  was  already  planning  work  for  Polk  to  do  as  soon  as  he 
had  been  reelected.'^  Polk,  Grundy,  and  Johnson  were  to  get  up 
meetings  which  would  instruct  Representatives  in  Congress  to  vote 
against  the  chartering  of  any  bank.  They  were  also  to  induce  the 
state  legislature  to  instruct  the  Senators  from  Tennessee  to  vote 


<isNUes'  Register,  XLVIII,  80-81. 

«9  Scott,  Memoir  of  Hugh  Laicson  White,  385. 

-0  Polk  to  Jackson,  Aug.  14,  1835,  reporting  his  victory  at  the  polls, 
Poll-  Popers. 

'1  Clay,  said  the  President,  is  the  real  candidate  of  the  opposition,  and 
Bell  will" sacrifice  White  and  try  to  get  votes  for  himself  in  the  Sjieaker- 
ship  election.  "The  Judge  will  be  left  politically  prostrate  as  ever  Aron 
Burr  was,  and  as  few  to  sympathize  with  him  on  his  downfall." 


JUDGE   WHITE  AND  THE  PRESIDENCY  87 

for  Benton's  expunging  resolution  and  against  a  bank  charter. 
In  order  to  preclude  the  charge  of  persecution,  he  advised  that 
the  local  meetings  should  draft  their  instructions  before  the  legis- 
lature had  convened  and  before  either  Bell  or  White  had  been 
nominated  for  reelection  as  members  of  Congress.  In  any  event, 
Bell's  "Cassedy  letter"  would  be  a  sufficient  answer  to  any  such 
charge.'-  And  yet  the  man  who  wrote  this  letter  vehemently 
denied  that  he  ever  interfered  with  the  free  choice  of  the  people ! 
Some  of  the  party  politicians^^  were  inclined  to  doubt  the  wis- 
dom of  having  the  members  of  Congress  instructed  by  local  meet- 
ings. They  were  not  given  much  choice,  however,  in  the  matter 
of  instructing  Senators,  for  the  President  himself  prepared  an 
outline  of  instructions,  which  he  sent  to  Governor  Carroll.  Major 
Guild  was  selected  to  present  the  instructions  in  the  legislature. 
Jackson  sent  to  Carroll,  also,  two  volumes  of  the  Extra  Glohe 
which  contained  Benton's  speeches  and  other  materials  that  might 
be  useful  for  reference.  He  instructed  Polk  to  repair  to  Nash- 
ville before  the  meeting  of  the  legislature  for  the  purpose  of 
arranging  everything  for  prompt  action.'*  He  also  urged  Polk 
to  be  in  Washington  a  few  days  before  the  opening  of  Congress, 
and  "there  must  be  a  meeting  of  the  friends  of  the  administration 
&  select  the  candidate  for  Speaker  and  elect  him  the  first  ballott." 
He  did  not  state  explicitly  that  Polk  would  be  that  candidate,  but 
his  assurance  that  "the  New  England  states  will  sustain  you" 
indicates  that  Polk  was  the  President's  own  choice  for  the  office." 


72  Jackson  to  Polk,  Aug.  3,  1835,  Folic  Papers. 

73  For  example,  A.  V.  Brown  (Brown  to  Polk,  Aug.  27,  1835,  Polk 
Papers). 

74  "You  must  be  in  Nashville  some  days  before  the  Assembly  meets, 
every  arrangement  ought  to  be  made,  and  as  soon  as  the  House  is  formed 
the  resolutions  ought  to  be  offered,  or  the  opposition  will  forestall  you  by 
a  set  prepared  for  their  own  pallate  be  prompt  and  do  not  permit  your- 
selves to  be  outgeneraled,  the  first  blow  is  half  the  battle,  and  as  they 
are  preparing  to  elect  a  Senator,  these  resolutions  will  strike  terror  & 
confusion  in  their  ranks— produce  a  panic,  and  blow  up  all  their  digested 
arrangements,  and  will  add  all  the  doubting  members  to  your  ranks. 

75  Jackson  to  Polk,  Sept.  15,  1835,  PoUc  Papers.  ' '  When  you  read  & 
note  burn  this"  was  his  final  instruction. 


88  JAMES  K.  POLK 

Even  if  there  had  not  already  existed  a  strong  personal  friend- 
ship between  Polk  and  the  President,  their  common  desire  to 
overthrow  the  Bell-White  faction  was  sufficient  to  identify  their 
political  interests. 

For  the  next  two  months  Polk  kept  Jackson  well  informed  on 
passing  events  in  Tennessee.  With  Donelson,  also,  he  kept  up 
a  separate  correspondence,  concerning  which  they  did  not  always 
take  the  President  into  their  confidence.'^*'  Donelson  did  not 
share  Jackson 's  belief  that  the  legislature  would  adopt  the  Guild 
resolutions  to  instruct  the  Senators  from  Tennessee." 

In  October,  while  the  legislature  was  in  session,  Judge  White 
visited  Nashville  and  other  nearby  towns,  where  public  dinners 
were  given  in  his  honor.  Without  assigning  any  reasons,  Polk 
curtly  declined  to  attend  any  of  these,  but  he  reported  to  the 
President  that  White  had  taken  advantage  of  the  occasions  to 
electioneer  for  himself  and  to  censure  Polk,  Grundy,  and  other 
supporters  of  the  administration.  Jackson  was  much  incensed 
by  this  information,  but  he  still  believed  that  the  effect  of  the 
judge's  speeches  would  be  counteracted  by  the  debate  in  the 
legislature  on  the  expunging  resolutions.  "Mark  these  words," 
he  wrote  to  Polk,  "have  the  yeas  &  nays  taken  upon  them,  and 
all  who  votes  against  them  will  be  taught  by  the  people  of  Tenn- 
essee that  they  have  misrepresented  them."'^  White,  in  Jack- 
son's opinion,  could  not  be  too  severely  condemned  for  attacking 
Polk  and  other  members  of  Congress ;  ' '  rouse  Grundy  &  Johnson 
into  action,  and  I  will  vouch  for  the  virtue  of  the  people. '  '~^ 

The  President's  wish  for  prompt  action  on  the  expunging 
resolutions  was  doomed  to  disappointment ;  a  wearisome  discussion 


70  Both  suspected  that  Bell  had  a  spy  in  the  President 's  household  l\y 
whom  he  was  supplied  with  administration  secrets,  but  they  give  no  clew 
as  to  whom  they  suspect  (Donelson  to  Polk,  Sept.  24,  1885,  Polk  Papers). 

--  Donelson  to  Polk,  Oct.  20,  1835,  ihid. 

7s"T  cannot  yet  believe,"  he  continued,  "that  the  democratic  repub- 
licans of  Tennessee  can  be  so  unjust  to  me,  as  to  unite  with  Clay  &  the 
opposition  in  condemning  me  for  preserving  the  constitution. 

7'J  Jackson  to  Polk,  Oct.  20,  1835,  Pollc  Papers. 


JUDGE   WHITE  AND  THE  PRESIDENCY  89 

followed  the  introduction  of  the  subject.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  legislature  very  promptly  nominated  White  for  the  Presi- 
dency, even  before  Jackson's  above-quoted  letter  had  i-eaehed 
Tennessee.  In  his  letter  of  acceptance,  White  declared  emi)hati- 
cally  that  his  political  principles  had  undergone  no  change ;  that 
the  administration  forces,  and  not  he,  luid  deserted  the  traditional 
party  standards  and  become  "a  mere  f action. '"^'^  After  the 
formal  nomination  liad  been  made  the  people  regarded  the  cam- 
paign as  a  contest  between  Jackson  and  White,  and  the  Presi- 
dency was  the  principal  topic  of  discussion  at  every  local  gath- 
ering. The  country  people  generally  stood  loyally  by  the  Presi- 
dent, while  those  living  in  towns  were  more  apt  to  favor  White. ^^ 
After  the  congressional  delegation  had  set  out  for  Washing- 
ton— Polk  to  be  elected  Speaker  over  his  arch  enemy.  Bell,  and 
Johnson  to  frighten  his  friends  by  his  near  approach  to  a  duel 
with  the  much  hated  Bailie  Peyton^- — the  legislature  continued 
the  acrimonious  debates  on  Jackson's  expunging  resolutions.  To 
add  variety,  the  Wliite  supporters  in  the  legislature  were  accused 
by  their  opponents  of  fraud  in  connection  with  the  public  print- 
ing. While  the  debate  was  in  progress,  Jackson  sent  appeals  for 
support  to  members  of  the  legislature,  and  it  was  said  that  Polk 
had  prepared  the  list  to  be  thus  solicited.  White,  also,  corre- 
sponded with  some  of  the  members.  He  made  no  attempt  to  in- 
fluence their  votes,  but  his  exposure  of  the  methods  employed  by 
the  President  to  defeat  him  undoubtedly  brought  him  support. 
Strong  language  was  used  by  both  sides,  and  members  did  not 
hesitate  to  call  General  Jackson  a  "dictator"  or  to  accuse  him 
of  trying  to  appoint  his  successor.*^ 


80  The  documents  relating  to  White's  nomination  are  printed  in  Scott, 
Memoir  of  Hugh  Lawsnn  White,  331-334. 

81  J.  W.  Childress  to  Polk,  Nov.  22,  1835,  Poll:  Papers. 

82Laughlin  to  Polk,  Dec.  1;  J.  W.  Johnson  to  Polk,  Dec.  9,  1835,  Polk 
Papers. 

83  A.  O.  P.  Nicholson  to  Polk,  Feb.  4,  1836,  ibid.  "It  is  declared  every- 
day &  by  the  leaders,  that  to  Mr.  Van  B's  personal  character  they  do  not 
object— ^but  their  great  objection  is,  to  Pres*  Jackson  nominating  his 
successor"  (Catron  to  Polk,  Jan.  8,  1836,  ibid.). 


90  JAMES  K.  POLE 

Both  Jackson  and  Bell  were  said  to  have  flooded  the  state 
with  "franked"  political  literature  for  the  purpose  of  influencing 
both  the  legislature  and  the  people.  But  the  command  of  the 
"old  hero"  was  no  longer  as  of  yore.  The  legislature  which 
had  so  recently  nominated  Judge  White  now  declined  to  instruct 
him  to  vote  for  Benton 's  expunging  resolution®* 

Polk  was  elected  Speaker  of  the  House  by  a  large  majority, 
and  both  in  Washington  and  in  Tennessee  the  defeat  of  Bell  for 
that  office  was  expected  to  injure  White's  prospects  in  his  own 
state.    ' '  It  was  urged  by  the  faithful, ' '  wrote  White, 

that  by  the  election  of  Polk,  the  vote  of  Tennessee  would  be  changed. 
The  course  of  Alabama, ss  it  was  said,  will  be  followed  by  the  legislature 
of  Tennessee,  and  in  a  very  short  time  my  name  will  be  dropped  every- 
where. .  .  .  Everything  which  can  be  done  to  my  injury,  within  their 
power,  is  done  by  Grundy  and  Johnson,  from  my  own  State,  and  probably 
by  Polk,  also. 80 

Party  leaders  in  Tennessee  undoubtedly  believed  that  White 
would  now  withdraw  from  the  race,  or  that  in  any  case  Van 
Buren  would  carry  the  state.  Polk  received  many  letters  ex- 
pressing this  opinion.'*'  Their  hopes  of  defeating  the  judge  were 
somewhat  disturbed  by  the  refusal  of  the  legislature  to  instruct 
him  on  the  expunging  resolutions,  but  they  were  revived,  by  the 
expected  effect  of  White's  votes  against  some  of  Jackson's  ap- 
pointments and  by  his  arguments  and  vote  in  favor  of  Clay's 
land  distribution  bill.®^ 


84  E.  H.  Foster  to  White,  Feb.  26,  1836  (Scott,  Memoir  of  Hu(ih  Lawson 
White,  337). 

»->  The  legislature  of  Alabama  nominated  White,  but  on  the  condition 
that  he  should  be  "the  choice  of  the  republican  party  throughout  the  Union." 

80  White  to  Geo.  W.  Churchwell,  Jan.  3,  1836  "(Scott,  Memoir  of  Hugh 
Lawson  White). 

•'-"Among  the  rest  Nicholson  wrote  (January  22)  that  since  Polk's 
election  the  White  men  had  practically  given  up  the  struggle;  "all  ex- 
citement here  has  subsided,  and  the  election  of  V.  B.  is  given  up  by  all  but 
Gen.  Barrow. ' ' 

88  Walker  to  Polk,  April  11,  1836.  White  's  vote  on  the  land  bill  ' '  must 
seal  his  fate,"  wrote  Laughlin  to  Cave  Johnson  on  May  9.  One  of  White  's 
admirers  said  at  a  ])olitical  meeting  that  he  "had  followed  White  to  his 
grave  when  he  [White]  voted  for  the  land  bill — and  that  he  could  not 
stand  to  bo  buried  with  him"  (Herndon  to  Polk,  May  25,  1836).  All  in 
Polk  Papers. 


JUDGE   WHITE  AND  THE  PRESIDENCY  91 

One  of  the  mosj;  serious  handicaps  of  the  administration  party 
in  Tennessee  was  the  weakness  of  their  press.  The  Bell-White 
faction  had  procured  control  of  the  leading  newspapers  in  Nash- 
ville and  elsewhere.  The  Nashville  Union  was  the  main  Demo- 
cratic organ  and  Polk  was  in  constant  receipt  of  letters  from 
Laughlin,  its  editor,  which  stated  that  the  paper  was  approaching 
bankruptcy.  Laughlin  himself  was  enthusiastic  but  unreliable. 
Many  a  letter  from  Nashville  politicians  reported  to  Polk  that 
"Laughlin  has  been  drunk  for  a  week."  Near  the  close  of  the 
campaign  he  became  so  untrustworthy  that  Judge  Catron  was 
obliged  to  edit  the  Union.^° 

For  our  present  purpose  it  is  unnecessary  to  follow  in  detail 
the  remainder  of  White's  campaign  for  the  Presidency.  By 
splitting  the  Democratic  party  and  by  bringing  to  Polk  the 
powerful  support  of  General  Jackson,  it  was  one  of  the  prin- 
cipal factors  in  elevating  Polk  to  the  Speaker's  chair.  In  his 
attitude  toward  White,  Polk  may  have  in  some  degree  played  the 
"unscrupulous  partisan"  which  Parton  says  he  was,"°  but  the 
political  situation  which  resulted  from  White's  candidacy  left 
him  very  little  choice. ^^  He  could  not  cooperate  with  Bell,  and 
it  would  have  been  political  suicide  to  break  with  the  President. 

With  the  remainder  of  this  campaign  Polk's  political  wel- 
fare was  not  so  intimately  connected.  It  will  therefore  be  treated 
incidentally  only,  in  connection  with  his  career  as  Speaker  of  the 
House. 


89  Catron  to  Polk,  Sept.  6,  1836,  PoJk  Papers. 

90  Parton,  Life  of  Andretv  Jackson,  III,  617. 

91  That  partisan  Democrats  really  believed  Judge  White  to  have  been 
made  the  tool  of  designing  politicians  and  his  own  ambition  is  well  indi- 
cated by  Laughlin 's  entry  in  his  diary  on  hearing  of  the  death  of  White. 
' '  So,  here  is  the  end  of  ambition — of  the  ambition  of  an  old  politician  who 
had  been  betrayed  and  deceived  by  his  pretended  friends,  John  Bell  and 
others,  into  a  course  of  intrigue  and  tergiversation,  which  had  cast  him 
from  the  Senate,  had  lost  him  the  esteem  of  all  good  men  in  his  state,  and 
had  embittered  his  latter  days,  and  probably  shortened  his  life.  What  a 
warning  his  example  ought  to  afford  to  all  thinking  and  candid  men!" 
(Diary,  April  14,  1840).  As  White  carried  the  state  by  an  overwhelming 
majority,  there  must  inded  have  been  a  dearth  of  ' '  good  men ' '  and  a 
surplus  of  rascals! 


CHAPTER  VI 
SPEAKER  OF  THE  HOUSE  UNDER  JACKSON 

Following  Jackson's  advice  Polk  went  to  "Washington  late  in 
November,  1835,  in  order  to  prepare  the  way  for  his  election  as 
Speaker.^  The  twenty-fourth  Congress  assembled  on  December 
7,  and,  as  the  President  had  planned,  Polk  was  elected  on  the 
first  ballot.  The  coveted  office  was  his  reward  for  party  loyalty, 
but  he  soon  discovered  that  he  must  also  pay  the  penalty  of  his 
success  by  being  the  object  of  more  heckling  and  abuse  than  had 
fallen  to  the  lot  of  any  of  his  predecessors.  The  Democrats  had 
a  substantial  majority  in  the  House  and  were  able  to  carry  their 
measures;  but  the  knowledge  of  this  power  only  made  their  op- 
ponents more  determined  to  goad  the  majority  by  obstructive 
tactics  and  by  personal  vituperation. 

The  entire  period  of  Polk's  speakership  was  one  of  i)olitieal 
unrest,  sectional  discord,  and  personal  animosity.  Those  who 
had  so  recently  been  friends  and  relentless  in  pursuing  the  com- 
mon enemies,  Adams  and  Tobias  Watkins,  hated  one  another  all 
the  more  cordially  now  that  the  party  was  disintegrating,  for 
each  faction  believed  the  other  treacherously  to  have  abandoned 
traditional  party  principles.  On  his  own  account,  Polk  had  to 
suffer  the  slings  and  arrows  of  his  brilliant  but  censorious  rival, 
and  of  Peyton,  Crockett,  and  other  personal  enemies.  In  addi- 
tion, all  who  harbored  grudges  against  the  ' '  military  chieftain ' ' — 
whether  Nullifiers  or  Whigs — took  keen  delight  in  vitriolic  at- 
tacks upon  the  administration,  and  in  making  it  personally  un- 
comfortable for  tlie  Speaker,  whom  they  charged  with  being  the 
President's  creature  and  obedient  slave.     To  this  potpourri  of 


1  Jackson  to  Polk,  Sept.  15,  1835,  Folic  Papers. 


SPEAKER  OF  THE  HOUSE   UN  DEE  JACKSON  93 

discord  was  added  the  battle  between  Adams  and  the  southern 
fire-eaters  over  the  abolition  petitions.  Each  side  accused  the 
Speaker  of  unfairness  and  harrassed  him  with  hairsplitting  ques- 
tions of  i)arlianientary  procedure.  Fortunately  for  himself  his 
knowledge  of  detail,  his  methodical  mind,  and  his  habitual  cool- 
ness under  the  most  trying  ordeals,  enabled  him  to  pi-eside  over 
the  exciting  debates  with  dignit}^  and  success  when  many  a  more 
brilliant  man  would  have  met  with  failure. 

The  disposition  to  humiliate  Polk  was  manifested  even  before 
he  had  been  elected.  As  soon  as  the  House  had  been  called  to 
order,  the  clerk  announced  the  first  business  to  be  the  election 
of  a  Speaker  by  ballot.  To  this  customary  procedure  Patton  and 
others  objected,  and  insisted  upon  a  viva  voce  election.  Except 
for  showing  a  disposition  on  the  part  of  the  opposition  to  resort 
to  annoying  tactics  whenever  possible,  this  attempt  to  alter  the 
mode  of  election  was  of  little  importance,  for  the  House  pro- 
ceeded to  ballot  as  usual,  and  Polk  received  one  hundred  and 
thirty-two  votes  to  eighty-four  for  Bell — a  vote  which  Benton 
says  "was  considered  a  test  of  the  administration  strength,  Mr. 
Polk  being  supported  by  that  party. '  '- 

The  President's  message  was  sent  to  Congress  on  the  second 
day  of  the  session.  Evidently  descrying  the  gathering  war  clouds, 
Jackson  called  attention  to  the  dangers  that  would  result  from 
internal  dissensions.  He  again  recommended  the  adoption  of  an 
amendment  to  the  Constitution  which  would  prevent  the  election 
of  a  President  from  devolving  upon  the  House.  It  is  unlikely, 
however,  that  he  had  much  hope  that  his  suggestion  would  be 
followed. 

The  standing  committees  were  announced  by  the  Speaker  on 
the  fourteenth  of  December.  In  forming  them,  Polk  followed 
the  usual  custom  of  placing  safe  party  majorities  on  those  which 
would  have  the  shaping  of  important  legislation.  In  so  doing 
he   simply   followed   precedent ;   but   he   had.   when   a   minority 


2  Benton,  Thirty  Tears'  View,  I,  569. 


9-4  JAMES   K.   POLK 

member,  condemned  the  practice,  and  by  adhering  to  precedent 
now  he  became  the  object  of  criticism  and  abuse. 

The  first  difficult  problem  which  confronted  the  new  Speaker 
was  the  disposition  of  abolition  petitions.  On  December  18, 
1835,  Jackson,  of  Massachusetts,  presented  a  memorial  in  which 
citizens  of  his  state  asked  Congress  to  abolish  slavery  in  the 
District  of  Columbia.  Hammond,  of  South  Carolina,  moved  that 
the  petition  "be  not  received,"  but  Polk  ruled  that  such  a  motion 
had  never  before  been  presented  to  the  House  and  that  under 
the  rules  it  was  not  in  order.  When  Hammond  offered  another 
motion  to  "reject"  the  petition,  Polk  ruled  that  any  petition 
might  be  rejected  after  it  had  been  received.  Although  his 
rulings  were  logical  and  fair,  they  were  assailed  by  the  contest- 
ants on  either  side.  The  Speaker's  motives  were  impugned  and 
appeals  were  taken  to  the  House,  but  even  John  Bell  admitted 
that  Polk  had  made  the  best  disposition  of  a  new  and  debatable 
question.  This  particular  petition  was  sent  to  the  table  on  Decem- 
cember  21 ;  but  others  like  it  soon  appeared,  and  the  ' '  right  of 
petition"  became  one  of  the  most  heated  topics  of  debate.  The 
Glohe  upheld  the  cause  of  the  petitioners.  Should  the  House, 
it  said,  yield  to  the  demands  made  by  Hammond  and  Wise  and 
refuse  to  receive  such  petitions,  it  would  be  violating  one  of  the 
most  sacred  constitutional  guaranties.^ 

Nearly  all  of  the  northern  members  held  that  all  petitions 
from  American  citizens  must  be  received  and  that,  after  recep- 
tion, Congress  might  dispose  of  them  as  it  pleased.  Southern 
members  did  not  deny  the  right  of  petition,  in  the  abstract ;  they 
were  willing,  they  said,  to  receive  '*hona  fide"  petitions.  But 
radicals  from  that  section  argued  that,  inasmuch  as  the  peti- 
tioners in  question  were  asking  something  which  did  not  fall 
within  the  power  of  Congress  to  perform,  tliere  could  be  no  obli- 
gation to  receive  requests  to  do  the  impossible. 


3  Washington  Globe,  Jan.  1,  1836. 


SPEAKER  OF  THE  HOUSE   UNDER  JACKSON  95 

On  February  8,  Pinckney,  of  South  Carolina,  presented  a 
resolution  which  prescribed  a  method  for  dealing  with  anti- 
slavery  petitions.  After  its  passage  by  Congress  it  was  popu- 
larly known  as  the  "gag  rule."  It  directed  that  all  memorials, 
already  presented  or  to  be  presented,  praying  for  the  abolition 
of  slavery  in  the  District  of  Columbia  should  be  referred  to  a 
select  committee.  By  the  same  resolution  the  committee  was  in- 
structed to  report  that  Congress  possessed  no  power  to  interfere 
with  slavery  in  states  and  ought  not  to  interfere  with  it  in  the 
District.  Regarded  as  a  compromise,  tbe  resolution  was  passed, 
by  a  large  majority,  but  its  provisions  did  not  win  the  approval 
of  extremists  on  either  side.  Slavery  restrictionists  condemned 
a  measure  which  to  them  seemed  a  combination  of  cowardice  and 
tyranny,  while  southern  hotspurs  like  Hammond  and  Wise  w^ere 
dissatisfied  because  Congress  would  not  reject  all  petitions  re- 
lating to  this  subject.  The  recalcitrant  members  raised  endless 
technical  objections  and  appealed  repeatedly  from  the  decisions 
of  the  chair,  but  only  in  one  instance  did  the  House  fail  to  sustain 
the  rulings  of  the  Speaker.  Of  all  the  objectors,  Wise  was  the 
most  abusive  and  unfair.  Among  other  things  he  accused  Polk  of 
trying  to  force  members  to  "vote  like  mules"  without  affording 
them  an  opportunity  to  consider  the  questions  to  be  decided. 

Pinckney 's  resolution  did  not  succeed  in  precluding  further 
debate  on  the  subject  of  slavery.  Briggs,  of  Massachusetts,  pre- 
sented another  petition  on  February  15,  and,  in  response  to  a 
question  put  by  Wise,  Polk  decided  that  the  Pinckney  resolution 
applied  only  to  petitions  which  had  already  been  received..  There- 
upon Wise  moved  that  the  Briggs  petition  "be  not  received," 
and  the  Speaker  ruled  the  motion  to  be  in  order.  The  ruling 
was  clearly  an  error  on  Polk's  part,  and  his  decision  was  over- 
ruled by  a  vote  of  the  House.  His  apparent  concession  to  Wise 
was  severely  criticized  by  both  northern  and  southern  men. 
Among  the  latter,  Manning,  of  South  Carolina,  said  that  the 
effect  of  the  Speaker's  decision  would  be  to  renew  the  angry 


96  JAMES  E.  POLK 

sectional  debates  which  the  supporters  of  the  Pinckney  resolution 
had  hoped  to  obviate ;  in  addition,  it  M^as  an  arbitrary  setting 
aside  of  the  will  of  the  House.  "If  the  Speaker,"  continued 
IManning,  "can  b}^  his  decision  reverse  this  resolution  .  .  .  then 
he  has  power  to  suspend,  alter,  or  change,  any  deliberate  act  of 
this  House,  intended  as  a  rule  for  its  governance."^  The  vote 
of  the  House  settled  the  question  for  the  session  at  least.  The 
effect  of  the  reversal  of  Polk's  decision  was  to  apply  the  "gag 
rule"  to  all  petitions  that  might  appear,  and  to  refer  them  auto- 
matically to  the  select  committee.  It  was,  of  course,  well  under- 
stood that  they  would  not  be  considered  or  reported  back  by  the 
committee. 

The  Nashville  Repuhlican  criticized  Polk  for  being  unable  to 
keep  order  in  the  House.  It  contrasted  him  unfavorably  with 
Bell,  and  proved  his  incompetence  by  citing  numerous  appeals 
that  had  been  taken  from  his  decisions.  The  Globe  replied  that 
the  disorder  and  appeals  were  machinations  of  Bell's  henchmen, 
who  had  been  purposely  trying  to  discredit  the  Speaker.  It 
pointed  with  pride  to  the  fact  that  only  one  of  his  decisions — a 
new  rule  which  Polk  had  construed  in  favor  of  the  Bell  men — 
had  been  reversed  by  the  House.^ 

The  twenty-fourth  Congress  had  not  been  long  in  session  be- 
fore the  candidacy  of  Judge  White  entered  into  the  debates  of 
the  House.  On  January  2,  1836,  the  Globe  charged  that  Nulli- 
fiers,  like  Wise,  and  Abolitionists  were  supporting  White  for  no 
other  reason  than  to  draw  votes  from  Van  Buren.  For  the  same 
reason,  it  said,  Webster  was  urged  to  run  on  a  ticket  of  his  own. 
In  turn,  Wise  embraced  every  opportunity  to  attack  the  Presi- 
dent and  administration  members,  including  the  Speaker,  and 
to  accuse  them  of  engaging  in  political  intrigues. 


*  Cong.  Globe,  24  Cong.,  1  sess.,  App.,  145. 

5  "The  truth  is,  Mr.  Polk  has  deserved  the  confidence  of  the  House  by 
a  firm,  faithful,  industrious,  and  able  discharge  of  his  duties."  This  paper 
denied  that  Polk  desired  or  had  been  offered  a  place  in  the  cabinet,  for 
the  administration  wished  him  to  remain  in  the  Speaker's  chair  (Wash- 
ington Globe,  March  IC,  1836). 


SPEAKER  OF  THE  HOUSE   UNDER  JACKSON  97 

Such  an  opportunity  was  presented  when  Adams  moved  that 
a  certain  passage  of  the  President's  message  be  referred  to  a 
sek^et  committee.  During  the  hist  days  of  the  twenty-third  Con- 
gress the  House  had  passed,  as  part  of  tlie  general  api)roi)riation 
bill,  an  item  of  $3,000,000  to  be  expended  for  national  defense 
by  order  of  the  President.  As  the  two  houses  had  been  unable 
to  agree  on  certain  details,  the  measure  was  defeated  in  the 
Senate.  The  President  in  his  message  deplored  the  failure  of 
Congress  to  pass  this  necessary  measure,  and  again  recommended 
the  appropriation.  Adams  moved  that  the  subject  be  referred 
to  a  select  committee  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  by  whose 
fault  the  appropriation  had  been  lost.®  While  debating  the 
question,  Wise  sarcastically  remarked  that  it  was  a  most  import- 
ant subject,  for  "the  fate  of  the  presidential  canvass  is  in  part 
made  to  depend  upon  it. ' '  The  President,  he  said,  had  intended 
to  use  the  money  as  a  secret  service  fund ;  had  Cambreleng  not 
refused  to  accept  the  reasonable  amendments  proposed  by  the 
Senate,  the  measure  would  have  carried.  He  charged  Polk  with 
having  solicited  votes  for  the  appropriation  on  the  plea  that  the 
President  desired  it,  and  with  having  requested  the  members 
solicited  to  refrain  from  mentioning  this  fact."  Scarcely  a  mea- 
sure came  before  the  House  that  was  not  made  by  Wise  the  motif 
for  an  assault  upon  the  administration.  His  criticisms  of  the 
Speaker  were  many  and  bitter,  and  frequent  though  futile  were 
his  appeals  from  the  decisions  of  the  chair.  Polk's  friends 
thought  that  Wise  and  Peyton  were  trying  to  provoke  the  Speaker 
into  fighting  a  duel ;  even  his  own  family  feared  that  blood  might 
be  shed.^ 


c  The  National  InteJUgencer  had  asserted  that  the  House,  not  the  Senate, 
had  been  at  fault — a  charge  which  Adams  resented. 

7  Jan.  21,  22,  29.    Cong.  Globe,  24  Cong.,  1  sess. 

8  James  Walker  advised  Polk  to  treat  their  abuse  with  contempt.  No 
one,  he  said,  would  doubt  the  Speaker's  physical  courage.  The  whole 
matter  was,  in  his  opinion,  a  scheme  of  Bell  to  disgrace  Polk  by  drawing 
him  into  a  duel  with  either  Wise  or  Peyton  (Walker  to  Polk,  March  14, 
1836,  Polk  Papers). 


98  JAMES  K.  POLK 

Although  Bell  was  less  abusive  than  either  Wise  or  Peyton, 
he  frequently  questioned  the  justice  of  the  Speaker's  rulings  and 
accused  him  of  partisan  bias.^  On  February  3,  1836,  during  a 
debate  on  the  reference  of  a  Senate  bill  for  limiting  the  terms  of 
certain  officers,  Bell  said  that  never  before  had  so  many  things 
of  importance  been  excluded  from  the  discussions  of  the  House 
"by  forms  and  decisions  upon  the  rules."  His  principal  speech 
of  the  session  was  delivered  while  the  naval  appropriation  was 
being  discussed  in  the  House.  He  had  little  to  say  on  the  sub- 
ject under  consideration,  but,  having  avowed  his  intention  "to 
indulge  the  privilege  of  debate  to  the  utmost  limit  of  parliamen- 
tary license,"  he  launched  into  an  extended  discussion  of  "the 
general  policy  of  the  present  Administration,  as  lately  devel- 
oped."^" He  employed  the  present  occasion,  he  said,  because 
those  who  were  in  control  of  the  House  took  good  care  to  exclude 
any  resolution  to  which  such  remarks  as  he  desired  to  make  would 
be  really  germane.  After  twitting  the  Speaker  wdth  having 
changed  his  opinions  on  the  subject  of  patronage,"  he  arraigned 
the  administration  party  for  having  abandoned  the  principles 
on  which  General  Jackson  had  been  chosen  President.  It  was 
not  surprising,  he  said,  that  strange  doctrines  should  appear, 
inasmuch  as  the  single  principle  which  is  common  to  the  present 
majority  is  unlimited  devotion,  not  to  any  particular  creed,  but 
to  the  party.  He  pointed  out  with  remarkable  precision  the  evils 
of  abject  partyism,  and  the  inevitable  abuses  which  result  from 


9  Perhaps,  as  was  later  suggested  by  the  Boston  Age  (Aug.  17,  1836), 
prudence  led  Bell  to  refrain  from  leading  the  assault  and  to  delegate  this 
function  to  his  two  associates.  Still,  Wise  needed  little  urging,  and  the 
fact  that  Bailie  Peyton  was  a  nephew  of  Judge  White  was  sufficient  to 
account  for  his  animosity. 

10  March  16,  22,  2.5,  18.36.    Cong.  Globe,  24  Cong.,  1  sess.,  App.,  722  ff. 

11  "It  was,  I  believe,  a  private  scheme  [earlier]  of  my  colleague,  who 
is  now  the  presiding  officer  of  this  House  [Mr.  Polk]  to  take  from  the 
Secretary  of  State  the  power  of  designating  the  publishers  of  the  laws, 
and  to  vest  it  in  the  House  of  Representatives;  so  important  at  that  day 
was  the  purity  of  the  public  press  regarded  by  the  Jackson  party. ' ' 


SPEAKER   OF  THE  HOUSE   UNDER  JACKSON  99 

personal  government  by  a  popular  hero.^-  His  own  speech  Avas 
no  doubt  intended  for  caini)aign  purposes,  but  the  picture  which 
he  drew  of  existing  evils  was  none  the  less  accurate  on  that  ac- 
count. If  it  lacked  in  any  particular,  it  was  in  being  too  char- 
itable to  the  President  himself,  for  after  all  Jackson  was  the 
individual  most  responsible  for  perpetuating  those  evils  in  the 
interest  of  party  discipline.     There  were  other  critics  of  the 


12  "How  has  it  happened  that  these  abuses  have  not  only  been  suflfered 
to  exist,  but  even  to  increase,  under  an  Administration  so  decidedly  pop- 
ular and  powerful"?  When  this  problem  shall  be  solved  to  the  satisfaction 
of  the  public,  the  remedy  will  be  supplied.  The  true  answer  to  the  ques- 
tion, how  these  abuses  came  to  exist  under  such  an  Administration,  is, 
because  the  Administration  is  such  as  it  is,  because  it  is  popular.  Every 
man  of  sound  mind  and  lawful  age  knows  that  the  President,  nor  any 
other  being  of  created  existence,  can  exercise  a  personal  inspection  and 
superintendence  over  all,  or  even  a  tenth  part  of  the  most  important  de- 
tails of  the  public  service.  Yet  every  important  transaction  connected 
with  the  public  service  is  so  managed  by  the  subordinate  officers,  as  to 
throw  the  responsibility  upon  the  President.  If  the  delinquent  officers 
do  not  do  this  themselves,  their  defenders  in  Congress  and  out  of  Congress 
do  not  fail,  in  effect,  to  fix  the  responsibility  there.  Whether  in  Congress, 
or  in  the  country,  complaint  is  made  of  abuse  in  any  branch  of  the  public 
service,  the  answer  is,  eternally,  that  the  charge  is  meant  as  an  attack 
upon  General  Jackson !  His  great  name  and  popularity  are  the  shield  and 
buckler  of  every  official  delinquent,  whether  from  incompetency  or  infi- 
delity, from  a  clerk  to  the  head  of  a  Department — from  the  register  or 
receiver  of  a  land  office,  or  an  Indian  agent,  to  a  Minister  Plenipotentiary! 
The  name  and  services  of  General  Jackson,  I  repeat,  are  invoked  to  shield 
and  cover,  as  with  a  mantle,  every  official  transgression  or  omission,  from 
the  highest  to  the  lowest,  whenever  it  suits  the  interest  of  party  to  avail 
themselves  of  them. 

"And  the  people  are  called  upon  to  rally  round — to  stand  by  and 
defend — not  the  individual  arraigned — not  the  delinquent  department,  but 
the  President  himself,  who  it  is  asserted  through  a  thousand  channels,  is 
intended  to  be  struck  at  and  stabbed  through  the  sides  of  the  accused 
officer  or  Department.  The  people  cannot  at  once  detect  the  artifices  of 
party.  They  are  jealous  of  everything  which  savors  of  an  attack  upon 
General  Jackson,  and  they  in  general  act  upon  that  suspicion.  Those, 
therefore,  who  dare,  here  or  elsewhere,  to  find  fault  with  the  course  of 
affairs,  upon  any  ground,  instead  of  finding  countenance  from  those  in 
power,  or  from  the  dominant  party — instead  of  being  cheered  on  in  the 
ungracious  task  of  reform,  are  met  on  the  threshold,  with  the  charge  of 
secret  and  sinister  motives — with  anti-Jacksonism !  They  are  told,  that 
their  object  is  to  assail  the  character  of  the  hero  of  New  Orleans,  and  the 
conqueror  of  the  United  States  Bank;  as  if  either  one  or  the  other  of 
those  victories  could  be  of  any  worth  now  or  hereafter,  except  to  protect 
the  Constitution,  the  country,  and  its  liberties — as  if  those  victories  could 
be  of  any  value,  if  as  the  price  of  them  we  are  to  surrender  that  very 
Constitution,  those  very  liberties — those  rich  and  glorious  prizes  for  which 


100  ■  JAMES  E.  POLK 

administration,^^  but  none  covered  the  whole  ground  so  thor- 
oughly and  so  accurately  as  did  Bell. 

The  attacks  made  by  Wise  on  the  Speaker  and  the  adminis- 
tration were  capricious  and,  to  his  associates,  extremely  enter- 
taining. His  assertions,  however,  were  more  irritating  than  con- 
vincing. His  own  resolution,  which  called  for  an  investigation 
of  the  method  by  which  state  banks  of  deposit  had  been  selected, 
gave  him  an  opportunity  to  vent  his  wrath  upon  Reuben  M. 
Whitney,  and  upon  those  who  had  employed  Whitney.  His  time 
was  ill  spent;  assailing  Whitney's  reputation  was  like  slaying 
the  dead. 

Throughout  the  session  the  Presidential  campaign  was  a  topic 
of  absorbing  interest.  Few  questions  came  before  the  House  that 
did  not  elicit  a  discussion  of  the  approaching  election.  This  was 
natural,  perhaps,  for  Van  Buren  had  been  nominated  for  the 
avowed  purpose  of  continuing  the  policies  of  the  present  admin- 
istration, and  it  was  from  these  very  policies  that  the  White 
element  of  the  party  had  revolted.  On  this  subject  personal 
animosity  increased  as  the  end  of  the  session  approached.     As 


those  battles  were  fought  and  won.  If  those  who  venture  to  make  charges 
against  any  department  of  the  public  service  are  not  met  precisely  in  this 
way,  they  are,  at  all  events,  told  that' General  Jackson  is  the  head  of  the 
Government — that  he  is  responsible  for  all  the  executive  branches  of  the 
public  service,  and  no  attack  can  be  made  upon  any  branch  of  the  public 
service,  therefore,  without  attacking  him,  and  everybody  knows  that  he 
does  his  duty.  A  most  shameful,  egregious,  and  pernicious  flattery.  But 
the  absurdity  of  the  argument  does  not  prevent  it  from  being  constantly 
interposed.  The  argument  is,  that  because  General  Jackson  is  able,  faith- 
ful, and  patriotic,  in  the  discharge  of  all  his  duties,  therefore  all  the  sub- 
ordinate officers  of  the  Government  are  so  likewise.  But  more:  if  anyone 
shall  rejily  to  all  this,  and  that  he  means  no  attack  ujion  General  Jackson, 
that  he  is  willing  to  exonerate  him  from  any  agency  in  the  abuses  which 
are  alleged  to  exist,  he  is  forthwith  denounced  as  a  hypocrite — as  a  das- 
tardly assailant,  who  wants  the  courage  and  independence  to  make  a  direct 
attack.  He  is  dared  to  come  forward  like  a  man,  and  assail  General 
Jackson  as  the  author  of  all  these  abuses — his  pride  is  ajipealed  to — his 
feelings  are  chafed  to  draw  him  on  to  utter  the  fatal  denunciation;  and 
the  moment  he  does  so,  the  myrmidons  of  the  party  stand  ready  to  hack 
him  to  pieces!  These,  sir,  are  the  true  causes  of  the  continued  abuses  in 
the  public  service." 

i-'  Robertson,  of  Virginia,  when  sjieaking  (April  .5)  on  the  same  bill, 
asserted  that  the  administration  desired  a  large  appropriation  for  tlie 
navy  so  that  there  might  be  no  surplus  to  distribute  among  the  states. 


SPEAKEB  OF  THE  HOUSE   UNDER  JACKSON  101 

if  to  make  amends  for  the  moderation  displayed  in  his  speech  on 
the  naval  a})propriation  bill,  Bell,  when  discussing  the  river  and 
harbor  bill  on  June  23,  severely  castigated  both  the  Speaker  and 
the  administration.  He  charged  the  administration  with  delib- 
erate extravagance,  and  said  that  the  Committee  of  Ways  and 
Means  had  been  purposely  organized  by  Polk  "upon  a  principle 
of  extravagance."^^  His  purpose  was  to  show,  as  Robertson,  of 
Virginia,  had  tried  to  show  when  discussing  the  naval  appro- 
priation bill  on  April  5  that  the  administration  hoped  to  nullify 
the  effect  of  Clay's  "distribution  bill"  by  leaving  no  surplus 
for  distribution  among  the  states.  However,  it  is  difficult  to  see 
how  Polk  could  have  anticipated  the  passage  of  this  bill  when 
he  appointed  the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means. 

Bell  had  little  reason  to  complain  of  Polk's  committees,  for, 
as  Gillet,  of  New  York,  pointed  out  (June  24),  they  were  sub- 
stantially the  same  as  those  appointed  by  himself.^^  In  selecting 
his  committees  Polk  had  given  no  greater  advantage  to  the  ma- 
jority than  was  customary,  yet  it  is  interesting  to  recall  in  this 
connection  that  he,  too,  during  the  Adams  administration,  had 
complained  because  "studied  majorities"  had  been  placed  on 
committees,  "in  conformity  to  a  previous  secret  understanding, 


n"l  have  said  that  I  regard  this  bill  as  the  result  of  a  deliberate 
system  of  extravagance — of  a  plan  for  increasing  the  wants  of  the  Gov- 
ernment, and  exhausting  the  Treasury.  ...  I  affirm  that  your  Committee 
of  Ways  and  Means  of  this  House  was  organized  ujjon  a  principle  of  ex- 
travagance. Look  at  the  composition  of  that  committee,  sir,  and  then 
tell  me  it  was  not  constituted  with  a  deep  design,  and  expressly  with  a 
view  to  the  largest  expenditure  for  which  a  pretext  could  be  found,  in  every 
branch  of  the  public  service.  Was  there  ever  such  a  Committee  of  Ways 
and  Means  appointed  in  this  House"?  Was  there  ever  a  more  palpable 
desertion  of  the  principle  of  representation — a  more  shameful  abandon- 
ment of  the  interests  of  the  entire  interior  of  the  country?"  {Cong.  Globe, 
24  Cong.,  1  sess.,  App.,  745). 

15  Gillet  scathingly  denounced  Bell's  attitude  toward  Polk.  He  twitted 
Bell  with  not  having  defended  his  constituent  (the  President)  when 
during  the  last  Congress  he  had  been  called  a  toothless  tyrant  by  a  member 
of  the  opposition  party.  Eepelling  such  attacks  upon  the  President  and 
declining  to  attend  a  caucus  of  the  Tennessee  delegation  were  the  only 
crimes,  said  Gillet,  of  which  Polk  could  be  convicted,  and  as  Speaker, 
' '  even  his  political  opponents  bear  testimony  to  his  capacity,  honesty,  and 
impartiality. ' ' 


102  JAMES  K.  POLE 

among  the  favorites  at  Court.  "^*'  Both  men  advocated  majority 
rule,  yet  neither  accepted  it  with  good  grace  when  he  chanced  to 
be  numbered  with  the  minority. 

In  this  same  speech  Bell  reverted  to  the  caucus  of  the  Tenn- 
essee delegation,  which  had  been  called  to  consider  the  nomi- 
nation of  Judge  White.  He  said  that  the  main  object  of  the 
meeting  had  been  to  test  the  sincerity  of  certain  members  and 
that  two  of  these  gentlemen,  Polk  and  Grundy,  "are  at  this 
moment  in  the  enjoyment  of  the  rewards  of  their  hypocrisy  and 
their  treachery  to  their  colleagues. ' '  He  still  spoke  with  respect 
of  General  Jackson  and  denied  that  he  had  ever  called  the  Presi- 
dent a  tyrant  or  a  crouching  sycophant.  "He  may  be  the  master 
of  slaves  and  menials/'  said  Bell,  "but  nature  has  disqualified 
him  from  becoming  one  himself. ' ' 

The  first  session  of  the  twenty-fourth  Congress  terminated 
on  July  4,  1836.  Among  its  legislative  acts  were  the  admission 
to  statehood  of  Arkansas  and  Michigan,  and  the  reorganization 
of  the  general  post-office  along  lines  advocated  by  Amos  Kendall. 
Another  law  approved  the  President's  order  for  removing  public 
deposits  from  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  and  regulated  for 
the  future  the  method  of  depositing  public  money  in  state  banks. 
As  a  result  of  the  payment  in  full  of  the  national  debt.  Clay 
introduced  in  the  Senate  his  well-known  measure  for  distributing 
among  the  states  the  surplus  revenue  of  the  federal  government. 
As  it  was  made  to  assume  the  guise  of  a  deposit  rather  than  a 
gift,  the  bill  passed  both  houses  of  Congress  and  was  signed — 
but  with  reluctance — by  the  President.  On  June  7,  while  the 
bill  was  before  the  House,  an  attempt  was  made  to  refer  it  to  the 
Committee  of  the  Whole,  for  the  purpose,  said  the  Glohe,  of  pro- 
longing the  debate  and  thereby  defeating  the  admission  of  Ar- 
kansas and  Michigan.  Polk  blocked  such  a  reference  by  casting 
his  ballot  in  the  negative  and  making  it  a  tie  vote.^^ 


16  Polk  to  Colonel  Win.  Polk,  Dec.  14,  1826,  Col.  Wnu  Polk  Papers. 

17  Washington  Glohe,  June  10,  1836. 


SPEAKER  OF  THE  HOUSE   UNDER  JACKSON  103 

Although  tlie  Speakership  is  the  most  important  and  respon- 
sible position  in  the  House,  and  although  the  Speaker's  influence 
upon  legislation  is  surpassed  by  few  other  officers  of  the  federal 
government/^  yet,  from  the  very  nature  of  his  position,  that 
influence  is  difficult  to  trace.  By  the  personnel  of  his  committees, 
by  his  decisions,  by  his  control  over  debate  by  recognizing  or 
refusing  to  recognize  members  who  may  desire  to  speak,  one  may 
trace  in  a  general  way  the  part  played  by  the  Speaker ;  but  neces- 
sarily he  takes  little  part  in  the  discussions  of  the  House.  Polk 
did  not  even  avail  himself  of  the  privilege  of  participating  in 
debate  when  the  House  had  resolved  itself  into  a  Committee  of 
the  Whole.  For  this  reason  his  views  on  the  various  measures  are 
not  readily  ascertained,  and  during  this  particular  period  his 
pi,'ivate  correspondence  affords  little  assistance.  That  he  satisfied 
the  party  which  elected  him,  there  is  abundant  evidence  in  the 
records  of  the  House,  and  in  the  public  press.  That  he  possessed 
the  necessary  knowledge  and  coolness  of  temperament  to  avoid 
the  pitfalls  prepared  lay  his  adversaries,  is  equally  clear. 
' '  Never, ' '  said  the  editor  of  the  Boston  Age, 

Avas  man  more  rigidly  ami  constantly  assailed  by  a  pack  of  untiring  pursuers, 
than  was  Mr.  Speaker  Polk  by  his  uncompromising  assailants.  They  left 
no  stone  unturned  that  could  be  moved  to  his  disadvantage.  .  .  .  But 
notwithstanding  all  the  efforts  that  were  made  to  destroy  Mr.  Polk,  he 
passed  the  ordeal  unscathed,  and  ultimately  triumphed. 

The  editor  said  that  he  did  not  like  Polk  personally,  and  that  he 
had  preferred  Bell  for  Speaker,  still  "it  is  but  an  act  of  justice 
to  say  of  him,  that  he  discharged  his  duties  with  great  ability, 
promptness,  and  throughout  the  session  was  popular  with  an  im- 
mense majority  of  the  members,"   and  self-respect  compelled 


18  Mrs.  Polk  probably  voiced  her  husband's  sentiments  when  she  said, 
years  afterward:  "The  Speaker,  if  the  proper  person,  and  with  a  correct 
idea  of  his  position,  has  even  more  power  and  influence  over  legislation, 
and  in  directing  the  policy  of  parties,  than  the  President  or  any  other 
public  officer."  Conversation  with  Samuel  J.  Kandall.  Quoted  in  Nelson, 
Memorials  of  Sarah  Childress  Polk,  206. 


104  JAMES  K.  POLK 

northern  Whigs  to  support  the  Speaker  in  putting  down  "Wise 
and  his  friends." 

After  the  adjournment  of  Congress  on  July  4,  the  great  prob- 
lem to  be  solved  by  the  administration  forces  was  not  so  much 
how  to  elect  Van  Buren,  for  that  seemed  certain,  but  how  to  save 
Tennessee.  The  prospect  of  losing  the  vote  of  the  President's 
own  state  was  most  humiliating  to  himself  and  to  the  entire  party. 
At  first  Jackson  could  not  believe  such  a  calamity  possible ;  but, 
as  the  campaign  proceeded,  even  he  began  to  realize  that,  if  the 
state  could  be  saved  at  all,  it  could  be  done  only  by  heroic  efforts. 

As  usual,  Jackson  spent  his  vacation  at  the  Hermitage,  and 
during  the  summer  he  was  honored  with  public  dinners  at  various 
places.  The  people  of  Nashville  entertained  him  with  a  barbecue 
to  which  "all  creation"  was  invited.^°  The  press  and  the  plat- 
form of  the  respective  parties  vied  with  each  other  in  regaling 
the  people  with  political  gasconade  and  personal  abuse  of  the 
opposing  politicians.  On  the  President 's  side  were  Polk,  Grundy, 
Cave  Johnson,  and  Judge  Catron,  assisted  by  many  lesser  lights 
who  followed  their  directions.  Opposed  to  them  were  White, 
Bell,  Peyton,  and  Foster,  aided  by  a  much  longer  and  much  abler 
list  of  second-rate  assistants  than  could  be  rallied  to  the  Jackson 
standard. 

The  most  serious  handicap  with  which  the  administration 
leaders  had  to  cope  was  the  want  of  an  influential  press.  The 
Nashville  Tlnion,  which  had  been  founded  after  Bell  had  obtained 
control  of  the  other  Nashville  papers,  had  never  prospered,  and 
was  now  in  the  final  stages  of  bankruptcy.  Long,  the  proprietor, 
had  given  up  in  despair  and  gone  to  Athens  in  East  Tennessee 
to  edit  an  obscure  Van  Buren  sheet  of  precarious  existence.-^ 
Due  to  drink,  Laughlin,  the  editor  of  the  Union,  had  become  so 
unreliable  that  Catron,  in  the  heat  of  the  campaign,  was  forced 


ii»  Boston  Afie,  Aug.  17,  1836;  copy  among  Polk  Papers. 
20  Laughlin  to  Polk,  Aug.  8,  1836,  PoJk  Papers. 
-'1  Long  to  Polk,  Aug.  21,  1836,  ibid. 


SPEAKER  OF  THE  HOUSE   UNDER  JACKSON  105 

to  come  to  the  rescue  and  edit  the  paper  himself."  The  Wash- 
ington Globe  devoted  considerable  space  to  political  affairs  in 
Tennessee.  It  tried  to  convince  the  people  of  the  state  that  White 
could  not  by  any  possibility  be  elected,  and  that  his  nomination 
had  been  the  work  of  instruments  of  Clay  and  Calhoun,  who 
were  conspiring  against  Jackson  and  Van  Buren  and  attempting 
to  deceive  the  people  of  Tennessee.-^  Bell,  of  course,  Avas  charged 
with  being  the  chief  conspirator.  "It  is  painful,"  said  the  Globe 
on  October  7, 

to  a  fair  mind  to  deal  with  petty  tricks— the  offspring  of  low  cunning— 
of  a  man  educated  as  a  pettifogger,  and  improved  into  a  political  Machiavel 
by  a  persevering  study  of  the  arts  of  deception  in  a  seven  years '  appren- 
ticeship in  Congress.  John  Bell  has  arrived  at  a  point  which  entitles  him 
to  a  diploma  as  a  political  imposter 

who  is  trying  to  deceive  the  people  of  Tennessee.  As  examples 
of  Bell's  hypocrisy,  it  cited  his  original  opposition  to  White  and 
his  attempt  to  induce  R.  M.  Johnson  to  run  for  President  on  a 
bank  platform. 

Much  emphasis  was  placed  on  White 's  alleged  affiliation  with 
friends  of  the  United  States  Bank.  Bell's  "Cassedy  letter"  was 
said  to  have  pledged  White,  in  the  event  of  his  election,  to  sign  a 
bill  for  rechartering  the  bank.  In  several  letters.  Van  Buren 
had  already  stated  his  unalterable  opposition  to  such  an  institu- 
tion, and  ])y  so  doing  furnished  an  excuse  for  the  catechizing  of 
his  rival.  In  a  letter  addressed  to  him  by  one  of  the  local  Demo- 
crats, White  was  asked  the  definite  question  whether  he,  if  elected, 
would  sign  a  bill  to  establish  a  bank  of  discount  and  deposit,  or 
one  of  deposit  only.  It  was  hoped  that  the  letter  would  place  the 
judge  in  an  embarrasing  position,  but  this  hope  was  not  realized. 
He  met  the  issue  squarely  by  stating  that,  while  he  considered 
the  bank  question  to  be  obsolete,  he  would  nevertheless  give  his 

22  After  the  campaign  was  over  Catron,  in  a  letter  to  Polk  (Nov. 
24)  said  that,  while  he  hated  to  desert  a  man  for  "that  infirmity,"  they 
must  have  a  reliable  editor. 

23  Washington  Globe,  Aug.  27  and  Sept.  5,  18.36. 


106  JAMES  E.  POLE 

views  on  the  subject.  He  had  always  believed,  he  said,  that  Con- 
gress did  not  possess  the  power  to  authorize  any  bank  to  transact 
business  within  the  states  ;  moreover,  even  if  the  power  existed,  it 
should  not  be  exercised.    This  was  still  his  opinion.-* 

In  a  speech  delivered  at  Knoxville  in  August,  White  had 
already  given  a  very  complete  statement  of  the  principles  for 
which  he  stood.  He  enumerated  the  doctrines  which  had  been 
advocated  b}^  himself  and  the  President  at  the  time  of  the  latter 's 
first  election.  For  advocating  these  same  doctrines,  said  he,  the 
President  is  now  ' '  openly  denouncing  me  as  a  '  red  hot  Federalist, ' 
having  abandoned  his  Administration  and  being  as  far  from  him 
as  the  poles  are  asunder."  The  judge  claimed  to  uphold  the 
Kepublican  creed  of  Jefferson,  while  the  President  is  on  "that 
side  which  leads  directly  to  monarchy,  although  I  hope  he  does 
not  so  intend  it. '  '-^ 

Not  even  Jackson  could  shake  the  faith  of  Tennesseans  in  the 
ability  and  the  integrity  of  Judge  White.  Even  though  the 
motives  of  his  leading  supporters  may  have  been  somewhat  ques- 
tionable, nothing  that  was  ignoble  or  equivocal  could  be  traced 
to  White  himself.  He  carried  the  state  in  spite  of  the  misrepre- 
sentations of  his  traducers,  and  never  again  during  the  life  of  the 
"hero  of  New  Orleans"  was  Tennessee  to  be  found  in  the  Demo- 
cratic column  at  a  Presidential  election — although  one  of  her  own 
sons  was  the  candidate  in  1844. 

The  President  was  greatly  mortified  by  the  loss  of  his  state. 
He  declared  that  White  had  always  been  a  hypocrite,  and  that  the 
"morals  of  society"  demanded  his  exposure.-"    But  the  mote  in 


2*  Andrew  A.  Kincannon  to  White,  Sept.  14;  White  to  Kincanuon, 
Sept.  19,  1836,  Polk  Papers. 

25  Speech  printed  in  Scott,  Memoir  of  Kugli  Latrson  White,  340  ff. 
Excerpts  in  Washington  Globe,  Sept.  23,  1836. 

2«  "Nothing  but  falsehood  appears  to  be  the  weapons  of  our  modern 
new  born  White  Whigs  of  Tennessee  in  their  late  political  crusade.  White, 
Bell,  Peyton,  Murray  &  Co.  appear  to  have  abandoned  truth,  and  now  when 
the  election  is  over,  does  not  wish  to  be  held  accountable  for  their  false- 
hoods .  .  .  should  I  live  to  get  home,  a  duty  I  owe  to  truth  &  the  morals 
of  society  will  induce  me  to  expose  Judge  White,  Mr.  Bell,  Mr.  Peyton, 


SPEAKEE  OF  THE  HOUSE  UNDER  JACKSON  107 

his  brother's  eye  obscured  the  huge  beam  in  his  own  own;  his 
unfair  treatment  of  White  had  been  the  determining  factor  in 
making  the  Judge  a  candidate  and  in  winning  for  him  the 
electoral  vote  of  the  state. 

Congress  reassembled  on  December  5  and,  on  the  following 
day,  received  the  last  annual  message  of  General  Jackson.  This 
document  criticized  the  operation  of  the  deposit  act  passed  at  the 
last  session  and  advised  the  adjustment  of  revenue  to  the  actual 
needs  of  the  government.  It  informed  Congress  of  the  promulga- 
tion of  the  "specie  circular"  and  asked  that  the  policy  therein 
adopted  be  made  permanent  b.y  legislative  enactment.  It  urged 
that  the  finances  of  the  government  should  be  put  on  a  hard 
money  basis.  The  tone  of  the  message  was  optimistic,  and  indica- 
tive of  the  satisfaction  felt  by  the  President  with  the  results  of 
his  administration.  It  contained  no  hint  that  he  even  suspected 
the  country  to  be  already  on  the  verge  of  one  of  its  most  disastrous 
industrial  and  financial  crises. 

To  carry  the  administration  program  through  the  House  was 
a  task  of  little  difficulty  for  the  Speaker.  Polk  arranged  his  com- 
mittees on  a  political  basis,  and  there  was  a  safe  majority  in  that 
body  to  insure  the  passage  of  desired  measures.  It  required  both 
skill  and  patience,  however,  to  preserve  order  and  to  render  harm- 
less the  assaults  of  an  opposition  whose  animosity  had  not  been 
lessened  by  their  recent  defeat  at  the  polls. 

Early  in  the  session  there  appeared  a  new  avalanche  of  memo- 
rials in  which  Congress  was  asked  to  abolish  slavery  in  the  District 
of  Columbia.  Generally,  but  not  always,  they  were  presented  by 
John  Quincy  Adams.     Polk  decided  that  the  "gag  rule"  had 


Mr.  Murray,  and  their  falsehoods,  so  that  the  moral  part  &  truth  loving 
portion  of  the  citizens  of  Tennessee  may  judge  what  credit  can  be  reposed 
in  those  men,  when  they  make  assertions  as  to  the  acts  &  doings  of  others. 
I  now  believe  that  Judge  White  has  been  acting  the  hypocrite  in  politics, 
all  his  life,  and  individually  to  me — that  he  is  unprincipled  &  vindictive 
I  have  full  proof — that  he  Avill  willfully  lie,  his  Knoxville  speech  amply 
shows.  I  can  forgive,  &  will,  but  I  never  can  forget  hypocrisy,  or  the 
individual  capable  of  it"  (Jackson  to  Kev.  H.  M.  Cryer,  Nov.  13,  1836, 
Am.  Hist.  Mag.,  IV,  242-243). 


108  JAMES  K.  POLK 

expired  with  the  last  session,  and  so  the  whole  question  was  once 
more  open  for  discussion.  After  several  heated  debates,  the  rule 
was  reenacted  in  an  aggravated  form  which  sent  all  such  peti- 
tions to  the  table  as  soon  as  presented,  Avithout  even  the  courtesy 
of  a  reference  to  a  committee.  Southern  members  looked  upon 
these  petitions  as  the  work  of  fanatics-^  whose  sole  purpose  was 
malicious  mischief.  They  failed  to  realize  that  abolition  was 
simply  one  among  the  many  manifestations  of  the  birth  of  a  pub- 
lie  conscience  and  of  a  desire  to  reform  the  world.  The  old  idea 
that  governments  should  not  abridge  personal  privileges,  even  by 
eradicating  admitted  evils,  was,  during  this  period,  rapidly  giving 
way  to  a  new  belief  that  society  as  well  as  individuals  possesses 
rights,  and  that  governments  are  in  duty  bound  to  protect  them. 
It  was  a  period  among  which  "isms"  of  various  sorts  flourished, 
and  among  the  number,  abolitionism.  The  most  important  and  per- 
manent product  which  resulted  from  this  social  unrest  and  striv- 
ing for  the  ideal  was  the  emergence  of  a  public  conscience  and  a 
determination  to  adjust  individual  conduct  to  the  standards  of 
public  opinion.  A  feeling  of  responsibility  for  existing  evil  led 
the  troubled  conscience  to  seek  power  to  eradicate  it,  and  in  seek- 
ing the  necessary  power  the  reformers  naturally  turned  to  the 
federal  government.  Calhoun  understood  the  changed  viewpoint 
far  better  than  did  his  contemporaries.  He  realized  that,  on  the 
subject  of  slavery,  a  national  conscience  had  developed,  although 
he  may  have  exaggerated  the  i)art  played  in  this  development  by 
the  Nullification  proclamation  of  General  Jackson.-* 


27  "Abolition,"  said  Bynum,  of  North  Carolina,  Jan.  9,  1837,  "is 
priestcraft  [i.e.  New  England  clergy],  concocted  and  brought  into  exist- 
ence by  their  unholy  alliance  with  the  superstitious  and  ignorant  of  both 
sexes." 

'-S  Speaking  in  the  Senate  on  the  Oregon  bill,  Aug.  12,  1849,  Calhoun 
said:  "Tlie  abolition  of  African  slavery  in  its  old  form  in  the  British 
West  India  Islands,  and  the  long  an<l  violent  agitation  which  preceded  it, 
did  much  to  arouse  this  feeling  at  the  North,  and  confirm  the  impression 
that  it  was  sinful.  But  something  more  was  necessary  to  excite  it  into 
action, — and  that  was,  a  belief,  on  the  part  of  those  who  thought  it  sinful, 
that  they  were  resjtonsible  for  its  continuance. 

"It  was  a  considerable  time  before  such  a  belief  was  created,  except 
to  a  very  limited  extent.     In  the  early  stages  of  this  Government,  while 


SPEAKEE  OF  THE  HOUSE   UNDER  JACKSON  109 

The  eiiaetnient  of  gag  rules  resulted  in  more  harm  than  good 
to  the  cause  which  they  were  intended  to  benefit.  Many  who  had 
little  sympathy  with  abolitionists  disapproved  of  this  drastic 
method  of  stifling  public  opinion.  They  regarded  the  gag  laws 
as  a  fatal  blow  to  the  right  of  petition,  although  it  is  difficult  to 
see  why  the  southern  members  were  not  right  in  their  contention 
that  this  right  extended  only  to  those  who  would  petition  about 
their  own  grievances,  and  not  those  of  other  persons.  The  right 
of  the  people  to  petition  for  a  redress  of  their  own  grievances  was 
never  questioned  by  the  most  belligerent  of  the  southern  fire- 
eaters. 

Polk  was  a  slaveholder,  but  he  did  not  let  this  fact  influence 
his  decisions.  When  objections  were  raised  because  Adams  in- 
sisted upon  presenting  petitions  from  states  other  than  Massa- 
chusetts the  Speaker  decided,  on  February  6,  1837,  that  "every 
member  had  a  right  to  present  a  petition,  come  from  what  quarter 
it  might. ' '  Adams  thereupon  informed  the  Speaker  that  he  had 
a  petition  purporting  to  have  come  from  slaves  and  asked  if  it 
would  fall  within  the  regular  rule.  The  character  of  the  peti- 
tioners presented  a  new  point  in  procedure,  which  Polk  did  not 
attempt  to  decide ;  instead,  he  asked  for  a  ruling  by  the  House. 
Without  seeking  to  ascertain  the  nature  of  the  petition — which 


it  was  yet  called,  ami  regarded  to  be,  a  federal  Government,  slavery  was 
believed  to  be  a  local  institution,  and  under  the  exclusive  control  of  the 
Governments  of  the  States.  So  long  as  this  impression  remained,  little 
or  no  responsibility  was  felt  on  the  part  of  any  portion  of  the  North,  for 
its  continuance.  But  with  the  growth  of  the  power  and  influence  of  the 
Government,  and  its  tendency  to  consolidation, — when  it  became  usual  to 
call  the  people  of  these  States  a  nation,  and  this  Government  national, 
the  States  came  to  be  regarded  by  a  large  portion  of  the  North,  as  bearing 
the  same  relation  to  it,  as  the  counties  do  to  the  States;  and  as  much 
under  the  control  of  this  Government,  as  the  counties  are  under  that  of 
their  respective  State  Governments.  The  increase  of  this  belief  was  ac- 
companied by  a  corresponding  increase  of  the  feeling  of  responsibility 
for  the  continuance  of  slavery,  on  the  part  of  those  in  the  Is^orth  who 
considered  it  so.  At  this  stage  it  was  strengthened  into  conviction  by 
the  proclamation  of  General  Jackson  and  the  act  of  Congress  authorizing 
him  to  employ  the  entire  force  of  the  Union  against  the  Government  an(l 
people  of  South  Carolina."  Having  discovered  the  extent  of  national 
power,  said  Calhoun,  the  abolitionists  have,  since  1835,  been  striving  to 
bring  it  into  operation   (Calhoun,  Works,  IV,  517-521). 


110  JAMES  K.  POLK 

turned  out  to  be  a  hoax,  and  asked  for  the  expulsion  of  Adams — 
southern  members  wasted  much  time  in  an  intemperate  tirade 
against  the  venerable  ex-President.  They  at  first  demanded  his 
expulsion,  and,  failing  in  this,  asked  that  he  should  be  censured 
"for  giving  color  to  an  idea"  that  slaves  might  address  a  com- 
munication to  Congress.  After  Adams  had  riddled  their  argu- 
ments with  sarcasm  and  ridicule,  the  House  finally  ended  the 
matter  by  deciding  simply  that  slaves  had  no  right  to  petition. 
The  charge  made  by  Adams  that  Polk  had  exercised  arbitrary 
authority  in  his  decisions  on  the  subject  of  petitions  seems  to  have 
been  wholly  unwarranted,  for  the  Speaker  accorded  him  every 
privilege  which  the  rules  of  the  House  permitted.-^ 

The  Speaker's  enemies  tried  on  many  occasions  to  confuse 
him  by  propounding  unusual  and  complicated  questions,  but  in 
this  they  were  invariably  disappointed.  His  thorough  knowledge 
of  parliamentary  procedure,  and  his  ability  to  anticipate  their 
designs  and  to  prepare  for  them,  enabled  him  to  render  his  deci- 
sions promptly  and  correctly.  Never  frustrated,  he  was  quick 
to  see  the  bearing  of  an  unusual  proposition.^"  Although  he 
safeguarded  the  interests  of  the  administration  whenever  possible, 
yet  his  rulings  were  sustained — almost  without  exception,  by  a 
considerable  number  of  his  political  opponents. 

The  most  severe  charge  which  was  brought  against  Polk  during 
the  session  arose  out  of  the  investigation  of  Reuben  M.  Whitney 's 
connection  with  the  Treasury  Department.  It  was  alleged  that 
"Whitney    had    given    out    advance    information    to    speculators 


29  Polk's  opinion  of  Adams'  conduct  and  his  complaints  is  recorded  in 
an  undated  manuscript  in  the  Polk  Papers.  It  is  an  answer  to  letters 
written  by  Adams  to  the  Quincy  Patriot.  "The  Speaker  carries  out  and 
enforces  the  decisions  of  the  majority  &  therefore  he  represents  in  his 
letter  that  the  'Speaker  and  the  majority  of  the  House'  have  undertnken 
to  exercise  'arbitrary  authority.'  If  Mr.  Adams  is  unwilling  to  submit 
to  the  decisions  of  the  majority  of  the  House,  he  is  unfit  to  be  a  member 
of  that  body.  .  .  .  His  complaints  that  his  petitions  were  not  read, — 
shows  either*  a  total  ignorance  of  the  rules  of  the  House,  or  is  an  attempt 
to  impose  on  the  public"  (Polk  Papers,  undated,  vol.  80). 

30  For  example,  Bell's  motion  of  January  10  for  leave  to  bring  in  a 
bill  to  secure  freedom  of  elections. 


SPEAKER  OF  THE  HOUSE   UNDER  JACKSON  111 

regarding  the  purport  of  Jackson's  specie  circular,  and  that  he 
had  been  a  partner  in  tlie  resulting  speculations.  It  was  said,  also, 
that  he  had  levied  blackmail  upon  the  state  banks  which  had  been 
selected  as  depositories  for  government  funds.  A  majority  of  the 
committee  which  Polk  appointed  to  investigate  these  charges 
exonerated  Whitney,  but,  in  a  minority  report,  Peyton,  of  Tenn- 
essee, accused  the  Speaker  and  the  majority  of  the  committee 
with  having  deliberately  covered  the  fraud  out  of  subserviency 
to  the  President.  Nothing  better,  he  said,  could  be  expected  from 
a  Speaker  who  had  crawled  up  to  his  office  and  had  exchanged 
principle  for  power. ^^  Even  if  these  charges  had  been  true,  Pey- 
ton was  not  the  man  to  throw  stones.  Hamer,  of  Ohio,  forced 
him  to  admit  that  he  had  himself  solicited  for  Bell  the  support 
of  the  President  on  the  plea  that  Bell  was  a  good  party  man  and 
that  Polk  had  been  seeking  votes  from  the  Nullifiers. 

The  short  but  stormy  session  was  adjourned  by  the  Speaker  on 
March  3,  1837.  Although  Polk  had  been  severely  criticized  by 
some  of  his  enemies,  no  one — as  was  done  two  years  later — refused 
to  join  in  extending  to  him  the  customary  vote  of  thanks.  The 
administration  and  its  defenders  had  been  denounced  in  violent 
language  for  alleged  interference  in  elections,  abuse  of  the  power 
of  patronage,  and  derangement  of  the  finances  of  the  country. 
Investigations  had  been  demanded,  and  in  some  cases  undertaken, 
but  the  charges  had  not  been  sustained.  Indeed,  so  long  as  Polk 
had  the  selection  of  committees,  there  was  small  danger  that  any 
malfeasance  would  be  officially  unearthed. 

For  good  or  for  evil.  General  Jackson  had  triumphed  over  all 
opposition.     Van  Buren  had  been  chosen  to  succeed  him,  Taney 


31  ' '  The  price,  in  these  days,  whieli  must  be  paid  for  power,  is  the  sale 
and  prostration  of  every  principle  of  honor,  patriotism,  independence ;  and  I 
fear,  sir,  the  day  is  distant  when  we  shall  see  the  Speaker  of  an  American 
Congress  dare  to  appoint  investigation  committees,  a  majority  of  which 
will  be  in  favor  of  inquiry,  how  important  soever  it  may  be  to  the  preser- 
vation of  the  institutions  and  liberties  of  this  country.  .  .  .  Any  man  who 
crawls  up  to  that  point  [Speakership]  in  these  days,  will  never  hazard  the 
consequences  of  a  patriotic,  a  generous,  or  a  noble  action;  it  would  be  fatal 
to  him."    March  1,  1837  {Cong.  Globe,  24  Cong.,  2  sess.,  App.,  349-359). 


112  ■  JAMES  E.   POLE 

had  been  confirmed  as  Marshall's  successor,  the  mortifying  cen- 
sure of  the  Senate  had  been  expunged,  and  the  Bank  of  the  United 
States  no  longer  existed  as  a  federal  institution.  On  the  last  day 
of  the  session  Congress  passed  an  act  which  not  only  carried  out 
another  of  the  President's  wishes,  but  which  affected  materially 
the  future  career  of  the  Speaker  of  the  House.  Incorporated  in 
the  civil  appropriation  bill  was  a  clause  providing  for  the  outfit  of 
a  minister  to  Texas,  which  meant,  in  effect,  a  recognition  of  Texan 
independence.  The  already  approaching  financial  crisis  made 
Congress  unwilling  to  continue  by  law  the  policy  of  the  specie 
circular,  as  Jackson  had  recommended  in  his  message ;  instead, 
that  body  sent  him,  on  the  last  day  of  the  session,  a  bill  which 
would  virtually  annul  the  celebrated  circular.  But  even  in  this, 
"Old  Hickory"  had  his  w^ay.  He  declined  to  sign  the  bill  on  the 
ground  that  its  provisions  were  obscure  and  contradictory.^- 


32  Eichardson,  Messages,  III,  282. 


CHAPTER  VII 

SPEAKER  OF  THE  HOUSE  UNDER  VAN  BUREN 

Judge  White's  victory  in  Tennessee  humiliated,  and  for  the 
time  being  discouraged,  the  Democrats  of  that  state.  Before  the 
winter  had  passed,  however,  their  hopes  revived  and  they  began 
to  lay  plans  for  the  future.  They  were  encouraged  by  the  belief 
that  White  would  never  again  be  a  candidate  and  that  the  main 
cause  of  defection  would  therefore  be  removed.  In  a  letter  to 
Polk,  Nicholson  said  that  the  opposition  leaders  were  determined 
to  hold  the  state,  and  would  do  all  in  their  power  to  injure  Van 
Buren.  But  the  people,  said  he,  had  gone  over  to  White  for 
purely  personal  reasons  and  would  return  to  the  Democratic 
fold.^  Childress,  also,  had  hopes  that  the  people  would  renew 
their  allegiance.  He  believed,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the  leaders 
of  the  White  party  would  vote  for  ''Theodore  Dwight  himself" 
if  he  were  run  on  the  opposition  ticket.^  Still  another  informant 
discovered  that  the  White  faction  was  plotting  to  get  control  of 
the  legislature  for  the  purpose  of  ousting  Grundy  from  the  federal 
Senate.  They  were  planning,  he  thought,  to  run  Bailie  Peyton 
for  Governor ;  and  should  this  be  done,  no  one  except  Polk  or 
Jackson  could  defeat  him.^  At  the  Hermitage  Jackson  was  busily 
engaged  in  repelling  slanders  invented  and  circulated  by  the 
Whigs.  One  of  these  slanders  was  that,  as  a  result  of  endorsing 
notes  for  relatives,  the  General  had  become  financially  ruined 
and  now  wanted  a  national  bank.  Protesting  that  he  never  had 
and  never  would  favor  a  bank,  Jackson  announced  his  intention 


1  Nicholson  to  Polk,  Jan.  22,  1837,  Polk  Papers. 

2  Childress  to  Polk,  Feb.  17,  1837,  ibid. 

3  J.  H.  Talbot  to  Polk,  April  21,  1837,  ibid. 


114  JAMES   K.   POLK 

to  prepare  an  article  on  the  subject  which  he  desired  Polk  to  see 
before  its  publication.^ 

Democrats  were  united  in  their  desire  to  regain  control  of 
the  state,  but  opinions  differed  as  to  the  better  method  of  pro- 
cedure. Grundy  advocated  a  conciliatory  attitude  toward  the 
White  supporters;  this  policy  was  adopted,  and  was  voiced  by 
John  0.  Bradford,  the  new  editor  of  the  Nashville  VnionJ'  But 
the  seceders  did  not  respond  to  kind  treatment.  Dunlap  was 
badly  beaten  in  his  campaign  for  reelection  to  Congress,  and  his 
district  sent  only  bank  supporters  to  the  state  legislature."  Cave 
Johnson  was  likewise  unexpectedly  defeated  by  an  opponent  who 
was  as  "bitter  and  malignant"  as  John  Bell."  The  result  of  the 
election  caused  a  tempest  at  the  Hermitage.  Still  blind  to  the  real 
cause  of  the  dissensions  within  his  party,  Jackson,  in  character- 
istic fashion,  denounced  the  temporizing  policy  of  Grundy  and 
the  Union.^ 

The  outcome  of  the  state  elections  and  the  fact  that  the  sub- 
treasury   plan   was  unpopular   in   Tennessee''   led    Catron   and 


*  Jackson  to  Polk,  May  22,  1837,  ibid. 

5  Catron  to  Polk,  July  7,  1837,  ibid. 

6  Dunlap  to  Polk,  Aug.  7,  1837,  ibid. 

"!  Johnson  to  Polk,  Aug.  7,  1837,  ibid.  One  gets  an  interesting  glimpse 
of  the  prevailing  professional  ethics  from  his  remark  that  he  is  going 
to  Mississippi  to  practice  law,  for  "I  cannot  charge  my  friends  &  my 
enemies  will  not  employ  me. ' '  In  another  letter  to  Polk,  August  1-4, 
Johnson  tells  a  story  which  indicates  that  election  methods  in  his  day 
were  not  unlike  those  of  our  own:  "I  was  beaten  in  the  last  two  days 
by  the  almost  united  action  of  the  merchants  &  iron  makers — who  as  if 
by  concert  upon  my  leaving  a  county  for  the  last  time  went  to  work, 
under  the  pretence  of  collecting  their  debts,  telling  the  people  that  they 
would  be  compelled  to  collect  in  gold  &  silver  if  I  were  elected — the  ])rice 
of  property  be  reduced  to  almost  nothing  and  the  people  ruined.  Some 
of  the  iron  makers,  told  their  workmen,  that  they  could  not  be  employed 
if  I  was  elected. ' ' 

8  "Davidson  [County]  has  resulted  as  I  expected,  from  the  imbecile 
councils,  of  the  Nashville  politicians.  The  Union  has  been  Muzzled  by 
some  unseen  hands,  and  has  been  a  great  help  to  the  enemy  instead  of 
benefit  to  the  republican  party.  Mr.  Grundy  will  feel  the  effects,  of  the 
combination,  which  has  been  produced  by  supineness  &  want  of  courage" 
(Jackson  to  Polk,  Aug.  6,  1837,  Folic  Papers). 

0  James  Walker  informed  Polk  on  August  27  that  if  the  Van  Buren 
administration  should   adopt  the  sub-treasury  plan,   it   would  find   itself   in 


SPEAEEB   OF   THE  HOUSE   UNDER   VAN  BUEEN  115 

other  prominent  Democrats  to  believe  that  the  state  could  never 
be  regained  by  pursuing  Grundy's  conciliatory  policy.  It  was  a 
battle  of  numbers  against  wealth,  said  Catron,'"  and  war  to  the 
knife  was  therefore  the  true  Republican  policy.  He  favored  the 
sub-treasury  plan,  for  "the  Treasury  is  the  arm  of  power"  and 
must  not  be  placed  in  private  hands ;  the  possession  of  government 
money  by  private  banks  ' '  will  convert  the  keepers  into  Federalists 
in  principle  &  practice  in  a  few  years. ' '  Unlike  Jackson  and  Van 
Buren,  he  advocated  the  emission  of  paper  money  by  the  Treas- 
ury, for  the  people  want  it  and  "numbers  will  govern  in  fact, 
in  Congress,  &  out  of  it."  Although  he  approved  in  general  the 
idea  of  a  sub-treasury,  still,  after  reading  the  new  President's 
message  on  the  subject,  he  pronounced  the  plan  there  suggested 
to  be  sound  in  principle,  but  hardly  possible  in  practice.  The 
people,  he  said,  demanded  something  more  tangible,  and  unless 
provision  were  made  for  issuing  paper  money,  the  party  would 
surely  go  down  to  defeat.^^  "Strike  boldly,"  was  his  advice  to 
Polk,  "it  is  your  habit,  &  the  means  of  your  elevation;  it  is 
expected  of  you."^- 

The  echo  of  Jackson 's  farewell  address  had  scarcely  died  away 
before  the  long-gathering  financial  storm  burst  upon  the  country, 
leaving  in  its  wake  the  wrecks  of  shattered  banks,  ruined  busi- 
ness enterprises,  and  a  panic-stricken  people.    So  desperate  were 

the  minority  in  Tennessee,  as  the  plan  Avas  too  unwieldy  and  costly.  White, 
he  said,  had  announced  that  he  was  not  opposed  to  a  bank  located  in  the 
District  of  Columbia,  with  branches  in  the  states.  Walker  thought  that 
this  idea  would  win  in  Tennessee  if  states  instead  of  individuals  were 
made  stockholders  (Polk  Papers). 

10  ' '  Open  war,  &  to  the  knife,  has  ever  been  the  course  for  the  Eepublican 
side — no  other  position  is  left  for  it,  nor  has  there  been,  since  the  days 
of  Jefferson.  It  is  the  contest  of  Wealth  against  numbers;  sapped  by  the 
statutes  of  descents  when  wealth  consisted  of  Estates:  but  the  European 
policy  is  here  basing  itself  upon  incorporated  &  merchantile  wealth" 
(Catron  to  Polk,  Sept.  2,  1837,  ibid.). 

11  Catron  to  Polk,  Sept.  10,  1837,  ibid. 

12  "Go  in  for  30  or  40  millions,  to  be  circulated  fast  as  may  be  by 
the  Govt — go  for  20ties  &  over  in  gradations  of  tens.  Strike  out  the 
interest  feature — boldly  declare  that  the  farmers  will  hoard  the  notes 
bearing  5  per  cent"  (Catron  to  Polk,  September  27,  1837,  ibid.). 


116  JAMES  K.  POLK 

financial  conditions  that  Van  Bnren  felt  constrained  to  convene 
the  twenty-fifth  Congress  in  extra  session  on  September  4,  1837, 
for  the  purpose  of  laying  before  that  body  his  plans  for  relief. 
His  principal  recommendation  was  the  establishment  of  a  sub- 
treasury  ;  for  experience  had  shown,  he  said,  that  depositing  pub- 
lic money  in  state  banks  was  little  better  than  leaving  it  in  the 
hands  of  the  federal  bank.  The  only  safe  custodian  of  the  public 
funds  was,  in  his  opinion,  the  government  itself.  As  a  temporary 
remedy,  he  advised  Congress  to  withhold  further  deposits  with  the 
states  under  the  distribution  act,  and  to  authorize  the  emission  of 
treasury  notes.  Although  his  recommendations  were  straight- 
forward and  sensible,  they  were,  for  that  very  reason,  unlikely 
to  be  followed.  Even  the  members  of  his  own  party  were  divided 
in  opinion  concerning  the  cause  of  the  trouble,  consequently  they 
did  not  agree  on  remedies  to  be  applied.  Catron,  as  we  have  seen, 
was  an  advocate  of  paper  money,  while  Jackson  and  the  President 
still  believed  in  hard  money.  Jackson  received  advance  informa- 
tion concerning  the  character  of  the  message  and  was  delighted 
with  the  news  that  the  President  would  recommend  a  separation 
of  government  finances  from  all  banks,  and  the  collection  of  public 
revenues  in  gold  and  silver  coin." 

The  members  of  Congress  who  had  striven  so  hard  to  defeat 
Van  Buren  at  the  polls  were  not  disposed  to  aid  him  now  by 
sympathetic  cooperation.  In  the  House  they  were  far  more 
intent  upon  making  life  uncomfortable  for  the  Speaker  and  the 
President  than  they  were  on  relieving  the  financial  stress  of  their 
fellow-citizens.  It  was  known,  of  course,  that  Polk  would  be 
reelected,  and  before  the  ballot  had  been  taken,  Mercer,  of  Vir- 
ginia, proposed  to  transfer  from  the  Speaker  to  the  House  itself 
the  power  to  appoint  committees.  While  the  suggestion  was  not 
adopted,  Mercer  had  the  satisfaction  of  insulting  Polk  by  imply- 
ing that  he  could  not  be  trusted.  On  the  other  hand,  Patton,  of 
Virginia,  wished  to  have  the  rules  so  amended  that  the  Speaker 


13  Jackson  to  Polk,  Aug'.  6,  1837,  ibid. 


SPEAKEB   OF   THE  HOUSE   UNDER   VAN  BUEEN  117 

niiglit  have  a  vote  on  all  questions,  but  his  ameudinent  was  re- 
jected by  the  House.  As  most  of  the  business  of  the  session  would 
necessarily  pass  through  the  hands  of  the  Committee  of  Ways 
and  Means,  Polk  safeguarded  the  interests  of  the  administration 
by  selecting  seven  of  its  nine  members  from  the  ranks  of  his  own 
party. 

Although  the  President,  when  convening  Congress,  had  defi- 
nitely limited  the  scope  of  legislation,  Adams  was  more  terrified 
by  the  possiblp  annexation  of  Texas  than  he  was  by  the  magnitude 
of  the  financial  crisis.  On  September  13,  he  moved  to  ask  the 
President  whether  Texas  had  offered  to  join  the  United  States, 
and,  if  so,  what  had  been  the  reply  made  by  our  government.  Any 
proposition  to  annex  it,  declared  Adams,  would  be  unconstitu- 
tional— one  which  neither  the  President  nor  Congress  "had  any 
right  to  receive,  entertain  or  consider."  It  was  his  firm  opinion 
that  "a,  very  large  portion  of  the  people  of  this  country,  dearly 
as  they  loved  the  Union,  would  prefer  its  total  dissolution  to  the 
act  of  annexation  of  Texas."  The  House,  on  September  18,  cur- 
tailed his  dissertations  on  the  subject  by  passing  a  rule  which 
limited  discussions  to  questions  included  in  the  President's 
message.  Adams  tried  by  various  devices  to  inject  the  subject  of 
Texas  into  later  discussions,  but  Polk  rigorously  enforced  the  rule 
just  adopted. 

The  rule  for  limiting  discussion  did  not  deter  Wise  from  offer- 
ing a  resolution  which  provided  that  a  committee  be  chosen  by 
iallot  to  investigate  the  causes,  delays,  and  failures  of  the  Florida 
war.  Adams  approved  this  method  of  selecting  committees,  for, 
said  he,  experience  had  proved  that  no  real  investigation  would  be 
prosecuted  by  any  committee  selected  by  the  present  Speaker. 

Having  failed  in  his  attempt  to  deprive  the  Speaker  of  the 
power  to  make  appointments,  Wise  welcomed  the  appearance  in 
the  House  of  the  Senate  bill  for  creating  a  sub-treasury.  This 
subject  gave  him  an  opportunity  to  vent  his  wrath  and  sarcasm 
not  only  upon  the  "Greatest  and  Best,"  as  he  called  General 


118  JAMES  K.   POLK 

Jackson,  but  upon  Van  Buren  and  Polk  as  well.  The  late  and 
present  administrations,  he  said, ' '  have  deliberately  and  wickedly, 
with  malice  aforethought,  wrought  this  mischief"  and  should  be 
indicted  by  the  people  for  their  crimes.  He  took  special  delight 
in  reading  one  of  Jackson's  messages  which  had  incorporated  a 
part  of  Polk's  report — as  chairman  of  the  Committee  of  Ways 
and  Means — highly  commending  the  safety  and  efficiency  of  state 
banks.  And  now  we  read  in  the  message  of  Van  Buren,  shouted 
Wise,  "that  tlie  expenment  has  failed" — the  great  chief,  whom 
all  had  been  taught  to  regard  as  a  god,  was  after  all  a  weak 
mortal  whose  wisdom  was  as  fallible  as  that  of  other  men." 

Little  w^as  accomplished  during  this  brief  session.  The  sub- 
treasury  bill  was  defeated,  and  Congress  contented  itself  with 
the  enactment  of  emergency  measures.  The  first  three  install- 
ments paid  out  under  the  operation  of  the  distribution  act  were 
permitted  to  remain  with  the  states,  but  the  fourth  was  postponed 
and  never  paid.  To  meet  the  immediate  needs  of  the  govern- 
ment, the  President  was  authorized  to  prepare  interest-bearing 
treasury  notes  to  be  issued  to  an  amount  not  exceeding  ten  mil- 
lion dollars.  Having  failed  to  agree  upon  any  permanent  financial 
policy.  Congress,  on  October  19,  adjourned  until  the  regular 
session  in  December. 

Before  Congress  had  adjourned,  the  Tennessee  legislature  met 
in  regular  session.  Governor  Cannon  assailed  with  some  vehe- 
mence both  Jackson  and  his  successor.  The  Whigs  began  at  once 
to  formulate  plans  which  they  hoped  might  insure  Polk's  polit- 
ical downfall  and  prevent  the  reelection  of  Grundy.  Some  of 
the  Democrats  were  in  favor  of  silently  ignoring  their  critics,  but 
Polk,  who  was  still  in  Washington,  urged  the  adoption  of  an 
aggressive  course  and  the  prevention  of  the  election  of  a  Senator, 
for  the  present  at  least. ^^  Before  he  set  out  for  Tennessee,  Polk 
was  authorized  by  Grundy  to  withdraw  his  name,  as  candidate 


^^Cong.  Globe,  25  Cong.,  1  sess.,  App.,  318. 

15  Jonas  E.  Thomas  to  Polk,  Oct.  5;  Polk  to  Nichol.son,  Oct.  9,  1837; 
Foil:  Papers. 


SPEAKER   OF   THE   HOUSE   UNDER   VAN  BUREN  119 

for  Senator,  should  it  develop  that  the  interests  of  the  adminis- 
tration might  be  promoted  by  so  doing.^"  Grundy  was  reelected, 
but  not  without  difficulty,  for  the  ranks  of  the  "Whigs  were 
steadily  increasing. 

The  Democrats  were  alarmed  but  not  disheartened.  A  new 
editor,  Cunningham,  was  put  in  charge  of  the  Union;  for  to  the 
moderation  of  Bradford,  under  Grundy's  guidance,  had  Jackson 
attributed  the  recent  defeats."  Most  hopeful  of  all  was  Jackson 
himself;  he  prophesied  that  Tennessee  would  be  "herself  again" 
in  less  than  two  years,  in  spite  of  Bell's  New  England  tour, 
which  was  designed  to  transfer  the  state  to  Webster  and  the 
Federalists.^^ 

When  the  twenty-fifth  Congress  met  in  December  for  its 
second  session,  a  rather  unusual  problem  was  presented  to  the 
House  for  solution.  It  was  a  question  of  settling  a  contested 
election  of  members  from  Mississippi,  and,  as  the  decision  ulti- 
mately devolved  upon  the  Speaker,  Polk  incurred  the  enmity  of 
Sergeant  S.  Prentiss,  a  man  quite  as  venomous  as  Wise  or  Peyton, 
and  far  more  able  than  either. 

In  July,  1837,  the  Governor  of  Mississippi  had  called  a  special 
election  in  order  that  the  state  might  send  members  to  the  extra 
session  of  Congress  which  had  been  proclaimed  by  President  Van 
Buren.  Claiborne  and  Gholson,  the  men  chosen  at  the  special 
election,  were,  at  the  extra  session,  declared  by  the  House  to  be 
members  for  the  entire  term  of  the  twenty-fifth  Congress.  Not- 
withstanding this  decision  of  the  House,  Mississippi  held  another 


iG  Grundy  to  Polk,  Oct,  17,  1837,  ibid. 

17  Although  removed  for  the  moderation  of  his  editorials,  Bradford 
was,  on  the  other  hand,  dropped  from  the  roll  of  divinity  students  by 
the  Whig  bishop  for  being  so  ardent  a  Democrat.  The  incident  well 
illustrates  the  political  intolerance  of  the  period. 

18  ' '  The  course  of  Mr.  Bell  in  attending  the  aristocratic,  federal  & 
shin-plaster  meetings  in  Boston  &  New  York,  &  his  speeches  at  those 
meetings,  which  is  a  transfer  of  Tennessee  to  Mr.  Webster  &  the  blue 
lights,  abolitionists  and  vagrants,  is  working  well  here — it  has  opened 
the  eyes  of  the  democracy  of  Tennessee,  and  none  of  his  Whigg  friends 
here  will  guarantee  the  sale."  Jackson  to  Grundy,  Dec.  16,  1837  {Am. 
Hist.  Mag.,  V,  138-139). 


120  JAMES  K.  POLK 

election  in  November  and  chose  for  Representatives  S.  S.  Pren- 
tiss and  T.  J.  Ward.  Claiborne  and  Gholson  were  supporters 
of  the  administration,  and  their  friends  in  Mississippi,  relying 
on  the  decision  made  b}^  the  House,  took  no  part  in  the  November 
election.  As  a  result,  Prentiss  and  Ward  were  easily  elected. 
Each  side  now  claimed  its  representatives  to  have  been  lawfully 
elected  and  appealed  to  the  House  for  a  decision.  After  pro- 
longed debate  the  House  reversed  its  former  decision  and  pro- 
nounced the  election  of  Claiborne  and  Gholson  void.  It  then 
proceeded  to  ballot  on  the  validity  of  the  second  Mississippi  elec- 
tion at  which  Prentiss  and  Ward  had  been  chosen.  On  this  ques- 
tion the  vote  stood  117  to  117.  Polk  cast  his  ballot  in  the  nega- 
tive, and  the  whole  matter  was  referred  back  to  the  people  of  the 
state,  who  later  reelected  Prentiss  and  Ward.  The  "glorious 
infamy"  which  attached  to  the  Speaker's  vote  against  him, 
Prentiss  never  forgot.  In  a  flight  of  oratory  he  told  the  people 
of  Mississippi  that  "the  still  small  voice  of  James  K.  Polk  de- 
prived you  of  that  which  a  hundred  thousand  bayonets  could 
not  have  forced  upon  you. ' '"  On  his  return  to  Congress  he  had 
the  supreme  satisfaction,  not  only  of  harassing  the  Speaker  on 
every  possible  occasion,  but  of  opposing  the  ordinary  vote  of 
thanks  to  Polk  on  his  retirement  from  the  Speakership. 

Slade,  of  Vermont,  precipitated  a  stormy  debate  on  slavery 
by  presenting,  on  December  20,  two  memorials  which  asked  for 
the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  District  of  Columbia.  After  mov- 
ing that  the  memorials  be  referred  to  a  select  committee,  he 
entered  into  a  prolonged  and  scathing  discussion  of  the  slavery 
question  in  its  various  phases.  Having  recognized  the  member 
from  Vermont,  Polk  found  it  difficult  to  prevent  his  continuing, 
since  Slade  for  some  time  was  careful  to  keep  within  the  bounds 
of  parliamentary  rules.  When  he  finally  launched  into  a  dis- 
cussion of  slavery  in  Virginia,  a  member  entered  a  protest  and 


19  Clipping  from  some  Philadelphia  paper,   dated  Feb.   7,   1838   {Polk 
Papers). 


SPEAKER   OF   THE   HOUSE   UNDER    VAN  BUREN  121 

Polk  ordered  Slade  to  his  seat.-"  Wise,  Rhett,  and  other  southern 
radicals  were  choking  with  rage.  Several  exhorted  their  colleagues 
to  leave  the  hall  in  a  body.  After  adjournment  a  meeting  was 
held,  and,  although  threats  of  disunion  were  freely  made,  few- 
members  were  ready  for  so  drastic  a  procedure. 

On  the  following  day  Patton,  of  Virginia,  introduced,  as  a 
"concession  ...  for  the  sake  of  peace,  harmony,  and  union," 
a  gag  rule  more  drastic  than  its  predecessor.  It  directed  that 
all  petitions  on  the  subject  of  abolition  should  be  laid  on  the 
table  "without  being  debated,  printed,  read  or  referred,"  and 
that  no  further  action  should  be  taken  thereon.  The  rules  were 
suspended,  the  previous  question  invoked,  and  the  vote  hur- 
riedly taken.  When  his  name  was  called,  Adams  shouted  that 
the  resolution  violated  the  federal  Constitution,  whereupon  the 
Speaker  forced  him  to  take  his  seat.  Polk  then  ruled  to  be  out 
of  order  the  demand  made  by  Adams  that  his  reason  for  not  vot- 
ing should  be  entered  in  the  journal.  A  few  days  later,  Polk  even 
extended  the  new  "gag-rule,"  by  deciding  that  a  resolution  of 
the  Massachusetts  legislature  asking  for  a  repeal  of  the  gag  rule 
also  came  under  the  rule  itself  and  could  not  therefore  be 
considered.-^ 

Sectional  feeling  was  still  more  embittered  during  this  session 
by  the  killing,  in  a  duel,  of  Jonathan  Cilley,  of  Maine,  by  another 
member  of  the  House,  William  J.  Graves,  of  Kentucky.  The 
demands  made  upon  Cilley  by  Graves  and  his  second,  Wise,  were 
held  by  many  to  have  been  extremely  unreasonable.  By  such 
members  the  killing  of  Cilley  was  regarded  as  little  better  than 
premeditated  murder.  The  appointment  of  a  committee  to  inves- 
tigate the  circumstances  of  the  duel  with  a  view  to  punishing 
members  who  had  taken  part,  led  to  a  strange  alignment  in 


20  Polk  said  that,  while  his  position  would  not  permit  him  to  state 
his  own  opinions  on  such  agitation  of  this  question,  "they  might  readily 
be  inferred  by  the  House." 

21  January  3,  1838.  Polk  seems,  however,  to  have  felt  that  he  had 
gone  too  far  in  this  matter,  for  on  February  5  he  ruled  to  be  in  order  a 
petition  of  similar  purport  from  citizens  of  Massachusetts. 


122  JAMES  K.  POLK 

defense  of  the  participants.  Friends  of  Graves  and  Wise  charged 
that  Polk  had  "packed"  the  committee  to  the  prejudice  of  the 
defendants;  while  Adams,  declaring  the  investigation  to  be  "an 
administration  measure,"  not  only  condemned  the  committee  for 
having  prepared  an  opinion,  but  objected  to  receiving  their 
report.  So  intense  was  partisan  feeling  that  Sawyer,  of  North 
Carolina,  objected  to  receiving  a  message  from  the  President 
which  arrived  while  the  clerk  was  reading  the  report  of  the  com- 
mittee, but  Polk  promptly  decided  that  the  constitutional  right 
of  the  President  to  send  a  message  to  the  house  at  any  time 
transcended  the  rule  which  required  unanimous  consent  to  its 
reception. 

Hectoring  of  the  Speaker  continued  to  the  end  of  the  session. 
On  June  23,  Adams  reached  the  climax  of  absurdity  by  demand- 
ing that  Polk  should  reduce  to  writing  some  irrelevant  remarks 
which  Adams  had  made  and  which  the  Speaker  had  declared  to 
be  out  of  order.  On  Polk's  refusal,  Adams  appealed  from  the 
decision.    Needless  to  say,  the  House  sustained  the  Speaker. 

While  Polk  was  successfully  parrying  the  shafts  of  his  enemies 
in  Congress,  his  friends  in  Tennessee  w^ere  compassing  the  down- 
fall of  Bell,  as  well  as  formulating  new  plans  for  the  Speaker 
himself.  Donelson  was  indefatigable  in  his  efforts  to  expose  Bell's 
treachery.  From  his  retreat  at  the  Hermitage  "the  chief"  for- 
warded documents  to  the  Speaker  and  requested  him  to  answer 
Bell's  charges  against  himself  [Jackson],  either  in  Congress  or 
througli  the  Glohe."  Desirous  of  representing  Polk's  district  in 
Congress,  Nicholson  saw  in  the  Speaker  excellent  Vice-Presi- 
ential  timber,  but  Polk  was  inclined  to  agree  with  other  friends 
that  he  might  be  able  to  accomplish  more  good  in  the  governor 's 
chair.  Ex-Governor  Carroll  had  announced  to  Polk  his  willing- 
ness to  become  once  more  a  candidate  for  the  office,  and  promised 
to  handle  Cannon  "without  gloves";-^  but  the  politicians,  fear- 
ing that  he  would  be  defeated,  did  not  rally  to  his  support. 

22  Doneldson  to  Polk,  Jan.  4;  Jackson  to  Tolk,  Feb.  2,  1838;  Polk  Papers. 

23  Carroll  to  Polk,  Feb.  17,  18iS,  nhid. 


SPEAEEB   OF   THE   HOUSE   UNDER   VAN  BUEEN  123 

Even  before  Polk  had  consented  to  run  for  governor,  each 
party  was  striving  to  strengthen  its  own  position  in  the  state  and 
to  weaken  the  hokl  of  its  opponent.  In  Boston,  C.  G.  Greene, 
nnder  Polk's  direction,  collected  evidence  to  ])rove  that  Bell,  on 
his  New  England  tour,  had  been  entertained  by  Hartford  Con- 
vention Federalists;-*  while  in  Tennessee,  the  Whig  legislature 
instructed  Orundy  to  vote  against  any  sub-treasury  bill  that 
might  come  before  the  Senate.  Although  the  purpose  of  this 
move  was  to  force  his  resignation,  he  disappointed  the  Whigs  by 
promptly  announcing  that  he  would  obey  his  instructions.  Much 
Whig  literature  was  franked  from  Washington.  White  and 
Bell  scattered  widely  the  speech  in  which  Wise  had  castigated 
Polk  and  the  President. 

From  many  sources  Polk  was  importuned  to  accept  the  guber- 
natorial nomination,  for  it  was  believed  that  he  could  regain  the 
state  for  the  Democratic  party.-^  Apparently  the  office  was  not 
attractive  to  him,  yet  duty  to  his  party  seemed  to  point  in  that 
direction.  Late  in  the  summer,  after  mature  consideration,  he 
finally  consented  to  become  a  candidate.  Many  letters  told  him 
of  the  good  effect  which  his  acceptance  had  produced.  One  from 
Cave  Johnson  reported  that  in  many  places  "whole  neighbor- 
hoods" had  returned  to  the  Democratic  party.-" 

The  Democrats  were  still  embarrassed  by  the  weakness  of 
their  local  papers,  for  Cunningham  had  proved  to  be  quite  as 
unsuccessful  a  journalist  as  Bradford.  When  seeking  a  more 
competent  editor  for  the   Unian,  Polk  offered  the  position  to 


24-  Green  to  Polk,  Jan.  18,  1838,  ibid. 

25  One  correspondent  intimated  that  prospects  of  success  might  be 
better  in  the  state  than  in  Congress.  Polk,  he  said,  would  redeem  the 
state  if  any  one  could,  and  "If  there  is  any  possible  chance  of  the 
opposition  getting  the  upper  hand  in  the  ensuing  Congress,  perhaps  this 
course  might  be  the  prudent  one;  as  your  friends  would  as  soon  be 
annihilated  at  once,  as  to  see  that  most  infamous  of  all  infamous 
PUPPIES,  John  Bell,  triumph  over  you  in  a  contest  for  the  Speaker's  chair. 
Should  the  opposition  succeed  in  their  views,  this  must  and  will  be  the 
result,  as  you  are  now  the  most  dreaded  and  consequently  the  most 
hated  by  them"  (W.  S.  Haynes  to  Polk,  July  2-i,  1838,  ibid.). 

2G  Johnson  to  Polk,  Nov.  2,  1838,  ibid. 


124  JAMES   E.  POLE 

several  persons  iu  succession.  Among  the  number  were  Edmund 
Burke-'  and  C.  G.  Greene,  of  Boston.  It  was  Greene,  who,  when 
declining  the  offer,  suggested  Jeremiah  George  Harris,  then  edi- 
tor of  the  Bay  State  Democrat.-^  For  the  Democrats  this  proved 
to  be  a  most  fortunate  suggestion.  In  Harris  they  found  a  man 
in  every  way  suited  to  Tennessee  politics — one  who  was  more 
than  a  match  for  his  adversaries  of  the  quill,  with  the  possible 
exception  of  Parson  Brownlow.  The  Union  was  enlarged,  and 
on  February  1,  1839,  the  proprietor,  J.  M.  Smith,  introduced  the 
new  editor  to  the  people  of  Tennessee.  In  the  same  issue  Harris 
announced  his  policy:  namely,  to  fight  for  the  principles  of 
Jefferson  and  his  Republican  successors,  and  for  the  overthrow 
of  "Federalism"  in  the  state.-^  A  week  later  Smith  reported 
to  Polk  that  a  war  of  words  with  Hall,  editor  of  the  Banner,  had 
already  begun  and  that  he  [Smith]  was  much  pleased  with 
Harris.^" 

The  proprietor  of  the  Union  had  no  reason  to  revise  his 
opinion.  Harris  launched  at  once  into  a  campaign  of  vitupera- 
tion and  merciless  denunciation  of  the  Whigs  which  endeared  him 
to  his  friends  and  made  him  dreaded  by  his  opponents.  He  was 
the  type  of  editor  in  whom  the  people  of  the  West  delighted.  He 
and  General  Jackson  became  fast  friends,  but,  in  the  main,  it  was 
to  Polk  that  he  looked  for  counsel  and  guidance.  He  plunged 
with  zeal  into  the  campaign  against  Governor  Cannon  and  an- 
nounced that  "Tennessee  has  not  seen  so  proud  a  day  since  the 
election  of  her  own  Jackson  to  the  Presidency  as  will  that  on 


27  Burke  was  later  a  Eepresentative  from  New  Hampshire.  In  1845, 
Polk  put  him  in  charge  of  the  General  Patent  Office. 

28  Greene  to  Eives  of  the  Globe,  Dec.  3,  1838,  Polk  Papers. 

29  "That  tory  federalism  of  1798,  Hartford  convention  federalism 
of  1814,  and  'whig'  Federalism  of  this  day  are  identical,  so  far  as  they 
relate  to  the  two  grand  party  divisions  of  the  country,  is  too  susceptible 
of  the  clearest  letter  of  proof  to  admit  of  a  doubt." 

30  "Mr.  Hall  of  the  Banner  has  commenced  the  war  with  the  new 
editor  of  the  'Union'  and  if  I  am  not  mistaken  he  will  find  that  he  will 
have  a  little  more  to  do  than  he  at  present  imagines"  (Smith  to  Polk, 
Feb.  7,  1839,  PoJlc  Papers). 


SPEAKER  OF   THE   HOUSE   VNDEE    FAN  BUEEN  125 

which  the  sovereigns  of  her  soil  shall  by  their  nnboiight  suffrage 
call  ]\Ir.  Polk  to  the  gubernatorial  chair.  "^^ 

This  is  not,  however,  the  place  for  a  prolonged  discussion  of 
Polk's  gubernatorial  campaign.  Reserving  this  for  another  chap- 
ter, we  may  follow  his  career  through  his  last  session  as  Speaker 
of  the  House.  Selected  by  the  Democrats  for  the  avowed  purpose 
of  bringing  Tennessee  back  into  the  party  fold,  Polk,  as  he  called 
to  order  the  third  session  of  the  twenty-fifth  Congress,  was  more 
cordially  hated  than  ever  by  Bell,  Wise,  Prentiss,  and  other 
enemies  of  the  administration. 

Van  Buren's  message,  which  reached  the  House  on  December 
4,  1838,  was  optimistic  in  tone.  He  informed  Congress  that  the 
rapid  improvement  of  financial  conditions  and  the  resumption  of 
specie  payment  by  the  principal  banks  had  proved  beyond  ques- 
tion that  a  federal  bank  is  not  indispensable.  Reiterating  the 
belief  that  a  sub-treasury  would  prove  to  be  the  best  agency  for 
collecting  and  disbursing  the  public  revenue,  he  again  recom- 
mended its  creation  by  law.  He  alluded  to  Swartwout's  defalca- 
tion and  asked  for  legislation  which  would  make  such  peculation 
in  future  a  felony. 

The  lawmaking  body  of  the  nation  paid  little  heed  to  the 
President 's  recommendations.  Jockeying  for  position  suited  their 
present  mood  far  better  than  constructive  legislation.  Having 
made  gains  in  recent  political  contests,  the  Whigs  had  high  hopes 
of  carrying  the  next  Presidential  election.  Without  as  yet 
announcing  any  program  for  themselves,  they  employed  all  of 

31  Nashville  Union-,  Feb.  8,  1839.  In  the  same  issue  Harris  quoted  an 
article  from  the  Pennsylvania  EepoHer  in  which  that  paper  urged  that 
Polk  should  be  made  Vice-President.  Concerning  Polk's  record  the 
Eeportcr  said:  "Knowing  that  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  was  about 
to  bring  the  whole  of  its  mighty  influence  to  bear  against  the  administra- 
tion of  Gen.  Jackson,  it  was  deemed  of  the  highest  importance  to  be  well 
fortified  at  the  point  where  the  attack  was  to  be  made,  and  the  chair- 
man of  the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means,  as  the  financial  organ  of  the 
administration,  became  the  most  important  position  in  the  House.  Col. 
Polk's  known  position  in  opposition  to  the  re-charter  of  that  institution, 
his  intimate  acquaintance  with  its  history  and  transactions,  and  his 
powers  as  a  ready  and  able  debater,  recommended  him  for  its  occupancy. 
And  well  did  he  justify  the  confidence  so  reposed  in  him." 


126  JAMES  K.   POLK 

their  energies  in  heaping  odium  upon  the  administrations  of  Van 
Buren  and  his  predecessor.  In  the  House  the  session  was  stormy 
from  the  beginning.  When  they  could  enlist  the  votes  of  the 
so-called  conservatives,  the  Whigs  were  able  to  outvote  the  Demo- 
crats, and  the  task  of  the  Speaker  was  made  still  more  difficult. 

On  the  second  day  of  the  session,  and  before  the  President's 
message  had  been  received,  Adams  fanned  the  flame  of  sectional 
discord  by  moving  that  all  petitions,  remonstrances,  and  resolu- 
tions, for  or  against  the  annexation  of  Texas,  should  be  referred 
to  a  select  committee.  His  resolution  was  laid  on  the  table  by 
a  vote  of  136  to  61.  His  solicitude  on  this  subject  proved  to  be 
unwarranted,  for  the  President  in  his  message  assured  Congress 
that  all  proposals  for  annexation  had  been  withdrawn.  Adams 
then  submitted  a  resolution  which  called  for  a  committee  to  inves- 
tigate the  controversy  of  Andrew  Stevenson,  late  Speaker  of  the 
House  and  present  minister  to  England,  with  Daniel  O'Con- 
nell,  a  member  of  Parliament.  This  also  was  sent  to  the  table, 
but  it  had  accomplished  its  intended  purpose  of  attaching  odium 
to  the  administration. 

Abolition  petitions  again  made  their  appearance.  The  per- 
sistence of  the  reformers  aroused  the  fears  as  well  as  the  wrath 
of  southern  members,  and  slaveholders  required  guaranties  for 
the  protection  of  their  "peculiar  institution."  On  December  11, 
Atherton,  of  New  Hampshire,  submitted  a  series  of  resolutions 
the  purport  of  which  was  to  declare  unconstitutional  any  inter- 
ference with  slavery  either  in  the  states  or  the  District  of 
Columbia,  and  to  reenact  the  gag  rule  regarding  petitions.  After 
a  brief  debate  these  resolutions  were  adopted  by  the  House.  The 
adoption  of  the  gag  rule  did  not,  however,  eliminate  the  slavery 
question.  On  the  thirteenth,  Adams  tried  to  introduce  a  resolu- 
tion to  the  effect  that  no  enactment  of  Congress  could  add  to  or 
deduct  from  the  powers  of  Congress  which  had  been  conferred 
by  the  Constitution.  On  the  same  day,  Wise  offered  a  series  of 
resolutions  which  were  designed  to  deprive  Congress  of  all  power 


SPEAKEE  OF  THE  HOUSE  UNDER  VAN  BUBEN  127 

to  interfere  A\ith  slavery.  In  both  cases  perniission  to  introduce 
the  resohitions  was  denied  by  the  House.  While  Polk  applied 
the  gag  rule  whenever  possible,  Gushing,  of  Massachusetts,  won 
applause  from  the  reformers  by  forcing  the  Speaker  to  decide 
that  a  protest  against  the  constitutionality  of  the  gag  rule, 
although  itself  out  of  order,  must  be  inserted  in  the  Journal,  if 
brought  up  on  the  following  day  in  the  form  of  a  correction  of 
the  minutes."'- 

For  the  Whigs,  the  news  of  Swart wout's  defalcation  was  an 
unusually  sweet  morsel,  for  it  gave  them  an  excuse  to  explore 
with  telescope  and  microscope  the  administrations  of  Jackson  and 
Van  Buren.  And,  as  the  Democrats  no  longer  had  a  majority 
in  tlie  House,  it  incidentally  gave  them  a  chance  to  humiliate 
Polk  by  depriving  him  of  the  power  to  appoint  the  investigating 
committee.  In  disposing  of  the  questions  mentioned  in  the  Presi- 
dent's message,  Cambreleng  had  moved  that  the  part  relating  to 
the  defalcation  be  referred  to  the  Committee  of  Ways  and  jNIeans, 
of  which  he  was  chairman.  On  December  21,  Garland,  of  Vir- 
ginia, moved  to  amend  by  referring  the  question  to  a  select  com- 
mittee of  nine  to  be  chosen  by  hallot.  In  a  scurrilous  tirade. 
Wise  asserted  that  any  committee  appointed  by  the  present 
Speaker  would  conceal  rather  than  disclose  the  facts.  He  had,  he 
said,  been  chairman  of  another  committee  selected  by  Polk  to 
investigate  the  affairs  of  the  General  Post  Office,  and  all  his  efforts 
to  ascertain  the  truth  had  been  defeated.  Kendall,  the  Post 
Master  General,^^  had  declined  to  furnish  information  on  the 


32  Dec.  21,  1838.    Cong.  Globe,  25  Cong.,  3  sess.,  59. 

33  "Wise  called  Kendall  "the  President's  thinking  machine,  and  his 
writing  machine — ay,  and  his  lying  machine!  Sir,  if  General  Jackson  had 
been  elected  for  a  third  term,  one  great  good  would  have  come  of  the 
evil — Amos  Kend<iU  ivoitid  have  been  worked  to  death!  Poor  wretch,  as 
he  rode  his  Eosinante  down  Pennsylvania  avenue,  he  looked  like  Death 
on  a  pale  horse — he  was  chief  overseer,  chief  reporter,  amanuensis,  scribe, 
accountant  general,  man  of  all  work — nothing  was  well  done  without 
the  aid  of  his  diabolical  genius."  Shielding  Kendall,  said  Wise,  was  the 
more  reprehensible  because  Jackson  had  so  relentlessly  pursued  Tobias 
Watkins:  "When  the  indictments,  the  prosecutions,  were  pressed  unre- 
lentingly  against   poor   Watkins — when   the   Administration   was   crying, 


128  JAMES   K.   POLE 

ground  that  he  was  responsible  to  the  President  alone,  and  the 
majority  of  the  committee  had  excluded  everything  that  might 
reflect  upon  the  administration.  "Now,  sir,"  said  Wise  to  the 
Speaker, 

I  propose  to  show  that  yoicr  committee  obeyed  the  will  of  their  master. 
Yes,  as  you  had  done,  by  pacMng  and  stocking  the  committee.  It  was  your 
committee — peculiarly  and  emphatically  yours — its  appointment,  its  conduct, 
its  honor  or  infamy,  will  forever  attach  itself,  sir,  to  your  name.  In  illus- 
trating the  conduct  of  that  committee,  I  could  consume  days  to  show  how 
the  plainest  and  most  obvious  and  undeniable  propositions  were  voted  do^vn ; 
how  resolution  after  resolution,  question  after  question  to  witnesses,  going 
into  the  very  vitals  of  inquiry,  were  unblushingly  rejected  and  stifled  by 
the  majority  of  the  committee  .  .  .  ycni,  the  Speaker,  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  the  heads  of  Executive  Departments,  ymir  committee,  and 
your  whole  party,  combined  and  conspired  to  stifle  investigation. 

Some  of  Wise 's  friends  asked  him  to  yield  the  floor  for  a  motion 
to  adjourn.  He  declined  on  the  plea  that  he  might  never  get  it 
again,  for,  said  he  to  the  Speaker,  ' '  I  distrust  you,  sir. '  '^*  Polk 
bore  the  onslaught  with  dignity  and  composure,  and  without 
interference  until  Wise  referred  to  Benton  as  the  "monster" 
who  was  to  perpetuate  the  present  dynasty.  On  January  8,  1839, 
he  again  assailed  the  Speaker  and  compared  him  to  a  gambler 
who  plays  with  loaded  dice.^^ 

It  was  believed  by  the  Speaker's  friends  that  Wise,  Peyton, 
and  Clay  were  trying  to  provoke  him  into  sending  a  challenge,^® 
for  the  "murder"  of  Jonathan  Cilly  had  not  been  forgotten. 


Shylock-like,  'my  bond,  my  bond!'  against  one  of  Mr.  Adams's  default- 
ers, then  'general  and  minute  inquiries'  w'ere  not  only  lawful,  but  a 
duty;  but,  sir,  the  moment  the  band  of  investigation  touched  one  of  his 
'little  ones,'  then  inquiry  was  worse  than  a  'Spanish  Inquisition.'  " 

34  Dec.  21,  1838.     Cong.  GJohe,  25  Cong.,  3  sess.,  App.,  386-387. 

35  "My  colleague,"  said  he,  "wants  the  committee  appointed  by 
ballot,  in  order  to  avoid  imputations  on  the  Speal-er;  I  want  it  appointed 
by  ballot,  to  avoid  the  Speaker  himself. ' ' 

3*i  According  to  a  story  printed  in  the  Globe,  August  21,  1844,  on  the 
authority  of  General  Jackson,  Clay  at  one  time  appeared  at  the  bar 
of  the  House  and  said  to  Speaker  Polk:  "Go  home,  G-d  d-n  you,,  where 
you  belong!"  In  1844  this  ejaculation  was  made  the  theme  of  a  cam- 
paign song.  During  a  heated  debate  in  the  House,  Wise  shouted  to  Polk: 
''You  are  a  damned  little  petty  tijrant;  I  mean  tJd^  personally — packet 
it!" 


SPEAKER   OF   THE  HOUSE   UNDER   VAN  BUREN  129 

But  Polk  treated  their  insults  with  silent  contempt,  and  b>*  so 
doing  did  much  to  establish  a  new  precedent  in  such  "affairs  of 
honor."  His  personal  bravery  was  questioned  by  none  except 
his  bitter  enemies,  and  even  the  impetuous  Jackson  commended 
him  for  ignoring  such  flagrant  indignities.^^ 

The  committee  was  chosen  by  ballot,  and,  needless  to  say,  a 
majority  of  its  members  were  opposed  to  the  administration.  The 
Democrats  asked  for  the  privilege  of  selecting  the  minority  mem- 
bers, but  their  request  was  denied.  Both  majority  and  minority 
reports  were  tabled  by  the  House  on  February  27,  1839.  The 
investigation  had  been  successful  only  in  intensifying  political 
discord.  In  a  letter  to  Polk,  Jackson  asked  for  an  account  of 
the  investigation,  and  expressed  the  belief  that  Swartwout  could 
not  have  invested  all  of  the  million  and  a  quarter  which  he  had 
taken.  "Where  is  the  balance?"  he  asked,  "The  Whiggs  have 
it. '  '^^  To  Grundy  he  suggested  that  William  B.  Lewis  and  Daniel 
Jackson,  if  put  on  oath,  might  tell  how  Swartwout  had  invested 
some  of  his  money.^^ 

Defalcations  had  been  both  frequent  and  brazen,  and  their 
cause,  as  Underwood,  of  Kentucky,  pointed  out,^°  could  be  traced 
to  Jackson's  policy  of  filling  offices  with  those  "whose  subserv- 
iency to  the  will  of  the  President,  and  devotion  to  the  interests 
of  party,  constituted  their  principal  recommendation."  But 
undoubtedly  Bynum's  statement  was  equally  true— that,  when 
demanding'  that  the  select  committee  be  chosen  by  ballot,  the 
Whigs  were  less  interested  in  political  purity  than  in  blasting 
Polk's  prospects  in  his  gubernatorial  campaign." 

3T  Jackson  to  W.  P.  Kowles,  Aug.  24,  1840.  Printed  in  Washington 
Globe,  July  19,  1844. 

3s  Jackson  to  Polk,  Feb.  11,  1839,  Poll:  Papers. 

39  "T  have  no  doubt  "  he  continued,  "if  the  truth  can  be  reached, 
that  the  mgVrnecCt^  of  New  York  hold  in  their  hands  of  the  revenue 
chargeable  to  Swartwout,  from  $60n,000  to  $800,000  if  not  more,  and  it 

s  sulges  ed  that  he  loaned  to  our  little  Whigg  printer.  Hall  of  the  Banner, 
some^thousands."  Jackson  to  Grundy,  Feb.  20,  1839  (^m.  Mag.  of  Hrst., 
V,  141-142). 

40  Cong.  Globe,  25  Cong.,  3  sess.,  App.,  375. 
4:1  Idem,  125. 


130  JAMES  E.  POLE 

Unquestionably  disintegration  of  the  Jackson  party  was  due 
in  part  to  the  jealousy  of  ambitious  politicians  who  had  failed  to 
obtain  what  they  considered  to  be  an  adequate  reward  for  services 
rendered.  But  there  was  a  deeper  cause  for  defection — one  based 
on  the  nature  and  ends  of  government  itself.  For  example,  a 
man  of  Bell's  type — one  who  believed  in  constitutional  govern- 
ment, and  one  whose  penetrating  mind  enabled  him  so  clearly  to 
see  the  inevitable  results  of  administering  the  government  accord- 
ing to  Jacksonian  methods — never  logically  belonged  in  the  ranks 
of  the  party  which  followed  so  loyally  the  dictates  of  the  "old 
hero. ' '  Bell,  and  all  others  who  viewed  things  as  he  did,  were  con- 
stitutionalists, and  they  gravitated  naturally  to  the  party  which 
accepted  the  precepts  of  Hamilton,  Marshall,  and  Webster.  Dur- 
ing Jackson's  first  term,  and  to  some  extent  during  his  second, 
there  was  much  confusion  of  thought  on  governmental  principles 
and  functions.  Admiration  for  the  man  had  obscured  the  vision 
of  many  who  would  otherwise  have  been  quick  to  detect  the 
inherent  evils  of  Jacksonism.  By  the  time  Van  Buren  became 
President,  the  personal  element  had,  to  a  considerable  degree, 
disappeared  from  politics.  In  the  party  realignment  which  re- 
sulted, personal  qualities  were  not  entirely  ignored ;  but  of  far 
greater  importance  was  the  attitude  of  statesmen  and  their  sup- 
porters toward  the  fundamentals  of  government  itself.  On  this 
question  the  issue  was  clear  cut. 

Several  speeches  delivered  during  this  session  show  that  their 
authors  fully  understood  the  nature  of  Jacksonism  and  its  para- 
lyzing influence  upon  constitutional  government.  The  President 
in  his  message  had  attributed  the  success  of  our  institutions  to 
the  "constant  and  direct  supervision  by  the  people  over  every 
public  measure."  With  this  as  a  text,  Bell  assailed  the  "demo- 
cratic tendencies"  of  w^hich  the  administration  boasted,  and 
made  an  ardent  plea  for  a  return  to  constitutional  government : 

The  People  are  told  that  our  ancestors,  who  framed  the  Constitution  in 
1789,  were  half  a  century  in  the  rear  of  the  improvements  of  the  present 
age;  that  they  had  not  the  benefit  of  the  new  lights  -which  experience  has 


SPEAKER   OF   THE  HOUSE   UNDER   VAN  BUREN  131 

shed  upou  the  subject  of  government  since  that  time,  and  Avhich  are  now 
in  full  blaze  around  us.  The  science  of  government,  we  are  told,  has  made 
great  strides  since  our  Constitution  was  framed;  and,  in  deed,  that  instru- 
ment is  beginning  to  be  looked  upon  by  many  rather  as  a  device  of  bad  men, 
to  advance  the  interests  of  the  few  at  the  expense  of  the  many,  and  forming 
an  actual  obstruction  to  that  full  tide  of  happiness  and  prosperity  Avhich 
awaits  us  when  the  inventions  of  modern  democracy  shall  be  substituted 
for  it.  At  all  events,  it  is  proclaimed  to  be  the  duty  of  every  man  who 
would  improve  the  condition  of  the  human  family  to  strengthen  the  demo- 
cratic tendencies  of  the  Constitution,  and  to  disrobe  or  rather  strip  it  of  those 
limitations  and  restrictions  upon  the  popular  will,  with  which  our  unimproved 
ancestors  have  thought  it  necessary  to  encumber  it.  .  .  .  In  truth,  sir*  it 
cannot  be  disguised  that  there  are  a  class  of  politicians  in  the  country  at 
this  moment,  whose  aspirations  it  does  not  suit  that  any  restriction,  any 
limitation  whatever,  shall  exist  in  the  practice  of  the  Government  upon  the 
will  or  absolutism  of  the  majority;  and,  in  the  estimation  of  all  their 
followers,  our  Constitution  is  defective.*^ 

Deploring  the  attempt  to  bring  about  more  immediate  control 
by  the  people,  Bell  boldly  asserted  that 

according  to  our  system,  the  People  do  not,  and  cannot,  exercise  any  direct 
supervision  over  any  public  measure.  Their  power,  their  influence,  their 
supervision,  can  be  constitutionally  exercised  only  by  petition  and  remon- 
strance, and  by  the  utterance  of  their  voice  at  the  ballot-box. 

This  was  but  a  simple  statement  of  facts ;  nevertheless,  it  required 
temerity  to  proclaim  such  a  truth  in  the  face  of  clamor  for  the 
exercise  of  popular  will.  To  Van  Buren's  declaration  that  the 
extension  of  practical  democracy  had  strengthened  the  Union, 
Bell  replied  that  never  before  had  there  been  such  a  relaxation 
of  all  ties  which  bind  society  together.^^  The  power  of  the 
people,  he  said,  had  not  in  reality  been  increased,  for  party 
discipline  had  deprived  them  of  all  voice  in  public  affairs.^*    The 

42  Dec.  26,  1838.     Cong.  Globe,  25  Cong.,  3  sess.,  App.,  360-361. 

43  "At  no  former  period  has  so  general  a  spirit  of  opposition  to  legal 
restraints  or  requirements  manifested  itself  throughout  the  country,  when 
they  stand  in  the  way  of  wlful  passions  or  purposes  of  any  kind.  Slight 
ret^ard  for  the  Constitution  and  laws,  commencing  with  the  Government 
its'elf  and  its  administrators,  has  gradually  diffused  itself  over  society." 

44  "Such  is  and  has  been  the  power  of  party  discipline — such  the 
despotic  principle  of  party  association  for  years,  that  the  mass  of  the 
community  have  rather  stood  in  the  relation  of  subjects  to  be  governed 
than  the  controlling  elements  of  power. ' ' 


132  JAMES  K.   FOLK 

truth  of  this  statement,  however,  only  made  more  deplorable  the 
fact  that  the  party  which  Bell  himself  had  helped  to  organize 
should  keep  up  the  fiction  of  popular  sovereignty,  and  even 
outdo  their  opponents  in  catering  to  the  passions  of  the  multitude. 
When  discussing  an  appropriation  bill,  on  February  19,  1839, 
Kennedy,  of  Maryland,  diverged  from  his  subject  to  give  a 
critical  analysis  of  Jacksonism  and  to  point  out  its  disastrous 
consequences.  Jackson,  he  said,  had  been  singularly  unlucky 
as  a  reformer,  although  he  had  been  an  innovator  ' '  in  the  broadest 
and  worst  sense": 

His  adininistratiou  was  one  ceaseless  change:  change,  sometimes  steal- 
ing along  in  noiseless  advance,  sometimes  bursting  forth  in  bold,  open-day 
achievement ;  one  while  sweeping  with  the  breath  of  spring,  at  another  -with 
the  rage  and  havoc  of  the  tornado.  We  had  ever  change  of  men,  change 
of  measures,  change  of  principles.  .  .  .  The  pervading  characteristic  of  that 
most  anomalous  and  extraordinary  administration  was  mutation — uncer- 
tainty— experiment.  It  lived  in  perpetual  motion,  defying  all  hope  of 
repose;  it  rejoiced  in  turmoil,  and  revelled  in  paradox.  .  .  .  The  idea  of 
political  consistency  never  entered  the  President's  head — he  had  no  per- 
ception of  the  meaning  of  the  term. 

Jackson's  idol,  continued  Kennedy,  was  popularity,  and  what- 
ever sustained  popularity  constituted  the  theory  of  his  conduct. 
It  was  not  that  wholesome  popularity  based  on  services  rendered, 
"but  a  domineering,  wayward,  arrogant  popularity — an  im- 
patient, hectoring  assumption  of  the  right  to  lead,  which  repu- 
diates all  law,  despises  all  observance,  and  maintains  its  supre- 
macy by  personal  and  party  force:"  Jackson,  said  he,  used  his 
popularity  to  increase  his  power ;  and,  in  turn,  he  used  that  power 
to  increase  his  popularity.^^ 


45  "  The  very  boldness  of  his  designs  seemed  to  fascinate  the  public 
admiration:  he  dazzled  the  popular  mind  by  that  fearlessness  which  we 
were,  for  a  time,  accustomed  to  interj)ret  as  a  proof  of  his  honesty  and 

uprightness   of   purpose He    flattered    the    People   with    the    address 

of  a  practiced  courtier,  startled  and  amused  them  by  the  thunderclaps 
of  his  policy,  identified  liis  success  with  the  gratification  of  tlieir  favorite 
passions,  grappled  himself  with  wonderful  adroitness  to  the  predominant 
sentiments,  wishes,  and  prejudices  of  the  great  and  massive  majority — 


SPEAKER   OF   THE   HOUSE   UNDER   VAN  BUREN  133 

On  February  22,  Slade,  of  Vermont,  obtained  the  floor  for 
the  purpose  of  discussing  the  general  appropriation  bill.  His 
time  was  mainly  occupied,  hoAvever,  in  a  masterful  arraignment 
of  Jackson  and  Van  Buren,  and  of  their  methods.  He  attributed 
the  gift  of  prophecy  to  Benton,  Van  Buren,  and  R.  M.  Johnson, 
who,  in  1826,  had  reported  to  the  Senate  on  the  evils  of  executive 
patronage.  Patronage,  they  said,  would  inevitably  lead  to  one 
man  power.  By  exchanging  patronage  for  votes  the  President 
would  soon  control  not  only  both  houses  of  Congress,  but  the 
entire  country.^''  "What  was  prophecy  in  1826,"  said  Slade, 
"has  become  history  in  1839." 

Under  the  caption  of  the  "Pretensions  of  Democracy,"  he 
contrasted  the  now  obsolete   Republicanism   of  Jefferson  with 


and  became  a  monarch,  an  autocrat,  by  the  sheer  concentration  of  repub- 
lican suffrage. ' ' 

Having  discussed  in  detail  the  methods  by  which  Jackson  had  arro- 
gated all  authority  to  himself  while  professing  reverence  for  the  Con- 
stitution, Kennedy  depicted  most  admirably  the  effect  of  Jaeksonism, 
not  alone  upon  the  character  of  the  government,  but  upon  society  itself. 
It  Jed  not  merely  to  corruption  in  official  circles,  but  it  demoralized  the 
masses,  as  well.  "We  lived,"  said,  he,  "in  the  midst  of  convulsions. 
The  public  taste  was  vitiated  and  fed  by  the  stimulous  of  constantly 
recurring  political  eruptions;  it  delighted  in  strange  conjectures — the 
heaviugs  and  spasms  of  that  capricious  power  which  displayed  itself  in 
such  fantastic  action  at  the  capital.  A  spirit  of  insubordination,  of  mis- 
rule and  riot  became  dift'used  through  the  community.  Wild  and  visionary 
theories  of  political  duty  were  disseminated  abroad  and  showed  them- 
selves, in  the  most  mischievous  forms,  in  the  proceedings  of  the  State 
Legislatures.  The  most  abstruse  and  difficult  problems  of  political 
economy — questions  of  currency,  finance,  constitutional  power — were 
summarily  but  authoritatively  disposed  of  by  the  shallowest  pretenders 
to  statesmanship;  and  the  oldest  and  best  institutions  of  the  country 
attacked  and  beaten  down  by  political  charlatans.  Knowledge,  delibera- 
tion, experience,  all  were  obliged  to  give  way  to  this  newly-inspired 
intuition;  and  the  greatest  pains  were  taken  by  party  leaders  and  dema- 
gogues to  deceive  the  people  into  the  belief  that  the  profoundest  ques- 
tions of  government  might  be  consigned  to  the  decision  of  men  of  the 
lowest  scale  of  qualification  in  political  science"  (Cong.  Globe,  25  Cong., 
3  sess.,  App.,  410-412).     The  whole  speech  is  well  worth  reading. 

46 ' '  "We  must  look  forward  to  the  time  when  the  nomination  of  a 
President  can  carry  any  man  through  the  Senate,  and  his  recommenda- 
tion can  carry  any  measure  through  the  two  Houses  of  Congress;  when 
the  principle  of  public  action  will  be  open  and  avowed — the  President 
wants  my  vote,  and  I  want  his  patronage;  I  will  vote  as  he  wishes,  and 
he  will  give  me  the  office  I  wish  for.  What  will  this  be  but  the  govern- 
ment of  one  man?  and  what  is  the  government  of  one  man,  but  a  mon- 
archy?"    Quoted  from  their  report  by  Slade. 


134  JAMES  E.  POLE 

the  madness  of  Jacksonian  Democracy — ''the  Democracy,"  as  it 
is  called.  Its  chief  characteristic,  said  he,  is  sham,  and  it  relies 
for  its  success  upon  fomenting  class  prejudice.^'  He  read  the 
well-known  letter  to  Monroe  in  whicli  Jackson  urged  the  Presi- 
dent to  crush  the  "monster,  party  spirit,"  and  contrasted  the 
sentiments  expressed  in  that  letter  with  the  practice  of  the  admin- 
istration of  its  author.  Hypocritical  as  had  been  the  pretensions 
to  political  virtue  of  those  who  had  brought  General  Jackson 
forward  for  the  Presidency,  Slade  did  not  believe  that  even  they 
had  fully  realized  the  political  debauchery  upon  which  they  were 
entering.*^ 

The  Speaker,  to  whom  this  merciless,  but  for  the  most  part 
well-merited,  arraignment  of  Jacksonism  was  officially  addressed, 
listened,  undismayed  by  the  perils  which  were  being  depicted. 
None  believed  more  thoroughly  in  party  discipline  than  he,  and 
few  had  been  more  closely  identified  with  the  administrations  of 
Jackson  and  Van  Buren.  He  had  effectively  served  his  party 
in  many  capacities,  from  conducting  the  bank  war  in  the  House 
down  to  establishing  local  party  newspapers.  His  enemies  fully 
recognized  his  skill  as  a  political  strategist,  even  though  they 
denounced  him  as  the  tool  of  those  whom  he  served. 


47  "Thus,  the  rich  are  made  an  object  of  jealousy  to  the  poor.  The 
laborer  is  excited  against  the  capitalist — the  indolent  and  improvident 
against  the  industrious  and  frugal — the  ignorant  against  the  learned  and 
intelligent — and  even  the  vicious  and  abandoned  against  the  virtuous  and 
upright.  Associated  wealth,  no  matter  how  widely  it  may  embrace  men 
of  small  means,  is  declared  to  be  monopolizing  and  dangerous.  Banks, 
however  prudently  and  safely  managed,  are  denounced  as  the  money 
making  machines  of  the  wealthy,  designed  only  to  make  the  rich  richer 
and  the  poor  poorer.  Factitious  distinctions  are  created.  Jealousies  are 
excited.  An  imaginary  aristocracy  is  raised  up  in  the  midst  of  every 
community;  and  nothing  can  be  heard  but  the  war-cry — down  with 
monopolies,  and  down  with  the  aristocracy." 

48  "It  seems  impossible  they  should  have  dreamed  that  General  Jack- 
son, the  author  of  the  noble  sentiments  I  have  quoted,  could  ever  be 
brought  to  enact,  in  his  own  administration,  an  utter  falsification  of  every 
profession  they  contained — a  falsification  so  complete,  that  there  should 
not  be,  as  in  truth,  there  is  not,  found  a  single  one  of  his  friends  whose 
face  does  not  crimson  with  blushes  at  an  exhibit  of  the  contrast"  {Cong. 
Globe,  25  Cong.,  3  sess.,  App.  323  fif). 


SPEAKEE   OF   THE  HOUSE   UNDEE   VAN  BUEEN  135 

Jaeksonisni  was  not  without  its  defenders,  although  they 
failed  to  match  their  opponents  in  oratorical  powers  or  in  logical 
arguments.  Crary,  of  Michigan,  saw  in  the  Supreme  Court  a 
political  body  "of  the  worst  character,"  and  he  commended 
Jackson  for  having  assumed  the  right  to  construe  the  Constitution 
as  he  pleased.  As  soon  as  men  are  elevated  to  that  court,  said 
Crary,  they  apply  themselves  to  the  study  of  British  law  and 
British  precedents,  and  "they  cannot  be  operated  upon  by  the 
healthy  influence  of  a  sound  public  opinon."'"'  Rhett,  of  South 
Carolina,  said  that  the  country  had  always  been  divided  into 
two  great  political  parties — one  which  feared  government  and 
another  which  feared  the  people.  Inasmuch  as  strength  in  the 
government  could  be  attained  only  at  the  expense  of  popular 
freedom,  he  believed,  like  Jefferson,  in  restricting  the  functions 
of  government  within  the  narrowest  possible  limits.^" 

The  entire  session  was  characterized  by  intense  party  and 
personal  recrimination.  The  Democratic  party  was  no  longer 
omnipotent.  It  was  reaping  the  harvest  of  its  own  misdeeds, 
and,  in  addition,  it  was  held  accountable  for  the  distressed  con- 
dition of  the  country,  although  this  had  resulted  from  causes 
economic  rather  than  political.  Hope  of  success  added  boldness 
to  the  attacks  of  its  opponents.  Twelve  years  earlier,  an  attack 
upon  Jackson  and  his  policies  would  have  meant  political  suicide 
for  the  assailant ;  it  was  now  one  of  the  surest  means  of  acquiring 
popularity. 

More  than  any  other  member  of  the  House,  Polk  was  given 
credit  by  one  party,  and  blame  by  the  other,  for  the  success  of 
the  legislative  part  of  the  Jackson  program.  Consequently  his 
adversaries  were  unwilling  to  permit  him  to  withdraw  from  na- 
tional polities  without  making  one  more  attempt  to  humiliate  him 
in  the  eyes  of  the  nation.  They  had  been  unsuccessful  in  their 
efforts  to   confuse   him   in   the   complexities   of    parliamentary 


49  Cong.  Globe,  25  Cong.,  3  sess.,  App.,  154. 

50  Idem,  134. 


13G  JAMES  K.   POLE 

procedure.  Their  insulting  invectives  and  their  invitations  to 
personal  combat  had  been  received  with  a  dignity  and  composure 
that  did  credit  to  the  Speaker.  Unable  to  gratify  their  desire 
to  injure  the  Speaker  in  a  more  effective  manner,  his  enemies 
resorted  to  the  petty  and  unprecedented  course  of  opposing  the 
ordinary  vote  of  thanks  on  his  retirement  from  office.  Prentiss, 
who  had,  at  a  previous  session,  been  deprived  of  a  seat  in  the 
House  by  Polk's  casting  vote,  was  chief  actor  and  stage  manager 
in  this  puerile  opera  houffe.  The  resolution  which  thanked  the 
Speaker  for  ' '  the  able,  impartial,  and  dignified  manner ' '  in  which 
he  had  presided  over  the  House,  Prentiss  moved  to  amend  by 
striking  out  the  word  impartial.  Prentiss  did  not  ''deny  the 
capacity  of  the  Speaker,  his  dispatch  of  business,  or  his  full  and 
thorough  knowledge  of  parliamentary  law,"  but  he  could  not 
agree  that  he  had  been  impartial.  He  argued  that  the  House 
had  expressed  its  distrust  of  the  Speaker  by  taking  from  him  the 
appointment  of  the  Swartwout  committee.  On  the  other  hand, 
he  frankly  admitted  that  his  main  objection  to  the  resolution 
was  the  favorable  effect  it  would  have  upon  Polk's  gubernatorial 
canvass  in  Tennessee.  The  Speaker,  he  said,  was  "playing  a 
political  game,"  in  which  this  resolution  would  constitute  an 
important  part.  Reviewing  the  personnel  of  the  House  commit- 
tees, he  condemned  the  Speaker  for  having  put  on  all  ' '  political 
committees"  a  greater  number  of  administration  men  than  the 
small  majority  of  that  party  would  justify.  He  charged  Polk 
with  being  a  tool  of  the  President  and  of  the  party.  "A  more 
perfectly  party  Speaker, ' '  said  he,  ' '  one  who  would  be  more  dis- 
posed to  bend  the  rules  of  the  House  to  meet  the  purposes  of  his 
own  side  in  politics,  never  had  pressed  the  soft  and  ample  cush- 
ions of  that  gorgeous  chair.  "^^ 

There  was  little  justification  for  this  intemperate  arraignment 
and  for  the  conduct  of  the  other  fifty-six  merabers^^  who  co- 
operated with  Prentiss  in  opposing  the  customary  vote  of  thanks. 


51  Cong.  Globe,  2;j  Cong.,  3  sess.,  251-252. 

52  The  vote  stood  94  to  57. 


SPEAEEE  OF   THE  HOUSE   UN  DEB   VAN  BUBEN  137 

When  forming  his  committees,  Polk  had  simply  followed  prece- 
dent. Many  Whigs  bore  testimony  to  the  justness  of  his  de- 
cisions. And  yet,  he  could  hardly  complain  because  of  this  par- 
tisan attack,  for  he  had  himself,  on  a  former  occasion,  quite  as 
unjustly  accused  a  Speaker  of  subserviency  to  "the  throne. "^^ 

Polk's  farewell  address  to  the  House,  in  response  to  the  reso- 
lution of  thanks  just  passed,  did  much  to  destroy  the  effect  of 
the  shafts  which  had  been  hurled  at  him,  and  to  elevate  liim  in 
the  opinion  of  fairminded  men  of  all  parties.  He  did  not  de- 
scend to  answer  the  charges  made  against  him  or  to  indulge  in 
recrimination.  Without  boasting,  he  alluded  to  his  record  of 
"constant  and  laborious"  service,^*  and  to  the  peculiar  difficul- 
ties which  attach  to  the  office  of  Speaker.  All  Speakers,  said  he, 
have  borne  testimony  to  the  impossibility  of  giving  entire  satis- 
faction to  all,  but 

it  has  been  made  my  duty  to  decide  more  questions  of  parliamentary  law 
and  order  many  of  them  of  a  complex  and  difficult  character,  arising  often 
in  the  midst  of  high  excitement,  in  the  course  of  our  proceedings,  than 
had  been  decided,  it  is  believed,  by  all  my  predecessors,  from  the  formation 
of  this  Government. 

Ignoring  the  minority,  he  thanked  the  majority  for  the  evidence 
of  their  approbation.  With  good-tempered  adroitness,  he  belit- 
tled the  effect  of  the  negative  vote  by  declaring  that  he  regarded 
the  resolution  just  passed  "as  the  highest  and  most  valued  testi- 
mony I  have  ever  received  from  this  House, ' '  because,  under  the 
circumstances,  it  was  not  a  mere  and  a  meaningless  formality.^^ 
Many  who,  for  partisan  reasons,  had  voted  against  the  resolution, 
as  soon  as  Congress  had  adjourned,  hastened  to  assure  the  late 
Speaker  of  their  personal  good  will.^*'     Instead  of  discrediting 


53  See  pp.  19-20. 

5*  "  I  can,  perhaps,  say  what  few  others,  if  any  can — that  I  have  not 
failed  to  attend  the  daily  sittings  of  this  House  a  single  day  since  I 
have  been  a  member  of  it  [14  years],  save  on  a  single  occasion,  when 
prevented  for  a  short  time  by  indisposition." 

55  Cong.   Globe,  25   Cong.,  3   sess.,   252-253. 

56  The  Nashville  Union,  March  22,  1839,  quoted  a  letter  from  a 
person  who  had  been  present  when  Polk  made  his  farewell  address :     "I 


138  JAMES  E.  POLK 

the  Speaker,  the  minority  had  really  made  him  an  object  of 
interest  throughout  the  Union.  Their  conduct  was  generally  con- 
demned, while  his  dignified  reply  raised  him  in  the  estimation 
of  all  except  the  most  zealous  partisans.^'  His  ability  as  a  pre- 
siding officer  was  made  still  more  apparent  during  the  following 
session  by  contrasting  him  with  his  successor,  E.  IM.  T.  Hunter, 
of  Virginia.  In  the  opinion  of  Cave  Johnson,  Hunter  displayed 
"ignorance  of  rules  and  a  want  of  energy  &  power  to  command"  ; 
he  feared  that  the  House  had  chosen  a  boy  to  do  the  business  of 
a  nian.^^  J.  W.  Blackwell  likewise  reported  that  Hunter  was 
too  young  for  the  position.  "While  you  were  Speaker,"  said 
he,  "your  friends  praised,  and  your  enemies  abused  you,  but  it 
is  now  admitted,  on  all  sides,  that  Jas.  K.  Polk  was  the  best  pre- 
siding officer  that  we  have  had  for  many  years,  and  some  say — 
the  best  we  ever  had.""'' 

At  the  close  of  the  session  Polk  set  out  for  Tennessee  to 
engage  in  an  active  campaign  for  the  governorship.  After  four- 
teen years  of  service  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  his  party 
had  assigned  him  duties  in  a  new  field  of  labor.  Whatever  his 
success  in  the  new  field  might  be,  no  one  even  dreamed  that  the 
retiring  Speaker  would  next  appear  in  Washington  as  President- 
elect. 


never  witnessed  more  enthusiasm  tliau  the  Speaker 's  admirable  reply  to 
the  vote  elicited.  Many  of  those  who  had  voted  in  the  negative  expressed 
their  admiration  of  it,  and  gave  evident  signs  of  shame  and  regret  at 
the  partisan  course  they  had  pursued.  Even  Air.  Graves,  of  Kentucky, 
declared  to  a  friend  at  his  elbow  that  the  Sjjeaker  had  done  as  well  as 
any  one  could  do  under  such  circumstances,  and  stepping  forward  took 
manly  leave  of  him — as  also  did  most  of  the  members,  a  few  bitter  and 
envious  partisans  excepted. ' ' 

57  For  example,  the  Worcester  (Mass.)  Palladium,  an  independent 
paper,  said:  "The  disreputable  conduct  of  the  opposition  members  of 
Congress,  towards  the  Speaker  of  the  House,  at  the  close  of  the  session, 
makes  that  gentleman  an  object  of  peculiar  interest,  at  the  present 
moment,  to  the  whole  democratic  party  of  the  Union.  An  effort  was 
made,  as  violent  as  it  was  uncourteous,  to  prevent  the  passage  of  the 
usual  complimentary  resolution  to  the  Speaker  on  his  retiring  from  the 
Chair.  But  it  was  an  unavailing  effort."  Quoted  by  Nashville  Union, 
April  8,  1839. 

58  Johnson  to  Polk,  Dec.  21,  1839,  Polk  Papers. 

59  Blackwell  to  Polk,  Dec.  30,  1839,  ihid. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

POLK  VERSUS  CANNON,  1839 

In  May,  1838,  shortly  before  he  consented  to  become  a  candi- 
date for  the  governorship  of  Tennessee,  Polk  was  examined  by 
a  phrenologist,  who,  unless  he  had  made  a  thorough  study  of  his 
client  beforehand,  made  some  exceedingly  shrewd  guesses.^  "He 
is  very  quick  of  perception"  ;  so  reads  the  prepared  statement, 

when  he  enjoys,  he  enjoys  remarkably  well,  and  when  he  suffers,  he  suffers 
most  intently.  .  .  .  His  is  a  remarkably  active  mind,  restless  unless  he  has 
something  of  importance  to  do;  cannot  be  idle  for  a  moment,  is  by  nature 
one  of  the  most  industrious  of  men;  loves  mental  labour  &  hard  study  as 
he  does  daily  food;   .  .  .  and  is  throughout  a  positive  character. 

The  traits  pointed  out  in  another  part  of  the  statement  are  mani- 
fest throughout  Polk's  public  career,  but  especially  so  during  the 
four  years  of  his  Presidency :    He 

thinks  well  of  himself;  often  asks  advice,  &  does  just  as  he  pleases;  is 
one  of  the  firmest  of  men;  slow  in  committing  himself,  but  once  committed, 
does  all  in  his  power  to  carry  through  his  measures  .  .  .  has  many  acquain- 
tances, feAv  bosom  friends  .  .  .  has  an  astonishing  command  of  facts  and 
can  call  to  mind  with  great  precision  what  occurred  long  ago. 

To  those  who  are  familiar  with  Polk's  career  in  national 
politics  only,  one  part  of  the  phrenologist's  statement  might 
seem  very  wide  of  the  mark.  In  it,  the  phrenologist  says  that 
Polk  would  have  succeeded  on  the  stage,  for  he  has  ability  in 
the  use  of  pungent  sarcasm  and  ridicule  and  "could  'take  off' 
the  peculiarities  of  others  if  he  would  indulge  this  propensity." 
During  the  campaign  which  followed,  Polk  indulged  this  pro- 
pensity to  the  full — especially  against  his  opponent  and  Bailie 
Peyton — for  ridicule  and  mimicry  were  among  the  chief  weapons 


1  The  phrenologist's  name  was  O.  S.  Fowler,  and  the  statement  which 
he  prepared  bears  the  date  of  May  30,  1838  (Polk  Papers). 


140  JAMES  K.  POLK 

used  in  assailing  his  adversaries.  He  is  usually  regarded  as  "a 
man  who  never  smiled";  however  this  may  have  been,  he  was 
very  successful  in  the  art  of  amusing  others. 

Tliere  was  rejoicing  among  the  Democrats  of  Tennessee  Avhen, 
in  September,  1838,  Polk  announced  that  he  would  enter  the 
contest  with  Governor  Newton  Cannon  for  the  highest  office  of 
his  state.  He  received  many  letters  in  which  the  writers  ex- 
pressed their  delight,  promised  support,  and  assured  him  of  vic- 
tory. It  was  the  general  opinion  that  he  alone  could  restore  the 
state  to  the  Democratic  party.  It  was,  indeed,  this  belief  that 
induced  him  to  abandon  his  career  in  the  national  legislature. 
The  unholy  work  of  White  and  Bell  must  be  undone ;  Old  Hick- 
ory's state  must  be  redeemed. 

While  he  was  still  in  Washington,  presiding  for  the  last  time 
over  the  House  of  Representatives,  Polk  received  many  letters 
from  Tennessee  friends  urging  him  to  put  the  chief  emphasis 
of  his  gubernatorial  campaign  on  national  issues  and  state  in- 
ternal improvements.  It  was  pointed  out  that  the  Whigs  would 
confine  themselves  almost  exclusively  to  an  attack  upon  the  na- 
tional administration  and  that  the  people  of  the  state  were  much 
interested  in  internal  development.  The  advice  seems  to  have 
accorded  wuth  his  own  views.  At  any  rate  the  topics  suggested 
were  the  ones  on  which  he  placed  the  most  emphasis. 

As  stated  elsewhere,  one  of  the  most  important  events  of  Polk's 
campaign  against  Cannon  was  the  advent  of  Jeremiah  George 
Harris  as  editor  of  the  Nashville  Unian.  In  response  to  the  pop- 
ular taste  of  the  period,  the  press  of  the  state  had  been  notorious 
for  extravagance  of  statement  and  personal  abuse.  It  now  en- 
tered upon  a  campaign  of  scurrility  and  abandon  that  has  seldom 
been  equaled;  Mark  Twain's  employer  could  scarcely  have  made 
his  editorials  more  "peppery  and  to  the  point."-  Equipped 
with  a  style  that  was  cutting  without  descending  to  mere  ribal- 
dry, and  with  a  pen  dipped  in  wormwood,  Harris  goaded  his 


2  See  Mark  Twain,  "Journalism  in  Tennossoo, "  in  Sketches  New  and  Old. 


POLK  FEESUS  CANNON,  1839  141 

opponents  to  a  frenzy  that  was  unprecedented.  Lacking  the 
ability  to  imitate  his  style,  his  enemies  often  resorted  to  coarse 
and  vulgar  abuse.  No  Whig  editor  in  the  state,  except  the  in- 
imitable Parson  Brownlow,  could  cope  with  him  in  picturesque 
invective.  Harris  had  a  spread-eagle  woodcut  prepared,  large 
enough  to  cover  a  considerable  portion  of  the  front  page  of  his 
paper.  As  its  appearance  in  the  TJnion  was  always  accompanied 
by  news  of  Democratic  victory,  the  Whigs  expressed  their  con- 
tempt by  calling  it  "Harris's  buzzard. "^ 

When  Harris  took  charge  of  the  Union,  February  1,  1839, 
A.  A.  Hall,  of  the  Nashville  Banner,  was  already  making  capital 
of  the  charge  made  in  Congress,  by  Wise  and  others,  that  Polk 
■had  "packed"  the  committees  of  the  House.  The  new  editor 
plunged  at  once  into  a  vigorous  defense  of  the  Speaker  and  at- 
tributed the  charges  to  jealousy  of  Polk's  success  and  to  a  desire 
to  injure  him  in  Tennessee.  When  the  House  voted  to  select  the 
Swartwout  committee  by  ballot,  the  Banner  exultingly  heralded 
the  event  as  proof  positive  that  the  House,  having  learned  by 
experience  that  ' '  Speaker  Polk  could  not  be  trusted,  proclaimed 
the  fact  to  the  world. '  '* 

Some  of  the  other  Whig  papers  were  even  more  scurrilous 
than  the  Banner.  For  example,  an  article  in  the  Knoxville 
Register,  signed  "Curtius,"  spoke  of  Polk  as  "lost  to  a  sense 
of  honesty,  decency  and  integrity,  laboring  under  insanity  and 
disgrace,  pliant  tool,  traitor,  apostate  and  tory.'''^  tj^^  Memphis 
E7iquirer  called  him  "a  crouching  sychophant"  who  lacked  even 

3  It  was  said  that  a  leading  Whig,  who  had  gone  to  the  Murfrees- 
borough  post-office  in  quest  of  election  news,  saw  through  the  window  a 
package  of  "Unions"  and  exclaimed  in  disgust:  "It's  all  over;  there  is 
Harris's  infernal  buzzard  in  the  mail"  (Phelan,  Hist,  of  Tenn.,  381). 

*  "  He  has  been  tried  by  his  peers  and  found  wanting.  A  brand  is 
upon  him  that  no  time  can  efface.  He  may  cry  'Out  d — d  spot,'  but  it 
will  abide  with  him  for  life"  (Quoted  in  Nashville  Vnion,  February  8 
1839.)  When  criticizing  a  speech  made  by  Dr.  Duncan,  candidate  for 
Congress,  the  Banner  called  it  "the  roaring,  staving,  bellowing,  howling 
Doctor's  fanfaronade  of  bombast  and  nonsense"  February  13,  1839. 

5  Quoted  in  Union,  March  4,  1839. 


142  JAMES  K.  POLE 

the  sense  of  shame.*'  A  friend  had  written  to  Polk  that  "your 
election  is  dovetailed  into  that  of  every  candidate  for  Congress 
in  the  State.  "^  The  Whigs  apparently  believed  this,  also,  and 
were  resolved  at  all  hazard  to  defeat  him. 

In  April,  1839,  Polk  formally  opened  his  gubernatorial  cam- 
paign by  publishing  a  long  and  argumentative  "Address  to  the 
People  of  Tennessee."^  The  address  deals  almost  entirely  with 
national  issues,  the  nature  of  the  government,  and  the  principles 
of  the  two  great  political  parties.  It  was  pronounced  by  the 
Banner^  to  be  "a  poor  enough  concern";  but  Phelan,  with 
sounder  judgment,  has  called  it  "the  ablest  political  document 
which  appeared  in  this  State  up  to  the  time  of  the  war."^"  For 
the  student  of  history,  it  is  one  of  the  most  interesting  documents 
ever  penned  by  its  author,  for  in  it  he  has  stated  fully  and  with 
clearness  the  principles  and  doctrines  which  he  considered  to  be 
essential  to  all  just  government.  It  was  evidently  prepared  with 
great  care,  and  nowhere  else  does  he  give  so  full  a  statement  of 
his  views  on  so  varied  a  list  of  subjects. 


6 ' '  Condemned  and  spit  upon  by  a  majority  of  the  U.  S.  House  of 
Representatives,  in  taking  from  him  [Mr.  Polk]  the  power  of  appoint- 
ing committees,  freely  entrusted  to  all  of  his  predecessors,  but  which  he 
basely  prostituted  for  the  benefit  of  the  party — of  locofocoism — plainly 
told  in  language  of  thundering  indignation  that  has  been  heard  even  to 
the  shores  of  the  seas,  that  he  was  no  longer  worthy  of  the  confidence  of 
Congress,  like  a  crouching  sychophant,  instead  of  resigning  his  narrowed 
trust  with  shame,  and  disdaining  tamely  to  see  his  integrity  assailed  by 
even  those  who  exalted  him,  he  submits,  ignobly  bears  the  rankling  con- 
tumely, and  in  hope  of  political  reward  for  '  self-sacrifice '  upon  the  altar 
of  locofocoism,  he  still  patiently  ministers  at  its  shrine  reeking  in  cor- 
ruption with  a  zeal  that  can  only  be  inspired  by  a  hope  of  reward."  When 
quoting  this,  the  Union  replied  in  the  same  issue  that  "the  raving  of 
Mr.  Prentiss,  the  ranting  of  Mr.  Wise,  and  the  management  of  Mr.  Bell 
in  reference  to  the  appointment  of  the  '  Swartwout  Committee, '  were 
all  calculated  for  effect  in  Tennessee,"  and  would  be  so  regarded  by  the 
people  (Nashville  Union,  March  4,  1839). 

7  A.  Balch  to  Polk,  February  21,  1839,  rolTc-  Papers. 

8  A  copy  in  pami)hlet  form  may  be  found  in  the  Po/A-  Papers,  vol.  83. 
It  is  printed  in  full  in  the  Nashville  Union,  April  10,  12,  15,  1839,  as  well 
as  in  other  papers. 

0  Nashville  Banner,  April  11,  1839.  On  April  17  the  Banner  called  it 
"an  elaborate  and  ingenious  production,  but  characterized  by  a  want 
of  manliness,  candor  and  sincerity." 

10  Phelan,  Hist,  of  Tenn.,  381. 


POLK  VEESUS  CANNON,  1839  143 

In  stating  his  reasons  for  confining  his  address  so  largely  to 
national  questions,  Polk  asserted  that  the  chief  objections  urged 
against  him  were  based  on  the  principles  and  policies  which  he 
had  upheld  as  a  member  of  Congress.  He  gave  a  historical  sum- 
mary ^^  of  the  perennial  contest  between  those  who  distrusted  and 
ignored  the  will  of  the  people  and  those  w^ho  believed  that  gov- 
ernment should  carry  into  effect  the  popular  will.  The  popular 
party,  he  said,  had  triumphed  in  the  convention  which  drafted 
the  Constitution,  but  Hamilton  and  his  adherents  soon  procured 
by  construction  what  they  had  failed  to  have  embodied  in  the 
Constitution.  Democracy  triumphed  under  Jefferson,  but  under 
J.  Q.  Adams  the 

latitudinarian  doctrines,  with  all  the  consolidating  tendencies  of  the 
Hamilton  school,  as  practiced  under  the  administration  of  the  elder  Adams, 
were  resuscitated  and  revived.  It  was  publicly  proclaimed  that  the  whole- 
some restraints  of  the  public  will  on  the  action  of  the  servants  of  the 
people  were  to  be  disregarded,  and  that  the  *  Eepresentative  was  not  to 
be  palsied  by  the  will  of  his  constituents.'    It  was  declared  by  the  Chief 


11  "In  the  origin  of  the  Government  there  were  two  parties.  In  the 
Convention  that  framed  the  Constitution  one  party  distrusted  the  power 
and  capacity  of  the  people  for  self-government,  and  wished  a  strong 
central  government.  They  admired  the  British  Constitution — they  were 
in  favor  of  a  President  and  Senate  for  life — they  were  for  forming  a 
strong  government,  far  removed  from  the  popular  control;  they  wished  to 
abstract  from  the  power  of  the  States — to  restrict  the  right  of  suffrage, 
and  to  create  other  influences  than  the  will  of  the  people  to  control  the 
action  of  their  public  functionaries.  This  party  was  not  successful  in 
the  convention,  and  a  constitution  was  formed  which  invested  the  new 
government  with  a  few  delegated  and  well  defined  powers,  leaving  all 
others  to  the  States  and  the  people,  to  exercise  according  to  their  sovereign 
will.  The  parties  in  the  convention  were  the  germ  of  the  two  great 
political  divisions,  which  afterwards  contended,  and  are  still  contending 
for  the  mastery  in  the  Government. 

' '  No  sooner  was  the  government  put  in  operation  under  the  Constitu- 
tion, than  the  enemies  of  popular  control  over  public  authority,  attempted 
by  a  latitudinous  construction  of  the  Constitution,  to  make  the  govern- 
ment in  practice  what  they  had  in  vain  attempted  to  make  it  in  principle 
and  form.  Alexander  Hamilton,  a  professed  monarchist  in  principle,  and 
in  the  Convention  the  leading  advocate  of  a  strong  central  government, 
was  the  first  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  and  immediately  began,  by 
strained  and  unwarranted  constructions  of  the  Constitution,  to  enlarge 
the  power  and  influence  of  the  Federal  Government,  with  the  view  of 
diminishing  the  power  of  popular  will  over  the  administration  of  the 
Government. ' '  Jefferson  himself  could  scarcely  have  penned  a  more 
telling  indictment  against  the  Federalists. 


lU  JAMES  E.   POLK 

Magistrate  to  be  ineffably  stupid  to  suppose  that  the  Representatives  of 
the  people  were  deprived  of  the  power  to  advance  the  public  weal,  thereby 
substituting  the  unrestrained  discretion  of  Congress  and  of  the  Federal 
Government  for  the  specific  grants  of  power  conferred  by  a  Constitution 
of  limitations  and  restrictions. 

Polk's  recital  of  historical  occurrences  was  accurate  and  well 
put ;  but  it  was  begging  the  question  to  imply,  as  he  did,  that 
the  framers  of  the  Constitution  had  intended  that  representatives 
should  divest  themselves  of  all  judgment  and  become  mere  auto- 
matons for  registering  the  popular  will.  Custom  and  a  desire 
for  reelection  m^ay  prevent  members  of  Congress  from  exercising 
their  own  judgment,  but  undoubtedly  Adams  rather  than  Polk 
reflected  the  views  of  those  who  drafted  the  Constitution. 

It  was  thought  by  many  politicians  of  both  parties  that  Clay 
would  be  the  candidate  of  the  Whigs  at  the  approaching  Presi- 
dential election.  Polk,  therefore,  devoted  a  considerable  portion 
of  his  address  to  Clay  and  the  policies  which  he  advocated.  The 
principal  achievements  of  the  Federalist  administrations  were, 
in  Polk's  opinion,  the  grasping  of  power  by  the  general  govern- 
ment and  the  creation  of  the  money  power.  Their  successors, 
the  Whigs,  likewise  stood  for  these  evils,  and  in  addition,  had 
adopted  Clay's  "miscalled  'American  System'  of  high  tariff  and 
internal  improvements,  the  result  of  which  combination  would 
oppress  the  poor  and  increase  the  evils  of  executive  patronage. 

The  administration  of  Jackson  he  eulogized  without  stint. 
The  adherents  of  White  were  told  that  they  had  supported  the 
judge  because  he  had  been  represented  to  be  a  better  ''Jackson 
man"  than  Van  Buren,  consequently  there  was  no  reason  now 
why  they  should  not  return  to  the  party  of  the  people.  It  was 
untrue,  said  lie,  that  Jackson  had  changed  since  his  elevation  to 
power ;  his  detractors,  not  he,  had  deserted  to  the  enemy.  "  I, " 
continued  Polk, 

in  common  with  the  whole  Republican  party,  am  represented  to  you  as 
one  of  these  changelings.  ]n  what  have  1  changed?  I  opposed  Henry 
Clav  on  account  of  his  odious  Federal  doctrines,  and  his  coalition   with 


POLK  VEESUS  CANNON,  1839  145 

Mr.  Adams,  and  I  oppose  him  still.  I  opposed  the  high  tariff  policy,  and 
I  oppose  it  still.  I  opposed  Internal  Improvements  by  the  General  Govern- 
ment, and  I  oppose  them  still.  I  supported  the  removal  of  the. deposits, 
and  I  have  not  changed  my  language  or  my  opinions  in  relation  to  that 
great  measure.  In  fine,  what  single  point  is  there,  involving  the  principles 
of  the  great  Republican  party,  in  which  my  course  has  not  been  uniform 
since  1825,  when  I  was  first  honored  with  a  seat  in  Congress,  down  to  the 
present  day? 

From  a  man  Avho  had  a  reputation  for  concealing  his  views, 
this  was  certainly  a  most  unequivocal  declaration.  Moreover, 
it  was  a  true  declaration,  and  it  required  courage  to  make  it 
under  the  existing  political  conditions  in  Tennessee.  Whether 
right  or  wrong,  Polk  had  not  swerved  from  his  original  political 
platform,  although  many  of  the  policies  for  which  he  stood  had 
become  unpopular  in  his  state.  He  may  have  broken  with  Judge 
White  for  personal  as  well  as  political  reasons,  but  on  national 
issues  he  had  been  consistent.  He  pinned  his  faith  now,  as  he 
had  always  done,  on  government  by  the  will  of  the  majority; 
and  however  chimerical  this  may  be  in  practice,  his  most  private 
correspondence  indicates  that  his  belief  in  its  practicability  was 
sincere.  Passing  lightly  over  state  issues,  he  asked  for  approval 
or  condemnation  on  his  record  in  national  politics — a  record 
which  was  being  grossly  misrepresented  by  the  Whig  papers  of 
the  state. ^- 

At  Murfreesborough,  on  April  11,  1839,  Polk  made  his  first 
speech  of  the  campaign.  Governor  Cannon  attended  and  was 
invited  by  Polk  to  speak  first,  on  account  of  his  age  and  office. 
This  he  declined  to  do,  saying  that,  although  he  had  not  come 
prepared  to  speak,  he  might  make  a  reply.  Polk  talked  for  two 
and  a  half  hours,  mainly  on  national  issues  and  in  commendation 
of  the  Jackson  party.  He  said  little  on  state  issues,  of  which 
the  Banner  (April  15)  ungenerously  credited  him  with  knowing 
"very  little  more  than  the  man  in  the  moon." 


12  "For  months  past  I  have  been  the  unceasing  and  almost  exclusive 
object  of  their  calumnies  and  misrepresentation." 


146  JAMES  K.   POLE 

Cannon  in  reply  said  that  he  had  never  "clung  to  the  coat 
tail"  of  General  Jackson,  and  when  "danger  approached,  jumped 
into  his  pocket,"  but,  instead,  he  had  had  to  "stem  the  buffet- 
ings  of  his  wrath. ' '  Before  the  Creek  war,  according  to  his  own 
story.  Cannon  was  a  member  of  a  jury  selected  to  try  one  Magnus 
on  the  charge  of  having  murdered  Patton  Anderson,  a  personal 
friend  of  Jackson.  When  Cannon  voted  for  acquittal,  Jackson, 
pointing  his  finger  at  the  young  juror,  exclaimed,  "I'll  mark  you, 
young  man!"  Cannon  insinuated,  also,  that,  in  fulfillment  of 
this  promise,  Jackson  had,  during  the  Creek  war,  purposely  ex- 
posed Cannon  and  a  small  detachment  of  troops  to  almost  certain 
death,  while  the  General  himself  remained  in  safety  on  the  other 
side  of  the  river.  He  was  a  "tyrant  by  nature  and  education," 
and  no  one  could  be  his  follower  "who  would  not  be  his  tool  and 
his  slave.  "^^ 

In  a  brief  rejoinder  Polk,  according  to  the  Union  (April  12), 
made  the  "roof  ring"  with  his  "power  of  ridicule."  The 
Banner,  on  the  other  hand,  reported  that  "the  locomotive  can- 
didate seemed  to  feel  deeply  that  he  had  caught  a  Tartar,"  and 
that  Governor  Cannon  "triumphantly  overthrew"  him.^* 

Polk's  superiority,  both  in  intellect  and  debating  powers,  was 
apparent  from  the  beginning  of  the  campaign.  Cannon  was 
slow  and  prosaic — lacking  in  force  and  personal  magnetism.  He 
was  unable  either  to  hold  the  attention  or  to  arouse  the  s^'mpathy 
of  the  multitude.  He  had  until  recently  professed  loyalty  to 
Democratic  doctrines,  and  he  still  seemed  uncertain  as  to  whether 
he  had  become  a  full-fledged  Whig.^^    There  was,  on  the  contrai-y, 


13  Nashville  Bep.  Banner,  April  16;  Nashville  Union,  April  12,  18;59. 

1*  The  Banner  made  much  sjiort  of  Polk's  "firing  and  grimaces"  in 
imitation  of  Bailie  Peyton  and  Henry  Clay.  "James  K.  Polk,  the  nar- 
row minded,  superficial,  little,  grimacing  politician  attempting  to  expand 
his  outward  man,  gesture  and  voice  into  something  his  hearers  might 
take  for  Henry  Clay!"  He  tried,  also,  it  said,  to  imitate  Webster  (Banner, 
April  13,  1839). 

15  In  his  reply  to  Polk,  Cannon  said:  "I  believe  I  have  always  been 
a  Democrat.  Indeed,  they  used  to  call  me  an  Ultra  Democrat,  a  Radical." 
He  claimed  to  be  a  Democrat  still,  but  not  in  favor  of  A'an  Buren  (Banner, 
April  16,  1839). 


POLK   VERSUS  CANNON,  1839  147 

no  uncertainty  about  Polk's  views,  and  he  knew  how  to  state  them 
most  effectively.     He  was,  says  Phelan,^^' 

the  first  great  "stump  speaker"  .  .  .  always  full  of  his  subject,  ready  at 
retort,  sophistical,  quick  to  capture  and  turn  the  guns  of  the  enemy  against 
him,  adroit  in  avoiding  an  issue  whose  result  must  be  unfavorable,  thor- 
oughly equipped  with  forcible  illustrations,  humorous  anecdotes,  and  a 
ridicule  which  ranged  through  all  the  changes  from  burlesque  to  wit. 

With  no  pretensions  to  oratory,  his  strength  lay  in  his  ability  to 
state  the  issues  clearly  and  forcibly,  and  to  argue  these  issues  in 
language  that  was  simple  and  convincing. 

On  April  13,  the  candidates  met  again  at  Lebanon.  On  state 
issues  they  were  in  substantial  agreement,  and  once  more  their 
time  was  occupied  mainly  with  a  discussion  of  national  affairs. 
At  the  close  of  the  debate  Governor  Cannon,  pleading  important 
state  business,  set  out  for  Nashville.  Polk  informed  his  wdfe 
that  the  Governor  and  himself  got  on  "very  harmoniously,"  but 
there  was  little  harmony  in  his  relations  with  Bell. 

Polk  and  Cannon  had  consumed  the  entire  afternoon,  and 
Bell,  who  was  not  expected  to  take  part,  took  the  stump  at  5 :30 
in  a  "rage  of  passion."  He  talked  until  sunset,  and  then  an- 
nounced that  he  would  continue  at  the  courthouse  after  supper. 
His  first  address,  as  reported,  was  most  abusive  in  character.^' 
Polk  wrote  home  that  even  Bell's  friends  were  disgusted  by  the 
speech,  and  that  he  had  no  difficulty,  in  his  reply,  in  putting 
Bell  in  the  wrong  and  winning  tremendous  applause. ^^ 

Governor  Cannon  resumed  the  debates,  at  McMinnville,  on 
April  18,  but  shortly  after  he  retired  from  the  stump  entirely. 
At  McMinnville,  having  been  taunted  with  indecision,  he  at  last 


icffisi.  of  Tenn.,  377. 

1'  He  said  that  Hopkins  L.  Turney,  Representative  from  Tennessee, 
"was  not  good  enough  for  the  Penitentiary — that  Amos  Lane  was  a 
scoundrel — that  Dr.  Duncan  was  a  moral  pestilence — that  these  were  the 
tools  which  Col.  Polk  set  forward  to  make  speeches  in  Congress,  instead 
of  coming  out  and  answering  him  [Bell]  on  the  floor  of  Congress  face  to 
face"  {Union,  April  17,  1839). 

18  Polk  to  Mrs.  Polk,  April  14,  1839,  Polk  Papers. 


148  JAMES  E.  POLK 

came  out  squarely  for  Clay,  in  the  event  of  his  nomination/*^ 
Because  Polk  had  declared  here  and  elsewhere  that  he  and  Can- 
non differed  little  in  their  views  on  state  questions,  the  Banner 
called  Polk  a  "Government  emissary"  and  regarded  it  as  ex- 
tremely impudent  in  him  to  try  to  depose  the  Governor  for  his 
dislike  of  Van  Buren.-" 

The  peoj)le  in  those  days  took  keen  delight  in  political  cam- 
paigns. .  They  attended  in  large  numbers,  and  no  debate  was 
long  enough  to  be  tedious  if  it  were  spiced  with  personal  recrimi- 
nation and  with  what  passed  for  witty  retorts.  The  popular  ear 
in  Tennessee  of  that  day  w^as  not  attuned  to  a  very  high  grade 
of  humor,  while,  in  argument,  pungent  thrusts  rather  than  logic 
won  the  sympathy  of  the  audience.  The  festal  side  of  a  campaign 
Avas  quite  as  important  as  the  forensic,  consequently  political 
debates  were  usually  held  in  open  air,  accompanied  by  a  banquet 
or  a  barbecue.  When  Polk  reached  East  Tennessee,  the  Whig 
section  of  the  state,  special  pains  were  taken  by  the  Democrats 
to  give  his  journey  the  appearance  of  a  triumphal  procession.-^ 
Even  though  he  could  not  hope  to  gain  many  votes  in  this  section, 
the  appearance  of  popularity  in  a  Whig  stronghold  might  aid  him 
in  other  parts  of  the  state. 


19  Nashville  Union,  April  22,  1839. 

20  "Is  it  not  a  most  impudent,  unheard  of  request,  then,  on  his  part, 
to  the  people  of  Tennessee,  that  they  should  turn  Governor  Cannon  out 
and  put  /uTO  in,  all  because  the  Governor  is  opposed  to  Mr.  Van  Buren's 
election  f  Is  it  not  apparent  that  he  is  a  Government  emissary,  traversing- 
the  State,  county  by  county,  with  the  sole  view  of  revolutionizing  it  on 
the  subject  of  national  politics?"  (Banner,  April  19,  1839).  On  May  22, 
the  same  paper  called  Polk  a  deserter  from  genuine  republican  doctrines, 
"a  political  changeling — a  weather  cock,  pointing  ever  in  the  direction 
from  whence  comes  the  breath  of  the  President's  nostrils — a  devourer, 
eater-up  of  his  own  sentiments,  formerly  proclaimed  in  tones  of  self- 
gratification — a  jjalace  slave  laborer  for  his  master  at  Washington." 

21  The  Tennessee  Sentinel  thus  described  a  Polk  meeting  at  Jones- 
borough  on  May  17,  1839:  "As  a  means  of  enhancing  the  enjoyments  of 
the  day,  suitable  arrangements  were  made  for  a  dinner,  free  to  all  of 
each  party,  without  distinction,  who  might  think  proper  to  participate. ' ' 
After  dinner  there  were  toasts  to  Washington,  Jackson,  Van  Buren,  Polk, 
Amos  Kendall,  et.  ah, — and  one  to  "Newton  Canxon — the  friend  and 
supporter  of  Henry  Clay  for  the  next  Presidency.  Will  the  freemen  of 
Tennessee  be  thus  transfererd  by  dictation  from  the  mouth  of  any  Cannon? 
Cries  of  No!  No!"   Quoted  in  Nashville  Union,  June  3,  1839. 


FOLK  VEBSUS  CANNON,  1839  149 

The  political  contest  was  by  no  means  confined  to  the  stump 
and  the  platform.  Wherever  a  group  of  people  gathered,  issues 
and  candidates  were  freely  discussed.  Personal  encounters  not 
infrequently  resulted'--  when  arguments  had  failed  to  convince. 
Despite  his  surroundings,  however,  Polk  always  maintained  his 
own  dignity ;  although  his  language  on  the  stump  was  often 
scathing  and  exasperating,  he  never  descended  to  vulgarity  or 
mere  personal  abuse. 

Accuracy  was  not  a  desideratum  in  a  political  newspaper. 
That  editor  was  most  popular  who  could  hurl  grotesque  epithets 
at  his  opponents  and  who  always  reported  as  well  as  prophesied 
victory  for  his  own  side.  Harris  of  the  Union  fully  measured 
up  to  the  Democratic  ideal, -^  and  for  this  reason  his  paper 
wielded  great  political  influence. 

In  June,  A.  A.  Hall,  of  the  Banner,  caused  consternation  in 
Democratic  ranks  by  quoting  anti-slavery  articles  which  had  been 
written  by  Harris  while  he  edited  the  New  Bedford  (Massachu- 
setts) Gazette.^^  By  befogging  the  issue  and  heaping  abuse  upon 
his  accusers,  Harris  was  quite  successful  in  extricating  himself 
from  the  difficulty.  Nevertheless,  the  charge  that  Harris  had 
been  an  abolitionist  did  Polk  some  injury  in  the  canvass,  for  it 
was  he  who  had  been  mainly  responsible  for  bringing  the  editor 
to  Nashville.-^  In  order  to  divert  attention  from  his  own  past 
record  and  to  give  new  impetus  to  Democratic  enthusiasm  Harris 


22  For  example,  Polk's  brother-in-law,  Dr.  Eucker,  is  reported  to  have 
thrashed  a  "bully"  whom  the  Whigs  had  brought  to  Murfreesborough 
to  provoke  a  quarrel  with  him  (John  W.  Childress  to  his  sister,  Mrs.  Polk, 
May  27,  1839,  Polk  Papers). 

23  For  example,  in  reporting  a  debate  between  Bell  and  his  opponent, 
Burton,  the  Union  said  that  Bell  abused  Van  Buren,  eulogized  Clay  and 
called  Polk  "the  travelling  missionary,"  but  Burton  "literally  dissected 
his  opponent  who  has  been  schooled  in  the  sophistries  of  partizanship,  and 
laid  the  diseased  limbs  of  Modern  Whigism  bare  to  the  bone"  (May 
27,  1839). 

24  One  of  them,  dated  May  13,  1836,  in  opposing  the  annexation  of 
Texas,  called  slavery  ' '  the  blackest,  the  foulest,  blot  on  our  national 
escutchen, ' '  and  said  that  it  would  be  ' '  the  height  of  madness ' '  to  extend 
it  over  more  territory   {Banner,  June  11,  1839). 

25  John  W.  Cliildress  to  Mrs.  Polk,  June  18,  1839,  Polk  Papers. 


150  JAMES  K.   POLE 

printed  in  the  Union  (June  24)  the  "Mecklenburg  Declaration 
of  Independence ' '  and  suggested  its  ratification  on  the  Fourth  of 
July.  He  dilated  at  length  on  the  fact  that  Polk  had  been  born 
in  Mecklenburg  county — a  fact  which  proved  that  he  had  come 
from  pure  Democratic  stock. 

The  Whigs  hoped  for  good  results  from  a  speech  made  by 
Judge  White  in  Knoxville,  on  the  Fourth  of  July.  He  still  pro- 
fessed adherence  to  Jetfersonian  Republicanism,  but  denounced 
the  Democrats,  whose  whole  creed  consisted  in  "always  acting 
with  the  same  man,  or  set  of  men."  Far  from  being  democrats 
they  were,  said  he,  "in  reality  monarchists."-'^  Harris  was  hor- 
rified because  White  had  talked  politics  on  the  Fourth  of  July, 
but  concluded  from  the  "claptrap"  which  the  judge  had  uttered 
that  he  must  be  in  his  "dotage."-' 

White's  warning  against  monarchists  did  not  produce  the 
effect  which  the  Whigs  had  anticipated,  for  Polk  succeeded  in 
winning  back  a  considerable  number  of  those  who  had  supported 
the  judge  in  1836.  Before  the  close  of  the  campaign  he  received 
many  letters  telling  of  the  good  results  which  his  canvass  had 
achieved.-^ 

Cannon  was  easily  vanquished,  and  he  retired  from  the  stump, 
but  Bell  dogged  Polk's  footsteps,  bringing  into  full  play  his  great 
ability  and  oratorical  powers.  On  July  17  he  spoke  at  Nashville 
"from  early  candle-lighting  until  midnight"  in  an  effort  to  de- 
feat Polk  in  Middle  Tennessee.  He  was,  however,  doomed  to 
disappointment.  On  August  1  Polk  was  elected  by  a  majority 
of  three  thousand  votes,  and  Harris  got  out  his  "buzzard"  to 
adorn  the  front  page  of  the  Union  along  with  the  election  re- 
turns.   The  result  of  the  campaign  was  justly  regarded  as  a  great 

26  Copied  from  Knoxville  Times  in  Nashville  Banner,  July  18,  1839. 

27  Nashville  Union,  July  19,  1839. 

28  C.  W.  Hall,  writing  from  Kingsport  on  July  12,  told  liim  that  "one 
of  my  neighbors  said  the  other  day,  'Sir,  1  did  not  understand  my 
political  i)0.sition,  until  I  heard  Col.  Polk,  and  I  then  discovered  most 
clearly,  tluit  I  iras  acting  with  men,  who  are  opposed  to  mji  principles,  and 
1  instantly  resolved  to  quit  their  company'.  .  .  .  This  is  a  common 
observation"   (PoVc  Papers). 


POLK   VERSUS  CANNON,  1839  151 

personal  victory  for  Polk,  inasmuch  as  the  Whigs^elected  seven 
members  of  Congress  and  the  Democrats  only  six.-"  The  Demo- 
crats elected  a  majority  of  the  state  legislature,  which  gave  them 
the  power  to  get  rid  of  the  Whig  Senators  by  hampering  them 
with  obnoxious  instructions. 

Up'  to  the  very  last  the  Whigs  of  the  state  seemed  confident 
of  victor5^  They  were  reluctant  to  admit  defeat  even  after  the 
election  had  been  held.  But  the  Banner,  on  August  9,  mourn- 
fully informed  its  readers  that  owing  to  a  lack  of  proper  organ- 
ization in  Middle  Tennessee^"  the  "Spoilsmen  for  a  season  will 
have  the  management  of  affairs  in  the  State. ' '  Two  days  before 
this,  prominent  Whigs  held  a  meeting  in  Nashville.  Resolutions 
were  passed  urging  the  organization  of  committees  in  every 
county  for  the  purpose  of  retrieving  the  state.  They  invited  Clay 
to  visit  Tennessee,  but  he  was  unable  at  the  time  to  accept  the  invi- 
tation. Although  the  Banner  from  time  to  time  reported  enthu- 
siastic Whig  meetings,  it  was  several  weeks  before  there  were 
signs  of  recovery  from  the  shock  of  the  recent  defeat. 

In  their  elation  over  Polk's  election,  the  Democrats  rather 
overrated  its  significance.  It  has  already  been  noted  that  they 
regarded  the  result  as  a  personal  victory  for  Polk  over  his 
enemies ;  but,  in  addition,  they  interpreted  it  to  mean  that  Tenn- 
essee had  returned,  or  at  least  was  returning,  to  the  party  of 
Jackson  and  Van  Buren.  Polk  had  been  nominated  for  the 
avowed  purpose  of  regaining  the  state  for  the  national  adminis- 
tration ;  he  had  made  his  canvass  almost  entirely  on  national 
issues ;  and  Bell,  as  well  as  others,  had  opposed  him  on  his  record 
as  an  administration  member  of  Congress.  As  his  friend  Maclin 
said  in  a  letter,  more  importance  was  attached  to  Polk's  success 
than  to  the  election  of  any  other  candidate.     There  w^as,  in  his 


29  One  of  these  was  Cave  Johnson.  Writing  to  Polk  on  August  11 
he  said  that  he  had  been  elected  by  a  majority  of  1300  votes,  and,  as 
he  had  entered  the  race  only  on  account  of  Polk  and  Grundy,  he  expected 
to  retire  from  politics  at  the  end  of  his  term  {PoJlc  Papers). 

30  On  August  13  the  same  paper  attributed  the  result  to  bribery  and 
illegal  voting. 


152  JAMES  K.  FOLK 

opinion,  but  one  thing  lacking  to  make  the  triumph  complete — 
namely,  the  success  of  Burton  over  John  Bell.^^ 

To  no  one  did  the  national  effect  of  Polk's  victory  appear  of 
greater  importance  than  to  General  Jackson.  As  soon  as  the 
news  reached  him,  he  hastened  to  congratulate  Polk  and  the 
country  on  his  election  and  "the  return  of  old  democratic  Tenn- 
essee to  the  republican  fold  again."  With  customary  hyperbole 
he  predicted  that  "it  will  be  at  least  a  century  before  she  will 
permit  herself  to  be  again  duped  into  her  late  false  position  by 
such  Jesuitical  hypocrites  &  apostates  as  Bell,  "White  &  Co.  "•*- 
Polk  was  doubtless  well  aware  of  the  program  that  was  to  be 
carried  into  effect  in  the  event  of  his  election,  and  presumably 
he  aided  in  formulating  it;  therefore  Jackson  did  not  allude  to 
it  in  the  letter  just  quoted.  In  a  letter  to  Van  Buren,  however, 
the  General  outlined  the  party  plans  in  characteristic  fashion. 
As  the  Democrats  have  elected  both  governor  and  legislature, 
said  he, 

of  course  Mr.  Fosterss  &  his  gagg  law  will  not  any  more  trouble  the  U. 
States  Senate — Judge  White  must  resign,  or  he  will  feel  the  weight  of 
instructions  &  a  Senator  elected  over  his  head — the  precedent  set  by  our 
last  Legislature  will  justify  this  proceedure.  My  own  opinion  is,  White 
will  resign — Bell  being  disappointed  in  going  into  the  Senate  to  fill  White 's 
vacancy,  which  was  the  price  of  his  apostacy,  if  he  is  disappointed  in  get- 
ting into  the  Speaker's  chair,  will  resign  or  cut  his  throat  in  despair  & 
disapi)ointment;  and  this  catastrophy  will  end  the  existance  of  bluelight 
federalism  in  Tennessee. 

For  so  great  a  triumph,  he  gave  the  principal  credit  to  Colonel 
Polk  and  General  Robert  Armstrong."**     As  will  appear  in  the 


31  Sacfield  Maclin  to  Polk,  August  10,  1839,  Polk  Papers. 

32  Jackson  to  Polk,  August  13,  1839,  ibid. 

33  E.  H.  Foster  was  elected  to  the  Senate  when  Grundy  resigned. 

3*  Jackson  to  Van  Buren,  August  12,  1839,  Fan  Burcn  Papcrss  "I 
hope,"  wrote  Richard  Warner  to  Polk,  September  29,  "we  shall  be  able 
to  adopt  such  measures  as  will  compel  Foster  to  give  up  the  seat  he  and 
his  friends  usurped  at  the  last  session."  The  legislature  should  instruct 
the  Senators  to  vote  for  the  sub-treasury  bill.  If  this  (iocs  not  bring 
"poor  old  White"  to  his  senses,  it  should  then  be  ascertained  wliether 
he  is  a  Senator  at  all.  (On  account  of  ill  health,  Wliite  had  tendered  his 
resignation  to  Governor  Cannon,  but  it  had  not  been  accepted.) 


POLK  VERSUS  CANNON,  1839  153 

following  chapter,  the  program  here  outlined,  except  the  suicidal 
role  assigned  to  Bell,  was  carried  into  successful  operation. 

When  the  election  took  place,  the  "old  hero"  was  sojourning 
at  Tyree  Springs,  in  Sumner  County.  After  it  had  been  ascer- 
tained beyond  question  that  the  state  had  been  redeemed,  the 
leading  Democrats  of  Middle  Tennessee,  including  Polk,  Attor- 
ney-General Grundy,  Judge  Campbell,  and  General  Armstrong, 
reported,  with  their  ladies,  to  that  place  in  order  to  join  with 
the  General  in  celebrating  the  victory.  Burdens  of  state  as  well 
as  the  infirmities  of  age  were,  for  the  time  being,  forgotten,  and 
the  company  once  more  indulged  in  the  frivolities  of  youth. 
Each  morning,  after  breakfast,  a  mock  court  was  held,  of  which 
Grund}^  was  Chief  Justice  and  General  Jackson,  Associate.  From 
fines  levied  by  this  "court,"  provisions  for  the  day  were  sup- 
plied— a  proceeding  which  seems  to  have  added  much  to  the 
enjoyment  of  the  company. ^^ 

Polk  did  not  remain  long  within  the  jurisdiction  of  this 
improvised  court.  He  soon  returned  to  his  home  in  Columbia 
to  complete  his  plans  for  ousting  the  Whig  Senators,  and  to 
prepare  for  his  inauguration.  Unlike  many  who  offered  him 
advice.  Cave  Johnson  believed  that  the  program  of  persecution 
would  do  the  Democrats  more  harm  than  good,  and  therefore 
urged  Polk  to  oppose  it.    "  It  is  essential, ' '  he  wrote, 

to  the  existence  of  our  party  that  every  selfish  consideration  be  laid  aside 
&  act  in  concert  &  no  man  can  do  so  much  to  eifect  this  as  yourself.  .  .  . 
It  has  struck  me  with  some  force,  that  our  friends  should  go  to  work  & 
do  the  business  of  the  State  without  the  slightest  interference  with  Federal 
politics — let  White  and  Foster  take  their  course — go  to  Washington  if 
they  choose — if  Foster  adopts  that  course  he  is  forever  disgraced — toward 
the  conclusion  of  the  Session  we  can  instruct. 

He  did  not  "wish  our  party  to  have  the  semblance  of  coercing 
either  until  it  is  absolutely  necessary."  He  believed  that  Foster 
would  resign  even  without  instructions,  but  however  that  might 
be,  "by  all  means  let  the  necessity  for  interference  be  manifest 


33  Nelson,  Memorials  of  Sarah  Childress  Polk,  60-63. 


154  JAMES  E.  POLK 

before  it  is  done,  rather  let  it  be  urged  upon  the  Legislature  by 
the  people  rather  than  upon  the  people  by  the  Legislature."''*' 
Johnson's  advice  may  have  been  prompted  by  political  sagacity 
rather  than  by  a  sense  of  justice,  but  whatever  the  motive  his 
recommendations  were  good. 

As  will  appear  in  the  following  chapter,  other  counsels  pre- 
vailed, and  the  Democrats  elected  to  make  the  most  of  their 
political  power.  Their  choice  gave  them  a  temporary  advantage, 
although  eventually  their  unfair  treatment  of  the  Whig  Senators 
helped  to  transfer  votes  from  their  own  party  to  that  of  their 
opponents. 


36  Johnson  to  Polk,  Clarksville,  September  28.  The  year  is  not  given. 
The  letter  has  been  put  with  the  Polk  Papers  for  1838,  but  evidently  it  was 
written  in  1839. 


CHAPTER  IX 

GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE 

In  accordance  with  an  absurd  custom,  a  governor  of  Tenn- 
essee, in  the  closing  hours  of  his  administration,  enacted  the 
solemn  farce  of  submitting  to  the  legislature  a  message  in  which 
he  made  elaborate  recommendations  for  its  consideration.  This 
was  done  with  a  full  knowledge  that  within  a  few  days  a  new 
governor  would  be  inaugurated  and  that  he,  in  turn,  would  pre- 
sent entirely  different  recommendations. 

On  October  8,  1839,  Governor  Cannon  submitted  his  final 
message  to  a  legislature  composed  of  thirteen  Democrats  to  ten 
Whigs  in  the  Senate,  and  forty-nine  Democrats  to  thirty-three 
Whigs  in  the  lower  house.  It  is  unnecessary  to  dwell  on  his 
suggestions  concerning  state  affairs,  for,  needless  to  say,  no  heed 
was  paid  to  them.  For  political  reasons,  however,  the  Democratic 
majority  in  the  new  legislature  felt  that  his  severe  condemnation 
of  the  national  administration  merited  both  consideration  and 
rebuke.  Unanswered,  the  Governor's  remarks  might  tend  to  in- 
fluence the  wavering,  and  a  refutation  would  afford  another  op- 
portunity to  herald  the  glorious  achievements  of  the  "party  of 
the  people." 

Among  other  things  the  retiring  Governor  had  expressed  a 
hope  that  "the  country  will  ere  long  be  delivered  from  the  mal- 
administration of  the  present  rulers,  with  its  pernicious  train  of 
experiments  and  spoliations."  This  part  of  his  message  was 
referred  by  the  legislature  to  a  "Committee  on  Federal  Rela- 
tions" which  was  created  early  in  the  session.  The  most  active 
member  of  the  committee  was  Samuel  H.  Laughlin,  former  editor 
of  the  Nashville  Union  and  a  personal  friend  of  both  Polk  and 


156  JAMES  E.  POLE 

Jackson,  and  it  was  easy  to  foretell  what  the  verdict  would  be. 
On  January  29,  1840,  Laughlin  reported  that  his  committee  had 
been 

wholl}'  unable,  from  aiiytliiug  contained  in  said  message,  or  in  the  past 
action  of  the  Federal  Government,  executive,  legislative  or  judicial,  during 
the  late  or  present  administrations,  which  can,  in  the  slightest  degi-ee,  even 
by  implication,  afford  the  least  warrant  of  authority  for  the  imputations 
contained  in  that  portion  of  said  message,  i 

The  verdict  of  the  committee  was  approved  by  the  legislature, 
and  little  attention  was  paid  to  a  minority  report  which  upheld 
the  contentions  of  the  former  Governor.  Laughlin 's  report 
served  as  a  vindication  of  the  national  administration.  In  addi- 
tion, it  served  as  the  basis  for  one  of  the  instructions  given  to 
the  federal  Senators  from  Tennessee — the  instruction  to  vote 
against  the  bill  to  prevent  interference  in  elections  by  certain 
federal  officers. 

On  October  14,  1839,  Polk  was  inaugurated  as  governor  of 
Tennessee.  Among  those  present  to  witness  the  ceremony  it  gave 
Harris  of  the  Union  ' '  great  pleasure  to  notice  ex-President  Jack- 
son, with  health  apparently  improved."  The  inaugural  address, 
according  to  the  same  writer,  was  "an  effort  of  great  happiness 
on  the  part  of  Gov.  Polk."  "It  was,"  wrote  Old  Hickory,  "a 
great  address  well  suited  to  the  occasion — there  was  a  great 
contrast  betwen  his  and  Mr.  Cannon 's."- 

On  account  of  its  supposed  influence  on  national  politics, 
more  importance  was  attached  to  Polk's  inauguration  than  is 
usually  the  case  when  a  state  executive  is  installed.  Levi  Wood- 
bury voiced  the  sentiment  of  most  Democrats  when  he  wrote : 
"I  have  seldom  known  the  result  of  any  election  to  be  more 
triumphant  &  gratifying  over  the  whole  Union  than  that  of 
yours. '  '^ 


1  Tenn.  Sen.  Jour.,  1839-40,  7,  504. 

2  Jackson  to  Van  Buren,  Oct.  18,  18.S9,  Fan  Bnren  Papers. 
sWoodburj'  to  Polk,  October  20,  1839,  PoR-  Papers. 


GOVEENOE   OF   TENNESSEE  157 

The  new  Governor's  first  message  was  submitted  to  the  legis- 
lature on  October  22,  and  the  subjects  most  emphasized  in  it 
were  banks  and  internal  improvements.  He  expressed  the  belief 
that  there  had  been  no  necessity  for  the  suspension  of  specie 
payments  by  the  banks  of  Tennessee.  On  the  assumption  that 
they  had  suspended  such  payments  simply  because  eastern  banks 
had  done  so,  he  urged  the  enactment  of  measures  which  would 
compel  resumption,  for  "like  individual  debtors,  they  should 
meet  their  liabilities  honestly  and  promptly  as  long  as  they  are 
able  to  pay."  Banks  often,  said  he,  do  their  most  profitable 
business  during  suspension,  while  the  loss  is  borne  by  labor.  He 
denied  that  the  federal  government  had  been  responsible  for  de- 
rangement of  the  currency  or  that  a  national  bank  could  have 
prevented  it.  The  main  cause  of  financial  distress,  he  said,  was 
speculation  on  borrowed  capital.  For  remedy,  therefore,  he  did 
not  seek  new  legislation,  but  suggested  something  far  more  sensi- 
ble— a  remedy  which  in  no  degree  depended  on  governmental 
action.  "The  only  substantial  and  permanent  relief,"  said  the 
Governor, 

is  to  be  found  in  habits  of  economy  and  industry,  and  in  the  productive 
labor  of  our  people.  By  the  observance  of  these,  another  crop  would  more 
than  liquidate  our  eastern  debt.  We  must  bring  our  expenses  within  our 
income.  Our  merchants  and  traders  must  cease  to  indulge  in  hazardous 
and  wild  speculations  which  they  are  unable  to  meet. 

This  was  very  sound  advice,  far  too  sound  to  be  widely  accepted 
in  a  period  when  most  people  believed  that  the  government  was 
able  to  dispense  or  withhold  prosperity  at  will,  regardless  of  their 
own  reckless  speculative  ventures. 

Another  recommendation  was  that  the  legislature  should,  by 
law,  prohibit  the  Bank  of  Tennessee  from  emitting  notes  under 
twenty  dollars,  because  excessive  issues  of  paper  tended  to  drive 
out  metal  money,  and  in  addition,  to  facilitate  speculation. 

Polk  declared  himself  to  be  strongly  in  favor  of  internal  im- 
provements made  by  the  state.    He  asked,  however,  that  existing 


158  JAMES  K.  FOLK 

laws  on  that  subject  should  be  so  modified  as  to  prevent  extrava- 
gance. For  example,  the  legislature  at  the  preceding  session  had 
enacted  a  law  which  required  the  state  to  subscribe  for  one-half 
of  the  capital  stock  of  all  railroads,  macadamized  turnpikes, 
graded  turnpikes,  and  sanded  turnpikes  for  which  acts  of  incor- 
poration ''have  heretofore  been  granted  or  for  which  acts  of 
incorporation  may  be  hereafter  granted. ' '  Such  a  law  had  great 
possibilities  for  evil,  and  under  it  worthless  enterprises  had 
already  been  undertaken.  Polk  now  urged  that  the  law  should 
be  so  modified  that  subscriptions  in  future  must  be  limited  to 
works  of  real  improvement,  and  that  a  board  of  public  works 
should  be  created  to  authorize  and  supervise  such  enterprises.* 

On  the  whole  the  Governor's  message  was  a  creditable  docu- 
ment, although  it  lacked  the  vigor  and  elaboration  which  usually 
characterized  his  written  productions.  It  was  evident  that  his 
interests  were  national  rather  than  local.  His  recommendations 
were  duly  considered  by  the  legislature,  but  even  the  members 
of  that  body  seemed  to  be  more  interested  in  "doing  practical 
politics"  for  the  national  party  than  in  enacting  laws  for  the 
good  of  the  state.  At  any  rate  practical  politics  was  given  first 
place  on  their  program. 

It  was  well  known  to  all  that  the  main  reason  for  making  Polk 
the  gubernatorial  candidate  was  the  belief  that  he  alone  could  win 
the  state  back  to  Democratic  allegiance.  For  this  same  reason 
he  had  consented  to  make  the  race.  The  question  which  soon 
presented  itself  was:  What  does  he  expect  as  his  reward,  if  he 
succeeds?  During  the  campaign  the  Whigs  made  the  charge  tliat 
Polk  did  not  care  for  the  governorship,  and  that  his  nomination 
had  been  simply  a  ruse  to  win  Tennessee  for  Van  Buren  and  the 
Vice-Presidency  for  himself  at  the  approaching  federal  election. 
In  such  an  event  he  would,  of  course,  resign  in  the  middle  of  his 
term.  The  charge  was  repelled  by  Polk's  friends,  but  the  prob- 
ability of  its  ti-uth  was  so  great  that  many,  especially  in  East 


4  Tenn.  Sen.  Jour.,  1839-40,  64-68. 


GOVERNOR   OF   TENNESSEE  159 

Tennessee,  declined  to  vote  for  him  under  the  circumstances.  He 
was  urged"'  to  make  an  emphatic  denial  of  the  charge,  but  he  fol- 
lowed his  usual  policy  of  keeping  silent.  When,  therefore,  the 
state  senate,  within  forty-eight  hours  after  his  inauguration, 
began  to  consider  the  question  of  nominating  Polk  for  Vice- 
President,  the  Banner  charged  that  this  had  been  the  sole  pur- 
pose of  making  him  governor,  and  that  the  people  had  been 
grossly  deceived." 

The  senate  with  little  opposition  passed  a  resolution  nomin- 
ating Van  Buren  and  Polk,  and  on  October  22,  the  same  day  on 
which  it  received  the  Governor's  message,  the  house  proceeded 
to  consider  this  senate  resolution.  Two  amendments  were  offered 
by  the  opposition — one  to  require  the  candidates  to  support  a 
federal  bank,  another  to  strike  out  the  name  of  Polk — but  both 
were  promptly  rejected.  After  prolonged  and  animated  debate 
the  house,  on  November  4,  concurred  in  the  senate  resolution  and 
formally  nominated  the  two  candidates.'  Until  the  question  had 
been  decided,  the  local  newspapers  kept  up  a  war  of  words  on 
the  subject,  each  trying  to  surpass  its  rival  in  vulgar  abuse,  which 
doubtless  pleased  the  readers  but  which  made  few  converts  in 
the  legislature.® 

In  Washington  the  Democratic  members  of  the  Tennessee 
delegation  in  Congress  were  busily  engaged  in  an  effort  to  pro- 
cure for  Polk  the  second  place  on  the  national  ticket.  His  prin- 
cipal competitor  was  the  incumbent,  Colonel  Richard  M.  Johnson, 
of   Kentucky.     Johnson   had   the   support   of    the   conservative 


5  H.  W.  Anderson,  of  Bro^vnsville,  to  Polk,  September  10,  1839,  Folic 
Papers. 

6  Nashville  Banner,  Oct.  19,  1839.  One  enthusiastic  friend  urged 
Polk  not  to  leave  the  governorship  for  the  Vice-Presidency :  ' '  The  plan 
that  I  had  laid  off  was  for  you  to  be  our  Governor  six  years  and  then 
Senator  Six  and  at  the  end  of  Benton's  eight  years  make  you  President" 
(Amos  Kirkpatrick,  of  Meigsville,  to  Polk,  Oct.  17,  1839,  Polk  Papers). 

7  Tenn.  House  Jour.,  1839-40,  68-69. 

8  To  quote  one  sample  of  their  ability  in  vivid  description:  The  Union, 
on  October  16,  informed  its  readers  that  John  B.  Ashe,  a  state  senator, 
"came  very  near  bursting  his  boiler  and  collapsing  his  flue  on  yesterday," 
in  condemning  the  Union. 


160  JAMES  K.  POLK 

element  of  the  party — of  the  class  of  people  whose  main  rule  of 
action  is  leaving  well  enough  alone.  But  a  portion  of  the  party 
desired  a  more  vigorous  candidate,  a  man  who  would  conduct  a 
more  energetic  campaign,  and  a  man  who  would  be  more  accept- 
able to  the  southern  states.  These  qualities  were  especially 
desired  in  the  candidate  for  Vice-President  in  order  to  offset  the 
want  of  them  in  Van  Buren,  their  candidate  for  President. 

The  supporters  of  Polk  fully  realized  that  it  would  be  difficult 
to  procure  for  him  the  coveted  nomination.  They  knew  that  there 
was  little  genuine  enthusiasm  for  Johnson  in  any  quarter,  still 
they  feared  that  he  might  be  nominated  by  the  national  conven- 
tion simply  because  that  body  would  not  know  how  to  get  rid 
of  him.  Their  only  hope  seemed  to  lie  either  in  preventing  ttie 
calling  of  a  national  convention,  or  in  preventing  any  nomination 
of  a  Vice-Presidential  candidate  if  such  a  convention  shoidd  be 
held.  A  letter  outlining  the  situation  Avas  sent  to  Polk  by  six 
Democratic  members  of  Congress  from  Tennessee."  It  stated  that 
a  national  convention  had  been  recommended  by  New  Hampshire, 
and  that  it  now  seemed  to  be  a  certainty.  If  so,  it  was  their 
opinion  that  Johnson  would  probably  be  nominated,  although 
New  England,  New  York,  Virginia,  North  Carolina  and  other 
states  preferred  Polk.  Johnson  was  a  "dead  weight"  on  the 
party,  they  said,  but  it  was  hard  to  drop  him.  It  was  possible, 
they  believed,  that  the  convention  might  fail  to  nominate  any  one, 
and  break  up  in  confusion,  but  at  all  events  Tennessee  should  be 
fully  represented  in  the  convention.  In  a  separate  letter  (dated 
February  4)  Brown  tells  Polk  that  Calhoun  is  for  him  on  the 
ground  of  "your  position,  your  abilities  &  your  pnnciples." 

A  few  days  after  the  receipt  of  the  above-mentioned  letter 
Polk  informed  Hubbard,  a  member  of  the  House  from  New  Hamp- 
shire,^*' that  his  position  was  "passive" — that  he  would  accept 


9  The  letter  was  dated  at  Washington,  February  3,  1840,  and  was  signed 
by  Felix  Grundy,  A.  McClellan,  H.  M.  Watterson,  II.  L.  Turney,  C.  Johnson, 
and  A.  V.  Bro-wn  {Polk  Papers). 

10  Polk  to  Hubbard,  February  7,  1840,  Polk  Papers. 


GOVERN  OB    OF   TENNESSEE  161 

the  nomination  at  the  hands  of  his  party,  but  would  not  seek  it. 
Such  at  attitude  was  in  line  with  his  usual  adherence  to  party 
unity.  His  passive  attitude,  however,  seems  to  have  been  some- 
what affected  by  his  unanimous  nomination  by  a  Virginia  con- 
vention. This  nomination  was  made,  it  was  said^^  at  the  instance 
of  the  friends  of  Calhoun.  In  response  to  Polk's  letter,  Hubbard 
strongly  urged  Polk  to  put  aside  all  delicacy  and  run.  Johnson, 
he  said,  was  in  favor  of  both  tariff  and  internal  improvements, 
and  was  unpopular  with  many  in  the  party.  For  these  reasons, 
said  Hubbard,  Democrats  should  oppose  a  national  convention, 
and  should  nominate  Polk  in  some  other  way ;  Virginia  had  done 
so,  and  why  should  other  states  not  follow  her  example  ?  Should 
the  election  eventually  devolve  upon  the  Senate,  he  was  certain 
that  Polk  would  be  chosen.^-  In  Washington,  A.  J.  Donelson  was 
using  his  influence  to  procure  Polk's  nomination.  On  March  4 
he  wrote  that,  although  the  South  was  unequivocally  for  Polk, 
yet  he  feared  that  the  convention  would  choose  Johnson  instead.^^ 
Polk  was  willing  enough  to  run,  but  being  a  firm  believer  in 
party  solidarity,  he  was  reluctant  to  become  the  candidate  of  a 
portion  of  the  party  unless  it  should  develop  that  the  party  as 
a  whole  could  not  agree  upon  a  choice.  Writing  to  Cave  Johnson 
on  March  27,  he  said  that  "up  to  now"  he  had  maintained  that 
he  would  not  run  unless  nominated  by  the  undivided  party.  But, 
said  he,  the  refusal  of  Virginia  and  South  Carolina  to  send  dele- 
gates to  the  Baltimore  convention  had  changed  the  situation  by 
making  unanimity  in  any  case  out  of  the  question ;  consequently 
if  the  convention  should  fail  to  make  a  nomination,  in  other 
words,  in  the  event  of  there  being  no  party  nominee,  he  might 
in  that  case  consent  to  run.^* 


11  Theophilus  Fisk  to  Polk,  Eiclimoiul,  February  21,  1840,  Polk  Papers. 
In  reporting  the  news  to  Polk,  Fisk  added :  ' '  Wherever  my  paper,  the  Old 
Dominion,  circulates,  and  it  has  a  very  wide  one,  the  people  will  hear  of 
no  candidate  but  yourself. ' ' 

12  Hubbard  to  Polk,  February  23,  1840,  Polk  Papers. 

13  Donelson  to  Polk,  March  4,  1840,  ibid. 

14  Polk  Papers.    He  wrote  a  similar  letter  to  Hubbard  on  April  5,  1840. 


162  JAMES  K.   POLK 

Ready  as  ever  to  aid  his  friends,  General  Jackson  used  his 
influence  in  an  attempt  to  procure  Polk's  nomination  by  the 
national  convention.    In  a  letter  to  Van  Buren  he  said  that 

A  man  ought  to  be  chosen  that  all  the  republicans  in  every  state  would  cheer- 
fully unite  on,  and  if  this  is  not  done  it  will  jeopardise  your  election — it 
ought  to  be  a  man  whose  popularity  would  strengthen  you,  not  one  that 
would  be  a  dead  weight  upon  your  popularity. 

Polk,  in  his  opinion  had  double  the  popularity  of  Johnson,  and 
his  nomination  by  the  party  would  insure  victory.  He  was 
pained  to  learn  from  Major  Donelson  that  many  in  Congress 
believed  it  advisable  to  make  no  nomination  for  the  Vice-Presi- 
dency ;  ' '  surely  our  friends  have  not  taken  a  common  sense  view 
of  the  whole  subject. '  '^^ 

Before  leaving  Tennessee,  Laughlin  and  some  of  the  other 
delegates  to  the  Baltimore  convention  held  a  conference  in  Nash- 
ville with  Polk,  Jackson,  and  other  political  leaders.  The  Gen- 
eral was  firm  in  his  belief  that  candidates  ought  to  be  nominated 
for  both  President  and  Vice-President,  and  that  Van  Buren  and 
Polk  should  be  the  nominees.  Polk,  he  repeated,  would  add 
strength  to  the  ticket,  while  Colonel  Johnson  would  be  an  encum- 
brance. On  the  other  hand,  Polk  made  it  clear  to  the  delegates 
that  in  no  event  would  he  run  as  a  sectional  candidate,  as  Judge 
White  had  done  in  1836;  should  Johnson  be  nominated,  he  would 
earnestly  support  him.  Should  no  nomination  be  made  at  Balti- 
more, and  if  within  a  reasonable  time  a  sufficient  number  of 
states  had  not  indicated  a  preference  for  himself,  he  would  then 
take  field  in  support  of  Colonel  Johnson  or  any  other  candidate 
that  seemed  most  likely  to  bring  success  to  the  party. ^" 

Laughlin  arrived  in  Washington  on  April  25,  and  three  days 
later,  after  conferences  with  Tennesseans,  he  recorded  in  his 
diary  that  "all  were  now  agreed  that  Gov.  Polk  could  not  be 
nominated — that  Johnson  could  not  without  New  York,  and  that 


15  Jackson  to  Van  Buren,  April  3,  1840,  Van  Buren  Tapers. 

16  S.   H.   Laughlin,   "Diarv,"   April   14,   15,   Teiin.   Hist.   Mag.,   March, 
1916,  45-47. 


GOVEBNOE   OF    TENNESSEE  163 

the  best  way,  if  possible,  was  to  make  no  nomination.  This  matter 
was  in  treaty  between  Mr.  Grundy  and  Mr.  Wright."  On  the 
day  following,  Laughlin  reported  to  Polk  that  Benton  and 
Buchanan  Avere  secretly  in  favor  of  Johnson  and  that  "such 
creatures  as  Walker  and  Sevier  are  only  fit  to  do  mischief, ' '  but 
that  Calhoun  was  heartily  in  favor  of  Polk's  nomination.^'  At 
a  meeting  held  in  Grundy's  room  on  May  1  it  was  agreed  that 
Polk's  only  hope  lay  in  preventing  any  nomination  by  the  con- 
vention, and  some  believed  that  a  refusal  by  delegates  to  attend 
would  be  the  most  effective  way  of  procuring  the  desired  result. ^^ 
This  plan  was  not  followed,  however,  and  a  few  days  later  Laugh- 
lin wrote  from  Baltimore  that  the  convention  had  nominated 
Van  Buren  but,  by  a  vote  of  one  hundred  and  thirty-two  to 
ninety-nine,  had  declared  it  inexpedient  to  nominate  a  candidate 
for  Vice-President. 

After  the  convention  had  adjourned  without  naming  a  candi- 
date for  Vice-President,  Polk  prepared  a  statement  in  the  form 
of  a  letter  to  Grundy  and  requested  him  to  have  it  published  in 
the  Washington  Globe}^  It  had  been  his  wish,  he  said,  that  the 
Baltimore  convention  might  nominate  a  candidate,  but,  as  it  had 
not  done  so,  he  still  hoped  that  the  opinions  of  the  majority  could 
in  some  way  be  ascertained.  In  that  event  he  would  cheerfully 
support  the  choice,  but,  as  he  had  been  nominated  by  some  of  the 
states,  he  would  let  the  party  decide  whether  to  settle  on  one  or 
more.  He  hoped  that  some  one  would  be  chosen  by  the  electoral 
college.  In  answer,  Grundy  told  him-°  that  no  doubt  he  would 
have  won  if  there  had  been  no  convention,  but  as  matters  now 


1"  S.  H.  Laughlin,  "Diary,"  April  28,  29,  op.  cit.  Laughlin  to  Polk, 
April  29,  1840,  Folic  Papers.  In  his  diary  for  May  4,  Laughlin  recorded 
that  "Mr.  Buchanan  from  hostility  to  Gov.  Polk's  future  prospects  had 
allied  himself  to  King,  and  by  contrivance,  their  friends  Avere  trying  first 
to  effect  a  compromise  with  the  friends  of  Johnson  and  Polk  and  thereby 
get  King  nominated  upon  the  half-way  house  principle;  but  if  they  could 
not  get  this  done,  they  united  and  were  to  unite  with  Johnson's  friends 
and  press  for  a  nomination. ' ' 

18  Laughlin  to  Polk,  May  2,  1840,  Folic  Papers. 

19  Polk  to  Grundy,  May  27,  1840,  ibid. 

20  Grundy  to  Polk,  June  1,  1840,  ibid. 


164  JAMES  K.  POLK 

stood,  he  thought  that  Johnson  would  be  elected.  The  Nashville 
Union,  he  said,  had  injured  rather  than  aided  Polk  by  calling  on 
the  states  to  declare  their  preference.  As  it  would  not  look  well 
to  withdraw  formally  from  the  race,  Grundy  advised  Polk  simply 
to  do  nothing. 

The  contest  between  Polk  and  Johnson  for  second  place  on  the 
Democratic  ticket  was  more  than  a  rivalry  between  the  two  men. 
Back  of  it  was  a  party  cleavage  which  four  years  later  was  to 
land  Polk  in  the  White  House.  Despite  Jackson 's  loyalty  to  Van 
Buren,  many  of  the  General 's  best  friends  did  not  like  the  ' '  little 
magician";  they  supported  him  only  from  a  sense  of  party  duty. 
Still  less  did  this  wing  of  Democracy  like  Colonel  Johnson,  and, 
if  they  must  support  Van  Buren,  they  wished  at  least  to  have 
a  Vice-Presidential  candidate  for  whom  they  could  willingly 
vote.  There  seems  to  be  no  evidence  that  Polk  himself  had,  up 
to  this  time,  been  opposed  to  Van  Buren,  nevertheless  he  was  on 
very  intimate  terms  with  the  insurgent  faction  of  the  party. 
This  wing  of  the  party  was  impelled  mainly  by  a  desire  to  promote 
southern  interests,  although  a  revolt  against  "old  fogyism"  was 
already  becoming  a  political  factor.  Its  adherents  regarded  Polk 
as  sound  on  southern  questions,  while  they  had  doubts  in  the  case 
of  both  Van  Buren  and  Johnson.  Party  cleavage  had  existed 
before  Polk  had  been  suggested  for  the  Vice-Presidency,  but  the 
apparent  hostility  of  the  administration  to  his  candidacy  aided 
in  widening  it.  Although  the  President  himself  seems  to  have 
expressed  no  preference,  those  who  were  in  his  confidence  and 
who  were  supposed  to  voice  his  wishes  were  directly  or  indirectly 
supporting  Colonel  Johnson.  Among  them  were  Benton, 
Buchanan,  Kendall,  and  Blair. -^  For  a  second  time--  Blair 
appeared  reluctant  to  give  aid  to  Polk  when  he  was  sorely  in 
need  of  it.     These  instances  alone  furnish  a  very  good  reason 


21  Jackson's  attitude  toward  the  candidates  had  no  connection  with  this 
party  sfjlit.  He  favored  Van  Buren  and  Polk,  and  opposed  Johnson,  purely 
for  personal  reasons. 

■-*;;  The  first  time  Avas  when  Polk  was  a  candidate  for  Speaker  of  the 
House. 


GOVERNOR   OF   TENNESSEE  165 

why  Polk,  when  he  became  President,  declined  to  adopt  the  Globe 
as  his  official  organ. 

Shortly  after  the  Democratic  convention  had  adjourned,  Cave 
Johnson  informed  Polk^^  that  a  Life  of  Van  Buren  and  Johnson 
had  appeared  aiid  that  he  believed  it  had  been  published  at  the 
office  of  the  Globe.  Blair,  he  said,  had  declared  himself  to  be 
impartial  as  to  Colonel  Johnson  and  Polk,  but  "I  have  no  faith 
in  that  establishment  so  far  as  your  interests  are  concerned." 
For  this  reason  he  (Cave  Johnson)  and  his  friends  were  not  eager 
to  extend  the  circulation  of  Kendall's  "Extra  Globes,"  which 
had  been  prepared  especially  for  campaign  purposes.  On  May 
25,  five  of  the  Tennessee  delegation-*  addressed  a  letter  to  Kendall 
himself.  In  it  they  stated  that  while  they  were  anxious  to  advance 
the  cause  of  the  administration,  they  were  unwilling  to  prejudice 
the  cause  of  their  favorite  candidate,  and  therefore,  "before  we 
undertake  the  circulation  of  the  Extra  Globe,  we  are  desirous  of 
being  informed,  whether  the  Extra  will  take  any  part,  &  if  any 
what  part,  in  the  election  of  Vice  President."  Kendall  gave  a 
rather  evasive  reply-^  in  which  he  stated  that,  while  he  thought 
well  of  their  ' '  favorite  candidate, ' '  he  would  attempt  to  promote 
the  cause  of  the  party  by  speaking  well  of  any  or  all  candidates 
as  the  occasion  might  require.  With  this  reply,  which  was  re- 
garded as  a  virtual  endorsement  of  Johnson,  they  had  to  be  con- 
tent, but  the  hostility  to  Kendall  and  Blair  by  no  means  abated. 
The  element  that  supported  Polk  became  more  and  more  alienated 
from  Van  Buren  and  his  intimates  until,  in  1844,  they  succeeded 
in  preventing  his  nomination. 

The  other  question  of  a  purely  political  nature  that  engrossed 
the  attention  of  the  Tennessee  legislature  was  that  of  forcing 
White  and  Foster  out  of  the  United  States  Senate  by  the  use  of 
humiliating  instructions. 


23  Johnson  to  Polk,  May  24,  1840,  PolTc  Papers. 

24  Cave  Johnson,  A.  V.  BroAvn,  H.  L.  Turney,  A.  McClellan,  and  H.  M. 
Watterson. 

25  June  9,  1840.     Both  letters  are  in  the  Folk  Papers. 


166  JAMES   K.   POLK 

In  White's  case  another  method  was  first  attempted,  for  the 
judge  was  still  popular  in  the  state,  and,  if  he  could  be  eliminated 
without  resorting  to  instructions,  less  odium  would  attach  to  his 
adversaries.  In  the  fall  of  1838  White  had,  on  account  of  ill 
health,  tendered  his  resignation  to  Governor  Cannon.  The  Gov- 
ernor suspended  action  in  the  hope  that  White's  health  might 
improve.  As  it  did  improve  sufficiently  to  enable  him  to  make  the 
journey  to  Washington,  the  resignation,  at  Cannon's  request,  was 
withdrawn  without  having  been  accepted. 

Kumors  of  White 's  letter  of  resignation  had  found  their  way 
to  Democratic  ears  and  suggested  the  possibility  of  disposing  of 
the  judge  by  maintaining  that  by  his  own  action  his  seat  had 
become  vacant.  Accordingly,  when  the  legislature  convened  in 
October,  1839,  the  senate  by  resolution  asked  Governor  Cannon 
for  copies  of  the  correspondence  which  had  passed  between  him- 
self and  White  relative  to  the  latter 's  resignation.  Cannon  replied 
that  White's  resignation  had  never  been  accepted  and  that  his 
letter  had  been  returned ;  all  other  correspondence  had  been  per- 
sonal, not  official,  and  had  not  been  preserved.  Attorney-General 
Grundy  wrote-*'  from  Washington  urging  that  White's  successor 
should  be  chosen  without  delay,  and  expressing  the  opinion  that 
Foster  would  resign  if  instructed  to  vote  for  the  sub-treasury  bill. 
Such  a  program,  if  successful,  would  give  the  Democrats  an 
opportunity  to  choose  both  Senators,  one  of  whom  was  to  be 
Grundy  himself. 

Notwithstanding  Grundy's  advice,  the  difficulty  of  proving 
that  White's  seat  had  become  vacant  seemed  to  be  so  great  that, 
on  October  25,  Levin  H.  Coe  introduced  in  the  state  senate  a 
series  of  resolutions  which  instructed  the  Senators  and  requested 
the  Representatives  to  carry  out  the  wishes  of  the  legislature  on 
certain  enumerated  subjects.-"  While  the  resolutions  were  being 


26  Grundy  to  Polk,  October  17,  Polk  Pai)ers. 

27  (1)  To  vote  against  the  chartering  of  a  United  States  bank.  (2)  To 
vote  for  the  sub-treasury.  (3)  To  vote  against  any  bill  for  the  prevention 
of  interference  in  elections  by  certain  federal  officers,  as  such  a  bill  would 


GOVEENOB   OF   TENNESSEE  167 

discussed  by  the  legislature,  Judge  White  wrote  to  one  of  the 
members  of  the  lower  house  stating  that  he  would  resign  rather 
than  support  the  sub-treasury  bill.'^  His  letter  was  read  to  the 
legislature,  and  soon  afterwards  that  body,  by  a  strict  party  vote, 
passed  the  resolutions.  General  Jackson's  program  was  thereby 
successfully  carried  into  effect,  and  once  more  he  had  the  satis- 
faction of  humiliating  the  man  who  had  dared  to  run  for  Presi- 
dent against  his  wishes.  It  was  a  contemptible  transaction,  and 
those  who  participated  in  it  are  deserving  of  nothing  but  con- 
demnation. It  remained  to  be  seen,  of  course,  whether  the  Whig 
Senators  would  repudiate  their  instructions,  but  there  was  little 
doubt  that  White  at  least,  would  resign. 

On  his  way  to  Washington,  early  in  November,  John  Bell 
stopped  at  Knoxville  to  deliver  a  public  address  in  which  he 
scathingly  denounced  the  administration  and  its  supporters.  In 
response  to  a  call  from  the  audience,  White  addressed  the  same 
meeting  in  language  which  was  reported  to  have  been  violently 
intemperate.-^ 

While  White  was  yet  on  his  journey  to  Washington,  Polk,  in 
a  letter  to  Van  Buren,  congratulated  him  on  recent  Democratic 
victories,  and  pointed  out  that  they  were  a  good  omen  for  1840. 
"Judge  White,"  said  Polk,  "forgetting  the  dignity  of  his  station, 
as  well  as  the  former  character  of  which  he  boasted,  descended 
into  the  political  arena,  and  became  an  active  partisan  and 
travelling  electioneer."    He  told  Van  Buren  that  the  legislature 


violate  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  (4)  To  vote  against  dis- 
tribution among  tlie  states  of  revenue  derived  from  the  sale  of  public  lands — 
and  for  reducing  the  price  of  such  lands.  (5)  To  vote  for  a  repeal  of  the 
duty  on  salt.  (6)  To  support  in  good  faith  the  leading  measures  of  the 
present  administration  {Tenn.  Sen.  Jcmr.,  1839-40,  77-79;  Scott,  Memoir 
of  Hugh  Lawsoii  White,  370). 

2s  White  to  Jacobs,  September  5,  1839  (Scott,  Memoir  of  Hugh  Lawson 
White,  371). 

29  Lewis  P.  Eoberts  to  Polk,  Nov.  11,  1839,  Folk  Papers.  Eoberts 
doubtless  exaggerated  in  reporting  that  White  "characterized  the  -whole 
of  the  V.  B.  party  as  gamblers  and  blacklegs ' '  and  accused  Van  Buren  of 
pocketing  the  money  which  the  people  had  lost  from  a  derangement  of 
currency. 


168  JAMES  K.  POLK 

had  instructed  the  Senators  to  support  the  President 's  measures, 
and  expressed  the  belief  that  Foster  would  resign  and  White 
obey  the  instructions.  Grundy,  he  said,  would  be  the  best  man 
to  succeed  Foster ;  he  therefore  urged  the  President  to  give  up 
his  Attorney-General  for  the  good  of  the  cause. ^'^ 

Foster  promptly  resigned  on  November  15,  thus  leaving  one 
seat  in  the  Senate  at  the  immediate  disposal  of  the  Democrats. 
Catron,  Avho  was  holding  court  in  Louisville,  believed  that  "White, 
too.  would  soon  be  forced  to  resign.  Tennessee,  he  wrote,  must 
be  held  loyal  to  the  administration,  and  the  best  way  of  insuring 
this  was  to  make  Polk  the  candidate  for  Vice-President.^^ 

The  legislature  by  a  party  vote  chose  Grundy  to  fill  Foster's 
unexpired  term.  As  soon  as  the  news  reached  Washington,  how- 
ever, one  of  his  friends,  H.  C.  Williams,  pointed  out  to  him  that 
he  was  not  eligible  for  the  office.^"  The  constitution  required  that 
a  Senator,  at  the  time  of  his  election,  must  be  a  local  resident, 
and  it  was  thought  that  Grundy  was  not  such  a  resident  so  long 
as  he  remained  in  the  cabinet.  He  therefore  resigned  his  seat  in 
the  Senate,  and  the  technicality  was  obviated  by  his  reelection 
after  his  return  to  Tennessee. ^^ 

On  receiving  his  instructions  from  the  legislature.  White 
decided  that  instead  of  resigning  at  once  he  would  wait  until 
some  question  had  been  presented  which  would  compel  him  either 
to  vote  contrary  to  his  principles  or  to  violate  his  instructions. 
The  Democrats,  therefore,  hastened  to  bring  forward  an  obnox- 
ious measure.  On  January  13,  1840,  Silas  Wright  called  up  the 
sub-treasury  bill  and  thereby  forced  the  issue.  White  rose  and 
explained  to  the  Senate  the  embarrassment  of  his  position,  and 
then  read  the  letter  of  resignation  which  he  was  about  to  send 


30  Polk  to  Van  Buren,  Nov.  11,  1839,  Van  Buren  Papers. 

31  Catron  to  Polk,  Nov.  19,  (1839  ?),  Poll-  Papers. 

32  Williams  to  Polk,  Nov.  28,  1839,  "Most  strictly  confidential." 
On  December  1  Cave  Johnson  gave  a  similar  opinion,  and  said  that  Grundy 
■would  go  to  Nashville  to  look  after  the  matter  (Polk  Papers). 

^^Niles'  Ecgistcr,  Jan.  11,  1840. 


GOVEENOE   OF   TENNESSEE  169 

to  the  Tennessee  legislature.^*  Gnindy  and  others  had  expected 
from  the  persecuted  Senator  a  bitter  arraignment  of  the  admin- 
istration party.  They  had  come  prepared  to  answer  him,  but 
Grundy  himself  admitted  that  White's  letter  to  the  legislature 
had  been  "drawn  with  some  ability"  and  was  too  respectful  to 
call  for  a  reply.^" 

While  no  one  questioned  the  legal  right  of  a  state  to  instruct 
its  Senators,  it  was  generally  felt  that  the  legislature  had  used 
its  power  for  the  unworthy  purpose  of  punishing  White  and  gain- 
ing a  political  advantage  to  which  the  Democrats  were  not  en- 
titled. A  dinner  was  given  in  the  deposed  Senator's  honor  at 
which  all  of  the  prominent  Whigs  were  present.  His  public  career 
and  his  loyalty  to  principle  were  exalted  in  toasts  and  addresses 
made  by  Clay,  Preston,  and  many  others.^"  It  was  his  last  public 
appearance.  An  attack  of  pneumonia  before  his  departure  from 
Washington  and  the  fatigue  caused  by  the  journey  home  greatly 
impaired  his  vitality,  and  his  death  occured  on  April  10,  1840. 

White's  resignation  gave  the  choice  of  his  successor  to  the 
Democratic  majority  in  the  legislature.  As  the  judge  was  from 
East  Tennessee,  custom  required  that  his  successor  should  be  a 
resident  of  the  same  section  of  the  state.  The  legislature  selected 
Alexander  Anderson,  a  lawyer  of  fair  ability  but  a  man  without 
national  reputation. 

As  noted  above,  the  principal  recommendations  made  by 
Governor  Polk  in  his  message  dealt  with  banks  and  internal  im- 
provements. To  these  topics  the  legislature  gave  its  attention 
when  it  was  not  too  busily  engaged  with  practical  politics.  Like 
most  banks  in  the  Union  those  of  Tennessee  had  suspended  specie 
payments.  In  response  to  the  Governor's  suggestion  Yoakum,  on 
October  28,  1839,  presented  a  resolution  which,  if  adopted,  would 


3*  Both  explanation  and  letter  are  printed  in  Scott,  Memoir  of  Hugh 
Lawson  White,  375  ff. 

s5  Grundy  to  Polk,  Jan.  13,  18-40,  and  other  letters  on  the  same  sub- 
ject in  the  PoUc  Papers. 

36  An  account  of  this  dinner  is  given  in  Scott,  Memoir  of  Hugh  Laicson 
White,  395  ff. 


170  JAMES  K.  POLK 

compel  the  Bank  of  Tennessee  and  its  branches  forthwith  to 
resume  and  continue  specie  payments  on  all  notes  of  and  under 
ten  dollars.  Another  resolution  moved  by  Jennings,  an  opposi- 
tion member,  required  the  committee  on  banks  to  interrogate  the 
president  and  directors  of  this  bank  as  to  whether  financial  ac- 
commodations were  made  on  the  basis  of  political  sentiments.  On 
November  11,  Jennings  presented  a  bill  which  embodied  and 
made  more  explicit  the  ideas  included  in  his  resolution.  The  bill 
required  the  committee  on  banks  to  call  on  the  Bank  of  Tennessee 
for  the  following  items  of  information:  (1)  whether  the  choice  of 
officers  of  the  branch  banks  was  influenced  by  politics;  (2) 
whether  contracts  were  so  influenced;  and  (3)  whether  politics 
was  considered  in  making  loans.  Another  bill  w'as  proposed  by 
Wheeler  the  purpose  of  which  was  to  compel  all  banks  of  the 
state  to  resume  specie  payments  within  thirty  days  on  penalty  of 
forfeiture  of  their  charters.  On  January  15,  1840,  Jennings 
proposed  an  amendment  to  the  state  constitution  the  intent  of 
which  was  to  prevent  the  state  in  future  from  becoming  the  sole 
proprietor  of,  or  a  partner  in,  any  bank,  and  from  raising  money 
on  the  credit  of  the  state,  except  for  defense.^'' 

None  of  these  proposals  was  enacted  into  law.  The  Demo- 
crats easily  disposed  of  the  political  measures  of  their  opponents, 
but,  with  the  exception  of  a  few  minor  remedial  regulations,  they 
were  unable  to  carry  their  own.  Toward  the  close  of  the  session 
Laughlin  submitted  a  report  from  the  committee  which  had  been 
appointed  by  the  senate  to  investigate  the  banks.  It  stated  that 
no  evidence  of  politics  in  bank  transactions  had  been  discovered 
and  that  specie  payments  would,  in  the  opinion  of  the  banks,  be 
resumed  by  July  1,  1840.^*  This  belief,  however,  proved  to  be 
erroneous. 

In  response,  also,  to  suggestions  made  in  the  Governor's  mes- 
sage, the  legislature  undertook  to  modify  existing  laws  on  the 


37  Tenn.  Sen.  Jour.,  1839-40,  85-86,  109,  156-157,  407. 

38  Ihid.,  Appendix. 


GOVEENOB    OF   TENNESSEE  171 

subject  of  internal  improvements.  Yielding  to  a  popular  clamor 
for  state  aid,  the  legislature  under  Cannon's  administration  had 
made  it  obligatory  for  the  state  to  become  a  partner  in  all  im- 
provement ventures  regardless  of  the  nature  of  the  enterprise. 
Wholesale  extravagance  had  been  the  result ;  nevertheless  it  was 
not  an  easy  matter  to  eliminate  the  abuses  without  doing  injury 
to  those  who,  relying  on  continued  support  from  the  government, 
had  invested  capital  in  various  projects.''''  The  secretary  of 
state  reported  to  the  senate  that,  under  the  act  of  1836, 
$2,732,541%  had  been  subscribed  by  the  state  to  improvement 
enterprises,  and  under  the  act  of  1838,  $889,500  had  been  sub- 
scribed for  turnpikes  and  river  improvements,  $65,000  to  the 
Louisville,  Cincinnati,  and  Charleston  Rail  Road  Company,  and 
a  similar  amount  to  the  Hiawassee  Rail  Road  Company.^*' 

In  order  to  save  the  state  in  future  from  such  ruinous  expen- 
ditures, the  legislature  repealed  all  laws  which  had  required  the 
governor  to  subscribe  for  stock  in  improvement  corporations.  In 
the  repealing  act  provision  was  made  for  the  withdrawal,  so  far 
as  possible,  from  partnerships  already  formed.  By  another  act, 
passed  on  January  28,  1840,  the  legislature  recalled  $150,000 
in  state  bonds  which  had  been  placed  with  banks  to  be  sold  and 
the  proceeds  invested  in  stocks  of  improvement  companies.  This 
legislation  was  substantially  what  the  Governor  had  recommended, 
and,  although  there  was  no  remedy  for  the  waste  that  had  already 


39  In  responding  to  a  vote  of  thanks  at  the  close  of  the  session,  Speaker 
Coe,  of  the  Senate,  stated  very  clearly  the  difficulty  which  confronted  the 
legislature:  "In  1836  and  1838  laws  were  passed  for  the  encouragement 
of  Internal  Improvement  and  works  of  the  most  extensive  character  have 
been  commenced,  and  are  now  in  progress  of  erection.  If  we  continued 
to  advance  under  the  law  as  we  found  it,  many  saAv  in  it  the  germ  of  a  dis- 
ordered and  bankrupt  treasury,  and  a  people  loaded  Aovra  with  taxes,  levied 
to  pay  the  interest  on  an  onerous  State  debt — whilst  it  was  asserted  by 
others,  with  much  reason,  that  the  State  had  voluntarily  tendered  the  right 
hand  of  assistance  to  large  bodies  of  our  fellow  citizens,  and  had  invited 
enterprises,  having  for  their  object  the  cultivation  and  improvement  of  our 
common  country;  and  under  such  circumstances  the  sudden  withdrawal 
of  all  aid,  would  involve  individuals  in  private  ruin  and  consign  public 
works  to  dilapidation"  (ibid.,  545-546). 

40  Eeports  of  Luke  Lea,  secretary  of  state,  Oct.  25  and  Nov.  23,  Term. 
Sen.  Jour.,  1839-40,  74,  142. 


172  JAMES  K.  POLK 

occurred,  so  long  as  Polk  remained  in  the  governor's  chair  care 
was  taken  to  restrict  expenditures  and  to  reduce  the  state  debt. 

During  Polk's  first  year  as  governor  of  his  state,  the  people 
of  the  nation  were  engaged  in  the  whirlwind  Presidential  cam- 
paign of  1840 — the  first  and  most  boisterous  of  its  kind.  In 
every  state  in  the  Union  the  contest  was  waged  with  unpre- 
cedented fury,  and  especially  so  in  Tennessee.  Reason  and  logical 
argument  were  cast  to  the  winds,  while  noise  and  caricature 
became  the  order  of  the  day.  The  "stump  speech"  played  a  less 
important  part  than  usual ;  while  both  sides,  but  especially  the 
Whigs,  expended  their  energies  in  fantastic  processions.  The 
greater  the  din  of  deafening  and  discordant  noises,  the  more 
spectacular  or  grotesque  the  banners  and  other  devices  designed 
to  excite  the  emotions  of  the  crowd,  the  more  successful  was  the 
pageant  considered. 

For  sentimental  reasons,  as  well  as  for  the  importance  of  her 
electoral  votes,  the  contest  in  Tennessee  was  regarded  as  of 
national  significance.  Failure  to  redeem  "Old  Hickory's  state" 
was  thought  by  Democratic  politicians  to  be  nothing  short  of 
disgrace,  while  the  hope  of  thus  humiliating  their  opponents 
spurred  the  Whigs  to  untiring  effort.  But  the  Whigs  had  the 
advantage  from  the  outset.  The  rank  and  file  of  the  Democrats 
did  not  share  the  feeling  of  the  party  leaders;  they  could  not 
wax  enthusiastic  over  Van  Buren.  In  the  Whig  camp,  on  the 
contrary,  there  was  unity. 

In  1839,  as  soon  as  it  became  known  that  Polk  had  been  elected, 
prominent  Whigs  held  a  convention  in  Nashville  and  arranged 
for  the  appointment  of  local  committees  throughout  the  state. 
These  committees  were  effective  engines  of  agitation,  and  the 
Umo)i  promptly  denounced  them  as  "new  and  strange  fermenta- 
tions in  the  body  politic  to  be  put  down  by  all  lovers  of  peace 
and  social  order.  "^^  Clay  was  invited  to  visit  Tennessee  by  a 
delegation  sent  to  Kentucky  for  that  purpose  by  the  Nashville 


41  Phelan,  Hist,  of  Tcnn.,  384. 


GOTEBNOR   OF   TENNESSEE  173 

convention,  but,  the  sage  of  Ashland,  pleading  illness  and  press- 
ure of  private  business,  declined  to  make  a  definite  promise 
to  accept.^-  It  was  expected,  of  course,  that  the  legislature 
would  instruct  the  Whig  Senators  and  force  their  resignation, 
and  the  Banner  was  certain  that  such  a  course  would  be  of 
great  advantage  to  the  Whigs  in  the  Presidential  campaign. 
This  paper  urged  the  Senators  to  remain  in  office  until  forced 
to  resign.  In  such  an  event  their  names  were  to  head  the  Whig 
electoral  ticket,  and  the  state  was  to  be  "thoroughly  and  ably 
canvassed,  in  every  county  and  every  neighborhood  and  victory 
would  be  assured.""*^ 

The  national  convention  of  the  Whig  party  met  at  Harris- 
burg,  Pennsylvania,  on  December  4,  1839.  Due  to  prejudice 
against  national  conventions,  the  Whigs  of  Tennessee  refused  to 
send  delegates,  for  it  will  be  remembered  that  opposition  to  the 
convention  which  nominated  Van  Buren  was  a  chief  factor  in  the 
creation  of  the  ' '  White  Whig ' '  party.  As  their  hearts  were  set  on 
Clay,  they  were  disappointed,  and  at  first  somewhat  discouraged, 
when  Harrison  received  the  nomination.  They  soon  rallied, 
however,  and  throughout  the  campaign  their  loyalty  and  energy 
were  not  surpassed  by  the  Whigs  of  any  other  state.  Bell  was 
their  most  eloquent  speaker,  although  Foster,  who  canvassed  the 
entire  state,  w^as  more  successful  in  winning  votes.  In  this  cam- 
paign the  Whigs  appealed  more  to  the  eye  than  to  the  ear.  They 
relied  more  on  banners  and  processions  than  on  oratory  or  argu- 
ments. "The  fact  is,"  wrote  one  of  Polk's  Democratic  friends 
after  the  election,  "the  people  like  coonery  and  foolery  better 
than  good  argument."** 

The  great  event  of  the  campaign  was  the  Whig  convention 
held  in  Nashville  on  August  17,  1840;  Delegations  came  from 
surrounding  states,  each  joining  in  the  spectacular  procession 


i2NUes'  Register,  October  12,  1839, 

43  Nashville  Banner,  quoted  in  Niles'  Register,  September  7,  1839. 

4*  Isaac  Goladay  to  Polk,  November  9,  1840,  Polk  Papers. 


174  JAMES  K.  POLK 

and  each  bearing  aloft  banners  fantastically  decorated  and 
adorned  with  mottoes  designed  to  win  popular  applause.^^  The 
procession  wended  its  way  to  a  grove  in  the  outksirts  of  the  city, 
where  the  multitude  was  entertained  by  speeches  made  by  prom- 
inent Whigs  of  Tennessee  and  other  states.  Foster,  who  was 
chairman  of  the  meeting,  made  the  opening  address,  but  the  lion 
of  the  occasion  was  Clay  himself,  whose  personal  magnetism  and 
oratorical  flights  electrified  the  audience,  although  his  address 
was  rather  commonplace. 

The  Democrats  were  not  so  well  organized  as  the  Whigs  and 
their  speakers  were  decidedly  inferior  to  those  of  their  opponents. 
Their  most  effective  debater,  Polk,  was  prevented  by  his  office 
from  actively  entering  into  the  canvass,  although  he  made  a 
few  speeches  in  favor  of  Van  Buren,  which  led  to  his  present- 
ment as  a  "nuisance"  by  the  grand  jury  of  Sevier  county,^®  and 
the  Whig  papers  circulated  the  story  that  the  Governor's  grand- 
^  father  had  been  a  Tory  during  the  Revolution.*'  Nicholson  met 
Bell  in  debate ;  Cave  Johnson,  A.  V.  Brown,  and  H.  L.  Turney  did 
their  utmost  to  stem  the  Whig  tide ;  Jackson  wrote  letters  in 
which  he  lauded  Van  Buren,  and  denounced  Harrison  as  a  Fed- 
eralist, but  the  people  would  not  listen  as  of  yore.  On  the  eve 
of  the  election  the  Democrats  tried  to  brand  Harrison  as  an  aboli- 
tionist. At  the  last  moment,  they  distributed  handbills  on  which 
they  had  printed  a  letter  which  Harrison  was  alleged  to  have 
written  to  Arthur  Tappan  declaring  himself  to  be  such.  But 
the  plot  had  been  discovered,  and  the  Whig  was  ready  with 
Harrison 's  denial  as  soon  as  the  handbills  appeared. 

Tennessee  refused  to  be  "redeemed";  the  vote  for  Harrison 
was  60,391,  while  Van  Buren  polled  but  48,289.  It  was  a  signal 
victory  for  the  Whigs,  and,  unlike  four  years  earlier,  it  could 
not  be  said  that  voters  had  supported  the  Whig  candidate  simply 
because  he  was  a  favorite  son  of  the  state.    Undoubtedly  one  of 


45  The  parade  is  described  in  some  detail  by  Phelan,  Eist.  of  Tcnn.,  387  ff. 

i<i  Ibid. 

47  Edwin  Polk  to  Polk,  August  27,  1840,  Folic  Papers. 


GOV  ESN  OB   OF   TENNESSEE  175 

Polk's  correspondents  was  right  in  saying**  that  many  Democrats 
had  refrained  from  voting  because  they  "could  not  be  rallied  to 
Van  Buren, ' '  and  that  the  Democratic  loss  was  much  greater  than 
the  Whig  gain.  Still,  any  hopes  built  on  such  calculations  were 
illusive,  for  in  national  politics  the  state  was  irretrievably  lost  to 
the  Democrats. 

Not  realizing  the  real  strength  of  the  Whigs,  the  leading 
Democrats,  almost  before  the  smoke  of  battle  had  lifted,  began 
to  formulate  plans  for  winning  the  next  state  election.  First 
of  all,  Harrison  and  his  administration  must  be  vigorously 
assailed,  regardless  of  the  course  he  might  pursue.  The  difficulty 
of  finding  anything  of  sufficient  importance  to  attack  caused 
them  no  little  anxiety.  A.  0.  P.  Nicholson  put  the  case  frankly 
in  a  letter  to  Polk,  written  before  it  had  been  definitely  ascer- 
tained that  Harrison  had  been  elected.  The  Democrats,  he  said, 
must 

keep  up  a  raking  fire  upon  the  whole  of  Harrison 's  inconsistent  and  imbecile 
history.  It  is  unfortunate  for  us  that  Harrison's  administration  (if  elected) 
will  not  be  developed  before  our  August  elections,  but  still  enough  will 
probably  have  transpired  to  present  available  points  of  attack. 49 

And  yet  the  politicians  who  uttered  such  sentiments  claimed  to 
be  followers  of  Jefferson,  one  of  whose  cardinal  principles  was 
"absolute  acquiescence  in  the  decisions  of  the  majority."^** 

Although  the  Democrats  were  hopeful  and  even  confident, 
the  Whig  victory  of  1840  made  them  realize  that  Polk's  defeat  in 
1841  was  within  the  realms  of  possibility.  When,  therefore,  in 
December,  1840,  it  was  reported  in  Washington  that  Grundy 
could  not  live,  the  Democratic  members  of  Congress  from  Tenn- 
essee counselled  together  and  decided  that  Polk  ought  to  succeed 
him  as  Senator  from  his  state.    In  a  letter  to  Polk,^^  Hopkins  L. 


4s  Samuel  P.  Walker  to  Polk,  November  4,  1840,  Folic  Papers. 

49  Nicholson  to  Polk,  November  6,  1840,  Polk  Papers.     Other  letters  to 
Polk  also  expressed  regret  that  there  would  probably  be  little  to  attack. 

50  See  Jefferson 's  first  inaugural  address. 

51  Turney  to  Polk,  December  21,  1840.     On  the  same  day  A.  V.  Brown 
wrote  a  letter  of  similar  purport.     Both  in  Polh  Papers. 


176  JAMES  E.   POLK 

Turney  pointed  out  to  the  Governor  that  his  reelection  was  doubt- 
ful and,  even  if  such  were  not  the  case,  he  would  stand  a  better 
chance  of  promotion  if  elected  Senator.  Both  Cave  Johnson 
and  A.  Y.  Brown,  he  said,  concurred  in  this  view.  Before  this 
letter  had  reached  its  destination,  however,  Polk  had  appointed 
Nicholson  to  succeed  Grundy,  whose  death  had  occurred  on  the 
nineteenth  of  the  month.  So  gratified  was  Nicholson  by  his 
appointment  that,  on  his  arrival  in  Washington,  he  saw  visions 
of  his  benefactor's  certain  elevation  to  the  Presidential  chair. 
After  telling  the  Governor  of  his  popularity  in  Washington  and 
of  the  anxiety  for  his  reelection,  he  added :  "I  shall  be  disap- 
pointed if  your  success  in  this  contest  does  not  lead  on  certainly 
to  your  elevation  to  the  Presidency. '  '^^ 

While  the  politicians  on  either  side  were  speculating  on  the 
probability  of  Harrison's  calling  an  extra  session  of  Congress, 
considerable  excitement  was  caused  in  Nashville  by  the  shooting 
of  J.  George  Harris,  editor  of  the  Union,  by  Robert  C.  Foster, 
a  son  of  the  deposed  Senator.  Harris  quickly  recovered,  but  the 
affair  furnished  Democrats  with  something  to  denounce  while 
they  were  awaiting  further  political  developments. 

In  case  Harrison,  after  his  inauguration,  should  call  Congress 
together  in  extra  session,  Tennessee  would  have  no  representa- 
tion in  the  House^^  unless  the  Governor  should  see  fit  to  call  a 
special  election.  Anderson,  who  had  been  chosen  to  fill  Foster's 
unexpired  term,  would  cease  to  be  Senator  on  March  4,  and  the 
official  term  of  Nicholson,  who  was  serving  on  the  governor's 
appointment,  would  be  automatically  terminated  should  Polk 
decide  to  call  an  extra  session  of  the  legislature.  Should  no 
extra  session  be  called,  Nicliolson  would  continue  in  office  until 
the  regular  session  which  would  open  in  October,  1841.  As  the 
probability  of  a  called  session  of  Congress  increased,  the  Demo- 
crats differed  as  to  whether  it  would  be  wiser  to  convene  the 


52  Nicholson  to  Polk,  Jan.  33,  38-41,  ihid. 

53  The  terms  of  present  members  would  expire  on  March  4  and  a  regular 
election  would  not  be  held  until  autumn. 


GOVEBNOB   OF   TENNESSEE  177 

legislature  and  attempt  to  elect  two  Senators,  or  to  be  contented 
with  one  Senator,  Nicholson,  leaving  the  other  seat  vacant. 

When  sounded  on  the  subject,  Polk  expressed  himself  as 
opposed  to  convening  the  legislature.  He  gave,  as  his  reasons, 
economy,  and  the  fear  that  the  "Whigs  would  make  political 
capital  of  such  a  procedure.  On  the  other  hand,  Jackson,  who 
had  lost  none  of  his  political  zeal,  strongly  favored  an  extra  ses- 
sion in  order  that  two  Senators  might  be  chosen  and  instructed 
as  to  how  they  should  cast  their  votes.  "If  it  can  be  done  with 
propriety, ' '  he  advised  Governor  Polk, 

if  tliere  is  a  called  session  of  congress,  the  Legislature  should  be  convened  to 
give  us  a  full  representation  in  the  Senate;  and  to  instruct  our  senators  & 
request  our  representatives  to  vote  against  a  high  Tariff,  a  distribution  of 
the  Public  Funds,  against  a  national  Bank  of  any  kind,  or  deposits  in  the 
State  banks,  and  against  a  repeal  of  the  sub-treasury  act,  and,  altho  last 
not  least,  to  pass  a  law  to  compell  our  Batiks  to  resume  specie  payments  or 
wind  up.f'-i 

From  Washington,  Anderson  urged  the  necessity  of  a  full  repre- 
sentation in  the  Senate.^^  Turney  seconded  this  appeal  and 
once  more  tried  to  induce  the  Governor  to  become  a  candidate. 
Polk,  he  said,  could  do  much  good  in  the  Senate,  for  since 
Grundy's  death  there  was  no  one  able  to  cope  wdth  the  Whigs. 
On  this  same  subject  Polk  received  what  appears  to  be  his  first 
letter  from  Andrew  Johnson.^*^  In  it  Johnson  advises  the  Gov- 
ernor to  convene  the  legislature  for  the  purpose  of  electing  mem- 
bers of  Congress  whose  terms,  unless  he  is  ' '  rong, ' '  expire  on  the 
fourth  of  March. 

While  Nicholson  was  in  Washington,  still  worrying  for  fear 
there  would  be  little  in  the  Harrison  administration  to  assail,^^ 


54  Jackson  to  Polk,  Feb.  8,  1841,  Polk  Papers. 

55  Anderson  to  Polk,  Feb.  17,  1841,  ibid. 

56  At  least  it  is  the  first  letter  from  Johnson  in  the  Polk  collection.  It 
seems  that  Polk  had  written  to  Johnson,  stating  that  either  he  or  Blair 
must  run  for  Congress.  Johnson  declined  to  become  a  candidate  (Johnson 
to  Polk,  March  4,  1841,  Polk  Papers). 

5"  "I  do  not  calculate  that  we  will  be  able  to  make  any  capital  out  of 
the  Inaugural;  but  the  Cabinet  Avill  be  enough  for  our  purposes,  if  Ave  use 


178  JAMES   K.  POLK 

the  much-reviled  administration  of  Van  Buren  passed  into  his- 
tory."^  Ignoring  his  critics,  the  "littk^  magician"  remained 
unperturbed  and  courteous  to  the  end.  When  his  successor 
arrived  in  Washington,  an  invitation  to  dine  was  extended  by 
Van  Buren  and  accepted  by  Harrison,  and  the  Nashville  Union 
marvelled  that  Harrison  could  take  "vermacilla  soup  from  those 
horrible  gold  spoons!"^''  The  Whig  newspapers  never  tired  of 
contrasting  the  democratic  simplicity  and  generous  hospitality"" 
of  Harrison  with  the  royalistic  pomp  and  cold  exclusiveness  of 
Van  Buren.  It  was  unkind  of  the  Whigs  thus  to  purloin  from 
their  opponents  the  very  arguments — almost  the  exact  phrases — 
which  had  done  such  effective  service  in  winning  popular  support 
for  General  Jackson.  Such  utter  disregard  for  the  proprietary 
rights  of  others  fully  justified  J.  George  Harris  in  trying  to 
render  harmless  the  stolen  implements  of  war.     Shortly  after 


it  with  skill. "  It  is  rumored,  he  said,  ' '  that  Webster  will  be  Secretary 
of  State;  Granger,  Post-Master-General;  Ewing,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury; 
Bell,  Secretary  of  War;  Preston,  Secretary  of  the  Navy;  and  Crittenden 
Attorney-General.  What  think  you  now  of  the  Cabinet!  I  think  you 
may  set  it  down  as  settled  that  we  are  to  have  an  anti-war  fed.  for 
Secretary  of  State,  an  abolition  fed.  for  Post-Master-General,  a  uni- 
form fed.  for  the  Treasury,  a  gag-bill  Clay  fed.  for  Atty.  Gen.,  a  gag- 
bill-no  party- White  Whig  fed.  for  the  War,  and  a  Nullification  fed.  for  the 
Nav)^  Will  not  this  open  the  eyes  of  Tennesseans!  If  not,  then  may  we 
surrender  at  discretion"  (Nicholson  to  Polk,  Feb.  12,  1841,  Folk  Papers). 
Jis"  Tomorrow  night,  at  twelve  o'clock,"  said  the  Madisonian,  "the 
administration  of  Martin  Van  Buren  terminates.  Tliat  administration,  acci- 
dental in  its  beginning,  and  unfortunate  and  profitless  in  its  career,  will 
then  have  gone,  with  all  its  powers,  its  prerogatives,  its  follies,  its  malign 
influence,  and  with  Avhatever  streak  of  virtue  may  have  been  possibly 
mingled  in  its  texture,  to  control  us,  to  agitate  us,  to  injure  us,  no  more. 
Four  years  it  has  lived,  and  its  principal  achievement  has  been  the  passage 
of  the  sub-Treasury,  by  trampling  wath  contempt  upon  the  broad  seal  of 
a  sovereign  State.  What  good  it  has  done,  we  are  unable  to  point  out. 
What  harm  it  has  accomplished,  we  may  possibly  conceive  of,  by  consider- 
ing the  present  condition  of  the  Treasury,  of  our  foreign  relations,  of  our 
Navy,  of  the  Army  and  the  defences,  of  the  Post  Office,  and  of  the  public 
morals,  and  the  condition  of  the  peoi)le.  But  Ave  congratulate  the  country 
that  it  has  at  last  come  to  an  end.  It  is  gone"  (The  Madisonifni,  March 
3,  1841). 

59  Union,  March  4,  1841. 

00  Under  the  heading  "Hospitality  at  the  White  House"  an  article  in 
the  New  Haven  Palladium  said:  "He  [Harrison]  keeps  his  house  open 
to  all  comers.  .  .  .     The  servants  at  the  White  House  find  more  difficulty 


GOVE  EN  on   OF   TENNESSEE  179 

his  inauguration,  the  President  had  directed  Webster  to  issue  a 
most  wholesome  order  stating  that  any  interference  in  elections, 
state  or  federal,  by  federal  officers,  would  be  regarded  as  cause 
for  removal.  The  i:)lain  farmer  of  the  Whigs  was  promptly 
branded  by  Harris  as  a  usurper  of  royal  powers  and  a  violator 
of  the  rights  of  states,  for  "the  Autocrat  of  all  the  Kussias  never 
issued  an  Ukase  more  potent. '  '^^  But  before  these  unjust  charges 
against  the  President  had  been  put  in  type,  the  career  of  the 
"autocrat"  had  been  cut  short,  and  the  same  issue  of  the  paper 
which  contained  them  chronicled,  also,  the  news  of  Harrison's 
death. 

As  Polk's  campaign  for  reelection  began  as  soon  as  his  com- 
petitor had  been  nominated  on  March  5,  1841,  the  incidents  of 
the  remainder  of  his  gubernatorial  term  will  be  treated  in  the 
succeeding  chapter,  which  deals  primarily  with  that  spirited 
political  contest  and  with  the  transfer  of  Tennessee  to  the  Whigs. 


in  ailapting  tliemselves  to  the  change  of  Administration  than  any  other 
officeholders.  He  breaks  in  on  all  the  elegant  aristocratic  usages  of  the 
jjalace,  and  plays  the  mischief  with  that  systematic  courtly  etiquette  which 
with  the  Sub-Treasury  constituted  the  two  great  radical  reforms  of  the 
late  President.  He  gets  up  at  sunrise,  like  a  plain  farmer  as  he  is,  and 
wants  his  breakfast  within  an  hour  after,  (the  vulgar  man!) — and  eats 
with  an  appetite  of  a  common  day  laborer.  He  gave  one  of  his  servants 
a  regular  '  blowing  up '  the  other  day,  for  leaving  a  visitor  dripping  wet 
and  muddy  in  a  cold  '  ante-chamber, '  because  the  President  was  at  break- 
fast and  could  not  be  disturbed,  and  because  the  carpet  Avould  be  injured 
by  the  muddy  feet  of  one  Avho  came  on  foot!  The  President  brought  the 
visitor  into  the  breakfast  parlor,  and  insisted  on  making  him  comfortable 
at  the  fire  at  once.  At  all  these  things  the  demooracy  are  much  shocked, 
and  look  aghast  at  this  desecration  of  the  'palace!  '  "  Quoted  in  Nashville 
Banner,  April  5,  1841. 

61  Harris  quoted  from  the  Evening  Post:  "this  document  has  added 
the  last  insult  that  can  be  given  to  a  free  and  independent  people,  and 
will  be  held  up  to  popular  execration  by  every  man  who  is  not  disposed  to 
yield  his  neck  to  the  yoke  of  party,  or  who  is  not  a  base  and  degraded 
slave.  It  is  so  insolent  in  spirit  and  dictation,  breathes  an  air  so  vile  and 
debasing,  that  it  is  difficult  to  speak  of  it  without  subjecting  one  's  self  to 
an  unwonted  excitement"  (Nashville  Unions,  April  12,  18-tl). 


CHAPTER  X 

DEFEATED  BY  JONES  IN  1841 

From  the  day  of  their  defeat  in  1839  the  Whigs  of  Tennessee 
had  been  marshalling  their  forces  for  the  next  gubernatorial  con- 
test, and  the  great  national  victory  of  1840  gave  them  reason 
to  hope  for  success.  It  had  also,  by  example,  indicated  the  type 
of  campaign  that  would  be  most  likely  to  win  that  success.  Can- 
non's  main  weakness  as  a  candidate  had  been  his  inability  to 
adjust  himself  to  the  guerrilla  variety  of  campaign  by  which 
many  a  less  brilliant  politician  had  endeared  himself  to  the  peo- 
ple. Capable  but  painfully  serious.  Cannon  was  a  shining  mark 
for  the  shafts  of  wit  and  ridicule  which  Polk  had  hurled  with 
unerring  aim  whenever  they  had  met  in  joint  discussion.  On 
the  contrary,  Polk  had  demonstrated  his  adaptability  to  a  degree 
that  surprised  his  closest  friends.  Distinguished  for  his  dignified 
and  learned  discussions  in  the  national  House  of  Representatives, 
Polk  had,  in  1839,  discomfited  his  rival  and  won  the  people  by  a 
most  skilful  use  of  mimicry  and  sarcasm.  The  Whigs  were  there- 
fore familiar  with  the  campaign  methods  of  the  Governor  as 
well  as  the  predilections  of  the  people,  and  the  convention  which 
assembled  at  Murfreesborough  on  March  5,  1841,  displayed  polit- 
ical wisdom  by  nominating  the  one  man  in  the  state  who  was 
thought  to  be  capable  of  "beating  the  governor  at  his  own  game." 
This  man  was  Major  James  C.  Jones/  a  "horny-handed"  farmer 
from  Wilson  County,  who  had  represented  his  county  in  the 
legislature,  served  as  a  Presidential  elector,  and  acquired  a  local 
reputation  as  an  effective  "stump  speaker."  Tall  and  ungainly 
in  appearance,  Jones  possessed  many  of  those  grotesque  personal 


1  Jackson  declined  to  call  Jones,  major,  ''for  he  never  ^vas  a  corporal" 
(Jackson  to  Polk,  March  20,  18-41,  Po/A:  Papers). 


DEFEATED  BY  JONES  IN  1841  181 

qualities  which  had  made  John  Randolph  famous.  Even  the 
sobriquet  "Lean  Jimni}',"  with  which  his  admiring  friends  had 
christened  him,  served  as  a  valuable  asset  in  a  contest  so  closely 
following  the  "great  whirlwind  campaign"  of  1840.  Realizing 
that,  in  knowledge  and  debating  powers,  he  was  no  match  for  his 
adversary,  Jones  resorted  to  hectoring  tactics  and  relied  more 
on  amusing  than  on  convincing  his  audience.  Nevertheless  he 
was  a  man  of  considerable  ability,  and  he  displayed  a  fair  knowl- 
edge of  the  political  issues  of  the  day.  In  spite  of  the  picture 
drawn  by  Phelan  and  others,  there  was  a  serious  side  to  the  cam- 
paign of  1841.  Jones  did  not  devote  all  of  his  time  to  "coonery 
and  foolery, ' '  but  at  times  displayed  alertness  and  skill  as  a 
debater. 

As  in  1839  the  canvass  dealt  principally  with  national  issues. 
In  his  "Address  to  the  People,"  Polk  stated  that  his  views  on 
national  questions  had  been  given  in  detail  in  his  address  of 
1839,  and  that  nothing  had  since  occurred  to  alter  them.  He 
had,  he  said,  been  forced  to  begin  the  campaign  early  because  of 
the  untiring  efforts  of  the  Whigs  to  defeat  hira.- 

Each  side  accused  the  other  of  being  Federalists,  and  Har- 
rison's "autocratic"  order  against  interference  in  elections,  and 
Van  Buren's  regal  splendor,  were  offered  as  evidence  to  prove 
the  opposing  contentions.  The  death  of  Judge  White  nearly  a 
year  before  did  not  prevent  his  name  from  being  dragged  into 
the  contest.  Jackson,  in  exhorting  Polk  to  answer  the  "false- 
hoods" of  Bell  and  Foster  regarding  Van  Buren's  extravagance 
in  furnishing  the  executive  mansion,  provided  him  with  a  state- 
ment that  it  was  Bell's  disappointment  at  not  being  made  a 
member  of  Jackson's  cabinet,  on  White's  recommendation,  that 
had  caused  Bell  to  desert  the  party  and  to  bring  White  out  for 


2  "From  the  moment  of  my  election  in  1839,  it  had  been  manifestly  an 
object  of  no  minor  importance  with  my  leading  political  opponents  in  the 
State,  to  prostrate  and  destroy  me.  Their  attacks  -were  constant.  Their 
presses  kept  up  an  incessant  war  upon  me.  No  calumny  or  misrepresenta- 
tion of  my  political  opinions  and  course  had  been  too  gross  to  fill  their 
columns"   (Nashville  Union,  March  29,  1841). 


182  JAMES  K.  POLK 

the  Presidency.''  A  friend  in  Albany*  furnished  Polk  with  sev- 
eral letters  written  by  Granger,  the  Postmaster-General  which 
Avere  to  be  used  for  the  purpose  of  proving  him  to  be  an  Aboli- 
tionist. Jones  and  other  Whigs  tried  to  counteract  the  effect  pro- 
duced by  these  by  asserting  that  Polk's  grandfather  had  been 
a  Tory. 

Early  in  March  Jones  published  a  list  of  his  speaking  appoint- 
ments. He  opened  the  campaign  at  Murfreesborough,  where  he 
boasted  that  he  could  tell  a  greater  number  of  anecdotes  than  the 
Governor  himself."  He  promptly  accepted  an  invitation  from 
Polk  to  meet  in  joint  debate  whenever  possible,"  and  they  met 
for  the  first  time  at  Murfreesborough  on  the  twenty-seventh  of 
March. 

Polk  opened  the  discussion  with  a  spirited  attack  upon  the 
Harrison  administration.  He  denounced  Granger  as  an  Aboli- 
tionist, and  Webster  as  a  Federalist  who,  in  1835,  had  been  so 
unpatriotic  as  to  declare  that  he  would  not  support  a  certain  bill 
to  appropriate  money  for  defense  "though  the  enemy  were  batter- 
ing down  the  walls  of  the  Capitol. ' '  Unfortunately  for  himself, 
Polk  tried,  as  he  had  done  in  the  canvass  with  Cannon,  to  weaken 
his  opponent  by  making  him  an  object  of  ridicule.  Among  other 
shafts  of  sarcasm,  he  said  that  his  friend  Jones  was  a  "promising 
young  man,"  but  "as  for  his  being  Governor,  that's  all  a 
notion."^  As  soon  as  Jones  took  the  platform,  he  referred 
repeatedly  to  Polk  as  "my  venerable  competitor."  This  he  con- 
tinued to  do  whenever  they  met  in  debate,  much  to  the  amuse- 
ment of  the  audience,  for  Polk  at  that  time  was  only  forty-six 
years  of  age. 

Before  the  candidates  met  again,  Governor  Polk  issued  a 
public  statement  in  which  he  gave  his  reasons  for  not  convening 


3  Jackson  to  Polk,  March  20,  1841,  Folic  Papcrfs. 

4E.  Crowell  to  Polk,  March  19,  1841,  ibid. 

5  Yoakum  to  Polk,  March  15,  1841,  ibid. 

oPolk  to  Jones,  MarcJi  15;  Jones  to  Polk,  March  18,  1841,  ibid. 

7  Nashville   Union,  March  29,   1841. 


DEFEATED  BY  JONES  IN  1841  183 

the  legislature  in  extra  session  so  that  Senators  miglit  be  chosen 
in  time  for  Harrison's  called  session  of  Congress.  He  had  already 
called  a  special  election  for  the  purpose  of  choosing  members  of 
the  House  of  Representatives.  In  declining  to  convene  tiie  legis- 
lature, Polk,  as  we  have  already  noted,  disregarded  the  wishes, 
not  only  of  General  Jackson,  but  of  nearly  all  of  tlie  leading 
Democrats  of  the  state.  It  was  thoroughly  characteristic  of 
Polk  to  follow  his  own  judgment  rather  than  the  wishes  of  his 
friends,  even  of  "Old  Hickory,"  and  yet  he  was  often  charged 
with  being  a  \veak  tool  of  General  Jackson. 

The  main  reasons  assigned  in  his  public  statement  for  not 
convening  the  legislature  were  unnecessary  expense  and  the 
impropriety  of  taking  advantage  of  an  accident  to  strengthen  his 
own  party  in  the  federal  Senate.  The  members  elected  to  the 
legislature  in  1839  had  not,  he  said,  been  chosen  with  the  selec- 
tion of  Senators  in  view,  and  "my  opinion  is  that  the  frank,  fair, 
and  honest  course,  is  to  leave  the  choice  open  for  the  decision 
of  the  people  at  the  next  August  election."  Harrison,  he  said, 
had  given  him  an  opportunity  to  disregard  the  popular  will,  for 
it  is 

certain  that  if  I  had  availed  myself  of  them  that  the  present  General 
Assembly,  if  convened,  Avould  choose  two  Democratic  Senators.  If,  how- 
ever, the  President  under  the  influence  and  control  of  inflamed  partisans, 
maddened  with  their  late  success  .  .  .  has  committ«d  a  capital  political 
blunder,  it  is  no  reason  vi'hj  I  should  commit  one  also. 

He  denounced  the  President  for  unnecessarily  convening  Con- 
gress, for,  as  there  was  plenty  of  money  in  the  Treasury,  the  call 
must  have  been  made  for  purely  political  reasons.* 


s  ' '  Large  and  extravagant  promises  which  can  never  be  redeemed  had 
been  made  to  the  people,  and  it  was  doubtless  deemed  to  be  necessary  to 
do  something,  or  to  appear  to  do  something  to  keep  up  the  public  expecta- 
tion, and  thereby  possibly  to  operate  upon  the  elections  which  are  to  take 
place  in  States  during  the  present  yeai-.  .  .  .  They  probably  fear  to  let 
the  public  mind  sober  down  to  a  state  of  calm  reflection,  le.st  perad venture 
they  may  not  succeed  in  their  favorite  measures  of  Federal  policy,  at  the 
next  regular  session  of  Congress. ' '  Printed  in  Nashville  Union,  April  1, 1841. 


184  JAMES  K.  FOLK 

Whether  the  Goveruor  was  influenced  solely  by  a  spirit  of 
fairness,  no  one  but  himself  could  know,  but,  whatever  his  motives 
were,  he  received  no  thanks  from  the  Whigs  for  his  magnanimity. 
The  Banner  bitterly  assailed  him  for  impugning  the  motives  of 
the  President,  and  for  praising  himself.  It  pronounced  his  action 
hypocritical  and  declared  that  his  forbearance  had  been  due  to 
a  knowledge  that  the  legislature  would  not  dare  to  choose  two 
Democrats  in  the  face  of  the  late  election,  and  to  fear  that  an 
attempt  to  make  such  a  choice  would  injure  his  own  prospects 
of  reelection."  At  a  debate  held  at  Lebanon  shortly  after  the 
publication  of  Polk's  statement,  Jones  won  applause  by  remind- 
ing the  Governor  that  his  solicitude  for  the  popular  will  had  not 
prevented  him  from  appointing  Nicholson  Senator  after  the  peo- 
ple had  repudiated  him  (Nicholson)  by  refusing  to  make  him  a 
Presidential  elector.  The  Whig  paper  of  the  town  commended 
Polk's  wit  and  added  that  "he  makes  as  much  of  it  with  his  face 
as  with  his  tongue.  "^°  Most  effective  of  all  were  his  impersona- 
tions of  Bailie  Peyton,  the  chief  feature  of  which  was  what  the 
Whigs  called  ' '  Polk 's  horrible  grin. ' ' 

The  candidates  visited  the  principal  towns  of  the  state.  From 
the  press  notices,  one  would  be  led  to  believe  that  their  time  was 
occupied  almost  entirely  with  the  relation  of  humorous  anec- 
dotes and  the  coining  of  witty  remarks.  Nevertheless,  their 
printed  speeches  show  that  a  serious  discussion  of  political  issues 
was  by  no  means  omitted.  Polk,  especially,  displayed  great  power 
as  a  debater.     He  thoroughly  understood  the  questions  under 


9  Nashville  Banner,  April  5,  18-il.  The  most  abusive  of  all  papers  was 
Parson  Brownlow 's  Jonesborough  Whig.  In  an  article  addressed  to  Polk, 
the  editor  said  that  the  Governor  while  "under  the  influence  of  liquor  or 
opium,  being  half  drunlc"  had  denounced  the  Whig  for  criticising  his 
ancestors  who  had  been  lying  in  the  tomb  for  forty  years.  Brownlow 
reminded  Polk  that  he  had  criticized  both  White  and  Harrison  since  their 
death,  and  then  continued:  "You  canting,  cringing  hypocrito — you  dema- 
gogue and  time-serving  politician,  you  advise  mankind  as  to  prudence  and 
moderation!"  Undated  in  Folk  Fapers. 

10  Lebanon  Chronicle,  quoted  by  Nashville  Banner,  April  5,  18-11. 


DEFEATED  BT  JONES  IN   1841  185 

discussion,  and  few  could  excel  him  in  clear  and  logical  presenta- 
tion. Had  his  opponent  attempted  to  meet  the  Governor's  argu- 
ments by  a  frank  and  fair  discussion,  he  would  have  been  easily 
vanquished,  for  his  knowledge  of  political  questions  was  super- 
tieial  and  limited.  To  Jones,  however,  ignorance  of  the  subject 
was  never  a  cause  of  embarrassment.  By  substituting  bold  asser- 
tion for  knowledge,  he  was  able  to  discuss  any  topic  without  hesi- 
tation, and,  so  far  as  his  audience  was  concerned,  he  had  dis- 
])roved  every  contention  of  his  adversary.  It  availed  Polk  little 
to  demolish  these  assertions  by  clear  presentation  of  historical 
data.  Like  Douglas  in  his  debates  with  Lincoln,  Jones  would 
calmly  reiterate  his  assertions,  no  matter  how  often  they  had  been 
refuted,  or  else  he  would  divert  the  attention  of  the  audience  by 
a  humorous  anecdote  or  by  a  dissertation  on  the  beauties  of  coon 
fur.  In  either  case  the  effect  of  Polk's  argument  was  entirely 
lost,  while  his  adversary  succeeded  in  winning  the  vociferous 
applause  of  an  uncritical  audience.  No  wonder  that  a  Democrat 
who  heard  their  debate  at  Somerville  exclaimed  in  disgust :  ' '  Mr. 
Polk  made  an  ass  of  himself,  talking  sense  to  a  lot  of  d — d  fools, 
and  urged  that  the  Governor  "ought  to  get  a  stick  and  crack 
Jones's  skull,  and  end  this  tomfoolery ! "^^ 

One  of  Jones's  most  exasperating  characteristics  was  his 
never-failing  good  humor.  As  he  had  declined  to  become  em- 
barrassed by  the  most  complete  demonstration  of  his  ignorance, 
so,  also,  he  refused  to  be  angered  by  sarcasm  or  ridicule.  At 
times  Polk  tried  to  crush  his  opponent  by  belittling  his  abilities 
and  by  holding  him  up  to  scorn.  In  reply,  Jones  would  solicit 
the  compassion  of  the  hearers  for  his  "irascible  but  venerable 
competitor."  Polk  said  that  he  had  tried  to  discuss  questions  of 
state  in  a  serious  manner  and  that  his  opponent  had  wisely  made 
jest  of  things  which  were  beyond  his  comprehension.  When  he 
asserted  that  Jones  was  better  suited  to  the  circus  ring  than  to 
the  Governor's  chair,  Jones  good-naturedly  admitted  that  they 


11  Phelan,  Hist,  of  Tenn.,  403. 


186  JAMES  K.  POLK 

Avould  both  do  well  in  the  ring — himself  as  a  clown,  and  the 
Governor  as  "the  little  fellow  that  is  dressed  up  in  a  red  cap 
and  jacket  and  who  rides  around  on  a  poney.  "^-  The  Governor 
wearied  of  the  travesty,  and  would  gladly  have  abandoned  joint 
meetings,  but,  as  they  had  been  undertaken  upon  his  own  invi- 
tation, there  was  no  way  of  breaking  gracefully  with  his  tritiing 
antagonist. 

The  debates  attracted  attention  in  all  parts  of  the  state,  and 
everywhere  large  audiences  greeted  the  speakers.  Much  import- 
ance was  attached  to  their  meeting  at  Nashville,  which  was  not 
only  the  capital,  but  the  political  headquarters  of  the  state. 
Here,  on  May  19,  they  were  greeted  by  a  large  and  enthusiastic 
concourse  of  people,  and  each  candidate  according  to  agreement 
spoke  for  two  and  one-half  hours.  "Polk,"  as  Phelan  has  well 
said,  "made  a  speech  that  would  have  swept  from  the  stump  any 
man  who  had  ever  been  Governor  of  Tennessee  before  him,  aud 
any  man  who  was  Governor  after  Jones  until  Andrew  Johnson 
came  forward.  "^^  It  was  a  forceful  and  logical  presentation 
of  the  issues,  replete  with  historical  data  and  spiced  with  humor- 
ous illustrations.  Jones's  address  was  a.  compound  of  sophistry 
and  nonsense.  Intead  of  answering  Polk's  arguments  he  con- 
structed innumerable  ' '  men  of  straw ' '  and  then  demolished  them 
to  the  entire  satisfaction  of  his  audience.  He  misquoted  and 
distorted  everything  that  the  Governor  had  said,  after  which 
he  amused  the  crowd  by  poking  fun  at  his  opponent  and  by  re- 
lating preposterous  stories.^*  No  man  of  Polk's  training  and 
dignity  could  cope  with  such  politcal  bushwhacking. 

Had  the  people  been  really  interested  in  political  issues, 
Jones  could  not  have  commanded  a  lu^aring.     But  since  1840, 


i2  7brd.,  402.  1^  Ibid.,  404. 

14  The  Union  of  May  24  thus  describod  him:  "Maj.  Jones  is  a  floater; 
amusing  at  tinu's,  but  superficial  as  a  bubble.  He  drifts  along  on  the  sur- 
faeo  of  today  and  plays  with  the  uppermost  passions  and  prejudices  of  his 
heaiers ;  trifles  with  important  matters  and  converts  important  matters  into 
trifles.  ...  In  a  word,  he  is  (juite  possible  as  an  electioneer  for  his  party — 
good  of  the  kind,  but  the  quality  is  none  of  the  best." 


DEFEATED  BY  JONES  IN  1841  187 

the  Whigs  had  ahandoned  serious  discussion  and  had  staked 
everything  on  an  appeal  to  the  emotions.  For  this  reason  Polk's 
training  and  success  were  used  to  prejudice  the  people  against 
him.  Not  only  had  his  grandfather  been  a  Tory,  but  the  Gov- 
ernor himself  was  said  to  be  an  aristocrat,  who,  at  heart,  held 
the  people  in  contempt.  Ignorance,  uncouth  appearance,  and 
slovenly  dress  were  regarded  as  attributes  of  honest  statesman- 
ship, and  Jones  always  emi)hasized  the  fact  that  he  had  followed 
the  plow.^^  The  Governor,  however,  deserved  little  sympathy 
on  account  of  these  misrepresentations,  for  with  similar  weapons 
he  had  aided  in  "putting  down"  the  able  and  u'pright  John 
Quincy  Adams. 

Up  to  the  close  of  the  canvass,  no  one  could  predict,  with 
any  degree  of  certainty,  what  the  result  would  be.  The  Whigs 
did  most  of  the  shouting.  They  made  extravagant  claims,  but 
many  Democrats  could  not  believe  that  a  majority  of  the  people 
would  be  willing  to  cast  out  a  man  of  Polk's  ability  and  repu- 
tation and  put  in  his  place  a  man  whose  sole  claim  to  fame  rested 
on  a  grotesque  personal  appearance  and  low-grade  wit.  The 
Democrats,  however,  had  overrated  the  people's  sense  of  pro- 
priety, and  on  that  account  were  doomed  to  disappointment. 
At  the  election,  which  was  held  on  August  5,  Polk  was  defeated 
by  a  majority  of  over  three  thousand  votes,  but  the  Vnion  con- 
gratulated the  Democrats  on  their  "signal  triumph  of  prin- 
ciple in  sweeping  away  ten  thousand  of  the  last  year's  ma- 
jority."^" It  was  generally  conceded,  even  by  the  Whigs,  that 
no  other  man  in  the  party  could  have  polled  so  many  votes,  and 
instead  of  losing  prestige,  Polk  was  credited  by  his  party  with 


15  The  Knoxville  Register  in  contrasting  the  candidates  aaid  that  Jones 
was  "free,  manly,  undisguised,  plain,  and  earrjnng  conviction  with  every 
sentence."  Polk  was  "hidden,  dissembling,  artful,  shrinking  and  hypo- 
critical in  the  extreme"  Quoted  in  Nashville  Banner,  August  2,  1841. 

16  "Never,"  said  Harris,  the  editor,  "did  Gov.  Polk  win  for  himself 
more  laurels  than  he  has  won  in  this  contest.  The  Democracy  of  the  whole 
Union  will  appreciate  his  Herculean  efforts  at  the  expense  of  health  to 
maintain  the  principles  that  he  has  uniformly  supported,  the  principles 
of  Jefferson  and  Jackson"   (Nashville  Union,  August  12,  1841). 


188  JAMES  K.  POLK 

having  won  a  great  personal  victory.  In  a  letter  to  Van  Buren, 
General  Jackson  rejoiced  in  the  reduction  of  the  Whig  majority 
and  said  that  ' '  Gov.  Polk  deserves  the  thanks  of  the  Democracy 
of  the  whole  union,  he  fought  the  battle  well  and  fought  it  alone, 
I  may  say."  Strange  to  say,  Jackson  commended  rather  than 
criticized  Polk  for  having  disregarded  his  advice  about  conven- 
ing the  legislature.  He  pointed  out  to  Van  Buren  that,  had  the 
legislature  been  called,  two  Democratic  Senators  would  have  been 
elected,  but  "the  Governor  threw  aside  policy,  and  adopted  the 
real  republican  creed — that  a  majority  have  the  right  to  rule."^' 

In  the  legislature  which  was  elected  with  Jones,  the  Whigs 
had  a  majority  of  three  in  the  lower  house.  In  the  senate  the 
Democrats  still  had  a  majority  of  one.  But  one  of  their  number, 
Samuel  Turney,  was  regarded  as  rather  independent  in  politics, 
and,  when  the  time  came  for  him  to  take  a  definite  stand  with 
his  colleagues,  he  proved  to  be  weak  and  vacillating.  Nominally, 
however,  the  Democrats  had  a  majority  of  one  and  thereby  pos- 
sessed the  power  to  block  any  measure  of  the  lower  house  that 
required  their  separate  approval.  But  on  any  question  which 
required  the  joint  vote  of  the  two  houses  the  Whigs,  by  virtue 
of  their  majority  of  three  in  the  lower  house,  were  in  a  position 
to  outvote  their  opponents. 

In  Tennessee,  politics  had  precedence  over  legislation.  There- 
fore the  defeated  party  began  at  once  to  devise  ways  and  means 
of  preventing  their  opponents  from  filling  the  two  vacant  seats 
in  the  United  States  Senate.  The  term  for  which  Judge  White 
had  been  elected,  and  which  since  his  resignation  had  been  filled 
by  Alexander  Anderson,  had  expired.  The  other  vacancy  had 
been  caused  by  the  death  of  Senator  Grundy,  and  had  been 
filled  temporarily  by  A.  0.  P.  Nicholson,  by  virtue  of  the  Gov- 
ernor's recess  appointment. 

Following  the  election,  Polk  received  many  letters,  the  main 
object  of  which  was  to  congratulate  him  for  having  reduced  the 


17  Jackson  to  Van  Bureu,  Aug.  16,  1841,  Van  Buren  Papers. 


DEFEATED  BY  JONES  IN  1841  189 

Whig  majority.  In  these  letters  several  of  his  friends  expressed 
the  opinion  that  the  Democrats  ought  to  demand  the  privilege 
of  choosing  one  of  the  Senators,  and  that  Polk  himself  should 
be  the  man.  Among  others,  Hopkins  L.  Turney  advised  such  a 
course.  He  assured  Polk,  also,  that  his  brother,  Samuel  Turney, 
would  vote  with  the  Democrats.^* 

When  plotting  to  force  the  Whigs  to  concede  them  one  Sen- 
ator, Democratic  leaders  tried  to  ease  their  conscience  by  assert- 
ing that  in  1840  Whig  members  of  the  legislature  had  threatened, 
in  the  event  of  Polk's  convening  the  legislature,  to  remain  at 
home  and  thus  prevent  an  election  of  Senators.  It  was  further 
alleged  that  these  threats  had  been  made  on  the  advice  of  Henry 
Clay.^^  It  was  said,  also,  that,  during  the  recent  campaign, 
when  it  was  believed  that  the  Democrats  would  elect  a  majority 
of  the  legislature,  Jones  had  boasted  that  the  Whig  members 
would  not  permit  the  Democrats  to  hold  an  election  for  Sen- 
ators.-°  Polk  at  first  was  noncommittal,  but  he  soon  made  it 
known  that  he  was  not  a  candidate  for  the  office.  The  reason 
which  he  gave  for  not  permitting  the  use  of  his  name  was  that 
he  would  not  accept  any  office  except  one  conferred  upon  him  by 
a  vote  of  the  people.-^  With  Polk  out  of  the  race,  the  politicians 
turned  their  attention  to  other  candidates,  but  nothing  could  be 
done,  of  course,  until  the  meeting  of  the  legislature  and  the 
inauguration  of  a  new  governor. 


18  Turney  to  Polk,  Washington,  Aug.  24,  1841  {Folk  Fapers).  Laugh- 
lin,  Huntsman,  and  others  assured  Polk  that  some  of  the  Whigs  had  agreed 
to  vote  for  him. 

19  H.  L.  Turney  to  Polk,  Jan.  2,  1842,  ihid. 

20  Alex.  Anderson  to  Polk,  Aug.  20,  1841,  ibid.  Anderson  urged  that 
the  Democrats  should  now  practice  this  plan  upon  those  who  had  invented  it. 

21  Geo.  W.  Smith,  of  Memphis,  advised  Polk  not  to  permit  the  use  of  his 
name  for  two  reasons:  (1)  possibility  of  defeat  and  loss  of  prestige;  (2) 
it  would  lend  color  to  the  Whig  charge  that  lie  had  never  cared  for  the 
governorship,  and  had  wished  it  only  as  a  stepping-stone  to  a  higher  office. 
(Smith  to  Polk,  Sept.  2,  1841,  ibid.)  Polk  may  have  been  influenced  by  con- 
siderations of  this  kind. 


190  JAMES  E.  POLK 

As  soon  as  the  legislature  had  convened.  Polk,  on  October  1, 
submitted  his  final  message  as  governor."  It  was  a  long  docu- 
ment and  filled  with  detailed  information  on  various  topics,  but 
mainly  on  banks  and  internal  improvements.  For  a  man  who 
had  only  a  week  longer  to  serve,  Polk  was  surprisingly  free  with 
advice  and  suggestions  for  the  future.  He  expressed  satisfaction 
with  the  degree  of  prosperity  which  had  been  enjoyed  by  the 
people  during  the  last  two  years,  and  he  attributed  it  to  cor- 
rective legislation  and  the  consequent  elimination  of  extravagant 
speculation.  He  regretted  that  banks  had  not  been  compelled 
by  law  to  resume  specie  payments,  and  once  more  recommended 
the  enactment  of  such  a  law.  "There  is,"  said  he,  "no  sound 
principle  of  ethics  or  of  public  policy  which  should  exempt  Banks 
from  the  moral  and  legal  obligations  which  rest  upon  individuals 
to  pay  their  debts."  He  pointed  out  that  the  bank  note  circu- 
lation amounted  to  about  three  million  dollars  and  that  the  aver- 
age rate  of  depreciation  was  eight  and  one-half  per  cent ;  tliis 
unnecessary  burden  was  borne  by  the  people,  while  the  banks 
were  prosperous — even  paying  dividends.  He  reported  that  the 
law  recently  enacted  which  provided  for  "the  reduction  of  the 
State  debt"  had  enabled  him  to  recall  and  to  cancel  fifteen  hun- 
dred state  bonds  of  one  thousand  dollars  each.  The  outstanding 
internal  improvement  bonds  amounted  to  $1,816,916.66%,  while, 
so  far,  only  one  company  had  paid  a  dividend  to  the  state — the 
small  sum  of  $1620.  The  currency,  he  said,  had  been  much  im- 
proved by  the  law  which  prohibited  the  emission  of  notes  under 
ten  dollars ;  as  a  further  remedy  for  financial  ills,  he  recom- 
mended that  commercial  houses  and  improvement  companies 
should  be  prevented  by  law  from  issuing  checks  designed  to 
circulate  as  money.  The  internal  improvement  board  had,  in  his 
opinion,  accomplished  much  good  by  requiring  various  companies 
to  reduce  their  stock  and  to  conduct  their  affairs  in  a  more 
economical  manner.     Among  other  things  the  retiring  Governor 


22  Tenn.  Sen.  Jour.,  1841-42,  22-42, 


DEFEATED  BY  JONES  IN  1841  191 

recommendeil  that  improvements  be  made  in  hospitals  for  tlie 
insane,  that  sexes  be  segregated  in  penitentiaries,  and  that  the 
governor  be  given  power  to  commute  the  death  penalty  to  life 
imprisonment.-^'  His  recommendations  were  salutary  and  sensi- 
ble. Some  of  his  suggestions  indicated  grave  need  for  improve- 
ment in  social  conditions. 

One  paragraph  in  the  Governor's  message  is  especially  inter- 
esting, for  in  it  Polk  expressed  his  views  on  the  slavery  question, 
a  subject  which  he  usually  avoided.  He  infonncd  the  legislature 
that  he  had,  during  the  past  year,  received  two  communications 
from  friends  of  negroes  convened  in  London,  on  June  12  to  20, 
1840,  in  which  they  had  asked  for  the  abolition  of  slavery  and 
the  slave  trade.  Viewing  these  communications  ' '  as  an  imperti- 
nent and  mischievous  attempt  on  the  part  of  foreigners  to  inter- 
fere with  one  of  the  domestic  institutions  of  the  State,"  he  had 
declined  to  enter  into  any  correspondence  with  this  convention. 
Doubtless  he  was  governed  more  by  his  belief  in  state  rights  than 
by  an  interest  in  the  institution  of  slavery  itself;  still,  he  was 
ready  to  resent  outside  interference  with  the  "peculiar  insti- 
tution." 

On  October  14  Polk  delivered  his  valedictory,  and  on  the 
same  day  James  C.  Jones  was  inaugurated  as  his  successor.-* 
"While  it  is  true  that  Polk's  interests  were  national  rather  than 
local,  yet  the  state  was  indebted  to  him  for  causing  the  enact- 
ment of  beneficial  laws.  Under  his  leadership  the  state  had  been 
freed  from  a  ruinous  internal  improvement  policy,  and  he  had 
done  much  to  check  currency  inflation  and  to  reduce  the  debt  of 
the  state.  His  reform  measures  were  all  in  the  line  of  sound 
statesmanship,  and,  if  we  may  judge  from  the  suggestions  made 
in  his  final  message,  the  people  might  have  profited  by  continuing 
him  in  office. 


23  He  could  now  pardon  only. 

24  Tenn.  Sen.  Jour.,  1841-42,  78. 


CHAPTER  XI 

POLK  IN  RETIREMENT 

On  October  14,  1841,  James  C.  Jones  became  governor  of 
Tennessee,  and  on  the  nineteenth  his  first  message  was  sent  to 
the  legislature.^  His  recommendations  differed  little  from  those 
which  had  already  been  submitted  by  his  predecessor,-  and,  also 
like  Polk,  he  attributed  most  of  the  distress  of  the  people  to  their 
own  fault — to  buying  more  than  they  could  reasonably  hope  to 
pay  for.  In  one  respect  only  did  Jones  differ  radically  from  the 
former  governor.  The  crisis  in  the  monetary  affairs  of  the  coun- 
try, he  said,  had  been  produced  by  the  destruction  of  the  Bank 
of  the  United  States.  Such  a  statement  was  naturally  to  be  ex- 
pected, for  some  part  of  a  Whig  governor's  message  must  needs 
indicate  the  change  of  administration,  and  the  bank  was  a  sub- 
ject of  general  interest. 

As  usual  the  legislature  was  far  more  interested  in  ' '  practical 
politics"  than  in  the  less  sportive  business  of  lawmaking.  The 
paramount  question  was  the  election  of  United  States  Senators, 
but  first  of  all,  the  opinions  of  both  legislators  and  constituents 
must  be  molded  so  as  to  accord  with  those  of  the  leaders.  The 
Democrats  were  most  active  in  the  senate,  for  in  this  branch  they 
had,  counting  Samuel  Turney,  a  majority  of  one.  The  leaders 
in  the  senate  were  Samuel  H.  Laughlin,  former  editor  of  the 
Union,  and  Andrew  Johnson,  who,  at  the  recent  election,  had 
been  promoted  to  the  upper  house.  Johnson  had  ability  and 
force,  but  Laughlin  excelled  him  in  political  cunning  and  effec- 
tiveness as  a  manipulator.     In  the  Polk-Bell  contest,  Johnson 


1  Tenn.  Sen.  Jour.,  1841-42,  116-125. 

2  Jones  was  accused  of  having  borrowed  from  Polk's  inaugural  of  1839, 
and  to  prove  the  claim  the  Vniun  published  the  two  addresses  in  parallel 
columns  (Laughlin,  Diary,  Oct.  21,  1843). 


POLK  IN  RETIEEMENT  193 

had  supported  the  latter.  Laughlin  liad  ever  been  subservient 
and  therefore  enjoyed  the  entire  eonfidenee  of  Polk  and  other 
prominent  Democrats. 

On  October  18,  Laughlin,  as  chairman  of  the  committee  on 
federal  relations,  submitted  a  series  of  eight  resolutions  to  which 
four  more  were  added  on  the  fifth  of  November.^  The  preamble 
recited  the  Virginia  and  Kentucky  Resolutions  of  1798  and  de- 
clared that  many  of  the  laws  enacted  by  Congress  at  the  late 
extra  session  violated  the  spirit  of  the  Constitution  quite  as  much 
as  did  the  laws  against  which  those  historic  resolutions  had  pro- 
tested. The  first  resolution  reaffirmed  those  of  1798  and  asserted 
that  they  were  "universally  true  at  all  times  and  especially 
applicable  to  the  present  crisis  and  state  of  affairs."  The  suc- 
ceeding seven  resolutions  condemned  the  convening  of  Congress 
by  Harrison  and,  also,  the  various  measures*  proposed  or  enacted 
by  the  Whigs  at  that  session.  This  indictment  of  the  Whigs 
was  intended  to  prepare  public  opinion  for  the  items  which  were 
to  follow — the  four  resolutions  that  were  added  on  the  fifth  of 
November.  The  first  of  these,  the  ninth  of  the  entire  list,  de- 
clared that  the  legislature  had  full  power  to  instruct  Senators 
chosen  to  represent  the  state  in  Congress,  and  that  it  was  the 
duty  of  these  officials  to  obey  or  resign.  The  second  asserted 
that  it  was  the  duty  of  candidates  for  legislative  offices  to  give 
explicit  answers  to  queries  made  by  citizens  or  members  of  the 
legislature  concerning  their  views  on  public  questions.  The  third 
affirmed  the  right  of  the  people  to  instruct  members  of  the  legis- 
lature. The  fourth  formally  instructed  the  Senators  (not  yet 
chosen)  and  requested  the  Representatives  from  Tennessee  to 
conform  their  votes  to  the  opinions  expressed  by  the  foregoing 
resolutions. 

The  last  four  resolutions  displayed  far  more  shrewdness  than 
principle.      On   their   face  they   contained   nothing   which   any 


3  The  resolutions  may  be  found  in  Tenth.  Sen.  Jour,  under  the  dates  given. 

4  For   example,   the   "bankrupt   bill'   and   the  tariff,   distribution,   and 
bank  bills. 


194  JAMES  K.   POLK 

advocate  of  representative  government  could  very  well  decline  to 
support.  But  they  were  designed,  as  every  one  knew,  for  the 
purpose  of  harassing  the  Whig  candidates  with  embarrassing 
interrogations  and  for  rendering  them  ineligible  should  they  de- 
cline to  answer.  By  asserting  the  right  of  the  people  to  instruct 
their  representatives  in  the  legislature,  the  Democrats  hoped 
to  hold  in  line  their  own  members  who  might  be  inclined  to 
follow  their  individual  judgments.  Their  party  had  nothing  to 
lose  by  obstructive  tactics,  and,  by  blocking  their  opponents  at 
every  turn,  they  might  worry  the  Whigs  into  conceding  one  seat 
in  the  Senate. 

Ephraim  H.  Foster  and  Spencer  Jarnagin  were  selected  as 
the  Whig  candidates  and  on  November  16  the  lower  house  sent 
to  the  senate  a  resolution  urging  the  immediate  election  of  two 
United  States  Senators  lest  delay  ' '  may  lead  to  bargain,  intrigue, 
and  management,  to  the  detriment  of  the  public  interest."  As 
soon  as  the  resolution  was  read  in  the  senate,  Andrew  Johnson 
moved  to  amend  by  making  it  read  that  delay  "may  lead  to 
bargain,  intrigue,  and  management,  to  the  great  detriment  of 
E.  H.  Foster  and  Spencer  Jarnagin,  and  thereby  promote  and 
advance  the  public  interest,  by  keeping  them  out  of  power  for 
the  next  four  and  six  years.  "^  The  Democratic  majority  in  the 
senate  soon  came  to  be  called  "the  immortal  thirteen"  and  ex- 
cept for  an  occasional  desertion  by  Samuel  Turney  they  voted 
as  a  body  on  all  questions  of  party  politics. 

The  customary  method  of  electing  Senators  in  Tennessee  was 
^J  a  joint  "convention"  of  the  two  houses.  As  the  Whigs  had 
a  majority  of  three  in  the  lower  house  and  the  Democrats  a 
majority  of  but  one  in  the  senate,  it  was  obvious  that  if  the  usual 
method  were  to  be  followed  the  Whigs  would  outnumber  their 
rivals  in  the  convention.  The  Democrats  now  made  the  discovery 
that  the  usual  method  was  unconstitutional,  for,  as  they  alleged, 
the  constitution  of  the  state  required  that  each  house  should  vote 


•'''  Protests  against  the  amendment  were  made,  but  it  passed  the  senate 
by  a  vote  of  13  to  12  {Tenn.  Sen.  Jour.,  1841-42,  227,  232-233). 


POLK  IN  RETIREMENT  195 

separately  for  Senators.  For  their  own  purposes  it  was  au  im- 
portant discovery ;  by  no  other  method  could  they  hope  to  prevent 
an  election  until  the  Whigs  were  ready  to  compromise  on  choosing 
one  Senator  from  each  party. 

Up  to  November  22  the  Democrats  were  confident  of  their 
ability  to  prevent  an  election  unless  the  "Whigs  would  yield  to 
their  terms.  A  few  days  before,  Turney  had  introduced  a  reso- 
lution calling  for  an  election  by  convention,  but  he  had  subse- 
quently voted  with  the  Democrats  on  the  above-mentioned  John- 
son resolution.  On  the  twenty-second,  however,  Turney  caused 
consternation  in  Democratic  ranks  by  announcing  that  he  would 
call  up  and  support  his  resolution  in  favor  of  a  convention 
election."  According  to  William  H.  Polk,  Turney  had,  for  the 
last  two  weeks,  "been  shivering  in  the  wind,"  due  to  the  fact 
that  the  Whigs  had  "brought  every  influence  to  bear  on  him 
within  the  range  of  human  ingenuity."^  On  November  22 
Gardner  moved  to  amend  Turney 's  resolution  by  fixing  the  fol- 
lowing Saturday  as  the  date  on  which  the  Senate  would  vote 
separately  for  federal  Senators.  Turney  accepted  the  amend- 
ment, but  it  was  the  younger  Polk 's  opinion  that,  after  one  trial, 
Turney  would  revert  to  the  convention  plan.  The  Democrats 
offered  another  compromise  resolution  the  purport  of  which  was 
to  declare  elected  Hopkins  L.  Turney  and  Thomas  Brown,  a 
Whig  from  East  Tennessee.  It  was  hoped  that,  having  passed 
the  senate,  this  resolution  could  be  forced  through  the  lower 
house.^     On  the  twenty-third  Gardner  modified  his  amendment. 


6  "On  Saturday  last  the  '13'  were  safe  against  the  world,  and  the 
Whigs  considered  themselves  as  beaten.  Guess  then,  what  our  astonish- 
ment was,  when  coming  into  the  Senate  on  Monday  morning  [November  22], 
Sam  Turney  announcetl  that  he  had  changed  his  mind,  and  would  call  up 
and  vote  for  his  own  resolutions  to  bring  on  the  Senatorial  election  at  an 
early  day  on  joint  vote  in  Convention."  Turney  said  that  his  change  of 
mind  was  due  to  letters  from  his  constituents  (Laughlin  to  Polk,  November 
24,  1841,  Polk  Papers). 

7  W.  H.  Polk  to  J.  K.  Polk,  November,  22,  18-41,  ibid. 

8  ' '  My  own  impression  is,  tliat  if  the  resolution  passed  the  Senate,  as 
now  amended,  declaring  Turney  and  Brown  the  Senators  elect — we  can 
force  it  through  the  House,  by  lashing  the  doubtful  men  into  a  redemption 
of  their  former  pledges  ....  can  at  least  produce  a  tie"   (Idem). 


196  JAMES  K.  FOLK 

The  legislature  was  now  asked  to  choose  one  Senator  from  each 
party  on  the  ground  that  the  popular  vote  at  the  recent  election 
had  been  nearly  equally  divided.  Other  modifications  were  sug- 
gested, but  these,  as  well  as  Gardner's  resolution,  were  rejected. 
The  Democratic  majority  in  the  senate  succeeded  in  passing  a 
resolution  which  named  Hopkins  L.  Turney  as  Grundy's  suc- 
cessor, but,  on  December  1,  the  lower  house  refused  to  concur  in 
its  adoption.  On  the  same  day  Speaker  Samuel  Turney  joined 
the  Whigs  of  the  senate  in  making  an  agreement  with  the  lower 
house  to  meet  in  joint  convention  on  the  second  and  third  of 
December  for  the  purpose  of  electing  Senators.  It  was  under- 
stood that  each  of  those  days  would  be  devoted  to  filling  one  of 
the  vacancies. 

On  December  2,  therefore,  Speaker  Turney  and  the  twelve 
Whigs  proceeded,  according  to  agreement,  to  the  chamber  of  the 
lower  house  to  join  with  that  body  in  choosing  one  of  the  Sen- 
ators. The  other  twelve  Democratic  senators  declined  to  attend 
the  election.  When  summoned  by  the  doorkeeper,  they  sent 
written  notice  to  their  speaker  (Turney)  that  they  were  in  the 
senate  chamber,  ready  for  "constitutional  business."''  The  joint 
convention,  for  want  of  a  quorum,  was  forced  to  adjourn.  On 
the  morning  of  the  third  the  lower  house  again  notified  the 
senate  that  it  was  ready  to  receive  the  senators  and  to  proceed 
to  the  election  of  one  of  the  federal  Senators.  It  had  already 
been  arranged  to  hold  the  other  election  in  the  afternoon  and  for 
this  reason  Speaker  Turney  deemed  it  to  be  unnecessary  to  join 
the  house  in  convention  twice  in  one  day,  inasmuch  as  both  elec- 
tions could  be  held  during  the  same  half-day.  He  therefore 
voted  with  the  Democrats  in  declining  to  attend  the  forenoon 
session  of  the  convention.  This  vote  so  angered  the  Whig  sen- 
ators that  tliey  left  the  senate  chamber  in  a  body.  By  so  doing 
they  gave  a  distinct  advantage  to  the  Democrats,  who  now  ad- 
journed to  the  following  day,  thereby  nullifying  the  original 


9  Tenn.  Sen.  Jour.,  1841-42,  280. 


FOLK  IN  BETIBEMENT  197 

resolution  which  had  designated  December  2  and  3  as  the  days 
on  which  elections  by  convention  should  be  held. 

By  seceding  from  the  senate  the  Whigs  had  committed  the 
tactical  blunder  of  releasing  Turney  from  his  agreement.  He 
now  blamed  them  for  the  failure  to  elect  Senators,  and  once  more 
became  one  of  the  "immortal  thirteen."^"  Five  of  the  twelve 
Democratic  senators  submitted  a  written  statement  of  reasons 
Avhy  they  had  refused  to  participate  in  the  proposed  election. 
The  proposed  method  of  election,  they  asserted,  would  violate  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States,  w^hich  vests  the  election  of 
Senators  in  the  legislature  of  the  state — not  in  a  convention.  It 
w'ould  violate,  also,  the  state  constitution,  which  says  that  Sen- 
ators shall  be  chosen  by  the  concurrent  vote  of  the  two  houses 
"sitting  separately" — not  together.  Both  statements  were  un- 
true, and  besides,  the  convention  method  had  been  thoroughly 
established  by  custom,  and  up  to  this  time  its  validity  had  never 
been  questioned.  This  new-born  solicitude  for  constitutional 
limitations  was  simply  a  clever  bit  of  pettifogging. 

Before  any  attempt  to  elect  Senators  had  been  made,  two 
interesting  resolutions  for  dividing  the  state  were  offered  in  the 
senate.  The  first  was  introduced  by  Andrew  Johnson,  on  De- 
cember 7,  and  provided  that  a  joint  committee  of  the  two  houses 
should  be  appointed  to  consider  the  expediency  and  the  consti- 
tutionality of  ceding  East  Tennessee  to  the  United  States  so  that 
it  might  be  made  an  independent  commonwealth  and  called  the 
' '  State  of  Frankland. ' '  The  resolution  directed  Governor  Jones 
to  correspond  with  the  governors  of  Georgia,  North  Carolina, 
and  Virginia  with  a  view  to  procuring  portions  of  those  states 
for  inclusion  within  the  limits  of  "Frankland."  On  December 
15,  Gardner  offered  a  similar  resolution  which  provided  for  the 


10  Turney 's  explanation,  ihid.,  304-305.  On  December  13,  J.  Geo.  Harris 
informed  Polk  by  letter  that  there  was  no  prospect  of  an  election.  ' '  Thank 
God  and  the  immortal  thirteen  Epliraim's  [Foster]  fiddle  is  broke.  No 
more  will  its  dulcet  strains  minister  to  the  desponding  faculties  of  faction ' ' 
{Polk  Papers). 


198  JAMES  E.  POLE 

creation  of  the  state  of  "  Jacksoniana. "  It  was  to  include  the 
"Western  District"  of  Tennessee  and  portions  of  Kentucky  and 
Mississippi."  The  senate  rejected  Gardner's  proposal  by  a  vote 
of  eleven  to  fourteen.  Johnson's  resolution  passed  the  senate 
by  a  vote  of  seventeen  to  six  (January  18),  but  after  consider- 
able discussion  and  many  futile  attempts  to  amend,  this  too  was 
finally  rejected  by  the  lower  house. 

In  accordance  with  the  Laughlin  resolutions,^-  Democratic 
members  of  the  legislature  had  addressed  queries  to  all  senatorial 
candidates  concerning  their  views  on  public  questions.  Foster 
and  Jarnagin  treated  these  queries  with  silent  contempt.  Hop- 
kins L.  Turney,  the  Democratic  aspirant,  gave  satisfactory  an- 
swers as  a  matter  of  course,  and  so,  also,  did  Thomas  Brown,  a 
Whig  of  Roane  County,  East  Tennessee.  On  December  20, 
Laughlin  offered  in  the  senate  a  resolution  which  differed  little 
from  the  one  previously  submitted  by  Gardner.  Whereas,  in 
choosing  Senators,  the  popular  will  should  be  consulted,  so  read 
the  preamble,  and,  as  the  recent  election  had  shown  the  people 
to  be  about  equally  divided  in  politics,  and  as  neither  party  was 
able  to  choose  Senators  without  the  cooperation  of  the  other,  it 
was  therefore  resolved  that  Turney  and  Brown,  having  responded 
to  all  interrogatories,  be  declared  the  Senators  to  represent  the 
state  in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States.  Turney  was  to  fill  the 
unexpired  term  of  Grundy,  and  Brown  was  to  have  the  full  term 
of  six  years.^^  The  resolution  passed  the  senate  but  failed  in 
the  other  house,  and  that  body  once  more  invited  the  senate  to 
join  them  in  an  election  by  convention.  The  Whigs  of  both 
houses  refused  to  cooperate  with  the  Democrats  in  electing  a 


11  Tenn.  Sen.  Jour.,  1841-42,  288,  345. 

12  Those  which  he  had  introduced  on  Nov.  5,  relating  to  the  interrogation 
of  candidates  for  office.     See  above. 

13  Tenn.  Sen.  Jmtr.,  1841-42,  366-67.  ' '  Some  of  our  friends  here  are 
of  opinion — that  after  all  our  Senators  should  be  elected — if  the  Whigs 
can  be  brought  'to  elect  one  and  one'  "  (A.  V.  Brown  t«  Polk,  Washing- 
ton, Dec.  23,  1841,  Polk  Papers).  This  seems  to  indicate  that  the  Demo- 
crats had  counted  more  on  preventing  an  election  than  on  effecting  a 
compromise. 


POLK  IN  BETIBEMENT  199 

comptroller  and  a  treasurer  unless  the  Democrats  would  agree 
to  choose  Senators  by  a  joint  vote.  Of  this  refusal  the  Democrats 
tried  to  make  political  capital  ;^^  bj'  exploiting  it  they  endeavored 
to  divert  the  attention  of  the  people  away  from  their  own  ob- 
structive tactics. 

Polk  kept  in  close  touch  with  the  contest  that  was  being 
waged  at  Nashville  and  from  time  to  time  gave  directions  to  his 
political  friends.  He  was  one  of  the  first  to  doubt  the  loyalty  of 
his  old  friend  A.  0.  P.  Nicholson,  and  to  suspect  him  of  courting 
an  alliance  with  Foster  for  the  purpose  of  procuring  their  elec- 
tion to  the  Senate.^'  He  was  most  severe  in  his  denunciation  of 
Nicholson  and  predicted  that  he  would  follow  in  the  footsteps 
of  John  Bell.^'^  Hearing  that  some  of  Bell's  friends  had  made 
overtures  offering  to  settle  the  senatorial  deadlock  by  choosing 
Bell  and  some  Democrat,  Polk  stated  to  Senator  Maclin^^  that  it 
would  never  do  "to  elect  Bell  by  Democratic  votes.  It  would 
not  only  be  placing  him  in  a  position  to  do  mischief  but  it  would 
be  rewarding  his  apostacy."  He  had  heard  also,  he  said,  that 
similar  overtures  had  been  made  by  Foster's  friends.  "To  no 
man  in  the  State,"  he  continued,  "would  it  be  more  grating  than 
to  myself  to  be  driven  to  the  necessity  of  making  a  compromise 
by  which  he  might  obtain  a  seat  in  the  Senate,  and  yet  it  is  not 


14  "Our  Avhole  object  is,"  -vvTote  Wm.  H.  Polk,  Avho  Avas  a  member  of 
the  lower  house,  "to  place  them  [the  Wliigs]  in  the  position  of  refusing  to 
elect  State  officers,  necessary  and  essential  to  the  proper  administration  of 
our  State  Government,  because  we  prevent  them  from  placing  in  the  Senate 
men  who  stand  Mum"  (W.  H.  Polk  to  J.  K.  Polk,  Jan.  6,  18i2,  Polk 
Papers). 

15  In  answer  to  one  of  Polk's  letters,  J.  P.  Hardwick  wrote  from  Nash- 
ville that  ' '  I  have  no  doubt  a  great  effort  is  being  made  to  carry  out  an 
unholy  alliance  between  F.  &  N."    (Hardwick  to  Polk,  Jan.  16,  1842,  ibid.) 

16  "Every  day  convinces  me  more  and  more  that  he  [N]  is  now  travelling 
in  the  broad  road — that  John  Bell  travelled  for  several  years  before  Ms 
apostacy — Avhilst  he  was  making  loud  professions  of  his  adhesion  to  our 
principles.  We  all  know  where  John  Bell  now  is,  and  mark  what  I  now 
say  to  you,  that  five  years,  perhaps  not  one  will  pass — before  he  is  where 
Bell  now  is,  unless  it  shall  be  his  personal  interest  shall  make  him  seem 
otherwise.  I  am  not  mistaken"  (Polk  to  State  Senator  Sackfield  Maclin, 
Jan.  17,  1842,  Andrew  Johnson  Papers,  vol.  1). 

1-  Ibid. 


200  JAMES  K.  FOLK 

impossible  that  our  safety  as  a  party  in  the  State  might  require 
such  a  sacrifice.  "^^  Should  an  agreement  with  Foster  be  made, 
Polk  believed  that  the  Democrat  ought  to  be  chosen  from  East 
Tennessee ;  but  if  any  western  Democrat  was  to  be  selected,  it 
should  be  Hopkins  L.  Turney.  He  preferred  a  Whig  Senator 
to  Nicholson,  because  he  had  ' '  more  respect  for  an  open  opponent 
than  a  hypocritical  friend. "^^  Some  of  the  "immortal  thir- 
teen," however,  were  unwilling  to  accept  any  compromise  which 
did  not  eliminate  both  Foster  and  Bell. 

On  February  7,  the  last  day  of  the  session,  Laughlin,  prob- 
ably acting  under  instructions  from  Polk,  offered  a  new  reso- 
lution "in  the  spirit  of  harmony,  concession  and  compromise." 
This  resolution  authorized  the  Whig  members  of  the  legislature 
to  choose  a  Senator  from  any  of  the  three  divisions  of  the  state 
(east,  middle  or  west),  and  provided  that  the  Democrats  should 
then  select  a  Senator  from  one  of  the  other  divisions.  The  reso- 
lution passed  the  senate  by  a  strict  party  vote,  but  not  until  an 
amendment  had  been  added  which  required  that  both  Senators 
must  be  ' '  selected  from  men  who  have  not  been  in  public  life  for 
the  last  four  years."  Such  a  limitation  had  not  been  contem- 
plated by  either  Laughlin  or  Polk,  but  some  of  the  thirteen 
would  accept  nothing  less.  The  lower  house  would  not,  of  course, 
agree  to  the  resolution ;  all  hope  of  compromise  was  at  an  end ; 
and  the  legislature  adjourned  without  having  filled  either  va- 
cancy.    On  the  same  day  the  thirteen  had  the  satisfaction  of 


18  "It  would  be  a  hitter  pill,"  said  Polk,  "to  take  Mr.  F.  even  upon  a 
compromise,  and  yet  if  nothing  else  can  be  done  I  have  been  brought  very 
seriously  to  doubt,  whether  we  had  not  better  take  him  with  some  good  and 
true  Democrat  than  to  have  the  State  unrepresented  in  the  Senate  and  tlms 
raise  up  a  perplexing  troublesome  issue  of  Senators  or  no  Senators  in  the 
State,  which  may  and  probably  will  be  the  test  question  in  our  elections  in 
1843.  Before  you  can  compromise  at  all  with  him  or  any  other  Whig — 
they  must  jaeld  to  your  mode  of  elections  and  agree  to  obey  instructions. 
If  they  will  do  this  and  agree  to  give  us  a  Democratic  Senator  with  him — 
my  conviction  is,  that  it  is  the  course  of  safety  to  yield  to  it. ' ' 

19  Polk  to  James  Walker,  Jan.  17,  1842,  Polk  Papers.  Whether  well 
founded  or  not,  the  belief  in  Nicholson's  disloyalty  was  quite  general. 
H.  L.  Turney  wrote  from  Washington  to  Polk,  April  25,  1842:  "I  think 
A.  O.  P.  N.  has  put  his  foot  in  it.  Can  it  be  possible  that  he  can  longer 
deceive  the  democra-^y  of  Tennessee  "t" 


POLE  IN  EETIBEMENT  201 

rejecting  for  a  second  time  a  list  of  persons  whom  Governor 
Jones  had  nominated  to  be  directors  of  the  Bank  of  Tennessee, 
and  as  a  result,  the  Democratic  incumbents  retained  their  posi- 
tions. 

In  their  game  of  obstruction  the  Democrats  had  won  a  de- 
cided victory — much  greater  than  they  had  any  reasonable  hope 
to  expect.  Had  any  of  the  "immortal  thirteen"  failed  them, 
everything  would  have  been  lost,  and  more  than  once  Samuel 
Turney  had  threatened  to  desert  to  the  enemy.  By  bad  manage- 
ment, the  Whigs  had  failed  to  take  advantage  of  his  willingness 
to  cooperate  with  them,  while  the  Democrats  spared  no  effort  to 
hold  him  in  line.  The  tactics  employed  by  the  senate  to  attain 
its  ends  were  as  unscrupulous  as  they  were  successful.  The  aid 
given  by  Polk  and  Jackson  was  something  of  which  neither  man 
had  reason  to  be  proud,  but  politicians  are  seldom  overscrupulous 
when  party  interests  are  at  stake. 

Just  as  the  Democrats  were  rejoicing  over  their  success  in 
thwarting  the  Whigs,  their  own  party  suffered  a  real  loss  in  the 
retirement  of  J.  George  Harris  from  the  editorship  of  the 
Union.'°  He  had  taken  charge  of  the  paper  when  it  was  bank- 
rupt and  impotent,  and  under  his  management  it  had  become 
one  of  the  most  influential  papers  in  the  state.  His  style  was 
not  always  elegant  nor  his  assertions  true,  but  he  was  peculiarly 
fitted  to  perform  the  task  to  which  he  had  been  assigned.  After 
his  retirement  the  Union  rapidly  deteriorated,  until  Polk  and 
his  associates  had  to  take  its  rehabilitation  in  hand  during  the 
campaign  of  1843. 

After  the  adjournment  of  the  legislature,  the  thoughts  of 
politicians  turned  to  plans  for  the  future.  Although  it  was  an 
open  secret  that  Polk  would,  in  1843,  again  be  the  candidate  for 
governor,  both  he  and  his  friends  were  ever  on  the  alert  to  pro- 
mote his  prospects  for  the  Vice-Presidential  nomination  in  1844. 


20  In  the  issue  of  March  31  Harris  announced  that  he  was  going  to 
Europe  for  a  few  months  and  that  the  owners,  Hogau  and  Heiss,  wouhl 
conduct  the  paper  themselves. 


202  JAMES  E.   POLE 

The  more  apparent  it  became  that  Van  Buren  would  again  head 
the  Democratic  ticket,  the  more  necessary  it  seemed  to  be  to  find 
a  running  mate  that  would  be  acceptable  to  the  South  and  "West. 
IMaclin,  of  the  Tennessee  senate,  voiced  the  general  sentiment 
when  he  told  Polk  that  "Our  friends  intend  to  fight  the  battle 
with  you,  and  keep  Van  Buren  as  much  out  of  sight  as  possible." 
In  these  two  sections  of  the  Union,  influential  leaders  fully  ap- 
preciated Polk's  great  services  to  the  party  and  looked  with  favor 
upon  his  nomination  for  the  Vice-Presidency,  but,  as  Maclin 
frankly  told  him,  it  had  been  urged  that  he  was  not  well  known 
to  the  people  in  other,  parts  of  the  country.-^ 

Politicians  of  both  parties  attached  much  importance  to  Van 
Buren 's  visit  to  the  Hermitage  in  the  spring  of  1842.  Knowing 
Jackson's  warm  friendship  for  Polk,  the  Whigs  expected  and 
many  Tennesseans  hoped  that  the  visit  would  result  in  a  formal 
agreement  between  Van  Buren  and  Polk.  But,  despite  the  ef- 
forts of  Polk's  friends  in  his  behalf,  the  New  Yorker  remained 
noncommittal  to  the  point  of  exasperation--  and  left  Tennessee 
without  having  mentioned  to  Polk  the  subject  of  the  Vice-Presi- 
dency.-^ 

Although  Van  Buren  declined  to  take  any  part  in  promoting 
Polk's  candidacy  or  even  to  discuss  it,  and  even  though  his  in- 
different attitude  during  his  visit  had  still  further  alienated  the 
supporters  of  Polk,  yet  both  the  Whigs  and  the  Calhounites  were 


21  Maclin  to  Polk,  May  4,  1842,  Folk  Papers.  Maclin  had  just  returned 
from  Mississippi,  where  he  had  been  sounding  Polk's  praises  and  urging 
the  people  to  call  a  convention  for  the  purpose  of  nominating  Van  Buren 
and  Polk. 

22  "I  am  at  a  loss  to  know  what  to  say  to  you,  I  can  learn  nothing.  .  .  . 
Mr.  Van  Buren  seems  disposed  to  say  nothing  on  the  subject  we  spoke  of 
when  I  last  saw  you.  I  made  an  effort  througli  Donelson  again  this  evening 
but  it  was  all  Mum.  ...  It  may  be  that  he  Avill  say  to  you  what  he  Avill 
not  say  to  another  person.  Tlie  old  Genl  will  tell  hdm  before  leaving  th-c 
Hermitage,  to  have  a  conversation  with  you"  (Gen.  K.  Armstrong  to  Polk, 
May  4,  1842,  Polk  Papers). 

2'-i  Polk  himself  said  in  a  letter  that  during  Van  Buren 's  visit  neither 
liad  "mentioned  verbally  or  in  writing"  tlie  subject  wliicli  the  Whigs  say 
brought  him  to  Tennessee  (Polk  to  Elmore,  of  South  Carolina,  June  13, 
1842,  Polk  Papers). 


POLE  IN  RETIREMENT  203 

certain  that  an  agreement  between  the  two  candidates  had  been 
effected  and  that  one  of  its  objects  was  to  crush  Calhoun.-*  Van 
Buren  was  not  popular  in  Tennessee,  and  many  Democrats  felt 
that  Polk's  election  would  be  more  certain  if  some  other  than 
the  New  Yorker  could  be  nominated  for  President.-^  Cass  was 
most  frequently  mentioned  by  those  who  held  this  belief.  Others 
were  inclined  to  await  developments.  Benton,  like  Van  Buren, 
had  declined  to  commit  himself  in  Polk's  favor,  but  his  denunci- 
ation of  Richard  M.  Johnson  was  regarded  by  Tennesseans  in 
Washington  as  a  hopeful  sign.-**  Realizing  the  general  indiffer- 
ence toward  Van  Buren  in  southern  states,  friends  of  Callioun 
began  to  entertain  hopes  that  he  would  be  nominated  for  the 
Presidency  in  1844  r^  but,  believing,  as  they  did,  that  Polk  was 
in  agreement  with  Van  Buren,  they  did  not,  it  appears,  seek 
assistance  from  his  friends.  Then,  too,  the  adherents  of  the  great 
nullifier  could  hardly  hope  for  the  cooperation  of  a  man  who  was 
thought  to  be  under  the  dominating  influence  of  General  Jackson. 
"When  the  Tennessee  legislature  convened  in  the  autumn  of 
1842,  another  futile  attempt  was  made  to  fill  the  vacant  seats  in 
the  federal  Senate.  J.  George  Harris,  who  had  returned  to  Nash- 
ville, reported  to  Polk  that  Bell's  supporters  had  offered  to  make 
an  agreement  whereby  Bell  was  to  answer  the  queries  which  had 

24  "  It  is  thought, ' '  wrote  Dixon  H.  Lewis,  ' '  Van  has  effected  his  pur- 
pose with  Polk,"  while  according  to  Gentry,  of  Tennessee,  no  one  doubted 
that  Van  Buren  and  Polk  would  be  the  Democratic  candidates  (Lewis  to 
Richard  Cralle,  May  31,  and  June  10,  1842,  CraUe  Papers). 

25  "I  assure  vou,  sir,"  A\Tote  J.  P.  Hardwieke,  "there  is  a  disinclination 
to  take  up  Van' Buren  again.  I  have  taken  some  pains  to  arrive  at  tins 
conclusion  at  our  little  caucuses"  (Hardwieke  to  Polk,  Nov.  13,  1842, 
Polk  Papers). 

26  Cave  Johnson  to  Polk,  Jan.  29;  H.  L.  Turney  to  Polk,  Jan.  31,  1843, 
Polk  Papers. 

27  One  of  the  hopeful  was  Dufe  Green.  He  thought  that,  if  the  Van 
Burenites'  plan  of  an  early  nominating  convention  could  be  thwarted,  Cal- 
houn would  be  nominated.  *  "  It  has  now  naiTOwed  down, ' '  he  wrote,  "to  a 
choice  between  Calhoun  and  Van  Buren  and  the  demonstrations  are 
becoming  more  decided  for  Mr.  Calhoun  so  that,  in  my  opinion,  the  con- 
centration in  his  favor  will  become  so  apparent  as  public  opinion  develops 
that  the  convention  will  indeed  become  obsolete"  (Green  to  Cralle,  February 
8,  1843,  Letters  of  Duff  Green-  in  Library  of  Congress). 


204  JAMES  K.  FOLK 

been  ignored  by  Foster  and  Jaruagin.  Having  done  this,  he  was 
to  be  elected  as  one  of  the  Senators,  and  the  Democrats  were  to 
fill  the  other  vacancy  with  a  candidate  of  their  own  choice. 
Harris  was  in  favor  of  such  an  agreement  if  Polk  would  consent 
to  be  the  Democratic  Senator ;  Foster  would  be  killed,  politically, 
while  Bell  if  properly  instructed  would  be  less  powerful  than  at 
present.-^  Nothing,  of  course,  resulted  from  the  suggestion. 
Polk  had  already  declined  to  make  any  compromise  with  Bell, 
and  besides,  the  overtures  of  Bell's  friends  were  probably  made 
without  his  knowledge.  During  this  session  the  Democrats  made 
little  attempt  to  force  a  compromise,  but  simply  contented  them- 
selves with  blocking  the  Whigs  from  electing  their  candidates. 
Their  greatest  fear  seems  to  have  been  that  Nicholson,  by  some 
treacherous  agreement  with  the  Whigs,  would  attempt  to  pro- 
mote his  own  selfish  interests.-" 

Feeling  that  both  his  own  and  his  party's  interests  could  be 
best  served  by  defeating  Governor  Jones,  Polk  once  more  entered 
the  race.  The  campaign  was  opened  by  a  joint  debate  at  Spring- 
field, March  25,  1843.  Jones  scathingly  denounced  the  conduct 
of  the  "immortal  thirteen."  Polk  retorted  by  charging  that 
Jones  had  originated  the  idea  which  they  had  put  into  practice. 
The  Umon^°  published  letters  from  Whigs  Avho  claimed  to  have 
heard  Jones  boast  that,  in  case  the  Democrats  should  have  a  bare 
majority  on  joint  ballot,  the  Whigs  would  prevent  a  choice  of 
Senators  by  refusing  to  participate  in  the  election.  Throughout 
the  campaign  the  Union  defended  the  thirteen  for  preventing 
the  election  of  men  who  refused  to  be  bound  by  the  wishes  of 
their  constituents.  The  refusal  of  the  state  senate  to  confirm 
Jones's  list  of  bank  directors  was  purely  for  political  reasons. 
The  truth  was  reprehensible  enough,  but  on  the  stump  Jones 


28  Harris  to  Polk,  Dec.  11,  1842,  Polk  Papers. 

29  W.  H.  Polk  to  J.  K.  Polk,  February  14,  1843,  Polk  Papers.  Andrew 
Johnson,  fearinf!^  that  his  kno^\^l  friendship  for  Nicholson  might  be  mis- 
interpreted, wrote  to  Polk  that  "you  have  always  been  my  first  choice  for 
anything"  (Johnson  to  Polk,  February  20,  1843,  ibid.) 

30  March  31,  1843. 


FOLK  IN  RETIBEMENT  205 

Avon  applause  by  asserting  that  the  Polk  directors  Avere  corrupt 
and  time-serving  partisans  who,  for  fear  of  exposure,  did  not 
dare  to  relinquish  their  offices. 

In  many  respects  the  campaign  was  a  repetition  of  that  of 
1841.  There  was,  perhaps,  more  argument  and  less  burlesque, 
although  botli  candidates  made  use  of  anecdotes  and  sarcastic 
retorts.  Polk  was  not  unmindful  of  his  own  powers  of  wit. 
When  writing  to  his  wife  of  a  debate  held  at  Jackson  with  ililton 
Brown,  he  said  that  his  opponent  tried  to  turn  the  "occasion 
into  a  frolic  .  .  .  but  I  turned  the  laugh  upon  him  &  almost 
laughed  him  out  of  the  Court  House.  "^^ 

In  his  "Letter  to  the  People"^-  Polk,  as  usual,  emphasized 
national  issues  such  as  the  tariff,  the  national  bank,  and  the 
general  extravagance  of  the  Whigs.  Once  more  Tennessee  was 
regarded  as  the  pivotal  state — the  index  to  the  approaching  Pres- 
idential campaign.  As  it  was  practically  certain  that  Clay  would 
be  the  Whig  candidate,  much  of  Polk's  time  on  the  stump  was 
devoted  to  Clay  and  his  policies.  Incensed  b}'-  a  revival  of  the 
old  "bargain  and  corruption"  charge  of  1825,  Clay  challenged 
Polk  to  a  discussion  of  this  question  at  a  time  and  place  to  be 
fixed  by  the  Tennessean  himself.^^  Apparently  the  challenge  Avas 
not  accepted. 

Early  in  the  campaign  a  group  of  persons  in  Memphis  sub- 
mitted to  the  two  candidates  a  list  of  questions  on  political  topics. 
Jones  replied  at  once,  and  among  other  things  expressed  the 
following  views.  He  favored  a  national  bank,  but  was  not  fully 
satisfied  with  Clay's  bill  that  had  been  vetoed  by  Tyler.  He 
believed  in  a  tariff  for  revenue,  with  incidental  protection  to 
home  industries.  In  his  opinion  the  legislature  had  full  power 
to  choose  Senators  in  anv  manner  which  it  saw  fit.     The  last 


31  Polk  to  Mrs.  Polk,  April  4,  1843,  Polk  Papers. 

32  It  bore  the  date  of  May  17,  1843,  and  was  printed  in  the  Union,  May 
2?>  and  26. 

33  TypeA\Titten  copy  of  a  letter  from  Clay  to  Polk  dated  Ashland,  May 
20,  1843,  Polk  Papers. 


206  JAMES  K.  FOLK 

answer  did  not  harmonize  very  well  with  his  condemnation  of 
the  Democratic  senate  for  insisting  that  each  house  should  vote 
separately.^* 

In  answer  to  the  same  queries  Polk  stated  that  he  believed 
in  the  sub-treasury,  and  in  metal  money  for  the  nation  supple- 
mented by  a  limited  amount  of  paper  issued  by  state  banks. 
He  opposed  direct  taxes  and  endorsed  tariff  for  revenue  only. 
Like  Jones,  he  thought  that  the  legislature  possessed  the  right 
to  elect  Senators  in  any  manner  agreeable  to  itself.  He  held, 
on  the  other  hand,  that  all  candidates  for  office  were  under  obli- 
gation, when  called  upon,  to  express  their  views  before  election 
on  all  public  questions.  ' '  The  chief,  if  not  the  only  value  of  the 
right  of  suffrage,"  said  he, 

consists  in  the  fact,  that  it  may  be  exercised  understandingly  by  the 
constituent  body.  It  is  so,  whether  the  immediate  constituency  consists 
of  the  Legislature,  as  in  the  case  of  the  election  of  United  States  Senators, 
or  of  the  people  in  their  primary  capacity,  in  the  election  of  their  Execu- 
tive or  Legislative  agents.  In  either  case  the  constituent  has  a  right  to 
know  the  ojiinions  of  the  candidate  before  he  casts  his  vote. 33 

Except  on  the  bank  question  the  views  expressed  by  the  two 
men  were  very  much  alike.  Indeed,  the  paramount  issue  was: 
Shall  Tennessee  be  returned  to  the  Democratic  column  in  national 
politics  ? 

Throughout  the  campaign  the  Democrats  were  handicapped 
by  the  weakness  of  their  party  press.  Since  Harris's  resignation 
the  Union  lacked  both  spirit  and  influence,  and  was  rapidly  drift- 
ing into  bankruptcy.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Whigs  had  several 
vigorous  papers,  the  most  invincible  of  which  was  Brownlow's 
Jonesborough  Whig.  Polk  was  condemned  for  the  part  he  had 
taken  in  the  administrations  of  Jackson  and  Van  Buren,  and 
again  it  was  said  that  he  sought  the  governorship  merely  as 
a    stepping-stone    to    the    Vice-Presidency.       Polk's    ''Tory" 


34  Jones's  reply  is  dated  April  24,  1843,  and  is  printed  in  the  Memphis 
American  Eagle,  May  2,  a  copy  of  which  is  among  tlie  Polk  Papers. 

35  The  answer  is  dated  May  15,  and  is  printed  in  the  Union,  June  2,  1843. 


POLK  IN  BETIREMENT  207 

grandfather  was  again  held  up  to  scorn,  while  a  Chattanooga 
paper  charged  the  Democratic  candidate  with  being  an  aristocrat 
who  had  ' '  refused  to  eat  with  some  wagoners  who  were  stopping 
at  the  same  tavern  with  him  some  years  ago. '  '^^ 

Although  Polk  made  a  thorough  canvass  and  demonstrated 
his  superiority  over  his  rival,  Jones  was  reelected  by  a  majority 
of  nearly  four  thousand  votes.  This  time  the  Whigs  elected  a 
majority  of  the  legislature  as  well  as  the  governor,  and  the  power 
of  the  "immortal  thirteen"  had  been  broken.  Polk  attributed 
the  victory  of  the  Whigs  to  their  success  in  drawing  the  attention 
of  the  people  to  local  questions  and  away  from  great  national 
issues.  He  was  still  confident  that  his  party  would  carry  the 
state  in  the  federal  election  of  1844.^^ 

Soon  after  the  election  the  defeated  candidate's  friends  once 
more  turned  their  attention  to  procuring  for  him  the  Vice-Presi- 
dential nomination.  They  were  interested  of  course  in  his  per- 
sonal advancement,  and  besides,  they  had  hopes  that,  with  their 
favorite  on  the  ticket,  Tennessee  might  be  restored  to  the  Demo- 
cratic party.  On  September  5  the  Undon,  in  a  series  of  edi- 
torials, urged  his  nomination  and  declared  him  to  be  "one  of 
the  ablest  men  in  the  democratic  party  in  the  Southwest."  In 
a  letter  to  A^an  Buren,  General  Jackson  expressed  the  belief  that 
the  former  President  would  be  nominated — and  elected,  also,  if 
Polk  were  put  on  the  ticket  with  him.  Such  a  ticket,  he  said, 
would  surely  carry  Tennessee;  Polk  would  add  strength  to  the 
party  in  all  of  the  states,  while  Colonel  Johnson  would 
weaken  it.^* 

The  new  legislature  met  on  October  2,  1843.  In  the  senate 
the  Whigs  had  fourteen  members,  the  Democrats,  eleven ;  in  the 
lower  house  the  Whigs  numbered  forty,  the  Democrats,  thirty- 
five.     The  two  main  political  questions  which  confronted  the 


36  Both  articles  and  a  denial  are  in  the  Union,  June  27,  1843. 

37  Polk  to  Van  Buren,  August  8,  1843,  Van  Buren  Papers. 
3S  Jackson  to  Van  Buren,  September  22,  1843,  ibid. 


208  JAMES  K.   POLK 

legislature  were  fixing  a  permanent  location  for  the  state  capital, 
and  the  election  of  federal  Senators.  Although  now  in  the 
minority,  the  Democrats  planned  to  prevent  the  election  of  Foster 
and  Jarnagin  by  supporting  two  other  Whigs,  A.  R.  Alexander, 
of  West  Tennessee,  and  Joseph  L.  Williams,  of  East  Tennessee. 
Some  of  the  Whigs,  especially  the  Rutherford  delegation,  M^ere 
eager  to  have  the  capital  removed  from  Nashville  to  some  more 
central  location.  The  Democrats  therefore  concocted  a  scheme 
by  which  they  hoped  to  procure  a  sufficient  number  of  Whig  votes 
to  elect  Alexander  and  Williams  by  offering  to  vote  for  the  re- 
moval of  the  capital.  Polk  was  then  in  Nashville  and  gave  his 
support  to  the  plan.^^  Their  plotting  was  in  vain.  On  October 
7  both  houses  voted  to  retain  the  capital  at  Nashville,  and  on 
the  seventeenth  Foster  and  Jarnagin  were  elected  Senators,  the 
former  to  fill  Grundy's  unexpired  term,  the  latter  to  succeed 
Anderson.*'' 

Repeated  defeats  annoyed  but  did  not  discourage  Democratic 
leaders.  Harmony  within  their  own  ranks  was  the  first  desider- 
atum, and  Laughlin  undertook  the  task  of  bringing  Nicholson 
and  his  adherents  back  into  the  fold.*^  The  task  did  not  seem 
hopeless,  for  since  the  seats  in  the  Senate  had  been  filled  by  the 
Whigs  there  was  no  reason  why  Nicholson  should  not  cooperate 
with  his  former  associates.  The  "little  magician"  was  the  chief 
cause  of  embarrassment.  Democrats,  generally,  were  ready  to 
support  Polk,  but  from  all  parts  of  the  state  came  reports  of 
indifference  or  hostility  to  Van  Buren. 

Laughlin 's  "missionary"  work  was  not  confined  to  the  Nich- 
olson faction.  As  soon  as  the  question  of  locating  the  capital 
had  been  settled,  it  was  a  foregone  conclusion  that  Foster  and 
Jarnagin  Avould  be  elected.     Freed  from  the  responsibility  of 


30  S.  H.  Laughlin,  "Diary,"  October  1-4,  1843. 

■io/buZ.,  Oct.  17.  "  Jonaldn  has  gone  home  a  Senator — and  Ephe  is 
running  about,  grinning  and  jumping  like  a  pleased  monkey — A\ith  just 
about  the  dignity  of  one,  at  best"  (Laughlin  to  Polk,  Oct.  20,  1843, 
Poll:  Papers). 

41  Laughlin  to  Polk,  Oct.  12,  1843,  Polk  Papers. 


POLE  IN  BETIEEMENT  209 

mauipulatiug  the  scheme  to  defeat  this  election,  Laughlin  could 
devote  his  entire  energy  to  procuring  for  Polk  the  nomination 
for  Vice-President.  In  letters  to  influential  leaders  and  news- 
paper men,  he  almost  demanded  that  Polk  should  be  taken  up  by 
"the  press  and  the  People."  He  proposed  that  the  former  Gov- 
ernor should  be  nominated  by  the  state  convention  which  was 
to  meet  in  November,  and  that  the  Tennessee  delegation  should 
go  to  the  national  convention  "supporting  his  claims,  and  un- 
committed as  to  Presidential  candidate,  but  committed  to  abide 
its  nomination."  He  told  his  correspondents  that  if  Polk  were 
put  on  the  ticket  with  Van  Buren  or  any  other  good  Democrat 
the  party  would  surely  win,  "but  without  Polk's  name  we  would 
be  beaten  and  tied  down  in  federal  chains  in  Tennessee  for  the 
next  six  or  ten  years.  "^-  His  remark  concerning  the  national 
convention  seems  to  be  the  first  indication  of  the  plan,  later 
adopted,  to  nominate  Polk,  and  to  remain  noncommittal  as  to  the 
Presidential  candidate.  The  determination  to  make  no  nomi- 
nation for  President  was  strengthened,  no  doubt,  by  a  letter 
written  from  New  York  by  Harvey  M.  Watterson  to  A.  0.  P. 
Nicholson.  Van  Buren  was  Watterson 's  own  choice,  but,  fearing 
that  his  favorite  could  not  be  elected,  he  did  not  believe  it  wise 
to  nominate  him.  Cass,  in  his  opinion,  was  the  most  available 
candidate.  He  said  that  "the  Van  Buren  party  intend  to  give 
Polk  the  go  hy  as  to  a  nomination  for  the  Vice  Presidency, ' '  and 
that  Johnson  would  be  nominated  by  the  national  convention.*^ 
On  October  18,  two  days  after  the  receipt  of  Watterson 's  letter, 
Laughlin  conversed  with  A.  V.  Brown.  Brown  advised  serving 
notice  on  the  New  Yorkers  that  the  Tennesseans  would  support 
Van  Buren  if  his  adherents  would  agree  to  support  Polk ;  other- 
wise they  would  go  for  Cass.  To  this  Laughlin  and  Armstrong 
assented,  and  Donelson  was  selected  to  state  their  views  to  Silas 
Wright  and  other  friends  of  Van  Buren.**    Probably  this  threat 


42  S.  H.  Laughlin,  "Diary,"  Oct.  9,  1843. 

43  Ibid.,  October  16,  1843. 
^ilbid.,  October  18,  1843. 


210  JAMES  K.  POLK 

was  not  carried  into  effect.  At  any  rate  Polk  later  disclaimed 
any  knowledge  of  a  project  to  drop  Van  Buren  for  Cass.^''  In 
January,  1844,  he  asked  Heiss  to  place  Van  Buren 's  name  along 
with  his  own  at  the  head  of  the  political  columns  of  the  Union,*'' 
but,  for  the  time  being,  the  editor  refused  to  comply. 

The  State  convention  met  at  Nashville  on  November  23,  1843. 
Polk  was  nominated  for  Vice-President  by  a  unanimous  vote, 
but  no  one  was  named  for  the  Presidency.  The  convention  sim- 
ply agreed  to  support  whatever  candidate  the  Baltimore  conven- 
tion might  see  fit  to  nominate.  The  reason  assigned  for  not 
nominating  Van  Buren,  as  stated  to  him  in  letters  from  both 
Polk  and  Jackson,^"  was  a  fear  that  the  Cass  supporters  might 
resist  such  action,  and  that  a  breach  in  the  party  would  result. 

On  hearing  from  Cave  Johnson  and  A.  V.  Brown  that  Van 
Buren  was  stronger  in  "Washington  than  Cass  and  that  he  would, 
in  all  probability,  be  nominated  at  Baltimore,  Polk  advised  the 
editors  of  the  Union  to  come  out  for  the  ex-President.*^  His 
real  feeling  toward  Van  Buren  is  not  easy  to  determine,  but 
from  his  silence  rather  than  his  words,  one  always  gets  the  im- 
pression that  his  support  of  the  New  Yorker  was  based,  as  in 
this  case,  on  expediency  instead  of  admiration  for  the  man.  It 
was  quite  natural  that  this  should  have  been  so,  for  Van  Buren 
had  more  than  once  shown  indifference  when  Polk  needed  his  aid. 

Realizing  that  the  party  had  suffered  from  the  want  of  a 
vigorous  newspaper,  Polk  turned  his  attention  to  rehabilitating 
the  Nashville  Union.  Since  its  purchase  by  Hogan  and  Heiss, 
it  had  been  edited  by  the  senior  partner.  He  had  never  been  a 
forceful  writer,  and  of  late  his  health  had  become  so  impaired 
that  the  paper  was  practically  without  an  editor.  With  the  con- 
sent of  the  owners,  Polk  asked  Laughlin  to  take  charge  of  the 


45  Polk  to  Cave  Johnson,  March  18,  1844,  " Polk-Johnsou  Letters." 

46  Polk  to  Heiss,  Jan.  21,  1844,  "Heiss  Papers." 

47  Jackson  to  Van  Buren,  Nov.  29;  Polk  to  Van  Buren,  Nov.  ."^0,  1843, 
Va7i  Buren  Papers. 

48  Polk  to  Heiss,  Dec.  21,  1843,  "Heiss  Papers." 


POLE  IN  BETIEEMENT  211 

paper  and  promised  him  financial  support  from  the  party.  Fear- 
ing, however,  that  he  might  jeopardize  his  chances  of  being 
elected  to  Congress  (from  his  home  district),  Laughlin  at  first 
declined  to  accept  the  position/"  His  subsequent  acceptance 
and  his  editorial  services  to  his  party  will  be  considered  in  the 
following  chapter. 


49  Polk  to  Heiss,  Dec.  21,  1843,  "Heiss  Papers."     Laughlin  to  Polk, 
Dee.  7;  Heiss  to  Polk,  Dec.  19,  1843,  Polk  Papers. 


CHAPTER  XII 

SELECTION  OF  CANDIDATES,  1844 

The  campaign  of  1844  may  be  said  to  have  opened  with  the 
new  year.  From  early  in  January  announcements  from  pros- 
pective candidates,  declarations  of  principles,  and  notices  of  nom- 
inations made  by  local  bodies,  began  to  occupy  leading  places 
in  the  columns  of  the  party  journals.  There  was  little  doubt 
that  Clay  would  be  chosen  to  head  the  Whig  ticket,  although, 
in  response  to  an  inquiry  from  friends,  Webster  announced  his 
willingness  to  accept  a  nomination  at  the  hands  of  the  Whig  con- 
vention. Tyler  had  been  read  out  of  the  Whig  party,  and,  since 
the  Democrats  had  not  shown  a  disposition  to  adopt  him  as  their 
own,  it  seemed  likely  that  he  would  enter  the  contest  as  an  inde- 
pendent candidate.  Van  Buren's  nomination  by  the  Baltimore 
convention  was  fully  expected  by  all  parties  not  so  much  because 
any  considerable  portion  of  his  party  wanted  him,  as  because 
there  seemed  to  be  no  one  who  had  a  better  claim.  He  had  been 
left  by  General  Jackson  as  a  legacy  to  the  party,  the  position  he 
had  occupied  gave  him  prestige,  and,  as  Dixon  H.  Lewis  re- 
marked, he  had  the  advantage  of  ''being  cmisidered  the  candidate 
of  tJie  party. "'^  These  influences  combined  would  insure  him' 
the  nomination  unless  something  should  happen  before  the  meet- 
ing of  the  convention  to  change  indifference  into  active  hostility. 
For  some  time,  of  course,  there  had  been  active  hostility  in  certain 
quarters,  but  this  came  generally  from  those  who  were  promoting 
the  interests  of  some  other  still  more  unpopular  candidate,  such 
as  Calhoun  or  Tyler,  consequently  there  was  little  danger  from 
that  source.     Unless  something  should  occur  to  cast  doubts  on 


1  Lewis  to  Cralle,  June  10,  1842,  CraUe  Papers. 


SELECTION   OF   CANDIDATES,   1844  213 

his  orthodoxy  or  his  personal  fitness,  Van  Biiren  was  reasonably 
certain  of  the  nomination,  hut  unfortunately  for  him,  that  some- 
thing did  occur— the  unexpected  turn  in  the  Texas  question. 
Before  the  appearance  of  this  firebrand,  friends  of  other  aspirants 
were  exerting  every  effort  to  weaken  his  hold  on  the  party  and 
to  strengthen  that  of  their  favorites.  The  most  active  were  the 
supporters  of  Calhoun  and  Cass;  some  were  ready  to  join  with 
the  followers  of  Tyler ;  and  a  few,  like  W.  C.  Rives,-  announced 
that,  as  Van  Buren's  nomination  seemed  assured,  they  would 
vote  for  Henry  Clay. 

Early  in  the  year,  when  Van  Buren's  nomination  seemed  to 
be  a  foregone  conclusion,  the  m^ain  topic  of  discussion  in  Demo- 
cratic ranks  was  the  choice  for  the  second  place  on  the  ticket. 
The  persons  most  frequently  mentioned  were  Colonel  Richard 
M.  Johnson,  of  Kentucky,  and  James  K.  Polk,  of  Tennessee.  As 
in  Van  Buren's  case,  many  were  ready  to  support  Colonel  John- 
son simply  because  they  did  not  see  how  the  party  could  drop 
him  gracefully.^'  The  Van  Burenites  favored  Johnson,  but  for 
this  very  reason  his  nomination  was  vigorously  opposed,  especially 
in  the  South  and  Southwest.  It  was  felt  by  many  that  if  Van 
Buren  must  be  accepted,  the  Vice-President  should  be  a  man 
more  agreeable  to  the  southern  wing  of  the  party.  For  some 
time  the  Tennessee  Democrats  had  been  urging  Polk's  claims  to 
this  office,  and  since  his  second  defeat  by  Jones  they  were  still 
more  determined  to  procure  for  him  the  nomination. 

Ardently  desiring  this  office,  Polk  began  as  early  as  the  fall 
of  1843  to  ask  his  friends  to  use  their  influence  with  politicians 
of  other  states.  In  a  letter  to  Donelson  he  expressed  the  belief 
that  Van  Buren  would  be  made  the  candidate  for  President,  and 
if  so,  "the  candidate  for  the  Vice  Presidency  must  come  from  the 
West,— and  from  a  slave-holding  state."     He  hoped  that  the 

2  His  letter,  dated  January  1,  is  printed  in  Nat.  IntelL,  Jan.  12,  1844. 

3  It  was  rare  to  see  a  person,  wrote  Cave  Johnson,  who  did  not  prefer 
Polk.  The  main  trouble  was  getting  rid  of  "Old  Dick"  (Johnson  to  Polk, 
Jan.  31,  1844,  Polk  Papers). 


214  JAMES  K.  POLE 

press  and  party  leaders  would  come  out  early  for  Van  Buren  and 
himself,  at  least  before  R.  M.  Johnson  had  yielded  his  "preten- 
sions for  the  Presidency"  and  had  become  his  competitor  for  the 
second  place.  Even  this  early  he  expressed  distrust  for  the 
Washington  Globe. 

I  do  not  understand  Blair's  course.  ...  I  do  not  think  he  is  inclined  to 
do  me  justice.  Why  I  know  not,  unless  it  be  that  he  has  strong  attach- 
ments for  Col.  Johnson,  and  looks  to  his  restoration  with  Mr.  Van  Buren. 

The  attitude  of  Ohio  and  Mississippi,  he  said  in  another  letter, 
would  go  far  to  settle  the  question,  therefore  Donelson  and  other 
Tennessee  friends  should  send  letters  to  prominent  politicians  in 
those  states.* 

Early  in  January,  1844,  Laughlin  and  others  procured  from 
General  Jackson  letters  to  political  leaders  in  various  states. 
These  letters  were  used  in  an  effort  to  induce  state  conventions 
to  declare  their  preference  for  Polk.^  A  letter  signed  "Amicus" 
that  appeared  in  the  Glohe  and  advocated  the  nomination  of 
William  R.  King,  of  Alabama,  gave  Cave  Johnson  and  A.  V. 
Brown  an  opportunity  to  sound  Polk's  praises  and  to  urge  his 
nomination.  In  an  article  signed  "A  Tennessee  Democrat," 
they  pointed  out  that  King,  voluntarily,  and  Van  Buren,  under 
instructions,  had  voted  for  the  United  States  Bank,  and  that  it 
would  never  do  to  have  two  candidates  who  had  endorsed  that 
discredited  institution.  But,  they  asked,  who  does  not  remember 
in  Jackson 's  battle  against  the  bank  ' '  the  unterrified  ability  dis- 
played by  Governor  Polk  on  these  trying  occasions?"  The  very 
fact  that  Tennessee  was  a  doubtful  state  was  an  additional  reason 
for  nominating  Polk.^  To  a  friend  in  Tennessee  Johnson  wrote 
that  old-line  politicians  such  as  Buchanan,  Calhoun,  Benton,  and 
Blair  were  doing  their  utmost  to  ruin  Polk's  prospects,  and  other 


4  Polk  to  Donelson,  Oct.  19,  Dee.  20,  1843,  "Polk-Donelson  Letters." 
The  Ohio  politicians  mentioned  were  Allen,  Tappan,  Medary,  Dawson,  and 
Medill. 

■-'  Letters  of  W.  H.  Polk  and  Laughlin  to  Polk  (Polk  Papers). 

6  Washington  Globe,  Jan.  15,  1844.  Johnson  to  Polk,  Jan.  13,  21,  31, 
1844,  Polk  Papers. 


SELECTION  OF  CANDIDATES,  1844  215 

letters  told  Polk  that  these  men  feared  hiin  as  another  rival  for 
the  Presidency." 

In  general,  conservatives  evinced  a  preference  for  either  King 
or  Colonel  Johnson,^  but  the  more  aggressive  element  favored 
Polk.  The  Mississippi  state  convention  at  its  Jackson  Day 
(January  8)  celebration  drank  toasts  to  Polk  and  nominated  him 
for  Vice-President,^  and  in  many  other  states  there  was  growing 
sentiment  in  his  favor.  The  attention  of  the  country  had  recently 
been  called  to  the  state  of  Tennessee  by  the  introduction  in  Con- 
gress of  a  bill  to  reimburse  General  Jackson  for  the  thousand 
dollar  fine  imposed  upon  him  at  New  Orleans  in  1815.  "William 
H.  Polk  moved  in  the  Tennessee  legislature  to  instruct  the  Sen- 
ators and  request  the  Representatives  from  that  state  to  vote  for 
the  bill.  Although  such  an  action  was  only  to  be  expected  from 
any  Tennessee  Democrat,  it  is  not  unlikely  that  Polk  had  consid- 
ered the  probable  effect  on  his  brother's  candidacy.^*' 

The  private  correspondence  of  this  early  part  of  1844  is  very 
interesting  in  view  of  the  assertion  made  later  that  an  anti-Van 
Buren  plot  had  been  hatched  in  Tennessee  by  the  intimate  asso- 
ciates of  Polk.  The  letters  show  conclusively  that  instead  of 
opposing  the  ex-President's  nomination  the  leading  politicians 
were  trying  hard  to  bring  it  about.  On  the  other  hand,  the  rank 
and  file  of  the  Democracy  of  the  state  cared  little  for  Van  Buren 
and  feared  that  he  would  be  a  "dead  weight"  upon  the  party. 
Even  Hogan  and  Heiss,  the  proprietors  of  the  Vmon,  at  first  de- 
clined to  place  his  name  at  the  head  of  their  political  column, 

7  Levin  H.  Coe  to  Polk,  Jan.  27,  1844,  ibid. 

8  In  a  letter  to  the  editor  of  the  Glohe,  dated  January  28,  Johnson  stated 
that  he  had,  at  various  places,  been  nominated— sometimes  for  President, 
sometimes  for  Vice-President.  He  would  accept  either,  he  said,  if  ratifaed 
by  the  national  convention,  but  in  any  event  he  would  support  the  regular 
nominees. 

9  Nashville  Union,  Jan.  23,  1844. 

10  When  Polk 's  resolution  reached  the  senate,  a  Whig  member  moved 
that  the  preamble  should  be  changed  to  read  that  the  "question  is  now 
brought  before  the  American  people  not  with  a  view  to  relieve  Gen. 
Jackson  .  .  .  but  alone  for  political  effect"  (Nashville  Vmon,  Jan.  .5, 
1844). 


216  JAMES  E.  POLK 

although  Polk  had  requested  them  to  do  so.^^  Urged  by  Laughlin 
as  well  as  by  Polk,  the  editors  finally,  though  reluctantly,  con- 
sented. His  name  appeared  for  the  first  time  on  February  8, 
1844,  and  the  editors  stated  frankly  that 

in  placing  Mr.  Van  Buren  's  name  at  the  head  of  our  paper,  subject  to  the 
action  of  the  National  Convention,  w^  assume  no  new  position  either  in 
reference  to  our  views  or  the  preferences  of  the  great  body  of  the  democ- 
racy in  Tennessee. 

They  would  support,  they  said,  the  nominee  of  the  convention, 
whoever  he  might  be.^-  On  March  12,  after  much  urging  by  Polk, 
Laughlin  assumed  the  editorship  not  only  of  the  Union  but  of 
the  Star  Spangled  Banner,  a  weekly  campaign  journal  which 
was  to  be  published  from  the  same  office.^^  The  tone  of  the  Union 
now  became  more  favorable  to  Van  Buren,  and  there  seemed  to 
be  little  doubt  that  he  would  be  nominated  at  Baltimore. 

Up  to  the  time  that  Van  Buren 's  Texas  letter  was  published, 
there  was  no  indication  that  influential  Tennesseans  had  any 
intention  of  opposing  his  nomination.  Cave  Johnson,  who,  with 
R.  J.  Walker,  was  charged  later  wdth  having  instigated  the  plan 
to  defeat  him  at  Baltimore,  was  a  hearty  supporter  of  the  ex- 
President.  In  a  letter  written  from  Washington  he  told  of  a 
movement  in  that  city  to  nominate  Cass.  This  movement,  he 
believed  should  be  vigorously  opposed,  for  "in  my  opinion  your 
only  chance  for  the  position  we  wish"  depends  upon  the  nomi- 
nation of  Van  Buren."  At  a  large  meeting  held  at  Nashville 
on  March  15,  1844,  to  celebrate  the  anniversary  of  Jackson's 


11  "Tell  the  General,"  said  Polk  in  a  letter  to  Donelson,  December  20, 
1843,  "that  I  had  an  interview  with  both  Editors  of  the  Union,  when  I 
was  at  Nashville  and  both  agreed  to  take  decided  and  bold  ground  for 
Van  Buren  in  their  paper.  If  they  do  not  do  so,  in  their  next  paper,  I 
will  write  to  them  and  urge  it  upon  them.  The  paper  here  has  done  so" 
("Polk-Donelson  Letters")- 

12  Nashville  Union,  Feb.  8.  Polk  to  Heiss,  Jan.  21  "Heiss  Papers"; 
Laughlin  to  Polk,  Feb.  4,  Polk  Papers. 

13  Polk 's  letters  to  Heiss  advising  the  employment  of  Laughlin  are  in 
the  "Heiss  Papers."  Various  letters  of  Polk  and  Laughlin  on  the  sub- 
ject are  in  the  Polk  Papers. 

14  Johnson  to  Polk,  March  6,  1844,  Polk  Papers. 


SELECTION  OF  CANDIDATES,   1844  217 

birth  and  the  remission  of  his  fine  by  Congress/''  efforts  were 
made  to  create  enthusiasm  for  both  Van  Bnren  and  Polk.  Whih^ 
at  Nashville  Polk  answered  Johnson's  letter  and  fully  concurred 
in  the  views  he  had  expressed.  A  few  days  later  he  wrote  again 
on  the  same  subject  and  said  that  "the  movement  which  you  say 
is  on  hand — to  profess  publicly  to  support  Mr.  Van  Buren,  with 
a  secret  intention  to  attem])t  to  nominate  Genl  Cass  in  the  Con- 
vention,— can  receive  no  countenance."  If  there  is  any  move- 
ment in  Tennessee,  said  he,  to  couple  his  name  with  that  of  Cass 
to  the  prejudice  of  Van  Buren,  he  is  not  aware  of  it,  and  if  dis- 
covered, he  will  not  permit  it. 

It  is  now  settled  that  the  preference  of  a  large  majority  of  the  party  is 
for  Mr.  Van  Buren,  and  the  whole  party  should  yield  to  his  nomination 
and  make  it  unanimous.  Such  men  as  Duf  Green,  and  the  discontented 
in  our  ranks  may  attempt  to  produce  confusion  by  resisting  the  popular 
choice  of  the  party,  but  their  movements  can  receive  no  countenance  or 
support  from  me.i''> 

Immediately  following  the  Nashville  meeting  Laughlin  sounded 
the  trumpet  more  vigorously  than  ever  for  Van  Buren  and  Polk, 
and  insisted  that  four-fifths  of  the  Democrats  in  Congress  were 
in  favor  of  the  ex-President's  nomination.  Although  a  friend 
of  General  Cass,  Laughlin  deplored  the  agitation  in  his  behalf. 
Cass  himself,  said  he,  "has  frowned  upon  the  design."  Those 
who  had  come  out  for  Cass  had,  in  Laughlin 's  opinion,  done  so 
for  the  purpose  of  dividing  the  party,  and  most  prominent  among 
them  was  Duff  Green,  "a  renegade  deserter."^' 

On  March  20,  the  day  before  the  appearance  of  Laughlin 's 
editorial,  Polk  had  declined  an  unofficial  offer  of  a  place  in  the 
cabinet  of  John  Tyler.  Abel  P.  Upshur,  Secretary  of  State,  and 
Thomas  W.  Gilmer,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  had  been  killed  in 
the  Princeton  disaster  of  February  28,  leaving  two  vacancies  in 


15  Laughlin  submitted  a  resolution  which  declared  that  revenge  had 
led  Judge  Hall,  to  impose  the  fine.  Polk  seconded  the  resolution  and  made 
a  speech  on  political  questions  (Union,  March  19,  1844). 

i«Polk  to  Johnson,  March  18,  1844  ("Polk -Johnson  Letters"). 

1"  Nashville  Union,  March  21,  1844. 


218  JAMES  K.  POLK 

the  cabinet.  Calhoun  had  been  selected  to  succeed  Upshur,^^  but 
John  Y.  Mason,  who  had  been  invited  to  take  Gilmer's  place  de- 
clined, at  first,  to  accept  the  offer.  At  this  juncture  Theophilus 
Fisk,  former  editor  of  the  Old  Dominion  and  a  friend  of  the 
President,  sent  a  letter  to  Polk  asking  whether  he  would  accept 
the  navy  portfolio  "without  any  pledge,  shackle,  or  trammel 
being  asked  of  you,  other  than  is  already  guaranteed  by  your 
exalted  character  and  standing. '  '^''  Mason,  however,  changed  his 
mind,-°  and  by  accepting  the  appointment  left  no  vacancy  to  be 
filled. 

Without  knowledge  of  the  offer  made  to  JNIason,  or  of  his 
accceptance,  Polk  had  already  written  to  Fisk,  stating  that  he 
Avould  not  accept  a  place  in  the  cabinet.  In  a  letter  to  Cave 
Johnson,  which  was  intended  also  for  the  eye  of  Silas  Wright, 
Polk  gave  a  twofold  reason  for  declining  a  cabinet  position.  In 
the  first  place,  it  would  seem  like  withdrawing  from  the  race  for 
Vice-President,  and  this  he  had  no  intention  of  doing.  Again, 
Tyler's  administration  was  supposed  to  be  hostile  to  Van  Buren ; 
consequently,  if  he  accepted,  he  would  be  placed  in  a  false  posi- 
tion, for  he  was  heartily  in  favor  of  Van  Buren.  This,  in  effect, 
was  a  notice  to  the  Van  Burenites  that  he  was  still  in  the  race 
for  Vice-President  and  that,  as  he  was  loyal  to  their  candidate, 
he  expected  their  support  in  return.  He  also  called  attention 
to  Laughlin's  editorial  in  the  Union  against  the  attempted  move- 
ment for  Cass.  In  another  passage  of  the  letter  he  not  only 
declared  his  own  views  on  the  Texas  question,  but  he  intimated, 
also,  that  he  took  it  for  granted  that  Van  Buren  would  not  op- 
pose annexation.  Speaking  of  Calhoun's  call  to  the  Department 
of  State,  he  said  : 


IS  For  the  circumstances  of  Calhoun's  selection,  see  Schouler,  llhU  of 
U.  S.,  IV,  455. 

10  Fisk  to  Polk,  March  9,  1844,  Polk  Papers.  Fisk  said  that  the  i(lea 
was  his  own,  but  he  told  Cave  Johnson  that  he  was  acting  by  authority 
of  the  President  (Johnson  to  Polk,  March  10,  ibid). 

20  Much  to  the  surprise  of  both  Tyler  and  Fii^k — so  said  the  latter  in 
a  letter  to  Polk,  March  13  (ibid.). 


SELECTION   OF  CANDIDATES,   1844  219 

T  think  it  probable  that  he  will  see  that  it  is  his  interest  to  co-operate 
thoroiifjhly  with  the  Democratic  party,  so  heartily  for  Mr.  Van  Burcn, 
harmonize  his  friends  at  the  South,  and  make  a  great  effort  ujion  the 
Texas  and  Oregon  questions.^i 

At  the  time  that  Polk  declined  to  accept  a  place  in  Tyler's 
cabinet,  the  Texas  question  was  fast  approaching  its  critical  stage. 
Since  Polk  was  soon  to  become  closely  identified  with  this  im- 
portant question,  it  seems  necessary  to  give  a  brief  summary  of 
its  history  up  to  this  point  and  to  ascertain,  if  possible,  whether 
he  or  his  friends  had  any- part  in  bringing  it  forward. 

The  idea  of  annexing  Texas  was  not  new ;  but  since  the  failure 
of  the  first  attempt,  during  Jackson's  administration,  no  party 
had  made  annexation  an  active  political  issue.  That  it  was  made 
an  issue  in  the  campaign  of  1844  was  due,  according  to  Benton,-- 
to  the  machinations  of  Calhoun,  who  hoped  by  this  means  to 
prevent  the  nomination  of  Van  Buren  and  the  election  of  Henry 
Clay.  The  first  move  in  this  direction  was  made  in  the  winter 
of  1842-43.  At  that  time  a  letter,  written  by  Thomas  W.  Gilmer 
but  inspired  by  Calhoun,  was  printed  in  a  Baltimore  paper.  It 
advocated  the  immediate  annexation  of  Texas  in  order  to  fore- 
stall the  designs  of  Great  Britain.  The  letter,  said  Benton,  was 
"a  clap  of  thunder  in  a  clear  sky,"  for  no  one  was  aware  of  any 
such  design.  Webster  left  the  Department  of  State  in  May,  1843, 
and  after  the  brief  term  of  Legare,  w^as  succeeded  on  June  24 
by  Abel  Upshur,  of  Virginia.  Upshur  was  a  friend  of  Calhoun 
and  interested  in  the  annexation  of  Texas.  It  was  probably  due 
to  the  influence  of  Upshur  and  Gilmer  that  Tyler  first  became 
interested  in  annexation,  but  before  long  the  President  had  de- 
termined to  use  it  for  his  own  purposes.  In  his  third  annual 
message,  which  was  sent  to  Congress  early  in  December,  1843, 


21  In  another  letter  of  the  same  date  which  was  intended  for  Brown 
and  Johnson  only,  Polk  made  still  more  explicit  the  purpose  of  the  first 
letter,  for  he  pointed  out  that  Wright,  if  he  would,  could  certainly  prevent 
E.  M.  Johnson  from  being  nominated  (Polk  to  Johnson,  March  21,  1844, 
"Polk-Johnson  Letters"). 

22  Benton,  Thirty  Years'  View,  II,  581  ff. 


220  JAMES  K.  FOLK 

Tyler  alluded  to  the  dangers  that  might  result  from  continued 
war  between  Texas  and  Mexico,  and  hinted  pointedly  at  possible 
annexation. 

At  this  stage  of  the  question  Aaron  V.  Brown,  an  intimate 
friend  of  Polk,  became  a  leading  factor  in  the  annexation  pro- 
gram. Whether  or  not  he  was  consciously  lending  his  aid  to  the 
Tyler-Calhoun  project  is  not  easy  to  determine.  In  a  conver- 
sation with  Benton  on  the  first  day  of  the  session,  Brown  spoke 
of  annexation  as  "an  impending  and  probable  event,"  and  he 
was  rebuked  by  the  Senator  who  said  that  it  was  "on  the  part 
of  some,  an  intrigue  for  the  presidency  and  a  plot  to  dissolve  the 
Union — on  the  part  of  others,  a  Texas  scrip  and  land  specula- 
tion."-^ In  a  "confidential"  letter  to  Polk,  Brown  alluded  to 
Tyler's  message  and  added:  "But  this  is  not  all.  I  have  reason 
to  suppose  it  will  soon  be  followed  up  with  some  definite  and 
precise  proposition — some  think  a  treaty."  The  Whigs,  said  he, 
think  that  Tyler  has  brought  the  question  up  as  a  firebrand  be- 
tween North  and  South  in  order  to  gain  support  for  himself,  and 
that  nothing  will  come  of  it ;  but  however  this  may  be,  it  is 
Brown 's  opinion  that  neither  Whigs  nor  Democrats  of  the  South 
and  West  should  commit  themselves  against  annexation.-* 

This  was  not  the  first  time  that  Brown  had  shown  an  interest 
in  the  Texas  question.  In  January,  1843,  he  had  sent  to  Jackson 
a  copy  of  the  Madisonian  containing  Gilmer's  letter  and  had  re- 
ceived in  reply  the  famous  letter  of  February  12  in  which  the 
General  urged  the  necessity  of  immediate  annexation.  Jackson's 
letter  was  not  made  public  until  a  year  later,  about  three  months 
after  Tyler  had  submitted  his  message  on  the  subject  of  Texas. 
The  procurement  and  the  publication  of  Jackson's  letter  have 
been  declared  by  Benton  to  be  links  in  the  chain  of  events  which 
had  been  forged  by  Calhoun  and  his  fellow-conspirators  for  the 
purpose  of  making  Texas  the  leading  political  issue  and  Calhoun 
the  candidate,  although  he  does  not  say  that  Brown  was  fully 


23  Ibid.,  583. 

2-t  Brown  to  Polk,  Dec.  9,  1843,  Polk  Papers. 


SELECTION   OF  CANDIDATES,   1844  221 

aAvare  of  the  part  lie  Avas  playing.-"^  He  has  intimated,  also,  that 
the  letter  was  purposely  dated  1844  instead  of  1843 ;  but  Brown's 
own  letter — published  at  the  same  time — explained  the  circum- 
stances under  which  it  had  been  procured  and  stated  explicitly 
that  it  had  been  in  his  possession  for  a  "long  time."-"  However, 
Benton's  interest  in  Van  Buren's  nomination  and  his  opposition 
to  annexation  seem  to  have  led  him  to  associate  events  which  in 
reality  Avere  not  related;  on  the  other  hand.  Brown's  own  desire 
for  Texas  is  sufficient  to  explain  his  soliciting  the  opinion  of 
General  Jackson  on  the  subject. 

If  Brown  was  a  conscious  participant  in  any  conspiracy  to 
undermine  Van  Buren,  it  is  quite  evident  that  his  bosom  friends, 
Polk  and  Cave  Johnson,  were  not  aware  of  the  fact.  Although 
Johnson  looked  with  favor  on  the  acquisition  of  Texas,  he  was 
averse  to  having  it  made  an  issue  for  campaign  purposes.  At 
the  time  that  Polk's  name  was  mentioned  in  connection  with 
Tyler's  cabinet,  Johnson  stated  his  opinions  very  explicitly  in  a 
letter  to  Polk : 

I  fear  some  secret  movements  are  making  here  so  as  to  bring  up  the 
Texas  question  here  prominently  before  the  Convention  meets  &  to  make 
it  operate  if  practicable  agt  Van  in  the  Convention  &  agt  Clay  in  the 
election — if  it  can  be  brought  up  fairly  &  properly  &  with  a  reasonable 
prospect  of  getting  it  I  should  have  no  objection,  but  if  it  is  designed 
merely  as  a  political  question  to  operate  in  the  ensuing  canvass  then  I 
shall  deplore  it.  An  effort  no  doubt  will  be  made  to  unite  the  destinies 
of  Oregon  &  Texas  so  as  to  unite  the  South  &  West — may  you  not  be 
identified  with  these  movements  if  in  the  cabinet?  &  if  unsuccessful  what 
follows  ?27 

The  friends  of  Calhoun  confidently  expected  that  their  leader 
would  profit  from  the  emergence  of  the  Texas  question.  Fearing 
that  "being  considered  a  candidate"  would,  if  left  unchallenged, 
procure  for  Van  Buren  the  coveted  nomination,  they  began  at 
an  early  date  to  seek  support  for  their  favorite.-^    Due  to  their 

23  Benton,  Thirty  Years'  View,  IT,  584. 

26  The  letters  of  both  Jackson  and  Brown  were  published  in  various 
newspapers — among  others,  the  Nashville  Union  of  April  2,  1844. 

27  Johnson  to  Polk,  March  10,  1844,  Polk  Papers. 

28  Dixon  H.  Lewis  to  Richard  Cralle,  June  10,  1842,  Cralle  Papers. 


222  JAMES  E.  POLK 

efforts  the  time  for  holding  the  national  convention  was  post- 
poned from  December,  1843,  to  a  later  date,  in  order  that  they 
might  have  a  longer  time  to  educate  public  opinion ;  for  even 
before  Jackson's  Texas  letter  was  written,  they  were  confident 
that  Calhoun  would  be  nominated.-'' 

During  the  summer  of  1843  the  administration  had  become 
convinced  that  Great  Britain  was  about  to  interfere  in  Texan 
affairs  and  effect,  if  possible,  the  abolition  of  slavery  there.  Duff 
Green  was  in  England  gathering  information,  and  his  communi- 
cations were  supplemented  by  reports  which  came  from  Texan 
representatives  in  London. ^°  In  December,  as  we  have  already 
noted,  Tyler  called  the  attention  of  Congress  to  the  dangers  of 
foreign  interference  in  Texas,  and  soon  afterwards  he  began  to 
formulate  plans  of  annexation.  The  supporters  of  Calhoun  co- 
operated with  the  President,  and  there  seemed  to  be  no  doubt 
in  their  minds  that  their  patron,  and  not  Tyler,  would  reap  the 
political  reward.  Their  hopes  of  success  mounted  high  when 
Calhoun  was  called  to  take  charge  of  the  Department  of  State. 
Like  the  President  they  were  interested  in  annexation  per  se; 
in  addition,  they  fully  appreciated  its  importance  as  a  campaign 
issue.  "It  is  the  greatest  question  of  the  Agc,'^  wrote  Dixon  H. 
Lewis,  and  he  rejoiced  that  Calhoun  was  in  a  position  "to  direct 
its  force  &  control  its  fury. '  '^^    Three  days  after  Lewis  had  made 


20  In  a  letter  written  from  Washington,  February  8,  1843,  Duff  Green 
told  Cralle  that  although  the  Van  Buren  faction  wanted  an  early  con- 
vention, he  hoped  that  it  could  be  delayed  until  June.  "It  has  now," 
said  he,  ' '  narrowed  down  to  a  choice  between  Calhoun  &  Van  Buren  and 
the  demonstrations  are  becoming  more  and  more  decided  for  Mr.  Calhoun 
so  that,  in  my  opinion,  the  concentration  in  his  favor  will  become  so 
apparent  as  public  opinion  developes  that  the  convention  will  indeed 
become  obsolete"  (Letters  of  Duff  Green,  Library  of  Congress;  Benton, 
Thirty  Years'  View,  II,  585). 

30  Smith,  Annexation  of  Texas,  chap.  vi. 

31  "Every  thing  depends  on  the  Texas  question,  which  is  an  element 
of  Power  so  much  stronger  than  Clay,  V  Buren  &  their  conventions  that 
it  unsettles  all  calculations  as  to  the  future  course  of  men  &  parties.  It 
is  the  greatest  question  of  the  Age  &  I  predict  will  agitate  the  country 
more  than  all  the  other  public  questions  ever  have.  Public  ojjinion  will 
boil  &  effervesce  .  .  .  more  like  a  volcano  than  a  cider  Barrell — but  at 


SELECTION  OF  CANDIDATES,   1844  223 

this  assertion  Jacksou's  Texas  letter  appeared  in  the  liiehmond 
Enquirer.  No  doubt  it  fitted  into  the  Calhoun  program,  yet  it  is 
not  at  all  certain  that  this  was  Brown's  motive  in  having  the  letter 
])ublished.  Surely  General  Jackson  did  not  write  it  for  any  such 
purj)0se.^- 

The  emergence  of  the  Texas  question  was  not  welcomed  by 
Henry  Clay.  Early  in  December,  1843,  he  stated  his  opinions  on 
the  subject  in  a  letter  to  John  J.  Crittenden.^''  There  were,  he 
said,  already  a  sufficient  number  of  issues  without  ' '  adding  freak 
ones"  of  this  character,  and  he  did  not  think  it  right  to  allow 
John  Tyler  to  make  capital  out  of  this  exciting  topic.  In  his 
opinion,  annexation,  either  by  treaty  or  by  conquest,  was  entirely 
out  of  the  question ;  however,  unless  Tyler  should  present  some 
definite  project  of  annexation  he  did  not  feel  called  upon  to  make 
public  expression  of  his  views.  In  the  following  March,  when 
it  was  rumored  that  the  President  was  negotiating  with  Texas, 
Clay — with  his  usual  faith  in  his  own  ability  both  to  shape  and 
to  direct  political  issues — still  felt  confident  that  he  could  stem 
the  tide  of  Texas  agitation."* 


last  will  settle  down  with  unanimity  for  annexation  in  the  South  &  West 
&  a  large  majority  in  the  North.  It  will  in  the  meantime  unite  the  hitherto 
divided  South,  while  it  will  make  Abolition  &  Treason  synonymous  &  thus 
destroy  it  in  the  North. 

"The  beauty  of  the  thing  is,  that  Providence  rather  than  Tyler  has 
put  Calhoun  at  the  head  of  this  great  question,  to  direct  its  force  &  con- 
trol its  fury.    It  is  understood  by  letters  from  him  that  he  accepts. 

"P.  S.  '  It  is  understood  the  preliminaries  of  the  Treaty  have  already 
been  arranged  &  only  awaits  the  special  minister  who  is  daily  expected." 
(Lewis  to  Cralle,  March  19,  1844,  Cralle  Papers).  Alexander  H.  Stephens 
believed  that  "the  dissolution  of  the  present  Confederacy"  lay  "near 
Mr.  Calhoun's  heart ".  (Stephens  to  James  Thomas,  May  17,  1844,  Sep. 
Am.  Eist.  Assn.,  1911,  II,  58). 

32  Benton  says  tliat  Blair  declined  to  publish  the  letter  in  the  Globe 
(Thirty  Years'  View,  II,  587).  Later,  however,  it  was  printed  in  that 
paper,  along  with  BroAvn  's  letter  explaining  his  reasons  for  publishing  it. 

33  Clay  to  Crittenden,  December  5,  1843,  Crittenden  Papers. 

34  Writing  from  Savannah,  he  said:  "I  think  I  can  treat  the  question 
in  a  manner  very  different  from  any  treatment  Avhich  I  have  yet  seen  of  it, 
and  so  as  to  reconcile  all  our  friends,  and  many  others  to  the  vieAVs  which 
I  entertain.  Of  one  thing  you  may  be  certain,  that  there  is  no  such  anxiety 
for  the  annexation  here  at  the  South  as  you  might  have  been  disposed  to 
imagine"   (Clay  to  Crittendon,  March  24,  1844,  Crittenden  Papers). 


224  JAMES   E.   POLK 

The  time  was  fast  approaching  when  candidates  must  take  a 
definite  stand  either  for  or  against  annexation.  Despite  the  de- 
sire of  some  of  them  to  eliminate  this  topic  from  the  issues  of  the 
campaign,  every  day  brought  the  subject  more  into  prominence. 
Calhoun's  position  was  already  well  known,  for  in  his  letter  ac- 
cepting the  cabinet  portfolio  he  had  come  out  strongly  in  favor 
of  annexation.  Clay  would  probably  be  nominated  by  his  party 
no  matter  what  position  he  might  choose  to  take  with  respect  to 
the  all  absorbing  topic.  Of  greater  importance,  therefore,  was 
the  stand  to  be  taken  by  Van  Buren ;  for  on  this  would  depend, 
in  all  probability,  his  success  or  failure  in  the  nominating  con- 
vention. 

On  March  27,  1844,  W.  H.  Hammet,  a  member  of  Congress 
from  Mississippi  and  an  "unpledged  delegate  to  the  Baltimore 
convention,"  addressed  a  letter  to  Van  Buren  asking  for  his 
views  on  the  annexation  of  Texas.  In  writing  this  letter  Hammet 
was  evidently  cooperating  with  the  most  loyal  friends  of  Van 
Buren,  and  not,  as  Benton  has  intimated,  with  the  supporters  of 
Calhoun. ^^  After  taking  ample  time  for  consideration  Van  Buren 
on  April  20,  drafted  his  reply  and  sent  it  to  his  most  intimate 
friend,  Silas  Wright.  When  it  reached  Wright  on  the  evening 
of  the  26th,  it  was  read  to  a  number  of  Van  Buren 's  friends, 
including  Fairfield,  King,  and  Benton.  They  approved  it  and 
decided  that  it  should  be  published  immediately 'in  the  Glohc. 
This  course  was  decided  upon  before  Hammet  had  even  seen  the 
letter.^^  The  ex-President  began  his  letter  by  asserting  his  be- 
lief that  the  United  States  had  the  constitutional  right  to  annex 
Texas,  He  then  gave  a  history  of  the  quesion  and  of  his  own 
attempt  to  purchase  it  while  Secretary  of  State  under  Jackson. 


35  BentoD,  Thirty  Years'  View,  II,  587. 

36  Wright  to  Van  Buren,  Washington,  April  29,  1844,  Van  Buren  Papers. 
"Hammet  Avas  frightened,"  said  Wright,  "and  it  was  with  some  diftieulty 
that  we  induced  him  to  our  proposition  for  publicatiorr,  before  he  had  read 
it;  but  lie  behaved  well  and  himself  and  the  Major  remained  at  the  Globe 
offic«  until  about  midnight,  to  examine  the  proof. ' ' 


SELECTION   OF  CANDIDATES,  1844  225 

But,  said  he,  as  conditions  are  now,  annexation  would  in  all 
probability  bi'ing  on  a  war  with  Mexico,  and 

could  we  hope  to  staud  perfectly  justified  in  tiic  eyes  of  mankind  for 
entering  into  it;  more  especially  if  its  commencement  is  to  be  preceded 
by  the  appropriation  to  our  own  uses  of  the  territory,  the  sovereignty  of 
which  is  in  dispute  betwCn  two  nations,  one  of  wliich  we  are  to  join  in 
the  struggle? 

He  thought  not,  for  "we  have  a  character  among  the  nations  of 
the  earth  to  maintain. ' '  He  did  not  believe  that  there  was  danger 
of  foreign  interference  in  Texas  or  that  nothing  but  immediate 
action  could  prevent  Texas  from  being  lost  to  the  United  States.^^ 
On  the  very  day  that  Van  Buren  penned  his  answer  to  Ham- 
met,  Cave  Johnson  sent  him  a  letter  from  Washington.^'^  He 
informed  the  ex-President  that  within  two  days  the  Texas  treaty 
would  be  sent  to  the  Senate,  and,  from  all  appearances,  would 
be  the  controlling  factor  in  the  next  Presidential  election.  For 
this  reason  he  and  other  friends  hoped  that  A-^an  Buren  would 
favor  annexation,  because  "they  hope  such  a  position  will  not 
injure  you  in  the  North,  whilst  it  must  overwhelm  Mr.  Clay  in 
the  South  if  he  hesitates  or  equivocates."  In  order  to  forestall 
intrigues  to  prevent  his  nomination,  Johnson  urged  him  to  make 
his  position  known  at  the  earliest  possible  date.^^  Johnson's 
warning,  to  be  sure,  came  too  late ;  on  the  other  hand,  it  seems 


3'  The  letter  was  published  in  the  Washington  Glohe,  April  28,  1844. 

3s  Whether  Johnson  had  any  knowledge  of  Hammet  's  letter  to  Van 
Buren,  I  am  unable  to  say.  If  he  had,  Van  Buren 's  long  delay  in  answering 
probably  induced  him  to  "WTite. 

39  "  In  the  event  of  your  being  favorable  to  the  treaty,  I  entreat  you 
to  take  the  earliest  opportunity  of  giving  your  -sdews — we  have  intrigues  on 
hand  here  if  practicable,  to  supersede  you  in  the  Baltimore  Convention — 
and  this  Cjuestion  is  one  of  the  means  used  to  arouse  some  of  the  Western 
&  S  Western  members  agt  you — from  a  supposition  that  you  are  hostile 
to  it — the  delay  of  the  Globe  in  coming  out — your  delay  and  the  opinion  of 
some  of  the  N.  Y.  Democrats — all  are  urged  &  I  fear  with  some  effect  among 
the  members."  Already,  said  he,  some  are  expressing  fears  of  Van  Buren 's 
"availability"  and  are  talking  of  other  candidates,  such  as  Stewart, 
Dodge,  and  Cass.  He  is  gratified  to  learn  that  Nicholson,  who  had  headed 
the  Cass  movement  in  Tennessee,  now  says  that  Van  Buren  is  the  only  man 
Avho  can  carry  that  state.  Such,  also,  is  the  opinion  of  Governor  Polk 
(Johnson  to  Van  Bureu,  April  20,  1844,  Van  Buren  Papers). 


226  JAMES  K.  POLK 

to  show  that  he  was  sincerely  desirous  of  Van  Buren's  nomina- 
tion until  the  New  Yorker  had  taken  a  position  which  would, 
in  all  probability,  render  his  election  impossible.  The  sin- 
cerity of  Johnson's  regret  when  Van  Buren's  opposition  to  an- 
nexation became  known  is  expressed  in  a  letter  to  Polk.  "Many 
of  us  are  in  rather  low  spirits  today — his  course  gives  great  advan- 
tage to  the  discontents  over  us  and  they  will  make  the  most  they 
can  out  of  it."*"  Two  days  later  he  reported  that  the  excitement 
over  Van  Buren's  letter  was  not  abating,  and  that  the  friends 
of  Texas  had  called  a  meeting  at  the  capitol  over  which  E.  J. 
Walker  had  presided.  They  wanted  another  candidate — some 
w^ere  looking  to  Cass,  others  to  Calhoun.*^ 

Clay,  who  was  then  on  a  canvassing  tour,  reached  "Wahington 
in  the  latter  part  of  April.  "While  there  his  letter  on  the  Texas 
question,  dated  at  Raleigh  on  April  17,  was  given  to  the  National 
Intelligencer  for  publication.  He  was  decidedly  opposed  to  ar 
nexation,  because  it  would  surely  result  in  a  war  with  Mexico. 
Even  if  Mexico  should  agree,  he  believed  that  it  would  be  inex- 
pedient to  admit  Texas  into  the  Union.*-  Knowing  that  Van 
Buren,  whon/  he  supposed  would  be  his  opponent,  did  not  favor 
annexation,  Clay  had  not  the  "smallest  apprehension"  in  stating 
his  position.*^ 

Inquiries  were  not  limited  to  candidates  for  the  Presidency. 
Late  in  March  a  nonpartisan,  anti-Texas  meeting  assembled  in 
Cincinnati  and  a  committee  of  five,  including  Salmon  P.  Chase, 
drafted  a  letter  to  Polk  asking  his  views  on  annexation.  When 
the  letter  reached  Columbia,  Polk  was  on  his  farm  in  Mississippi, 


40  "  A  serious  &  povs-erf  ul  effort, ' '  he  continued,  ' '  will  be  made  to  get  a 
new  nomination  in  which  I  think  most  of  my  democratic  colleagues  will 
unite,  from  the  little  I  can  learn.  The  discontents  are  moving  heaven  and 
earth  &  will  never  stop  until  the  Convention  is  over  if  they  do  so  then." 
At  present,  he  said,  the  desertion  is  toward  Cass,  but  he  does  not  believe 
that  Cass  will  get  the  nomination  (Johnson  to  Polk,  April  28,  1844,  Polk 
Papers). 

41  Johnson  to  Polk,  April  30,  1844,  ibid. 

42  Nat.  InteU.,  April  27,  1844. 

43  Clay  to  Crittenden,  April  21,  1844,  Crittenden  Papers. 


SELECTION  OF  CANDIDATES,  1844  227 

but  as  soon  as  he  liad  reached  home  his  reply  to  the  committee 
was  prepared  without  hesitation.  It  bore  the  date  of  April  23 
and  advocated  unequivocally  "immediate  re-annexation."*^  Like 
Jackson  in  his  letter  to  Brown,  Polk  emphasized  the  point  that  our 
original  title  to  Texas  had  been  valid  beyond  question  and  that 
the  territory  had  unwisely  been  ceded  to  Spain.  He  conveniently 
ignored  the  fact  that  the  cession  had  been  made  by  those  who 
possessed  the  constitutional  authority  to  make  it.  And  however 
unwise  such  an  action  may  have  been,  it  is  difficult  to  see  the  bear- 
ing of  this  lack  of  wisdom  on  our  subsequent  right  to  re-annex  the 
lost  territory.  On  account  of  the  danger  that  Texas  might  become 
a  British  colony,  Polk  maintained  that  all  European  countries 
should  be  excluded  from  both  Texas  and  Oregon.  "Let  Texas 
be  re-annexed, ' '  said  he, 

and  the  authority  and  laws  of  the  United  States  be  established  and  main- 
tained within  her  limits,  as  also  the  Oregon  Territory,  and  let  the  fixed 
policy  of  our  government  be  not  to  permit  Great  Britain  or  any  other  foreign 
power  to  plant  a  colony  or  hold  dominion  over  any  portion  of  the  people  or 
territory  of  either.45 

These  remarks  on  colonization  are  not  without  interest,  for  they 
are  a  forerunner  of  what  was  later  called  the  ' '  Polk  Doctrine. ' ' 

Polk's  letter  was  written  only  three  days  after  that  of  Van 
Buren  and  of  course  without  knowledge  of  its  contents.  Indeed, 
as  late  as  May  4,  after  he  had  read  Clay's  anti-Texas  letter,  he 
expressed  the  hope  and  the  belief  that  Van  Buren  would  "now 
take  ground  for  annexation."*"  The  views  which  he  expressed 
coincided  with  those  held  generally  by  Democrats  in  Tennessee. 
On  the  very  day  that  Van  Buren  penned  his  indictment  against 
annexation,  an  enthusiastic  meeting  of  Democrats  at  Nashville 


44  "I  have  no  hesitation  in  declaring  that  I  am  in  favor  of  the  immediate 
re-annexation  of  Texas  to  the  territory  and  government  of  the  United 
States.  I  entertain  no  doubt  as  to  the  power  or  the  expediency  of  the 
re-annexation. ' ' 

45  MS,  dated  Columbia,  April  23,  1844,  Polk  Papers.  Printed  in  Wash- 
ington Globe,  May  6,  1844. 

4G  Polk  to  Johnson,  May  4,  1844,  "Polk-Johnson  Letters." 


228  JAMES  E.  POLK 

passed  resolutions  in  favor  of  it  by  a  unanimous  vote.*^  It  is  not 
surprising,  therefore,  that  Van  Buren's  letter  had  a  ''prostrating 
and  cooling  effect ' '  upon  his  supporters  in  that  state  or  that  many 
"who  had  stuck  to  him  from  a  sense  of  duty  should  now  feel  re- 
lieved from  further  obligation/''*  Individuals  could  express  their 
sentiments  very  freely  to  one  another,  but  Laughlin,  who  for  some 
time  had  been  sounding  Van  Buren's  praises,  was  now  in  some- 
what of  a  quandary.  As  editor  of  the  party  organ,  he  must  of 
course  make  some  comment.  On  May  9,  therefore,  he  pointed 
out  in  an  editorial  that,  while  Clay's  objections  to  annexation 
were  permanent,  those  of  Van  Buren  were  temporary — objec- 
tions only  until  certain  obstacles  had  been  removed.  Laughlin 
himself  advocated  immediate  annexation,  regardless  of  conse- 
quences; still,  if  a  majority  of  Democrats  should  decide  to  wait, 
he  was  ready  to  acquiesce.  This  left  the  way  open  for  continued 
support  of  Van  Buren.  Since  taking  charge  of  the  Union, 
Laughlin  had  been  bitter  in  his  assaults  upon  Clay.  The  Whig 
candidate  had  perjured  himself  by  challenging  Randolph  to  fight 
a  duel ;  he  was  guilty  of  Cilly  's  death,  because  he  had  written 
the  challenge  for  Graves;  but  neither  crime  was  surprising  in  a 
man  who  had  "defrauded  Gen.  Jackson  out  of  the  Presidency, 
for  an  office  wortli  $6000  per  annum. '  '*^ 

Before  his  treaty  with  Texas  had  been  consummated,  Tyler 
seems  to  have  given  up  hope  that  he. might  be  nominated  by  the 
Democrats.  His  official  organ  indignantly  denied  the  assertion 
made  by  the  Glohe  that  he  was  knocking  for  admission  to  the 
Baltimore  convention;  on  the  contrary,  "the  friends  of  the  Veto- 
Administration  intend  having  a  Convention  which  will  repre- 
sent the  Republican  party  more  truly  than  Mr.  Van  Buren's 


47  Nashville  Union,  April  23,  1844. 

48  "Indeed  it  has  given  a  pretext  for  doing  that  Avhieh  they  have  had 
in  their  minds  to  do — to  declare  against  V.  B.,  and  a  considerable  portion 
of  them  will  never  be  reconciled  to  him"  (Nicholson  to  Heiss,  May  8,  1844, 
"  Heiss  Papers"). 

40  Nashville  Union,  March  30,  1844. 


SELECTION   OF  CANDIDATES,   1844  220 

Convention,  and  the  nominee  will  be  elected.  "'^'^  Still,  the  Presi- 
dent Avas  ready  to  welcome  assistance  from  any  quarter,  for  in 
May  his  friend  Fisk  sounded  Cave  Johnson  concerning  Jackson 's 
opinion  of  his  administration,  and  at  the  same  time  Polk  was  being 
considered  for  the  War  Department  or  the  British  mission. '^^ 

Cass  was  the  last  of  the  aspirants  to  declare  himself  on  the 
Texas  question.  In  response  to  a  letter  from  Hannegan,  he, 
too,  came  out  for  immediate  annexation. °- 

On  May  1,  four  days  after  Clay's  Texas  letter  had  appeared 
in  print,  the  Whig  convention  assembled  at  Baltimore.  One  day 
sufficed  for  nominating  the  candidates  and  adopting  a  platform. 
Without  a  dissenting  voice,  Clay  w^as  chosen  for  the  first  place, 
and  on  the  third  ballot,  Frelinghuysen,  of  New  Jersey,  was 
selected  as  his  running  mate.  The  platform  was  drawn  to  suit 
the  candidate.  It  avoided  the  Texas  and  bank  questions  and 
emphasized  tariff,  currency,  distribution,  and  usurpation  by  the 
Executive.  With  one  omission — the  bank  question — Clay  took 
his  stand  on  the  traditional  Whig  policies,  and  appealed  to  the 
people  to  sustain  him. 

While  the  Whigs  rallied  with  enthusiasm  to  the  standard  of 
their  chief,  harmony  within  Democratic  circles  was  rendered  im- 
possible by  the  appearance  of  the  "lone  star"  on  the  political 
horizon.  The  party  w^hich  had  long  been  distinguished  for  its 
effective  discipline  and  its  unity  of  action  now  appeared  to  be 
hopelessly  divided  on  the  eve  of  battle.  Even  the  great  "chief" 
at  the  Hermitage  seemed  to  be  uncertain  as  to  the  proper  plan 
of  campaign.  His  commands  were  ambiguous,  for  they  resulted 
from  conflicting  emotions;  he  longed  to  see  his  old  friend  Van 
Buren  nominated,  but  his  desire  for  Texas  was  still  stronger. 
Although  few  had  a  definite  idea  as  to  the  best  means  of  restor- 
ing harmony,  as  the  time  for  the  Baltimore  convention  approached 


50  Madisonian,  April  3.  184-t. 

51  Johnson  to  Polk,  May  8,  1844,  Polk  Papers. 

52  His  letter  was  dated  at  Detroit  on  May  10.     There  is  a  copy  in  Niles' 
Register,  May  25,  1844. 


230  JAMES  K.  POLK 

the  conviction  that  Van  Biiren  could  not  be  elected  became  very- 
widespread.  The  Virginia  Democratic  central  committee,  by  reso- 
lution, released  the  delegates  of  that  state  from  the  obligation 
to  obey  their  instructions,  and  delegates  of  other  states  announced 
publicly  that  they  would  not  vote  for  Van  Buren/'^ 

Before  the  appearance  of  his  Texas  letter  Van  Buren  had  been 
accepted  generally  as  the  candidate;  not  because  he  enjoyed  a 
wide  popularity,  but  because  a  small  minority  urgently  advocated 
his  nomination  and  the  rest  of  the  party,  being  more  indifferent 
than  hostile,  simply  acquiesced,  since  they  had  no  substitute  to 
offer.  After  the  publication  of  his  Texas  letter,  his  downfall 
was  brought  about  by  much  the  same  process  that  had  procured 
his  elevation  to  party  leadership.  The  few  who.  were  violently 
opposed  to  his  nomination  had  little  difficulty  in  convincing 
others,  and  especially  the  friends  of  Texas,  that  he  could  not 
possibly  be  elected.  Those  who  had  supported  him  from  a  sense 
of  duty  only,  now  had  no  hesitancy  in  transferring  their  alle- 
giance to  another  candidate  who  would  be  more  likely  to  win. 
Amos  Kendall  emphasized  this  point  in  a  letter  written  to  Van 
Buren.  He  told  him  frankly  that  he  had  no  good  news,  and  that 
unless  some  one  else  could  be  nominated  at  Baltimore  the  south- 
ern delegates  would  put  up  a  third  candidate.  Kendall  did  not 
believe  that  the  pro-Texas  feeling  was  due  to  any  organized  move- 
ment, but  rather  to  the  "continued  ding-dong  sung  in  their  ears" 
by  a  few  of  the  most  interested.  Van  Buren 's  letters,  he  said, 
had  appeared  at  the  worst  possible  time ;  the  guns  were  being 
trained  on  Clay,  and  Van  Buren  appeared  just  in  time  to  get 
the  shot.^*  Cave  Johnson  reported  the  political  situation  as 
apparently  hopeless.     Benton  and  the  New  Yorkers  seemed  to 


53  Many  such  details  are  given  in  Niles'  Beg.,  LXVI,  162-163. 

54  Kendall  to  Van  Buren,  May  13,  1844,  Van  Buren  Papers,  lleudrick 
B.  Wright,  of  Pennsylvania,  believed  that  Van  Bnren  could  not  be 
nominated — and  if  nominated,  could  not  be  elected,  and  Wni.  K.  King, 
writing  from  New  York,  reported  it  to  be  generally  admitted  that  the 
ex-President  could  not  be  elected  (Wright  to  Buchanan,  May  13;  King  to 
Buchanan,  May  14,  1844,  Buchanan  Papers). 


SELECTION  OF  CANDIDATES,  1844  231 

be  determined  not  to  yield ;  Calhoun  and  his  supporters  were 
equally  uncompromising,  while  each  faction  claimed  a  majority 
of  the  convention.  ''I  see  no  hope,"  said  Johnson,  "unless  some 
man  can  be  found  disconnected  with  both  these  fragments  of  the 
democratic  party  &  who  will  yield  to  the  annexation  of  Texas. '  ''^^ 
Polk,  the  man  to  whom  this  letter  was  written,  fulfilled  these 
requirements;  and  before  the  letter  had  reached  its  destination, 
his  availahiUfij  had  already  been  discussed  at  the  Hermitage. 

The  correspondence  which  passed  between  Democratic  leaders 
in  Tennessee  about  the  middle  of  May  shows  an  absence  of 
definite  plans  for  the  future.  On  May  10  Donelson^°  summoned 
Polk  to  Nashville  to  consult  with  General  Jackson  and  others  in 
the  hope  that  they  might  find  some  means  of  preventing  a  split 
in  the  party  over  the  annexation  question.  "I  feel  deeply  morti- 
fied," said  he, 

that  our  wise  men  should  differ  so  much;  and  particularly  that  a  measure 
of  such  vast  consequences  should  have  been  kept  so  long  in  the  dark  and 
precipitated  with  so  much  haste. 

Donelson  was  fully  aware  that  Jackson's  indorsement  of  annexa- 
tion would  aid  Tyler  and  Calhoun ;  and,  apparently,  although 
his  letter  is  not  very  clear,  he  did  not  approve  making  Texas  a 
leading  issue.^'  Polk  accepted  the  invitation  and  reached  Nash- 
ville on  the  twelfth.  On  the  following  day  he  and  General  Arm- 
strong repaired  to  the  Hermitage.  They  w^ere  met  on  the  road 
by  Donelson,  who  was  taking  to  Nashville  for  publication  in  the 
Union  Jackson's  well-known  letter  which  appeared  a  few  days 
later  under  date  of  May  13th.  In  it,  Jackson  insisted  that  Texas 
must  be  annexed. 


55  Johnson  to  Polk,  May  12,  1844,  Folic  Papers. 

56  Gen.  Armstrong  and  other  politicians  wTote,  also. 

57"!  am  particularly  anxious  that  the  ground  occupied  by  the  Genl. 
should  be  thoroughly  understood  by  you.  What  he  may  now  say  if  not 
modified  by  disclosures  recently  made  will  produce  important  results.  If 
the  Texas  question  is  urged  as  it  doubtless  Avill  be  by  Tyler  cfc  Caliioun, 
and  Genl.  Jackson  gives  the  weight  of  his  name  to  sustain  their  views, 
making  it  a  leading  question  in  the  South,  the  sooner  we  know  it  the 
better.  Come  and  talk  over  the  matter  with  the  Genl.  and  our  friends 
generally"  (Donelson  to  Polk,  May  10,  1844,  Polk  Papers). 


232  JAMES  E.   POLK 

"When  reporting  the  interview  to  Cave  Johnson,'^  Polk  said 

that 

He  [Jackson]  speaks  most  affectionately  of  Mr.  Van  Buren,  but  is  com- 
pelled to  separate  from  him  upon  this  great  question,  and  says  both  he  and 
Mr.  Benton  have  by  their  letters  cut  their  own  throats  politically.  He  has 
no  idea  that  Mr.  V.  B.  can  be  nominated  or  if  nominated  that  he  can  receive 
any  Southern  support. 

Jackson  said  that  the  Baltimore  convention  must  select  some 
other  candidate  and  that  he  should  be  from  the  Southwest ;  and 
Polk's  letter  hinted  that  the  General  had  suggested  that  Polk, 
himself  ought  to  be  placed  at  the  head  of  the  ticket.  Polk  asserted 
that  he  aspired  to  the  second  place  only,  but  that  his  friends 
might  use  his  name  as  they  might  see  fit ;  in  any  event  the  party 
should  unite  on  some  '^one  candidate"  and  he  must  be  in  favor 
of  annexation.  "I  have  stood  by  3Ir.  V.  B./'  he  continued,  "and 
will  stand  by  him  as  long  as  there  is  hope,  but  I  now  despair  of 
his  election — even  if  he  be  nominated. ' '  In  another  letter  written 
on  the  following  day,°^  Polk  was  more  explicit  concerning  Jack- 
son's desire  to  substitute  his  name  for  that  of  Van  Buren.  The 
General  remarked,  said  he,  that  writing  the  anti-Texas  letter 
was  the  only  vital  error  over  committed  by  Van  Buren ;  never- 
theless, it  would  be  fatal  to  his  election. 

He  thinks  the  candidate  for  the  Presidency  should  be  an  annexation  man 
and  reside  in  the  Southwest,  and  he  openly  expresses  (what  I  assure  you  I 
had  never  for  a  moment  contemplated)  the  opinion  that  I  Avould  be  the 
most  available  man;  taking  the  Vice-Presidential  candidate  from  the  North. 
This  I  do  not  expect  to  be  effected. 

Polk  thought  it  was  more  probable  that  some  northern  man 
would  be  nominated  for  first  place,  and  himself  for  the  second. 
If  Van  Buren  should  be  withdrawn,  his  friends  would  doubtless 
control  both  nominations,  therefore  great  pains  should  be  taken 
to  conciliate  them.  Nothing,  said  Polk,  could  prevent  Clay's 
election  except  the  harmonious  selection  of  a  candidate  at  Balti- 
more.   In  offering  suggestions  for  bringing  about  sudi  harmony 


58  Polk  to  Johnson,  May  13,  1844,  "Polk-Johnson  Letters." 

59  Polk  to  Johnson,  May  14,  1844,  ibid. 


SELECTION  OF  CANDIDATES,   1844  233 

he  displayed  that  shrewedness  and  attention  to  detail  which  made 
him  one  of  the  most  astute  politicians  of  his  time.""  Along  with 
this  went  another  letter  to  Johnson,  marked  "Highly  Confi- 
dential.""^ Johnson  was  authorized  to  show  the  first  letter  to 
Silas  Wright,  and  we  are  not  left  in  douht  as  to  the  reason. 

Mr.  Wright 's  deelaratiou  to  you,  in  the  conversation  which  you  detail  in 
your  letter  of  the  8th  that  I  was  ' '  the  only  man  he  thought  the  Northern 
Democrats  would  support  if  Van  Buren  was  set  aside,  because  I  was  known 
to  be  firm  and  true  to  the  cause, ' '  is  precisely  the  opinion  which  Genl  J. 
expressed  to  me  when  I  saw  him  two  days  ago.  The  General  had  previously 
expressed  the  same  thing  to  others. 

He  once  more  asserted  that  he  had  aspired  to  the  second  office 
only  and  had  been  loyal  to  Van  Buren ;  but  since  the  secret  attack 
on  the  ex-President  "  'Fortune  is  in  a  frolic,'  and  .  .  .  there  is 
no  telling  what  may  happen. ' '  He  recommended  General  Pillow 
to  Johnson  as  a  shrewd  and  reliable  colleague  in  carryijig  out 
all  plans. 

In  Jackson's  letter  of  May  13  to  the  Nashville  Union,  in  which 
he  commented  on  Van  Buren 's  Texas  letter,  the  General  said  his 
old  friend  evidently  was  unaware  that  conditions  had  changed 
since  he  had  been  President.  No  difference  of  opinion  could 
change  his  confidence  in  Van  Buren,  but  as  to  Texas,  "Let  us 


fio  "  I  have  but  little  hope  that  union  or  harmony  can  be  restored  among 
the  members,  but  I  have  hope  that  the  Delegates  'fresh  from  the  people' — 
who  are  not  members  of  Congress — and  have  not  been  so  much  excited 
can  be  brought  together.  Let  a  strong  appeal  be  made  to  the  Delegates  as 
fast  as  they  come  in,  to  take  the  matter  into  their  own  liands,  to  control 
and  override  their  leaders  at  Washington,  who  have  already  produced  such 
distraction,  and  tMis  save  the  party.  The  Delegates  from  a  distance  can 
alone  do  this.  I  suggest  as  a  practical  plan  to  bring  them  to  act,- — to  get 
one  Delegate  from  each  State  who  may  be  in  attendance  to  meet  in  a  room 
at  Brown 's  hotel  or  somewhere  else,  and  consult  togetlxer  to  see  if  they 
cannot  hit  upon  a  plan  to  save  the  party.  If  you  will  quietly  and  without 
announcing  to  the  public  Avhat  you  are  at,  undertake  this  with  energy  and 
prosecute  it  with  vigor,  the  plan  is  feasible  and  I  think  will  succeed.  If 
the  preliminary  meeting  of  a  Delegate  from  each  State  can  agree  upon  the 
man,  then  let  each  one  see  the  other  Delegates  from  his  own  State,  and 
report  at  an  adjourned  meeting  the  result.  This  is  the  only  way  to  secure 
efficient  action  when  the  Convention  meets. ' '  The  essential  features  of  this 
plan  were  followed,  and  resulted  in  success. 

01  Polk  to  Johnson,  May  17  [14],  18-4-i,  "Polk-Johnson  Letters." 


234  JAMES  K.  FOLK 

take  it  now  and  lock  the  door  against  future  danger.""-  His 
complimentary  remarks  about  Van  Buren  were  much  like  an 
epitaph  for  a  departed  friend.  When  he  penned  them  he  felt 
certain  that  his  former  protege  was  doomed.  In  a  letter  written 
on  the  following  day  he  told  Benjamin  F.  Butler  that  nothing 
could  restore  Van  Buren  except  indorsement  of  annexation,  for 
''you  might  as  well,  it  appears  to  me,  attempt  to  turn  the  current 
of  the  Miss  [iss]  ippi  as  to  turn  the  democracy  from  the  annexation 
of  Texas  to  the  United  States. '  '"^ 

Texas  must  be  annexed,  and  Van  Buren  must  be  dropped.  So 
much,  at  least,  was  settled ;  and  if  Polk  could  be  substituted,  so 
much  the  better.  The  Union  now  began  to  prepare  its  readers 
for  the  change.  Laughlin  had  been  chosen  as  a  delegate  to  the 
Baltimore  convention,  and  Heiss  took  charge  during  his  absence. 
On  May  14,  Heiss  announced  that  Van  Buren 's  name  had  been 
placed  at  the  head  of  the  political  column  because  he  was  thought 
to  be  the  choice  of  the  Democracy.  It  would  be  left  there  until 
some  action  had  been  taken  by  the  convention,  although  the  editor 
disagreed  with  his  weak  position  on  the  Texas  question.  On  the 
18tli,  Heiss  declared  further  support  of  the  New  Yorker  to  be 
hopeless,  and  by  the  23rd  he  was  ready  to  hazard  some  "guesses" 
regarding  the  nomination.  The  first  was  that  Van  Buren  w^ould 
come  out  for  Texas  or  withdraw.  The  second  was  that  one  from 
a  suggested  list  would  be  selected  as  the  candidate.  Heading 
the  list  was  the  name  of  Governor  Polk,''*  but  since  Laughlin  was 
a  member  of  the  pre-convention  conference  held  at  Nashville, 


C2  This  letter  was  dated  May  13,  aud  published  iu  the  Nashville  Union, 
May  16,  1844. 

63  "Clay's  letter  had  prostrated  him  -svith  the  Whiggs  in  the  South  & 
"West,  and  nine  tenths  of  our  population  liad  decided  in  favour  of  Mr.  V. 
Buren  &  annexation  of  Texas — when  this,  illfated  letter  made  its  appear- 
ance and  fell  upon  the  democracy  like  a  thunderbolt''  (Jackson  to  Butler, 
May  14,  1844,  Van  Buren  Papers.  A  full  copy,  also,  in  Am.  Hist.  Bev., 
July,  1906,  833-834).  The  letter  was  carried  to  Butler  by  Donelson.  Both 
men  were  delegates  to  the  Baltimore  convention. 

04  The  others  suggested  were  Calhoun,  Cass,  Stewart,  Tyler,  and 
Buchanan. 


SELECTION   OF  CANDIDATES,   1844  235 

the  "guess"  regarding  Polk  required  no  great  powers  of  divina- 
tion.®^  On  May  28,  Heiss  made  another  significant  statement  in 
the  Union: 

We  do  not  believe  Mr.  Van  Biiren  will  receive  one  vote  from  the  Tennessee 
delegation.  If  he  does,  that  delegate  who  votes  knowingly  against  the  wishes 
of  his  constituents,  will  be  marked,  hereafter,  as  a  man  unworthy  of  their 
confidence. 

Nearly  all  the  delegates  to  the  Democratic  convention  gathered 
in  Washington  on  their  way  to  Baltimore.  For  what  transpired 
there,  we  must  rely  mainly  on  letters  written  by  Gideon  Pillow."® 
Pillow  and  Laughlin  reached  Washington  on  May  21  and  began 
a  campaign  of  interviewing  delegates  to  ascertain  their  views. 
Pillow  represented  Cave  Johnson  as  being  rather  apathetic  and 
without  hope  of  success.  It  is  true  that  Johnson  M'as  inclined 
to  see  the  dark  side ;  but  he  was  a  shrewd  politician  and  a  per- 
sonal acquaintance  of  most  of  the  delegates,  and  it  is  probable 
that  he  exerted  fully  as  much  influence  as  either  Pillow  or 
Laughlin."" 

Pillow  reported  the  party  to  be  hopelessly  divided.  The 
insurgents  declared  that  they  would  not  attend  the  convention 
unless  the  two-thirds  rule  were  agreed  upon,  and  that  they  would 
not  support  Van  Buren  in  any  event.  The  Van  Burenites  were 
equally  insistent  on  a  majority  rule."^    The  pro-Texas  Democrats 


65  On  June  4  the  National  Intelligencer  quoted  the  guesses  made  by 
Heiss  and  remarked  that  the  ' '  inference  is  irresistible ' '  that  the  arrange- 
ment for  dropping  Van  Buren  and  bringing  Polk  forward  was  made  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Nashville. 

06  Pillow  was  both  conceited  and  unprincipled ;  still,  if  allowance  be 
made  for  his  exaggeration  of  his  own  importance,  his  account  is  probably 
authentic.  His  letters  to  Polk  are  among  the  Polk  Papers.  Copies  edited 
by  Professor  Reeves  are  accessible  in  the  Am.  Hist.  Ecv.,  July,  1906,  835ff. 

67  In  his  letter  of  May  24,  Pillow  said:  "I  saw  your  letter  to  C —  J — 
and  noted  its  suggestions."  Evidently  he  refers  to  the  letter  to  Cave 
Johnson,  May  14,  1844.     See  above. 

6S  In  a  letter  written  from  Washington  to  Van  Buren,  May  26,  Wright 
said  that  the  Texas  men  Avere  plotting  to  defeat  him  by  means  of  the  two- 
thirds  rule.  New  Hampshire  men  were  told,  said  he,  that  Woodbury  would 
get  the  nomination  in  case  Van  Buren  should  be  set  aside ;  the  Pennsyl- 
vanians  Avere  told  the  same  with  respect  to  Buchanan,  and  the  Tennesseans 
with  respect  to  Polk,  Van  Buren  Papers. 


236  JAMES  K.  POLE 

tried  to  commit  Polk's  friends  against  A^an  Buren,  but  all  except 
a  few  of  the  Tennessee  delegates  maintained  a  discreet  silence 
on  this  subject.  Two  of  them,  Anderson  and  Jones,  were  bitterly- 
opposed  to  the  New  Yorker  and  would  not  cooperate  with  their 
colleagues.  Even  Andrew  Johnson  was  ready  to  sacrifice  Polk 
in  order  to  get  rid  of  A"an  Buren.  Pillow  was  satisfied  that  two- 
thirds  of  the  delegates  favored  Polk  for  Vice-President ;  many 
expressed  a  preference  for  him  as  the  candidate  for  President. 
No  agreements  were  reached  before  leaving  Washington,  yet  Pil- 
low was  quite  certain  that  Van  Buren  would  be  forced  to  with- 
draw, and,  if  so,  that  his  friends  would  never  support  Cass.  On 
the  other  hand,  he  thought  it  probable  that  they  would  be  willing 
to  support  Polk.  If  Polk  should  be  brought  forward,  it  must  be 
done  by  the  North,  because  it  would  never  do  for  southerners  to 
suggest  his  name. 

The  Democratic  convention  assembled  in  Baltimore  on  ]\Iay  27, 
1844.  A  large  majority  of  the  delegates  had  been  instructed  to 
vote  for  Van  Buren  by  state  conventions  which  had  been  held 
before  the  publication  of  his  anti-Texas  letter — in  fact,  before 
Texas  had  been  seriously  considered  as  a  political  issue.  But 
Tyler  and  Calhoun  had  precipitated  the  question,  and  many  who 
were  bitter  opponents  of  both  of  them  were  nevertheless  in  favor 
of  annexation.  Because  Van  Buren  had  taken  his  stand  against 
annexation,  many  held  that  their  instructions  were  no  longer 
binding,  for  the  conditions  under  which  they  had  been  framed 
had  changed  completely,  and  Van  Buren  no  longer  represented 
the  will  of  the  people.  In  a  few  cases,  as  in  Virginia,  steps  were 
taken  to  annul  the  instructions.  Some  of  the  delegates  from 
other  states  openly  repudiated  their  instructions,  and  others  went 
to  Baltimore  prepared  to  vote  for  Van  Buren  on  the  early  ballots 
and  then  to  use  their  own  judgments.  Benton,  Welles,  and  other 
adherents  of  the  ex-President  have  asserted  that  there  was  whole- 
sale intriguing  against  their  favorite.  No  doubt  there  was,  but 
the  widespread  defection  which  preceded  the  convention  was  not 
wholly  due  to  intrigue. 


SELECTION   OF  CANDIDATES,   1S44  237 

The  convention  selected  as  its  chairman  Hendrick  B.  Wright, 
of  Pennsylvania,  and  as  its  secretary  William  F.  Ritchie,  whose 
father  was  editor  of  the  Richmond  Enquirer.     The  friends  of 
Van  Buren  desired  a  majority  nomination,  but  his  opponents 
succeeded  in  adopting  the  two-thirds  rule,  which  had  been  used 
on  former  occasions.     The  Van  Burenites  complained  that  the 
rule  was  now  adopted  for  the  purpose  of  defeating  their  favorite, 
but,  although  the  charge  was  true,  the  majority  merely  followed 
the  usual  practice  of  Democratic  conventions.     In  asking  for  a 
new  rule  the  New  Yorkers  were  requesting  a  personal  favor  for 
their  candidate,  which,  under  the  circumstances,  they  had  no 
right  to  expect.    Van  Buren  himself  had  not  been  overscrupulous 
about  accepting  a  nomination  at  the  hands  of  Jackson's  "made 
to  order"  convention.    He  had  small  reason  to  complain  because 
the  advantage  was  now  with  his  opponents.    On  the  first  ballot  he 
received  a  majority  of  the  votes,  but  not  the  necessary  two-thirds. 
In  succeeding  ballots  his  vote  steadily   decreased.     After  the 
seventh  ballot  had  been  taken,  J.  L.  Miller,  of  Ohio,  moved,  by 
resolution,  to  declare   Van   Buren   the   party   nominee,   on   the 
ground  that  he  had,  on  the  first  ballot,  carried  a  majority  of  the 
convention.     Hickman,  of  Pennsylvania,  caused  much  laughter 
by  moving  that  General  Jackson  be  nominated  for  President  by 
a  unanimous  vote.    Both  motions  were  ruled  to  be  out  of  order, 
and  the  convention  adjourned  for  the  day  without  having  selected 
a  candidate. 

The  evening  of  May  28,  the  second  day  of  the  convention,  was 
a  momentous  one  for  Polk ;  and  Pillow  and  George  Bancroft  are 
in  substantial  agreement  as  to  what  happened,  except  that  each 
claims  first  honors  in  the  transactions  which  took  place.  In  a 
letter  to  Polk,  in  which  he  chronicled  the  events  of  the  day.  Pillow 
said :  "I  have  within  the  last  few  minutes  received  a  proposition 
from  a  leading  Delegate  of  Pennsylvania  and  of  Massachusetts  to 
bring  your  name  before  the  Convention  for  President."  Pillow 
explained  to  them  that  if  done  at  all  this  must  be  done  by  the 
North.     "There  is,  I  think  a  strong  probability  of  your  name 


238  JAMES  K.   POLK 

ultimately  coming  up  for  President.  I  do  not  think  it  prudent 
to  move  in  that  matter  now.  I  want  the  North  to  bring  you 
forward  as  a  Compromise  of  all  interests. '  '"'*  The  delegate  from 
Massachusetts  was  evidently  George  Bancroft,  for,  in  a  letter  to 
Polk,  Bancroft  said  that  after  the  convention  had  adjourned  on 
the  second  day  "it  flashed  on  my  mind,  that  it  would  be  alone 
safe  to  rally  on  you."'°  Carrol  and  Hubbard,  of  the  New  Hamp- 
shire delegation,  heartily  agreed,  and  likewise  Governor  Morton, 
of  Massachusetts. 

I  then  went  to  your  faithful  friends  Gen.  Pillow  and  Douelson.  They 
informed  me  that  if  we  of  N.  E.  would  lead  off,  they  would  follow  with 
Mississippi  and  Alabama.  .  .  .  Certain  of  this,  I  repaired  with  Gen.  Donel- 
son  and  Pillow  to  the  house  where  were  the  delegates  of  Ohio  and  New  York, 
and  I  spent  the  time  till  midnight  in  arguing  with  them. 

Medary,  of  Ohio,  was  agreeable,  and  assured  Bancroft  that  Ohio 
would  go  for  Polk  in  preference  to  Cass.  Kemble,  of  New  York, 
also  agreed  to  support  Polk. 

On  the  morning  of  the  third  day,  May  29,  Tibbatts,  of  Ken- 
tucky, withdrew  the  name  of  Richard  M.  Johnson  and,  as  Pillow 
reported  to  Polk,  ' '  we  brought  your  name  before  the  Convention 
for  the  Presidency.  "^^  On  the  first  ballot  of  the  day,  the  eighth 
of  the  session,  Polk  received  forty-four  votes.^-    As  soon  as  the 


69  Pillow  to  Polk,  May  28,  1884  {Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  July,  1906,  841). 

70  Bancroft  to  Polk,  July  6,  1844  (Howe,  Life  and  Letters  of  George 
Bancroft,  I,  253).  Years  afterward  Bancroft  wrote  a  still  more  detailed 
account  of  his  activities  during  that  evening.  He  stated  explicitly  that 
' '  Polk  owed  his  nomination  by  the  Democratic  Convention  to  me, ' '  and  that 
"I  was  the  one  who  of  my  own  mind  and  choice,  first,  on  the  adjournment 
of  the  nominating  convention,  for  the  day,  resolved  to  secure  the  nomina- 
tion for  Polk"  (Bancroft  to  I.  G.  Harris,  Bancroft  Papers,  Lrenox  Library; 
cited  by  Eeeves  in  Ain.  Hist.  Bev.,  July,  1906,  841).  Perhaps,  without 
realizing  it,  Bancroft  was  inspired  by  Pillow  and  Lauglilin  to  suggest 
Polk 's  nomination. 

■J^i  Cave  Johnson  told  Polk  that  John  Kettlewell,  of  Baltimore,  was 
"the  man  who  first  started  your  name  in  the  Baltimore  Convention" 
(Johnson  to  Polk,  Jan.  11,  1845,  Polk  Papers). 

72  In  his  letter  of  the  ■29th  to  Polk  Pillow  said  42  votes,  but  the  Balti- 
more Sun  reported  the  vote  as  follows:  Van  Buren,  104;  Cass,  114;  Polk, 
44;  Buchanan,  2;  and  Calhoun,  2.  Polk  received  6  from  N.  H.,  7  from 
Mass.,  2  from  Pa.,  1  from  Md.,  9  from  Ala.,  6  from  La.,  and  the  13  votes 
of  Tennessee. 


SELECTION  OF  CANDIDATES,   1844  239 

result  liad  been  announced,  Frazer,  of  Pennsylvania,  stated  that 
he  had  at  first  voted  for  Van  Buren  because  he  had  been  instructed 
to  do  so,  and  then  for  Buchanan  as  the  favorite  son  of  his  state ; 
but  seeing  that  neither  could  be  nominated,  he  had  cast  his  vote 
for  "James  K.  Polk,  the  bosom  friend  of  Gen.  Jackson,  and  a 
pure,  whole-hogged  democrat,  the  known  enemy  of  banks  and 
distribution."     His  remarks  were   greeted   with   applause   and 
several  warm  friends  of  Van  Buren  now  announced  that  for 
similar  reasons  they  were  ready  to  unite  upon  Polk.     Governor 
Hubbard,  of  New  Hampshire,  and  General  Howard,  of  Mary- 
land, pleaded  for  Polk  and  harmony,  and  Medary  pledged  the 
vote  of  Ohio."    Roane  took  the  Virginia  delegation  out  for  con- 
sultation and  returned  to  announce  that  its  vote  would  be  trans- 
ferred from  Cass  to  Polk.'-'    The  ninth  ballot  had  not  proceeded        , 
far  before  it  became  evident  that  it  would  be  the  last.    The  Polk    / 
list  became  so  large  that  Butler  withdrew  the   name   of  Van 
Buren,  and  many  who  had  supported  other  favorites  now  trans- 
ferred their  votes  to  the  Tennessean.     In  this  way  his  vote  was 
made  unanimous,  and  although  South  Carolina  was  not  repre- 
sented officially,  Elmore  and  Pickens  were  present  and  pledged 
the  support  of  their  state  to  the  new  candidate.     Silas  Wright, 
of  New  York,  a  warm  friend  of  Van  Buren,  was  nominated  for 
Vice-President;  he  declined  the  honor,  and  George  M.  Dallas 
was  chosen  in  his  stead."    A  series  of  resolutions  was  adopted, 
one  of  which  declared  in  favor  of  ' '  the  re-occupation  of  Oregon 
and  the  re-annexation  of  Texas  at  the  earliest  practicable  period." 
The  committee  on  resolutions  had  considered  the  "one  term" 
pledge  which  had  been  referred  to  it  by  the  convention,  but 
reported  against  such  a  restriction  on  the  ground  that  it  would 


"3  Speaking  of  Bancroft's  influence,  Lauglilin  told  Polk  that  "he  and 
old  Morton  ' '  were  mainlv  responsible  for  wheeling  the  ' '  Yankee  States ' ' 
into  line  (Laughlin  to  Polk,  May  31,  1844,  Polk  Papers). 

T4  Bancroft  to  Polk  (Howe,  op.  cit.,  I,  254). 

75  The  above  details,  unless  otherwise  noted,  have  been  taken  from  the 
report  of  the  convention  published  in  the  Baltimore  Sun,  May  28-30,  and 
Niles'  Eegister,  June  1,  1844. 


240  JAMES  K.  POLK 

be  inconsistent  to  take  such  action  after  so  many  had  been 
instructed  to  support  Van  Buren  for  a  second  term. 

When  notifying  Polk  of  his  nomination,  Pillow'"  was  inclined 
to  take  all  the  credit  for  bringing  it  about.  To  be  sure,  he  very 
modestly  said  that  "I  had  good  help  in  some  true-men  in  the 
North,"  but  that  he  "got  no  help"  from  "our  home  people." 
On  the  other  hand,  Bancroft  has  made  it  clear  that  Donelson  took 
a  leading  part  in  procuring  votes  for  Polk,  and  it  is  unlikely 
that  two  such  veteran  politicians  as  Laughlin  and  Cave  Johnson 
were  entirely  inactive.  It  appears  that  the  knowledge  of  Jack- 
son's preference  for  Polk  was  by  no  means  confined  to  Tennes- 
seans,'^  and  it  would  be  interesting  to  know  in  what  degree  this 
fact  had  a  bearing  on  the  ultimate  choice  of  the  convention. 

From  the  above  account  it  will  be  seen  that  Polk's  nomination 
resulted  from  a  combination  of  influences  originally  distinct. 
Seeing  no  hope  of  their  own  election,  both  Tyler  and  Calhoun 
were  ready,  for  two  reasons,  to  lend  their  support  to  the  new 
candidate.  In  the  first  place,  he  believed  as  they  did  on  the 
Texas  question ;  in  the  second,  so  long  as  the  office  was  beyond 
their  own  reach,  they  would  rather  see  it  go  to  a  new  man  than 
to  one  of  the  competitors  w^ho  had  so  roundly  abused  them.  In 
the  long  run  the  Van  Burenites  were,  for  similar  reasons,  con- 
strained to  acquiesce  in  Polk's  nomination  and  to  contribute 
their  support  to  his  campaign.  The  Calhoun  faction  and  the 
insurgent  element  led  by  R.  J.  Walker  were  enemies  in  other 
respects,  but  they  agreed  on  annexation  and  therefore  combined 
successfully  to  prevent  the  nomination  of  Van  Buren.  There  is 
plenty  of  evidence  that  the  Van  Burenites  had  no  love  for  Polk, 


T6  His  letter  bore  the  date  May  30,  but  obviously  it  "vvas  written  on  the 
29th  (Am.  Hist.  Bev.,  July,  1906,  842). 

77  J.  B.  Jones,  writing  from  Baltimore  to  liis  paper,  the  Madisonian, 
May  29,  said:  "It  is  true  I  hear  it  whispered  about  the  streets,  that  the 
nomination  of  Mr.  Polk  was  agreed  upon  at  the  Hermitage,  Mr.  B.  F. 
Butler,  in  behalf  of  Mr.  Van  Buren  and  the  Globe,  concurring"  (Madi- 
sonian,  May  30,  1844). 


SELECTION   OF  CANDIDATES,   1844  241 

yet  their  feeling  toward  him  \vas  indifference  rather  than  hos- 
tility. Though  they  were  not  strong  enough  to  nominate  their 
favorite,  they  could  at  least  veto  the  nomination  of  an  objec- 
tionable rival  like  Cass,  and,  within  certain  limits,  could  deter- 
mine the  choice  of  the  candidate.  To  Polk  they  had  no  specific 
objection ;  consequently,  if  all  factions  would  agree  to  accept  him, 
his  nomination  would  be  less  objectionable  than  that  of  Cass 
or  Buchanan.  Therefore  they  made  a  virtue  of  necessity  and 
reluctantly  transferred  from  Van  Buren  to  Polk.  They  claimed 
afterwards  that  they  had  been  responsible  for  Polk's  nomination, 
and  this  was  true  in  the  sense  that  they  could  have  prevented  it ; 
still,  under  the  circumstances,  Polk  had  small  reason  to  feel  under 
obligation  to  men  who,  after  all,  had  acquiesced  in  his  nomination 
merely  as  a  choice  of  evils. 

Even  before  the  appearance  of  his  anti-Texas  letter.  Van 
Bureau  had  little  real  popularity  outside  of  a  small  circle  of 
friends.  After  its  publication,  his  defeat  at  the  polls  being 
inevitable,  his  nomination  would  have  meant  party  suicide.  This 
fact  should  have  been  obvious  to  his  most  ardent  supporters,  and 
yet  they  chose  to  regard  his  defeat  at  Baltimore  as  the  result  of 
a  series  of  political  intrigues.  They  did  not,  of  course,  have  all 
the  information  which  is  now  accessible,  consequently  the  motives 
of  many  of  their  contemporaries  were  misjudged.  Benton's 
version  of  Van  Buren 's  downfall  has  already  been  noted;  still 
more  elaborate  and  equally  erroneous  is  the  version  of  Gideon 
Welles. 

In  a  history  of  the  contest  which  he  prepared  but  never  pub- 
lished,^* Welles,  like  Benton,  attributed  the  shelving  of  Van 
Buren  to  a  many-sided  intrigue  in  which  Calhoun,  originally, 
was  the  chief  actor."'-*     In  a  "last  desperate   struggle   for  the 


78  MS  article,  "A  Eeview  of  the  Political  History  of  the  United  States 
and  Presidential  Contests"  (Welles  Papers,  Library  of  Congress). 

79  "If  Mr.  Calhoun  was  insatiable  in  his  ambition,  he  was  also  fertile 
in  his  schemes  to  promote  it.  They  were  often  visionary  and  startling, 
so  much  so  as  to  forfeit  rather  than  beget  general  confidence,  yet  to  those 


242  JAMES  K.  POLE 

presidency"  he  brought  forward  tlie  Texas  question,  and,  when 
he  entered  Tyler's  cabinet,  he  believed  that  the  President  would 
assist  him.  His  main  object,  up  to  this  time,  according  to  Welles, 
was  to  make  Van  Buren's  nomination  impossible.  But  Tyler 
appropriated  the  Texas  question  and  resolved  to  stand  for  reelec- 
tion ;  and  while  many  Democrats  were  ready  to  espouse  annexa- 
tion, they  would  not  rally  to  the  standard  of  Calhoun.  In  other 
words,  he  had  succeeded  in  weakening  Van  Buren,  but  had  failed 
in  the  attempt  to  attract  support  for  himself.  Robert  J.  Walker, 
said  Welles,  was  interested  in  the  annexation  of  Texas  because  it 
offered  an  opportunity  for  land-scrip  speculation.  Working 
through  Mason,  Tyler's  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Walker  had  con- 
vinced the  Richmond  politicians  that  the  surest  means  of  defeat- 
ing the  aspirations  of  Calhoun  was  the  nomination  of  some  other 
pro-Texas  Democrat.  The  preference  of  the  Virginians,  said 
Welles,  was  Levi  Woodbury,  but  on  arriving  at  Baltimore  they 
found  that  New  England  would  not  support  him. 

Up  to  this  point,  with  some  modification  as  to  Walker's 
motives,  Welles 's  account  is  apparently  accurate,  but  his  state- 
ments, concerning  the  promotion  of  Polk 's  interests  are  erroneous 
in  detail  and  give  an  unfair  impression  of  the  attitude  of  the 
Tennessee  politicians. 

Although  Calhoun  had  announced  before  the  meeting  of  the 
convention  that  he  would  not  permit  his  name  to  be  presented, 
Welles  believed  that  he  still  had  hopes  of  being  nominated  and 
that  they  had  been  blasted  by  the  nomination  of  Polk.  After 
asserting  that  Polk  was  "brought  forward"  by  the  friends  of 
Van  Buren  who,  under  the  circumstances,  would  not  support  any 
of  the  other  competitors,  Welles  then  proceeds  to  tell  how  the 
Tennesseans  under  the  leadership  of  Cave  Johnson  and  Gideon 


with  whom  he  was  intini<ate,  or  who  were  within  the  circle  of  his  influence, 
there  was  a  charm  in  his  plans  that  was  to  the  adventurous  inviting. 
There  were  always  some  one  or  more  prominent  ]>oints  in  his  intrigues 
that  enlisted  ardent  supporters,  and  on  these  points  he  concentrated  the 
energies  of  an  intellect  of  unusual  power,  and  pursued  his  object  with  an 
intensity  that  had  no  limits." 


SELECTION  OF   CANDIDATES,   1844  2-13 

Pillow  had,  for  some  time  before  the  meeting  of  the  convention, 
been  playing  a  "deep  and  subtle  game"  to  procure  Polk's  nom- 
ination. They  "concealed  their  purpose  from  Genl  Jackson  who 
would  give  no  countenance  to  the  movement "[!]  ;  they  "fast- 
ened themselves  on  Wright  and  Benton  as  friends  and  partisans 
of  Van  Buren,  which  they  were  except  in  the  contingency  of 
securing  Polk's  nomination,"  betrayed  their  confidence  and 
secretly  intrigued  against  Van  Buren.^° 

Many  of  the  items  in  Welles 's  statement  may  be  true  enough, 
but  in  one  of  the  main  clauses  the  terms  are  inverted.     He  con- 
tends that  the  Tennesseans  were  ready  to  support  Van  Buren 
xmless  they  could  nominate  Polk ;  whereas,  they  desired  to  nom- 
inate Polk  because  Van  Buren 's  nomination,  or  his  election  at 
any  rate,  was  no  longer  possible.     Their  efforts  in  Polk's  behalf 
were  made  not  only  with  Jackson's  knowledge,  but  at  his  instiga- 
tion.    Under  the  circumstances,  neither  he  nor  they  considered 
these  efforts  to  be  a  betrayal  of  Van  Buren.    Surely  Jackson  had 
made  it  clear  to  both  Van  Buren  and  Butler,  as  well  as  to  Benton, 
that  he  favored  the  nomination  of  some  pro-Texas  candidate.    So 
successful,  however,  were  the  Tennessee  delegates  in  their  decep- 
tion, according  to  Welles,  that  the  friends  of  Van  Buren  "had 
no  conception  of  the  duplicity  in  that  quarter"  until  all  was 
over,  and  then  they  were  forced  to  support  the  party  nominee. 
The  "reserve"  of  Wright  and  the  "indignant  resentment"  of 
Benton  were  caused  by  the  discovery  of  this  "treachery."     The 
New  York  Democrats  worked  loyally  for  the  ticket,  and  "few 
knew  what  doubt  &  repugnance  their  strongest  men  entertained 
for  the  candidate "  [ !] 

The  New  Yorkers  were  chagrined  by  the  defeat  of  their 
favorite,  and  not  knowing  all  the  facts,  it  was  natural  for  them 
to  suspect  the  motives  of  those  who  had  profited  by  their  defeat. 

80  Welles  admits  that  for  Iavo  years  the  Tennesseans  had  been  loyal^  to 
Van  Buren  while  others  were  intriguing  against  him.  He  states  that  New 
Yorkers  desired  to  associate  Polk  on  the  ticket  with  the  ex-President, 
instead  of  R.  M.  Johnson.     This  is  extremely  improbable. 


244  JAMES  E.  POLK 

It  was  rumored  at  Baltimore  that  Polk's  nomination  had  been 
agreed  upon  at  the  Hermitage,  and  "Whig  papers  made  assertions 
to  this  effect."  In  stating  to  Polk  his  reasons  for  declining  the. 
Vice-Presidential  nomination,  Wright  said  that  the  people  of 
New  York  believed  that  there  had  been  intrigue  against  "\"an 
Buren  in  the  convention  and  tliat  votes  for  Polk  could  be  pro- 
cured in  the  state  only  by  asserting  that  the  candidate  had  had 
nothing  to  do  with  the  intrigue.*^-  Doubtless  Wright  shared  the 
belief  of  his  associates ;  but  even  if  all  of  the  charges  against  the 
insurgent  element  had  been  true,  Van  Buren  "s  rejection  had  been 
brought  about  not  so  much  by  intrigue  as  by  the  application  of 
the  Democratic  doctrine  of  majority  rule.  To  be  sure,  he  received 
the  votes  of  a  majority  of  the  convention,  but  the  delegates  had 
been  selected  before  his  views  on  Texas  had  become  known ;  and 
although  there  is  no  means  of  ascertaining  with  certainty  the 
desire  of  Democratic  voters  as  a  whole,  there  is  ample  reason  for 
believing  that  a  large  majority  of  them  did  not  prefer  Van  Buren 
after  the  publication  of  his  anti-Texas  letter.  From  the  first, 
Calhoun  Democrats  had  been  openly  hostile,  and  those  led  by 
Walker,  whom  Welles  had  called  the  "chief  engine"  of  the  con- 
vention, made  no  attempt  to  conceal  their  unalterable  opposition 
to  Van  Buren.  It  is  not  easy  to  see  why  their  efforts  to  defeat  his 
nomination  should  be  termed  an  intrigue  any  more  than  the  efforts 
of  his  supporters  to  procure  it.  Even  "Old  Hickory"  did  not 
hesitate  to  say  that  no  anti-Texas  man  could  possibly  win,  and 
surely  he  could  not  be  accused  of  plotting  against  his  old  friend 
and  protege.    Naturally  Polk's  immediate  friends  did  not  confide 


SI  "There  is  one  circumstance,  and  only  one,"  said  the  Nashville  Union 
(June  11,  1844)  in  denying  these  charges,  "which  could  impress  any 
honest  mind  with  the  belief  that  General  Jackson  controlled  the  nomi- 
nation— that  circumstance  is  this:  the  work  is  so  iveJl  done,  that  to  an  honest 
mind,  it  looks  reasoncihle  that,  it  might  have  been  done  by  old  Hickory ! " 

82  Wright  to  Polk,  June  2,  1844,  Polk  Papers.  It  has  been  said,  con- 
tinued Wright,  that  Van  Buren  was  set  aside  because  of  his  anti-Texas 
letter.  Better  leave  it  so.  Had  he  (Wright),  who  held  the  same  views, 
accepted  the  nomination  on  an  annexation  ticket,  the  people  would  have 
concluded  that  Van  Buren  had  been  dropped  for  some  other  reason. 


SELECTION  OF  CANDIDATES,   1844  2-45 

their  secret  hopes  to  Wright  or  to  Benton,  and  the  realization  of 
these  hopes  was  contingent  on  the  defeat  of  Van  Buren's  nom- 
ination ;  l)ut  if  this  amounted  to  deception,  it  should  be  remem- 
bered that  the  ex-President's  doom  was  sealed  by  the  vote  of  148 
to  lis  in  favor  of  the  two-thirds  rule,  and  even  if  the  Tennessee 
delegates  had  joined  with  the  minority,  such  action  would  not 
have  altered  the  result.    Van  Buren  had  always  been  indifferent 
when  Polk  stood  in  need  of  assistance,  consequently  there  was  no 
valid  reason  why  the  Tennesseans  should  continue  to  follow  the 
ex-President  in  his  pursuit  of  a  forlorn  hope.    On  the  first  seven 
ballots  they  voted  for  Cass,  after  which  they  transferred  to  Polk. 
Irrespective  of  intrigues  in  his  behalf,  the  selection  of  Polk 
as  the  compromise  candidate  was  quite  natural,  if  not  inevitable. 
Apparently,  a  majority  at  least  had  come  to  Baltimore  prepared 
to  support  him  for  the  second  place.    He  was  the  only  aspirant 
who  was  not  also  a  candidate  for  the  Presidency,  and  for  that 
reason,  objectionable  to  the  different  factions.  The  Van  Burenites 
would  not  support  any  of  their  hero's  rivals,  with  the  possible 
exception  of  Colonel  Johnson ;  and  the  other  factions  would  never 
consent  to  make  Johnson  the  Presidential  candidate.    Some  new 
man  must  be  selected ;  and  of  these,  who  had  a  better  claim  than 
Polk's?     As  a  member  of  Congress  he  had  done  valiant  party 
service,  and  had  proved  himself  to  be  a  man  of  ability  and  discre- 
tion.   The  statements  made  by  Welles'*^  that  he  ''was  destitute  of 
personal  popularity"  and  especially  that  he  had  "no  qualities  to 
recommend  him"  are  gross  exaggerations.     Welles  himself  had 
expressed  a  different  opinion  in  1844.*^     Even  Horace  Greely, 
although  he  spoke  disparagingly  of  Polk  during  the  campaign, 
had,  in  1839,  called  him  "one  of  the  ablest  men  and  most  powerful 


83  Welles,  loc.  cit. 

84  In  a  letter  written  to  Van  Buren,  Nov.  1.3,  1844,  he  askc.l  whether 
Polk  would  have  sufficient  energry  and  discernment  to  make  the  a.lnnnis- 
tration  his  own,  and  added  that  "my  own  belief  is,  that  he  will  prove 
himself  worthv  of  being:  the  choice  of  the  democracy,  after  it  could  not 
have  its  first  choice"  (Fan  Buren  Papers). 


246  JAMES  E.  POLK 

speakers  in  the  south  west. '  '^^  General  Jackson  aptly  summarized 
Polk's  qualifications  for  office  when  he  wrote  that 

his  capacitv  for  business  [is]  great — -and  to  extraordinary  i^owers  of  labor, 
both  mental  and  physical,  he  unites  that  tact  and  judgment  which  are 
requisite  to  the  successful  direction  of  such  an  office  as  that  of  Chief 
Magistrate  of  a  free  people.so 

Joseph  Storey  was  "thunderstruck"  by  the  selection  made  at 
Baltimore  ;  Governor  Letcher  exclaimed  ' '  Polk !  Great  God,  what 
a  nomination ! ' '  ;^'^  and  the  Whig  journals  predicted  an  easy  vic- 
tory. But  the  Democrats,  in  the  public  press  and  in  private  cor- 
respondence, gave  abundant  evidence  of  both  satisfaction  and 
relief  because  a  party  crisis  had  been  averted.  Of  course,  due 
allowance  must  be  made  for  partisan  zeal,  and  for  a  self-seeking 
desire  to  stand  well  with  the  nominee.  No  doubt  many  professed 
a  friendship  which  they  did  not  feel,  and,  in  the  hope  of  reward, 
claimed  to  have  been  influential  in  procuring  the  nomination.**'* 
Still,  he  was  scarcely  less  popular  than  any  of  the  other  aspirants, 
and  as  the  campaign  proceeded  it  came  to  be  recognized  generally 
that  the  convention  had  chosen  the  leader  who  would  be  most 
likely  to  win. 

The  Spectator,  which  was  supposed  to  voice  the  sentiments 
of  Calhoun,  while  expressing  surprise  that  Polk  had  been  selected, 
nevertheless  approved  the  choice  which  had  been  made.'^**     Its 


so  Biographical  A)imial,  1841,  p.  52.  When  quoting  this  the  Washington 
Globe,  July  12,  1844,  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  Clay  lived  in  the 
southwest. 

86  Letter  dated  June  24.     Quoted  by  Nashville  Union,  Aug.  13,  1844. 

87  Story  to  McLean,  Aug.  16,  1844,  McLean  Papers.  Letcher  to  Bu- 
chanan, July  7,  1844,  Buchanan  Papers. 

88  "If  you  were  here,"  wrote  Pillow,  "3'ou  would  imagine  yourself 
the  most  popular  man  in  the  world,  and  you  would  be  sure  you  nercr  had 
an  enemy  in  the  convention.  You  cannot  know  how  much  pains  they  take 
to  give  in  to  me  their  adhesion  to  j^ou,  and  to  impress  me  with  the  great 
merit  of  their  conduct."  "Never,"  said  Benton,  "was  such  a  multitude 
seen  claiming  the  merit  of  Polk's  nomination,  and  demanding  the  reward, 
for  having  done  what  had  been  done  before  they  heard  of  it"  (Pillow  to 
Polk,  May  30  (29?),  1844,  Polk  Papers;  Bcntoii.  Tliirti/  Years'  Fiew,  II, 
594). 

80  Spectator,  May  29,  1844. 


SELECTION   OF  CANDIDATES,   1844  247 

editor,  John  Heart,  announced  liis  intention  to  publish  a  weekly 
journal,  to  he  called  "Young  Hickory"  in  honor  of  Polk.  Tyler 
was  nominated  by  a  convention  of  his  own,  but  his  letter  of 
acceptance  intimated  that  he  might  cease  to  be  a  candidate  if 
Texas  should  be  annexed  by  treaty  or  otherwise.""  Polk  entered 
the  canvass,  therefore,  supported  by  an  apparently  united  Democ- 
racy, and  with  some  prospect  of  eventual  assistance  from  those 
who  had  recently  unfurled  to  the  breeze  the  banner  of  "Tyler 
and  Texas." 


9oA'af.  InteJh,  May  31,  1844.  Several  years  later  he  hinted  that  his 
main  object  had  been  to  force  the  Democrats  to  stand  firmly  for  Texas 
(Tyler  to  Wise,  Tyler,  Letters  and  Times  of  the  Tylers,  II,  317). 


CHAPTER  XIII 

CAMPAIGN  OF  1844 

"Who  is  James  K.  Polk?"  Such  was  the  derisive  query 
raised  by  the  Whigs  as  soon  as  the  result  of  the  Democratic  con- 
vention had  been  announced.^  It  was  an  effective  campaign  cry. 
More  than  argument  could  have  done  it  attached  to  Polk  the 
stigma  of  mediocrity  and  obscurity,  and,  to  some  extent  at  least, 
it  appears  to  have  influenced  the  opinion  of  later  generations. 
But  as  it  turned  out  this  very  cry  recoiled  as  a  boomerang  upon 
those  who  hurled  it,  for  this  "obscure"  person  was  soon  to  be 
known  as  the  vanquisher  of  their  own  renowned  "Prince  Hal." 

Justly  or  unjustly,  both  in  1844  and  since  that  time,  Clay  has 
enjoyed  the  reputation  of  being  a  great  man.  On  the  other 
hand,  Polk's  opponents  have  rated  him  as  a  man  possessed  of 
scarcely  second-class  ability — a  man  whom  accident  alone  had 
placed  in  an  exalted  position.  Even  his  friends  have  usually 
been  rather  apologetic — not  insisting  that  he  was  really  a  great 
man,  but  that  he  was  more  able  than  he  has  been  represented  to 
be  by  his  adversaries. 

The  Whigs  entered  the  campaign  full  of  confidence  in  tlieir 
standard  bearer  and  delighted  that  the  Democratic  party  had 
made  the  "blunder"  of  passing  over  a  man  of  ability  like  Van 
Buren,  and  had  as  the  National  Intelligencer  put  it,  ''let  itself 
down"  to  Polk.  The  Demcrats,  on  the  contrary,  while  they  rallied 
loyally  to  the  ticket,  were  manifestly  full  of  misgivings  because 
one  of  the  prominent  men  of  the  party  had  not  been  selected  to 


1  Writing  from  Columbia,  S.  C,  to  Crittenden,  Wm.  C.  Preston  said: 
"The  democrats  here  cry  hurra  for  Polk  in  the  street  and  come  round  to 
ask  me  who  the  devil  he  is"  (undated  letter  in  the  Crittenden  Papers, 
vol.  9). 


CAMPAIGN   OF   1844  2-19 

enter  the  contest  with  Clay.  Some  of  the  newspapers,  while  ad- 
mitting that  Polk  was  not  of  the  first  rank,  argued  that  great 
men  and  democracy  were  incompatible. 

And  yet,  what  is  a  great  man,  and  by  what  standard  is  he 
measured?  In  his  long  career  in  the  political  field.  Clay  had 
been  an  opportunist,  and,  to  a  considerable  degree,  an  adventurer. 
He  had  mounted  one  hobby  after  another  in  the  hope  of  political 
advancement.  There  was  little  consistency  in  his  record,  for  the 
panacea  which  he  advocated  on  any  particular  occasion  might 
differ  radically  in  principle  from  the  one  offered  only  a  year  or 
two  before.  Many  of  the  policies  championed  by  Clay  were  vision- 
ary and  impracticable,  and  few  of  them  would  now  be  considered 
sound.  Furthermore,  if  greatness  is  to  be  rated  by  success. 
Clay's  claim  to  it  was  not  very  well  founded;  for  although  he 
frequently  succeeded  in  upsetting  the  plans  of  others,  he  was 
seldom  successful  in  inaugurating  his  own  most  cherished  policies. 
His  greatest  strength  lay  in  his  power  of  persuasion,  and  his 
greatest  achievements  were  in  compromising  the  divergent  views 
of  others  and  in  procuring  the  adoption  of  measures  after  the 
compromise  had  been  agreed  upon. 

Polk  early  adopted  the  fundamentals  of  the  Jeffersonian 
creed.  A  conservative  by  nature,  he  was  wary  of  experiments 
and  shaped  his  course  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  the 
party  which  had  been  founded  by  his  patron.  His  record,  there- 
fore, was  consistent,  and  he  could  seldom  be  accused  of  trimming 
his  sails  to  catch  the  varying  winds  of  popular  opinion.  He  was 
not  a  creator  of  issues,  but  his  judgment  on  those  which  were 
presented  was  far  sounder,  as  a  rule,  than  that  of  his  great 
opponent.  With  no  pretense  to  oratory,  he  was  an  effective  and 
convincing  debater,  while,  his  thorough  knowledge  on  public 
questions  was  conceded  even  by  his  foes.  When  he  was  nominated 
for  the  Presidency,  he  could  point  to  a  career  of  almost  uniform 
successes,  and  as  President  few  have  had  a  more  definite  program 
to  carry  out  or  have  succeeded  so  well  in  accomplishing  their 


250  JAMES   E.  POLE 

purposes.  But  in  spite  of  all  this  Clay  was  conceded  a  place  in 
the  first  rank  of  statesmen,  while  many,  even  of  Polk's  supporters, 
did  not  claim  for  their  candidate  more  than  second-rate  ability. 
The  Democratic  Review,'^  although  it  denounced  the  methods  by 
which  Clay  had  achieved  his  fame,  did  not  deny  that  in  the 
popular  mind  Clay  was  rated  higher  than  Polk,  so  it  made  the 
best  of  the  situation  by  saying  that  ' '  our  opponents  are  welcome 
to  all  their  pride  in  their  chief  as  a  'great  man' — we  are  content 
with  ours  as  a  good  one,  and  great  enough  for  all  practical 
purposes. ' ' 

At  the  time  that  the  two  men  were  nominated,  it  was  natural 
enough  that  Clay  should  be  heralded  as  the  superior  of  his  rival. 
It  was  a  period  that  was  dominated  by  great  personalities,  and 
spectacular  qualities  were  regarded  as  essential  attributes  of 
greatness.  The  influence  wielded  by  Clay,  "Webster,  and  Calhoun, 
resulted  more  from  the  eloquence  of  their  delivery  than  from  the 
soundness  of  their  arguments.  Even  the  tempestuous  and  gen- 
erally illogical  conduct  of  President  Jackson  was  easily  mistaken 
for  statesmanship. 

Polk  was  not  possessed  of  spectacular  qualities,  and  he  never 
tried  to  cultivate  them.  He  was  by  nature  secretive,  even  sly,^ 
and  the  degree  of  his  influence  in  shaping  public  policies  was 
known  only  to  his  intimate  friends.  In  all  of  those  qualities 
which  are  thought  to  make  men  illustrious,  Polk  suffered  by  com- 
parison with  his  rival ;  but,  as  the  Review  pointed  out,  a  Demo- 
cratic candidate  might  succeed  without  possessing  them,  however 
essential  they  might  be  for  the  Whig. 

In  no  other  campaign  has  Democracy  and  Whiggery  so 
definitely  contested  for  victory ;  in  no  other  campaign  have  the 


2  Article  on  "First  and  Second  Eate  Men,"  August,  1844. 

3  For  example,  he  made  a  practice  of  sending  his  Nashville  correspond- 
ence under  an  extra,  cover,  addressed  to  General  Armstrong,  so  that  his 
opponents,  through  the  Whig  postmaster,  might  not  learn  its  final  desti- 
nation. 


CAMPAIGN  OF  1844  251 

candidates  so  clearly  represented  the  principles  and  policies  of 
their  respective  parties.* 

Polk  was  the  first  "dark  horse"  ever  nominated  for  President 
hy  a  political  party,  but  while  his  name  had  not  been  previously 
associated  with  that  office,  it  is  not  true  that  he  was  unknown  or 
that  his  nomination  was  entirely  accidental.  The  Baltimore  con- 
vention did  not  simply  make  a  grab  in  the  dark,  with  the  hope 
that  either  Providence  or  Fate  would  save  the  party  from  disaster. 
The  man  who,  as  chairman  of  the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means, 
had  borne  tlie  brunt  of  the  war  against  the  Bank  was  unknown 
to  neither  party ;  a  Speaker  who  was  so  thoroughly  hated  that  his 
opponents  had  wished  to  deny  him  the  customary  vote  of  thanks 
could  not  have  been  so  soon  forgotten— least  of  all  by  the  Whigs. 
He  had  never  filled  any  of  the  great  executive  offices,  but  he  had 
been  intrusted  by  his  party,  during  a  most  critical  period,  with 
the  two  most  responsible  positions  in  the  lower  house  of  Congress. 
No  faction  of  his  party  doubted  his  ability,  but  like  John  Quincy 
Adams,  his  personal  following  was  small.  For  personal  reasons, 
many  in  the  party  may  have  preferred  another  candidate,  but,  if 
a  certain  newspaper  story  is  to  be  credited,  Clay,  at  least, 
recognized  that  the  wisest  choice  had  been  made.^ 

4  "The  two  candidates  indeed,  with  a  felicity  of  adaptation  and  eorre- 
spondence,  which  is  no  mere  accident,  may  be  said  in  a  remarkable  manner 
to  represent,  respectively,  the  spirit  and  character  of  the  two  great  parties 
by  whom  they  have  been  chosen.  .  .  .  Mr.  Clay  is  truly  the  living  embodi- 
ment and  incarnation  of  his  party.  Eloquent,  showy,  versatile,  adroit^ 
imperious,  ...  the  first  Whig  in  America.  A  second-rate  man  in  point  ot 
eloquence,  intellectual  force,  and  eminence  of  rank,  would  never  hav^e 
answered— could  never  have  been  adopted— as  the  head  of  such  a  party. 
We  concede  them  this  credit.  They  are  naturally  fond  of  splendor  and 
strength— large  and  sweeping  action— bold  and  brilliant  energy  and  enter- 
prise Such  is  precisely  the  character  their  instinct  has  ever  tended  and 
striven  to  impress  upon  the  government."  Thus  abbreviated,  this  char- 
acterization of  Clay  and  his  party  is  by  no  means  an  inaccurate  descrip- 
tion, and  it  is  quite  as  true  that  Polk  would  "have  been  perfectly  satisfactory 
to  us  for  the  presidency,  even  if  he  possessed  in  a  far  less  degree  than  he 
has  alreadv  amply  proved,  the  further  addition  of  the  latter  qualification 
[intellectual  eminence],  for  the  high  office  to  which  he  is  about  to  be 
called"  {Bern.  Eev.,  August,  1844). 

5  "When  the  news  of  the  democratic  nomination  reached  Ashland, 
voung  Clav,  who  was  impatiently  waiting  its  announcement  at  the  office. 


252  JAMES   E.  POLK 

Apparently  the  Democrats  of  all  sections  received  the  news 
of  the  nominations  with  genuine  satisfaction — only  in  the  Van 
Buren  camp  Avere  there  signs  of  resentment  and  reluctant  sup- 
port. They  had  not  looked  with  favor  on  Polk's  claim  to  the 
Vice-Presidency,  and  now  he  had  beaten  their  patron  in  the  race 
for  first  place.  One  of  Catron's  letters  throws  some  interesting 
light  on  the  attitude  of  political  leaders  toward  Polk.  It  indi- 
cates also  that,  aside  from  the  Texas  question,  Polk  liad  profited 
by  a  desire  on  the  part  of  the  younger  Democrats  to  get  rid  of 
the  older  leaders,  by  whom  they  had  "been  treated  as  boys." 
Together  with  others  to  be  cited  presently,  this  letter  seems  to 
make  it  plain  that  Polk's  desire  for  a  new  party  organ  did  not 
result  from  any  bargain  with  Calhoun,  but  from  a  real  distrust 
of  tlie  Globe,  which  of  course  was  the  organ  of  Van  Buren.'' 

Polk's  nomination  was  a  victory  for  the  annexationists,  and 
it  was  also  a  victory  for  the  younger  element  of  the  party.  All 
factions  were  in  duty  bound  to  support  the  ticket,  but  it  was 
evident  from  the  first  that  "old  fogies"  must  give  way  to  those 


hastened  with  the  news  to  his  father,  who  remained  at  home.  'Well,  my 
son,  who  is  nominated?'  *  Guess,  father. '  '  Why  Matty,  of  course. '  'No, 
father;  guess  again.'  'Cass?'  'No.'  'Buchanan?'  'No.'  'Then  who. 
the  devil  have  they  nominated?'  'James  K.  Polk,'  said  the  son.  The 
old  man  started  from  his  seat,  and  rushing  across  the  room,  with  disap- 
pointed hopes  painted  on  his  countenance,  exclaimed,  'Beat  again,  by 
G-d'  "  (N.  Y.  Plebeian,  copied  in  tlie  Washington  Globe,  Oct.  29,  1844). 

6  "Mr.  Van  B.,"  said  Catron,  "was  out  of  luck — we  again  hav*  it. 
Had  the  Dem.  Con.  met  a  month  sooner,  we  w'd  have  been  ruined  in  the 
west  &  South  for  ten  years.  Clay  is  out  fully — many  of  the  undermen 
are  out,  on  annexation — and  we  have  the  strength  added  of  a  rejection 
of  our  V.  P.  on  the  precise  ground,  drawing  in  all  the  Calhoun  strength — 
a  vast,  &  controlling  power,  in  the  South.  Among  the  leaders,  you  have 
many  jealousies  to  quiet;  they  feared  to  see  you  on  any  ticket  as  vice,  for 
fearyou  would  set  up  for  chief,  after  the  first  success.  My  position  has 
let  me  into  the  deepest  recesses  of  these  things.  I  traversed  the  city  night 
after  night,  last  winter,  encountering  and  pledging  myself  to  the  contrary 
of  this  opinion:  But,  sir,  I  made  no  converts,  as  I  then  believed.  Bu- 
chanan was  for  Johnson — Benton  for  King;  the  Van  B.  men  for  either, 
sooner  than  yourself"  [Both  Calhoun  and  Tyler  friendly  to  Polk].  "The 
coarse  brutality  of  the  Globe,  was  loathed  last  ^^'inter,  by  a  large  majority 
of  our  party."  .  .  .  "Your  strength  lies  mainly  as  I  think  in  this;  you 
are  of  the  present  generation — the  old  leaders  are  thrown  off;  to  do  this 
has  been  an  ardent  wish  bv  nineteen  in  twenty  of  our  party  in  the  House 


CAMPAIGN  OF  1844  253 

Avlio  were  abreast  of  the  times.  Old  in  years,  but  young  in  spirit, 
Jackson  gave  his  enthusiastic  support  to  both  platform  and  candi- 
dates;' nevertheless,  even  his  wishes  went  unheeded  in  cases 
where  he  desired  to  restore  any  of  the  ' '  old  guard ' '  to  power. 

Within  a  few  days  after  Polk's  nomination,  his  Tennessee 
friends  in  Washington  began  to  formulate  plans,  not. only  for 
the  campaign,  but  for  his  course  as  President  of  the  United  States. 
The  most  active — not  to  say  presumptuous — of  all  was  A.  V. 
Brown,  who  did  not  hesitate  to  draft  a  list  of  instructions  for  the 
guidance  of  the  candidate.  First  of  all  Polk  was  told  that  he 
must,  in  his  letter  of  acceptance,  commit  himself  to  a  one-term 
policy.^  The  Democratic  platform  had  said  nothing  on  this 
point,  but  it  was  evidently  thought  necessary  to  checkmate  the 
Whigs,  whose  platform  had  limited  their  candidate  to  a  single 
term.  Besides,  as  Brown  seems  very  clearly  to  intimate,  other 
"deserving  Democrats""  with  high  aspirations  might  be  expected 
to  support  the  campaign  with  more  enthusiasm  if  they  could  be 
assured  that  the  way  would  be  open  for  them  at  the  end  of  four 


E.  for  two  sessions — but  they  would  not  do  it,  as  they  believed — not  as  I 
believed.  They  are  now  gone"  (Catron  to  Polk,  June  8,  [1844],  Polk 
Papers). 

"!  "Although  I  regret  losing  Mr.  V.  B.  and  the  cause,  yet  I  rejoice  that 
the  Convention  have  made  choice  of  those  worthy  Democrats,  Polk  and 
Dallas.  They  are  the  strongest  and  best  selection  that  could  have  been 
made"  (Jackson  to  Gen.  Planche,  June  14,  1844,  Polk  Papers.  Same  to 
W.  G.  Beeves  et  al.,  June  5,  1844,  Wash.  Glohe,  June  28,  1844).  Polk 
doubted  that  the  Planche  (often  spelled  Plauche)  letter  was  intended  for 
publication,  and  thought  it  imprudent  in  Planche  to  publish  it.  He  feared 
the  cry  of  "dictation"  (Polk  to  Donelson,  July  11,  1844,  "Polk-Donelson 
Letters"). 

8  "In  your  acceptance  you  must  some  way  or  other  express  yourself  in 
favor  of  the  one  term  system.  This  is  important — 1  might  say  all  im- 
portant— you  will  know  exactly  liotc  it  will  be  highly  useful.  The  thing  is 
right  per  so  &  under  all  the  circumstances  I  think  you  ought  not  to  hesitate 
to  do  it"  (Brown  to  Polk,  May  30,  1844,  Polk  Papers). 

'■)  Laughlin,  although  not  without  some  doubt  as  to  the  wisdom  of  such 
a  declaration,  thought  that  "perhaps  all  in  all  it  may  be  best — and  will 
be  making  assurance  doubly  sure,  and  put  us  on  an  equality  with  the 
"Whigs  on  that  question"  (Laughlin  to  Polk,  May  31,  1844,  Polk  Papers). 


254  JAMES   K.  POLK 

years.  Although  Brown's  suggestion  may  have  been  entirely 
superfluous,  the  one-term  pledge  found  a  place  in  Polk's  letter  of 
acceptance.^'' 

The  next  instruction  was  for  Polk  to  prepare  data  on  his  life 
and  career  for  Brown  to  turn  over  to  Bancroft,  Kendall,  or  some 
other  person  who  would  incorporate  it  into  a  biography."  An- 
other thing  to  be  considered,  said  Brown,  was  whether  the  Globe 
was  to  be  continued  as  ' '  the  Polk  organ ' ' ;  and  while  he  was  not 
yet  certain  that  it  should  not  be  so  continued,  it  is  apparent  that 
the  discarding  of  that  paper  was  already  being  discussed. ^- 

Cave  Johnson,  as  well  as  Brown  and  Catron,  distrusted  the 
Glohe,^^  but  he  by  no  means  believed  in  courting  the  favor  of  or 
permitting  the  domination  by  the  southern  wdng  of  the  party. 
On  June  1  he  wrote  to  Polk  that  the  party  was  more  united  than 
at  any  time  since  the  election  of  Jackson,  but  he  pointed  out  that 
danger  might  result  from  the  fact  that  the  South  had  been  zealous 
in  procuring  Polk's  nomination.  The  Glohc,  he  said,  is  noncom- 
mittal, and  is  already  expressing  doubts  of  Democratic  success — 
a  new  paper  of  unquestioned  loyalty  is  very  much  needed.  Two 
weeks  later  he  wrote  that  matters  are  growing  worse  and  must 
soon  come  to  a  head.  "The  struggle  now  is  by  a  few  Southern 
men  to  appropriate  you  &  the  nomination  to  their  exclusive  bene- 
fit whilst  the  northern  Democrats  are  determined  to  yield  no  such 


10  In  1835  Polk  had,  on  the  floor  of  the  House,  advocated  a  single  term 
for  all  Presidents  (Cong.  Globe,  23  Cong.,  2  sess.,  part  2,  292). 

11  Brown  had  asked  Laughlin  to  write  the  biography  and  it  was  he  in 
turn  who  had  suggested  Bancroft  (Laughlin  to  Polk,  May  31,  1844,  Polk 
Papers). 

12  "Much  is  said  here  by  some  as  to  continuing  the  Globe  as  the  Polk 
organ — this  we  will  manage  with  souml  discretion.  The  Globe  will  change 
its  tone  &  perhaps  take  back  much  that  it  has  said  &  go  in  warynJy  if  not 
heartily — if  so — well.  But  we  will  not  commit  ourselves  to  it  after  the 
election.' ' 

13  "Benton  &  the  Globe  falls  in  but  not  with  so  good  a  grace  as  we 
expected"  (Johnson  to  I'olk,  May  31,  1844,  Poll-  Papers).  lie  referred 
to  an  editorial  of  the  29th  in  which  Blair  had  said  that  the  nomination  of 
Polk  would  at  first  be  received  with  disappointment  by  those  who  had 
stood  for  favorites,  but  that  a  little  reflection  would  convince  all  that  it 
was  for  the  best. 


CAMPAIGN   OF  1844  255 

thing. ' '  Johnson  had  caHed  a  caucus  in  the  hope  of  compromising 
differences,  but  the  northern  men  became  alarmed  for  fear  the 
Calhoun  members  woukl  get  control ;  and  Johnson  decided  that 
the  best  thing  he  could  do  was  to  prevent  anyihing  from  being 
done. 

I  have  been  to  see  S.  W.  Jr.  [Silas  Wright]  hoping  to  have  it  controled 
in  some  way  &  ended— he  is  furious  and  I  think  determined  to  push 
C[alhoun]  and  his  clique  to  the  wall  or  finish— in  this  battle.  The  object 
of  both  will  be  to  make  us  take  sides— the  Northern  know,  that  you  have 
always  been  with  them,  whilst  the  South  think  that  the  question  &  the  posi- 
tion of  G<'nl  J[ackson]  ynW  take  you  with  them — how  both  are  to  be  kept 
I  cannot  see — already  we  have  much  secret  talk  of  upsetting  the  Globe — 
turning  Benton  overboard  &c.  I  was  disgusted  to  day,  even  Eeuben  Whit- 
ney talked  of  turning  Benton  out  of  the  Democratic  church.  I  am  sick  of 
this  state  of  things  &  see  no  means  of  avoiding  the  explosion  &  most  anxious 
to  leave  here.i* 

Johnson's  fears  increased  rather  than  abated,  for  a  few  days 
later  he  expressed  a  belief  that  the  combined  obstinacy  of  Benton 
and  the  South  Carolinians  would  lead  to  a  southern  movement 
that  might  imperil  not  only  the  Democratic  party  but  the  Union 
itself.^^    It  seems  very  evident  that  Johnson  had  entered  into  no 


11  Johnson  to  Polk,  June  13,  1844,  Polk  Papers. 

15  He  has  seen,  he  said,  many  prominent  Democrats  and  all  are  pleased 
with  the  nominations,  but  "the  only  difficulty  I  fear  arises  from  the  course 
of  T.  H.  Benton,  when  connected  with  the  movements  of  S.  C.  The  latter 
uses  immediate  annexation  for  the  purpose  of  uniting  the  South  and  killing 
T.  H.  B.  &  will  if  practicable  identify  you  &  Genl  J.  with  all  their  future 
movements— fears  are  entertained  in  the  North,  that  this  may  be  so—& 
if  any  incident  takes  place  to  confirm  the  suspicion,  our  cause  is  jeoparded. 
I  have  given  everv  assurance  to  S.  W.  Jr.  &  a  few  others  that  you  could 
not  be  induced  to  separate  yourself  from  the  Northern  Democracy— in- 
stanced vour  former  course,  in  the  case  of  White  &c  &c  and  also  thought 
it  impossible  that  Genl  J.  should  lend  himself  to  any  such  purpose.  The 
only  danger  of  the  latter  taking  any  step  to  favor  the  Southern  movement 
they  think  will  arise,  from  some  letter  from  him,  that  will  seem  to  favor 
the" movement  without  sufficiently  weighing  the  consequences. 

"Can  not  you  see  him  &  have  a  free  conversation  as  to  the  Southern 
movement  &  put  him  on  his  guard?"  Johnson  fears  that  there  will  be  a 
southern  convention  called  to  meet  at  Nashville,  an<l  advises  that  this 
should  be  forestalled  bv  an  earlier  meeting  to  which  Wright  and  other 
northern  men  should  be  invited.  "I  have  the  most  serious  apprehensions 
from  the  Southern  movement  not  only  to  our  cause  but  the  country. 
Mason  &  Dickson's  line  now  divides  the  Methodist  church  &  will  soon 


256  JAMES   K.  FOLK 

agreement  with  southern  delegates  to  procure  Polk  *s  nomination, 
and  it  is  equally  clear  that  he  had  no  desire  to  see  the  party 
brought  under  southern  domination.  He  desired  harmony,  to 
be  sure,  and  support  from  all  factions,  but  harmony  that  would 
leave  Polk  indebted  to  neither  section — free  and  unhampered  in 
shaping  his  own  course.  Polk's  replies  show  that  he  fully  agreed 
with  the  views  expressed  by  Johnson.  He  promptly  warned 
General  Jackson  and  took  other  steps  to  forestall  a  sectional  con- 
vention; "no  countenance  must  be  given  to  an}"  attempt  should 
it  be  made.  "^"^  A  few  days  later  he  asked  Donelson  to  prepare  an 
article  on  this  subject  for  the  Nashville  Union.  "The  idea," 
said  he,  "of  a  Southern  convention  or  a  sectional  meeting  at  Nash- 
ville or  elsewhere  must  not  for  a  moment  he  entertained."  He 
did  not  believe  it  to  be  necessary  to  allude  specifically  to  disunion 
sentiments  in  South  Carolina,  but 

Let  the  article  strongly  enforce  the  leading  idea,  that  a  meeting  of  the 
masses  from  all  sections  of  the  Union  is  what  is  intended,  and  let  every 
thing  giving  it  the  appearance  of  a  sectional  or  Sonthern  affair  be  expressly 
negatived.  This  would  have  the  effect  of  allaying  the  fears  of  the  North, 
by  satisfying  them  that  we  in  Tennessee  gave  no  countenance  to  the  sugges- 
tion for  a  Southern  Convention  upon  the  Texas  or  any  other  subject. i7 

While  Johnson  was  warning  Polk  against  the  southern  wing 
of  the  party,  Catron  was  exhorting  him  not  to  listen  to  those 
who  insisted  that  the  salvation  of  Democracy  depended  upon  the 
restoration  to  office  of  the  old  guard  that  had  been  ousted  by 
Harrison,  "cabinet  &  all,"  leaving  no  place  for  the  rank  and 
file  whose  money  and  talents  would  be  responsible  for  the  victory. 
"You  who  fought  in  the  very  van,"  said  Catron, 


divide  the  other  churches.  This  movement  will  tend  to  divide  political 
parties  by  it.  The  Texas  question  brings  into  the  contest  the  fanaticism 
of  the  North  with  increased  fervor.  Our  only  safety  for  the  country  & 
our  cause  depends  upon  the  Southern  Democracy  maintaining  the  position 
we  have  hitherto  occupied — firm  &  consistent  friends  of  the  Northern 
Democracy — yielding  much  for  conciliation  &  harmony"  (Johnson  to  Polk, 
Louisville,  June  21,  1844,  Polk  Papers). 

10  Polk  to  Johnson,  June  21  [?],  1844,  July  1,  1844,  "Polk-Johnson 
Letters,"  Tenn.  Hist.  Mag.,  Sept.,  1915,  245-246). 

IT  Polk  to  Donelson,  June  26,  1844,  "Polk-Donelson  Letters." 


CAMPAIGN   OF   1S44  257 

and  wlio  tlio  wortliy  old  geiitlotiioii  thoufjflit  last  Avintcr,  had  died  in  the 
ditch,  have  been  brought  out  alive,  not  by  their  consent,  nor  help,  but  [by] 
those  who  look  to  chances  for  themselves.  "Treason  &  Traitor,"  "rotten 
to  the  core, ' ' — liave  been  the  gentle  epithets  that  have  greeted  every  move 
tending  to  -wrench  the  power,  as  a  party,  from  the  old  clique.  Mr.  Van 
Buren  thought  this  public  opinion,  if  Col.  Bentou  let  him  think  at  all, 
which  I  doubt. i'^ 

Like  Johnson,  Catron  warned  Polk  against  unnecessarily  express- 
ing his  views,  and,  as  he  had  "a  soul  to  be  saved, '^  he  should 
avoid  answering  letters  of  the  Sheri-od  Williams  type.^" 

Benton  had  M-ritten  a  letter  in  which  he  had  exonerated  Polk 
and  Dallas  from  any  part  in  the  "intrigue  Avhich  had  nullified 
the  choice  of  the  people,"-*^  but  on  June  13  he  openly  accused 
A.  Y.  Brown  of  having  "vicariously"  procured  from  Jackson 
the  letter  in  favor  of  annexing  Texas. -^  While  General  Jackson 
Avas  charitable  enough  to  attribute  Benton's  outbursts  to  insanity, 
caused  by  the  Princeton  disaster,--  others  knew  that  he  was  simply 
expressing  what  Van  Burenites  generally  were  thinking;  and, 
although  the  appearance  of  harmony  prevailed  during  the  cam- 
paign, mutual  distrust  was  manifest  in  private  correspondence,-'^ 
and  a  break  was  almost  inevitable  as  soon  as  the  election  had 
been  held. 

In  general,  the  Democratic  press  of  all  sections  and  factions 
rallied  to  the  support  of  the  candidates  without  reservation  or 


18  Catron  to  Polk,  June  10,  [1844],  Po]k  Papers. 

19  In  1836  Williams  had  catechised  Van  Buren,  Harrison,  and  White 
as  to  their  opinions  on  certain  campaign  isues.  See  Shepard,  Martin  Van 
Buren,  264. 

20  Dated  June  .'5.  Nat.  InteJL,  July  1,  1844;  Benton,  Thirty  Years'  View, 
II,  595. 

21  "A  card,"  printed  in  the  Wash.  Globe,  June  13,  1844. 

22  "Gen.  Jackson  was  a  good  deal  excited  at  Benton's  course — said 
'he  shall  hear  from  me  soon';  and  asserts  that  ever  since  the  explosion  of 
the  big  gun  Benton  has  not  been  in  his  right  mind.  I  think  so  too"  (J. 
Geo.  Harris  to  Bancroft,  June  25,  1844,  Polk  Papers). 

23  For  example,  Sacfield  Maclin,  of  Tennessee,  wrote  from  Little  Eock, 
Arkansas,  to  Polk,  on  June  14,  that  "Colo  Benton  and  the  Globe  for  the 
last  eighteen  months  have  done  our  party  more  damage  than  all  the  Whig 
papers  in  the  Union.  I  have  no  doubt,  and  our  friemls  here  believe  with 
me,  that  if  Colo  Benton  thought  he  could  hold  his  place  in  the  affections 
of  the  Democratic  party,  and  go  against  you,  he  would  do  so  with  all  his 
energy"  (Polk  Papers). 


258  JAMES  E.  POLK 

qualification.  ^Most  enthusiastic  and  influential  of  all,  perhaps, 
was  the  Richmond  Euquirer,-*  but  Calhoun's  Washington  organ 
was  hardly  less  effusive  in  its  praise.-^ 

Cass  bore  his  defeat  with  better  grace  than  any  of  the 
other  aspirants.  At  a  ratification  meeting  held  in  Detroit  he 
commended  the  action  of  the  Baltimore  convention  and  promised 
his  support.  He  spoke  of  Polk  as  a  man  who  would  follow  in 
the  footsteps  of  Washington,  Jefferson,  Madison,  and  Jackson,  a 
statement  which  caused  the  Charleston  Courier  to  remark  that 
Polk,  in  order  to  do  this,  would  have  to  "walk  all  sorts  of 
ways."-*^  He  took  an  active  part  in  the  campaign-'  and  spent  his 
energies  freely  in  preaching  the  Texas  gospel  in  a  northern 
latitude. 

Polk's  letter  accepting  the  nomination  bore  the  date  of  June 
12,  1844.  In  it  the  most  significant  phrase,  aside  from  approval 
of  the  Baltimore  platform,  was  that 

I  deem  the  present  to  be  a  proper  occasion  to  declare,  that  if  the  nomination 
made  by  the  convention  shall  be  confirmed  by  the  people,  I  shall  enter  upon 
the  discharge  of  the  high  and  solemn  duties  of  the  office  with  the  settled 
purpose  of  not  being  a  candidate  for  reelection. 

This  self-denying  declaration  resulted  evidently,  as  we  have 
noted,  from  an  effort  to  checkmate  the  Whigs  and  a  desire  to 


24  "Mr.  Polk's  nomination  has  been  received  at  Baltimore,  at  Wash- 
ington, and  at  Richmond,  with  enthusiasm.  It  heals  all  divisions,  unites 
our  party  with  bands  of  iron.  It  thwarts  every  hope  the  Whigs  had  in- 
dulged of  discord  and  divisions.  It  blasts  the  election  of  Mr.  Clay,  and 
saves  our  country  from  the  sceptre  of  the  dictator.  Mr.  Polk  is  true  to  all 
our  rejiublican  principles,  and  he  is  the  friend  of  Texas."  Quoted  by 
Nashville  Union,  June  11,  1844. 

25  ' '  The  great  mass  of  the  people  wantd  a  man  pure  in  morals,  sound 
in  political  principles,  and  in  favor  of  the  immediate  annexation  of  Texas, 
and  such  they  have  in  James  K.  Polk.  He  is  a  consistent  and  sound  poli- 
tician, of  the  Jeffersonian  Democratic  school;  talented,  firm  and  discreet" 
(Washington  Spectator,  May  29,  1844). 

2«  Quoted  in  Nat.  Intel].,  June  24,  1844. 

2T  Geo.  N.  Sanders  to  Polk,  July  12;  Austin  E.  Wing  to  Polk,  Aug.  2, 
1844,  Folic  Papers. 


CAMPAIGN  OF  1844  259 

harmonize  factional  discords  in  Democratic  ranks.  "I  said  noth- 
ing to  commit  the  party  upon  the  one  term  principle,"  he  told 
Cave  Johnson,  ' '  but  expressed  simply  my  own  determination. '  '-^ 
The  pro-Texas  Democrats  may  be  said  to  have  included  three 
fairly  well  defined  groups.  The  first  was  made  up  of  the  fol- 
lowers of  Calhoun  whose  interest  centered  mainly  in  promoting 
his  advancement.  The  second  comprised  those  who  were  not 
friends  of  Calhoun,  but  who  were  interested  primarily  in  wresting 
the  control  of  the  party  from  the  hands  of  the  older  leaders. 
They  saw  in  the  Texas  question  a  possible  means  of  accomplish- 
ing this  purpose;  and,  in  addition,  annexation  would  enlist 
southern  sympathies  and  place  the  party  reins  in  southern  hands. 
Some  of  them  were  accused,  and  perhaps  not  unjustly,  of  being 
influenced  by  prospective  profits  from  Texas  land  scrip.  The 
third  group  was  composed  of  men  like  Cave  Johnson,  and  appar- 
ently Polk,  who  favored  annexation  but  who,  at  the  same  time, 
did  not  desire  southern  domination.  They  wished  above  all  things 
to  harmonize  differences  which  were  threatening  to  disrupt  the 
party,  if  not  the  Union  itself.  The  second  group  was  most  active 
in  the  nominating  convention,  and  Robert  J.  Walker,  of  Missis- 
sippi, was  its  reputed  head.  Catron  and  A.  V.  Brown  were  close 
friends  of  Polk  but,  unlike  Cave  Johnson,  they  had  strong  lean- 
ings toward  the  southern  groups.  "Walker  had  long  been  inter- 
ested in  Texas.  During  Jackson's  administration  he  had  worked 
hard  for  the  recognition  of  the  new  republic.  In  February, 
1844,  he  had  written  a  long  letter  in  which  many  reasons  were 
assigned  why  Texas  should  be  annexed.-^  It  was  alleged  by  his 
opponents  that  he  was  influenced  by  the  hope  of  profit  from  land 
speculations,  but  undoubtedly  this  personal  motive  was  greatly 
exaggerated. 


28  Polk  to  Johnson,  June  21  [?],  1844,  "Polk- Johnson  Letters,"  Tenn. 
Hist.  Mag.,  Sept.,  1915,  245. 

29  For  an  excellent  summary,  see  Smith,  Annexation  of  Texas,  140-144. 


260  JAMES   E.  POLK 

The  annexation  of  Texas  was  not  the  only  question  on  which 
the  Democrats  of  1844  were  unable  to  ag-ree.  For  a  time  con- 
siderable anxiet}'  was  felt  for  fear  that  Polk's  well-known  views 
on  tariff  might  cost  him  votes  in  northern  states,  particularly 
in  Pennsylvania.  The  discussion  of  Polk's  views  on  this  subject 
M-as  precipitated  by  the  so-called  Irvin-IIardin  correspondence. 
Shortly  after  Polk's  nomination  James  Irviu,  of  Pennsylvania, 
had  addressed  a  letter  to  John  J.  Hardin,  of  Illinois,^"  asking 
about  the  candidate's  opinions  on  tariff.  Hardin  replied  that 
Polk  was  a  believer  in  free  trade.  As  soon  as  Polk  read  the 
letters  in  the  papers,  he  asserted  that,  although  the  second  letter 
had  been  signed  by  Hardin,  it  must  have  been  Avritten  by  Milton 
Brown,  a  member  of  Congress  from  Tennessee.  He  asked  that 
the  "trick"  be  exposed.^^ 

Walker  undertook  to  instruct  the  nominee  as  to  the  stand  he 
should  take  on  this  perplexing  subject,  and  also  as  to  the  proper 
treatment  of  Democrats  who  had  left  the  party  in  1840.  He 
suggested  that  Polk  should  make  it  known  that  he  would  welcome 
"all  Jacksonian  Democrats."  On  the  tariff  he  was  to  declare 
for  a  revenue  basis,  adjusted  in  such  a  manner  as  to  give  "inci- 
dental aid"  and  a  "reasonable  profit"  to  every  branch  of  domes- 
tic industries.  He  urged  especially  that  the  word  aid  should 
be  used  instead  of  protect ion.^^  But  before  Walker's  letter  had 
left  Wa.shington,  Polk  had  already  announced  his  views  on  the 
tariff  in  a  letter  to  J.  K.  Kane,  of  Philadelphia.  When  he  penned 
his  "Kane  letter,"  Polk  had  not  of  course  read  AValker's  sug- 
gestions, but  their  ideas  were  practically  identical  and  even 
the  phraseology  of  their  letters  was  very  much  the  same.  jMore 
straightforward  than  Walker,  however,  and  less  southern  in  his 
leanings,  Polk  did  not  sugar-coat  incidental  protection  by  calling 


30  Both  men  were  members  of  Congress.     Their  letters,  dated  May   30, 
1844,  are  printed  in  Niles'  Reg.,  LXVI,  234. 

31  Polk  to  Johnson,  June  8,  1844,  "Polk-Johnson  Letters.'" 

32  Walker  to  Polk,  June  18,  1844,  Folic  Papers. 


CAMPAIGN   OF   IS 44  261 

it  an  "aid. "'^^  It  was  said  at  the  time  that  Polk  in  drafting  his 
letter  made  a  definite  attempt  to  face  both  ways — that  his 
emphasis  on  incidental  protection  was  for  the  North,  while  the 
substance  was  for  the  South.  But  if  the  tariff  Democrats  were 
in  any  sense  deluded  it  must  have  resulted  from  a  meaning  which 
they  had  read  into  the  letter,  for,  as  Polk  had  pointed  out  in  the 
letter  itself,  his  present  views  were  to  be  found  in  his  own  record, 
the  record  of  his  party,  and  the  declarations  that  liad  been 
adopted  at  the  Baltimore  convention.  In  such  a  statement  there 
was  nothing  equivocal — nothing  to  which  a  protectionist  had 
reason  to  pin  his  hopes.  "On  all  great  questions,"  wrote  Gen- 
eral Jackson  in  a  letter  commending  Polk,  "from  the  Panama 
mission  to  the  present  day,  he  has  been  consistent,  orthodox, 
and  true  to  the  standards  of  old-fashioned  Jeffersonian  democ- 
racy";"* and  the  Kane  letter  promised  no  departure  from  such 
a  course.  To  an  intimate  friend  Polk  wrote  that  his  letter  had 
been  sent  to  Kane 

with  a  request  that  he  would  show  it  to  Mr.  Dallas  and  Mr.  Horn,  and  if  in 
their  judgment,  it  was  absolutely  necessary,  they  were  at  liberty  to  publish 
it,  but  not  otherwise.  It  was  but  a  re-declaration  of  the  opinions  upon 
which  I  have  acted  on  that  subject;  it  was  carefully  prepared  and  upon 
its  doctrines  I  am  ready  to  stand.ss 


33  "I  am,"  said  Polk,  "in  favor  of  a  tariff  for  revenue,  such  a  one  as 
will  yield  a  sufficient  amount  to  the  Treasury  to  defray  the  expenses  of  the 
Government  economically  administered.  In  adjusting  the  details  of  a 
revenue  tariff,  I  have  heretofore  sanctioned  such  moderate  discriminating 
duties,  as  would  produce  the  amount  of  revenue  needed,  and  at  the  same 
time  afford  reasonable  incidental  protection  to  our  home  industries.  I  am 
opposed  to  a  tariff  for  protection  merely,  and  not  for  revenue."  [Cites 
his  votes  on  tariff  bills.]  "In  my  judgment,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  Govern- 
ment, to  extend  as  far  as  it  may  be  practicable  to  do  so,  by  its  revenue 
laws  &  all  other  means  within  its  power,  fair  and  just  protection  to  all  the 
great  interests  of  the  whole  Union,  embracing  agriculture,  commerce  and 
navigation"  (Polk  to  Hon.  J.  K.  Kane,  June  19,  1844;  copy  of  original  in 
Polk  Papers;  printed  copies  in  newspapers). 

34  Jackson  to  M.  M.  Jones,  Utica,  N.  Y.,  June  25,  1844,  Wash.  Globe, 
July  20,  1844. 

35  Polk  to  Johnson,  June  21  [?],  1844,  "Polk-Johnson  Letters." 


262  JAMES   K.  FOLK 

Shortly  after  the  adjournment  of  the  Democratic  convention 
the  Senate  took  a  vote  on  Tyler's  treaty  of  annexation.  Instead 
of  the  two-thirds  in  its  favor  which  the  President  had  promised 
the  Texan  diplomats,  more  than  two-thirds  (;^5  to  16)  voted  to 
reject  it.  Many  who  were  not  averse  to  annexation  voted  against 
the  treaty,  for  they  resented  the  manner  of  its  negotiation  and 
despised  the  renegade  President  and  his  Secretary  of  State. 
Tyler's  friends  tried  to  cast  the  blame  for  ill  feeling  on  Calhoun 
and  his  Pakenham  correspondence,  while  Calhoun  regretted  that 
the  question  had  been  brought  forward  under  such  a  weak 
administration.^"  In  the  Senate,  Benton  now  introduced  a  bill 
of  his  own  for  annexing  Texas  whenever  Mexico  should  be  ready 
to  acquiesce,  while  McDuffie  presented  a  joint  resolution  which 
would  require  simply  a  majority  vote  of  both  houses  of  Con- 
gress. Both  failed,  and  without  taking  further  action  Congress 
adjourned  on  June  17,  to  await  the  result  of  the  pending 
campaign. 

Wlien,  on  May  1,  Clay  was  nominated  at  Baltimore,  all  signs 
seemed  to  augur  success  for  the  Whigs.  The  party  was  united 
and  the  choice  of  the  candidate  was  unanimous.  Tyler's  annex- 
ation treaty  had  caused  some  annoyance  to  be  sure,  but  by  his 
"masterly"  Raleigh  letter  Clay  was  thought  to  have  made  his 
own  position  unassailable.  Besides,  it  did  not  appear  that  Texas 
would  be  an  important  issue,  for  Van  Buren,  whose  nomination 
by  the  Democrats  seemed  a  foregone  conclusion,  had  also  taken 
a  stand  against  immediate  annexation.  Although  Van  Buren 's 
nomination  was  fully  expected,  it  was  known  tliat  many  Demo- 
crats had  set  their  hearts  on  procuring  Texas,  consequently 
division  and  weakness  appeared  to  be  the  inevitable  result. 

At  first  it  did  not  seem  that  Polk's  nomination  had  solved 
the  difficulties  which  had  confronted  the  Democrats,  for  despite 
the  professions  of  harmony  it  was  well  known  that  Benton,  Van 


36  Schouler,  Hist,  of  the  V.  S.,  IV,  470. 


CAMPAIGN   OF  1S44  263 

Buren,  and  their  followers  were  dissatisfied  with,  if  not  indeed 
hostile  to,  their  party.  Tyler  had  been  nominated  on  an  annex- 
ation ticket,  barring  any  accessions  from  Democrats  who  with 
him  liad  deserted  to  the  Whigs  in  1840.  His  official  organ  even 
insisted  that  Polk  should  decline  the  nomination  in  favor  of  the 
man  who  had  been  responsible  for  bringing  the  Texas  question 
forward.^" 

The  Democrats  had  trouble  in  plenty,  but  the  AVliig  program 
was  likewise  going  awrj^  Van  Buren  had  not  been  nominated 
as  they  had  expected,  and  Clay's  Raleigh  letter,  instead  of 
settling  the  Texas  question,  bid  fair  to  cost  him  many  northern 
votes.  In  August,  1843,  the  Liberty  party  had  nominated  James 
G.  Birney,  of  Michigan,  on  an  anti-slavery  ticket,  and,  after  the 
publication  of  Cla^-'s  letter,  man}'  who  under  ordinary  circum- 
stances would  have  voted  for  him  now  announced  their  intention 
to  support  the  Liberty  candidate.  Although  Clay  was  a  slave- 
holder and  did  not  oppose  the  annexation  of  Texas  with  the 
consent  of  Mexico,  still  the  Whigs  had,  originally,  no  reason 
to  believe  that  the  Liberty  Party  would  be  more  hostile  to  him 
than  to  the  Democratic  candidate,  who  was  likewise  a  slaveholder 
and,  in  addition,  an  advocate  of  immediate  annexation.  Never- 
theless the  unexpected  happened,  for  on  the  stump  Birney 
avowed  a  preference  for  Polk,  arguing  that  Clay's  superior 
ability,  coupled  with  his  equivocal  attitude,  made  him  the  more 
dangerous  and  objectionable  of  the  two.^^ 

The  Raleigh  letter  was  denounced  even  more  bitterly  in  the 
South,  and,  as  will  appear  later,  it  was  defection  in  this  quarter 
which  caused  the  candidate  most  alarm.  No  wonder  that  a 
leading  Whig  declared  the  Texas  question  to  be  "  an  enigma  and 


37  ' '  Mr.  Polk  is  too  wise  a  man  to  suflfer  the  Blairs  and  Kendalls  to  set 
him  up  as  a  mark  for  the  shafts  of  the  Whigs  ...  to  enter  the  contest, 
with  Mr.  Tyler  already  in  the  field,  and  with  the  certainty  of  an  over- 
whelming defeat  awaiting  him"  (The  Madisonian,  June  1,  1844). 

3s  Schouler,  Hist,  of  the  U.  S.,  TV,  475;  Smith,  Annex,  of  Tex.,  306,  308. 


264  JAMES   K.  POLK 

a  puzzle  to  the  most  astute,"^''  for  the  most  ardent  advocates 
of  annexation  would  lose,  economically,  by  its  consummation, 
while  the  opponents  of  annexation,  for  the  sake  of  principle, 
were  indirectly  aiding  Polk. 

After  Congress  had  adjourned,  all  parties  were  free  to  devote 
their  energies  to  the  campaign.  The  Democrats  fully  realized 
tliat  the  contest  would  be  close,  that  defection  must  be  prevented, 
and  new  recruits  gained.  Benton  and  the  Globe  must  be  whipped 
into  line,  and  if  possible,  Tyler  must  be  made  to  withdraw  in 
favor  of  Polk.  No  one  was  in  a  better  position  than  Old  Hickory 
to  perform  this  valuable  service,  and  no  one  was  more  ready 
to  undertake  the  difficult  task.  Jackson  was  much  excited  by 
Benton's  heated  reply  to  McDutfie  while  discussing  his  own 
annexation  bill,  and  still  more  so  by  the  report  that  his  old 
friend  had  solicited  the  cooperation  of  John  Quincy  Adams.*" 
His  irritation  was  increased  because  Benton  had  not  been  con- 
vinced by  a  letter  he  had  sent  him  stating  that  the  Union  could 
not  be  preserved  except  by  annexing  Texas  and  extendiaig  the 
laws  of  the  United  States  over  Oregon.  He  was  certain  that 
Benton  had  induced  Van  Buren  to  declare  against  annexation. 
He  called  Blair's  attention  to  Polk's  one-term  pledge,  and 
prophesied  that  Van  Buren  would  succeed  Polk  if  he  should 
take  the  proper  course.  "My  dear  friend,"  he  pleaded  with 
Blair,    "permit  not    Col.    Benton   to   have    controle    over   your 


39  Chas.  A.  Davis  to  Crittenden,  New  York,  June  5,  1844,  Crittenden 
Papers.  It  was  a  curious  fact,  said  Davis,  that  on  two  important  questions 
party  considerations  had  made  people  in  the  South  and  West  blind  to  their 
own  interests;  they  had  crushed  the  bank  and  thereby  driven  much  needed 
capital  back  to  the  North  and  East,  and  were  now  clamoring  for  Texas, 
although  the  other  sections  would  profit  more  by  its  annexation. 

*o  Jackson  to  Blair  (confidential) ,  June  25,  1844,  Jackson  Papers.  "The 
last  Washington  papers  give  an  account  of  the  very  irrated  reply  of  Col. 
Benton  to  Mr.  McDuffie  on  Benton's  annexation  Bill  in  the  Senate  after 
which  Col.  Benton  seized  J.  Q.  Adams  by  the  hand  &  said  'we  are  both  old 
men,  wo  must  now  unite  &  save  the  constitution' — do  my  dear  Mr.  Blair 
inform  me  if  this  can  be  true — if  it  is,  1  want  no  better  proof  of  his 
derangement,  &  it  j)olitical[ly]  prostrates  him." 


CAMPAIGN   OF   1844  265 

editorial  column,  as  he  will  ruin  y'"  paper.  If  he  will,  he  must 
pursue  his  eratic  course,  which  has,  &  will  politicaHly]  destroy 
him  if  not  already  done."  I-Jlair  assured  Jackson  that  Benton 
was  zealous  in  the  cause  of  Polk  and  Dallas,  but  that  he  dis- 
'trusted  Calhoun  and  opposed  his  pro^Tam  of  Texas  with  or 
without  the  Union.  These  views  were  shared  by  Blair  himself. 
Jackson  wrote  again  to  Blair  on  July  12,  criticizing  Benton's 
attitude  and  urging-  Blair  to  attend  the  ratification  meeting  to 
be  held  at  Nashville  on  the  fifteenth  of  August.*^ 

Before  Jackson  had  received  his  reply  from  Blair  he 
expressed  his  opinion  of  Benton  in  a  letter  to  Polk.*-  Benton's 
hatred  of  Calhoun  and  his  jealousy  of  the  growing  popularity 
of  Tyler,  said  Jackson,  had  deranged  him,  but 

you  ■\\'ill  perceive  I  have  estopped  Benton  or  any  others  from  believing  that 
you  or  I  could  countenance  nullification  or  disunion.  Every  letter  I  get 
gives  us  joyfull  news — You  will  get  20  states  at  least  &  your  one  term 
[pledge]   %\ill  get  you  22. 

He  told  Polk  that,  while  it  was  quite  unnecessary  for  Cave  John- 
son to  put  him  on  his  guard  lest  he  should  inadvertently  give 
aid  to  the  nullifiers,  still  every  Democrat  should  "put  his  face 
against  any  meeting  of  disunion,  or  nullification — we  must  &  will 
have  Texas,  with  &  in  our  glorious  Union.  The  Federal  Union 
must  be  preserved — A.  J.  "*^ 


*i  Blair  to  Jackson,  July  7;  Jackson  to  Blair,  July  12,  1844,  Jaclson 
Papers.  The  "Texas,  with  or  without  the  Union,"  program  mentioned 
by  Benton  was  an  attempt  made  in  South  Carolina,  while  Tyler's  treaty 
was  before  the  Senate,  to  call  a  southern  convention  and  annex  Texas  to 
the  southern  states  if  it  should  be  rejected  by  the  federal  government. 
See  Benton,  Thirty  Years'  View,  II,  616. 

•*2  Jackson  to  Polk,  June  29,  1844,  Polk  Papers.  "In  my  reply  to  f'ol. 
Benton's  first  letter  to  me  in  which  he  adverted  to  my  toast, — 'The 
Federal  Union  must  be  preserved,'  amongst  other  things,  I  said  to  him. 
The  Federal  Union  must  be  preserved,  and  to  ilo  this  effectually  &  perma- 
nently— Texas  must  be  reunited  to  the  United  States — the  laws  of  the 
Union  extended  forthwith  over  the  Oragon,  which  would  place  this  Federal 
Union  on  as  permanent  basses  as  the  Kocky  mountains,  and  preserve  our 
glorious  Union,  &  our  Kepublican  system  as  long  as  time  lasted. ' ' 

■43  Ibid. 


2G6  JAMES   K.  POLE 

Johnson  was  still  much  concerned  for  fear  that  something 
might  be  said  or  done  at  the  Nashville  meeting  which  might 
be  construed  as  an  approval  of  the  South  Carolina  program  of 
"annexation  or  a  dissolution  of  the  Union."  Doubtless  he  exag- 
gerated both  the  strength  and  the  determination  of  the  disunion 
element.  So  far  as  the  success  of  the  campaign  was  concerned, 
much  more  was  to  be  feared  from  the  attitude  of  Benton,  whose 
irascible  temper  could  not  be  held  in  check.  He  did  not  hesitate 
to  discuss,  even  with  Whigs,**  the  "villany"  of  the  Baltimore 
convention,  and  no  plea  for  harmony  could  induce  him  to  abate 
his  attacks  on  those  who  had  been  responsible  for  reviving  the 
Texas  question.  To  be  sure  he  had,  in  a  public  declaration 
exonerated  Polk  and  Dallas  from  participation  in  the  "intrigue," 
but  in  a  speech  made  at  St.  Louis  he  said  that  the  Texas  question 
had  been  "exploded"  only  forty  daj's  before  the  Baltimore 
convention — "just  time  enough  for  candidates  to  be  interrogated, 
and  for  the  novices  to  amend  their  answers."*^  Polk  was  evi- 
dently the  novice  whom  he  had  in  mind. 

As  the  campaign  progressed  Polk  came  more  and  more  to 
distrust  both  Benton  and  Blair.  "Since  the  nominations,"  he 
said  in  a  letter  to  Donelson, 

none  can  fail  to  have  observed  the  coldness  or  indifference  of  the  Globe. 
After  Blair's  professions  made  confidentially  to  you,  I  had  expected  that 
he  would  come  zealously  into  the  support  of  the  nominations,  and  not 
throw  cold  water  upon  them. 

After  quoting  a  letter  in  which  Dallas  spoke  of  this  hostility, 
Polk  suggested  that  Donelson  and  Jackson  should  urge  Blair 
to  alter  the  tone  of  his  paper.**^ 


4-t  Letcher  to  Buchanan,  July  19,  1844,  Buchanan  Papers. 

43  Speech  printed  in  Wash.  Globe,  Nov.  6,  1844.  Yoakum,  of  Tennessee, 
in  calling  Polk's  attention  to  this  speech  says  that  he  has  "no  doubt  but 
Col.  Benton  has  injured  us  100,000  votes"!  (Yoakum  to  Polk,  Nov.  22, 
1844,  Polk  Papers). 

40  Polk  to  Donelson,  July  22,  1844,  "Polk-Donelson  Letters." 


CAMPAIGN   OF  1844  267 

Toward  the  end  of  June  certain  overtures  made  by  close 
friends  of  President  Tyler  gave  hope  that  he  might  yet  with- 
draw from  the  race.  J.  B.  Jones,  the  editor  of  the  Madisoman, 
approached  A.  V.  Brown  and  others  with  a  suggestion  that 
J.  George  Harris  should  be  brought  to  Washington  to  assist  in 
editing  that  paper.  Harris  was  an  intimate  friend  of  both 
Polk  and  Jackson,  and  had  made  the  Nashville  Union  an 
effective  party  organ.  Harris  suggested  to  Polk  that  a  new 
paper  might  be  started  with  which  the  Madisonian  (Tyler)  and 
the  Spectator  (Calhoun)  might  soon  be  merged.  A  new  paper, 
in  his  opinion,  would  be  more  likely  to  succeed  because  of  preju- 
dices against  those  already  in  existence.  General  Armstrong, 
like  Harris,  thought  favorably  of  the  plan  to  merge  these  papers, 
and  believed  that  after  the  election  even  the  Glohe  might  be 
joined  with  the  rest.  Both  Johnson  and  Brown,  however,  were 
opposed  to  this  plan,  and  especially  to  putting  Harris  in  charge 
of  the  Madisoniany' 

Early  in  July  R.  J.  Walker,  who  had  from  the  first  urged  a 
friendly  attitude  toward  the  deserters  of  1840,  called  on  Tyler 
in  order  to  ascertain  his  views.  The  President  told  AValker  that 
he  would  withdraw  at  once  were  it  not  for  the  fact  that  his 
friends  felt  hurt  by  the  abuse  heaped  upon  them  by  the  Glohe 
and  other  papers.  There  were,  he  said,  about  150,000  of  his 
friends  who  had  voted  for  Wliigs  in  1840 ;  he  would  withdraw 
and  his  friends  would  support  Polk  and  Dallas,  provided  that 
assurance  be  given  that  they  would  be  welcomed  by  the  Demo- 
cratic party  as  brethren  and  equals.  "Now  I  think,"  said 
Walker  when  reporting  the  conversation  to  Polk,  "that  the 
importance  of  this  union  &  co-operation  cannot  be  overrated"; 
therefore  he  suggested  that  Polk  and  Jackson  might  write  letters 
to  political  friends,  speaking  kindly  of  Tyler  and  his  followers.*^ 

47  Harris  to  Polk,  June  27,  29;  Johnson  to  Polk,  June  28;  Armstrong  to 
Polk,  June  30,  1844,  Folic  Fapers. 

48  Walker  to  Polk,  July  10,  1844,  ibid. 


268  JAMES  K.  POLK 

After  reading  Walker's  letter  Polk  sent  it  to  the  Hermitage 
by  Gideon  Pillow.  In  a  letter  of  his  own,  sent  by  the  same 
messenger,  he  told  Jackson  that,  however  desirable  the  object 
sought  b}'  Walker  might  be,  he  would  not  write  any  letter  or 
make  any  promises.  He  would  like  of  course  to  see  a  reunion 
of  "all  the  old  Jackson  Democrats  of  '28  &  '32,"  but  he  would 
neither  write  a  letter  to  Tyler  nor  "make  any  pledges  to  any 
one — except  as  it  regards  my  public  principles,  in  advance  of 
election."  He  suggested,  however,  that  if  the  attacks  of  the 
Globe  were  responsible  for  Tyler's  continuing  in  the  race  and 
thereby  jeopardizing  the  result  in  certain  states,  something 
should  be  done  to  induce  Blair  to  cease  abusing  the  President. 
He  told  Jackson  that  he  was  the  onh-  one  who  could  influence 
Blair,  but  as  to  the  wisdom  of  exercising  such  influence  Jackson 
must  judge  for  himself.*^ 

Jackson  was  disgusted  with  Walker's  "want  of  common 
sense"  in  suggesting  that  he  and  Polk  should  write  letters  in 
commendation  of  the  President.  Such  letters,  he  told  Polk, 
would  "damn  you  &  destroy  your  election,"  for  the  Whigs 
would  at  once  charge  "bargain  &  intrigue.""''^  Although  not  yet 
ready  to  ask  favors  from  John  Tyler,  he  was  quite  willing  to 
remove,  if  possible,  the  cause  of  the  President's  injured  feelings. 
On  tliat  very  same  day  he  dispatched  a  letter  to  Blair  in  which 
he  condemned  Benton's  conduct,  urged  the  importance  of  annex- 
ation, and  ordered  Blair  to  "support  the  cause  of  Polk  &  Dallas, 
&  let  Tiler  alone — leave  Calhoun  to  himself  we  in  the  South  & 
West  will  attend  to  the  Federal  Union,  it  must  be  preserved.  "'^^ 
Indeed,  on  the  same  day,  he  authorized  Major  Lewis  to  express 
to  the  President  his    (Jackson's)    wish   for  the   success   of  the 


•10  Polk  to  Jackson,  July  28,  1844,  Jackson  Papers.  See  also  i'olk  to 
Bonelson,  same  date,  "  Polk-Donelson  Letters."  In  this  he  doubted  the 
l)ropriety  of  Jackson's  writing  a  letter  for  publication;  still,  he  seemed 
anxious  that  the  general  should  write  a  private  letter  "which  might  reach 
the  President 's  eye. ' ' 

•'i"  Jackson  to  Polk,  July  26,  1844,  Polk  Papers. 
51  Jackson  to  Blair,  July  26,  1844,  Jackson  Papers. 


CAMPAIGN  OF   1844  269 

administration  and  the  assurance  tliat  Tyler's  friends  would  be- 
received  as  brethren  into  the  Democratic  fold."'- 

From  various  quarters  pressure  was  brouji'ht  to  bear  upon 
Tyler,  and  appeals  to  his  vanit.y  were  not  wanting.  Ritchie,  of 
the  Richmond  Enquirer,  who  was  called  the  "king  of  the  Demo- 
cratic press,"  warml}"  urged  the  President  to  withdraw,  while 
Democratic  electors  agreed  to  support  Tyler  in  case  it  should 
develop  that  he  was  stronger  than  Polk.  The  Democratic  general 
committee  of  New  York,  on  August  6,  drafted  resolutions  laud- 
ing the  President  and  asking  his  support  ;'''■''  and  on  August  1 
Jackson  sent  another  letter  to  Major  Lewis  in  which  he  argued 
that  Tyler  ought  to  withdraw,  for  if  he  did  not,  it  would  be  said 


'•>-  Jaeksou  to  Lewis,  July  26,  1844  (Tyler,  Leitera  and  Times  of  the 
Tylers,  III,  143-146).  The  letter  read  in  part:  "You  know  I  have  a  great 
desire  that  Mr.  Tyler  should  close  his  term  with  credit  to  himself.  It  is 
certain  he  can  not  now  be  elected,  and  he  has  now  a  fair  field  by  with- 
drawing, to  add  great  and  lasting  popularity  to  himself  by  the  act,  and 
free  himself  from  the  imputation  that  his  exertions  to  re-annex  Texas 
were  to  make  himself  President,  and  show  that  his  energy  in  this  ease  w^as 
from  imperious  public  duty,  to  prevent  a  country  so  important  to  the 
defence,  safety  and  great  interest  of  our  whole  Union  from  falling  into 
the  hands  of  England,  our  most  implacable  enemy.  On  Mr.  Tyler's  with- 
drawal from  the  canvass  every  true  American  will  saj'.  Amen  to  his 
patriotism  in  the  case  of  Texas. 

' '  Several  of  Mr.  Tyler 's  friends  yesterday  visited  me,  and  wished  me 
to  cause  it  to  be  known  to  him  their  wishes,  as  his  withdrawal  at  once 
would  unite  all  the  Democrats  into  one  family  without  distinction.  This 
would  render  our  victory  easy  and  certain  by  bringing  Mr.  Tyler's  friends 
in  to  the  support  of  Polk  and  Dallas,  received  as  brethren  by  them  and 
their  friends,  all  former  differences  forgotten  and  cordially  united  once 
more  in  sustaining  the  Democratic  candidate. 

"...  It  is  impossible  now  that  Mr.  Tyler  should  be  elected,  and  if 
he  does  not  withdraw  he  will  be  charged  with  conniving  with  the  Clay 
Whigs  to  defeat  the  Democratic  nominees.  Although  this  would  he  untrue, 
yet  really  it  would  have  that  affect  and  would  do  Mr.  Tyler  much  injury. 
I  told  Mr.  Tyler's  friends  I  could  not  write  to  him  on  such  a  subject,  but 
that  I  had  such  confidence  in  his  good  sense  and  patriotism,  that  I  was 
sure  he  would  withdraw  in  due  time,  as  I  believe  him  to  be  a  good  Demo- 
crat, and  that  he  would  do  nothing  to  promote  Clay  or  injure  Democracy. 
If  you  think  it  prudent,  you  can  make  these  suggestions  to  Mr.  Tyler. 
T  think  he  would  receive  them  kindly,  be  his  determination  %vhat  it  may. 
His  proper  dignified  course  is  a  magnanamous  withdrawal,  with  such 
reasons  as  his  good  sense  may  suggest  for  the  occasion.  These  hints  flow 
from  a  real  regard  for  Mr.  Tyler  and  a  sincere  wish  that  he  may  retire 
with  much  credit. ' ' 

53  Tyler,  Letters  and  Times  of  the  Tylers,  II,  337-339. 


270  JAMES   K.  POLE 

that  he  had  adopted  the  annexation  program  merely  to  obtain 
a  reelection  and  that  he  was  remaining  in  the  field  in  order  to 
defeat  Polk.  Tyler  soon  informed  Jackson  that  this  letter  had 
determined  him  to  retire,"  and  on  August  20  his  letter  of  with- 
drawal appeared  in  the  Madisonian.  His  present  action,  he  said, 
had  resulted  from  changed  conditions.  The  people  had  vindi- 
cated him  by  driving  from  power  those  who  had  tried  to  crush 
him;  the  Democrats  had  adopted  his  policies,  and  he  no  longer 
felt  compelled  to  run.  On  the  next  day  this  paper  stated  that 
its  sole  object  all  the  time  had  been  to  defeat  Henry  Clay,  and, 
as  the  principles  of  Polk  and  Tyler  were  identical,  it  would 
henceforth  support  the  Democratic  candidates. ^'^  Two  years 
later  Tyler  wrote  that  he  had  accepted  the  nomination  "for  the 
sole  purpose  of  controlling  events  ....  for  the  public  good" 
and,  having  accomplished  his  purpose,  he  withdrew.^** 

The  Spectator,  also,  gave  Polk  and  Dallas  its  enthusiastic 
support,  and  Calhoun  predicted  that  the  results  would  "equal 
the  defeat  of  1828.""  Doubtless  he  indulged  hopes  that  he,  in 
the  event  of  Polk's  election,  would  be  the  guiding  spirit  of  the 
administration. 

During  the  summer  considerable  anxiety  was  caused  by  the 
fear  that  British  and  French  influence  might  induce  Houston 
to  agree  to  some  arrangement  with  Mexico.  Major  Lewis  was 
authorized  by  Calhoun  to  communicate  "confidentially"  to 
General  Jackson  that  the  State  Department  was  in  possession 
of  reliable  information  that  these  nations  had  offered  to  acknowl- 
edge the  independence  of  Texas  without  any  pledge  of  abolition. 


54  Smith,  Annexation  of  Texas,  310. 

55  The  Madisonian  (Au^.  24)  even  supplied  an  election  pun:  "Change — 
It  is  James  Knox  Polk  now,  it  will  be  Polk  knocks  Clay,  about  election 
time." 

56  Tyler,  Letters  and  Times  of  the  Tylers,  11,  341. 

57  Alex.  Anderson  to  Polk,  Aug.  22,  1844,  Folk  Papers.  "We  should 
have  carried  North  Carolina,"  said  Anderson,  "but  for  the  course  and 
speeches  of  that  arch  Traitor  Benton — so  say  our  letters  from  North 
Carolina."    Anderson  was  a  strong  adherent  of  Calhoun. 


CAMPAIGN   OF   1844  271 

provided  that  Texas  would  agree  to  remain  an  independent 
nation.  Similar  information  was  given  to  Polk  by  Calhoun's 
friend,  Alexander  Anderson.  Before  he  had  seen  these  letters, 
however,  Jackson  had  written  to  Houston  "as  strong  a  letter 
as  he  [I]  could  dictate,"  exhorting  him  not  to  yield  to  the  wishes 
of  foreign  nations.^'** 

Wliile  politicians  were  emphasizing  the  foreign  menace,  the 
Democratic  Review  was  trying  to  win  votes  in  northern  states 
by  maintaining  that  the  area  of  slavery  would  be  restricted  by 
acquiring  Texas,  for  slaves  would  be  drawn  to  the  new  fields, 
leaving  the  border  states  to  the  Yankees.'^^  Some  of  the  slavery 
advocates,  too,  believed  that  such  would  be  the  result,  and  for 
this  reason  violently  opposed  annexation."" 

There  was  some  defection  from  their  own  ranks  and  there 
was  fear  that  annexation  might  be  defeated  by  an  act  of  Texas 
itself,  but  the  Democrats  as  a  party  never  wavered  from 
their  position  in  favor  of  annexation.  They  had,  therefore,  the 
advantage  of  a  consistent  program.  Clay,  on  the  other  hand, 
in  order  to  retain  his  hold  on  both  North  and  South,  adopted  a 
shifty  course  and  modified  his  views  from  time  to  time,  as  the 
occasion  seemed  to  demand.  In  his  Raleigh  letter  of  April  17 
he  had  definitely  opposed  immediate  annexation,  but  he  soon 
discovered  that  such  a  stand  had  made  him  unpopular  in  the 
South  and  West.  To  retrieve  his  fortunes  in  those  sections  he 
wrote  to  Stephen  F.  Miller,  on  July  1,  his  first  "Alabama  letter." 
* '  Personally, ' '  said  he,  ' '  I  could  have  no  objection  to  the  annex- 
ation of  Texas;  but  certainly  I  would  be  unwilling  to  see  the 
existing  Union  dissolved  or  seriously  jeoparded  for  the  sake  of 


58  Lewis  to  Jackson,  Julv  19,  1844,  Jaclson  Papers.  Jackson  to  Polk, 
July  23,  1844,  Poll-  Papers'  See  also,  Polk  to  Donelson,  July  22,  1844, 
"Polk-Donelson  Letters." 

59  Dem.  Bev.,  July,  1844. 

60  Letter  of  Waddy  Thompson  to  editors  of  National  Intelligencer, 
printed  in  that  paper,  July  6,  1844. 

61  Printed  in  Nat.  Intell,  Aug.  8,  1844. 


272  JAMES   K.  POLK 

acquiring"  Texas.  ""^  As  this  was  not  strong  enough  to  win  votes 
in  the  South,  he  wrote  again  on  the  twenty-seventh  that  if  annex- 
ation might  be  accomplished  ' '  without  national  dishonor,  without 
war,  with  the  general  consent  of  the  States  of  the  Union,  and 
upon  fair  and  reasonable  terms,  I  should  be  glad  to  see  it."**- 
Both  Democrats  and  Abolitionists  seized  upon  the  last  phrase 
and  widely  advertised  the  fact  that  "Clay  would  be  glad  to  see 
it."  Other  letters  followed  in  an  attempt  to  show  that  he  had 
not  changed  his  original  views,  but  the  more  he  explained  the 
more  he  became  the  target  of  denunciation  and  ridicule.  The 
papers  made  much  sport  of  his  ' '  six  manifestoes, ' '  while  Jackson 
charged  that  Claj'  hy  his  letters  had  made  a  "perfect  devill" 
of  himself.^^ 

Although  this  was  a  campaign  in  whicli  party  principles  were 
clearly  defined  and  important  questions  involved,  nevertheless 
the  personal  element  was  not  wanting.  The  AVhig  ignorance  even 
of  Polk's  identity  was  soon  replaced  by  a  minute  knowledge  not 
only  of  his  own  shortcomings  but  of  those  of  his  ancestors.  It 
devolved,  therefore,  upon  the  candidate's  friends  in  Tennessee 
to  enlighten  the  public  on  his  past  record  and  to  defend  his 
reputation  against  the  slanders  of  his  opponents.  As  soon  as 
the  news  of  his  nomination  had  reached  Nashville  a  mass  meeting 
was  called  to  celebrate  the  event.  Speeches  were  made  by  prom- 
inent Democrats,  and  A.  0.  P.  Nicholson  ridiculed  the  Whig 
cry  of  "Who  is  Polk?"  Arrangements  were  made  for  another 
meeting  in  July  to  be  composed  of  delegates  from  all  parts  of 
the  state.°*  Biographical  materials  had  already  been  forwarded 
to  George  Bancroft  under  the  frank  of  General  Jackson.  But  as 
Bancroft,  according  to  Harris,  was  "somewhat  sensitive  on  the 


62  Fourth  Alabama  letter,  in  which  former  letters  are  quoted  (Nat. 
Intell,  Oct.  1,  1844).  The  letter  of  July  27  is  printed  in  Niles'  Beg., 
LXVI,  439. 

G3Schouler,  Hist,  of  U.  S.,  IV,  477.     Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas,  809. 

ci  Xasliville  Union,  June  8,  11,  1844. 


07^ 

CAMPAIGN  OF  1S44 


point  of  anthorship,"  and  declined,  it  was  decided  tl.at  editorials 
in  tlie  Union  would  do  quite  as  well  as  a  bioKi-aphy.'" 

Some  of  the  Whig  papers  char,'.  ,1  Folic  with  l.eins  a  duehst, 
while  ..thers  said  he  was  a  cringing  eoward  who  had  feared  to 
fi.ht  Wise.     The  first  allegation  was  refuted  in  letters  written 
to'the  Globe  by  Cave  Johnson  and  A.  V.  Brown,  and  the  sec.mV 
by  the  publication  of  an  old  letter  of  Jackson  s  ni  which  he  ha 
expressed  approval  of  Speaker  Polk  for  having  «at«<i  Wise  w  U 
contempt."    For  the  purpose  of  injuring  Polk  in  the  North   the 
AVhigs  circulated  widely  the  "Koorback"  canard  the  gist  of 
which  was  that  a  gang  of  slaves  branded  with  the  initials     J.  K. 
p  ••  had  been  seen  on  their  way  to  southern  markets.- 

'  Polk  was  most  annoyed  by  the  revival  of  the  sto,^-  that   us 
grandfather.  Colonel  Ezekiel  Polk,  Had  been  a  Tory  during  the 
Lvolntioii.    The  Washington  GMe  and  various  northern  papers 
repelled  the  charge,  and  the  Na.shville  VnU,n  printed  ^^^ 
and  affidavits  from  persons  who  had  certain  knowledge  that    he 
"to  Polk  had  been  a  Kevolutionary  officer;  it  P""-'-'';,^-; 
a  copy  of  his  comnrission  dated  June  18.  177o.    U"der  Polk 
direTt  on  this  material  was  printed  in  pamphlet  form  under  th 
tme  of  "A  Vindication  of  Colonel  E.ekiel  Polk,"  and  General 
Armstrong  was  instructed  to  send  copies  to  prominent  Demo- 
"u  over  the  United  States.''     To  these  Whig  campaign 
to    es    he  Democratic  press  retorted  in  kind.     Clay  s  use  of 
profIL  language  wa.  emphasized  and  he  was  called  a  drunkard, 
a  duelist,  a  gambler,  and  a  perjurer/'^ 
—  ,      ^         o-     T,,Kr  17    19    1844,  Folk  Papers. 

perienee  as  campaign  biographer  of  Van  Buren. 

ee  Wash.  Globe,  June  13,  19,  1844. 

67  See  Niles'  Beg.,  LXVII,  73  Armstrong,  Sept. 

6s  Union,  Sept.  11.    Polk  to  Heiss    Sept.  13; Jolk  to  Ar 
16,  1844,  ''Heiss  Papers,  '  f^^^^^^^^-'JZl^,,  ,i.  oath  of  office 

60  The  perjury  consisted  in  ^h^  «l\'f  ^^Vl  for  ^-or.is  spoken  in  debate 
SL?ifrj-"^,?.a"n.'' CXo?  SL-alTalfon  t.e  flcL  of  t„e  Ho„,e 


274  JAMES  E.  POLK 

Naturally  Polk  was  especially  desirous  of  carrying-  his  own 
state,  and  his  energy  and  skill  as  a  machine  politician  are  mani- 
fested in  many  ways.  Realizing,  as  usual,  the  importance  of  a 
spirited  party  press,  he  induced  Heiss  to  make  J.  George  Harris 
joint  editor  with  Laughlin  of  the  Nashville  Union.  "The 
Union,"  he  wrote,  "should  be  made  in  Tennessee  what  Medary's 
Statesman  is  in  Ohio,  and  what  the  Union  itself  was  in  1839. 
It  is  looked  to  from  all  parts  of  the  Union  and  must  be  a  great 
paper  during  this  canvass."  In  another  letter  he  urged  that 
"fire  and  spirit  and  power  should  be  thrown  into  it"  in  order 
to  counteract  the  Whig  falsehoods  and  m.isrepresentations.'^° 

On  July  13  a  dinner  was  given  in  Polk's  home  town,  Colum- 
bia, in  honor  of  delegates  to  the  late  nominating  convention, 
Presidential  electors,  and  members  of  Congress  from  Tennessee. 
To  Cave  Johnson  was  assigned  the  duty  of  inducing  prominent 
Democrats  to  be  present  in  order  to  counteract  the  effect  of  a 
Whig  ralh^  held  at  the  same  place. "^  Early  in  the  campaign 
arrangements  had  been  made  for  a  great  mass  meeting  to  be 
held  at  Nashville  on  the  fifteenth  of  August.  Both  Polk  and 
Johnson  were  anxious  tliat  the  northern  states  should  be  well 
represented  at  this  meeting  so  that  it  could  not  be  said  that  it 
was  a  gathering  of  disunionists.  Once  more  it  fell  to  Johnson 
to  send  the  invitations  and  to  urge  the  importance  of  a  large 
and  representative  attendance. ^^ 

On  the  appointed  day  the  multitudes  assembled,  and  Nash- 
ville, according  to  the   Union,  "was  from  sunrise  to  sunset  as 


that  "the  standard  of  Henry  Clay  should  consist  of  his  armorial  bearings, 

which  ought  to  be  a  pistol,  a  pack  of  cards,  and  a  brandy djottlc"  (Adams, 

Memoir  a,  XII,  45). 

TO  Polk  to  Heiss,  July  31,  Aug.  21,  1844;  Heiss  to  Polk,  Aug.  3,  1844, 

Folk  Papers. 

71  Polk  to  Johnson,  July  1,  July  6,  1844,  "Polk-Johnson  Letters." 

"2  Johnson  to  Polk,  June  21,  1844,  Polk  Papers.    Polk  to  Johnson,  July 

16,   1844,  "Polk-Johnson   Letters."     Among  those   invited   were   Wright, 

Cass,  Buchanan,  Woodbury,  Hubbard  of  New  Hampshire,  and  Duncan  and 

Medary,  of  Ohio. 


CAMPAIGN   OF   1844  275 


a  MiWcry  Camp.""    In  tlu-  evening  the  Honorable  Thomas  F. 
AIar.hall,  of  Kentucky,  addressed  "thonsands"  in  front  of  the 
;„,„,house  on  the  annexation  of  Texas.     On  the  second  day, 
Au-nst   16,  the  throng  gathered  at  Camp  Hickory  where  In 
„oo;,  "the  great  grove  at  the  Camp,  fifty  acres  '"  -*';«■  ^^^ 
as  full  as  it  could  hold,"  and  there  "were  two  miles  of  table 
u  which  the  Great  Dinner  was  served."    Speaking    oUowed  the 
dhiner,  and  Cave  Johnson,  as  presiding  ofRecr,  made    he  open- 
lug  address.    We  have  already  noted  his  solicitude  lost^a  d^^ 
union  character  might  be  attributed  to  this  meeting,  and  he 
now  embraced  the  opportunity 

cerned  in  calling  and  getting  up  the  present  meeting. 
The  number  in  attendance  was  so  great  that  speakers  addressed 
crowds   simultaneously   in   various   parts   of    the    grove;    each 
speaker,  following  Johnson's  lead,  repelled  the  charge  of  dis- 
union    General  Case  was  the  principal  orator  of  the  day ;  among 
the  others  were  Gansevoort  Melville-  Governor  Clay,  of  Ala- 
bama; Colonel  Terry,  speaker  of  the  ho^ise  from  the  same  state ; 
and  J  B.  Bowlin,  a  member  of  Congress  from  Missouri.    Letters 
were  received  from  leading  Democrats  of  both  sections,  regretting 
their  inability  to  be  present  and  expressing  hearty  cooperation ' 
Among  these  was  Judge  Douglas,  but  within  a  few  days  he  was 
in  Tennessee  stumping  the  state  for  Polk  and  Dallas.'  > 

-TT^^^lle  ^.io.,  Aug  \l^il%^XfJ^Lf'-o.^^^^^^  tfttairs 
every  road  to  the  city  was  to  be  seen  ^PPy^^,  j^^^^^n^^^s  of  music,  their 
TaiSf  S  t,;errttoUl  tLria;"?.H"s\reat  e„ea,np„.ent  of  t,.e 
sovereign  people. ' ' 

74  A  Tammany  Hall  leader.  ipffprs    from 

„Thesa,„e„u.,ber^of.he^»io..co.^u>s.^ 

Tilu^Z'^ll  Sume,'Ko'M   X  Waier,  i'  M.  Johnson,  et  «, 
"pflklo  Johnson,  Ang.  20,  22,  26,  1844,  "  Polk-Johnson  Letters. 


276  JAMES  K.  POLK 

Despite  the  absence  of  so  many  of  the  party  leaders  the 
Democratic  meeting-  was  regarded  as  highl}^  successful,  but  in 
glittering  pageantrj^  and  boisterous  enthusiasm  it  was  far  ex- 
celled by  the  "Great  Whig  Convention"  which,  on  August  21, 
likewise  essembled  in  the  city  of  Nashville  and  was,  to  quote 
Phelan,  "the  finest  of  the  kind  ever  held  in  the  Southwest."^'' 
Wliile  the  chief  feature  of  the  meeting  was  the  display  of  gor- 
geous battalions  and  expensive  campaign  banners,  there  were 
soul-stirring  addresses  by  prominent  Whig  orators.  The  great 
speech  of  the  meeting  was  made  by  Sergeant  S.  Prentiss,  of 
Mississippi,  who  was  regarded  by  many  as  the  peer  of  either 
Webster  or  Clay.  On  this  occasion  Prentiss  surpassed  even  his 
own  brilliant  record,  for  to  partisan  considerations  was  added  a 
personal  hatred  for  the  Democratic  candidate  whose  casting  vote 
had  once  deprived  him  of  a  seat  in  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives.''^ 

The  enthusiasm  caused  by  the  Wliig  meeting  spurred  the 
Democrats  to  a  still  more  vigorous  effort  to  win  the  election  in 
Tennessee.  Custom  did  not  permit  Polk  to  mount  the  platform 
in  his  own  behalf,  but  from  his  home  at  Columbia  he  directed 
the  campaign,  even  to  the  minutest  details.  He  planned  itiner- 
aries, assigned  speakers,  and  even  arranged  for  barbecues. "° 
Local  orators  were  assisted  by  prominent  politicians  from  other 
states.  This  list  included  Douglas,  of  Illinois,  Pickens,  of  South 
Carolina,  Melville,  of  New  York,  and  Claj',  Terry,  and  McClung, 
of  Alabama.  Of  local  men  the  most  notable  were  the  veteran 
campaigners,  Nicholson,  Brown,  and  Cave  Johnson.  Johnson 
was  much  broken  in  health,  but  so  highly  did  Polk  value  his 
services  that  he  goaded  him  to  an  active  part  in  the  campaign.^" 


77  Phelan,  Hist,  of  Teniu,  4T9. 

78  See  above,  p.  120. 

7»  Various  letters  of  Polk  to  Johnson,  Ang.-Oct.,  ' '  Polk-Johnson  Letters. ' ' 
^'>  Ihid.    On  Oct.  14  he  told  Johnson  that  ' '  all  our  energies  are  necessary 

to  keep  the  State  safe,  as  1  believe  she  now  is.    The  least  relaxation  at  the 

close  of  the  canvass  might  loose  her." 


CAMPAIGN   OF   1844  277 

Near  the  close  of  the  canvass  Polk  was  confident  of  carrying*  the 
state  by  a  "handsome  majority,"  but,  instead,  he  lost  it  by  the 
small  margin  of  one  hundred  and  thirteen  votes. 

In  southern  states  the  Wliigs  had  little  hope  of  success 
in  opposing  the  Democratic  annexation  program,  nevertheless 
strenuous  efforts  were  made  to  prevent  defection  from  their  own 
ranks  because  of  this  annoying  issue.  The  indomitable  Prentiss 
labored  to  show  that  Polk  was  not  entitled  to  profit  from  the 
revival  of  this  question,^^  and  in  a  speech  at  Natchez  he  referred 
to  Polk  as  a  ''blighted  burr,  that  had  fallen  from  the  mane  of 
the  war-horse  of  the  Hermitage."  In  an  attempt  to  counteract 
the  work  of  Prentiss  and  others,  and  to  win  Whig  votes  in  the 
South,  Senator  Walker,  of  Mississippi,  wrote  a  most  inflamma- 
tory pamphlet  entitled  "The  South  in  Danger"**^  in  which  he 
argued  that  as  Whigs  and  Abolitionists  had  joined  hands  in  the 
North,  therefore  all  parties  in  the  South  should  unite  in  the 
interest  of  annexation.  The  pamphlet  probably  did  little  good 
in  the  South,  and  many  Democrats  were  fearful  that  it  might 
do  serious  damage  in  the  North. "^ 

In  Ohio  the  contest  bid  fair  to  be  close,  and,  after  Claj^'s 
repudiation  of  the  utterances  of  his  relative,  Cassius  M.  Clay,^* 
leading  Democrats  had  hopes  that  many  Whigs  would  desert  him 
and  vote  for  Birnev.®^    But  the  result  of  the  state  elections  made 


81  "If  ever  I  join  the  Mormons,"  he  wrote  in  August  to  the  editor  of 
the  Vicksburg  Whig,  "I  shall  attach  myself  to  Joe  Smith,  the  founder  of 
the  sect,  and  not  to  one  of  his  rival  disciples,  and  should  I  ever  turn 
Locofoco  on  the  question  of  the  immediate  annexation  of  Texas,  I  will 
support  John  Tyler,  not  James  K.  Polk"  (Memoir  of  S.  S.  Prentiss,  II,  316). 

S2  This  pamphlet  was  issued  by  the  Democratic  Association  of  Wash- 
ington, D.  C.,  Sept.  25,  1844.    Coi>y  in  Library  of  Congress. 

83  For  example,  William  E.  Cramer,  editor  of  the  Albany  Argus,  in- 
formed Polk  that  New  York  could  never  be  won  on  the  program  outlined 
by  Walker,  while  Ohio  and  other  states  would  surely  be  lost  (Cramer  to 
Polk,  Oct.  4,  1844,  Polk  Papers). 

8*  C.  M.  Clay  had  represented  Henry  Clay  as  opposed  to  slavery.  The 
latter  in  a  letter  contradicted  the  former  's  statements. 

85  Gansevoort  Melville  to  Polk,  Oct.  .3;  Cass  to  Polk,  Oct.  4,  1844,  Polk 
Papers.  Both  wrote  from  Cleveland  and  expressed  the  opinion  that  the 
Democrats  would  carry  the  state. 


278  JAMES  K.  POLE 

it  evident  that  Clay's  letter  had  not  produced  any  defection,^" 
while  Walker's  ill-advised  pamphlet  added  strength  to  the 
Whig-s.®'  The  so-called  "Garland  forgery"  transferred  many 
votes  from  Birney  to  Clay,  and  may  possibly  have  brought 
victory  to  Clay  in  Ohio.^* 

Pennsylvania  was  normally  Democratic,  yet  there  were 
misgivings  lest  the  strong  sentiment  in  favor  of  tariff  might 
jeopardize  Polk's  success  in  that  state.  His  "Kane  letter"  had 
been  generally  accepted  as  satisfactory,  but  the  Whigs  repre- 
sented him  to  be  an  unqualified  free-trader.  The  Pemisylvanian 
refuted  this  charge  and,  on  October  15,  published  extracts  from 
his  speeches  to  prove  that  he  had  always  favored  incidental 
protection.  As  noted  above,  Polk,  in  his  letter  to  Kane,  did  not 
pretend  to  favor  tariff  except  that  which  might  be  necessary  for 
revenue,  but  by  means  of  construction  Pennsylvanians  were  able 
to  hold  voters  in  line  by  representing  him  to  be  in  favor  of  tariff. 
"We  have  succeeded,"  wrote  the  oily-tongued  Simon  Cameron, 
"in  fixing  the  belief  that  you  'are  as  good  a  tariff  man  as  Clay,'  " 
and  he  added  significanth'  that  no  man  known  to  be  opposed  to 
protective  tariff  could  possibly  carry  the  state.®^  Polk  did  not 
of  course  take  pains  to  undeceive  his  supporters  in  Pennsylvania ; 
on  the  other  hand,  he  did  not,  in  any  of  his  public  utterances, 
commit  himself  to  tariff  for  protective  purposes.  However, 
Cameron's  ruse  met  with  success,  and  Polk's  strength  in  Penn- 
sylvania greatly  exasperated  the  Whigs. ^" 


86  H.  C.  Williams  wrote  from  Washington  that  "the  letter  repudiating 
C.  M.  Clay  has  had  no  effect  in  the  northern  states,  while  it  satisfies  the 
Southern  Whigs.  The  Whig  papers  will  not  jniblish  it."  Democrats,  he 
said,  have  to  oppose  all  "fag  end"  parties,  and  Greely  is  now  tryino-  to 
stir  up  the  Irish  (Williams  to  Polk,  Oct.  14,  1844,  Polk  Pa2)ers).        '      ^ 

8"  Armstrong  to  Polk,  Nov.  5,  [1844],  Polk  Papers. 

88  See  Birney,  James  G.  Birney  and  his  Times,  355. 

89  Cameron  to  Polk,  Oct.  18,  1844,  Polk  Papers. 

00  Governor  Letcher,  of  Kentucky,  scoffed  at  the  idea  of  Polk  l)eing 
in  favor  of  tariff,  and  he  tried  to  persuade  Buchanan  to  refrain  from  advo- 
cating his  election.  "Polk,"  said  Letcher,  "has  no  more  chance  to  be 
elected  than  if  he  were  dead  and  hurled,  and  d — nd,  as  he  will  be  in  due 
time"  (Letcher  to  Buchanan,  Aug.  3,  1844,  BucJianan  Papers). 


CAMPAIGN   OF   1844  279 

"Native  Americanism"  was  said  to  have  cost  the  Democrats 
votes  in  Pemisylvania.  Catholics,  as  a  rule,  affiliated  with  that 
partv  and  the  Whigs  made  political  capital  out  of  the  fact  that 
Shuuk,  the  Democratic  candidate  for  governor,  had  been  niduced 
to  march  in  a  Catholic  parade.^^ 

It  was  alleged  that  the  Whigs  used  money  freely  m  Pennsyl- 
vania-^  and  that  they  were  guilty  of  practicing  frauds,-  but  it 
is  unlikely  that  the  Whigs  were  the  sole  transgressors  m  these 

respects. 

New  York  was  regarded  as  the  pivotal  state.     There  thirty- 
six  electoral  votes  were  to  be  won  or  lost,  and  the  result  seemed 
to  be  highlv  problematical.    In  this  state  various  extraneous  ele- 
ments helped  to  complicate  the  political  situation.    Both  "Native 
Americans"  and  Abolitionists  commanded  a  considerable  num- 
ber of  votes  in  the  state,  but  it  was  by  no  means  certain  just  how 
these  votes  would  be  cast.    At  the  beginning  of  the  campaign  it 
was  feared  that  the  followers  of  Van  Buren  might  not  rally  with 
enthusiasm  to  the  party  standard,  and  besides,  there  was  lack  of 
harmonv  in  Democratic  state  politics  with  respect  to  policies  and 
candidates.    In  order  to  carry  the  state  it  was  necessary  to  hold 
the  Van  Burenites  in  line,  and  since  the  Baltimore  convention 
manv  of  them  had  been  silently  nursing  their  resentment.    Gov- 
ernor William  C.  Bouck  wrote  that  a  number  of  Wright's  friends 
had  tried  to  get  up  a  secret  intrigue  to  procure  Polk  s  defeat, 
but  that  Wright  had  been  nominated  for  governor  and  his  ad- 
herents brought  into  harmony.-^    Van  Buren  told  Jackson  that 
Wright  had  accepted  the  nomination  reluctantly  and  not  until 
—^T^ler  to  Polk,  Oct.  12;  J.  M.  Porter  to  Polk,  Oct.  12,  1844,  Folic 
Papers;  also,  newspapers.  subseribe.l 

92  For  example    Kane  ^"^^^"^f  p^^le Iphia^^  nephew,  Wm. 

Oct.  31,  1844,  Polk  Papers). 

94  Bouck  to  Polk,  Sept.  7,  1844,  Po?A-  Papers. 


280  JAMES   E.  POLK 

he  liad  been  told  that  it  was  the  only  means  of  saving"  New  York,"'^ 
but  the  supporters  of  Bouck  felt  that  he  had  been  unceremon- 
iously sacrificed  to  satisfy  the  ambitions  of  Wright  and  his 
friends.*^"  Some  of  the  extreme  anti-Texas  leaders  in  New  York 
supported  the  candidates,  but  repudiated  the  annexation  plank  in 
the  platform.''"  This  was  the  policy  of  the  New  York  Evening 
Post. 

According  to  William  E.  Cramer,  of  the  Albany  Argus,  the 
Democrats  in  New  York  "were  on  a  volcano"  until  Clay  repu- 
diated the  statements  of  Cassius  M.  Clay  and  changed  his  posi- 
tion on  the  Texan  question.  The  Abolitionists,  he  said,  held  the 
balance  of  power  and  would  poll  from  fifteen  thousand  to  twenty 
thousand  votes.  "Before  Mr.  C's  fatal  letter  they  were  hesitat- 
ing whether  they  should  not  vote  for  him,"  but  "this  puts  an 
impassable  gulf  between  them."^^  On  the  other  hand,  in  pre- 
dicting victory  for  Polk  and  Dallas  in  New  York,  Wright  re- 
ported that  "Never  have  I  witnessed  an  equal  degree  of  enthu- 
siasm among  our  democracy,  not  even  in  the  days  of  Genl  Jack- 
son, nor  have  I,  at  any  time,  known  greater  harmony,  activity  or 
confidence. ' '''°  Late  in  October  another  letter  from  Cramer  stated 
that  the  Whigs  were  putting  forth  every  effort  to  form  coalitions 
with  "Native  Americans,"  Abolitionists,  and  Anti-renters,  and 
that  they  were  confident  of  winning  the  election.  Prospect  of 
success,  he  said,  had  brought  them  much  campaign  money  from 
manufacturers  who  desired  high  tariff.^'"'     . 


95  Jackson  to  Polk,  Sept.  26,  1844,  ibid. 

»*5  In  a  letter  to  Polk,  Sept.  11,  Marey  stated  that  Bouck  had  made  a 
satisfactory  governor,  and  that  Wright  had  been  nominated  for  political 
reasons;  while  an  anonymous  letter,  Sept.  14,  said  that  Bouck  had  been 
set  aside  without  reason,  and  that  the  action  might  cause  Polk  to  lose  the 
state. 

'■>'  See  the  signed  statement  of  Brvant  and  others  in  Nilcs'  Beg.,  LXVI, 
371. 

OS  Cramer  to  Polk,  Sept.  17,  1844,  Folk  Papers. 

09  Wright  to  Buchanan,  Sept.  23,  1844,  Buchanan  Papers. 

100  "The  report  is  that  the  Bostonians  promised  $100,000  provided 
they  could  receive  ample  assurance  that  it  would  secure  New  York  for  Mr. 
Clay! !  "  (Cramer  to  Polk,  Oct.  22,  1844,  Polk  Papers). 


CAMPAIGN  OF  1S44  281 

Still  other  factors  complicated  the  political  situation  in  New- 
York.  The  Abolitionists  who  had  formerly  voted  tlie  Whig 
ticket  were  appalled  when  Birney  came  out  in  favor  of  free 
trade  and  opposed  to  distributing  among  the  states  the  proceeds 
derived  from  the  sale  of  public  lands,  and  it  was  feared  in  Tam- 
many circles  that  his  announcement  might  cause  them  to  vote 
for  Clay."^  In  order  to  win  votes  for  their  national  ticket  the 
"Whigs  withdrew  some  of  their  candidates  for  Congress  and  the 
state  legislature  in  favor  of  the  "Native  American"  candi- 
dates.^*'- It  availed  them  little,  however,  for  Polk  and  Dallas 
carried  the  state. ^°^ 

It  appears  that  the  Democrats,  also,  withdrew  some  of  their 
candidates  in  favor  of  "Native  Americans, "^"^  and  in  the  process 
of  rapid  naturalization  they  outrivaled  their  opponents.  ' '  Tam- 
many Hall,"  wrote  Melville,  "is  a  perfect  jam  from  8  a.  m.  till 
after  midnight.  Naturalization  going  on  among  our  friends  to 
an  immense  extent.  On  Saturday  260 — all  Democrats — rec'd 
their  papers.  "^°^  Charges  of  wholesale  frauds  were  made  by 
both  parties,^''*'  but  it  may  be  doubted  that  such  frauds  materially 
affected  the  election  results. 

The  Texas  question  was  of  course  the  paramount  issue  of  the 
campaign,  although  it  was  not,  apparently,  the  chief  factor  in 
winning  the  election  for  Polk.  Many  contemporaries  believed  that 
Clay's  defeat  w^as  not  caused  by  the  emergence  of  this  question. 


101  Melville  to  Polk,  Oct.  26,  1844,  Polk  Papers. 

102  Alex.  Jones  to  Polk,  New  York  City,  Oct.  30,  Nov.  6,  1844,  ibid. 

103  Jones  told  Polk  in  a  letter  dated  November  21,  that  some  of  the 
Whigs  had  been  so  confident  of  winning  that  they  had  bet  all  of  their 
money,  and  even  their  homes.  One  had  lost  $38,000;  another,  $40,000. 
One  Whig's  wife  lost  her  mind  because  of  his  losses  {Polk  Papers). 

104  John  P.  Heiss  to  Polk,  Nov.  3,  1844,  Polk  Papers. 

105  Melville  to  Medary,  Nov.  4,  1844,  ibid. 

108  A  correspondent  from  New  London,  Conn.,  informed  Polk  that  in 
Connecticut,  Massachusetts,  and  Rhode  Island  "the  lords  of  the  spindle 
compelleil  the  degraded  operators  to  vote  their  will,  and  thus  obtained 
large  majorities  for  your  opponent"  (Dr.  Charles  Douglas  to  Polk,  Nov. 
22,  1844,  Polk  Papers).  For  a  useful  summary  of  press  opinions  on  frauds, 
see  Smith,  Annexation  of  Texas,  316  ff. 


282  JAMES   K.  POLE 

and  this  belief  is  held  by  Justin  H.  Smith,""  who  has  recently 
made  a  thorough  examination  of  conflicting  opinions  and  care- 
fully weighed  their  value.  The  Dcmocraiic  Review  evidently 
stated  the  trutli  when  it  said  on  the  eve  of  the  election  that 
neither  party  had  won  or  lost  many  votes  on  account  of  the  Texas 
issue,  and  that  "the  issue  is  between  the  principles  of  the  two 
parties  more  than  ever  before.""*  If  Polk  owed  his  success  in 
the  election  to  the  Texas  issue,  it  was  due  to  the  fact  that  it 
brought  him  the  support  of  President  Tyler  and  his  followers. 
While  we  can  not  be  sure  that  Tyler  would  have  remained  in  the 
field  if  the  Democrats  had  not  espoused  annexation,  certainty 
that  they  would  continue  his  Texas  program  at  least  furnished 
him  with  a  plausible  excuse  for  retiring  from  the  canvass."^ 

Polk  received  170  electoral  votes;  Clay  only  105.  In  the 
North,  Polk  carried  the  great  states  of  New  York  and  Pennsyl- 
vania, while  New  Hampshire,  also,  contributed  her  six  votes. 
Much  to  their  delight  the  Whigs  carried  not  only  Polk's  own 
state,  Tennessee,  but  even  the  very  precincts  of  both  Jackson 
and  Polk."°  The  Tennessee  Democrats  were  keenly  disappointed, 
of  course,  because  they  had  failed  to  win  the  election  in  their 
candidate's  own  state;  but  their  disappointment  soon  gave  way 
to  rejoicing  over  the  general  party  victory.  On  receiving  the 
news  that  New  York  had  gone  Democratic,  Jackson  sent  the  letter 
on  to  Polk  with  a  marginal  note,  "  'who  is  J.  K.  polk,'  will  be  no 
more  asked  by  the  coons — A.  J.  ""^ 


107  Smith.  Annexation  of  Texas,  317. 

108  "One  Last  Word  before  the  Election"  (Dem.  Ber.,  Oct.,  1844).  It 
thanked  heaven  that  Polk  was  not  a  "military  chieftain"  and  had  never 
even  killed  an  Indian;  also,  that  "there  is  no  peculiar  eminent  'popu- 
larity' attachinfr  to  him,  of  a  character  personal  to  himself,  and  distinct 
from  his  simple  position  as  the  representative  of  the  general  principles 
and  policy  of  the  party  whose  candidate  he  is." 

109  See  eorresi)ondence,  including  his  letter  of  withdrawal,  in  Tyler, 
Letters  and  Times  of  the  Tylers,  II,  3;58  If. 

110  Nashville  Banner,  Nov.  11,  1844.  The  Union  on  the  14th  retorted 
that  these  precincts  had  been  carried  by  non-resident  Whigs  who  had  gone 
there  and  voted  illegally. 

111  Written  on  a  letter  from  A.  C.  Flagg  to  Jackson,  Nov.  7,  1844,  Polk 
Papers.  The  "coons,"  of  course,  were  the  Whigs.  The  name  had  been 
attached  to  them  during  the  "log-cabin"  camjiaign  of  1840. 


CAMPAIGN   OF   1844  283 

Polk  received  the  news  of  his  election  some  hours  before  it 
was  known  to  the  people  of  either  Columbia  or  Nashville.     The 
New  York  mail  arrived  at  Nashville  at  nine  o'clock  in  the  even- 
ing, and  on  the  outside  of  the  package  the  postmaster  at  Cincin- 
nati had  written  a  note  stating  that  Polk  had  been  elected.    This 
attracted  the  attention  of  General  Robert  Armstrong,  postmaster 
at  Nashville  and  one  of  Polk's  most  intimate  friends.    Without 
giving  out  the  news,  Armstrong  sent  a  messenger  to  Columbia 
with  a  note  for  Polk.    At  dawn  he  read  the  glad  tidings  which  the 
note  contained,  but  he  said  nothing  about  it  to  his  neighbors  and 
friends.    For  the  next  twenty-four  hours  he  went  about  his  work, 
and  calmly  received  expressions  of  sympathy  on  his  defeat.^^- 
Sphinx-like  silence  was  a  role  that  Polk  dearly  loved  to  play,  and 
an  opportunity  to  do  so  on  this  occasion  no  doubt  added  much  to 
the  gratification  caused  by  the  information  contained  in  the  note. 
When  the  result  of  the  election  at  last  became  known  there 
was  great  rejoicing  in  Democratic  ranks.     On  the  other  hand, 
desperado  admirers  of  Clay,  both  in  Tennessee  and  Kentucky, 
threatened  Polk's  life,  and  friends  warned  him  to  "take  some 
thought  of  where  you  go  &  eat  &  drink. ""^    No  violence,  how- 
ever, was  attempted,  and  apprehensions  were  forgotten  in  the 
din  of  exuberant  celebrations.    At  Nashville  Polk  was  given  an 
elaborate  reception.    A.  0.  P.  Nicholson  made  the  principal  ad- 
dress,  and   there   was   general   rejoicing  because   the    "Young 
Hickory"  was  soon  to  grasp  the  helm  that  had  been  so  firmly 
guided  by  the  "Old  Hickory.""* 

Some  of  the  Democratic  factions  had  little  love  for  Poik,  but 
all  could  agree  with  the  Democratic  Review  in  thanking  God  for 
the  defeat  of  Henry  Clay.  ' '  Had  he  succeeded, ' '  said  the  Review, 
"it  would  have  stamped  him,  his  ideas  and  his  character  upon 
the  future  history  of  our  government,  with  a  fatal  depth  and 
extent  of  mischief  never  perhaps  to  be  again  effaced."""' 

112  Nelson,  Memorials  of  Sarah  Childress  Polk,  76-77. 

113  A.  V.  Brown  to  Polk,  Nov.  13,  1844.  Also  Gen.  John  A.  MeCalla, 
Lexington,  Ky.,  Nov.  22,  1844;  both  in  Polk  Papers. 

11*  Nashville  Union,  Nov.  30,  1844.  nsDem.  Bet:,  Nov.,  1844. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

PRESIDENT-ELECT 

Various  individuals  and  factions  claimed  the  credit  for  Polk's 
nomination  and  election,  and  as  soon  as  the  result  of  the  ballot- 
ing had  become  known  their  claims  to  recognition  were  presented. 
While  in  one  sense  it  was  true  that  the  successful  candidate 
owed  his  elevation  to  a  number  of  discordant  elements  within  the 
party,  in  another  sense  he  was  under  no  obligation  to  any  of  them. 
With  the  exception  perhaps  of  the  younger  element  the  several 
groups  within  the  party  had  united  on  Polk,  not  from  choice  but 
necessity,  and  not  until  each  had  found  it  impossible  to  procure 
the  nomination  of  its  particular  favorite.  The  circumstances 
under  which  he  had  been  nominated — the  very  fact  that  he  had 
not  been  generally  considered  for  the  first  place — relieved  the 
President-elect  from  the  necessity  of  making  pledges  to  any  one. 
Although  Polk  himself  fully  appreciated  this  fact  and  resolved 
to  make  the  most  of  it,  others  did  not  and  the  "jockeying  for 
position"  at  once  began. 

One  of  the  first  to  congratulate  Polk  on  his  victory  was  James 
Buchanan.  The  Senator  from  Pennsylvania  was  usually  num- 
bered with  the  old  leaders,  but  his  plea,  oddly  enough,  was  for 
the  recognition  of  young  men  in  the  distribution  of  offices.  ' '  The 
old  office  holders  generally,"  said  he,  "have  had  their  day  & 
ought  to  be  content.  Had  Mr.  Van  Buren  been  our  candidate, 
worthy  as  he  is,  this  feeling  which  everywhere  pervaded  the 
Democratic  ranks,  would  have  made  his  defeat  as  signal  as  it  was 
in  1840."  Even  Polk,  he  added,  would  have  run  better  in  Phila- 
delphia had  it  not  been  rumored  that  he  would  distribute  the 
patronage  among  the  "old  hunkers."^    Such  a  letter  from  Robert 


1  Buchanan  to  Polk,  Nov.  4,  1844,  Polk  Papers. 


PFESIDENT-ELECT  285 

J.  Walker  Avoukl  not  have  been  snrprising,  but  Buchanan's 
solicitude  for  the  younger  men  \vas  significantly  of  recent  origin. 
Tyler's  withdrawal  from  the  canvass  occasioned  speculation 
as  to  the  recognition  which  his  friends  would  receive  from  the 
Democratic  party,  and  during  the  campaign  Polk  received  many 
letters  which  were  designed  to  pledge  him  in  advance.  The 
candidate  discreetly  refrained  from  committing  himself,  although 
his  supporters  may  have  given  assurance  that  the  followers  of 
the  President  would  not  be  proscribed.  Special  importance  was 
attached  to  a  letter  written  by  Jackson  to  Major  Lewis-  in  which 
the  General  said  that  Tyler's  friends  would  be  received  as  breth- 
ren. Then,  too,  Walker,  as  chairman  of  the  national  Democratic 
committee,  had  made  promises  to  influential  adherents  of  the 
President.  Nevertheless  the  Tylerites  were  apparently  unwill- 
ing to  run  any  risks,  and  soon  after  Polk's  election  they  were 
charged  by  prominent  Democrats  with  having  concocted  a  scheme 
Avhereby  they  hoped  to  intrench  themselves  in  office.  One  part  of 
this  scheme,  according  to  H.  C.  Williams,  was  to  procure  the 
resignation  of  Whigs  so  that  President  Tyler  might  fill  the  offices 
with  eleventh-hour  Democrats  whom  it  would  be  embarrassing 
for  Polk  to  remove.^  Probably  such  reports  exaggerated  the 
facts,  especially  as  to  Whig  resignations,  but  it  is  certain  that 
the  Tyler  faction  believed  themselves  to  be  entitled  to  a  share  of 
Democratic  patronage.  In  plaintive  note,  John  Y.  Mason, 
Tyler 's  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  expressed  a  willingness  to  remain 
in  the  cabinet.  He  had,  he  told  Polk,  from  a  sense  of  duty 
resigned  a  judgeship  so  that  he  might  take  charge  of  the  Navy 
Department,  and  had  felt  "very  unhappy"  since  Tyler  had  be- 
come a  candidate.  Jackson,  whom  he  had  consulted,  had  advised 
him  to  remain  in  the  cabinet  because  Tyler  would  soon  with- 
draw.   He  would  resign  of  course  on  March  3  unless  Polk  should 


2  Dated  July  6,  1844.     See  Tyler,  Life  and  Times  of  the  Tylers,  III, 
143  ff. 

3  H.  C.  Williams,  Washington,  Nov.  15;  Henry  Simpson,  Philadelphia, 
Nov.  21,  1844,  Polk  Papers, 


286  JAMES  K.  POLK 

dedre  otherwise,  therefore  he  desired  a  "frank  statement"  of 
Polk's  intentions.  Mason  had  been  a  college  mate  of  Polk  and 
they  had  since  been  warm  personal  friends,  but  with  habitual 
caution  the  President-elect  replied  that  he  would  leave  all  such 
matters  to  be  settled  after  his  arrival  in  Washington.'* 

Directly  and  indirectly  Polk  received  much  unsolicited  advice 
on  the  subject  of  patronage,  and  especially  on  the  selection  of 
his  cabinet.  Through  General  Armstrong,  H.  C.  Williams 
warned  him  that  rival  factions  were  already  planning  for  the 
succession  of  their  respective  favorites,  therefore  he  should  dis- 
countenance all  of  them.^  As  usual,  Judge  Catron  was  free  with 
his  fatherly  advice.  He  had  been  told  by  Governor  Letcher,  of 
Kentucky,  that  the  Whigs  confidently  believed  Polk  to  be  under 
pledges  to  Calhoun;  and  that  because  Calhoun's  friends  and 
those  of  Van  Buren  and  Benton  could  never  work  in  har- 
mony, discord  and  disaster  would  beset  the  new  administration. 
Catron  assured  Letcher  that  Polk  had  made  no  pledges  to  any 
wing  of  the  party,  but  despite  the  truth  of  his  statement,  the 
rumors  regarding  Calhoun  continued  to  circulate.  Since  Polk 
had  been  elected  without  making  promises,  Catron's  advice  w^as 
that  he  should  "go  to  Washington  entirely  unpledged,  down  to 
a  post  office."  The  cold  shoulder,  he  said,  might  at  first  give 
offense ;  but  no  matter,  for  ' '  you  are  under  no  pressure  of 
obligation  to  your  party,  other  than  to  administer  the  govern- 
ment through  the  agency  of  men  of  undoubted  strength  and 
worth    of    character,    frcmi    head    to   foot."^     John    Blair,    of 


4  Mason  to  Polk,  Nov.  16;  Polk  to  Mason,  Dec.  6,  1844,  ihid. 

5  Williams  to  Armstrong,  Nov.  26,  1844,  ihid. 

«  Catron  to  Polk,  Nov.  23,  1844,  Polk  Papers.  Catron,  like  others,  had 
his  own  individual  preferences,  but  he  continued  to  urge  I'olk  to  make 
his  own  selections.  Both  Johnson  and  Brown  wrote  on  December  14  that 
Catron  had  suggested  Buchanan,  Wright,  and  Cass  for  the  State, 
Treasury,  and  War  Departments,  reai)ectively.  "Of  one  thing  I  am  abso- 
lutely certain,"  wrote  Catron  to  Polk  on  February  4,  "tliat  you  must 
begin  as  absolute  master  of  your  will,  if  this  be  possible,  in  framing  your 
cabinet.  Strength  it  must  have,  and  men  in  it  that  will  work  in  harmony: 
This  done  and  you  are  perfectly  safe,  regardless  of  fretting  for  a  brief 
space.  The  old  dare  not,  as  the  young  will  overthrow  them — and  the 
young,  set  up  no  claim  to  such  assumptions"  (Polk  Papers). 


PEESIDENT-ELECT  287 

Tennessee,  offered  a  liappy  solution  for  sectional  discord — 
patronao-e  in  plenty  for  the  North  and  principles  for  the  South." 
Warnings  and  advice,  however  well  meant,  were  entirely 
superfluous,  for  Polk  felt  himself  to  be  fully  capable  of  formulat- 
ing his  own  plans.  He  could  not  prevent  gossip  and  speculation, 
but  he  declared  emphatically  to  Cave  Johnson  that  he  was 
' '  under  no  pledges  or  commitments  to  any  of  the  cliques  ( if  such 
exist)  mentioned  by  the  newspapers."  The  policy  which  he  had 
chosen  to  follow  relieved  him  in  a  great  measure  from  consulting 
the  wishes  of  discordant  factions,  and  his  success  in  executing 
it  proved  the  wisdom  of  his  choice.  "My  object,"  he  told  Cave 
Johnson, 

will  be  to  do  my  duty  to  the  country,  and  I  do  not  intend  if  I  can  avoid  it, 
that  my  counsels  shall  be  distracted  by  the  supposed  or  not  conflicting  inter- 
ests of  those  cliques.  Another  thing  I  Avill  say — that  I  ^vill  if  I  can  have 
a  united  and  harmonious  set  of  cabinet  counsellors,  who  will  have  the  exist- 
ing administration  and  the  good  of  the  country  more  at  heart  than  the 
question  who  shall  succeed  me,  and  that  in  any  event  I  intend  to  be  myself 
President  of  the  U.  S.8 

No  one  can  follow  his  career  for  the  next  four  years  without 
being  convinced  that  he  held  the  executive  reins  firmly  in  his 
own  hands. 

Selecting  a  cabinet  from  men  of  ability  who  would  subord- 
inate their  own  personal  interests  to  those  of  the  administration 
and  of  the  country  required  an  unusual  degree  of  independence. 
The  desired  cooperation  could  not  be  obtained  without  the  elim- 
ination of  recognized  leaders  of  factions ;  and  such  a  course  would 
inevitably  subject  the  administration  to  attacks  from  all  who 
had  been  disappointed. 

The  claims  of  the  Tylerites  might  be  ignored  with  impunity, 
but  what  to  do  with  Calhoun  was  a  more  embarrassing  question. 


7  ' '  North  of  Mason  &  Dickson 's  line  should  be  plied  with  patronage 
as  principles  more  congenial  to  the  South  must  of  necessity  be  established 
&  carried  out  whatever  vour  personal  predelections"  may  be  (Blair  to 
Polk,  Dec.  2,  1844,  Polk  Papers). 

8  Polk  to  Johnson,  Dec.  21,  1844,  "Polk-Johnson  Letters." 


288  JAMES  E.  POLK 

Although  Calhoun  denied  emphatically  that  there  had  ever  been 
any  understanding  between  Polk  and  himself,''  apparently  he 
was  not  without  hope  that  he  would  be  invited  to  remain  at  the 
helm  in  the  Department  of  State.  Late  in  November  one  of  his 
intimate  friends,  General  James  Hamilton,  sounded  Polk  on  the 
subject  and  dwelt  on  the  desirability  of  having  Calhoun  con- 
tinued in  charge  of  the  Texas  and  Oregon  questions.  For  a 
southern  member  of  the  cabinet,  said  he,  the  entire  South,  from 
the  Potomac  to  Louisiana,  would  prefer  Calhoun. ^° 

The  difficulties  Avhich  might  result  from  any  attempt  to  har- 
monize factions  were  set  forth  in  a  letter  from  Cave  Johnson. 
He  said  that  it  was  understood  in  Washington  that  Calhoun  and 
other  members  of  Tyler's  cabinet  desired  to  remain.  It  was  also 
the  general  opinion  that  should  Calhoun  be  retained  Benton  and 
his  friends  would  oppose  Polk's  administration,  while,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  southern  element  would  be  hostile  unless  Calhoun 
should  be  continued  in  office.  Calhoun,  said  Johnson,  is  the  choice 
of  southern  men  for  Secretary  of  State,  while  many  from  the 
North  want  Silas  Wright ;  and  Benton  is  reported  to  have  de- 
clared that  should  Polk  retain  any  of  the  Tyler  cabinet  he  would 
open  fire  on  the  "rotten  eggs. "^^  General  Jackson's  advice  to 
Polk  was  the  exclusion  from  his  cabinet  of  "all  aspirants  to  the 
presidency,  or  vice";  and  the  General  was  so  confident  that  his 
advice  would  be  followed  that  he  assured  Blair  that  neither  Cal- 
houn nor  any  other  aspirant  would  be  appointed.  In  another 
letter  to  Polk,  Jackson  urged  that  Calhoun  must  not  be  retained, 
because  other  members  of  the  cabinet  could  not  get  along  with 
him:  "England  is  the  place  for  him  there  to  combat  with  my 
Lord  Aberdeen,  the  abolition  question."     The  entire  cabinet, 


9  "Nothing  has  ever  passed  between  Mr.  Polk  and  myself,  directly  or 
indirectly,  on  the  subject.  I  neither  know  his  views  nor  he  mine  on  the 
subject''  (Calhoun  to  J.  A.  Stuart,  Oct.  21,  1844,  Eep.  of  Am.  Hist.,  1899, 
II,  626). 

10  Hamilton  to  Polk,  Nov.  29,  1844,  Polk  Papers. 

11  Johnson  to  I'olk,  Dec.  1,  6,  1844,  ibid. 


PRESIDENT-ELECT  289 

said  he,  ought  to  be  composed  of  new  men.^-  Writing  late  in 
December,  Cave  Johnson  said  that  the  friends  of  Benton  and 
Calhoun  feared  each  other's  influence  with  Polk,  consequently 
the  breach  between  the  wings  of  the  party  was  widening.  Espe- 
cially did  the  northerners  fear  that  Polk  would  be  brought  under 
the  influence  of  Calhoun.  In  a  similar  strain  A.  V.  Brown 
wi'ote  that  all  elements  were  working  to  induce  Polk  not  to  retain 
Calhoun.  There  was,  he  said,  scarcely  less  opposition  to  Cass; 
while  Benton  and  Wright  opposed  Buchanan  on  account  of  the 
stand  he  had  taken  at  Baltimore  in  favor  of  the  two-thirds  rule.^^ 
While  others  were  doing  their  utmost  to  prevent  his  retention, 
Calhoun  himself  was  telling  his  friends  that  there  was  much 
speculation  concerning  the  cabinet  and  not  a  little  intriguing  in 
various  quarters.  He  reported  himself  to  be  ''perfectly  passive" 
and  "indifferent."  Whether  he  would  remain  or  not,  if  invited, 
would  depend  on  the  "probable  course  of  the  administration."^* 
His  supporters,  however,  were  both  active  and  hopeful.  Some 
of  them  were  sanguine  enough  to  believe  that  Calhoun  would 
be  able  to  build  up  such  a  strong  party  following  that  Polk  would 
not  dare  to  remove  him.^'^  Hearing  that  Gideon  Pillow  had  re- 
marked that  Polk's  chief  difficulty  was  "how  to  get  rid  of  Cal- 
houn," even  Duff  Green  felt  constrained  to  warn  the  President- 
elect of  the  dangers  which  would  result  from  sacrificing  Calhoun 
in  order  to  conciliate  Benton  and  Wright.  ' '  I  make  no  pretense 
of  friendship  for  you,"  he  told  Polk  very  frankly;  but  as  a 


12  Jackson  to  Polk,  Dee.  13,  16,  Folic  Papers;  Jackson  to  Blair,  Dec. 
14,  1844,  Jackson  Papers. 

13  Johnson  to  Polk,  Dec.  26;  Brown  to  Polk,  Dec.  29,  1844,  Polk  Papers. 

14  Calhoun  to  his  son-in-law,  Thos.  G.  Clemson,  Dec.  13,  1844,  Eep.  Am. 
Assn.,  1899,  II,  633.  Dr.  Gwin,  who  was  supposed  to  be  voicing  Calhoun's 
views,  suggested  to  A.  V.  Brown  the  following  cabinet:  Calhoun,  See.  of 
State;  Walker,  Sec.  of  Treasury;  Woodbury,  See.  of  War;  Eeed,  of  Pa., 
Atty.  Gen.;  Flagg,  P-M  Gen.;  Mason,  Sec.  of  Navy.  Van  Buren  was  sug- 
gested as  minister  to  England  (Brown  to  Polk,  Jan.  5,  1845,  Polk  Papers). 

15  C.  A.  Davis,  New  York,  to  Crittenden,  Dee.  17,  1844,  Crittenden 
Papers. 


290  JAMES   E.  POLK 

friend  of  the  South,  he  urged  Calhoun's  retention.^*'  Calhoun 
himself  continued  to  remain  passive  until  February  26,  when,  in 
a  personal  interview,  Polk  informed  him  that  there  was  to  be  an 
entirely  new  cabinet  and  offered  to  send  him  as  minister  to  Eng- 
land. On  the  day  following  he  sent  Polk  his  resignation  and 
assured  him  that  there  was  neither  dissatisfaction  nor  abatement 
of  kind  feelings  on  his  own  part.^^ 

New  England  began  at  an  early  date  to  solicit  a  place  in  the 
cabinet.  In  New  Hampshire,  Hubbard  and  Woodbury  were 
mentioned,  but  her  congressional  delegation  preferred  Pierce.^^ 
Bancroft  was  suggested  as  the  New  England  member,  but  he 
informed  Polk  that  he  would  prefer  a  foreign  mission.^*^  Maine 
was  especially  insistent  in  her  claims  for  recognition,  and  Polk 
received  numerous  letters  from  politicians  of  that  state.  In 
several  of  them  Governor  Fairfield  was  suggested  as  Secretary 
of  the  Navy,  and  Nathan  Weston  as  Attorney  General. 

The  greatest  rivalry,  however,  aside  from  the  solicitation  in 
Calhoun's  behalf,  was  that  between  New  York  on  the  one  side, 
and  Pennsylvania  and  the  West  on  the  other.  In  Pennsylvania 
Buchanan  and  Dallas  were  the  recognized  heads  of  two  rival  fac- 
tions, each  of  which  was  desirous  of  gaining  a  strategic  position 
in  the  new  administration.  In  order  to  accomplish  his  purpose, 
Dallas  recommended  that  Robert  J.  Walker,  of  Mississippi,  be 
made  Secretary  of  State.-"  Dallas  and  Walker  were  connected 
by  family  ties  as  well  as  by  political  sympathies.  In  addition, 
Walker  had  the  support  of  the  aggressive  forces  in  the  south- 
western states.     Richard  Rush  urged  the  claims  of  Buchanan. 


18  Green  to  Polk,  Jan.  20,  1845,  PoUc  Papers.  On  January  1,  Memucan 
Hunt  wrote  from  Galveston  that  leading  public  men  in  Texas  wished 
Calhoun  to  be  retained  and  Donelson  to  be  made  Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 

17  Calhoun  to  Polk,  Feb.  27,  1845,  Polk  Papers.  Same  to  Clemson, 
March  11,  1845,  Bep.  Am.  Hist.  Assn.,  1899,  II,  647. 

18  John  P.  Hale  to  Pierce,  Dec.  3,  1844,  Pierce  Papers. 

19  Lewis  Josselyn,  of  Boston,  to  J.  Geo.  Harris,  Dec.  4,  1844;  Bancroft 
to  Polk,  Jan.  1,  1845,  PoUc  Papers. 

20  Dallas  to  Polk,  Dec.  15,  1844,  ibid. 


PEESIDENT-ELECT  291 

The  latter  had  also  received  the  formal  endorsement  of  the 
Pennsylvania  electoral  college,  but  Dallas  informed  Polk  that 
this  action  had  been  procured  by  the  intrigue  of  a  man  who 
wished  to  be  made  collector  of  the  port  of  Philadelphia.  Dallas 
once  more  recommended  Walker,  dwelling  on  his  command  of 
foreign  languages  and  upon  the  fact  that  he  would  be  especially 
acceptable  to  the  Texans.-' 

The  rejection  of  Van  Buren  at  Baltimore  made  it  desirable 
that  the  powerful  state  of  New  York  should  be  placated  if  pos- 
sible.    Polk  very  naturally,  therefore,  turned  his  thoughts  in 
that  direction,  and  his  offer  of  the  Treasury  Department  to  Silas 
Wright  was  the  first  tender  of  a  cabinet  position  to  any  one. 
Wright  promptly  declined  the  oifer.    The  reason,  as  stated  in  his 
letter,  was  that  he  had  pledged  himself  to  serve  as  governor,  if 
elected,  and  should  he  fail  to  do  so  it  would  be  said  that  his 
nomination  had  been  a  trick  to  enable  him  to  procure  a  cabinet 
position.    When  expressing  regret  because  Wright  had  felt  con- 
strained to  decline,  Polk  stated  that  while  he  had  not  yet  decided 
upon  a  person  for  any  of  the  cabinet  positions,  he  intended  to 
select  either  the  Secretary  of  State  or  the  Secretary  of  the  Treas- 
ury from  the  state  of  New  York.     He  asked  Wright  freely  to 
suggest  a  man  for  either  position.-^    In  his  reply  Wright  recom- 
mended Benjamin  F.   Butler   for   the   State   Department   and 
Azariah  C.  Flagg  for  the  Treasury.    Lest  Polk  might  think  that 
he  would  have  accepted  the  State  portfolio,  he  assured  the  Presi- 
dent-elect that  he  did  not  feel  qualified  to  fill  that  office.     Had 
he  been  at  liberty  to  fill  any  such  position  he  would  have  accepted 
the  Treasury  appointment. 

In  a  letter  dated  January  4,  1845,  Polk  assured  Van  Buren 
that  his  nomination  at  Baltimore  had  been  unsought  and  unex- 
pected.   He  prevaricated  to  the  degree  of  stating  that :    "Until 

21  Rush  to  Polk,  Dec.  27,  1844;  Dallas  to  Polk,  Jan.  10,  1845,  Hid. 

22  Polk  to  Wright,  Dec.  7;  Wright  to  Polk,  Dec.  20,  1844;  Polk  to 
Wright,  Jan.  4,  1845,  ihid. 


292  JAMES  K.  FOLK 

the  moment  it  was  made,  it  was  very  far  from  my  thoughts,  that 
any  state  of  circumstances  could  arise,  which  could  lead  to  such 
a  result."  He  thanked  the  ex-President  for  his  "powerful 
support"  and  requested  his  advice  as  to  suitable  members  of 
the  cabinet.  Wright,  he  said,  was  the  only  selection  he  had 
made  without  consulting  anyone,  but  as  that  offer  had  been 
declined,  he  would  like  to  have  Van  Buren  suggest  persons  for 
either  the  State  or  Treasury  Departments.^^  In  reply,  Yan 
Buren  stated  that  Polk  had  acted  just  as  he  would  have  done  in 
offering  the  Treasury  portfolio  to  Wright,  and  that  Wright's 
refusal  to  accept  was  due  entirely  to  the  political  situation  in 
New  York.  He  knew  of  no  one  so  well  qualified  to  take  charge 
of  foreign  affairs  as  Benjamin  F.  Butler,  and  he  believed  either 
Flagg  or  Cambreleng  to  be  suitable  for  the  Treasury  Depart- 
ment. A  month  later  he  told  Polk  that  Donelson  would  be  a 
good  man  to  have  near  him.  He  had  desired  to  have  Donelson 
in  his  own  cabinet,  but  had  feared  that  modesty  would  prevent 
him  from  accepting.-*  Jackson  believed  that  Wright 's  refusal  to 
accept  a  cabinet  position  had  been  due  to  the  fear  that  Calhoun 
would  be  retained.  He  advised  Polk  to  deliberate  well  and  to 
make  no  final  decisions  until  he  had  reached  Washington.  He 
believed  Mason  and  Wilkins  to  be  worthy  men,  but  "surely  you 
will  do  well  to  select  an  entire  cabinett  fresh  from  the  people 
as  your  own,  &  leave  Mr.  Tylers  out  to  be  provided  for,  if  thought 
worthy  otherwise. '  '-^ 

Before  making  another  tender  of  a  cabinet  office  Polk  pre- 
pared a  form  of  invitation  to  be  used  in  future  eases.  Its  pur- 
pose was  to  make  clear  to  those  who  might  receive  it  that  a 
cabinet  position  was  not  to  be  used,  during  the  next  four  years, 
as  a  stepping-stone  to  the  Presidency,  and  that  each  member 


23  Polk  to  Van  Buren,  Jan.  4,  1845,  Van  Buren  Papers.  Also,  copy  in 
PolJc  Papers. 

2*  Van  Buren  to  Polk,  Jan.  18,  1845,  PoUc  Papers  and  Van  B.  Papers; 
Van  Buren  to  Polk,  Feb.  21,  Folic  Papers. 

-■>  Jackson  to  Polk,  Jan.  10,  1845,  Folk  Papers. 


PBESIDENT-ELECT  293 

must  devote  his  whole  time  to  the  duties  of  his  office.""  Although 
he  was  not  a  military  man,  Polk  possessed  at  least  one  attribute 
of  a  true  soldier.  As  a  private  in  the  ranks  of  his  party  he  was 
ever  ready  to  submit  without  complaint  to  the  judgment  of  the 
leaders ;  and  now,  as  party  chieftain,  he  required  from  others 
a  similar  respect  for  authority.  Jackson,  who  knew  Polk 
thoroughly,  assured  Blair  that  "He  will  have  no  caball  about 
him,  his  heads  of  Departments  must  be  a  unit.  This  is  my  opin- 
ion of  the  man,  and  I  think  you  will,  when  you  know  the  men 
be  pleased  with  his  selection."-^ 

On  January  28,  1845,  Polk  left  his  home  at  Columbia  and 
set  out  for  Washington.  The  fact  that  he  was  going  to  fill  the 
highest  office  of  his  country  did  not  for  a  moment  overcome  his 
habitual  caution  nor  prevent  him  from  giving  thoughtful  atten- 
tion to  minute  details.  He  had  written  to  Cave  Johnson  and 
other  friends  and  asked  them  to  procure  rooms  for  him  at  Cole- 
man's hotel,  but  the  rates  must  be  reasonable  and  the  bargain 
made  in  advance.^^ 

When  he  arrived  in  Washington  in  the  middle  of  February 
the  President-elect  had  not,  with  the  exception  of  Buchanan, 
definitely  decided  upon  any  member  of  his  cabinet.-''     Early  in 


26  See  infra,  p.  325. 

27  Jackson  to  Blair,  Jan.  21,  1845,  Jackson  Papers.  There  were,  of 
course,  those  who  held  a  radically  different  opinion.  "Polk,"  wrote 
Prentiss,  "was  elected  by  a  union  of  factions.  He  has  neither  honesty 
nor  capacity  to  be  the  president  even  of  his  party — he  will  become  at  once 
the  tool  of  those  factions"  (Prentiss  to  Crittenden,  Dec.  22,  1844,  Crit- 
tenden Papers).  J.  K.  Paulding,  also,  considered  Polk  weak  and  unable 
to  cope  with  the  situation,  "whether  he  selects  a  northern,  a  southern,  or 
a  mixed  cabinet."  "He  is  by  no  means  a  great  man — nor  scarcely  one 
of  extraordinary  mediocrity;  and  if  the  truth  must  be  told,  I  admire  Mrs. 
Polk  much  more  than  I  do  the  colonel  (Paulding  to  Van  Buren,  Jan.  19, 
1845,  Van  Buren  Papers). 

28  ' '  You  know  I  have  no  money  to  spend  unnecessarily, — and  to  avoid 
being  subjected  to  an  extravagant  or  enormous  charge,  it  is  necessary  that 
a  distinct  bargain  shall  be  made  in  advance"  (Polk  to  Johnson,  Dec.  21, 
1844,  "Polk- Johnson  Letters"). 

20  According  to  Gideon  Welles,  he  had  also  settled  upon  Bancroft  for 
the  Treasurv  and  Walker  for  Attorney  General,  before  leaving  Tennessee 
(MS  "Rev.^of  Pol.  Hist,  of  U.  S.  and  Pres.  Contests,"  Welles  Papers). 


294  JAMES  K.  POLK 

the  AA'inter,  at  a  meeting  held  at  the  Hermitage,  Buchanan  had 
been  discussed  as  a  possible  premier  for  the  cabinet,  but  then 
it  was  believed  that  his  appointment  would  cause  too  much 
jealously  on  the  part  of  Benton,  Calhoun,  Cass,  and  Wright.^" 
However,  on  his  arrival  in  "Washington,  Polk  immediately  invited 
Buchanan  to  take  charge  of  the  State  Department,  and  the  tender 
was  promptly  accepted. ^^ 

Having  thus  provided  for  Pennsylvania,  Polk  addressed  an- 
other letter  to  Van  Buren.  When  he  last  wrote,  he  said,  he 
intended  to  look  to  New  York  for  either  a  Secretary  of  State  or 
a  Secretary  of  War.  Subsequently  he  had  decided  to  call  a 
citizen  of  another  state  to  the  Department  of  State,  but  was  still 
desirous  that  a  citizen  of  New  York  should  take  charge  of  the 
Treasury.  Such  had  been  his  intention  when  he  came  to  Wash- 
ington. On  his  arrival,  however,  he  found  that  the  South  had 
already  united  on  a  distinguished  individual  from  that  section 
and  that  Indiana  as  well  as  other  western  states  favored  the  same 
person. 

I  was  not  satisfied  that  it  was  proper  to  appoint  him  to  that  Post — -but  became 
convinced — that  if  I  did  not — great  and  extensive  dissatisfaction  would 
prevail — unless  I  could  find  some  individual  in  some  part  of  the  Union  who 
would  be  unexceptionable  to  them  &  also  to  the  North. 

Believing  that  Bancroft  would  fulfil  these  conditions,  "my  pre- 
sent determination  therefore  is  to  call  him  to  that  [Treasury] 
Department."  He  was  inclined,  he  said,  to  retain  Mason  in 
charge  of  the  Navy,  and  would  be  glad  to  have  either  Butler  or 
Marcy  as  his  Secretary  of  War.^-  Evidently  the  distinguished 
individual  mentioned  in  the  letter  was  Robert  J.  Walker,  of 
Mississippi.    Writing  early  in  January,  A.  V.  Brown  told  Polk 


30  J.  P.  Brawles  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  20,  18'44,  Buchanan  Papers.  Brawles 
was  told  this  by  A.  V.  Brown,  who  had  been  ]>resent  when  Polk  discussed 
cabinet  appointments  with  Jackson. 

31  Polk's  letter  was  dated  at  Washington  on  Feb.  17  (Bucltanan  Papers) 
and  Buchanan  rej)lied  on  Feb.  18  (Polk  Papers). 

32  Polk  to  Van  Buren,  Feb.  22,  1845,  Van  Buren  Papers. 


PBESIDENT-ELECT  295 

that  Joseph  A.  Wright,  Representative  from  Indiana,  had  re- 
ported that  his  own  section  as  well  as  the  Northwest  wished 
Walker  to  be  made  Secretary  of  the  Ti'easury  so  that  he  might 
have  the  appointment  of  land  agents  and  other  western  officials. 
If,  said  he,  Silas  Wright  should  be  given  the  office,  he  would 
use  it  to  his  own  advantage  and  to  the  prejudice  of  Cass.  From 
Cave  Johnson,  also,  came  the  information  that  the  "Cass  men" 
all  preferred  Walker,  and  he  gave  the  same  reasons  for  their 
preference. ^^ 

Polk  did  not  yield  immediately  to  the  importunities  of 
Walker's  friends;  instead  he  held  to  his  original  plan  of  making 
Bancroft  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  and  Walker  Attorney  Gen- 
eral. He  even  drafted  a  letter  in  which  he  invited  Walker  to 
accept  the  latter  position,  but  probably  it  was  never  sent.^*  On 
February  25,  without  awaiting  a  reply  from  Van  Buren,  he 
offered  the  War  portfolio  to  Benjamin  F.  Butler.  Butler 
promptly  declined  because  of  "domestic  and  prudential  consid- 
erations," although  he  w-ould  have  made  the  sacrifice  if  he  had 
been  tendered  either  the  State  or  the  Treasury  Department. ^"^ 

Van  Buren  deliberated  well  before  answering  Polk's  letter 
of  February  22 ;  but  on  March  1,  he  drafted  a  reply  and  sent  it 
to  Washington  by  his  son,  Smith  Van  Buren.  In  it  he  said  that 
the  "honest  portion"  of  the  New  York  Democracy  were  excited 
by  a  rumor  that  Woodbury  was  to  be  made  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  and  that  New  York  was  to  be  passed  over  entirely.  He 
did  not  say,  but  seemed  to  assume,  that  Butler  would  reconsider 
his  refusal  of  the  War  portfolio."''     Polk  appears  to  have  felt 


33  Brown  to  Polk,  Jan.  9;  Johnson  to  Polk,  Jan.  11,  1845,  Polk  Papers. 

3*  Copy,  dated  Feb.  19,  1845,  ibid. 

33  Butler  to  Polk,  Feb.  27,  1845,  Polk  Papers.  Mrs.  Butler  wrote  to 
Van  Buren  that  she  was  responsible  for  her  husband's  refusing  the  War 
portfolio;  that  she  had  promised  that  if  he  were  offered  the  State  Depart- 
ment she  would  not  object,  but  this  promise  di<l  not  apply  to  other  depart- 
ments. Her  reason  was  that  she  did  not  like  to  live  in  Washington  (Mrs. 
Butler  to  Van  Buren,  Feb.  27,  1845,  Van  Buren  Papers). 

3c  Van  Buren  to  Polk,  Albany,  March  1,  1845,  Polk  Papers. 


296  JAMES  K.  POLK 

that  Butler's  prompt  refusal  and  Van  Buren's  delay  had  ab- 
solved him  from  further  obligation  to  that  wing  of  the  party, 
for,  on  March  1,  he  informed  Van  Buren  that,  as  Flagg  did  not 
have  a  national  reputation,  he  had  decided  to  make  Marcy  Secre- 
tary of  War.  He  hoped  that  this  appointment  would  be  satis- 
factory to  New  York.  The  rumor  that  Bancroft  was  to  be  made 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  had  "brought  down  upon  me"  the 
delegations  from  New  Hampshire  and  Maine,  and  many — on  ac- 
count of  the  patronage  he  dispenses — were  demanding  the  ap- 
pointment of  a  southern  man  to  that  office. ^^ 

When  Smith  Van  Buren  arrived  in  Washington  with  the  let- 
ter from  his  father  he  was  chagrined  to  learn  that  Polk  had 
already  appointed  Marcy.  "Well,"  he  reported  to  the  ex- 
President, 

the  letter  which  you  rec'd  dated  last  night  from  the  illustrious  cabinet-maker 
of  our  day  has  advised  you  of  the  fate  of  my  mission ;  and  unless  the  excuses 
&  explanations  were  more  skilfully  done  in  writing  than  in  conversation,  you 
will  have  seen  through  the  flimsy  pretexts — the  contradictory  &  evasive  & 
trimming  character  of  the  business,  at  least  so  far  as  New  York  is  concerned. 

Polk,  he  said,  had  declined  to  receive  him  for  half  an  hour,  in 
order  to  give  himself  and  A.  V.  Brown  time  to  "concoct"  an  an- 
swer. Polk  wished  that  he  might  have  seen  Van  Buren 's  letter  a 
day  earlier,  but  the  matter  had  now  been  decided.  ' '  The  Treasury 
arrangement  [Walker's  appointment]  you  perceive  tells  the  whole 
story  for  New  York.  The  only  chance  now  is  that  your  letter 
may  upset  the  whole  concern,  &  start  anew  the  business  to- 
morrow." In  a  letter  written  on  the  following  day  he  said  that 
when  he  read  his  father's  letter  to  Polk,  the  latter,  instead  of 
feeling  crestfallen,  had  the  "impudence"  to  say  that  he  felt 
relieved.    "I  denounced  Marcy  to  him  in  good  round  terms"  and 


37  Polk  to  "Van  Buren,  March  1,  1845,  Van  Buren  Papers.  Evidently 
Marcy  had  been  expecting  an  offer,  for  on  Feb.  24  he  wrote  to  Dickinson 
about  "my  appointment  as  a  member  of  the  cabinet."  This  must  have 
been  speculation,  because  on  the  day  following  (25th)  Polk  offered  the 
"War  portfolio  to  Butler. 


PEESIDENT-ELECT  297 

said  that  he  was  simply  an  office  seeker  in  whom  honest  Demo- 
crats had  no  faith.  Polk  replied  that  he  had  never  heard 
these  things  before  and  was  "tliunderstruck,"  although  "Dix 
has  told  him  the  same  thing  over  and  over  again.  "^'^ 

Instead  of  beginning  anew  with  his  cabinet  making,  Polk  dis- 
patched another  letter  to  A^an  Buren.  If  he  had  committed  an 
error,  he  said,  it  had  been  unintentional;  and  it  pained  him  to 
think  tliat  Van  Buren  might  think  he  had  acted  unkindly  to  him 
or  his  friends.  He  had  acted,  he  said  under  no  outside  influence ; 
he  had  followed  his  own  judgment,  and  harbored  no  unkind  feel- 
ing toward  either  Van  Buren  or  Wright.^*^  Nevertheless,  Smith 
Van  Buren  had  formed  quite  a  different  opinion.  "The  sound- 
est judges  here,"  he  wrote,  "think  P.  came  here  all  right — but 
has  been  be-deviled  since  he  arrived.  To  a  large  extent  this  is  of 
course  evident,  but  not  wholly  so."**^ 

It  is  scarcely  to  be  wondered  at  that  Polk  should  have  dis- 
sembled during  the  days  just  preceding  his  inauguration.  He 
was  beset  on  every  hand  by  conflicting  demands,  all  of  which  he 
was  expected  to  satisfy.  That  he  strove  to  harmonize  factional 
discord  so  far  as  his  own  self-respect  would  permit,  there  is  no 
reason  to  doubt.  He  tried  to  deal  fairly  with  each  faction,  but 
to  accept  the  dictation  of  none.  If  the  Van  Burenites  suffered 
disappointment  they  had  only  themselves  to  blame,  for  Polk  had 
given  them  more  consideration  than  he  had  ever  received  from 
them.    He  had  tendered  cabinet  positions  to  two  of  their  number. 


38  Smith  Van  Buren  to  his  father,  March  2,  3,  1845,  Van  Buren  Papers. 
Tilden  and  O 'Sullivan,  who  bore  letters  from  Butler  to  Polk,  were,  on  the 
other  hand,  thoroughly  captivated  by  the  President-elect.  The  latter  re- 
ported that  Polk  seemed  like  "one  of  us"  and  evinced  great  admiration 
for  both  Wright  and  Van  Buren.  ' '  He  certainly  entirely  won  the  hearts 
of  both  of  us,  and  has  effectually  dissipated  whatever  slight  degree  of 
anxiety  may  have  rested  in  our  minds  in  regard  to  the  Adm'n"  (O 'Sul- 
livan to  Van  Buren,  Washington,  March  1,  1845,  Van  Buren  Papers). 

39  Polk  to  Van  Buren,  March  3,  1845,  Polh  Papers. 

40  Smith  Van  Buren  to  his  father,  March  4,  1845,  Van  Buren  Papers. 
"Armstrong,"  said  he,  "so  far  as  I  can  observe,  is  the  only  honest  man 
about  him.  He  [Armstrong]  is  sick  &  very  much  affected  by  our  affairs. 
He  doubtless  sees  the  approaching  storm  from  Nashville." 


298  JAMES  K.  POLK 

and  he  had  kept  Van  Buren  fully  informed  regarding  his  plans. 
He  had  even  told  the  ex-President  of  his  intention  to  appoint 
Marcy  unless  Butler  should  accept  the  place  offered  to  him.  Van 
Buren  had  delayed  in  answering  his  letter,  and  it  was  unreason- 
able to  expect  Polk  to  wait  indefinitely  when  inauguration  day 
was  already  at  hand.  Surely  Polk  had  the  right  to  make  his  own 
choice  for  the  office  of  Secretary  of  State,  and  it  was  cool  effront- 
ery on  Butler's  part  to  intimate  that  the  position  should  have 
been  bestowed  upon  himself. 

"Walker's  assignment  to  the  Treasury  evidently  was  contrary 
to  Polk's  own  washes,  yet  he  felt  constrained  to  make  this  con- 
cession to  the  western  element  after  his  own  choice,  Bancroft, 
was  found  to  be  unpopular  even  in  New  England  states.  A  new 
adjustment  became  necessary,  therefore  Mason  was  made 
Attorney  General  so  that  Bancroft  might  be  assigned  to  the  Navy. 
Mason's  retention  in  the  cabinet  was  due  to  personal  friendship, 
and  not  to  a  desire  to  placate  Tyler  and  his  friends.  Tyler  had, 
in  January,  bestowed  a  diplomatic  appointment  upon  William  H. 
Polk,  but  the  latter  declined  to  accept  it  in  order  to  free  his 
brother  from  any  obligation  to  the  retiring  President.^^  In  fact, 
Tyler  was  much  displeased  by  the  ingratitude  of  his  successor, 
and,  in  1846,  wrote  that  Polk  seemed  to  be  ''avenging  the  sup- 
posed wrongs  to  Mr.  Van  Buren.  "*^  Marcy 's  acceptance  of  the 
War  portfolio"  completed  the  cabinet,  for  Cave  Johnson  had 
accepted  the  appointment  as  Postmaster  General  shortly  after 
Polk's  arrival  in  Washington.**  Although  many  persons  had 
suggested  Donelson  as  the  Tennessee  member,  Polk  evidently 
preferred   Johnson,    and   Jackson   assured   Polk   that    Donelson 


■*i  Cave  Johnson  to  Polk,  Jan.  8;  J.  L.  0 'Sullivan  to  Polk,  Jan.  20, 
1845,  Polk  Papers. 

42  Tyler  to  Alex.  Gardner,  Julv  11,  1846  (Tvler,  Letters  and  Times  of 
the  Tylers,  II,  342). 

43  Welles  says  that  "Gen.  [William  O.]  Butler  of  Kentucky  accom- 
paniecl  the  President-elect  to  the  seat  of  government  in  expectation  of  the 
appointment  [War  Dept.]  then  tendered  him"  (MS  "Rev.  of  Pol.  Hist., 
etc.").    I  have  seen  nothing  else  to  indicate  that  such  an  offer  was  made. 

44  Johnson  to  Polk,  Feb.  26,  1845,  Polk  Papers. 


PRESIDENT-ELECT  299 

would  be  satisfied  with  a  foreign  mission.  Jackson  had  made  it 
clear  to  Donelson,  he  said,  that  he  was  the  one  who  had  suggested 
a  diplomatic  appointment  in  preference  to  any  other. *^  Johnson 
thoroughly  deserved  a  place  in  Polk's  cabinet,  for  no  one  had 
stood  by  him  so  loyally  or  had  rendered  more  efficient  service  dur- 
ing his  entire  political  career.  Polk  was  by  nature  secretive  and 
self-reliant,  but  to  Johnson  more  than  to  any  other  person  he 
disclosed  his  plans  and  his  aspirations.  Johnson  had  never  failed 
him  in  the  hour  of  need,  and,  both  in  Washington  and  in  Tenn- 
essee, had  done  much  to  aid  his  political  advancement.  As  a 
statesman,  Johnson  was  conservative  and  rather  narrow ;  but  he 
was  a  crafty  and  capable  politician,  and  a  recognized  leader  in 
the  House. 

In  selecting  his  cabinet,  as  in  distributing  the  patronage,  Polk 
had  to  steer  between  Scylla  and  Charybdis.  When  he  tried  to 
be  fair  to  all  wings  of  the  party,  he  was  charged  with  weakness ; 
while  independent  actions  were  attributed  to  vanity  and  conceit, 
or  characterized  as  downright  treachery  to  his  benefactors.  It 
was  freely  predicted  that  leading  cabinet  members  Avould  dom- 
inate the  President  and  reduce  him  to  a  mere  figurehead,  yet, 
from  the  beginning,  Polk  was  master  of  the  situation. 

Scarcely  less  difficult  than  the  selection  of  a  cabinet  was  the 
choice  of  a  party  "organ"  which  Avould  give  ungrudging  sup- 
port to  the  new  administration.  Historians  have  indulged  in  no 
small  amount  of  conjecture  as  to  Polk's  reasons  for  discarding 
Blair  and  the  Glohe  despite  General  Jackson's  vigorous  protests. 
His  action  is  usually  said  to  have  been  the  consummation  of  a 
preelection  bargain  to  obtain  votes.  Sometimes  Tyler  is  made 
the  other  party  to  the  contract,  sometimes  Calhoun ;  and  in  an 
attempt  to  make  out  a  strong  case,  some  have  asserted  that  Blair's 
head  on  a  platter  had  been  offered  to  each  of  them  in  return  for 
his  political  support.    Usually  their  information  has  been  derived 


45  Jackson  to  Polk,  Jan.  10,  Feb.  15,  1845,  ibid.  On  account  of  Donel- 
son's  delicate  health,  Jackson  asked  that  he  might  be  sent  as  full  minister 
to  Spain,  Brazil,  or  Mexico. 


300  JAMES  K.  FOLK 

from  Benton,  and  accepted  without  question.  But  even  von 
Hoist,  who  had  no  difficulty  in  believing  the  Tyler  story,  balks  at 
the  absurdity  of  a  bargain  between  Polk  and  Calhoun.'*"  For 
very  good  reasons  both  Tyler  and  Calhoun  despised  the  editor 
of  the  Globe,  and  both  supported  the  nominees  of  the  Democratic 
party,  but  such  a  coincidence  does  not  imply  any  bargain  between 
them  and  the  Democratic  candidates.  Calhoun 's  letter  to  Stuart 
concerning  the  prospective  cabinet*^  seems  to  indicate  that  he 
had  no  knowledge  of  Polk's  plans  for  the  future,  and  Tyler  has 
specifically  and  emphatically  denied  that  he  and  Polk  had  ever 
entered  into  an  agreement  by  which  Tyler's  withdrawal  from 
the  canvass  was  made  contingent  on  Polk's  promise  not  to  make 
the  Globe  his  official  organ.  As  Tyler  very  aptly  remarked, 
"Blair  was  already  dead,"  and  it  only  remained  for  Mr.  Polk  to 
chant  his  requiem. ^^ 

It  is  unnecessary  to  seek  some  mysterious  intrigue  or  pre- 
election pact  in  order  to  find  Polk's  motive  for  establishing  a 
new  paper  in  Washington.  The  obvious  reason  for  establishing 
the  Union  was  his  desire  to  have  an  organ  at  the  capital  which 
would  give  his  administration  its  undivided  and  loyal  support. 
He  had  always  believed  Blair  to  be  hostile  or  indifferent  to  his 
jDolitical  advancement  when  he  had  been  a  candidate  for  Speaker, 
and  when  he  had  sought  the  Vice-Presidential  nomination.  Both 
Polk  and  his  friends  believed  that  the  Globe  had  supported  the 
nominees  of  the  Baltimore  convention  with  great  reluctance  and 
that  its  editor  was  now,  and  would  continue  to  be,  under  the 
absolute  domination  of  Senator  Benton.  This  belief  is  the  best 
of  reasons  for  Polk's  refusal  to  make  the  Globe  his  official  news- 
paper.   Walker  and  others  were  hostile  to  Blair  and  undoubtedly 

4«  von  Hoist,  Historij  of  the  United  States,  III,  7-8. 

•»'  See  above,  p.  288,  note  9. 

■* 8  Tyler  to  Eitchie,  Jan.  9,  1851;  same  to  John  S.  Cunningham,  Mav  8, 
1856  (Tyler,  Letters  and  Times  of  the  Tylers,  II,  409  ff.,  415).  In  ^the 
second  letter,  Tyler  said  that  the  "conspiracy  to  supplant  the  Globe,  by 
substituting  Mr.  Ritchie  or  anybody  else  as  the  editorial  mouth-piece  of 
Mr.  Polk,  is  the  sheerest  invention  that  ever  was  conceived  of. ' ' 


PRESIDENT-ELECT  301 

desired  his  elimination.  Their  feelings  may  have  strengthened 
Polk's  determination  to  look  elsewhere  for  an  editor,  but  there 
is  no  reason  for  believing  that  they  caused  it.  Polk's  Tennessee 
friends  wrote  freely  concerning  the  advisability  of  establishing  a 
new  paper,  but  in  his  correspondence  there  is  no  letter  from 
Walker  on  this  subject.*® 

Polk's  feelings  toward  Blair  are  manifested  in  a  letter  written 
to  Cave  Johnson  on  January  21,  1844.  "Amicus"  had  published 
in  the  Glolc  an  article  which  urged  the  claims  of  W.  R.  King  to 
the  Vice-Presidency.  In  reply,  S.  H.  Laughlin  and  H.  L.  Turney 
prepared  an  article  in  Polk's  behalf  and  sent  it  to  Blair  for  pub- 
lication. "Blair,"  said  Polk,  "surely  cannot  do  me  the  injustice 
to  exclude  it  from  his  columns";  if  so,  he  instructed  Johnson  to 
have  it  published  in  pamphlet  form.  After  alluding  to  his  nom- 
ination by  the  Mississippi  state  convention,  Polk  wondered 
whether  Blair  would  suppress  this  news  "or  stick  it  in  an  obscure 
corner  as  he  did  the  Tennessee  and  Arkansas  nominations?"^'^ 
Such  remarks  indicate  that  he  did  not,  even  at  that  time,  regard 
Blair  as  his  friend. 

Immediately  after  Polk  had  been  nominated  at  Baltimore, 
A.  V.  Brown  reported  from  Washington  that  "much  is  said  here 
by  some  as  to  continuing  the  Globe  as  the  Polk  organ— this  we 
will  manage  with  sound  discretion.  The  Globe  will  change  its 
tone  &  perhaps  take  back  much  that  it  has  said  &  go  in  warmly 
if  not  heartily— if  so— well— But  we  will  not  commit  ourselves 
to  it  after  the  election.""  The  last  remark  might  seem  to  indicate 
that  Blair's  fate  after  election  had  already  been  determined,  but 
this  is  disproved  by  letters  written  later  in  the  campaign.  Cave 
Johnson,  who  was  hostile  to  Calhoun  and  averse  to  the  Tylerites, 
wrote  that  the  Globe  was  noncommittal  and  that  a  new  paper  was 

49  Althoujih  Ambler  assigns  to  Walker  the  chief  role  in  the  overthrow 
of  Blair,  he  admits  his  inability  to  produce  any  tangible  evidence  (Ambler, 
Thomas  Eitchie,  252). 

50  Polk  to  Johnson,  Jan.  21,  1844,  "Polk-Johnson  Letters." 

51  Brown  to  Polk,  May  30,  1844,  Polk  Papers. 


302  JAMES  K.  POLE 

needed ;  but  two  weeks  later,  when  he  had  come  to  believe  that 
the  southerners  were  trying  to  "appropriate"  Polk,  he  spoke 
with  disgust  of  the  "secret  talk  of  upsetting  the  Globe  [and] 
turning  Benton  overboard."^-  Judge  Catron  vehemently  de- 
nounced the  Glohe  and  declared  that  its  "coarse  brutality"  was 
loathed  by  a  large  majority  of  the  party.^^ 

Late  in  June,  J.  B.  Jones,  editor  of  the  Madisonian,  invited 
J.  George  Harris  to  become  joint  editor  of  that  paper.  Harris 
and  General  Armstrong  looked  with  favor  upon  the  offer  and 
believed  that  all  threeWashington  papers — Madisonian,  Spectator 
and  Glohe — might  be  merged  into  one.  However,  A.  V.  Brown, 
who  had  come  from  Washington  recently,  did  not  approve  such 
an  arrangement.^*  It  was  not  yet  a  question  of  an  administration 
organ,  for  there  was  no  certainty  that  Polk  would  be  elected,  but 
many  of  Polk 's  friends  felt  that  Blair 's  support  of  the  ticket  was 
merely  perfunctory  and  that  a  more  vigorous  journal  was  needed. 
This  feeling  was  not  caused  entirely  by  what  appeared  or  did  not 
appear  in  the  columns  of  the  Glohe.  The  campaign  leaders  be- 
lieved Blair  to  be  under  the  thumb  of  Benton,  and  the  latter  was 
vociferously  denouncing  the  "intrigue"  which  had  deprived 
Van  Buren  of  the  nomination  and,  also,  the  annexation  program. 
Despite  the  need  of  a  reliable  party  organ  there  seemed  to  be  no 
satisfactory  solution  of  the  difficulty,  therefore  the  matter  was 
dropped  until  after  the  election. 

The  correspondence  does  not  disclose  who  it  was  that  first 
suggested  inviting  Ritchie  to  come  to  Washington,  but  Brown 
rather  than  Walker  seems  to  have  been  the  prime  mover.  In  a 
letter  written  to  Polk,  soon  after  the  election.  Brown  said  that 
Walker  ' '  entertains  the  same  opinion  with  us  "  as  to  the  import- 
ance of  procuring  Blair's  half  of  the  Glohe  for  Ritchie.  Blair 
would  not  be  approached,  he  said,  until  Cave  Johnson  had  gone 


52  Johnson  to  Polk,  June  1  [1844?,  year  not  given],  June  13,  1844,  PoJl: 
Tapers. 

•"Catron  to  Polk,  June  8,  [1844],  ibid. 

54  Harris  to  Polk,  June  27,  29 ;  Armstrong  to  Polk,  June  30,  1844,  ibid. 


PllESIBENT-ELECT  303 

to  Richmond  to  sound  Ritchie  on  the  subject.  "If  that  dont 
take — then  B  «&  Rives  must  sink  into  mere  propnctors,  with  an 
able  d'  competent  Editor  having  absolute  controul  of  the  political 
character  of  the  paper. "''°  Cave  Johnson,  also,  had  become  con- 
vinced that  Blair  must  go.  Some  of  the  politicians,  said  he,  fear 
that  the  Globe  will  be  dominated  by  Benton  and  they  will  there- 
fore oppose  giving  it  the  public  printing;  "I  see  no  chance  of 
a  reconciliation  with  them  if  F.  P.  Blair  is  retained."  A  few 
days  later  he  reported  that  "the  Globe  is  regarded  as  Benton's 
organ  by  the  friends  of  C  [alhoun]  &  will  oppose  him  to  the  utter- 
most &  will  in  connection  with  the  Whigs  defeat  him  &  therefore 
B[rown]  &  myself  have  been  sounding,  to  learn  the  prospect  of 
getting  Ritchie  .  .  .  .  T.  H.  B[enton]  has  a  great  dislike  to 
Ritchie  &  I  expect  will  be  greatly  provoked,  if  he  learns  any  such 
movement."^''  This  letter  show^s  a  desire  to  prevent  opposition 
from  the  Calhoun  faction,  but  it  indicates,  also,  that  there  had 
been  no  preelection  understanding.  Had  there  been  any  such 
understanding  Johnson  would  have  been  one  of  the  first  to  learn 
of  it. 

As  soon  as  General  Jackson  heard  of  the  scheme  to  supplant 
the  Globe  he  took  immediate  steps  to  thwart  it.  Assuming  that 
Polk  knew  nothing  about  the  matter,  Jackson  warned  him  that 
an  intrigue  was  being  concocted  in  "Washington  which  might 
divide  the  party  and  wreck  his  administration.  Some,  he  said, 
wished  to  substitute  the  Madisonian  for  the  Globe;  others  wanted 
to  make  Ritchie  editor  of  the  Globe.  He  urged  Polk  to  discoun- 
tenance such  maneuvers  for 

the  first  would  blow  you  sky  high  &  destroy  the  Republican  party —  The 
second  would  be  an  insult  to  the  Editor  of  the  Globe  &  seperate  him  from 
you,  whose  administration  he  is  determined  to  support —  Keep  Blairs  Globe 
the  administration  paper,  and  William  B.  Lewis,  to  ferret  out  &  make  known 
to  you  all  the  plotts  &  intrigues  Hatching  against  your  administration  and 
you  are  safe. 


55  Brown  to  Polk,  Dec.  5,  1844,  ibid. 

56  Johnson  to  Polk,  Dec.  6,  12,  1844,  ibid. 


30i  JAMES  K.  POLE 

These  men  had  been  such  a  source  of  strength  to  Jackson  himself 
that  very  naturally  he  desired  his  friend  Polk  to  have  the  benefit 
of  their  services.  But  battling  for  Old  Hickory  was  one  thing, 
and  loyal  support  of  the  man  who  had  profited  by  the  intngue 
against  Van  Buren  was  quite  another.  Polk  well  knew  that  both 
men  had  always  been  ready  to  throw  obstacles  in  his  way,  and 
he  had  no  reason  to  believe  that  their  feeling  toward  him  had 
undergone  any  change. 

Jackson  may  have  been  wrong  in  his  belief  that  Blair  and 
Lewis  would  labor  for  the  glory  of  Polk's  administration,  but 
another  part  of  his  letter  showed  that  he  understood  Ritchie's 
weaknesses  better  than  did  those  who  were  so  anxious  to  bring 
him  to  Washington.  "Ritchie  is  a  good  Editor,"  he  told  Polk, 
"but  a  very  unsafe  one —  He  goes  off  at  half  bent,  &  does  great 
injury  before  he  can  be  set  right. "^'  Before  many  months  had 
elapsed,  Polk  realized  fully  the  accuracy  of  the  General's  state- 
ment. 

On  the  following  day,  Jackson  informed  Blair  of  the  scheme 
to  merge  the  Spectator  and  the  Madisonian  into  a  Polk  organ. 
He  attributed  this  scheme  to  Calhoun.  Believing  that  his  word 
was  still  law,  he  told  Blair  that  ' '  I  am  sure  polk  when  he  hears  of 
it  will  feel  as  indignant  at  the  plott  as  I  do."^*  In  Washington 
the  "plott"  had  already  been  discovered,  and  Cave  Johnson  (on 
account  of  his  known  intimacy  with  Polk)  feared  to  go  to  Rich- 
mond for  the  purpose  of  negotiating  with  Ritchie.  The  pre- 
mature discovery  greatly  annoyed  Johnson,  and  he  complained 
that  "even  old  J.  Q.  A  [dams]  asked  when  we  were  going  to 
Richmond. "^^  Brown,  who  facetiously  called  himself  "the  Presi- 
dent elect  ad  interim,"  was  somewhat  disconcerted  by  Johnson's 
timidity.    He  even  suspected  that  his  colleague  did  not  desire  to 


-•7  Jackson  to  T'olk,  Dec.  13,  1844,  ibid. 

5s  Jackson  to  Blair,  Dee.  14,  1844,  Jackson  Papers. 

59  Johnson  to  Polk,  Dec.  14,  1844,  Polk  Papers. 


PRESIDENT-ELECT  305 

get  rid  of  Blair."'"^    General  Bayly,  of  the  Virginia  delegation,  and 
a  personal  friend  of  Ritchie,  now  undertook  to  negotiate  by  letter 
with  the  veteran  editor  of  the  Enquirer.    "If  my  road  is  blocked 
there,"  said  Brown,  "I  shall  then  go  for  sinking  Blair  &  Rives 
into  Proprietors  only  &  putting  the  political  controul  (absolute) 
into  the  hands  of  a  new  Editor  &  that  man  Burke  Avould  not 
be  a  bad  one."     Brown  believed  that  Blair  would  not  oppose 
the  change  "if  he  sees  that  Benton  means  to  be  antagonistic  to 
your  administration  as  many  of  his  Western  friends  think  likely 
enough.    He  shews  no  tnitigation  of  his  opposition  &  nothing  but 
instructions  plain  &  powerful  can  subdue  him."''^    Here  again  is 
a  statement  of  the  main  reason  for  wanting  a  new  party  organ — 
not  pledges  to  Tyler  or  to  Calhoun,  but  distrust  of  Blair  and  a 
fear  that  he  would  be  controlled  by  Benton,  who  was  considered 
to  be  an  enemy  of  the  incoming  administration.     Another  indi- 
cation that  Polk  had  made  no  bargain  with  the  Tylerites  is  the 
sentiment  voiced  in  a  letter  written  by  J.  B.  Jones,  editor  of  the 
Madisonian.     The  plan  contemplated  was,  in  his  opinion,  the 
only  sensible  one,  for  he  believed  that  discord  would  surely  result 
from    the    employment    of    any    of    the    Washington    editors. 
"When,"  said  he,  "Col.  Polk  shall  convince  all  parties  that  he 
is  in  his  own  hands— that  he  will  be  the  President,  and  not  a 
partisan  of  any  aspirant,  there  will  be  no  door  left  open  for  the 
ingress  of  factious  schemes.  "®- 


60  "He  feared  some  newspaper  squibs  at  him  &  I  feared  he  was  rather 
indifferent  about  any  matter  that  was  against  the  Globe  Benton  &  Co 
but  perhaps  I  was  wrong. ' ' 

61  Brown  to  Polk,  Dec.  23,  1844,  Polk  Papers. 

62  Party  factions  can  not  "object  to  the  [new]  paper  because  its  con- 
ductor entertains  no  special  partiality  for  any  one  of  the  aspirants  to  the 
succession.  But  if  I  were  to  conduct  the  paper  it  would  be  said  that  Mr. 
Polk  had  thrown  himself  into  the  hands  of  the  Tyler  men— if  the  editor 
of  the  Globe,  into  the  hands  of  CoL  Benton— and  if  the  Constitution 
[successor  to  the  Spectaior],  into  the  hamls  of  Mr.  Calhoun"    (Jones  to 

^  Dec.  23,  1844).     Apparently  this  was  written  to  J.  Geo.  Harris,  for 

it  was  inclosed  in  his  letter  to  Polk,  Jan.  4,  1845,  Polk  Papers. 


303  JAMES  E.  POLK 

At  first  Ritchie  did  not  take  kindly  to  the  plan  which  had  been 
arranged  for  him,  and,  in  a  letter  to  Bayl}^,  he  declined  the  invita- 
tion. He  was  not  able,  he  said,  to  purchase  the  Globe,  and  rival 
Democratic  papers  would  do  the  party  more  harm  than  good.^^ 
After  reading  Ritchie 's  letter,  Brown  concluded  that  ' '  If  Benton 
goes  right  on  Texas  &  Calhoun  is  not  in  the  Cabinet  there  would 
be  no  insuperable  difficulty  wdth  the  Globe — but  you  would  find 
it  hard  to  keep  in  order. '  "^^  Edmund  Burke  was  once  more  con- 
sidered, but  his  former  affiliations  with  Calhoun  were  urged 
against  his  selection."^  A  few  days  of  reflection  seem  to  have 
convinced  Brown  that  neither  Benton  nor  Blair  could  be  kept 
in  order,  for  he  presented  for  Polk's  consideration  an  entirely 
new  solution  of  the  difficulty.  He  offered  to  purchase  Blair's 
share  of  the  Globe  and  to  continue  the  paper  under  the  firm  name 
of  Brown  and  Rives.  Brown  was  to  have  exclusive  control,  and, 
with  Kendall's  help,  to  edit  the  journal  in  the  interest  of  the 
administration.*^"  His  new  scheme,  like  the  others,  came  to 
naught,  and  no  arrangement  had  been  made  when  Polk  reached 
Washington.  Apparently  the  President-elect  gave  no  encourage- 
ment to  the  editor  of  the  Globe,  for  Smith  Van  Buren  reported  to 
his  father  that  ' '  Blair  says — '  Where  am  I  to  go  ? '  '  '^^ 

Polk's  own  opinions  concerning  a  party  journal  were  ex- 
pressed in  very  definite  terms  before  he  left  Tennessee.  In  a 
letter  to  Cave  Johnson,  he  said : 

As  to  the  pi-ess  which  may  be  regarded  as  the  Government  organ,  one 
thing  is  settled  in  my  mind.  It  must  have  no  connection  with,  nor  be  under 
the  influence  or  control  of  any  clique  or  portion  of  the  party  which  is  making 
war  upon  any  other  portion  of  the  party — with  a  view  to  the  succession  and 


63  His  letter,  dated  Dec.  28,  is  printed  in  full  in  Ambler,  Thomas 
Ritchie,  247-249. 

6-i  Brown  to  Polk,  Jan.  1,  1843  [1845],  Folic  Papers. 

"3  Cave  Johnson  to  Polk,  Jan.  2,  1844,  ihid. 

oc  Brown  to  Polk,  Jan.  5,  1845,  ihid.  He  told  Polk  that  if  this  plan  di.l 
not  work  out  he  might  consent  to  run  for  governor  of  Tennessee,  although 
he  would  rather  "rent  a  brick  yard"  than  go  through  that  campaign! 

67  March  2,  1845,  Van  Buren  Papers. 


PEESIDENT-ELECT  307 

not  with  a  view  to  the  success  of  my  administration.  I  think  the  view  you 
take  of  it  proper  and  of  the  proposed  arrangement  the  best  that  eau  be 
made.     I  hope  it  may  be  effected.«8 

Apparently  Polk  felt  that  he  was  regarded  as  a  sort  of  charge  cV 
affaires  who  was  to  keep  things  running  while  the  great  men 
contended  for  the  prize.  He  had  no  intention  of  playing  such  a 
role,  and  his  determination  to  make  the  administration  his  own 
and  to  have  a  paper  which  would  promote  its  interests  was  both 
characteristic  of  the  man  and  an  exhibition  of  sound  sense."'' 
Even  von  Hoist,  who  has  found  little  in  Polk's  career  to  com- 
mend, obsolves  him  from  the  charge  of  subserviency  to  factional 
leaders.    He  says, 

Obedience  to  party  commands,  was  certainly  one  of  the  principal  articles 
of  his  political  creed.  But  if  politicians  had  expected  that  they  were  now 
going  to  have  the  mastery,  because  he  was  willing  to  play  the  part  of  a 
manikin,  they  were  greatly  mistaken  in  the  man.^o 

As  to  patronage  in  general  the  President-elect  maintained  a 
discreet  silence.  There  was  much  speculation  concerning  future 
rewards  and  punishments,  but  all  had  to  wait  until  the  new 
President  had  canvassed  the  situation  and  was  ready  to  act. 
Although  General  Jackson  made  no  exception  to  his  rule  of  at- 
tempting to  provide  for  his  friends,  he  did  not  find  Polk  as 
accommodating  as  Van  Buren  had  been.  His  solicitation  for  the 
welfare  of  Blair  and  Lewis  has  already  been  noted,  and  Polk 
had  scarcely  been  elected  before  Jackson  consulted  Amos  Kendall 
in  order  to  ascertain  the  position  which  would  be  most  acceptable 
to  the  star  member  of  his  "kitchen  cabinet."  Kendall  selected 
the  Spanish  mission  and  his  wishes  were  forthwith  reported  to 

08  Polk  to  Johnson,  Dec.  21,  1844,  "Polk-Johnson  Letters."  The 
"proposed  arrangement"  evidently  refers  to  the  attempt  to  procure 
Eitchie. 

69  A  rumor  that  Laughlin  was  going  to  Washington  to  edit  the  Madi- 
sonian  caused  General  Jackson  much  needless  worry.  He  warned  Polk  to 
keep  clear  of  Tvler  influence,  for,  if  he  did  not,  he  would  be  in  as  bad  a 
position  as  Tyler  himself  (Jackson  to  Polk,  Feb.  28,  1845,  Polk  Papers). 

70  von  Hoist,  History  of  the  United  States,  III,  21-22. 


308  JAMES  K.  POLK 

the  President-elect.  Jackson  assured  Polk  that  "there  can  be  no 
delicacy  in  recalling  Erwin  [Washington  Irving] — he  is  only 
fit  to  write  a  Book  &  scarcely  that,  and  has  become  a  good 
Wliigg.'"^^ 

Congress  had  already  consented  to  annex  Texas  before  Polk 
became  President  of  the  United  States.  Nevertheless,  since  one 
of  the  principal  planks  in  the  platform  on  which  he  had  been 
elected  related  to  this  subject,  and  since  he  had  been  an  indirect, 
if  not  a  direct,  participant  in  this  important  transaction,  it  is 
necessary  to  give  a  brief  outline  of  the  progress  of  events  during 
the  period  between  the  rejection  of  Tyler's  treaty  and  the  passage 
of  the  joint  resolution  of  annexation. 

Tyler's  annexation  treaty  was  rejected  by  the  Senate  on 
June  8,  1844.  Calhoun,  we  are  told,'-  disheartened  by  this  action, 
was  ready  to  abandon  all  further  attempts  at  annexation.  His 
dejection  was  so  great  that  Tyler  thought  of  requesting  his  resig- 
nation, but  he  soon  recovered  his  spirits  and  his  old-time  vigor. 
Since  the  treaty  method  had  failed,  nothing  could  be  done  with- 
out the  cooperation  of  Congress.  During  the  summer,  a  rumor 
to  the  effect  that  Tyler  was  about  to  convene  Congress  in  extra 
session  caused  the  Democratic  candidate  no  little  anxiety,  and 
he  appealed  to  Jackson  as  the  only  man  who  could  dissuade  the 
President  from  committing  such  a  political  error.  A  month  later 
Jackson  assured  him  that  Congress  would  not  be  convened,  al- 
though it  is  not  clear  whether  Jackson  was  instrumental  in  pre- 
venting such  a  course. '•''  At  any  rate  no  call  for  an  extra  session 
was  issued,  and  no  further  action  could  be  undertaken  until 
winter;  but  the  death  of  T.  A.  Howard,  the  American  charge 
in  Texas,  gave  Tyler  an  opportunity  to  strengthen  his  position 
by  assigning  A.  J.  Donelson  to  the  vacant  post.    When  notifying 


71  Kendall  tq  Jackson,  Dec.  2;   Jackson  to  Polk,  Dec.   13,   1844,  PoUc 
Papers. 

72  Tyler,  Letters  and  Times  of  the  Tylers,  II,  331. 

73  Polk  to  Donelson,  Aug.  27,  1844,  "Polk-Donelson  Letters."    Jackson 
to  Polk,  Sept.  26,  1844,  Polk  Papers. 


PRESIDENT-ELECT  309 

Jackson  of  Donelson's  appointment  the  President  expressed  the 
belief  that  the  selection  of  "a  member  of  your  family  ....  will 
have  a  controuling  influence  with  Gen^  Houstin  and  incline 
him  ....  to  pause  ere  he  declares  against  annexation."  He 
declared  his  determination  to  proceed  with  his  Texas  program, 
and  to  i)rotect  that  country  from  the  threatened  aggressions 
of  Mexico.  Jackson  informed  Polk  of  the  President's  plans  and 
remarked  that  ' '  This  is  the  true  energetic  course. '  '^* 

On  December  3,  1844,  Tyler  submitted  to  Congress  his  last 
annual  message.  In  it  he  called  attention  to  the  threatening 
Mexican  manifestoes  that  had  resulted  from  the  treaty  which 
the  United  States  had  negotiated  with  Texas.  Mexico,  he  said, 
had  no  cause  for  complaint ;  on  the  contrary,  the  measure  "should 
have  been  regarded  by  her  as  highly  beneficial."  The  treaty, 
said  he,  had  been  rejected  by  the  American  Senate  on  the  ground 
that  the  question  had  not  been  submitted  to  the  people,  but 
popular  approval  had  since  been  expressed  at  the  recent  election. 
Such  being  the  case,  he  urged  Congress  to  annex  Texas  by  joint 
resolution."^  He  followed  this  up  with  another  message  on  Decem- 
ber 18,  and  along  with  it  submitted  a  collection  of  correspond- 
ence. He  called  attention  to  the  abusive  character  of  this  cor- 
respondence and  to  the  barbarous  measures  which  were  threatened 
by  Mexico.  Especially  did  he  resent  Mexico's  criticism  of  south- 
ern states,  and  he  declared  with  emphasis  that  annexation  was 
not  a  sectional  question.'"  His  statement  that  "the  subject  of 
annexation  addresses  itself,  most  fortunately,  to  every  portion  of 
the  Union"  was,  to  say  the  least,  an  exaggeration;  still,  since  the 
election  had  been  decided,  there  were  many  indications  of  a 
change  in  public  opinion,  and  the  question  was  becoming  more 
national  every  day.  Could  the  subject,  when  it  was  presented 
originally,  have  been  divested  of  its  factional  and  its  sectional 


74  Tyler  to  Jackson,  Sept.  17,  1844,  Jackson  Papers.     Jacksou  to  Polk, 
Sept.  26,  1844,  Polk  Papers. 

75  Richardson,  Messages,  IV,  341-345. 

76  Ihid.,  353-356. 


310  JAMES   K.  POLK 

concomitants,  doubtless  there  would  have  been  little  opposition 
to  annexation.  Now  that  the  election  was  over,  those  who  had 
really  wished  to  see  Texas  admitted  into  the  Union  no  longer  had 
the  same  incentive  to  oppose  annexation  for  mere  factional  rea- 
sons. They  might  still  cavil  over  ways  and  means,  yet  the  pros- 
pect of  eventual  compromise  was  perceptibly  brightening."  There 
was  no  certainty,  however,  that  the  friends  of  Texas  would  be 
able  to  effect  annexation  during  the  present  session,  for  those 
who  had  been  defeated  at  Baltimore  still  harbored  a  bitter  re- 
sentment. Late  in  December,  Calhoun  believed  that  the  House 
would  take  favorable  action,  but  that  annexation  would  be  de- 
feated in  the  Senate.  "The  real  opposition  is  from  the  Benton 
V.  Buren  party"  who  would  join  with  the  Whigs  against  Texas; 
still  he  was  not  without  hope  that  "publick  opinion  will  force 
them  to  give  up  their  opposition.  Its  effects  are  already  ap- 
parent/''^ It  was  at  this  time  that  Calhoun  was  ready  to  make 
the  "sacrifice"  of  accepting  a  place  in  Polk's  cabinet,  if  the 
probable  course  of  the  administration  should  appear  to  be  satis- 
factory. 

While  Calhoun  denounced  Benton  and  Van  Buren  for  their 
obstructive  tactics,  others  believed  that  the  South  Carolinian 
himself  had  sounded  the  knell  of  the  Texas  treaty.  A  long  article 
on  "Abolitionists"  which  appeared  in  the  January  number  of 
the  Democratic  Review  held  him  responsible,  in  the  main,  for  the 
widespread  hostility  to  annexation.  Although  himself  in  favor 
of  annexation,  the  writer  flayed  Calhoun  for  the  position  he  had 
assumed  regarding  the  slavery  side  of  the  question.  In  the 
writer's  opinion,  the  fanatical  demands  of  the  Abolitionists  and 
the  ' '  gag  rule ' '  of  Congress  were  equally  to  be  deplored ;  but  the 
climax  of  absurdity  had  been  reached  when  Calhoun,  in  his  letters 
to  Pakenham  and  King,  had  represented  the  United  States  as 


7T  See  press  comments.  Smith,  Anncxalion  of  Texas,    323  ff. 
78  Calhoun  to  Clemson,  Dee.  27;  same  to  Hunter,  Dec.  29,  1844,  Jicp. 
Am.  Hist.  Assn.,  1899,  II,  634-636. 


PRESIDENT-ELECT  311 

desiring  Texas  in  order  to  protect  slavery.  In  his  effort  to  nation- 
alize slavery,  he  had  also  nationalized  abolition.  Other  critics 
of  Callionn  expressed  similar  sentiments.  Since  the  opposition 
had  been  aimed,  for  the  most  part,  at  the  negotiators  of  the  treaty 
and  their  methods,  acquiescence  in  annexation  was  made  easier 
when  it  became  practically  certain  tliat  Calhoun  as  well  as  Tyler 
would  soon  depart  from  the  scene  of  action. 

Soon  after  Congress  had  convened  in  December  various  plans 
of  annexation  were  offered  in  each  house,  some  to  admit  Texas  as 
a  state,  others  to  acquire  it  as  a  territory.  In  the  House,  after 
several  projects  had  met  with  serious  objections,  Milton  Brown, 
one  of  Polk's  Whig  antagonists  from  Tennessee,  offered  a  reso- 
lution which,  after  certain  alterations,  was  eventually  adopted  by 
the  House.  Brown 's  resolution  provided  that  the  territory  right- 
fully belonging  to  Texas  should  be  admitted  as  a  state.  The 
federal  government  was  to  undertake  the  adjustment  of  the  boun- 
daries of  the  new  state,  but  was  not  to  assume  her  debt  or  take 
over  her  public  lands.  Slavery  was  prohibted  in  all  territory 
north  of  36°  30' ;  south  of  that  line  the  people  were  to  decide  the 
question  for  themselves. 

In  the  early  days  of  the  session,  McDuflfie  once  more  presented 
the  joint  resolution  of  annexatioji  which  had  failed  to  pass  in  the 
spring.  It  voiced  the  sentiments  of  the  Tyler  administration 
and  was,  in  substance,  a  restatement  of  the  rejected  treaty.  As 
such,  it  was  unacceptable  to  the  Senator  from  Missouri,  and  Cave 
Johnson  reported  to  Polk  that  "the  great  battle  between  Mr. 
T.  H.  B.  [enton]  &  Mr.  C.  [alhoun]  has  commenced."  Appar- 
ently the  main  reason  for  presenting  the  resolution  in  this  par- 
ticular form  was  the  desire  to  embarrass  the  Van  Burenites  by 
compelling  them  either  to  accept  a  measure  which  they  had  de- 
nounced or  to  incur  the  odium  of  opposing  annexation  after  they 
had  endorsed  the  Baltimore  platform.  Such,  at  least,  was  the 
opinion  of  Cave  Johnson : 


312  JAMES  E.  POLE 

The  friends  of  T.  H.  B. Silas  Wright,  who  took  general  ground  before 

the  people  for  annexation  but  against  the  Treaty  are  to  be  forced  to  take 
that  Treaty  or  appear  before  the  people  as  hostile  to  Texas.  Mr.  C. 
thinks  that  he  has  got  the  advantage  of  T.  H.  B.  on  this  issue  &  intends 
to  drive  him  home  upon  it.     The  N.  Y.  democrats  will  go  en-mass  ag't  the 

treaty  &  I  have  no  idea,  that  the  friends  of  C will  take  any  thing  but 

the  Treaty.'!' 

On  the  day  following  the  appearance  of  McDuffie's  resolution, 
Benton  met  the  issue  by  reintroducing  his  own  bill  which  had 
failed  at  the  close  of  the  last  session,  with  a  modification  for 
making  the  territory  half  slave  and  half  free.  Since  this  bill 
could  not  by  any  possibility  get  but  a  few  votes,  Johnson  consid- 
ered Benton 's  conduct  to  be  "  outrageous. ' '  He  asked  the  Senator 
to  cooperate  in  offering  a  joint  resolution  which  woidd  assert  the 
determination  of  the  United  States  to  defend  Texas  against  all 
assaults,  leaving  the  question  of  annexation  to  Polk's  adminis- 
tration. Benton  declined  to  accept  this  resolution,  and  continued 
to  rage  against  his  opponents.^*^  Late  in  December  Johnson 
thought  that  the  hostility  between  the  two  factions  was  increas- 
ing; each  feared  that  the  other  would  influence  the  incoming 
President.'*^  Benton  blustered,  of  course,  for,  under  the  circum- 
stances, he  could  hardly  do  otherwise.  Since  the  election,  how- 
ever, he  must  have  known  that  he  was  championing  an  unpopular 
cause.  There  was  also  a  future  ahead,  and  his  course  had  alien- 
ated a  large  majority  of  his  party — even  many  of  his  lifelong 
friends.  In  addition,  the  legislature  of  Missouri  had,  by  reso- 
lution, requested  members  of  Congress  from  that  state  to  support 
annexation.^-  This  made  it  clear  that  his  conduct  did  not  meet 
with  approval  at  home ;  on  the  other  hand,  such  a  request  made 
it  easier  for  him  to  modify  his  attitude  on  the  subject.  About 
the  same  time  a  letter  from  Donelson  told  him  "that  his  course 
is  injuring  his  friends  and  his  country,  and  that  I  hoped  he  would 


T9  Johnson  to  Polk,  Dec.  12,  1844,  Polk  Papers. 

80  Idem,  and  Johnson  to  Polk,  Dee.  14,  Polk  Papers. 

81  Johnson  to  Polk,  Dec.  26,  1844,  Polk  Papers. 

82  Meigs,  Life  of  Thomas  Hart  Benton,  351. 


PRESIDENT-ELECT  313 

be  willing  to  modify  his  position.'"*^  No  doubt  all  of  those  mani- 
festations of  tlispleasure  liad  their  influence  in  determining  Ben- 
ton to  retreat,  i)rovided  he  could  do  so  in  good  order.  His  avenue 
of  escape  was  by  way  of  a  new  bill,  and  this  he  introduced  on 
February  5,  1845.  No  mention  was  made  in  the  new  measure  of 
obtaining  the  consent  of  Mexico.  It  provided  for  the  admission 
of  a  state  of  suitable  size  and  boundaries,  said  state  to  be  formed 
out  of  the  territory  of  the  republic ;  the  remainder  of  Texas  was 
to  be  a  territory  of  the  United  States.  The  measure  was  to 
become  effective  as  soon  as  an  agreement  had  been  reached  by 
the  governments  of  the  two  nations  concerned.  His  plan  would 
delay,  but  not  necessarily  defeat,  annexation,  although  defeat  is 
evidently  what  its  author  desired.  His  bill  and  the  House  reso- 
lution seemed  hopelessly  irreconcilable  until  R.  J.  Walker,  a  few 
days  later,  offered  as  an  amendment  a  combination  of  the  two 
methods,  and  Haywood  proposed  to  leave  the  choice  between  them 
to  the  President  of  the  United  States.  To  this  modification 
Walker  readily  agreed.**  Calhoun,  according  to  a  statement 
made  later,  believed  that  Benton's  bill  would  have  defeated  an- 
nexation, and  he  was  scarcely  less  opposed  to  the  combination 
measure.®^  He  used  his  "best  efforts"  to  defeat  both,  but  was 
unsuccessful  in  the  second  instance.  Many  counseled  delay,  but 
at  the  evening  session  of  February  27,  1845,  the  Senate  was  ready 
to  vote  on  Walker's  combination  amendment.  Before  the  vote 
had  been  taken,  however,  Archer,  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations,  offered  a  substitute  bill.  This  proposed  a  transfer  of 
the  territory  of  Texas,  with  the  assent  of  the  people  thereof,  to 
the  United  States.  The  vote  on  the  substitute  resulted  in  a  tie, 
and  it  looked  for  a  time  as  if  annexation  were  doomed.  Never- 
theless, relief  was  already  at  hand.    When  the  vote  on  the  Walker 


83  Donelson  to  Calhoun,  New  Orleans,  Dec.  26,  184-4,  Eep.  Am.  Hist. 
Assn.,  1899,  II,  1012. 

8-*  Smith,  Annexation  of  Texas,  343.  Smith  gives  an  exhaustive  account 
of  the  various  proposals  offered  in  each  house  (idem,  chap.  x^-i). 

85  Calhoun  to  Donelson,  Mav  23,  1845,  i?ep.  Am.  Hist.  Assn.,  1899,  IT, 
658. 


314  JAMES   E.  POLK 

amendment  was  taken  in  Committee  of  the  Whole,  Johnson,  a 
Whig  from  Louisiana  who  had  voted  for  the  Archer  bill,  now 
swung  to  the  Democrats  and  made  the  vote  twenty-seven  to 
twenty-five.  According  to  Judge  Catron,  Johnson  had  difficulty 
in  supporting  the  joint  resolution  on  constitutional  grounds,  but, 
after  consulting  Catron,  finally  agreed  to  do  so.'^*'  As  soon  as 
the  committee  had  reported  the  measure  to  the  Senate,  Miller, 
of  New  Jersey,  offered  Benton's  original  bill  as  a  substitute. 
Benton  said  from  his  seat  that  he  would  vote  against  this  substi- 
tute, and  when  asked  if  he  would  destroy  his  own  child,  he  re- 
plied, "I'll  kill  it  stone  dead."  The  substitute  failed,  and 
Walker's  amendment  passed  the  Senate  by  a  vote  of  twenty- 
seven  to  twenty-five,  Johnson  again  aligning  himself  with  the 
Democrats. ^^  The  amended  resolution  was  transmitted  to  the 
House  for  approval,  and  although  it  met  with  strenuous  opposi- 
tion there  was  never  any  doubt  of  its  passage.  This  measure  was 
given  precedence  over  other  matters ;  the  Speaker,  by  his  rulings, 
prevented  filibustering;  and,  in  Committee  of  the  Whole,  the 
debate  was  limited  to  five  minutes.  Milton  Brow^n,  the  author 
of  the  House  resolution,  tried  to  "kill  his  own  child,"  but  the 
measure  as  amended  by  Walker  passed  by  a  vote  of  one  hundred 
thirty-two  to  seventy-six.^^ 

The  President-elect  had  been  in  Washington  since  February 
13,  but  whether  and  to  what  extent  his  influence  was  effective 
at  this  time  is  very  difficult  to  determine.  Before  Polk  had  left 
Tennessee,  Cave  Johnson  assured  Calhoun  that  the  incoming 
President  and  his  friends  desired  to  have  Texas  annexed  during 


86  "The  amendment  offered  by  Mr.  Senator  Walker,"  continued  Catron, 
"was  rather  sudden;  it  left  the  slave  line  at  ;!6°  30'  N.  open.  To  this 
Gov.  Johnson  had  most  decided  objections;  it  threw  Mr.  Senator  Foster 
the  other  way,  and  endangered  the  measure."  Johnson,  said  the  judge, 
voted  for  the  measure  because  he  had  confidence  in  Polk,  and  because  he 
believed  that  36°  30'  would  be  definitely  fixed  as  the  northern  boundary  of 
slavery  (Catron  to  Buchanan,  March  15,  1845,  Buchanan  Papers). 

«"  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  362;  Smith,  Anncration  of  Texas,  344- 
345. 

s>iCong.  Globe  (Feb.  28),  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  372. 


PRESIDENT-ELECT  315 

the  present  session,  and  Donelson  informed  Calhoun  that  both 
Jackson  and  himself  hoped  for  immediate  action  by  the  existing 
Congress/'*  While  at  Coleman's  hotel  awaiting  liis  inauguration 
the  President-elect,  according  to  his  own  account,""  freely  ex- 
pressed the  wish  that  annexation  in  some  form  might  be  effected 
before  the  adjournment  of  Congress.  Should  Congress  fail  to 
take  definite  action,  he  feared  that  Texas  would  be  forever  lost 
to  the  Union.  He  did  not,  he  said,  have  time  to  examine  the 
different  measures  proposed,  but  thought  that  any  measure  would 
be  better  than  none.  That  he  desired  to  have  this  vexed  question 
settled  before  his  inauguration,  we  may  very  well  believe.  In- 
deed, it  was  said  that  he  offered  rewards  and  threatened  punish- 
ments for  the  purpose  of  influencing  votes.  Such  charges  rested 
on  no  tangible  evidence  and  doubtless,  for  the  most  part,  were 
unfounded,  although  it  is  quite  probable  that  he  may  have  let  it 
be  known  that  the  disloyal  need  not  look  to  him  for  favors. 
Always  ready  to  ' '  play  the  game ' '  himself,  he  was  a  firm  believer 
in  party  discipline. 

Later,  a  more  serious  charge  was  brought  against  Polk  in  this 
connection — a  charge  of  base  deception  instead  of  party  disci- 
pline. In  a  letter  printed  in  the  New  York  Evening  Post,  July  28, 
1848,  Senator  Tappan,  of  Ohio,  asserted  that,  in  February,  1845, 
Polk  had  personally  assured  Senator  Haywood  that,  should  the 
joint  resolution  pass,  he  would  choose  the  Benton  alternative  and 
negotiate  under  it.  In  a  letter  to  Tappan,  F.  P.  Blair  averred 
that  he,  also,  had  discussed  the  matter  with  Polk,  and  that  the 
President-elect  had  promised  to  choose  the  Benton  plan  of  nego- 
tiating a  treaty  with  Texas.  It  was  charged,  therefore,  that  at 
least  five  Senators  had  voted  for  the  joint  resolution  because  they 
had  been  deceived  by  Polk."^    Polk  denied  all  recollection  of  any 


so  Johnson  to  Polk,  Dec.  9,  1844,   Polk  Papers.     Donelson  to  Calhoun, 
Dee.  26,  1844,  Bep.  Am.  Hist.  Assn.,  1899,  II,  1012. 

90  Polk,  Diary,  IV,  41. 

91  The  essential  parts  of  both  letters  may  be  found  in  Benton,  Thirty 
Tears'  Fiew,  II,  636-637. 


316  JAMES   K.  POLE 

conversation  on  the  subject  with  either  Blair  or  Haywood,  and 
called  attention  to  the  fact  that  no  complaint  of  violated  pledges 
had  been  made  at  tlie  time.  In  addition,  he  pointed  out  that  in 
August,  1846,  Blair  had  expressed  to  him  a  warm  approval  of 
the  principal  measures  of  his  administration."-  The  members  of 
Polk's  cabinet  disclaimed  all  knowledge  of  such  a  pledge,  and 
even  the  fine-meshed  dragnet  of  Justin  H.  Smith  has  failed  to 
find  any  evidence  to  substantiate  the  charges  made  by  Tappan 
and  Blair.  On  the  contrary,  Smith  offers  some  valuable  sug- 
gestions as  to  why  it  is  highly  improbable  that  the  President 
elect  made  pledges  to  any  one.'-*^  Polk  had  committed  himself  to 
immediate  annexation ;  and  even  if  he  had  been  as  unprincipled 
as  his  enemies  alleged,  it  seems  incredible  that  so  crafty  a  poli- 
tician should  have  made  so  stupid  a  blunder.  Besides,  Polk  was 
a  man  who  seldom  disclosed  his  intentions  until  he  was  ready  to 
act,  and,  as  Cave  Johnson  said  in  his  letter,  it  was  extremely 
unlikely  that  he  would  do  so  to  Blair.  It  is  significant,  also,  that, 
as  soon  as  Texas  had  approved  annexation,  Polk  wrote  a  letter 
to  Haywood  in  which  he  commented  on  the  wisdom  of  choosing 
the  House  resolution  and  expressed  the  belief  that  Texas  would 
have  been  lost  if  the  Benton  alternative  had  been  selected.  "It 
was  not,"  wrote  the  President,  "until  after  I  entered  upon  my 
duties  that  I  had  an  opportunity — deliberately  to  consider  the 

92  Polk,  Diary,  11,  84. 

03  Smith,  Annexation  of  Texas,  347-350.  In  answer  to  Polk's  request 
for  a  statement  on  the  subject.  Cave  Johnson  (Oct.  6,  1848)  said  that  he 
conversed  with  the  President-elect  while  the  joint  resolution  was  before 
Congress.  Polk  said  that  he  hoped  one  of  the  alternatives  would  i)ass, 
but  e.xpressed  no  preference.  After  the  measure  had  passed,  he  expressed 
no  preference  until  the  cabinet  had  met.  Walker  (Oct.  6)  said  that  when 
the  measures  were  before  Congress,  Blair  came  to  him  and,  after  saying 
that  the  House  resolution  could  not  pass,  asked  him  to  vote  for  the  Benton 
bill.  Walker  refused.  Blair  stated  that  Texas  would  prefer  Benton's 
bill.  Walker  then  said  that  he  would  combine  the  two  and  let  Texas  take 
her  choice.  After  consulting  Benton,  Blair  said  that  they  would  support 
the  combined  resolution,  if  the  choice  were  left  to  the  President  instead 
of  Texas.  Walker  agreed,  and  .so  it  passed.  Polk  expressed  no  i>refer- 
ence— the  cabinet  was  divided.  Bancroft's  letter  of  Oct.  l."?.  Buchanan's 
of  Nov.  9,  Mason's  of  Nov.  12,  and  Marcy's  of  Nov.  20  all  stated  that 
Polk  had  not  expressed  any  preference.     All  letters  are  in  the  Folk  Papers. 


PRESIDENT-ELECT  317 

two  propositions — and  select  between  them.  I  acted  upon  my 
own  best  judgment  and  the  result  has  proved  that  I  was  right. '  '■'* 
It  is  inconceivable  that  he  could  write  thus  to  a  man  to  whom 
he  had  given  a  pledge  to  select  the  Benton  method  of  annexation. 
When  the  provision  was  added  to  the  joint  resolution  which 
gave  the  choice  of  alternatives  to  the  President,  it  was  intended 
of  course  to  give  this  selection  to  Polk.  Nevertheless,  it  was  sug- 
gested during  the  debate  that  Tyler  and  Calhoun  might  make  the 
selection,  but  McDuffie,  who  was  a  close  friend  of  both  men,  de- 
clared in  the  Senate  that  they  would  not  have  the  "audacity" 
to  do  such  a  thing.  When,  therefore,  the  House  passed  the  mea- 
sure on  February  28,  it  was  fully  understood  that  the  choice 
would  rest  with  President  Polk.  But  the  resolution  gave  this 
choice  to  the  "President  of  the  United  States,"  and  for  three 
days  more  that  office  was  occupied  by  "Captain"  Tyler.  Despite 
McDuffie 's  assurances  Tyler  possessed  the  necessary  audacity,  for 
he  immediately  took  steps  both  to  make  the  selection  and  to  carry 
it  into  effect.  In  1848  he  prepared  a  statement  which  gives  his 
version  of  the  transaction  and  explains  his  reasons  for  forestalling 
his  successor.  As  soon  as  Tyler  had  approved  the  resolution,  on 
March  1,  Calhoun,  the  Secretary  of  State,  remarked  that  the 
President  now  had  the  power  to  make  his  selection.  Tyler  replied 
that  he  had  no  doubt  of  his  power,  but  that  he  had  some  doubt 
as  to  the  propriety  of  exercising  it.  The  danger  of  delay,  urged 
Calhoun,  was  sufficient  to  overrule  all  feelings  of  delicacy  re- 
garding Polk.  Next  day,  at  a  cabinet  meeting,  all  agreed  that 
Tyler  ought  to  select  the  House  resolution  and  act  at  once.  He 
decided  to  do  so  and  requested  Calhoun  to  call  upon  Polk,  after 
the  meeting,  "and  explain  to  him  the  reasons"  for  immediate 
action.  Calhoun  complied  with  the  request,  and  reported  that 
"Mr.  Polk  declined  to  express  any  opinion  or  to  make  any  sug- 
gestion in  reference  to  the  subject."  On  the  third  instructions 
were  dispatched  to  A.  J.   Donelson,   whom   Tyler  had  recently 


94  Polk  to  Haywood,  Aug.  9,  1845,  Folk  Papers. 


318  JAMES   K.  POLK 

appointed  to  be  charge  d'affaires  at  the  capital  of  Texas.^^  When 
Polk  became  President  he  still  had  the  option  of  reversing  Tyler's 
action**"  and  recalling  the  messenger  or  of  acquiescing  in  the  choice 
made  by  his  predecessor.  Since  he  chose  the  latter  alternative 
there  was  little  delay  in  carrying  out  the  mandate  of  the  Balti- 
more platform.  The  progress  of  annexation  under  his  adminis- 
tration will  be  considered  in  another  chapter. 


95  See  statement,  Tyler,  Letters  and  Times  of  the  Tylers,  II,  364-365. 
At  a  later  time  Tyler  was  angered  by  Calhoun  's  assertion  in  the  Senate 
that  he  had  selected  the  House  resolution.  "//'  he  selected,  then  Texas  is 
not  legitimately  a  State  of  the  Union,  for  Congress  gave  the  power  to  the 
President  to  select,  and  not  to  the  Secretary  of  State."  He  referred  to 
Calhoun  as  "the  great  'I  am,'  "  and  to  Benton  as  "the  most  raving 
political  maniac  I  ever  knew"  Tyler  to  Gardiner,  March  11,  1847,  ibid., 
420). 

90  There  was  a  difference  of  opinion  regarding  this.  Walker,  and  per- 
haps other  members  of  the  cabinet,  believed  that  Polk  had  no  power  to 
reverse  Tyler's  action.     See  Polk,  Diary,  IV,  44. 


CHAPTER  XV 
ADMINISTRATION  AND  PATRONAGE 

On  March  4,  1845,  an  unusually  large  "concourse  of  people" 
congregated  in  Washington  to  witness  the  inauguration  of  Presi- 
dent Polk.  The  "arrangements  were  admirable"^  and,  in  true 
American  fashion,  men  who  had  bitterly  assailed  each  other  in 
the  press  and  on  the  platform  now  joined  in  doing  honor  to  the 
new  chief  executive.  Climatic  conditions  proved  to  be  the  only 
disturbing  element.  Rain  began  to  descend  in  torrents  as  the 
procession  wended  its  way  to  the  capitol  where,  according  to  the 
picturesque  description  given  by  John  Quincy  Adams,  the  new 
executive  delivered  his  inaugural  address  to  "  a  large  assemblage 
of  umbrellas."  "At  night,"  said  the  same  writer,  "there  were 
two  balls:  one  at  Carusi's  Hall,  at  ten  dollars  a  ticket,  of  all 
parties ;  the  other  of  pure  Democrats,  at  five  dollars  a  ticket,  at 
the  National  Theatre.  Mr.  Polk  attended  both,  but  supped  with 
the  true-blue  five-dollar  Democracy. '  '^ 

Not  yet  fifty  years  old,  Polk  enjoyed  the  distinction  of  reach- 
ing the  highest  executive  office  at  an  earlier  age  than  any  of  his 
predecessors — a  fact  which  he  did  not  fail  to  note  in  his  in- 
augural address.  This  address  was  in  the  main  a  reiteration  of 
Jeffersonian  principles  and  of  his  own  oft-expressed  opinions. 
Strong  emphasis  was  laid  on  the  value  of  the  Union ;  "no  treason 
V  to  mankind  since  the  organization  of  society  would  be  equal  in 
atrocity  to  that  of  him  who  would  lift  his  hand  to  destroy  it." 
On  the  other  hand,  he  frowned  upon  the  "schemes  and  agita- 
tions" which  aimed  at  the  "destruction  of  domestic  institutions 


T-Niles'  Beg.,  LXVIII,  1. 

2  Adams,  Memoirs,  XII,  179.     He  added  that  "my  family  and  myself 
received  invitations  to  both,  but  attended  neither." 


320  JAMES   E.  POLK 

existing  in  other  sections, ' '  and  urged  the  necessity  of  preserving 
the  compromises  of  the  Constitution. 

If  the  compromises  of  the  Constitution  be  preserveil,  if  sectional  jeal- 
ousies and  heart-burnings  be  discountenanced,  if  our  laws  be  just  and  the 
Government  be  practically  administered  strictly  within  the  limits  of  power 
prescribed  to  it,  we  may  discard  all  apprehensions  for  the  safety  of  the 
Union. 

Having  thus  expressed  his  disapproval  of  both  abolition  and 
disunion,  he  again  declared  himself  to  be  in  favor  of  a  tariff  for 
revenue,  but  not  for  "protection  merely."  He  congratulated 
the  country  on  the  passage  of  the  joint  resolution  to  annex  Texas, 
and  he  pronounced  our  title  to  Oregon  to  be  "clear  and  unques- 
tionable." Experience,  he  said,  had  disproved  the  old  belief  that 
a  federal  system  could  not  operate  over  a  large  area,  and  like  a 
true  expansionist  expressed  the  opinion  that  as  the  system  "shall 
be  extended  the  bonds  of  our  Union,  so  far  from  being  weakened, 
will  become  stronger." 

The  reference  to  Texas  must  have  been  inserted  shortly  be- 
fore the  address  was  delivered,  but  certain  letters  written  by 
A.  V.  Brown  indicate  that  the  first  draft  of  the  inaugural  was 
written  early  in  December  and  sent  to  Washington  for  criticism 
and  approval  by  Polk's  political  friends.  The  Brown  letters 
are  too  enigmatical  to  throw  much  light  on  the  subject,  but  as 
Polk  had  many  times  before  expressed  practically  all  of  the  views 
contained  in  his  address,  there  was  no  reason  for  believing  that 
it  was  not  substantially  his  own  product.^ 


3  On  December  14,  1844,  Brown  wrote  from  Washington  to  Polk:  "I 
received  yours  of  the  7th  Inst,  our  friend  called  yesterday  &  informed 
me  that  he  would  be  ready  in  a  few  days  &  1  shall  loose  no  time  after 
examination  to  forward  it  to  you." 

On  December  23  he  wrote:  "You  must  not  be  impatient — Our  friend 
has  been  sick  a  few  days — has  sent  me  for  examination  about  lutlf  to  be 
returned  with  my  comments  &  then  the  whole  to  be  finished  &  polish  'd — 
say  all  by  the  first  January  or  sooner.  So  far  it  is  a  happy  concejjtion 
for  instance  in  allusion  to  the  Union. 

"  '  If  this  be  not  enough,  if  that  freedom  of  thought  word  and  action 
given  by  his  Creator  to  fallen  man  &  left  by  human  institutions  as  free 
as  they  were  given,  are  not  sufficient  to  lead  him  into  the  paths  of  liberty 


ADMINISTEATION  AND  PATEONAGE  321 

Among  the  rejoicing  Democrats  none  felt  more  sincere  satis- 
faction in  the  defeat  of  Henry  Chiy  or  expressed  a  more  ardent 
wish  for  tlie  snecess  of  the  new  administration  than  did  the  "old 
hero''  at  the  Hermitage.  In  a  letter  written  two  days  after  the 
inauguration  he  told  Polk  that 

I  have  the  pleasure  to  congratulate  my  country  on  your  now  being,  really, 
president  of  the  United  States,  and  I  put  up  my  prayers  to  the  great 
Jehova,  that  he  may  conduct  you  thro'  your  administration  with  honor  to 
yourself,  and  benefit  to  our  Glorious  Union. 

Success  could  be  attained  only  by  "continuing  to  take  principle 
for  your  guide,  and  public  good  for  your  end,  steering  clear  of 
the  intrigues  &  machinations  of  political  clickes."*  If  the  Gen- 
eral had  any  misgivings  regarding  Polk's  independence,  they 
must  have  been  removed  by  the  receipt  of  a  letter  from  Judge 
Catron — a  letter  written  before  his  own  had  reached  Washington. 
"Our  friend,"  wrote  the  judge,  "is  very  prudent,  and  eminently 
firm,   regardless  of    consequences.     He  came  here  to  be — the 


&  peace,  whither  shall  he  turn"?  Has  the  sicord  proved  to  be  a  safer  and 
surer  instrument  of  reform  than  enlightened  reason?  Does  he  expect  to 
find  among  the  ruins  of  this  Union  a  happier  abode  for  our  swarming 
millions,  than  they  now  have  under  its  lofty  arch  &  among  its  beautiful 
columns?  No,  my  countrymen  never,  until  like  the  blind  Israelite  in  the 
Temple  of  the  Philistines,  we  find  ourselves  in  chains  and  dispair,  shall 
we  be  justified  in  thrusting  those  pillars  from  their  base;  for  whenever 
we  do,  we  shall  like  him  be  crushed  by  their  fall. ' 

' '  It  will  be  surely  ready  in  time  &  finished  with  a  polish  suitable  to 
the  occasion.  I  shall  enclose  it  to  you  under  an  envelope  to  our  friend 
J.  H.  Thomas  but  securely  sealed  so  that  he  shall  [not]  be  aware  of  its 
contents."  (Compare  the  part  quoted  by  Brown  with  Polk's  inaugural. 
See  Messages,  TV,  376.  Query:  Was  Brown  quoting  from  Polk's  original 
draft,  or  was  this  paragraph  written  in  Washington  and  remodeled  by 
Polk!) 

On  December  26  Brown  wrote:  "In  a  few  days  now  I  shall  hear  from 
our  friend  K  again  &  be  ready  to  meet  your  wishes.  The  Major  is  here 
on  yesterday  we  went  up  to  see  the  President.  He  is  acting  very  friendly 
but  I  shall  encourage  the  idea  of  his  remaining  here  but  a  short  time  or 
the  letter  writers  will  be  speculating  on  the  purpose  of  his  visit  &c." 
(Folk  Papers). 

Probably  "K"  means  John  Kane,  of  Philadelphia,  but  the  identity  of 
"our  friend"  and  "the  Major"  is  difficult  to  conjecture.  Major  Lewis 
was  not  a  close  friend  of  either  Brown  or  Polk,  and  Major  Donelson  w^as 
then  in  New  Orleans. 

•*  Jackson  to  Polk,  March  6,  1845,  Polk  Papers. 


322  JAMES   K.  POLK 

PRESIDENT — which  at  this  date  is  as  undisputed  as  that  you  was 
THE  GENL  at  N.  Orleans."^ 

On  March  5  the  new  President  submitted  to  the  Senate  his 
list  of  cabinet  officials.  James  Buchanan,  tlie  Secretary  of  State, 
had  long  been  a  leader  in  Pennsylvania  politics  and  for  many 
years  a  Senator  from  that  state.  His  selection  was  a  concession 
to  that  wing  of  the  -party  which  believed  in  a  moderate  protective 
tariff,  and  his  subsequent  opposition  to  the  tariff  of  1846  caused 
the  President  no  little  annoyance.  He  was  a  man  of  more  than 
average  ability,  but  he  possessed  certain  traits  which  made  him 
the  source  of  constant  irritation  to  the  President.  With  a  timid- 
ity which  caused  him  to  quail  before  responsibility  he  combined 
an  obstinacy  and  a  petulance  which  manifested  themselves  in 
obstructive  tactics  and  petty  insolence.  After  four  years  of  inti- 
mate association  Polk  concluded  that  "Mr.  Buchanan  is  an  able 
man,  but  is  in  small  matters  without  judgment  and  sometimes 
acts  like  an  old  maid. '  '*^  He  was  the  only  member  of  the  cabinet 
whom  the  President  found  it  necessary  to  discipline,  and  he  was 
the  only  one  whom  Polk  believed  that  he  could  not  fully  trust, 
Robert  J.  Walker,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  was  a  man  of 
ability  and  industry.  He  was  cordially  hated  by  the  Whigs  and 
was  disliked  and  distrusted  by  many  Democrats.  Originally  se- 
lected for  the  office  of  Attorney  General,  he  was  called  to  the 
Treasury  Department  in  order  to  placate  the  Cass-Dallas  element 
of  the  party.  He  was  the  only  member  to  whom  General  Jackson 
offered  objections,^  but  Polk  had  full  confidence  in  both  his  in- 
tegrity and  his  ability.    As  Secretary  of  War,  William  L.  Marcy 


5  Catron  to  Jackson,  March     [1845],  Jackson  Papers. 

6  Polk,  Diary,  IV,  355. 

7  "7  say  to  you,  in  the  most  confidential  manner,  that  T  regret  that  you 
put  Mr.  E.  J.  Walker  over  the  Treasury.  He  has  talents,  I  believe  honest, 
but  surrounded  by  so  many  broken  speculators,  and  being  greatly  himself 
incumbered  with  del)t,  that  any  of  the  other  Departments  would  have  been 
better,  &  I  fear,  you  will  find  my  forebodings  turn  out  too  true,  and  added 
to  this,  under  the  rose,  he  is  looking  to  the  vice  presidency"  (Jackson  to 
Polk,  May  2,  1845,  Polk  Papers). 


ADMIN  I  ST  BAT  I  ON  AND  PATRONAGE  323 

displayed  both  ability  and  tact.     He  was  a  leader  of  that  wing 
of  the  party  in  New  York  which  opposed  Van  Buren,  and  his 
appointment  greatly  imbittered  the  friends  of  the  ex-President ; 
otherwise  his  appointment  added  strength  to  the  administration. 
George  Bancroft,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  had  had  little  ex- 
perience in  practical  affairs.    His  appointment  seems  to  have  been 
a  makeshift,  and  he  was  soon  .given  a  diplomatic  position,  for 
which  he  had  originally  expressed  a  preference.    His  most  not- 
able achievement  as  a  cabinet  officer  was  his  success  in  procuring 
the  establishment  of  the  naval  academy  at  Annapolis.    John  Y. 
Mason,  a  college  mate  of  the  President,  was  made  Attorney  Gen- 
eral.   He  had  served  as  Secretary  of  the  Navy  in  Tyler's  cabinet 
and  was  again  put  in  charge  of  that  department  when  Bancroft 
was  made  minister  to  England.     Cave  Johnson,  the  Postmaster 
General,  had  for  many  years  been  Polk's  closest  political  friend. 
Although  he  was  not  considered  to  be  a  brilliant  statesman,  his 
good  judgment  and  methodical  habits  well  fitted  him  for  the 
office  assigned  to  him.    He  was  a  democrat  par  excellence,  and 
when  a  member  of  Congress  he  was  best  known  as  an  enemy  of 
extravagant  appropriations.    His  friends  gave  him  the  sobriquet 
of  "watch-dog  of  the  Treasury";  some  called  him  the  "scourge 
of  private  claimants,"  and  Adams  once  referred  to  him  as  the 
"retrenchment  monsoon."^ 

The  appointment  of  an  entirely  new«  cabinet  caused  general 
surprise  and  considerable  press  comment.  None  except  his  inti- 
mate friends  realized  that  Polk  was  a  man  of  unusual  determi- 
nation, and  that  he  was  resolved  to  be  President  in  fact  as  well 
as  in  name.  The  belief  that  he  would  be  a  mere  figurehead— 
a  pliable  instrument  in  the  hands  of  able  politicians-had  become 

8  Adams,  Memoirs,  XI,  223.  ,  .      ,    ■,     ^ 

.  Mason    of  coorse,  hail  been  a  member  ot  Tyler's  cabinet,  but  not  in 

t.e  pSn  ^^i^:,^^y^  :'^^"?;zs^f-r:^Z 

SJX    'e^ennoS;S,."Ru,nor,  of  it  have  been  in  .ircnlat.on  for 
some  weeks,  which  I  .li.l  not  believe"  {ibi4.,  XII,  180). 


324  JAMES  K.  POLK 

SO  firmly  fixed  in  the  public  mind  that  the  most  convincing  evi- 
dence to  the  contra ly  had  little  weight.  Although  it  is  now  well 
known  that  Polk  dominated  his  cabinet  to  a  greater  degree  than 
most  chief  executives,  so  keen  an  observer  as  Gideon  "Welles  could 
at  the  time  write : 

In  none  of  his  [Polk's]  Cabinet,  I  am  sorry  to  say,  have  I  any  confi- 
dence. Yet  this  cabinet  appears  to  me  to  have  more  influence  and  higher 
authority  than  any  other  I  have  ever  known.  The  Cabinet  is  a  sort 
of  council  of  appointments,  and  the  President  is  chairman  of  this  council, 
instead  of  being  President  of  the  United  States.  It  is,  as  I  wrote  our 
friend  Niles,  a  sort  of  joint  Stock  Company  in  which  the  President  is,  by 
no  means  the  principal  partner.  Yet  several  of  them  have  been  at  particular 
pains  to  tell  vie  that  the  President  has  his  own  way — does  as  he  has  a  mind 
to — makes  his  men  appointments  Sec.  There  is  not,  however,  a  man  in  the 
cabinet,  except  Johnson,  who  does  not  believe  himself  the  superior  of  the 
President  in  abilities  &  qualifications  as  a  statesman. i" 

Writing  in  1860,  Claiborne  says  that  Polk's  cabinet  was  "one 
of  the  ablest  ever  assembled  around  any  executive, ' '  but  that  the 
President  himself  ' '  can  only  be  regarded  as  'a  man  of  medioc- 
rity."^^ Both  statements  are  exaggerations.  Although  each 
member  of  the  cabinet  performed  well  the  duties  of  his  office, 
none  except  Buchanan,  Walker,  and  Marcy  can  be  included 
among  statesmen  of  the  first  rank.  On  the  other  hand,  an  ex- 
ecutive who  could  formulate  important  and  far-reaching  policies, 
and  successfully  carry  them  out  despite  strenuous  opposition, 
could  not  have  been  "a  man  of  mediocrity."  To  say  that  the 
President  ranked  below  the  members  of  his  cabinet  is  only  to 
add  praise  to  his  executive  ability,  for,  as  a  recent  writer  has  well 
said:  "In  the  Cabinet  Council  Polk  was  the  unmistakable  guide 
and  master."^-  Welles  had  been  correctly  informed.  Undoubt- 
edly the  President  had  "his  own  way." 


i<»  Welles  to  Van  Buren,  April  29,  1845,  Van  Buren  Papers.    The  italics 
are  mine. 

11  Claiborne,  Life  and  Correspondence  of  John  A.  Quitman,  I,  229-231. 

12  Learned,  Some  Aspects  of  the  Cabinet  Meeting,  128. 


ADMINISTMATION  AND  PAT  EON  AGE  325 

Polk's  control  over  his  cabinet  was  not  the  result  of  accident 
or  of  incidental  circumstances,  for,  with  his  usual  forethought, 
he  had  planned  to  be  "guide  and  master."  Before  leaving  his 
home  in  Tennessee  he  prepared  the  draft  of  a  letter  a  revised 
copy  of  which  was  sent  to  each  prospective  member  of  his  cabinet. 
After  calling  attention  to  the  "principles  and  policy"  which  he 
expected  to  carry  out  it  was  made  very  clear  that  he  desired  only 
such  advisers  as  would  "cordially  co-operate"  in  effecting  his 
purposes.  Each  member  would  be  expected  to  give  his  time  and 
ability  in  promoting  the  success  of  the  present  administration; 
whenever  he  should  feel  that  he  could  no  longer  do  so,  he  would 
be  expected  to  retire.  Should  these  restrictions  prove  acceptable, 
the  person  addressed  was  invited  to  become  a  member  of  the 
cabinet.  The  following  is  a  copy  of  this  interesting  document: 
Sir: 

The  principles  and  policy  which  will  be  observed  and  maintained  dur- 
ing my  administration,  are  embodied  in  the  Eesolutions  adopted  by  the 
Democratic  National  Convention  of  Delegates,  assembled  at  Baltimore  in 
May  last,  and  in  my  Inaugural  address  this  day  delivered  to  my  Fellow 
Citizens. — 

In  making  up  my  Cabinet  I  desire  to  select  gentlemen  who  agree  with 
me  in  opinion,  and  who  will  cordially  co-operate  with  me  in  carrying  out 
these  principles  and  policy. 

In  my  official  action  I  will  myself  take  no  part, — between  gentlemen 
of  the  Democratic  party,  who  may  become  aspirants  or  candidates — to 
succeed  me  in  the  Presidential  office,  and  shall  desire  that  no  member  of 
my  Cabinet  shall  do  so.  Individual  preferences  it  is  not  expected  or 
desired  to  limit  or  restrain. — It  is  official  interference  by  the  dispensation 
of  public  patronage  or  otherwise  that  I  desire  to  guard  against. — Should 
any  member  of  my  Cabinet  become  a  candidate  or  an  aspirant  to  the 
Presidency  or  Vice  Presidency,  of  the  United  States, — it  will  be  expected 
upon  the  happening  of  such  an  event,  that  he  will  retire  from  the  Cabinet. — 

I  disapprove  the  practice  which  has  sometimes  prevailed  of  Cabinet 
officers  absenting  themselves  for  long  periods  of  time  from  the  seat  of 
Government,  and  leaving  the  management  of  their  Departments  to  Chief 
Clerks — or  less  responsible  persons. — I  expect  myself  to  remain  constantly 
at  Washington — unless  it  may  be  an  occasional  necessary  absence, — and 
then  for  a  short  time, — It  is  by  conforming  to  this  rule, — that  the 
President  and  his  Cabinet  can  have  any  assurances  that  abuses  will  be 


323  JAMES   E.  POLE 

prevented — and  that  the  subordinate  executive  officers  connected  with  them 
respectively, — will  faithfully  perform  their  duty. — 

If  Sir:  you  concur  with  me  in  these  opinions  and  views,  I  shall  be 
pleased  to  have  your  assistance  as  a  member  of  my  Cabinet;  and  now 
tender  you   the   ofBce   of  and   invite  you   to   take   charge   of   the 

Dejiartment. — 

I  shall  be  pleased  to  receive  your  answer  at  your  earliest  convenience. 
I  am  with  great  respect 

Your  Ob't  S'v't.13 

To  every  item  of  the  program  outlined  in  this  letter  the  Presi- 
dent rigidly  adhered.  He  had  "his  own  way"  despite  the  in- 
credulity of  Gideon  Welles.  Catron's  above-quoted  remark,  and 
not  the  opinion  expressed  by  Welles,  is  a  true  statement  of  Polk's 
position  as  chief  executive.  Even  Welles  at  a  later  date,  although 
he  continued  to  underrate  the  President's  ability,  was  forced  to 
admit  that  "he  had  courage  and  determination  and  shrank  from 
no  labor  or  responsibility."^*  Claiborne  has  called  Polk  a  "polit- 
ical martinet"  :^^  he  was  likewise  something  of  an  executive  mar- 
tinet, but  no  member  of  his  cabinet  except  Buchanan  seems  to 
have  questioned  his  right  to  dictate  the  administrative  policy  of 
the  government.  Quite  frequently  the  Secretary  of  State  tried 
to  substitute  his  own  policies  for  those  of  the  President,  but  in- 
variably he  was  forced  to  submit  to  the  will  of  his  superior.  On 
several  occasions  Polk  was  on  the  point  of  dismissing  him  from 
the  cabinet  for  violating  his  pledge  to  put  aside  Presidential 
aspirations. 

On  questions  of  importance  the  President  sought  freely  the 
advice  of  his  cabinet,  members  of  Congress  and  private  individ- 
uals; very  often  the  advice  given  led  to  modifications  in  matters 
of  detail,  but,  except  in  very  rare  instances,  the  main  essentials 
of  his  policies  were  carried  into  effect  as  originally  ])lanned  by 


13  On  the  back  is  written:  "Rough  Draft  of  Letter.  To  be  revised 
corrected.  Jan.  15,  1845"  (Polk  Papers).  The  revised  coi)y  which  was 
sent  to  Buchanan  is  printed  in  his  Works,  VI,  110. 

1*  MS  "Review  of  Pol.  Hist,  of  U.  S.  etc.,"  Welles  Papers. 

13  Claiborne,  op.  eit.,  228. 


ADMINISTFATION  AND  PATRONAGE  327 

himself.  His  habit  of  considering  carefully  the  problems  in- 
volved before  they  were  presented  for  discussion  left  little  of 
importance  for  his  advisers  to  suggest.  He  felt  keenly  the  indi- 
vidual responsibility  of  his  office ;  it  followed,  therefore,  that  ]m 
own,  and  not  the  opinions  of  others,  should  dictate  the  policies 
to  be  pursued. 

The  President  yielded  his  convictions  neither  easily  nor  for  petty  reasons. 
Politics  influenced  him.  But  he  seldom  forgot  principles  even  though  he 
had  to  sacrifice  the  friendship  and  influence  of  men  as  powerful  as  Senator 
Benton  of  Missouri  and  to  some  extent  the  assistance  of  Buchanan.io 

Polk  was  not  indulging  in  idle  flourish  when  he  told  pros- 
pective cabinet  members  that  he  would  "remain  constantly  at 
Washington,"  for  during  his  entire  term  he  was  absent  from  the 
capital  not  more  than  six  weeks."  Being  a  strict  Sabbatarian  he 
abstained  from  Sunday  labor  except  in  cases  of  absolute  necessity. 
The  other  six  days  of  each  week  were  devoted  to  unremitting 
toil,  and  frequently  his  labors  extended  far  into  the  night.  Near 
the  middle  of  his  official  term  he  noted  in  his  diary : 

It  is  two  years  ago  this  day  since  I  left  my  residence  at  Columbia, 
Tennessee,  to  enter  on  my  duties  as  President  of  the  U.  S.  Since  that 
time  I  have  performed  great  labour  and  incurred  vast  responsibilities. 
In  truth,  though  I  occupy  a  very  high  position,  I  am  the  hardest  working 
man  in  this  country. 

A  few  weeks  later  he  wrote : 

This  afternoon  I  took  a  ride  on  horseback.  It  is  the  first  time  I  have 
mounted  a  horse  for  over  six  months.  I  have  an  excellent  saddle-horse, 
and  have  been  much  in  the  habit  of  taking  exercise  on  horseback  all  my 
life,  but  have  been  so  incessantly  engaged  in  the  onerous  and  responsible 
duties  of  my  office  for  many  months  past  that  I  have  had  no  time  to  take 
such  exercisers 


16  Learned,  op.  cit.,  124. 

IT  Ibid.,  120. 

18  Polk,  Diary,  II,  360,  456.  A  vear  and  a  half  later  his  story  is  the 
same:  "Since  my  return  earlv  in  July,  1847,  from  my  Northern  tour,  I 
have  not  been  more  than  two  or  three  miles  from  my  oflice,  and  during 
the  whole  period  (13  months)  my  labours,  responsibilities,  and  anxieties 
have  been  very  great"  (ibid.,  IV,  85-86). 


328  JAMES  K.  POLK 

The  office  of  President  is  never  a  sinecure,  yet  why,  it  may 
be  asked,  did  Polk  find  it  necessary  to  expend  his  energies  more 
lavishly  than  other  chief  executives.  The  answer  is  that  he  felt 
under  obligation  to  make  himself  familiar  with  all  branches  of 
executive  government.  He  alone  must  bear  the  responsibility 
for  efficient  administration,  consequently  he  alone  must  direct  the 
affairs  of  the  various  departments.  Supervision  on  so  vast  a 
scale  meant  a  sacrifice  of  time  and  energy,  but  he  had  the  satis- 
faction of  believing  that  he  had  not  sacrificed  them  in  vain.  "We 
are  not  left  in  doubt  regarding  his  feeling  of  self-reliance,  for 
on  September  23,  1848,  he  observed: 

I  have  not  had  my  full  Cabinet  together  in  council  since  the  adjourn- 
ment of  Congress  on  the  14th  of  August  last.  I  have  conducted  the 
Government  w^ithout  their  aid.  Indeed,  I  have  become  so  familiar  with 
the  duties  and  workings  of  the  Government,  not  only  upon  general  prin- 
ciples, but  in  most  of  its  intimate  details,  that  I  find  but  little  difficulty 
in  doing  this.  I  have  made  myself  acquainted  with  the  duties  of  the 
subordinate  officers,  and  have  probably  given  more  attention  to  details 
than  any  of  my  predecessors.  It  is  only  occasi[on]ally  that  a  great 
measure  or  a  new  question  arises,  upon  which  I  desire  the  aid  and  advice 
of  my  Cabinet.  At  each  meeting  of  the  Cabinet  I  learn  from  each  member 
what  is  being  done  in  his  particular  Department,  and  especially  if  any 
question  of  doubt  or  difficulty  has  arisen.  I  have  never  called  for  any 
written  opinions  from  my  Cabinet,  preferring  to  take  their  opinions, 
after  discussion,  in  Cabinet  &  in  the  presence  of  each  other.  In  this  way 
harmony  of  opinion  is  more  likely  to  exist.i^ 

Still  another  passage  from  his  diary  may  be  cited  as  indicative 
of  his  industry  and  of  solicitude  lest  some  duty  might  go  unper- 
formed : 

No  President  who  performs  his  duty  faithfully  and  conscientiously  can 
have  any  leisure.  If  he  entrusts  the  details  and  small  matters  to  subordi- 
nates constant  errors  will  occur.  I  prefer  to  supervise  the  whole  operations 
of  the  Government  myself  rather  than  entrust  the  public  business  to 
subordinates  and  this  makes  my  duties  very  great.20 

Although  the  excerpts  just  quoted  were  written  during  the 
last  year  of  his  administration,  Polk's  painstaking  supervision 

19  Polk,  Diary,  IV,  130-131. 

20  Ibid.,  261. 


ADMIXISTBATION  AND  PAT  EON  AGE  329 

of  tlio  "whole  operations"  of  the  government  began  as  soon  as 
he  had  entered  upon  the  duties  of  his  office.  His  searching  ex- 
amination of  all  documents  presented  for  his  signature  and  his 
ability  to  detect  errors  caused  considerable  newspaper  comment.^' 
His  thorough  knowledge  of  affairs  enabled  him  to  win  a  wager 
from  the  astute  Buchanan  in  an  argument  concerning  proper 
diplomatic  usage.'-- 

The  introduction  of  systematic  methods  in  the  handling  of 
department  affairs  added  greatly  to  the  efficiency  of  the  adminis- 
tration. On  questions  of  policy  Polk  preferred  oral  discussions 
to  written  opinions  from  his  cabinet,  but  each  member  was  re- 
quired to  report  regularly  on  all  matters  relating  to  his  depart- 
ment. In  a  circular  dated  April  11,  1845,  he  asked  the  head  of 
each  department  to  furnish  him  with  a  monthly  report  concern- 
ing the  work  of  the  various  bureaus  and  clerks  under  his  juris- 
diction. The  tendency  of  bureau  chiefs  to  favor  large  expendi- 
tures made  it  necessary  for  each  cabinet  oiBcer  to  ' '  give  vigilant 
attention"  to  all  estimates,  and  to  pare  them  down  whenever 
possible.^3  Such  reports,  supplemented  by  discussions  at  regular 
meetings  of  the  cabinet,  enabled  the  President  to  understand 
thoroughly  the  operations  of  all  departments. 

As  a  rule  the  cabinet  met  regularly  on  Tuesdays  and  Satur- 
days of  each  week,  and  there  were  frequent  special  meetings  on 
other  days.  Frequency  of  meeting  afforded  ample  opportunity 
for  the  consideration  of  administrative  policies.  Apparently  the 
President  never  attempted  to  interfere  with  a  free  expression  of 
opinions,  yet  by  adroitly  directing  the  discussions  he  was  able  to 

21  For  example:  "The  President  is  devoted  to  his  official  tasks.  He 
signs  nothing  without  the  strictest  examination,  and  has  frequently,  to 
the  confusion  of  clerks,  detected  serious  errors  in  the  papers  sent  for  his 
signature"  (New  York  Evening  Post,  May  3,  1845;  quoted  by  the  AVash- 
ington  Union,  May  8). 

22  Polk,  Diary,  TIT,  97-99.  The  bet  was  made  in  a  jesting  mood  and 
the  President  declined  to  accept  his  basket  of  champagne.  ' '  I  record  this 
incident,"  said  he,  "for  the  purpose  of  showing  how  necessary  it  is  for 
me  to  give  my  vigilant  attention  even  to  the  forms  &  details  of  my  [sub- 
ordinates ']  duties. ' ' 

23  Polk,  Diary,  I,  48,  and  passim. 


330  JAMES   K.  POLK 

"have  his  own  Avay"  without  causing  offense.  That  his  method 
of  dealing  with  his  cabinet  resulted  in  both  harmony  and  unity 
of  purpose  is  corroborated  by  the  testimony  of  Buchanan,  the 
most  discordant  member.  "However  various  our  views  might 
have  been  and  often  were  upon  any  particular  subject  when 
entering  the  cabinet  council,"  he  wrote,  in  advising  Pierce  to 
follow  Polk's  example,  "after  mutual  consultation  and  free  dis- 
cussion we  never  failed  to  agree  at  last,  except  on  a  few  questions, 
and  on  these  the  world  never  knew  that  we  had  differed."  More 
surprising,  perhaps,  is  his  praise  of  the  President  for  having 
personally  directed  diplomatic  relations.  "Mr.  Polk,"  said  he, 
' '  was  a  wise  man,  and  after  deliberation  he  had  determined  that 
all  important  questions  with  foreign  nations  should  be  settled  in 
Washington,  under  his  own  immediate  supervision."-*  Another 
proof  of  the  President's  ability  to  gain  and  to  retain  the  good 
will  of  his  cabinet  is  contained  in  a  letter  written  by  Bancroft 
in  1887  after  he  had  made  an  exhaustive  examination  of  the 
Polk  Papers: 

His  character  shines  out  in  them  just  as  the  man  he  was,  prudent,  far- 
sighted,  bold,  excelling  any  democrat  of  his  day  in  undeviatingly  correct 
exposition  of  democratic  principles;  and,  in  short,  as  I  think,  judging  of 
him  as  I  knew  him,  and  judging  of  him  by  the  results  of  his  administration, 
one  of  the  very  foremost  of  our  public  men  and  one  of  the  very  best  and 
most  honest  and  most  successful  Presidents  the  country  ever  had.25 

In  a  letter  written  during  the  following  year  Bancroft  again 
sounded  the  praises  of  his  former  chief  and  gave  the  reasons  for 
the  success  of  his  administration : 

His  administration,  viewed  from  the  standpoint  of  results,  was  perhaps 
the  greatest  in  our  national  history,  certainly  one  of  the  greatest.  He 
succeeded  because  he  insisted  on  being  its  centre,  and  in  overruling  and 
guiding  all  his  secretaries  to  act  so  as  to  ])roduce  unity  and  harmonj'. 
Those  who  study  his  administration  will  acknowledge  how  sincere  and 
successful  were  his  efforts,  as  did  those  who  were  contemporary  with  him. 20 


2*  Curtis,  Life  of  James  Buchanan,  II,  72,  76. 

25  Bancroft  to  J.  Geo.  Harris,  Aug.  30,  1887    (Howe,  Life  and  Letters 
of  George  Bancroft,  I,  294). 

26  Bancroft  to  J.  G.  Wilson,  March  8,  1888   (Wilson,  The  Presidents  of 
the  United  States,  230). 


ADMINISTRATION  AND  PATRONAGE  331 

With  a  deep  sense  of  personal  integrity  and  a  desire  to  avoid 
everything  which  might  impair  his  absolute  independence,  Polk 
declined  to  accept  presents  of  more  than  nominal  value.    Shortly 
aft(?r  his  inauguration  Thomas  Lloyd  sent  him  a  valuable  saddle- 
horse,  but  he  promptly  gave  orders  that  it  should  be  returned  to 
the  donor.     Another  admirer  who  sent  a  consignment  of  wine 
and'  other  delicacies  for  the  President's  table  was  instructed  to 
send  a  bill  or  to  take  the  articles  away.    It  soon  became  known 
that  he  would  accept  nothing  of  greater  value  than  a  book  or  a 
cane.     The  same  rule  applied  to  presents  for  Mrs.  Polk.='     The 
same  scrupulous  regard  for  propriety  is  shown  in  his  refusal  to 
invest  in  government  securities  a  certain  sum  of  money  belong- 
ing to  his  nephew  and  ward,  Marshall  T.  Polk.-«     His  public 
policies  were  denounced  in  unmeasured  terms,  and  his  political 
honesty  was  frequently  impugned,  but  even  his  enemies  credited 
him  with  personal  integrity  and  purity  of  character.     His  own 
personal  affairs  were  characterized  by  simplicity  and  frugality. 
This  fact  has  already  been  noted  in  the  care  with  which  he 
guarded  against  exorbitant  charges  at  the  time  of  his  inaugu- 
ration.-^     On  the  other  hand,  his  generosity  is  shown  by  loans 
and  gifts  to  friends  whenever  he  believed  the  recipients  to  be 
deserving.^''     The  improvident  beggar  was  unceremoniously  dis- 
missed, for  Polk  had  no  sympathy  for  the  man  who  believes  that 
the  world  owes  him  a  living. 

One  of  the  first  purely  political  questions  which  required  the 
new  President's  attention  was  the  establishment  of  a  newspaper 
which  would  serve  as  the  "organ"  of  the  administration.     We 

27  Letters  among  FoR-  Papers;  also,  Nelson,  Memorials  of  Sarah  Chil- 
dress Polk,  89. 

28  Polk,  Diary,  III,  15-17. 

29  See  above,  p.  293,  note  28.  He  was,  according  to  a  remark  in  the 
Diary,  his  "own  barbour"  {Diary,  III,  9). 

30  For  example,  when  the  news  came  that  Colonel  Yell  had  fallen  in  the 
battle  of  Buena  Vista  the  President  wrote:  "His  eldest  son,  and  perhaps 
his  only  son,  is  now  at  College  at  Georgetown,  and  as  my  impression  is  that 
Col.  Yell  died  poor,  I  ^nll  in  that  event  educate  the  boy,  and  shall  take 
great  interest  in  him"   {Diary,  II,  451-452). 


332  JAMES  K.  POLK 

have  seen  that  the  subject  had  already  been  discussed,  but  noth- 
ing definite  had  been  accomplished  when  Polk  entered  upon  the 
duties  of  his  office.  The  refusal  of  Ritchie  to  leave  Richmond 
determined  the  President  to  procure,  if  possible,  the  services  of 
Donelson,  for  in  no  case  would  he  consent  to  make  Blair  the 
administration  editor.  On  March  17  he  told  Jackson  in  a  "con- 
fidential" letter  that 

There  is  at  present  no  paper  here  which  sustains  my  administration 
for  its  own  sake.  The  Globe  it  is  manifest  does  not  look  to  the  success 
or  the  glory  of  my  administration  so  much  as  it  does  to  the  interests  and 
views  of  certain  prominent  men  of  the  party  who  are  looking  to  succeed 
me  in  1848.  The  arrangement  which  above  all  others  I  prefer  would  be 
that,  the  owners  of  the  Globe  would  agree  to  place  it  in  the  hands  of  a 
new  Editor, — still  retaining  the  proprietorship  of  the  paper  if  they  choose. 
You  may  rely  ujion  it,  that  without  such  an  arrangement,  the  Democratic 
party  who  elected  me  cannot  be  kept  united  three  months.  If  Maj>' 
Donelson  would  take  charge  of  the  Editorial  Department — all  the  sections 
of  the  party  would  be  at  once  reunited  and  satisfied. 

Donelson  and  Ritchie,  he  said,  were  the  only  ones  whom  he  would 
permit  to  edit  his  government  organ. ^^ 

Within  the  next  two  weeks  the  President  "had  full  and  free 
conversation  with  Mr.  Blair  and  in  good  feeling  frankly  told 
him,  that  it  was  impossible  for  the  whole  party  ever  to  be  united 
in  support  of  the  administration  whilst  the  Globe  was  regarded 
as  the  official  organ,"  and  that  he  must  have  a  new  paper.  In 
sending  this  information  to  Donelson  on  March  28  Polk  said  that 
within  the  last  forty-eight  hours  the  whole  matter  had  "been 
brought  almost  to  a  head."  Ritchie  had  been  in  Washington 
and  Blair  had  agreed  to  sell  the  Glohc  and  retire,  leaving  Ritchie 
and  Donelson  to  take  charge  as  joint  editors.  Blair  had  made 
but  one  stipulation,  that  the  arrangement  should  be  delayed  until 
he  could  consult  Van  Buren  and  Jackson ;  "he  says  positively 
that  if  Gen^  Jackson  assents,  he  will  at  once  sell  and  retire." 
After  repeating  the  reasons,  already  given  to  Jackson,  why  he 


31  Polk  to  Jackson,  March  17,  1845,  Jaclson  Papers. 


ADMINISTEATION  AND  PATRONAGE  333 

could  not  eiuxiloy  the  Globe  and  expressing  the  hope  that  the  ar- 
rangement then  pending  might  be  effected,  he  added  that  "if  it 
should  fail  I  am  still  deeply  convinced  that  it  will  be  indispens- 
able to  have  a  new  paper  and  I  have  so  informed  Mr.  Blair. "^- 

After  some  further  negotiation  Blair  and  Rives  consented  to 
dispose  of  the  Globe  and  retire.  The  purchasers  were  Thomas 
Ritchie,  of  the  Richmond  Enquirer,  and  John  P.  Heiss,  of  Ten- 
nessee, formerly  editor  of  the  Nashville  Union.  A  new  paper 
called  the  Washington  Vmon  succeeded  the  Globe  with  Ritchie 
as  its  chief  editor  and  Heiss  as  its  business  manager.  The  daily 
edition  of  the  new  "Polk  organ"  made  its  debut  on  May  1,  1845, 
and  a  semi-weekly  followed  four  days  later.  Among  the  note- 
worthy features  of  the  initial  numbers  were  a  eulogy  on  the  late 
editors  of  the  Globe,  and  the  first  installment  of  "Mrs.  Caudle's 
Curtain  Lectures, ' '  copied  from  the  London  Punch.  The  humor 
of  the  lectures  may  have  been  the  more  apparent  to  ingenuous 
readers. 

General  Jackson  was  quite  as  unsuccessful  in  his  attempt  to 
make  Major  William  B.  Lewis  the  "ferret"  of  the  Polk  admin- 
istration as  in  his  effort  to  have  Blair  retained  as  editor  of  the 
"organ."  Lewis  had  for  some  time  held  the  office  of  second 
auditor  of  the  treasury,  and,  as  he  was  considered  to  be  a  still 
more  treacherous  politician  than  Blair,  the  new  President  sum- 
marily dismissed  him.  In  a  letter  to  Polk,  Lewis  stated  that  he 
had  learned  from  a  private  source  that 

you  have  intimated  that  my  removal  from  office  was  rendered  necessary, 
because  the  position  I  occupied  was  dangerous  to  the  Government,  in  as 
much  as  it  would  enable  me  to  impart  information  to  a  foreign  power  to 
the  disadvantage  of  my  own  country. 

He  hoped  that  the  report  was  unfounded  but  desired  to  know 
whether  Polk  had  made  such  a  remark.  As  the  President  made 
no  reply  to  this  or  to  other  letters  on  the  same  subject,  Lewis 


32  Polk  to  Donelson,  March  28,  1845,  "Polk-Donelson  Letters." 


334  JAMES  K.  POLE 

left  for  his  home  in  Tennessee  and  published  the  correspondence 
in  a  Nashville  paper.^^  Polk's  reasons  for  declining  to  make 
explanations  are  given  in  a  letter  to  a  friend  in  Tennessee : 

As  to  Maj.  Lewis  I  shall  of  course  enter  into  no  controversy  with  him. 
What  he  desires  most  is  to  make  himself  conspicuous  by  such  a  contro- 
versy. His  course  since  his  removal  from  office  proves  his  unworthiness 
of  which  I  had  full  &  ample  proof  before  I  dismissed  him.  .  .  .  [Had 
Jackson  known  the  reasons  he  would  have  approved.] 3* 

The  enforced  retirement  of  Blair  and  the  dismissal  of  Lewis 
have  been  given  special  notice  because  many  have  cited  them  as 
evidence  to  convict  Polk  of  ingratitude  and  disloyalty  to  General 
Jackson — the  man  to  whom,  it  was  said,  he  owed  his  own  political 
advancement.  There  is  little  consistency  in  some  of  the  criticisms 
relating  to  this  matter.  The  man  whom  the  critics  denounced 
for  being  bold  enough  to  ignore  the  wishes  of  "Old  Hickory" 
was,  by  the  same  men,  said  to  be  weak  and  temporizing.  Such 
critics  commended  Jackson  for  discarding  his  old  friend  Van 
Buren  on  account  of  the  Texan  question ;  but  they  condemned 
Polk  for  dismissing  his  own  detractors  and  obstacles  to  party 
success  because  these  detractors  happened  to  be  friends  of  the 
General. •'*•'  Jackson  himself,  when  replying  to  Lewis's  complaints, 
pointed  out  that  the  President  had  the  right  to  till  offices  with 
men  in  whom  he,  and  not  others,  had  confidence.^** 

Although  General  Jackson  was  undoubtedly  disappointed  be- 
cause his  two  most  intimate  friends  had  been  dismissed,  their 
removal  does  not  seem  to  have  impaired  his  friendship  for  the 
President  or  his  desire  for  the  success  of  the  administration. 
The  last  letter  which  the  General  ever  penned  was  written  to 


33  The  originals  are  among  the  PoJk  Papers.  Printed  copies  may 
be  found  in  Niles'  Beg.,  LXVIII,  277. 

34  Polk  to  A.  O.  P.  Nicholson,  July  28,  1845,  Pollc  Papers.  In  a  letter 
to  Polk,  July  19,  J.  Goo.  Harris  expressed  the  belief  that  both  Blair  and 
Lewis  had  plotted  against  Polk. 

35  Claiborne,  for  example,  reflects  these  contrary  opinions  of  Polk.  See 
Life  and  Correspondence  of  John  A.  Quitman,  I,  228-229. 

3«  Jackson  to  Lewis,  April  10,  1845  (Niles'  Beg.,  LXVIII,  277). 


ADMIN  I  ST  EAT  ION  AND  PATFONAGE  335 

Polk  on  June  6,  1845.    It  expressed  not  only  personal  fi-iendship 

for  the  President,  but  warned  him  that  certain  rumored  acts  of 

Secretary  Walker  and  land  speculators  might  "blow  you  &  your 

administration  sky  high."     The  letter  was  characteristic  of  the 

writer  and   exhibited  his  well-known  traits — solicitude   for  his 

friend  and  protege,  a  wish  to  supervise  public  affairs,   and   a 

patriotic  desire  to  serve  his  country,  even  though  his  methods 

were  not  always  of  the  best.     "Here,  my  son,"  he  said,  as  he 

handed  it  to  Andrew  Jackson  Jr.,  "read  this  letter,  I  want  you 

to  be  a  witness  to  the  fact  that  I  have  warned  the  government 

against  the  disaster  with  which  it  is  threatened — and  have  done 

my  duty."     The  letter  was  mislaid  under  some  papers  and  not 

found  until  October  and  it  was  feared  it  had  been  stolen.     The 

high  value  set  upon  it  by  the  President,  as  well  as  his  feeling 

toward  the  writer,  is  stated  in  a  letter  in  which  Polk  asked  that 

a  search  be  made  to  recover  it : 

I  shall  prize  the  letter  as  above  all  price  as  being  the  last  ever  written 
by  the  greatest  man  of  the  age  in  which  he  lived — a  man  whose  confidence 
and  friendship  I  was  so  happy  as  to  have  enjoyed  from  my  youth  to  the 
latest.37 

On  the  question  of  ousting  Whigs  from  office  in  order  to 
make  room  for  Democrats,  Polk's  own  views  accorded  with  those 
of  his  party,^^  and  when  making  appointments,  except  a  few 
military  positions,  political  orthodoxy  was  a  sine  qua  non.  De- 
spite the  importunities  of  Buchanan,  he  refused  to  appoint  John 

37  Jackson  to  Polk,  June  6;  J.  Geo.  Harris  to  Polk,  June  28;  Polk  to 
Nicholson,  June  28,  1845,  Polk  Papers.  Andrew  Jackson,  Jr.,  approved 
what  the  President  had  done  and  when  writing,  on  October  10,  to  explain 
how  Jackson's  last  letter  had  been  mislaid  said:  "Our  old  friend  Majr 
Letois  has  completely  killed  himself  here  &  I  expect  else  where  by  his 
imprudent  publications — he  is  now  very  sick  of  it,  and  well  he  may  be" 
(PoUc  Papers). 

38  In  1846  an  officer  who  had  been  notified  that  he  would  be  removed 
protested  that,  although  he  had  once  been  a  Federalist,  he  had  been  a 
Democrat  for  many  years.  "Although  not  the  only  reason  for  nmking 
the  change  proper,'"  the  President  observed,  "I  have  no  doubt  he  is  a 
Whig  in  all  his  feelings,  and  that  his  patronage  is  bestowed  exclusively 
on  menil:)ers  of  that  party,  as  far  as  he  thinks  he  can  do  so  with  safety 
to  himself"   {Diary,  II,  113-114). 


336  JAMES  E.  POLE 

M.  Read  to  a  place  on  the  Supreme  Bench,  because  that  distin- 
guished jurist  had  once  been  a  Federalist.  His  remarks  in  this 
connection  on  the  perdurance  of  original  ideas  showed  his  political 
sagacity,  for  Read  later  deserted  the  party  and  became  a  Re- 
publican : 

Mr.  Eeacl,  I  learned,  was  until  within  10  or  12  years  ago  a  leading 
Federalist,  and  a  Eepresentative  of  that  party  in  the  Legislature.  Al- 
though he  has  since  that  time  acted  with  the  Democratic  party,  I  have  no 
confidence  in  the  orthodoxy  of  his  political  opinions  or  constitutional 
doctrines,  and  was  therefore  unwilling  to  appoint  him  to  a  station  for  life, 
where  he  would  almost  certainly  [have]  relapsed  into  his  old  Federal 
Doctrines  &  been  latitudinarian  in  his  doctrines.  I  have  never  known  an 
instance  of  a  Federalist  who  had  after  arriving  at  the  age  of  30  professed 
to  change  his  opinions,  who  was  to  be  relied  on  in  his  constitutional  opin- 
ions. All  of  them  who  have  been  appointed  to  the  Supreme  Court  Beuch, 
after  having  secured  a  place  for  life  became  very  soon  broadly  Federal 
and  latitudinarian  in  all  their  decisions  involving  questions  of  Constitu- 
tional power.  Gen'l  Jackson  had  been  most  unfortunate  in  his  appoint- 
ments to  that  Bench  in  this  respect.  I  resolved  to  appoint  no  man  who 
was  not  an  original  Democrat  &  strict  constructionist,  and  who  would  be 
less  likely  to  relapse  into  the  Broad  Federal  doctrines  of  Judge  Marshall 
&  Judge  Story.39 

Even  Benton's  son-in-law,  William  Carey  Jones,  w^as  denied  an 
office  because  he  had  once  edited  a  Federalist  paper  in  New 
Orleans.  Like  Jackson,  Polk  seemed  to  take  it  for  granted  that 
honesty,  except  in  very  rare  cases,  was  not  to  be  found  among 
the  Whigs,  and  his  na'ive  remarks  about  the  exceptions  which  he 
discovered  are  very  amusing.  Senator  Mangrum,  for  example, 
"though  a  Whig,  is  a  gentleman,  and  fair  &  manly  in  his  oppo- 
sition to  my  administration."  Senator  Crittenden,  also,  "though 
differing  wuth  me  in  politics  is  an  honorable  gentleman."""'  He 
does  not,  however,  seem  to  have  found  a  Whig  honorable  enough 
to  hold  an  appointive  office.  Still,  though  he  declined  to  place 
Whigs  in  appointive  offices,  he  did  not,  on  the  other  hand,  dis- 
miss them  for  partisan  considerations  merely.     In  his  diary  he 


39  Polk,  Diary,  I,  137-138. 

40  Ibid.,  Ill,  381,  II,  349. 


ADMINISTRATION  AND  PATEONAGE  337 

has  noted  the  gratitude  of  those  whom  he  had  retained  in  office, 
despite  their  political  opinions : 

Many  Whigs  whom  I  retained  in  office  were  among  those  who  called. 
Though  "mauv  removals  &  new  appointments  to  fill  vacancies  have  been 
made  by  me^ny  administration  has  not  been  proscriptive,  and  the  Whigs 
who  were  faithful  &  good  officers,  whom  I  have  retained  in  their  places, 
seem  to  appreciate  my  liberality  towards  them  and  many  of  them  have 
called  to  express  their  gratitude  &  to  take  leave  of  me.^i 

The  independence  displayed  in  dropping  Blair  and  Lewis  was 
characteristic  of  the  policy  which  Polk  endeavored  to  employ  in 
all  matters  of  patronage.  He  was  soon  to  discover,  however, 
that  the  dispenser  of  offices  is  by  no  means  a  free  agent,  and 
that  "political  considerations"  must  be  taken  into  account. 

Although  many  at  the  time  alleged  that  the  President  had 
made  preelection  pledges  to  the  Tyler  and  Calhoun  factions, 
there  is  now  no  reason  for  doubting  Polk's  oft-repeated  assertions 
that  he  was  "under  no  pledges  or  commitments""  to  any  of  the 
political  cliques.  Even  so,  their  wishes  could  not  be  wholly  dis- 
regarded with  impunity.  Hostile  elements  within  the  party  had 
united  for  the  purpose  of  winning  the  election,  and  each  was  ready 
to  claim  its  share  of  the  ' '  spoils. ' '  Having  no  assured  ' '  adminis- 
tration majority"  in  Congress,  the  success  of  his  own  program 
must  depend  upon  his  ability  to  enlist  the  support  of  several 
discordant  factions.  His  effort  to  deal  fairly  with  all  of  them 
resulted  in  general  criticism,  for  each  laid  claim  to  all  important 
offices  and  resented  all  favors  accorded  to  its  rivals.  To  have 
allied  himself  with  any  one  of  these  factions  would  have  resulted 
in  disaster;  the  refusal  to  do  so  was  attributed  to  timidity  and  a 
temporizing  disposition. 

It  has  been  noted  in  the  preceding  chapter  that  there  were 
three  rather  well-defined  groups  within  the  Democratic  party. 
The  first  comprised  the  followers  of  A' an  Buren  and  Benton ;  the 

41  Polk,  Diary,  March  2,  1849,  IV,  360. 

42  For  example,  Polk  to  Cave  Johnson,  Dec.  21,  1844,  -  Polk-Johnson 
Letters. ' ' 


338  JAMES  E.  POLK 

second,  the  adherents  of  Calhoun ;  and  the  third,  that  element 
in  the  South  and  "West  which  accepted  the  leadership  of  Walker 
and  Cass.*"  Until  the  appearance  of  Van  Buren's  anti-Texas 
letter  nothing  had  occurred  to  disturb  the  harmony  which  long 
existed  between  the  Van  Burenites  and  Jackson's  followers  in 
Tennessee,  consequently  Polk  had  been  identified  with  the  first 
group  even  though  his  claim  to  the  Vice-Presidency  had  met  with 
no  cordial  response. 

Due,  no  doubt,  to  this  affiliation  and  to  a  desire  to  assuage 
the  disappointment  caused  by  the  dropping  of  Van  Buren  by  the 
Baltimore  convention,  Polk  turned  first  to  New  York  when  mak- 
ing up  his  list  of  cabinet  appointments.  Wright,  as  we  have 
already  seen,  was  invited  to  take  charge  of  the  Treasury  Depart- 
ment ;  and  when  this  invitation  was  declined,  Butler,  on  the  advice 
of  Van  Buren,  was  tendered  the  War  portfolio.  Rebuffed  a 
second  time,  Polk  ceased  his  efforts  to  placate  the  Van  Burenites, 
and  appointed  their  rival,  Marcy,  to  be  Secretary  of  War.  For 
the  sake  of  harmony  within  the  party  he  had  done  all  that  any 
self-respecting  man  in  his  position  could  have  been  expected  to 
do,  and  if  the  friends  of  the  ex-President  did  not  receive  their 
proper  share  of  the  "loaves  and  fishes,"  the  blame  rested  entirely 
upon  their  own  shoulders.  The  President's  offer,  a  few  months 
later,  to  send  Van  Buren  as  minister  to  England  was  likewise 
declined,  and  the  attitude  of  the  ex-President  and  his  adherents 
continued  to  be  one  either  of  sullen  reserve  or  of  secret  opposition 
to  the  administration.  When  Polk  reached  New  York  on  his  north- 
ern tour  in  July,  1847,  Van  Buren  sent  him  a  verbal  invitation 
to  call.  Believing  the  invitation  to  be  a  mere  ' '  formal  courtesy ' ' 
impelled  by  public  opinion,  the  President  promptly  declined  to 
accept  it.  "The  truth  is,"  is  the  comment  in  his  diary,  "Mr. 
Van  Buren  became  offended  with  me  at  the  beginning  of  my  ad- 
ministration because  I  chose  to  exercise  my  own  judgment  in  the 


*3  With  characteristic  pungency  J.  Q.  Adams  divided  Democracy  into 
two  parts:  "  Soutliern  Democracy,  which  is  slavery,  and  Western  Democ- 
racy, which  is  knavery"  (Memoirs,  XII,  11). 


ADMIXISTEATION  AND  PATHONAGE  339 

selection  of  luv  own  Cabinet,  and  would  not  be  controlled  by  him 
and  suffer  liiiu  to  select  it  for  me."** 

Although  the  President  could  not  consent  to  retain  Calhoun 
in  liis  cabinet,  he  was  prepared  at  the  outset  to  deal  fairly  with 
that  wing  of  the  party.  The  British  mission  was  offered  first  to 
Calhoun  himself,  and  after  his  refusal,  to  his  friends,  Elmore 
and  Pickins.  But  this  faction,  like  the  Van  Burenites,  declined 
to  accept  anything  because  their  chief  had  not  been  permitted  to 
control  the  administration. 

The  Treasury  Department  with  the  patronage  incident  to  the 
office  was  assigned  to  Walker  as  a  clear  concession  to  the  South 
and  West.  The  selection  of  Greer,  a  friend  of  Dallas,  for  the 
Supreme  Bench  was  likewise  a  recognition  of  the  claims  of  this 
wing  of  the  party.  Apparently  Cass  did  not  seek  an  appointive 
office,  but  preferred  to  remain  in  the  Senate. 

When  selecting  federal  officers  the  President  did  not,  of  course, 
overlook  his  own  personal  friends.  First  of  all.  Cave  Johnson 
was  made  Postmaster  General,  and  Donelson,  after  being  consid- 
ered as  possible  editor  of  the  Union,  was,  on  his  return  from 
Texas,  sent  as  minister  to  Berlin.  J.  George  Harris,  whose  vitri- 
olic pen  and  exasperating  "buzzard"  had  made  the  Nashville 
Union  so  effective  a  party  journal,  was  made  purser  in  the  navy. 
The  loyal  but  dissolute  Laughlin  was  appointed  to  be  recorder 
of  the  general  land  office  as  a  reward  for  his  services  as  editor 
of  the  Nashville  Union  and  for  his  support  of  Polk  in  the  Balti- 
more convention.     The  President's  old  friend  and  former  law 


44  Polk,  Diary,  III,  74.  Polk  had  received  information  from  many 
sources  concerning  the  hostility  of  the  Albany  regency.  For  example, 
Buchanan,  who  visited  Albany  in  the  fall  of  1846,  reported  that,  while 
Governor  Wright  himself  was  friendly,  Cambreleng  and  others  avoided 
him.  A  month  later  George  Bancroft,  who  had  always  been  a  warm  friend 
of  Van  Buren,  after  a  similar  visit  informed  Polk  that  NeAV  York  poli- 
ticians were  hostile  to  the  administration  and  that  Van  Buren  evinced 
no  desire  to  renew  friendly'  relations  with  the  President.  Although 
Bancroft  had  originally  suggested  the  tender  to  Van  Buren  of  the  British 
mission,  he  now  advised  that  no  further  attempt  be  made  to  placate  the 
ex-President  (Buchanan  to  Polk,  Sept.  5,  1846;  Bancroft  to  Polk,  Oct.  4, 
1846,  Polk  Papers.  Van  Buren 's  correspondents  freely  criticized  the 
President,  Van  Buren  Papers,  passim). 


340  JAMES   E.  POLK 

partner,  Gideon  Pillow,  who  claimed  to  be  mainly  responsible  for 
Polk's  nomination  at  Baltimore,  was,  Avhen  the  war  broke  out, 
made  a  brigadier-general  of  volunteers.  Even  John  0.  Bradford, 
whom  a  Whig  bishop  had  excommunicated  for  editing  the  Nash- 
ville Union,  was.  now  rewarded  by  a  pursership  in  the  navy. 
Most  questionable  of  all,  however,  in  point  of  propriety,  was  the 
appointment  of  the  President's  own  brother,  William  H.  Polk, 
to  be  charge  d'affaires  at  Naples. 

Having  pointed  out  that  the  President,  in  an  effort  to  promote 
harmony,  assigned  to  the  several  factions  some  of  the  most  de- 
sirable appointive  positions,  and  tliat  friendship  rather  than  merit 
dictated  the  selection  of  certain  minor  officials,  we  may  now  con- 
sider his  general  policy  in  dealing  with  the  public  patronage. 
The  patronage  incident  to  the  office  of  chief  executive  is  a  source 
of  great  power,  and  for  this  reason  the  popular  belief  seems  to 
be  that  it  is  also  a  source  of  great  pleasure.  The  corollary  is 
doubtful  in  any  case  and  certainly  is  erroneous  when  applied  to 
Polk,  for  his  administration  had  not  proceeded  far  before  he 
came  to  regard  patronage  and  office-seekers  as  a  veritable  night- 
mare. 

Polk  was  a  man  of  very  positive  ideas,  and  one  of  those  ideas 
was  that  public  office  is  an  opportunity  for  public  service.  Al- 
though in  the  finesse  of  practical  politics  he  was  no  more  scrupu- 
lous than  his  fellows,  he  never  regarded  any  position  held  by 
himself  as  a  sinecure  and  he  believed  that  offices  should  not  be 
so  regarded  by  others.  The  keynote  of  his  policy  was  foreshad- 
owed in  the  circular  letter,  already  quoted,  that  was  sent  to 
prospective  members  of  his  cabinet.  He  would  aid  no  aspirant 
for  the  Presidential  nomination  in  1848  and  he  would  not  permit 
his  subordinates  to  use  their  offices  for  such  a  purpose ;  his  and 
their  energies  must  be  devoted  to  the  ''principles  and  policy" 
of  the  existing  administration.  Determined  to  devote  his  whole 
time  to  the  public  service,  he  required  that  cabinet  members  should 
do  likewise ;  intrusting  of  important  business  to  cliief  clerks  was 
not  to  be  tolerated. 


ADMINISTEATION  AND  PATRONAGE  341 

In  theory,  therefore,  the  President  believed  office  to  be  an 
opportunity  for  present  service  and  not  a  reward  for  acts  already 
performed.  And  if  we  except  the  few  instances  already  noted 
where  appointments  were  made  either  for  personal  reasons  or  in 
an  effort  to  promote  harmony  it  may  be  said  that  Polk,  at  the 
beginning  of  his  administration,  sincerely  endeavored  to  carry 
his  theory  into  practice.  The  more  important  appointments  re- 
ceived his  own  personal  attention,  and,  in  order  that  he  might 
conserve  his  time  for  affairs  of  state,  the  selection  of  minor  offi- 
cials was  turned  over  to  his  cabinet.*'  The  Union,  soon  after  its 
establishment,  repelled  in  an  editorial  assertions  made  by  poli- 
ticians that  Polk  would  have  to  dispense  patronage  in  accordance 
Avith  the  wishes  of  the  various  candidates  for  the  Presidency.  On 
the  contrary,  said  the  editor,  the  President,  in  making  his  ap- 
pointments, will  take  no  thought  of  whether  the  person  is  a  Van 
Buren  man,  a  Calhoun  man,  a  Cass  man  or  a  Buchanan  man.  His 
thought  will  be  simply :  "  Is  the  man  honest  and  capable  ? ' '  Two 
months  later  the  following  editorial  appeared : 

Mr.  Polk  has  avowed  and  acted,  and  will  continue  to  act,  upon  the 
settled  determination  not  to  permit  the  course  of  his  administration  to 
interfere  with,  or  influence,  the  selection  of  a  candidate  of  the  democratic 
party  to  succeed  him.  That  important  duty  he  will  leave  to  be  performed 
by  the  people,  unbiased  and  uninfluenced  by  his  official  action.  Can  any 
portion  of  the  democracy  object  to  this  course  ?i6 

45  Commenting  on  this  policy,  NUes'  Register  said:  "The  course  adopted 
bv  President  Polk,  on  taking  hold  of  the  helm  of  state,  in  relation  to 
the  importunities  for  office  which  had  grown  out  of  an  erroneous  course 
admitted  by  some  of  his  immediate  predecessors,  seems  to  have  gn^en 
satisfaction  to  every  body  except  those  who  were  in  full  cry  for  office. 
We  allude  to  his  having  announced  semi-officially  that  personal  attend- 
ance at  the  seat  of  government,  and  personal  importunities  for  office 
would  operate  against  the  applicant;— that  the  papers  designed  to  urge 
claims  for  appointment,  must  be  submitted  in  the  first  place  to  the  presid- 
ing officer  of  the  department  to  which  the  office  belonged,  and  must  be 
by  him  deliberated  upon  and  presented  in  due  form,  together  with  those 
of  all  other  applicants  for  the  same  office,  by  the  chief  of  the  department 
to   the  president,   for   his  deliberate   judgment— with  the   whole   subject 

before  him.  ,  ,       ^     _,.  -nr     i  •      a 

This  announcement  occasioned  a  general  scatterfication.     Washington 
city   immediately   lost    a   large    proportion   of   its   transient   crowd.      It    is 
to  be  hoped  the  position  will  be  adhered  to  in  its  genuine  spirit,  and  with 
due  decision"   {Niles'  Reg.,  LXVIII,  51,  March  29,  1845). 
46  Washington  Union,  May  13,  July  14,  1845. 


3-42  JAMES  K.  POLK 

Despite  the  soundness  of  the  President's  position,  it  was  al- 
ready apparent  that  not  only  ''any  portion"  but  every  portion 
of  the  party  was  displeased.  A  few  days  before  the  appearance 
of  the  latter  editorial  he  had  told  Silas  Wright  that  dispensing 
of  patronage  was  his  greatest  source  of  annoyance.  Concerning 
the  general  policy  of  the  administration,  said  he,  there  seems  to 
be  no  complaint,  but  much  dissatisfaction  about  offices;  "I  sin- 
cerely wish  I  had  no  office  to  bestow."*'  Could  he  have  seen 
contemporary  private  correspondence  his  wish  undoubtedly  would 
have  been  still  more  emphatic.  For  example,  old  line  Democrats 
complained  because  room  had  not  been  made  for  them  by  the 
ousting  of  all  ' '  Federalists, ' '  and  because  Polk  and  Walker  were 
too  busy  to  see  their  fellow-citizens.  One  of  them  in  reporting 
to  Van  Buren  this  sad  state  of  affairs  remarked  that  one  "never 
had  to  call  twice"  to  obtain  an  interview  with  either  Jackson  or 
Van  Buren. *^  Enraged  because  he  had  not  fared  so  well  as  certain 
other  Tennesseans,  Andrew  Johnson  pronounced  Polk's  appoint- 
ments to  be  the  "most  damnahle"  ever  made  by  any  President,*^ 
and  this  fact  he  attributed  to  duplicity  and  the  want  of  moral 
courage.  Nevertheless,  it  required  greater  courage  to  resist  im- 
portunities than  to  gratify  them,  and  dissatisfaction  from  so 
many  sources  is  but  evidence  that  an  attempt  was  being  made  to 
divorce  patronage  from  factional  politics,  even  though  that  at- 
tempt was  destined  to  prove  unsuccessful. 

We  are  not  left  in  doubt  concerning  the  President's  own 
opinions  on  the  subject  of  patronage,  for  in  making  daily  entries 
in  his  diary  he  seldom  neglected  to  express  his  loathing  for  the 


47  Polk  to  Wright,  July  8,  1845,  Polk  Papers. 

■is  John  P.  Sheldon  to  Van  Buren,  Oct.  30,  1845,  Van  Buren  Papers. 

4"  "  Take  Polk's  appointments  all  and  all  and  they  are  the  most 
damnahle  set  that  were  ever  made  by  any  president  since  the  government 
was  organized,  out  of  Tennessee  as  well  as  in  it.  He  has  a  set  of  inter- 
ested parasites  about  him  who  flatter  him  till  he  does  not  know  himself. 
He  seems  to  be  acting  on   the  principle   of  hanging  one   old  friend   for 

the  purpose  of  making  two  new  ones"   (Johnson  to  ?   [someone  in 

Tennessee],  July  22,  1846,  Johnson  Papers). 


ADMINISTRATION  AND  PAT  BON  AGE  343 

office-seeker.  He  had  the  utmost  contempt  for  those  whose 
'' patriotism"  consisted  solely  of  a  willingness  to  draw  a  salary 
from  the  government ;  he  regarded  them  not  merely  as  an  in- 
cubus but  as  a  serious  public  menace.  The  personal  boredom 
caused  by  listening  to  their  tales  became  almost  intolerable,  but 
Polk  was  even  more  exasperated  because  they  prevented  him 
from  devoting  his  time  to  important  governmental  affairs. 

At  the  beginning  of  his  administration  Polk  tried  to  follow 
the  program  announced  in  the  Union  of  making  his  appointments 
on  the  basis  of  honesty  and  merit.  He  attempted  also,  as  we 
have  seen,  to  conserve  his  own  time  by  delegating  to  his  cabinet 
the  lesser  appointments.  But  for  "practical"  reasons  he  was 
constrained  to  modify  this  salutary  program.  In  the  first  place 
his  predecessors  had  made  themselves  accessible  to  the  public  and 
it  was  difficult  for  any  President,  particularly  a  Democratic 
President,  suddenly  to  reverse  the  precedent.  In  the  second 
place  he  had  several  important  measures  which  could  be  carried 
into  effect  only  by  the  cooperation  of  Congress,  and  he  soon  dis- 
covered that  such  cooperation  could  not  be  procured  by  ignoring 
the  claim  of  members  to  their  "share"  of  the  patronage.  Re- 
gardless of  his  own  wishes,  therefore,  he  was  forced  to  give  audi- 
ence to  individual  office-seekers,  and  to  make  many  appointments 
on  the  recommendation  of  members  of  Congress.  In  order  to 
give  a  complete  history  of  his  patronage  tribulations  it  would  be 
necessary  to  reproduce  his  entire  diary ;  some  selected  passages 
may  serve  to  illustrate  the  annoyance  experienced  not  only  by 
Polk  but  by  every  chief  executive. 

Once  the  horde  had  been  admitted  to  his  presence  the  Presi- 
dent, being  a  very  courteous  man,  found  it  difficult  to  get  rid  of 
them.  A  few  months'  experience,  however,  taught  him  that  "the 
only  way  to  treat  them  is  to  be  decided  &  stern. ' '  In  February, 
1846,  Washington  was  infested  with  an  unusually  large  number 
of  persons  ' '  who  are  so  patriotic  as  to  desire  to  serve  their  country 


344  JAMES  K.  POLE 

by  getting  into  fat  offices."^"     On  the  anniversary  of  his  inaug- 
uration he  wrote  in  his  diary : 

I  am  ready  to  exclaim  will  the  pressure  for  office  never  cease!  It  is 
one  year  to-day  since  I  entered  on  the  duties  of  my  office,  and  still  the 
pressure  for  office  has  not  abated.  I  most  sincerely  wish  that  I  had  no 
offices  to  bestow.  If  I  had  not  it  would  add  much  to  the  happiness  and 
comfort  of  my  position.  As  it  is,  I  have  no  offices  to  bestow  without 
turning  out  better  men  than  a  large  majority  of  those  who  seek  their 
places.si 

The  inconvenience  of  possessing  a  courteous  disposition  is  illus- 
trated by  an  entry  made  on  June  4,  1846 : 

When  there  are  no  vacancies  it  is  exceedingly  distressing  to  be  com- 
pelled to  hear  an  office  [seeker]  for  an  hour  tell  his  story  and  set  forth  his 
merits  and  claims.  It  is  a  great  and  useless  consumption  of  my  time,  and 
yet  I  do  not  see  how  I  am  to  avoid  it  without  being  rude  or  insulting, 
which  it  is  not  in  my  nature  to  be.52 

There  were  times,  however,  when  politeness  ceased  to  be  a 
virtue,  especially  after  the  saime  individual  had  called  repeatedly 
"on  the  patriotic  business  of  seeking  office."  After  a  trying 
experience  with  "old  customers,"  he  observed  on  August  17, 
1846: 

I  concluded  that  it  was  useless  to  be  annoyed  by  them  any  longer,  and 
I  was  more  than  usually  stern  and  summary  with  them.  I  said  no!  this 
morning  with  a  free  will  and  a  good  grace.  Tlie  truth  is  that  the  persons 
who  called  to-day,  with  but  few  exceptions,  were  a  set  of  loafers  without 
merit.  They  had  been  frequently  here  before,  and  I  find  as  long  as  1  treat 
them  civilly  I  shall  never  get  clear  of  them.^s 

If,  as  the  Whigs  would  have  it,  Polk  needlessly  precipitated 
the  war  with  Mexico,  he  suffered  ample  punishment  in  the  form 
of  renewed  scramble  for  office.  Congressmen  now  not  only  sought 
places  for  their  constituents,  but  many  of  them  desired  military 
positions  for  themselves.    For  the  sake  of  harmony  the  President 


50  Polk,  Diary,  I,  158   (Jan.  9,  1846)  ;  ibid.,  255. 

r'llhid.,  261. 

'-2  Ibid.,  44(>-447. 

53  Polk,  Diary,  II,  85.     See  also  ibid.,  105-106. 


ADillXISTBATlON  AND  PATRONAGE  345 

was  ready  to  sutt'er  much  inconvenience,  but  when  it  came  to  a 
matter  of  principle  he  was  unyielding.  The  Diary  for  June  22, 
1846,  notes  that 

The  passiou  for  office  among  members  of  Congress  is  very  great,  if 
not  absolutely  disreputable,  and  greatly  embarrasses  the  operations  of  the 
Government.  They  create  offices  by  their  own  votes  and  then  seek  to  fill 
them  themselves.  I  shall  refuse  to  ai)point  them,  though  it  be  at  the 
almost  certain  hazard  of  incurring  their  displeasure.  I  shall  do  so  because 
their  appointment  would  be  most  corrupting  in  its  tendency.  I  am  aware 
that  by  refusing  their  applications  I  may  reduce  my  administration  to  a 
minority  in  both  Houses  of  Congress,  but  if  such  be  the  result  I  shall  have 
the  high  satisfaction  of  having  discharged  my  duty  in  resisting  the  selfish- 
ness of  members  of  Congress,  who  are  willing  to  abandon  their  duty  to 
their  constituents  and  provide  places  for  themselves.  I  will  not  counte- 
nance such  selfishness,  but  will  do  my  duty,  and  rely  on  the  country  for 
an  honest  support  of  my  administration. 

By  December  16,  1846,  the  unscrupulous  methods  resorted  to 
by  members  of  Congress  in  their  efforts  to  procure  offices  for  their 
clients  had  become  so  appalling  that  Polk  began  ' '  to  distrust  the 
disinterestedness  and  honesty  of  all  mankind. ' '  Complaints  and 
disatfection  over  petty  offices  gave  him  more  trouble  than  did 
great  national  policies.  "There  is,"  he  confided  to  his  diary, 
"more  selfishness  and  less  principle  among  members  of  Congress, 
as  well  as  others,  than  I  had  any  conception  [of]  before  I  be- 
came President  of  the  U.  S. '  '^*  Every  day  added  new  evidence 
of  congressional  depravity,  and  he  was  ' '  disgusted  with  the  trick- 
ery and  treachery"  exhibited  in  recommendations  for  office. ^^ 
The  way  in  which  patronage  had  become  a  menace  to  both  polit- 
ical parties  and  to  the  country  is  set  forth  in  the  entry  for  Janu- 
ary 7,  1847 : 

The  passion  for  office  and  the  number  of  unworthy  persons  who  seek 
to  live  on  the  public  is  increasing  beyond  former  example,  and  I  now 
predict  that  no  President  of  the  U.  S.  of  either  party  will  ever  again  be 
re-elected.  The  reason  is  that  the  patronage  of  the  Government  will 
destroy  the  popularity  of  any  President,  however  well  he  may  administer 


^ilbid.,  278-279. 
55  Ibid.,  296. 


3-46  JAMES   K.  POLE 

the  Government.  The  office  seekers  have  become  so  numerous  that  they 
hold  the  balance  of  power  betw^een  the  two  great  parties  of  the  country. 
In  every  appointment  which  the  President  makes  he  disappoints  half  a 
dozen  or  more  applicants  and  their  friends,  who  actuated  by  selfish  and 
sordid  motives,  will  prefer  any  other  candidate  in  the  next  election,  while 
the  person  appointed  attributes  the  appointment  to  his  own  superior  merit 
and  does  not  even  feel  obliged  by  it.  The  number  of  office  seekers  has 
become  so  large  that  they  probabl}'  hold  the  balance  of  power  between 
the  tw^o  great  parties  in  the  country,  and  if  disappointed  in  getting  place 
under  one  administration  they  will  readily  unite  themselves  with  the 
I)arty  and  candidate  of  the  opposite  politics,  so  as  to  increase  their  chances 
for  place.  Another  great  difficulty  in  making  appointments  which  the 
President  encounters  is  that  he  cannot  tell  upon  what  recommendations 
to  rely.  Members  of  Congress  and  men  of  high  station  in  the  country  sign 
])apers  of  recommendation,  either  from  interested  personal  motives  or  with- 
out meaning  what  they  say,  and  thus  the  President  is  often  imposed  on, 
and  induced  to  make  bad  appointments.  When  he  does  so  the  whole 
responsibility  falls  on  himself,  while  those  who  have  signed  papers  of 
recommendation  and  misled  him,  take  special  care  never  to  avow  the 
agency  they  have  had  in  the  matter,  or  to  assume  any  part  of  the  respon- 
sibility. I  have  had  some  remarkable  instances  of  this  during  my  admin- 
istration. One  or  two  of  them  I  think  worthy  to  be  recalled  as  illustrations 
of  many  others.  In  the  recess  of  Congress  shortly  after  the  commencement 
of  my  administration  I  made  an  appointment  upon  the  letter  of  recom- 
mendation of  a  senator.  I  sent  the  nomination  to  the  Senate  at  the  last 
session  &  it  was  rejected,  and,  as  I  learned,  at  the  instance  of  the  same 
Senator  who  had  made  the  recommendation.  A  few  days  afterwards  the 
Senator  called  to  recommend  another  person  for  the  same  office.  I  said  to 
him,  well,  you  rejected  the  man  I  nominated;  O  yes,  he  replied,  he  was 
without  character  &  wholly  unqualified.  I  then  asked  him  if  he  knew  upon 
whose  recommendation  I  had  appointed  him,  to  which  he  replied  that  he 
did  not.  I  then  handed  him  his  own  letter  &  told  him  that  that  was  the 
recommendation  upon  Avhich  I  had  appointed  him.  He  appeared  confused 
and  replied.  Well,  we  are  obliged  to  recommend  our  constituents  when  they 
apply  to  us.  The  Senator  was  Mr.  Atcheson  of  Missouri,  and  the  person 
appointed  &  rejected  Avas  Mr.  Hedges  as  Surveyor  of  the  port  of  St.  Louis.56 

A  week  after  the  above  had  been  written  the  begging  for  office 
had  become  ' '  not  only  disgusting,  but  ahnost  beyond  endurance. ' ' 


5B/bid.,  313-315.  Polk  crossed  out  the  last  sentence,  but  undoubtedly 
Atchison  was  the  Senator  in  question.  Members  of  Congress  frequently 
signed  enthusiastic  recommendations  for  ajqilicants  and  tlien  sent  private 
letters  which  requested  I'olk  to  pay  no  heed  to  the  recommendation.  The 
ai)plicant  of  course  blamed  Polk  when  the  appointment  was  not  made. 
See  ibid.,  278,  note. 


ADMINISTBATION  AND  PAT  HON  AGE  347 

''I  keep  my  temper,"  wrote  the  President,  "or  rather  suppress 
the  indignation  which  I  feel  at  the  sordid  and  selfish  views  of 
the  people  who  continually  annoy  me  about  place."  The  rule 
which  he  had  adopted  under  which  no  member  of  Congress  was 
to  be  appointed  to  office,  except  diplomatic  and  high  militarj^ 
positions,  had  already  caused  twenty  disappointed  applicants  to 
oppose  the  measures  of  the  administration ;  nevertheless  he  was 
determined  to  persist  in  applying  the  rule,  regardless  of  conse- 
quences. "If  God  grants  me  length  of  days  and  health,"  he 
wrote  in  desperation,  "I  will,  after  the  expiration  of  my  term, 
give  a  history  of  the  selfish  and  corrupt  considerations  which 
influence  the  course  of  public  men,  as  a  legacy  to  posterity.  I 
shall  never  be  profited  by  it,  but  those  who  come  after  me  may 
be.  "^'  ]More  than  a  year  later  he  again  expressed  his  determi- 
nation to  write  an  expose  of  office-seeking,"^  and  it  is  very  prob- 
able that  he  would  have  done  so  had  his  death  not  occurred  a  few 
months  after  his  retirement.  It  would  have  been  an  interesting 
volume,  for  he  possessed  both  the  data  and  the  disposition  to  do 
the  subject  full  justice. 

The  phrenologist  who  examined  Polk  in  1839  stated,  among 
other  things,  that  "when  he  suffers,  he  suffers  most  intently." 
No  one  who  has  followed  the  President's  almost  daily  denunci- 
ations of  place-hunters  will  be  inclined  to  deny  the  truth  of  this 
statement.  ' '  I  was  doomed  this  morning, ' '  is  the  diary  entry  for 
February  18,  1847,  "to  pass  through  another  pressure  of  impor- 
tunate office  seekers.  I  am  ready  to  exclaim  God  deliver  me  from 
dispensing  the  patronage  of  the  Government."^''  His  suffering 
was  made  the  more  intense  by  his  efforts  to  conceal  it.    His  habit 


57  Polk,  Diary,  II,  328-330. 

5s  Polk,  Diary,  III,  419.  "  If  a  kind  Providence  permits  me  length  of 
days  and  health,  I  will,  after  I  retire  from  the  Presidential  office,  write 
the  secret  and  hitherto  unknown  history  of  the  Government  in  this 
respect.  It  requires  great  patience  &  self  command  to  repress  the  loath- 
ing I  feel  towards  a  hungry  crowd  of  unworthy  office-hunters  who  often 
crowd  my  office." 

59  Polk,  Diary,  II,  382. 


348  JAMES  K.  POLK 

of  reticence  and  a  desire  to  preserve  his  dignity  led  him,  for  the 
most  part,  to  endure  the  agony  in  silence ;  to  his  diary  alone  did 
he  communicate  his  real  opinions.  "It  is  enough,"  he  wrote  on 
one  occasion,  "to  exhaust  the  patience  and  destroy  the  good 
temper  of  any  man  on  earth,  to  bear  the  daily  boring  which  I  have 
to  endure.  I  keep,  however,  in  a  good  humor  as  far  as  it  is  pos- 
sible to  do  so."^"  It  was  this  same  passive  exterior  which  led 
many  to  believe  that  he  did  not  have  positive  opinions  on  other 
subjects. 

The  severest  of  weather  was  no  deterrent  to  the  procession  of 
the  office-seeking  "patriots,"  for  "neither  ice  nor  fire"  could 
stop  them.  Polk  "pushed  them  off  and  fought  them  with  both 
hands  like  a  man  fighting  fire,"  but  "it  has  all  been  in  vain. ""^ 
He  felt  the  need  of  "one  of  Colt's  revolving  pistols"  to  enable 
him  to  clear  the  office  so  that  he  might  attend  to  his  public  duties.*'- 
Most  disgusting  of  all  were  those  who,  on  hearing  a  report  of  an 
officer's  illness,  rushed  to  the  President  with  an  application  for 
the  sick  man's  position,  "if  he  should  die."  Nearly  all  of  them 
were  ' '  mere  loafers  who  are  too  lazy  to  work  and  wish  to  be  sup- 
ported by  the  public ' ' — in  a  word,  ' '  the  most  contemptible  race 
on  earth.  "®^  So  far  as  members  of  Congress  were  concerned. 
Senator  Breeze,  of  Illinois,  enjoyed  the  distinction  of  being  the 
cliampion  pest.  "He  has,"  said  the  President,  "no  sooner  pro- 
cured an  appointment  than  he  sets  to  work  to  procure  another, ' ' 
and  his  recommendations  were  governed  by  his  political  interests 
and  not  by  the  public  good."* 

Although  Polk  fully  realized  at  the  time  of  his  inauguration 
that  he  was  entering  upon  four  years  of  incessant  toil,  he  un- 
doubtedly, like  all  who  have  not  held  the  office,  believed  the  Presi- 
dency to  be  a  position  of  dignity  as  well  as  power.  The  political 
intrigues  and  factional  jealousies  with  which  he  Avas  beset  soon 


00  Polk,  Dianj,  III,  2o0.  63  Polk,  Dianj,  III,  331,  IV,  79. 

oi  Polk,  Diary,  II,  3C0-361,  383.  64  Polk,  Diary,  II,  426. 

62  Polk,  Diary,  IV,  246. 


ADMIN  1ST  EAT  ION  AND  FAT  EON  AGE  349 

divested  the  office  of  much  of  its  glamour ;  the  political  necessity 
of  enduring  the  importunities  of  the  office-seeking  horde  made  it 
even  contemptible.    On  this  subject  we  may  quote  his  own  words : 

The  office  of  President  is  generally  esteemed  a  very  high  dignified  posi- 
tion, but  really  I  think  the  public  would  not  so  regard  it  if  they  could  look  in 
occasionally  and  observe  the  kind  of  people  by  whom  I  am  often  annoyed. 
I  cannot  seclude  mj-self  but  must  be  accessible  to  my  fellow-citizens,  and 
this  gives  an  opportunity  to  all  classes  and  descriptions  of  people  to  obtrude' 
themselves  upon  me  about  matters  in  which  the  public  has  not  the  slightest 
interest.  There  is  no  class  of  our  population  by  Avhom  I  am  annoyed  so 
much,  or  for  whom  I  entertain  a  more  sovereign  contempt,  than  for  the  pro- 
fessional office-seekers  who  have  besieged  me  ever  since  I  have  been  in  the 
Presidential  office.ss 

Scarcely  less  obnoxious  than  the  office-seeker  was  the  casual 
visitor  who  had  no  business  to  transact  but  who  nevertheless 
wasted  the  President's  valuable  time.  Even  though  he  begrudged 
the  time  spent  in  pointless  conversation  he  realized  that  a  refusal 
to  meet  callers  would  cause  adverse  criticism  and  weaken  his 
administration.  ' '  I  feel, ' '  said  he,  ' '  that  I  am  compelled  to  yield 
to  it,  and  to  deprive  myself  of  the  ordinary  rest,  in  order  to  attend 
to  the  indispensable  duties  which  devolve  upon  me. '  '®*' 

Ceremonious  notifications  of  royal  births  and  deaths  added 
their  share  of  irritation  to  the  busy  and  democratic  President. 
"I  confess,"  he  noted  on  one  occasion,  ''the  practice  of  announc- 
ing officially  the  birth  of  Foreign  Princes  to  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  has  always  appeared  to  me  to  be  supremely  ridicu- 
lous."*'"   When  his  attention  was  called  by  Buchanan  to  a  grave 


65  Polk,  Piary,  IV,  160-161   (Oct.  19,  1848). 

66  Polk,  Diary,  II,  280-281. 

<"■  Polk,  Diary,  I.  237.  When  not  too  much  absorbed  in  affairs  of  state, 
he  sometimes  saw  the  funny  side  as  well.  E.g.  "These  ceremonies  seem 
to  be  regarded  as  of  Great  importance  by  the  Ministers  of  the  Foreign 
Monarchies,  though  to  me  they  are  amusing  &  ridiculous"  (ibid.,  II,  215— 
216).  The  solemn  notification  of  the  death  in  the  royal  family  of  Eussia 
struck  him  as  being  so  ridiculous  that  he  could  "scarcely  preserve  his 
gravity."  "I  simply  remarked  [to  the  Russian  minister]  that  such 
occurrences  would  take  place,  and  at  once  entered  into  familiar  con- 
versation"  (ibid.,  374). 


350  JAMES   K.  POLE 

communication  from  the  French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  re- 
lating to  a  dispute  between  American  and  French  consuls  over 
their  claims  to  precedence,  Polk  related  with  approval  a  story 
of  Jefferson's  "pell  mell"  etiquette,  and  told  Buchanan  that  '"I 
was  not  a  man  of  ceremonies,  that  he  and  Mr.  Guizot  might  settle 
the  dispute  between  the  consuls  in  any  way  they  pleased."'"* 

Although  Polk  was  not,  as  is  generally  believed,  devoid  of  all 
sense  of  humor,  the  austerity  of  his  bearing  when  President  of  the 
United  States  very  naturally  gave  rise  to  this  belief.  His  habitual 
gravity  was  caused  in  part  by  ill  health,  but  still  more  by  the 
weight  of  responsibilities.  Official  cares  so  filled  his  mind  that 
no  room  was  left  for  amusement.  This  fact  is  well  illustrated 
by  an  incident  which  he  has  noted  in  his  diary.  One  day  a 
magician  gave  an  exhibition  before  a  select  company  at  the  execu- 
tive mansion  and  the  President  was  persuaded  by  Bancroft  and 
Mrs.  Catron  to  attend.  The  rest  of  the  company  derived  much 
enjoyment  from  the  entertainment,  but  Polk  felt  that  his  time 
had  been  unprofitably  spent.  "I  was  thinking,"  he  wrote, 
"more  about  the  Oregon  &  other  public  questions  which  bear  on 
my  mind  that  [than]  the  tricks  of  the  juggler,  and  perhaps  on 
that  account  the  majority  of  the  company  might  think  my  opin- 
ions entitled  to  but  little  weight."  He  could  not,  like  Lincoln, 
find  relaxation  in  a  homely  anecdote  or  in  a  chapter  from  some 
humorous  writer.  Official  cares  were  constantly  on  his  mind  and 
he  had  no  time  for  amusements. 

The  cares  of  office  added  much  to  the  gravity  of  the  Presi- 
dent's naturally  serious  disposition.  Indeed,  he  had  become,  as 
Claiborne  has  said,  "grave  almost  to  sadness."'"'  While  he  will- 
ingly spent  his  energies  in  the  public  service,  he  longed  for  the 
day  to  arrive  when  he  might  relinquish  the  helm  of  state ;  it 
needed  no  one-term  pledge  to  prevent  him  fi'om  standing  for 
reelection.    "I  have  now,"  he  wrote  on  his  fifty-second  birthday, 

<••«  Polk,  Diari),  II,  175. 

09  Claiborne,  Life  and  Correspondence  of  John  A.  Quitman,  I,  228. 


ADMIXISTEATION  AND  PATRONAGE  351 

"passed  through  two-thirds  of  my  Presidential  term,  &  most 
heartily  wish  the  remaining  third  was  over,  for  I  am  sincerely 
desirous  to  have  the  enjoyment  of  retirement  in  private  life.'"" 
Polk's  success  as  an  executive  and  as  a  constructive  statesman 
will,  we  believe,  be  made  manifest  in  the  chapters  which  follow. 
The  topics  to  be  considered  cover  the  fields  of  war,  diplomacy, 
finance,  industrial  development,  and  constitutional  law.  In  all 
of  these  fields,  the  President  formulated  his  own  policies  and,  in 
the  main,  succeeded  in  putting  them  in  operation.  Soon  after 
his  inauguration  he  announced  to  George  Bancroft  that  the  "four 
great  measures"  of  his  administration  would  be:  reduction  of 
the  tariff,  establishment  of  an  independent  treasury,  settlement 
of  the  Oregon  question,  and  the  acquisition  of  California.'^  He 
carried  out  this  program  in  spite  of  vigorous  opposition.  And 
if  we  except  the  coercion  of  Mexico,  upon  which  there  is  still  a 
difference  of  opinion,  it  is  the  verdict  of  history  that  his  policies 
were  both  praiseworthy  and  sound. 


70  Polk,  Diary,  III,  210. 

Ti  Schouler,  History  of  the  United  States,  IV,  498. 


CHAPTEE  XVI 

COMPLETION  OF  ANNEXATION 

As  we  have  noted  in  a  preceding  chapter,  the  joint  resolution 
adopted  by  Congress  on  February  28, 1845,  authorized  the  annex- 
ation of  Texas  by  either  of  two  methods.  Under  the  first — ^the 
House  resolution — Congress  consented  to  admit  Texas  as  a  state 
as  soon  as  the  government  and  people  of  that  republic  had  agreed 
to  annexation  and  had  conformed  to  certain  requirements 
specified  in  the  resolution.  The  second  method — the  so-called 
Benton  plan — provided : 

That  if  the  President  of  the  United  States  shall  in  his  judgment  and 
discretion  deem  it  most  advisable,  instead  of  proceeding  to  submit  the  fore- 
going resolution  to  the  Eepublic  of  Texas,  as  an  overture  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States  for  admission,  to  negotiate  Avith  that  Eepublic. 

Three  days  before  Polk's  inauguration  Tyler,  as  Ave  have 
seen,  approved  the  joint  resolution  and  selected  the  first  method 
— the  one  specified  in  the  House  resolution.  On  March  3  Presi- 
dent Tyler  dispatched  a  messenger  with  instructions  to  Donelson, 
the  American  charge  d'  affaires,  who  was  residing  temporarily 
in  New  Orleans. 

The  action  taken  by  Tyler  did  not,  of  course,  effect  the  annex- 
ation of  the  lone-star  republic.  There  was  a  possibility,^  at 
least,  that  the  new  President  might  recall  tlie  messenger  and 
select  the  Benton  alternative  of  negotiating  with  Texas.  Besides, 
annexation  in  any  case  was  contingent  on  the  acceptance  of  the 
proposed  terms  by  the  government  and  people  of  the  Texan 
republic. 


1  See  p.  318  and  note  96. 


COMPLETION   OF  ANNEXATION  353 

When  Calhoun  called  ui)on  Polk  to  inform  him  that  Tyler 
had  decided  to  select  the  House  resolution,  the  President-elect 
declined,  as  we  have  seen,  to  express  an  opinion.  And,  if  we 
except  the  seemingly  incredible  statements  made  by  Tappan  and 
Blair,  he  did  not  reveal  his  opinions  concerning  the  method  of 
annexation  up  to  the  time  of  his  inauguration.  He  says  in  his 
diary-  that  his  mind  was  not  fully  made  up  as  to  the  choice 
of  method  until  he  met  his  cabinet  on  March  10,  1845 ;  he  then 
decided  to  select  the  House  resolution,  or  in  other  words,  to 
acquiesce  in  the  choice  made  by  Tyler.  Additional  evidence 
that  he  arrived  at  no  decision  until  he  had  consulted  the  cabinet 
is  contained  in  a  private  letter  written  to  Donelson  on  the  seventh 
of  March.    He  said : 

A  despatch  was  transmitted  to  you  by  the  late  administration  on  the  3rd 
Ins.  In  two  or  three  days  another  will  be  forwarded  to  you  on  the  same 
subject  by  a  special  messenger.  But  five  members  of  my  Cabinet  have  been 
confirmed  by  the  Senate;  the  remaining  members  I  hope  will  be  confirmed 
at  the  next  meeting  of  the  Senate.  I  write  now  to  say  that  I  desire  you,  not 
to  take  any  definite  action  in  pursuance  of  the  instructions  given  in  the 
despatch  of  the  3rd  Inst,  until  after  you  receive  the  one  which  will  be  for- 
warded in  two  or  three  days,  and  by  which  the  instructions  will  probably 
be  modified.  I  write  you  this  informal  note  for  the  reason  that  Mr.  Buchanan 
the  Secretary  of  State  has  not  entered  the  duties  of  his  office,  and  because 
I  desire  to  have  the  Cabinet  complete  before  definite  action  is  had  on  my 
part.3 

Just  what  the  President  meant  by  saying  that  Tyler's  instruc- 
tions would  probably  be  modified  we  can  only  conjecture.  Pos- 
sibly he  may  have  been  contemplating  a  reversal  of  Tyler's 
action,  although  his  statement  does  not  seem  to  warrant  such  an 
inference.  More  likely  he  was  thinking  of  the  reasoning  con- 
tained in  the  instructions  sent  by  his  predecessor,  for  this,  as 
we  shall  see,  was  criticized  in  the  official  dispatch  which  soon 
followed. 


2  Polk,  Dmry,  IV,  44. 

3  Polk  to  Donelson,  March  7,  1845,  "Polk-Donelson  Letters."  The 
endorsement  on  the  letter  r^ads:  "The  President  March  7.  Reed,  from 
Mr.  Pickett  on  the  19th  at  New  Orleans." 


354  JAMES   E.  POLE 

As  soon  as  the  decision  to  proceed  under  the  House  resolution 
had  been  reached  Buchanan,  by  the  President's  order,  delivered 
to  Almonte,  the  Mexican  minister,  an  answer  to  the  protest 
against  annexation  which  that  otificial  had  addressed  to  Calhoun. 
In  his  letter  Almonte  characterized  annexation  as  "an  act  of 
aggression  the  most  unjust  which  can  be  found  recorded  in  the 
annals  of  modern  history — namely,  that  of  despoiling  a  friendly 
nation  like  Mexico,  of  a  considerable  portion  of  her  territory." 
After  asserting  that  Mexico  would  exert  all  of  her  power  in 
recovering  her  province  of  Texas,  he  concluded  by  demanding 
his  passports.  In  reply  Buchanan  informed  Almonte  that  while 
President  Polk  desired  to  continue  friendly  relations  with  Mexico, 
annexation  was  "irrevocably  decided"  so  far  as  the  United 
States  was  concerned,  and  that  it  was  too  late  to  raise  the 
question  of  Texan  independence.* 

On  the  same  day,  March  10,  Polk  sent  out  another  messenger, 
Governor  Archibald  Yell,  with  new  instructions  for  Donelson. 
The  instructions  from  both  Presidents  reached  the  charge  d' 
affaires  at  New  Orleans  on  March  24,  and  he  set  out  immediately 
for  Texas.^ 

In  the  new  instructions,  Buchanan  informed  Donelson  that 
Polk  did  not  concur  with  Tyler  in  the  belief  that  procedure  under 
the  Benton  alternative  would  necessitate  the  conclusion  of  a 
treaty  which  must  be  ratified  by  the  Senate,  "yet  he  is  sensible 
that  many  of  the  sincere  friends  of  Texas  may  entertain  this 
opinion."  Should  this  prove  to  be  the  case,  dissension  and  delay 
must  be  the  inevitable  result.  From  all  points  of  view,  said 
Buchanan,  the  House  resolution  \vas  to  be  preferred,  therefore 
he  urged  Texas  to  accept  it  without  modification  and  to  trust  to 
sister  states  for  desired  adjustments.  He  desired  especially  that 
the  public  lands  of  Texas  should  be  transferred  to  the  United 


4  Almonte  to  Calhoun,  March  6;  Buchanan  to  Almonte,  March  10,  1845 
(Buchanan,  Works,  VI,  118-120). 

5  Doiielson  to  Buchanan,  March  24,  1845  (Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  1,  29  Cong.,  1 
sess.,  45,  46). 


COMPLETION  OF  ANNEXATION  355 

States  SO  that  the  federal  government  might  extend  its  laws 
over  the  Indian  tribes.*' 

Donelson  reached  Galveston  on  March  27  only  to  find  that  a 
British  vessel  had  arrived  there  a  short  time  before  and  that  the 
British  and  French  ministers  had  gone  to  Washington,  Texas, 
to  confer  with  the  government  of  that  republic.     As  it  was 
rumored  that  these  diplomats  carried  with  them  the  promise  of 
Mexico's  recognition  of  Texan  independence  and  an  offer  from 
England  of  a  favorable  commercial  treaty,  Donelson  ''put  off 
in  a  hurry  after  them."     When  reporting  this  information  to 
Polk,  Yell  said  that  should  General  Houston  espouse  the  cause 
of  annexation,  President  Jones  would  also  support  it.    Yell  had 
conversed  with  many  Texan  leaders,  including  Memucan  Hunt. 
They  talked,  he  said,  of  getting  the  people  to  demand  that  con- 
gress should  be  called  for  the  purpose  of  considering  annexation." 
Not  all  of  the  leaders,  however,  were  pleased  with  the  terms  of 
annexation  offered  by  the  United  States.    Donelson  did  not  be- 
lieve that  the  people  would  acquiesce  in  annexation  unless  the 
proposition  were  presented  to  them  by  their  own  government, 
and  he  thought  that  President  Jones  was  not  in  favor  of  the 
measure.     He  was  not  encouraged  by  the  apparent  attitude  at 
the  capital  when  he  first  reached  there,  but  within  a  month  he 
was  able  to  report  that  he  considered  the  question  as  settled,  so 
far  as  Texas  was  concerned.* 

The  people  proved  to  be  in  favor  of  annexation,  and  the 
leaders  could  not  ignore  their  wishes;^  nevertheless,  the  Texan 
government  could  not  afford  to  disregard  the  wishes  of  General 
Houston,  and  he,  at  first,  assumed  a  hostile  attitude.  On  his 
arrival,  Donelson  found  the  Texan  government  disposed  to  offer 
objections  to  the  American  terms  of  annexation,  and  he  had 

6  Buchanan  to  Donelson,  March  10,  1845,  ihid.,  35-38. 

7  Yell  to  Polk,  Galveston,  March  26,  1845,  Polk  Papers. 

8  Donelson  to  Buchanan,  April  1,  3,  May  6,  1845  (Sen.  Doc.  1,  29  Cong., 
1  sess.,  47,  51,  56). 

9  Smith,  Annexation  of  Texas,  434-435. 


356  JAMES  K.  POLK 

reason  to  believe  that,  in  no  small  degree,  this  attitnde  was  due 
to  the  hostility  of  Houston.  The  ex-President  was  sojourning  at 
some  distance  from  the  seat  of  government.  Donelson  paid  him 
a  visit  in  the  hope  that  he  might  overcome  his  objections  to 
immediate  annexation. 

In  a  letter  to  Donelson,  Houston  had  said  that  in  the  House 
resolution  "the  terms  are  dictated  and  conditions  absolute." 
Believing  that  Texas  should  have  something  to  say  about  the 
terms  of  union,  he  therefore  preferred  the  Benton  alternative 
of  negotiation.  The  proposed  method,  in  his  opinion,  left  too 
many  things  uncertain.  He  opposed,  especially,  the  cession  of 
Texan  property  to  the  United  States  and  the  ambiguous  char- 
acter of  the  northwestern  boundary.^"  Donelson  reminded 
Houston  that  the  specifications  in  the  House  resolution  regarding 
property,  debts,  and  public  lands,  were  substantially  those  which 
had  been  suggested  by  Houston  himself  only  a  few  months  before, 
still  the  ex-President  gave  no  intimation  that  he  would  withdraw 
his  opposition.^^ 

However  sincere  Houston's  objections  may  have  been,  forces 
Avere  at  work  which  were  likely  to  modify  them.  Donelson  had 
brought  to  Houston  a  letter  from  General  Jackson  which  praised 
the  work  he  had  already  done  and  assumed  that  he  would  aid  in 
its  completion.^-  The  immediate  effect  of  this  letter  was  not 
apparent,  but  Houston,  like  Benton,  always  Mashed  to  stand  w^ell 
with  "the  chief."  In  addition,  he  could  never  quite  overcome 
a  lingering  desire  to  be  once  more  under  the  folds  of  "old  Glory." 
Then,  too,  the  Washington  Globe  and  other  newspapers  intimated 
that  he  might  be  chosen  President  of  the  United  States  in  the 


10  Houston  to  Donelson,  April  9,  1845  {Tex.  State  Hist.  Assn.  Quar., 
Oct.,  1897,  79  ff).  Donelson  to  Buchanan,  April  12,  1845  {Sen.  Doc.  I, 
29  Cong.,  1  sess.,  52). 

11  Donelson  to  Calhoun,  April  24,  1845  {Hep.  Am.  Hist.  Assn.,  1899, 
II,  1029).  Houston's  memorandum  of  suggestions  is  given  in  Jones, 
Eepublic  of  Texas,  414^415. 

12  Jackson  to  Houston,  March  12,  1845  (Yoakum,  History  of  Texas, 
II,  441).  See  also,  Duff  Green  to  Calhoun,  Dec.  8,  1844  {Eep.  Am.  Hist. 
Assn.,  1899,  II,  1007). 


COMPLETION  OF  ANNEXATION  357 

event  of  annexation/^  For  the  present,  however,  Houston  was 
obdurate,  and  Donelson  returned  to  the  seat  of  government  to 
continue  the  struggle  with  President  Jones  and  his  cabinet. 

Although  Jones  was  noncommittal  and  spoke  of  offers  from 
T^Iexico,  already  there  were  indications  that  popular  pressure 
would  be  brought  to  bear  upon  the  government.^*  Some,  it  is 
said,  even  threatened  to  lynch  Jones  if  he  should  attempt  to 
prevent  annexation. ^^ 

On  the  first  of  April  Donelson  transmitted  the  proposals  of 
his  government  to  Allen,  the  Texan  Secretary  of  State,  and  with 
them  a  letter  explaining  why  the  House  resolution  had  been 
selected.     President  Jones  complained  about  the  terms  offered 
in  the  resolution,  but  on  April  15  he  issued  a  proclamation  sum- 
moning the  Texan  congress  to  convene  on  the  sixteenth  of  June.^*' 
As  public  opinion  in  favor  of  annexation  rose  to  a  high  pitch, 
Houston's  attitude  experienced  a  noticeable  change,  and  early  in 
May  he  set  out  for  the  Hermitage  to  visit  General  Jackson.    After 
conversing  with  him  at  Galveston,  Yell  reported  to  Polk  that  the 
ex-President  was  now  friendly  and  not  the  least  opposed  to  annex- 
ation-that  ''he  is  now  safe."     He  is,  said  Yell,  the  "Power 
behind  the  Throne,  greater  than  the  Throne  itself."     Donelson, 
in  Yell's  opinion,  deserved  much  credit  for  the  "heroic  work" 
he  had  been  doing ;  his  relationship  to  the  ' '  old  hero ' '  had  greatly 
assisted  him  in  dealing  with  the  Texans.^^    Whatever  the  reason 
may  have  been,  Houston's  conversion  to  annexation  seems  to  have 
been  complete,  and  late  in  May  Jackson  wrote  with  enthusiasm 
that  "Texas  comes  into  the  union  with  a  united  voice,  and  Genl 

13  Smith,  Annexatioti  of  Texas,  439. 

14  Letters  to  Jones  from  Underwood,  Norton,  Lubbock,  Ashbel  Smith 
et  al  (Jones,  EepuMic  of  Texas,  442,  444,  44(>-449).  Jones's  endorsements 
on  these  letters  claim  that  instead  of  being  opposed  to  annexation,  he 
was  ' '  its  chief  author.' '      This  may  be  doubted. 

15  Smith,  op.  oit.,  441. 

10  Donelson  to  Allen,  March  31;     same  to  Buchanan,  April  1_2;  Procla- 
mation of  April  15,  1845  {Sen.  Doc.  1,  29  Cong.,  1  sess.,  48,  52,  o4). 
IT  Yell  to  Polk,  May  5,  1845,  Polk  Papers. 


358  JAMES  K.  POLK 

Houston,  as  I  know,  puts  liis  shoulders  to  the  wheels  to  roll  it  in 
speedily.  I  knew  British  gold  could  not  buy  Sam  Houston  all 
safe  &  Donelson  will  have  the  honor  of  this  important  Deed."^^ 

Houston's  conversion  did  not  settle  the  matter.  Another 
difficulty  now  presented  itself.  The  House  resolution  required 
that  a  convention  should  be  assembled  in  Texas  for  the  purpose 
of  framing  a  new  state  government,  but  the  Texan  constitution 
had,  of  course,  made  no  provision  for  such  proceeding.  Presi- 
dent Jones  could  block  annexation  by  declining  to  exercise  extra- 
legal authority,  and  for  a  time  it  was  feared  that  he  might  do 
so.  On  May  5,  however,  Jones  issued  another  proclamation. 
Admitting  his  want  of  authority,  he  nevertheless  recommended 
that  delegates  be  chosen  to  meet  at  Austin  on  July  4  for  the 
purpose  of  considering  the  offer  made  by  the  United  States.^** 

Allen  now  pointed  out  to  Donelson  that  acceptance  of  the 
American  proposal  of  annexation  would  very  likely  result  in  an 
invasion  from  Mexico.  He  therefore  requested  that  an  American 
army  should  be  brought  to  Texas  so  that  it  might  be  ready  to 
repel  such  an  invasion.-*^  Donelson  submitted  Allen's  request 
to  his  government ;  but  Polk  and  Buchanan  had  already  antici- 
pated the  wishes  of  Texas,  and  a  promise  of  protection  had 
been  forwarded  to  Donelson.  Buchanan  was  instructed  by  the 
President  to  say  that  as  soon  as  Texas  shall  have  accepted  the 
American  proposal,  "he  will  then  conceive  it  to  be  both  his 
right  and  his  duty  to  employ  the  army  in  defending  that  State 
against  the  attacks  of  any  foreign  power."     A  force  of  three 


IS  Jackson  to  Polk,  May  26,  1845,  ibid.  Smith  thinks  it  likely  that 
Houston  was  influenced  to  some  extent  by  the  belief  that  the  Uniter] 
States  might  seize  Texas  as  it  had  seized  West  Florida  (Smith,  op.  cit., 
443). 

19  Se7i.  Ex.  Doc.  1,  29  Cong.,  1  sess.,  63-64 

20  President  Jones  maintained  later  that  Donelson,  by  a  "trick,"  had 
induced  Allen  to  make  the  request  for  troops.  This  may  be  a  misrepre- 
sentation, yet  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  Polk  and  Buchanan  made 
an  offer  of  troops  before  they  had  received  Allen 's  request  (Jones, 
Republic  of  Texas,  53,  457-458).  As  to  misrepresentation,  see  Smith, 
Annexation,  445,  not©  21. 


COMPLETION  OF  ANNEXATION  359 

thousand  men,   he  said,   would  immediately  be  placed  on  the 
border,  prepared  to  enter  Texas  and  to  act  without  a  moment's 

delay.-^ 

Shortly  after  this  promise  to  protect  Texas  had  been  sent 
to  Donelson  a  significant  article  appeared  in  the  Washington 
Union.  It  may  not,  of  course,  have  been  inspired  by  the  Presi- 
dent ;  but  the  coupling  of  the  American  claims  against  Mexico 
and  the  desire  for  California  with  the  question  of  annexing  Texas 
accords  so  well  with  Polk's  previously  announced  policy  that 
one  is  tempted  to  assume  that  Ritchie  voiced  faithfully  the  views 
of  the  administration.  Polk  and  his  cabinet,  said  the  article,  are 
fully  capable  of  handling  the  Texas  and  Oregon  questions.  It 
is  uncertain  what  course  Mexico  will  pursue,  but 

Her  true  interest  ^vill  be  found  in  peace.  Let  the  great  measure  of 
annexation  be  aeeomplished,  and  with  it  the  questions  of  boundary  and  of 
claims.  But  if  she  madly  rushes  on  to  the  alternative  of  war,  who  shall 
pretend  to  set  bounds  to  the  consequences? 

We  infinitely  prefer  the  friendly  settlement  of  the  great  question  now 
pending.  It  wiU  secure  the  peace  and  welfare  of  the  Mexican  nation.  It 
can  now  be  done,  and  it  should  now  be  accomplished.  For  Avho  can  arrest 
the  torrent  that  will  pour  onward  to  the  West?  The  road  to  California  will 
open  to  us.  Who  will  stay  the  march  of  our  western  people?  Our  northern 
brethren  also  are  looking  towards  that  inviting  region  with  much  more 
interest  than  those  of  the  South.  They,  too,  will  raise  the  cry  of  "West- 
ward, ho!  "  However  strongly  many  of  them  may  now  oppose  annexation, 
yet  let  California  be  thrown  open  to  their  ambition  and  the  torrent  even  of 
their  population  will  roll  on  westwardly  to  the  Pacific.22 

The  preliminary  treaty  between  Texas  and  Mexico,  which 
had  been  arranged  by  Captain  Charles  Elliot,  the  British  charge, 
was  signed  by  the  executive  officers  of  the  former  country  on  the 
tw^enty-ninth  of  March.  Under  pretext  of  making  a  visit  to  South 
Carolina,  Elliot  had,  in  April,  set  out  for  the  Mexican  capital.'^ 
His  artifice,  for  the  time  being,  was  successful. 

21  Donelson   to    Buchanan,    May   6;    Buchanan    to    Donelson,    May    23 
(Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  1,  29  Cong.,  1  sess.,  40,  56,  69,  ff.). 

22  Union,  June  2,  1845. 

23  < '  I  shall  go  out  in  the  '  Electra, '  ' '  Elliot  wrote  to  President  Jones 
on  April  5,  "but  change  ships  out  of  sight  of  land,  and  go  down  in  the 


360  JAMES  K.  FOLK 

Having  sent  (May  6)  to  Buchanan  the  letter  in  which  he 
stated  that  Texas  desired  military  protection,  Donelson  left  for 
New  Orleans — partly  to  get  news  of  conditions  in  Mexico,  and 
partly  to  keep  track  of  Elliot.  At  New  Orleans  he  heard  it 
rumored  that  a  British  fleet  was  coming  to  aid  Mexico.  He 
notified  Buchanan  immediately  and  urged  that  the  United  States 
should  take  steps  to  protect  Texas.  "Of  course,"  said  he,  "if 
war  should  be  declared  against  us,  Texas  will  be  its  theatre,  and 
the  earlier  we  are  in  possession  of  the  commanding  points  on  the 
Rio  Grande  the  sooner  Ave  shall  be  able  to  bring  it  to  a  close."-* 

While  at  Iberville,  Donelson  read  in  a  New  Orleans  paper  that 
Captain  Elliot  had  induced  Mexico  to  recognize  the  independence 
of  Texas  if  she  would  agree  to  remain  a  separate  nation.  He 
returned  immediately  to  Texas.  Before  starting,  however,  he  dis- 
patched another  letter  to  Secretary  Buchanan  in  which  he 
prophesied  that 

Texas  ■will  be  sure  to  call  the  proposal  recognizing  her  independence  as 
nothing  but  a  ruse  on  the  part  of  the  British  government,  by  which  it  is 
hoped  that  the  people  of  Texas  will  be  led  to  reject  annexation ;  and  the. 
effect  Avill  be,  still  greater  unanimity  in  favor  of  the  United  States,  and 
against  all  interference  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  in  a  question  truly 
American. 

He  believed  that  the  United  States  should  be  prepared  for  "an 
immediate  blow  upon  Mexico"  in  case  that  country  should 
declare  war,  and  that  ' '  Texas  will  be  as  ready  as  we  are  to  defend 
the  'star  spangled  banner,'  and  denounce  British  dictation."-^ 
On  his  arrival  at  Galveston,  Donelson  learned  that  Elliot  was 
about  to  leave  for  Washington,  Texas,  for  the  purpose  of  sub- 
mitting to  the  Texan  government  the  plan  of  recognition  to  which 
Mexico  had  consented.     The  two  men  discussed  the  plan  freely, 


'Eurydice. '  By  this  means  I  shall  be  reported  as  gone  to  'Charleston' 
in  the  'Electra,'  and  so  hope  to  arrive  imobserved"  (Jones,  Bepuhlic  of 
Texas,  443).  The  preliminary  treaty  is  printed  on  pp.  473-475  of  the 
same  volume. 

24  Donelson  to  Buchanan,  May  Tl,  1845  (Sen.  Doc.  1,  29  Cong.,  1  sess.,  56). 

25  Donelson  to  Buclianan,  May  22,  1845  (ibid.,  58-59). 


COMPLETION   OF  ANNEXATION  361 

and  Donelson  was  disgusted  by  the  hypocrisy  displayed  in  tlie 
representation  that  the  overture  for  an  agreement  had  come 
from  Texas.  "Stripped  of  diplomatic  phrase,"  he  wrote,  "this 
recognition  is  nothing  more  nor  less  than  a  contrivance  of  Great 
Britain  to  defeat  the  measure  of  annexation,  or  involve  Mexico 
in  a  war  with  the  United  States."  Since  Mexico  was  reported 
to  be  concentrating  troops  on  the  Kio  Grande  ' '  where  Texas  has, 
as  yet,  established  no  posts, ' '  Texas  would  probably  send  a  force 
to  remove  these  intruders  and  Captain  Stockton  would  be  ready 
to  cooperate  after  the  acceptance  of  annexation.  In  "addition 
to  the  suggestions  before  made  on  this  subject,  I  would  remark 
that  the  route  for  the  infantry  or  artillery  in  our  service  which 
may  be  thought  requisite  on  the  Rio  Grande,  should  be  by  tvater 
and  not  by  land."  Two  days  later  he  wrote  again  to  the  Secretary 
of  State.  He  had  just  received  Buchanan's  letter  of  May  23 
which  promised  protection,  but  it  did  not  cover  the  whole  ground. 
If  Mexico  should  invade  Texas  to  the  Nueces  or  farther  before 
the  convention  has  had  an  opportunity  to  accept  the  American 
proposal,  "are  the  United  States,"  he  asked,  "to  stand  still  and 
see  the  country  thus  invaded,  without  interposing  protection  ? '  '-^ 
In  the  same  mail  with  Donelson 's  dispatches  went  a  letter 
from  Charles  A.  Wickliffe,  Polk's  confidential  agent  in  Texas. 
It  informed  the  President  that  Captain  Elliot  was  boldly  assert- 
ing that  annexation  would  be  followed  immediately  by  a  declara- 
tion of  war  by  Mexico.  Mexico,  said  Elliot,  would  declare  war 
instantly ;  the  United  States  would  blockade  the  Mexican  ports ; 
but  Great  Britain  would  not  submit  to  this,  and,  consequently, 
there  would  be  war  for  twenty  years.  Nevertheless,  said  the 
agent,  Elliot  was  fully  aware  that  a  majority  of  the  Texans  were 
in  favor  of  annexation.  Wickliffe  urged  that  any  attempt  on  the 
part  of  Mexico  to  invade  Texas  while  negotiations  for  annexation 
were  pending  should  be  repelled  with  vigor  by  the  United 
States." 


20  Donelson  to  Buchanan,  June  2,  4,  1845,  ibid.,  64-66. 
27  Wickliffe  to  Polk,  June  4,  1845,  Folic  Papers. 


362  JAMES   E.  POLK 

The  letter  just  received  from  Buchanan  authorized  Donelson 
to  guarantee  protection  after  the  American  proposal  had  been 
accepted,  and  on  June  11,  he  gave  this  qualified  promise  to  the 
Texan  Secretary  of  State.  Elliot's  bluster  thoroughly  aroused 
his  indignation,  and  in  his  letter  to  Allen  he  said  that 

if  Texas  cannot  be  allowed  to  enjoy  the  blessings  of  peace  and  independence, 
as  one  of  the  sovereign  members  of  the  American  Union,  Avithout  asking  per- 
mission of  Mexico  or  of  the  monarchies  of  Europe,  the  fact  is  worth  volumes 
of  argument  in  explaining  the  duty  of  those  who  are  struggling  to  maintain 
a  system  of  government  founded  on  the  will  and  controlled  by  the  authority 
of  the  people.28 

The  tone  of  this  letter  had  a  reassuring  effect  upon  the  Texans 
and  lessened  the  hazard  of  an  exercise  of  independent  judgment. 
The  letters  which  Donelson  and  Wickliffe  had  written  on  the 
second  and  fourth  of  June  procured  prompt  action  on  the  part 
of  their  government.  These  communications  reached  Washing- 
ton on  the  evening  of  June  14,  and  on  the  following  day  Polk 
wrote  an  interesting  and  important  letter  to  Donelson.  The 
threatened  invasion,  said  the  President, 

increases  our  solicitude  concerning  the  final  action  by  the  Congress  and 
Convention  of  Texas  upon  our  proposition  of  annexation.  In  vieAv  of  the 
facts  disclosed  by  you,  not  only  as  regards  the  approach  of  an  invading 
Mexican  army — but  of  the  open  intermeddling  of  the  British  Charge  d' 
affaires  Avith  the  question  of  annexation,  I  have  lost  no  time  in  causing  the 
most  prompt  &  energetic  measures  to  be  adopted  here.  I  am  resolved  to 
defend  and  protect  Texas,  as  far  as  I  possess  the  power  to  do  so. 

This  statement  makes  it  clear  that  Polk  did  not  doubt  the 
genuineness  of  the  British  menace,  and  that  he  was  prepared 
to  meet  it  at  all  hazards.  He  informed  Donelson  that  General 
Besancon,  the  bearer  of  this  letter,  would  be  dispatched  that 
night  with  instructions  and  that  another  messenger  would  be 
sent  at  the  same  time  to  Fort  Jessup,  bearing  orders  for  the 
troops  to  march  at  once  to  the  mouth  of  the  Sabine.     These 


28  Donelson  to  Allen,  June  11,  1845  (Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  1,  29  Cong.,  1  sess., 
71). 


COMPLETION  OF  ANNEXATION 


363 


troops  were  to  act  as  Donelson  might  direct,  under  his  instruc- 
tions from  the  Department  of  State.  The  charge  was  tokl  that  the 
steamer  Spencer  had  been  ordered  to  leave  New  York  to  report 
to  him  at  Galveston,  and  that  an  additional  naval  force  would 
be  sent  immediately  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  Polk  urged  that  the 
Texan  convention  should,  on  the  day  of  meeting,  pass  a  general 
resolution  accepting  the  offer  made  by  the  United  States.  "The 
moment  they  do  this,"  said  the  President, 

I  shall  regard  Texas  as  a  part  of  the  Union;  all  questions  of  Constitutional 
power  to  defend  &  protect  her  by  driving  an  invading  Mexican  Army  out 
of  her  Territory  will  be  at  an  end  and  our  land  and  naval  forces  will  be 
under  orders  to  do  so. 

The  convention  could  then  proceed  with  its  deliberations  in 
safety,  without  fear  of  Mexican  invasion  or  of  "British  intrigue" 
....  "The  assent  of  the  Convention  is  all  we  want."  The 
question  of  employing  the  army  and  navy  of  the  United  States 
to  repel  a  I^Iexican  invasion  during  the  interval  between  the 
acceptance  of  annexation  by  the  Texan  congress  and  the  meeting 
of  the  convention,  Polk  left  to  the  discretion  of  Donelson.  He 
expressed  the  hope  that  there  might  be  no  necessity  for  exercis- 
ing such  discretion,  nevertheless,  should  anything  occur  which 
was  calculated  to  overawe  or  interfere  with  the  peaceful  delibera- 
tions of  the  convention — 

then  in  my  judgment  the  public  necessity  for  our  interposition  will  be  such 
that  we  should  not  stand  quietly  by  &  permit  an  invading  foreign  enemy  to 
occupy  or  devastate  any  portion  of  Texan  Territory.  Of  course  I  would 
maintain  the  Texan  title  to  the  extent  which  she  claims  it  to  be  &  °ot  permit 
an  invading  enemy  to  occupy  a  foot  of  the  soil  East  of  the  Bio  Grande.-^ 

The  troops  stationed  at  Fort  Jessup  could  not,  as  the  letter 
pointed  out,  reach  Texas  in  time  to  afford  immediate  protection 
to  the  convention  which  would  assemble  on  July  4;  nevertheless, 
as  a  definite  statement  of  Polk's  plans  and  purposes,  this  letter 

29  Polk  to  Donelson,  June  15,  1845,  "Polk-Donelson  Letters."     Also, 
a  copy  in  Folk  Fapers. 


364  JAMES  K.  POLK 

is  extremely  interesting.  Writing  to  Donelson  on  the  same  day, 
Buchanan  said  that  Captain  Elliot,  by  obtaining  Mexico's  con- 
sent to  annexation,  had  ''deprived  that  power  of  the  only 
miserable  pretext  which  it  had  for  a  war  against  the  United 
States.  "^0 

The  troops  to  be  sent  from  Fort  Jessup  were  commanded  by 
General  Zachary  Taylor.  By  a  confidential  dispatch  dated  May 
28,  Marcy  had  given  instructions  for  the  general's  guidance, 
should  annexation  be  accepted  by  Texas.  Taylor  sent  a  messenger 
to  consult  with  Donelson  concerning  the  necessity  of  sending 
troops  into  Texas  and  to  investigate  the  resources  for  their  sub- 
sistence. Donelson  reported  to  him  that  all  branches  of  the 
existing  Texan  government  had  assented  to  annexation,  and  that 
the  convention  would  do  so  on  the  fourth  of  July.  If  any  re- 
liance, said  hcj  is  to  be  placed  upon  the  threats  made  by  Mexico 
and  the  advice  which  it  may  be  presumed  will  be  given  to  her 
by  the  British  and  French  governments,  "an  invasion  of  Texas 
may  be  confidently  anticipated" ;  at  all  events,  the  General  would 
be  justified  in  moving  to  the  western  frontier  in  order  to  give  the 
protection  authorized  by  President  Polk.  He  advised  Taylor  to 
transfer  the  troops  from  New  Orleans  directly  to  Corpus  Christi, 
which  is  a  healthy  place  and  convenient  for  supplies,  "and  is 
the  most  western  point  now  occupied  by  Texas."  In  the  same 
letter  Donelson  remarked  that  the  "occupation  of  the  country 
between  the  Nueces  and  Rio  Grande,  you  are  aware,  is  a  disputed 
question.  Texas  holds  Corpus  Christi ;  Mexico,  Santiago,  near 
the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande.  "^^ 

Von  Hoist  has  made  much  of  the  phrases  just  quoted.  Isolat- 
ing them  from  their  context  and  giving  to  them  an  erroneous,  or 
at  least  an  ambiguous,  translation,  he  has  used  them  to  sub- 
stantiate his  assertion  that  Donelson,  in  this  letter  which  was 
forwarded  by  Taylor  to  "Washington,  "emphasized  the  fact  that 


30  Buchanan  to  Donelson,  June  15,  1845   (Buchanan,  Works,  VI,  174). 

31  Taylor  to  Adj.   Gen.,  June  18;    Donelson   to   Taylor,   June   28,  184.'i 
(H.  Ex.  Doc.  60,  30  Cong.,  1  scss.,  800,  805). 


COMPLETION   OF  ANNEXATION 


365 


it  was  an  open  question  to  whom  the  land  between  the  Nueces 
and  the  Rio  Grande  belonged.  "^'^     His  purpose  is  to  show  that 
Polk  provoked  a  war  by  claiming  unjustly  a  strip  of  land  the 
ownership  of  which  even  his  own  subordinates  had  questioned. 
Whatever  may  have  provoked  the  war,  Donelson's  letter  conveys 
no  such  meaning.     As  a  matter  of  fact  his  chief  emphasis  was 
placed  on  the  healthful  conditions  at  the  places  designated  and 
his  desire  to  avoid  taking  "an  offensive  attitude  in  regard  to 
Mexico,   without    further   orders   from   the   government   of   the 
United  States."     Taylor  was  advised  to  limit  his  activities  to 
the  defense  of  Texas  unless  attacked,  in  which  case  he  was  to 
drive  the  Mexicans  beyond  the  Rio  Grande.    Donelson  spoke  of 
occupation,  not  of  oicnership;  but  even  if  he  had  meant  the  latter, 
it  is  clear  enough  that  it  was  not  a  "disputed  question"  so  tar 
as  he  was  concerned.     The  paragraph  which  contained  these 
phrases  was  followed  by  another  which  said  that  "the  threatened 
invasion  of  Texas,  however,  is  founded  upon  the  assumption  that 
Texas  has  no  territory  independent  of  Mexico."     Von  Hoist 
found  it  convenient  to  omit  this  paragraph,  for  it  did  not  har- 
monize with  the  thesis  which  he  had  set  out  to  prove.-    Donel- 
son's views  on  the   subject  had  already  been  expressed  very 
clearly  in  his  letters  of  May  11  and  June  2,  above  quoted,  m 
which  he  advised  an  early  occupation  of  posts  on  the  Rio  Grande. 
In  this  same  connection,  von  Hoist  represents  Taylor  to  have 
spoken  of  San  Antonio  as  being  situated  on  the  western  hoxuidary 
("redete  gar  von  San  Antonio  als  an  der  westlichen  Grenze  ge- 
•legen")  ;  whereas  the  General  simply  spoke  of  the  immediate 
occupation  of  "the  western   frontier    (italics  mine)    of   Texas, 
-"^7;;7i"olst,  Hisionj   of  the   United  States,  German  ed.,  II,   72,  Eng. 

dkl  not  remotely  deserve"   {iMd.,  Bug.  trans.,  Ill,  89). 


366  JAMES   E.  POLE 

from  the  coast  to  San  Antonio,  and  ultimately  further  north.  "^^ 
On  the  same  page  we  are  told  that  the  Texan  Secretary  of  War 
asked  Taylor  to  protect  Austin,  on  the  Colorado  "da  es  an  der 
Grenze  ist,"  which  the  translators  have  made  to  read  "because 
it  is  on  the  boundary. ' '    But  the  Secretary  had  written  that 

The  town  of  Austin  where  tlie  convention  will  assemble,  and  the  most  of  the 
archives  of  our  government  are  now  deposited,  being  on  the  frontier,  and 
exposed  to  Indian  depredations  and  Mexican  invasion,  would  require  pro- 
tection, as  would  also  San  Antonio  de  Bexar  and  Corpus  Christi.35 

In  justice  to  von  Hoist  it  may  be  said  that  Grenze  is  the  Ger- 
man equivalent  of  houndary,  and  that  he  may  have  been  ignorant 
of  the  distinction  drawn  by  Americans  between  the  words 
houndary  and  frontier;  and  yet,  it  seems  incredible  that  he  could 
have  so  misunderstood  the  letters  as  a  whole  as  not  to  have  known 
that  the  American  officials  were  speaking  of  a  general  region, 
and  were  not  attempting  to  fix  a  boundary  line.  That  von  Hoist 
himself  meant  houndary  when  he  used  the  term  Grenze  is  shown 
by  the  context,  and  his  translators  in  converting  his  writings 
into  English  have  invariably  written  houndary  instead  of  fron- 
tier, which  had  been  used  in  the  original  documents.  Wer.e  it 
not  for  the  fact  that  this  writer's  version  of  Polk's  policy  has 
influenced  both  writers  and  teachers  of  history,  it  would  hardly 
be  worth  while  to  dwell  on  his  misuse  of  official  documents. 

Donelson's  belief  that  Captain  Elliot  and  his  government 
were  striving  to  prevent  annexation  was  by  no  means  unfounded. 
Great  Britain  was  not  willing  to  extend  her  interference  to  the 
point  of  risking  a  war  with  the  United  States,  but  she  was  deter-. 
mined  to  apply  every  possible  pressure  that  stopped  short  of 
this  limit  which  she  had  set  for  her  activities.^"     However,  the 

ailbid.,  Ger.  ed.,  II,  72.  Taylor  to  Adj.  Gen.,  Julv  8,  1845  (H.  Ex. 
Dog.  60,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  802). 

35  von  Hoist,  op.  ait.,  Ger.  ed.,  II,  72,  Eng.  trans.,  Ill,  90.  Cook  to 
Taylor,  June  27,  3  845  (H.  Doc.  60,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  804). 

30  E.  D.  Adams,  Britith  Interests  and  Activities  in  Texas,  chap.  ix.  It 
has  been  considered  unnecessary,  in  a  biography  of  Polk,  to  discuss  in 
detail  the  acts  and  the  motives  of  lOnghiinl,  France,  and  Mexico,  except 
in  their  bearing  on  Polk  's  policy.  The  part  played  by  England  is  well 
presented  in  the  volume  by  Professor  Adams  just  cited. 


COMPLETION   OF  ANNEXATION  367 

officious  meddling  of  Captain  Elliot  and  the  Mexican  threats  of 
invasion  caused  anxiety  in  Texas,  and  fear  of  the  latter  led  the 
government  to  solicit  the  protection  of  the  United  States.  By 
instructing  Taylor  to  send  dragoons  to  San  Antonio  and  infantry 
to  Corpus  Christi,  Donnelson  had  inspired  the  people  with  a 
feeling  of  safety,  even  though  Taylor  could  not  reach  these 
points  before  the  meeting  of  the  convention.^^ 

The  preliminary  treaty  which  Elliot  had  arranged  between 
Texas  and  ]\Iexico^^  provided  for  the  suspension  of  hostilities 
until  the  people  of  Texas  had  either  accepted  or  rejected  the 
terms  of  the  agreement.  Accordingly,  on  June  4,  President  Jones 
issued  his  proclamaation  declaring  a  truce.  The  general  effect 
of  this  proclamation  and  of  the  mystery  and  secrecy  employed 
by  Elliot  in  bringing  the  two  governments  together^*'  led  the 
people  still  more  to  distrust  both  men,  and,  consequently,  aided 
the  cause  of  annexation.  Donelson  handled  the  question  most 
skilfully  and  did  much  to  solidify  the  sentiment  in  favor  of 
joining  the  United  States.  On  the  other  hand,  he  very  sensibly 
refrained  from  doing  anything  which  might  antagonize  the  Texan 
officials  who  were  still  trying  to  maintain  a  neutral  position.*" 
Then,  too,  the  apparent  insincerity  of  Mexico  added  strength  to 
the  annexationists.  As  soon  as  President  Jones  had  proclaimed 
a  truce,  Bankhead,  the  British  minister  in  Mexico,  pressed  that 
government  to  issue  a  similar  proclamation.  Instead  of  comply- 
ing, Cuevas,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  made  dire  threats 
of  war  on  Texas.*^  Even  those  in  the  lone-star  republic  who 
were  inclined  to  oppose  annexation  could  no  longer  contend  that 
Mexico  would  peacefully  concede  independence. 


37  Allen  to  Donelson,  June  26;  Donelson  to  Allen,  June  30,  18-45  (Sen. 
Ex.  Boo.  1,  29  Cong.,  1  sess.,  92,  94).     Smith,  Annexation  of  Texas,  451. 

3sFor  a  copy  of  this  document  see  Adams,  op.  cit.,  210-211,  or  Jones, 
Bepuhlic  of  Texas,  473-475. 

39  Elliot  was  later  reproved  by  the  British  Foreign  Secretary  for  the 
secrecy  of  his  proceedings  because  they  "laid  Great  Britain  open  to  the 
charge  of  intriguing  in  Texas"  (Aberdeen  to  Elliot,  July  3,  1845;  cited 
by  Adams,  up.  oit.,  220). 

■iiJ  Smith,  Annexation  of  Texas,  452-454. 

41  Adams,  British  Interests  and  Activities  in  Texas,  221-222. 


368  JAMES   E.  POLK 

On  June  16  the  Texan  congress  assembled,  and  President 
Jones  submitted  the  American  joint  resolution ;  two  days  later 
he  placed  before  this  body  the  terms  of  the  conditional  recogni- 
tion of  independence  which  Elliot  had  negotiated  with  Mexico. 
On  the  congress  now  devolved  the  duty  of  choosing  between  the 
two  proposals ;  but  as  Mexico  was  already  threatening  war,  there 
M-as  little  probability  that  any  arrangement  made  with  that 
country  would  be  selected.  Without  loss  of  time  the  congress 
by  a  unanimous  vote  agreed  to  accept  the  offer  made  by  the 
United  States,  and  by  a  similar  vote  it  rejected  the  proposed 
treaty  with  Mexico.^- 

As  the  time  for  the  meeting  of  the  popular  convention 
approached,  it  appeared  that  there  might  be  greater  difiieulty 
in  winning  the  approval  of  that  body.  In  several  respects  the 
terms  offered  by  the  United  States  were  unacceptable  to  the 
Texans.  The  American  joint  resolution  had  not  specified  a 
definite  boundary,  and  there  were  uncertainties  regarding  public 
lands,  Indian  policy,  and  other  details.  Some  suggested,  also, 
that  before  it  had  entered  the  Union  the  republic  ought  to  be 
divided  into  several  states,  in  order  to  increase  its  political 
importance.*^  On  the  other  hand,  Donelson  had  been  instructed 
by  his  government  to  urge  upon  Texas  the  wisdom  of  accepting 
the  proposed  terms  without  modification,  and  before  the  meeting 
of  the  convention  he  had  spared  no  effort  in  shaping  public 
opinion  to  sanction  such  a  course.  In  this  connection  he  pointed 
out  that  many  of  the  unsatisfactory  matters  could  be  adjusted 
after  annexation,  while  haggling  over  terms  would  result  in 
discord  and  delay. 

42  Donelson  to  Buchanan,  June  23,  1845  (Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  1,  29  Cong.,  1 
sess.,  83). 

43  Smith,  Annexation  of  Texas,  456-457.  General  Houston,  as  we  have 
noted,  had  had  misg-ivings  regardino-  the  boundary  question,  and  altliough 
he  had  left  the  scene  of  action  Polk  deemed  it  worth  while  to  reassure 
him  on  the  subject.  "You  may  have  no  apprehensions,"  wrote  the 
President,  "in  regard  to  your  boundary.  Texas  once  a  part  of  the 
Union  &  we  will  maintain  all  your  rights  of  territory  &  will  not  suffer 
them  to  be  sacrificed"  (Polk  to  Houston  (copy),  June  6,  1845,  Polk 
Papers). 


COMPLETION   OF   ANNEXATION 


369 


An  interesting  account  of  the  part  played  by  Donelson  and 
of  the  attitude  of  the  Texan  officials  is  given  in  a  letter  written 
to  Buchanan  from  Washington,  Texas,  by  John  G.  Tod.     Tod 
had  evidently  just  arrived  in  Texas  from  Washington  (D.  C), 
and  his  letteV  is  in  the  form  of  a  daily  journal  of  events  from 
July  1  to  July  11,  1845."    Donelson,  according  to  Tod,  had  no 
doubt  whatever  that  annexation  would  be  consummated,  and  he 
could  not  understand  why  officials  in  Washington  were  so  excited 
about  the  question.     "  'There  has,'  said  he,  'never  been  any 
difficulty  about  it  at  all.    President  Jones  has  always  been  open 
and  candid  upon  this  subject  and  there  was  no  room  to  appre- 
hend trouble  and  difficulty  if  it  is  not  created  by  the  management 
'  of  the  matter  in  Washington.'  "^^     Under  date  of  July  2,  Tod 
recorded  that  Jones,  Allen,  and  Raymond^''  had  called  on  Donel- 
son.    "The  President  and  the  latter  laughed  and  joked  a  good 
deal  about  the  excitement  on  the  Potomac."    After  this  meeting 
Tod  had  a  long  conversation  with  Jones  and  told  him  that  Polk 
and  his  cabinet  had  become  suspicious  because  Ashbel  Smith, 
on  his  way  to  England,  had  passed  right  by  Washington  without 
calling   on   the   President.      With    a   remark   that   he    was   not 
responsible  for  Smith's  acts,  Jones  proceeded  to  say  that  there 
never  had  been  any  doubt  of  or  opposition  to  annexation.    With 
apparent  contradiction,  however.   Tod  reported  Jones  to  have 
said  that  "Major  Donelson  had  conducted  the  affair  very  ably, 
and  if  it  had  not  been  for  his  prudence  and  good  management, 
the  last  Congress  would  have  involved  the  measure  with  much 
greater  obstacles  and  probably  defeated  it."     After  predicting 
that  there  would  be  no  war  if  the  United  States  would  "only 
keep   quiet   and   cool,"    Jones   said   that   there   were   two   very 

.^BucMnan,  Papers.  Tod  was  a  Texas  ^rmy  captain  and  servecl  as 
bearer  of  dispatches.  Later,  he  was  employed  by  Polk  as  special 
messenger  to Trry  to  President  Jones  a  copy  of  the  joint  i;esolution  of 
CouSeCwMch  admitted  Texas  into  the  Union  (Polk,  Diary,  I,  148). 

45  This  was  written  on  July  1.  Evidently  Donelson 's  opinion  of  Jones 
had  undergone  a  change. 

46  Recently  the  Texan  charge  at  Washington. 


370  JAMES  K.  POLK 

unaccountable  things  connected  with  annexation:  first,  that  the 
United  States  should  feel  any  uneasiness,  when  the  government 
as  well  as  every  man,  woman,  and  child  in  Texas  desired  annex- 
ation ;  and  second,  that  Elliot  should  have  entertained  any  hope 
that  tlie  offer  of  independence  or  anything  else  would  prevent 
Texas  from  joining  the  United  States.  He  had,  he  said,  told 
Elliot  that  he  would  laj'  his  offer  before  the  congress  and  the 
convention,  but  that  he  did  not  doubt  that  Texas  would  be 
annexed.  "  'His  object  in  obtaining  the  offer  which  he  did  from 
Mexico,  was  to  strengthen  the  cause  of  Annexation,  and  place 
us  on  higher  grounds  with  the  world.  It  was  truly  a  great 
advantage  to  our  caiLse,  that  it  disarmed  Mexico  entirely  in  the 
estimation  of  other  Nations,  and  Mexico  was  fully  aware  of 
it.'  ^'"  Jones's  statement  that  no  attempt  had  been  made  to 
deceive  Elliot  accords  with  the  reports  which  the  British  diplo- 
mat made  to  his  own  goverimient.'*^  Houston,  also,  testified  that 
President  Jones  had  not  been  guilty  of  double  dealing  and  denied 
that  European  governments  had  been  intriguing  in  Texas.*^ 
This  denial  does  not,  of  course,  mean  that  the  ministers  of  Eng- 
land and  France  had  not  done  all  in  their  power  to  prevent 
annexation;  but  whether  or  not  their  activities  amounted  to 
intrigue  depends  upon  the  definition  of  the  term.  "At  no  time, 
in  no  manner, ' '  said  Ashbel  Smith  long  afterwards, 

did  the  British  government  attempt  to  exercise  or  even  hint  the  remotest 
wish  to  exercise  any  political  influence  in  the  affairs  of  Texas,  or  to  possess 
any  advantage,  obtain  any  facility,  enjoy  any  privilege  that  was  not  equally 
and  as  fully  accorded  to  every  other  power  in  amity  with  Texas.so 

On  the  day  preceding  that  set  for  the  assembling  of  the 
convention,    some    of   the   delegates,    at    an    informal    meeting. 


47  Under  date  of  July  9,  Tod  said  that  the  people  of  Texas  were  sur- 
prised because  articles  in  American  newspapers — even  the  Washington 
Union — expressed  doubts  that  Texans  sincerely  desired  annexation. 

48  Adams,  British  Interests,  etc.,  216. 

40  J.  Geo.  Harris  to  Polk,  June  12,  1845,  Polk  Papers.  Harris  had  just 
seen  Houston  in  Nashville. 

50  Smith,  Beminiseences  of  lite  Texas  BepubUc,  38. 


COMPLETION   OF  ANNEXATION  371 

drafted  an  ordinance  expressing  assent  to  the  American  joint 
resolution.  Thus  prepared,  the  convention,  which  formally 
organized  on  July  4,  promptly  voted  to  enter  the  Union,  and 
by  another  vote  agreed  to  wear  crape  for  a  month  in  memory 
of  General  Jackson.  On  the  tenth,  Allen,  the  Secretary  of  State, 
notified  Elliot  of  the  action  taken  by  both  the  congress  and  the 
convention.  Wlien  doing  so,  he  pointed  out  that  "these  mani- 
festations hardly  admit  of  a  doubt  that  the  incorporation  of 
Texas  with  the  Federal  Union  is  destined  to  an  early  consum- 
mation."^^ By  the  end  of  August  the  convention  had  finished 
drafting  a  constitution  for  the  new  state,  and  the  second  Monday 
in  October  was  fixed  as  the  day  on  which  this  constitution  as 
well  as  the  question  of  accepting  the  American  offer  of  annex- 
ation should  be  submitted  to  a  vote  of  the  people.  By  Novem- 
ber 10  President  Jones  was  able  to  announce  that  the  people  had 
approved  both  annexation  and  the  state  constitution.=^- 

Since  both  the  government  and  the  people  of  Texas  had 
accepted  the  American  offer,  nothing  remained  to  consummate 
annexation  except  formal  admission  into  the  Union  by  the  Con- 
gress of  the  United  States.  AVhen,  therefore,  Congress  met  in 
December,  1845,  Polk  announced  that  Texas  had  agreed  to  annex- 
ation and  had  submitted  her  new  state  constitution.  Since  this 
had  been  done,  "the  public  faith  of  both  parties  is  solemnly 
pledged  to  the  compact  of  their  union,"  and  "strong  reasons 
exist"  why  the  new  state  should  be  admitted  without  delay.'' 

On  December  10  Douglas  reported  from  the  House  Committee 
on  Territories  a  joint  resolution  which  declared  Texas  to  be  a 

51  Alleu  to  Elliot,  July  10,  1845  {Texa^  DipJomatic  Correspondence,  UI, 
120)  No  further  action  was  taken  by  Great  Britain  or  her  representatives, 
and  Mexico  was  made  clearly  to  understand  that  England  ^^ould  not  support 
her  in  the  event  of  trouble  wdth  the  United  States  (Adams,  op.  oit.,  224-2Jo). 

53  Smith,  Annexation  of  Texas,  459-460.  As  late  as  September,  W.  D. 
Lee  presented  credentials  as  charge  d'  affaires  from  the  government  ot 
Texas  but  Polk  declined  to  recognize  him  in  that  capacity.  Insteiul,  he 
instructed  Buchanan  to  deal  with  Lee  as  the  agent  of  a  state  (Polk,  Diary, 
I,  17-20). 

53  Eichardson,  Messages,  IV,  386. 


372  JAMES  E.  POLK 

member  of  the  Union  on  an  equal  footing  with  the  original  states. 
Although  this  resolution  met  with  vigorous  opposition,  it  was 
adopted  eventually  by  a  majority'  of  nearly  two-thirds.  It  was 
transmitted  to  the  Senate  where  it  encountered  still  further 
opposition,  although  there  was  small  prospect  that  the  dissenters 
would  succeed  in  defeating  it.  Some  of  the  Senators  w^ho  had 
originally  opposed  annexation  now  agreed  with  the  President 
that  the  national  faith  had  been  pledged,  and  the  measure  was 
adopted  by  a  vote  of  thirty-one  to  fourteen.  "Within  a  short  time 
the  laws  of  the  Union  were  extended  over  the  new  state,  and 
the  Republic  of  Texas  ceased  to  exist.  One  important  question, 
hoAvever,  remained  to  be  answered :  What  will  Mexico  do  about  it  ? 


CHAPTER  XVII 

PRELUDE    TO   THE   MEXICAN   WAR 

Under  the  promises  made  by  President  Polk,  Texas,  after  the 
action  taken  by  her  convention  on  Jul}'  4,  was  entitled  to  the 
protection  of  the  American  army  and  navy.  The  query  was 
raised  at  the  time — and  pressed  vigorously  by  the  Whigs  after- 
wards— as  to  what  constituted  Texas  and,  consequently,  what 
the  United  States  was  bound  to  protect.  The  joint  resolution 
of  the  American  Congress  which  Texas  had  just  accepted  had 
specified  no  definite  boundary,  but  had  consented  to  annexation 
"subject  to  the  adjustment  by  this  government  of  all  questions 
of  boundary  that  may  arise  with  other  governments."  By  an 
act  passed  on  December  19,  1836,  however,  the  Texan  congress 
had  declared  the  Rio  Grande  to  be  her  boundary,  although  her 
territory-  as  a  department  of  Mexico  had  extended  only  to  the 
Nueces ;  and  early  in  his  administration  Polk  expressed  his 
determination  to  maintain  the  claim  set  up  by  Texas.  Mexico 
herself  made  such  a  position  easier  by  claiming  all  of  Texas  and 
by  making  no  discrimination,  at  this  time  at  least,  between  the 
land  lying  west  of  the  Nueces  and  the  rest  of  Texas.  As  above 
noted,  however,  Donelson  did  not  believe  that  it  would  be  either 
wise  or  necessary  to  provoke  a  war  with  Mexico  by  at  once 
expelling  the  Mexican  settlers  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Rio 
Grande,  or  by  stationing  the  military  forces  beyond  the  actual 
settlements  made  by  Texas.  But  at  the  same  time  he  made  it 
clear  that  he  did  not  intend  by  such  a  policy  to  abandon  the 
claim  to  the  Rio  Grande  as  the  boundary.  On  July  11,  after  his 
instiiiction  to  protect  Texas  had  been  made  obligatory  by  the 


374  JAMES   K.  POLK 

acceptance  of  annexation  b.y  the  convention,  he  again  reverted 
to  the  wisdom  of  such  a  policy.  He  told  Buchanan  that  in  his 
correspondence  with  Texas  he  had  avoided  any  discussion  of  the 
boundary  between  Texas  and  Mexico,  because  the  joint  resolution 
had  left  the  question  open,  and  the  preliminary  treaty  of  recog- 
nition arranged  by  Elliot  had  left  the  question  in  the  same  state. 
Jones,  in  his  truce  proclamation,  had  in  effect  agreed  to  leave 
matters  as  they  were — with  Texas  in  possession  of  part  of  this 
territor}^  and  Mexico  in  possession  of  another  part.  "What 
the  Executive  of  Texas,"  wrote  Donelson,  "had  determined  not 
to  fight  for,  but  to  settle  by  negotiation,  to  say  the  least  of  it, 
could  as  well  be  left  to  the  United  States  on  the  same  conditions." 
He  added,  however,  that  although  he  had  not  deemed  it  expedient 
to  discuss  the  boundary  question, 

I  have  been  far  from  advocating  that  the  claim  of  Texas  to  the  Eio 
Grande  ought  not  to  be  maintained.  This  was  not  the  question.  It  was 
whether,  under  the  circumstances,  we  should  take  a  position  to  make  war 
for  this  clainj,  in  the  face  of  an  acknowledgment  on  the  part  of  this  gov- 
ernment that  it  could  be  settled  by  negotiation. 

In  other  words,  he  did  not  believe  that  the  promise  to  protect 
Texas  made  it  incumbent  upon  the  United  States  to  expel  im- 
mediately all  Mexicans  from  the  territory'.  What  the  United 
States  would  decide  to  do  on  her  own  account  was  of  course 
another  matter.  Far  from  questioning  the  validity  of  the  claim 
to  the  Rio  Grande  as  the  boundary,  Donelson,  in  the  same  letter, 
suggested  the  grounds  upon  which  this  claim  might  be  based. 
They  were  the  revolutionary  rights  of  Texas,  the  agreement  made 
by  Texas  with  Santa  Anna  in  1836,  rights  under  the  Louisiana 
Purchase,  and  the  capacity  of  Texas  to  maintain  her  claim  by 
force.  The  last,  he  said,  ]\Iexico  herself  luid  admitted  but  a  short 
time  ago  when  she  agreed  to  recognize  the  independence  of 
Texas.^ 


1  Donelson  to  Buchanan,  July  11,  1845   {Sen.  Doc.  1,  29  Cong.,  1  sess., 
101-103.) 


PBELUDE  TO  THE  MEXICAN  WAB  375 

In  his  letters  to  Donelson  and  Houston,  Polk  had  made  it 
clear  that  he  would  insist  upon  the  Rio  Grande  as  the  boundary 
of  Texas     The  method  by  which  he  proposed  to  deal  with  the 
boundary  question  may  be  deduced  from  the  instructions  sent 
to  the  military  and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States.     It  was 
in  effect  the  same  as  that  proposed  by  Donelson.     On  June  15, 
George  Bancroft,  temporarily  in  charge  of  the  War  Department, 
informed  Tavlor  that  the  Texan  convention  would,  m  all  prob- 
ability, accept  annexation  on  July  4,  and  that  Texas  would  then 
be  a  part  of  the  United  States.    Taylor  was  ordered  to  move  his 
troops  to  the  western  frontier  of  Texas,  with  the  Rio  Grande  as 
his  ultimate  destination.     On  July  8,  Taylor  was  informed  by 
Marcy  that  Mexico  had  some  military  posts  on  the  east  side  ot 
the  Rio  Grande,  and  that  these  were  not  to  be  molested  'Hmless 
an  actual  state  of  war  should  exist."    Similar  instmctions  were 
sent  to  Commodore  Conner  on  July  11,  and  in  these  Bancroft 
stated  still  more  explicitly  the  policy  of  the  administration.    As 
soon  as  the  Texan  convention  had  approved  annexation,  Conner 
was  to  protect  Texas  like  any  other  part  of  the  United  States, 
but  it  was  the  President's  desire  to  avoid  aggression  and  blood- 
shed. 

That  you  may  precisely  understand  .vhat  is  meant  by  the  aggression 
you^e  instated  t'o  avoid'  I  will  add,  that  while  the  annexation  of  Texas 
Extends  our  boundary  to  the  Del  Norte,  the  President  reserves  the  vuuhca- 
tion  of  our  boundary,  if  possible,  to  methods  of  peace. 

For  this  reason,  the  Mexicans  already  on  the  east  side  of  the 
river  were  not  to  be  molested  while  peace  continued.  Positions 
were  to  be  selected  with  regard  to  the  health  of  the  officers 
and  men,  and  in  "such  a  manner  as  will  be  most  likely  to  dis- 
incline Mexico  to  acts  of  hostility."  Should  Mexico  declare  VN^r, 
Conner  was  to  dislodge  all  Mexican  troops  stationed  east  of  the 
mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande,  and  ^i/  your  force  is  sioffioient,  [you] 
will  take  the  castle  of  San  Juan  d'Ulla,  it  being  the  determina- 
tion of  the  President  to  preserve  peace,  if  possible;  and,  if  war 


376  JAMES   E.  POLK 

comes,  to  recover  peace  b}'  adopting  the  most  prompt  and  ener- 
getic measures."-  A  few  daj'S  later  the  Washington  Union  said 
that  it  would  be  "difficult  to  estimate"  the  importance  of  Polk's 
energetic  policy  in  deterring  Mexico  from  hostile  movements, 
and  in  giving  confidence  to  the  Texans.^  On  the  other  hand, 
the  National  Intelligencer  asserted  that  Polk  had.  in  order  to 
induce  Texas  to  accept  annexation,  made  promises  which 
exceeded  his  authority  under  the  joint  resolution.* 

A  private  letter  written  by  Polk  late  in  July  to  a  friend  in 
Tennessee  indicates  that  the  demonstrations,  at  this  time,  of 
the  military  and  naval  forces  on  the  Texas  frontier  were  intended 
purely  for  defensive  purposes.  After  speaking  of  the  Texan 
convention  and  of  sending  the  American  forces  to  protect  the 
new  state,  he  said:  "I  do  not  however  anticipate  that  Mexico 
will  be  mad  enough  to  declare  war.  I  think  she  would  have  done 
so  but  for  the  appearance  of  a  strong  naval  force  in  the  Gulf 
and  our  army  moving  in  the  direction  of  her  frontier  on  land.  "^ 
The  fact  that  Polk  saw  such  beneficial  results  from  sending  the 
troops  toward  the  Mexican  border  doubtless  explains  why  Marcy, 
two  days  later,  wrote  to  Taylor  that  the  President  wished  him 
to  station  a  part  of  his  army,  at  least,  west  of  the  Nueces."    His 


2  Bancroft  to  Conner,  July  11,  1845  (H.  Ex.  Doc.  GO,  30  Cong.,  1  sess., 
232-233.  The  "methods  of  peace"  which  the  President  wished  to  employ 
meant,  no  doubt,  the  vigorous  pressing  of  American  claims. 

3  "It  was  most  fortunate  that  President  Polk,  and  our  minister,  Mr. 
Donelson,  were  known  in  Texas  to  have  lield,  during  their  whole  lives  the 
most  intimate  relations  with  the  sage  and  patriot  of  the  Hermitage,  who 
had  manifested  so  much  solicitude  for  the  re-union  of  Texas  with  the 
parent  country,"  and  they  knew  that  "Young  Hickory"  would  repel 
any  interference  (Union,  July  14,  1845). 

*  But,  it  added,  "why  should  any  thing  else  be  exjiccted  than  that  the 
Executive   should   pay  just   as   little   regard   to   the   Joint   Resolution    as 
did  they  who  i)assed  it  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States"   (Nat. 
Intel!.,  July  19,  1845). 
^    •-■,  Polk  to  A.  O.  P.  Nicholson,  July  28,  1845,  PoR-  Papers. 

"  Taylor  is  still  ordered  to  avoid  aggressive  measures  toward  Mexico 
as  long  as  peace  exists.  "The  Rio  Grande  is  claimed  to  be  the  boundary 
between  the  two  countries,  and  up  to  this  boundary  you  are  to  extend 
your  protection,  only  excepting  any  posts  on  the  eastern  side  thereof, 
M'hich   are  in  the  actual   occupancy  of  Mexican   settlements  over   which 


PBELUDE   TO   THE  MEXICAN  WAR  377 

object  seems  to  have  been  to  prevent  a  hostile  act  on  the  part 
of  Mexico  by  showing-  her  at  once  that  the  United  States  would 
protect  Texas  to  the  Rio  Grande  at  all  hazards;  but  at  the  same 
time,  he  wished  to  avoid  acts  that  might  unnecessarily  precipitate 
a  war. 

On  August  6,  Taylor  was  notified  by  the  Adjutant  General 
that  although  war  might  not  take  place  he  was  authorized  to 
call  upon  Texas  for  additional  troops.  Such  troops  were  to  be 
"received  into  the  service  of  the  United  States  when  actuallj' 
required  in  the  field  to  repel  invasion,  actual  or  menaced,  and 
not  before."^ 

On  the  day  after  this  order  was  issued,  but  apparently-  witli- 
out  knowledge  of  it,  the  National  Intelligencer  expressed  a  fear 
that  the  President  was  about  to  make  war  upon  Mexico.  It 
admitted  that  necessity  might  justify  Polk  in  defending  Texas, 
but 

the  President  is  quite  indefensible,  if,  in  exceeding  the  measure  of  the 
necessity,  he  keep  not  strictly  on  the  defensive  and  within  the  settled  limits 
of  the  land,  whose  proper  i)opulation  merelj',  and  not  its  territorial  preten- 
sions, it  is  now  necessary  to  defend.  But  it  is  apparent  that  Texas  claimed, 
and  we  fear  it  is  equally  apparent  that  the  Executive  has  granted,  the  occu- 
pation of  everything  up  to  the  Rio  Grande ;  which  occupation  is  nothing 
short  (as  everybody  knows)  of  an  invasion  of  Mexico.  It  is  offensive  war, 
and  not  the  necessary  defense  of  Texas.  And  should  it  prove,  as  we  think 
it  will,  that  the  President  has  gone  this  additional  length,  then  the  President 
will  be  MAKING  WAR,  in  the  full  sense  of  the  word,  on  his  own  authority  and 
beyond  all  plea  of  need,  and  even  without  any  thought  of  asking  legislative 
leave.^ 

This  is  a  succinct  statement  of  the  "disputed  territory"  argu- 
ment which  was  arrayed  against  the  President  by  the  Wliigs 


the  Republic  of  Texas  did  not  exercise  jurisdiction  at  the  period  of  annex- 
ation or  shortly  before  that  event.  It  is  expected  that,  in  selecting  the 
establishment  for  your  troops,  you  will  approach  as  near  the  boundary 
line,  the  Rio  Grande,  as  prudence  will  dictate.  With  this  view,  the  Presi- 
dent desires  that  vour  position,  for  a  part  of  vour  forces  at  least,  should 
be  west  of  the  river  Nueces"  {H.  Ex.  Doc.  60,  *30  Gong.,  1  sess.,  82-83). 

-  Ibid.,  83-84. 

8  Nat.  InteJl,  Aug.  7,  1845. 


378  JAMES  E.  POLE 

tliroug'liout  the  war  period,  and  which  has  found  its  way  into 
many  histories  and  textbooks.  The  truth  of  the  AVhig  assertion 
will  be  discussed  later  in  this  chapter;  at  this  point  it  is  suiRcient 
to  note  that  Americans,  not  Mexicans,  first  raised  the  cry  of 
''disputed  territory"  as  applied  to  the  land  lying  between  the 
Nueces  and  the  Rio  Grande.  Mexico,  at  this  time,  laid  no  greater 
claim  to  this  land  than  to  the  rest  of  Texas.  In  her  eyes,  the 
crossing  of  the  Sabine  was  an  invasion  of  Mexico  and  an  act  of 
war.  To  the  assertions  made  by  the  National  Intelligencer  the 
TJnio7i  answered  that  "Texas  assumed  by  law"  all  territory  to 
the  Rio  del  Norte,  including  Santa  Fe,  to  which  the  National 
Intelligencer  retorted  that  their  fears  as  to  the  President's 
position  were  now  fully  admitted.  In  reply  to  the  charge  made 
that  going  to  the  Rio  Grande  would  be  an  offensive  and  not  a 
defensive  act,  the  Union,  a  few  days  later,  cited  a  letter  written 
by  Robert  J.  Walker  which  "proves"  that  Texas  as  a  part  of 
the  Louisiana  Purchase  had  extended  to  the  Rio  Grande.  It 
cited  also  a  speech  made  by  "Walker  in  the  Senate  wherein  he 
had  quoted  the  organic  law  of  Texas  which  essayed  to  fix  the 
boundary  line.  Just  how  Walker's  letters  and  speeches  could 
prove  anything  it  is  not  easy  to  see,  but  the  Union  accepted  them 
as  proof  and  from  it  argued  that  Polk  was  bound  to  enforce  the 
law  to  the  Rio  Grande."  The  President  was  far  more  disturbed 
by  the  annoyances  of  dispensing  patronage  than  by  the  criticisms 
of  the  Whigs,  and  the  success  of  annexation  convinced  him  more 
than  ever  of  the  wisdom  of  the  method  that  had  been  selected.^" 
The  officials  in  Washington  were  rather  in  the  dark  regarding 
the  plans  and  purposes  of  Mexico,  yet  on  August  2.3,  Marcy 
informed  Taylor  that  there  "is  reason  to  believe"  that  Mexico 
is  preparing  to  invade  Texas.    Upon  what  this  belief  was  based 


8  Nat.  Intell.,  Aug.  9.  Union,  Aug.  11,  1845.  For  a  discussion  of  the 
Spanish  boundaries  of  Texas,  see  Garrison,  Westward  Extcns-ion,  chap.  vii. 

10  Polk  to  Senator  Haywood,  Aug.  9,  1845,  PoJk  Papers.  He  expressed 
the  opinion  that  Texas  would  have  been  lost  to  the  Union  had  the  Benton 
alternative  been  selected. 


PEELUDE  TO   THE  MEXICAN  WAE  379 

the  letter  does  not  state,  but  it  was  probably  based  on  information 
given  to  the  Department  of  State  bj'  Baron  Gerolt,  the  Prussian 
minister  at  Washington.  In  a  conversation  with  George  Ban- 
croft, Gerolt  said  that  he  had  received  authentic  information 
from  Mexico,  under  date  of  June  28,  to  the  effect  that  Mexico 
was  making  preparations  to  invade  Texas.  Gerolt 's  informant 
stated  that  General  Arista  with  three  thousand  men,  chiefly 
cavalry,  had  been  ordered  to  move  toward  the  Del  Norte,  while 
Paredes,  the  commander-in-chief,  and  General  Felisola,  were 
read}"  to  follow  with  a  force  of  ten  thousand  men.  Gerolt  him- 
self believed  that  the  United  States  must  expect  protracted  guer- 
rilla warfare.  Bancroft  at  once  addressed  a  letter  to  Buchanan 
imparting  the  above  information.  Buchanan  was  away  at  the 
time,  but  Mason,  who  was  acting  in  his  stead,  showed  the  letter 
to  the  President.  Polk  accepted  the  information  as  reliable.  He 
thought  it  likely  that  the  Mexicans  would  cross  the  Rio  Grande, 
for  the  American  forces  already  on  the  ground  would  be  unable 
to  prevent  it.  He  took  steps  immediately  to  send  additional 
forces  to  Texas,  and  in  a  letter  to  Buchanan  he  urged  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  to  return  as  soon  as  possible  to  take  up  his  duties, 
and  especially,  to  hasten  the  settlement  of  the  Oregon  question.^^ 
Taylor  was  authorized  by  Marcy  to  accept  volunteers  from 
certain  designated  states,  and,  "should  Mexico  declare  war,  or 
commence  hostilities  by  crossing  the  Rio  Grande  with  a  consider- 
able force,"  he  was  to  lose  no  time  in  letting  these  states  know 
the  number  of  troops  needed.^-  This  order  was  followed  a  week 
later  by  another  which  was  more  aggressive  in  tone.  Marcy 
complained  of  lack  of  information  regarding  the  activities  of 


11  Bancroft  to  Buchanan,  Aug.  7;  Polk  to  Buchanan,  Aug.  7,  1845 
(Buchanan,  Works,  223-224).  Copy  of  the  latter  in  Polk  Papers.  Buchanan 
did  not  share  the  President's  apprehensions  caused  by  Gerolt 's  information 
and  views.  In  reply  to  Polk 's  letter  he  stated  his  belief  that  the  American 
forces  on  the  Rio  Grande  should  be  strengthened,  but  that  the  movement 
of  the  Mexican  troops  was  mainly  a  demonstration  to  insure  Herrera's 
election  (Buchanan  to  Polk,  Aug.  11,  1845,  Polk  Papers). 

12  Marcy  to  Taylor,  Aug.  23,  1845  {H.  Ex.  Doc.  60,  30  Cong.,  1  sess., 
84-85). 


380  JAMES  E.  POLK 

Mexico  and  urged  Taylor  to  write  frequently  to  the  War  Depart- 
ment.   "You  have  been  advised,"  said  Marcy, 

that  the  assembling  of  a  large  Mexican  army  on  the  borders  of  Texas,  and 
crossing  the  Rio  Grande  with  a  considerable  force,  Avill  be  regarded  by  the 
Executive  here  as  an  invasion  of  the  United  States,  and  the  commencement 
of  hostilities.  An  attempt  to  cross  that  river  -with  such  a  force  will  also  be 
considered  in  the  same  light. 

In  case  of  war,  "either  declared  or  made  manifest  by  hostile 
acts,"  Taylor's  main  object  was  to  be  the  protection  of  Texas, 
but  in  pursuit  of  this  object  he  was  authorized  to  cross  the  Rio 
Grande  and  take  Matamoras  and  other  places.^^  Polk  at  this 
time  considered  the  propriet}^  of  convening  Congress  in  the  event 
of  a  declaration  of  war  or  an  invasion  of  Texas  by  Mexico,  but 
Senator  Bagby,  of  Alabama,  and  perhaps  others,  advised  against 
such  a  course.^*  The  new  order  to  Taylor  was  decided  upon  at 
a  cabinet  meeting  held  on  the  twenty-ninth  of  August.^^  It  did 
not,  however,  result  from  any  sudden  panic  in  administration 
circles,^*'  and  Polk  has  been  condemned  for  holding  that  even 
an  attempt  to  cross  the  river  would  be  an  act  of  war.  He 
has  been  condemned  also  for  asserting  that  the  crossing  of  that 
river  by  a  Mexican  army  would  be  "an  invasion  of  the  United 
States.  "^^  But  if  it  be  conceded  that  Texas  extended  to  the 
Rio  Grande,  then  the  ground  taken  in  the  new  order  was  no  more 
aggressive  than  that  taken  in  the  former.  It  w^as  certainly  the 
duty  of  the  President  to  defend  Texas,  and  if  Texas  did  extend 
to  the  Rio  Grande,  an  attempt  to  cross  the  river  would  indicate 
the  disposition  of  Mexico  to  invade  the  United  States  quite  as 
well  as  the  actual  crossing.  Nations  do  not  wait  until  a  hostile 
fleet  is  within  the  three-mile  jurisdiction  limit  before  steps  are 


13  Marcy  to  Taylor,  Aug.  30,  1845,  ibid.,  88-89. 
*    "Polk,    Diary,  I.  12-13. 

15  Ibid.,  8-10. 

16  The  Adjutant  General  had  written  only  three  days  before,  August  26, 
that  the  country  was  filled  with  rumors  of  movements  of  Mexican  troops, 
but  that  they  were  believed  to  be  exaggerated  or  untrue  (H.  Ex.  Doo.  60, 
30  Coiig.,  1  sess.,  87). 

1"  E.  g.,  von  Hoist,  Histonj  of  the  United  States  (Eng.  ed.).  Ill,  98-103. 


PBELVDE   TO   THE  MEXICAN  WAR  381 

taken  to  repel  it.     Why  should  they  take  greater  chances  when 
an  invasion  by  land  is  threatened  ? 

Whether  the  land  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Rio  Grande  was 
legally  a  part  of  the  United  States  is  open  to  more  serions 
question.  From  the  first,  Polk  had  claimed  it  to  be  a  part  of 
Texas  and  consequently  of  the  United  States.  His  right  to  do 
so  involves  points  of  constitutional  law  which  the  writer  will 
not  attempt  to  determine,  although  some  phases  of  annexation 
may  be  recalled  in  order  to  indicate  the  questions  upon  which 
such  a  determination  must  be  based.  The  joint  resolution  under 
which  Texas  had  been  annexed  did  not  specify  any  territorial 
limits,  but  left  that  matter  "subject  to  the  adjustment  by  this 
government  of  all  questions  of  boundary  that  may  arise  witli 
other  governments. ' '  The  Texan  claim  to  the  Rio  Grande  rested 
mainly  on  the  agreement  made  with  Santa  Anna  after  his  defeat 
at  San  Jacinto  in  which  he  agreed  to  withdraw  beyond  the  Rio 
y/  Grande, ^^^  and  on  the  act  passed  by  the  Texan  Congress  on  Decem- 
ber 19,  1836,  which  had  declared  that  river  to  be  the  boundary 
of  the  republic.  "Wliatever  claim  these  transactions  may  have 
established  passed,  of  course,  to  the  United  States.  "Without 
attempting  to  determine  the  effect  of  these  events  on  the  legal 
right  of  Texas  to  all  land  east  of  the  Rio  Grande,  it  may  be  noted 
that  Santa  Anna  made  his  agreement  under  duress  and  perhaps 
without  authority;  and  it  is  b}^  no  means  certain  that  Texas  could 
lawfully  enlarge  her  territory  by  an  ordinary  legislative  enact- 
ment. The  United  States  government  claimed,  also,  that  Texas 
as  a  part  of  the  Louisiana  Purchase  had  extended  to  the  Rio 
Grande;  but,  as  Abraham  Lincoln  exclaimed  in  Congress,  ''what, 
under  heaven,  had  that  to  do  with  the  present  boundary  between 
us  and  Mexico  ? '  '^^  All  claim  to  this  region  had  been  transferred 
to  Spain  by  the  Florida  treaty  of  1819.  Congress,  when  passing 
the  joint  resolution,  had  left  the  boundary  for  future  settlement ; 


IS  TMs  agreement  is  printed  in  Niles'  Eegister,  L,  336. 
19  Lincoln,  Wurls   (Tandy  ed.),  I,  322. 


382  JAMES  K.  POLK 

and  both  Texas  and  Mexico,  in  the  project  of  a  treaty  had,  in 

March,  1845,  agreed  to  settle  the  question  by  negotiation.     By 

declaring  all  land  east  of  the  Rio  Grande  to  be  a  part  of  the 

United  States  Polk  may,  indeed,  have  exceeded  his  authority, 

but  it  does  not  follow  necessarily  from  this,  so  long  as  Texas 

asserted  ownership,  that  the  President  was  under  no  obligation 

to  prevent  a  hostile  army  from  entering  the  territory  until  the 

question  of  title  could  be  determined.    General  Jackson  and  his 

loyal  adherents  had  always  held  that  the  United  States  could 

never  be   adequately   protected   until   it    extended   to   the    Rio 

Grande,  and  Polk  had  promised  the  Texans  to  maintain  this 

boundary.    Apparently  the  President  attached  more  importance 

to  these  considerations  than  to  an  anah'sis  of  his  constitutional 

powers. 

Various  letters  written  by  General  Taylor  after  liis  arrival 

in  Texas  in  July,  1845,  informed  the  Adjutant  General  of  rumors 

that  Mexico  was  preparing  to  invade  Texas.     As  time  passed, 

however,  he  came  to  regard  these  rumors  as  groundless,  and  by 

September  he  reported  that  reliable  agents  had  ascertained  that 

the  Mexican  government  was  not  mobilizing  its  forces  on  the 

border.     Taylor  believed  that  the  assembling  of  the  American 

army  along  the  Nueces  had  had  a  deterrent  effect  upon  the 

Mexicans,  but  in  October  he  advised  a  forward  movement  to  the 

Rio  Grande.     "It  is  with  great  deference,"  he  wrote  to  the 

Adjutant  General, 

that  I  make  any  suggestions  on  topics  Avhich  may  become  matter  of  delicate 
negotiation ;  but  if  our  government,  in  settling  the  question  of  boundary, 
makes  the  line  of  the  Rio  Grande  an  ultimatum,  I  cannot  doubt  that  the 
settlement  will  be  greatly  facilitated  and  liastened  by  our  taking  possession 
at  once  of  one  or  tAvo  points  on  or  quite  near  that  river.  Our  strength  and 
state  of  preparation  should  be  displayed  in  a  manner  not  to  be  mistaken. 

As  Mexico  liad  not  yet  either  declared  war  or  conniiitted  any 
overt  act  of  hostility,  lie  did  not  feel  authorized  to  take  this  step 
without  further  orders  from  the  War  Department.-"    In  a  letter 

20  Taylor  to  Jones,  Oct.  4,  1845  (H.  Ex.  Doc.  60,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  108). 


PRELUDE  TO  THE  MEXICAN  WAR  383 

dated  October  16  Marcj^  suggested  to  Taj'lor  the  expediency  of 
putting  his  army  into  winter  liiits,  but  in  this  as  in  other 
military  matters  the  general  was  given  wide  discretion.  By 
the  first  of  November  Taylor  had  received  this  letter,  and  on 
the  fiftli  a  letter  from  Commodore  Conner  informed  him  that 
W.  S.  Parrott  had  set  out  for  Washington  bearing  a  message  that 
Mexico  was  willing  to  negotiate  the  (luestions  in  dispute  between 
the  two  countries.  Taylor  deemed  it  unnecessary  to  build  winter 
huts  for  his  troops,  but,  with  negotiations  about  to  begin,  he 
did  not  believe  himself  authorized  to  move  to  the  Rio  Grande. 
He  nevertheless  urged  the  occupation  of  posts  on  the  boundary 
line  at  the  earliest  possible  date.^^  Parrott  was  Polk's  confiden- 
tial agent  in  Mexico.  He  had  been  selected  for  this  position 
soon  after  Almonte,  the  Mexican  minister  at  Washington,  had 
demanded  his  passports,  and,  on  April  3,  1845,  had  taken  passage 
on  the  same  steamer  that  carried  Almonte  from  New  York  to 
Mexico.  He  had  at  one  time  practiced  dentistry  in  Mexico, 
and,  later,  had  engaged  in  business  there.  He  held  a  much 
inflated  claim  against  the  Mexican  government,  but  of  this  Polk 
was  probably  not  aAvare.^^  His  selection  was  due  no  doubt  to 
his  knowledge  of  the  Spanish  language,  for  otherwise  he  was 
ill  fitted  for  such  a  mission.  Parrott 's  instructions  bore  the  date 
of  March  28,  1845,  and  at  that  time  the  President  seems  to  have 
believed  an  immediate  declaration  of  war  by  Mexico  to  be  highly 
probable.  On  his  arrival  at  Vera  Cruz,  if  he  should  find  that 
Mexico  had  actually  commenced  open  hostilities  against  the 
United  States,  Parrott  was  to  return  immediately.  In  that 
case  the  administration  was  determined  to  "act  promptly  and 
vigorously'  in  maintaining  the  rights  and  honor  of  the  country. ' ' 
Should  hostilities  not  have  begun,  the  main  object  of  his  mission 
was  to  ascertain  whether  Mexico  wovild  renew  diplomatic  rela- 
tions, and  to  do  everything  that  could  discreetly  be  done  to 


21  Marcv   to    Taylor,   Oct.    16;    Conner   to   Tavlor,    Oct.    24;    Taylor   to 
Jones,  Nov.  7,  1845   (ibid.,  89,  111,  112). 

22  Eeeves,  American  Diplomacy  under  Tyler  and  Polk,  268-269. 


384  JAMES   K.  POLK 

bring  this  about.  He  was  to  get  in  touch  with  the  high  officials, 
if  possible,  and  to  let  them  know  that,  while  Texas  under  no 
circumstances  could  be  abandoned,  the  United  States  was  pre- 
pared to  settle  other  questions  "  in  a  liberal  and  friendly  spirit. ' ' 
He  was  not  to  disclose  his  official  character  until  it  liad  been 
clearly  ascertained  that  Mexico  was  ready  to  renew  diplomatic 
relations,  but  the  nature  of  his  mission  was  soon  discovered  by 
the  Mexican  government. ^^  The  "liberal  and  friendly  spirit" 
included,  no  doubt,  the  purchase  of  California  and  New  Mexico, 
although  there  seems  to  be  no  direct  evidence  that  plans  for  such 
a  purchase  had  been  definitely  formulated  at  this  early  date.  In 
his  correspondence  with  Buchanan,  however,  Parrott  emphasized 
the  danger  of  the  seizure  of  Upper  California  by  Great  Britain. 
He  did  not  believe  that  Mexico  would  go  to  war  with  the  United 
States  on  account  of  Texas,  but  he  nevertheless  recommended  a 
chastisement  of  that  country.  On  August  26,  he  reported  that 
Herrera  and  his  new  cabinet  would  not  go  to  war,  and  that  there 
was  a  desire,  even  publicly  manifested,  to  receive  a  "commis- 
sioner" from  the' United  States.  He  believed  that  an  "Envoy 
possessing  suitable  qualifications  for  this  Court  might  with  com- 
parative ease  settle  over  a  breakfast  the  most  important  national 
question."-*  Parrott 's  dispatch  and  others  sent  by  John  Black, 
United  States  consul  at  Mexico,  and  by  F.  M.  Uimond,  United 
States  consul  at  Vera  Cruz,  of  similar  import,  were  discussed 
at  a  cabinet  meeting  held  on  September  16.  It  should  be  noted 
that  Parrott  used  both  terms,  commissioner  and  envoy,  for  it 
is  possible  that  this  may  have  misled  President  Polk  as  to  the 
desire  of  the  Mexican  government.  At  any  rate  Polk  chose  to 
regard  Parrott 's  statement  as  assurance  that  Mexico  would 
receive  a  "minister,"  and  he  determined  at  once  to  send  an 
official   of   that    cliaracter.      It    would    be    interesting   to    know 


23  Buchanan   to   Parrott,   March   28,    1845    (Buchanan    H'orls,   VI,    132- 
134)  ;  Reeves,  op.  cit.,  269-270. 

24  Parrott  to  Buclianan,  Aug.  26,  1845;   quoted  by  Reeves,  op.  cit.,  271. 


PBELVDE   TO   THE  MEXICAN   WAB 


38") 


Whether  Polk  had  really  been  misled  by  Parrotfs  letter  or 
whether  he  deliberately  determined  to  send  a  regular  minister 
regardless  of  the  wishes  of  Mexieo,  for  the  nature  of  the  creden- 
tials oiven  to  the  American  diplomat  was  later  given  by  Mexico 
as  th^  reason  for  declining  to  receive  him.  At  the  cabinet  meet- 
in^  iust  mentioned,  it  was  decided  that  the  mission  should  be 
offered  to  .John  Slidell,  of  New  Orleans.  The  President  recorded 
in  his  diarv  that  one  great  object  of  the  mission  would  be 

that  a  better  boundary  would  be  the  Del  Norte  ^^^  f  ^P^f  ^^^^^f  o"^:^, 
iVl  Pasol  in  latitude  32°  North,  and  thence  West  to  the  Paeiie  Ucean, 
Meli!oTedin^  to  the  U.  S.  all  the  country  East  and  North  of  these  hues. 

He  believed  that  such  a  boundary  might  be  procured  for  fifteen 
or  twentv  millions  of  dollars,  but  he  was  willing  to  pay  as  high 
as  fortv  millions.^--  Here  is  an  explicit  statement  of  P^l^'s  deter- 
mination to  purchase  California,  if  possible.  He  probably  had 
this  method  in  mind  when,  shortly  after  his  inauguration,  he 
declared  to  Bancroft-  that  one  of  the  great  measures  ot  his 
administration  would  be  the  acquisition  of  that  country. 

News  of  recent  threats  of  war  by  the  Mexican  government, 
published  in  the  New  Orleans  papers,  led  Polk  to  believe  that 
Parrott  had  been  mistaken,  and  he  decided  that  it  would  be 
inexpedient  to  send  Slidell  until  the  facts  could  be  ascertained. 
However,  he  wrote  a  confidential  letter  to  Slidell  asking  him 
to  accept  the  appointment  and  to  be  ready  to  leave  for  Mexico 
on  a  day  s  notice.-' 

About  a  month  later  the  President  sent  for  Benton,  and 
sought  his  advice  concerning  both  Oregon  and  California, 
although  there  had  been  no  intercourse  between  the  two  men 
since  the  Missouri  Senator  had  so  bitterly  denounced  the  rejection 

~^7i^i^iary,  I,  33-35.  "  Polk,  Diary,  1,  35-36. 

26  See  page  351. 


386  JAMES  K.  POLK 

of  Van  Buren  by  the  Baltimore  Convention.  He  told  Benton 
that  he  thought  of  reasserting  the  Monroe  doctrine  against  the 
planting  of  any  foreign  colony  on  the  North  American  continent. 
His  immediate  object  was  to  forestall  any  contemplated  British 
colony  in  California.  Benton  approved  such  a  course,  generally, 
but  doubted  that  the  doctrine  could  be  applied  to  the  Frazer 
River  valley  in  which  the  British  had  made  discoveries  and 
settlements.^*^  Polk's  anxietj^  about  California  had  been  in- 
creased by  a  dispatch  received  from  Thomas  0.  Larkin,  Ameri- 
can consul  at  Monterey,  California,  which  bore  the  date  of 
July  10,  1845.-^  This  dispatch  stated  that  the  agent  of  the 
Hudson 's  Bay  Company  had  formerly  furnished  the  Calif ornians 
with  arms  and  money  to  enable  them  to  expel  the  Mexicans 
from  that  countrj^  but  that  now  Great  Britain  was  instigating 
a  Mexican  invasion  of  California.  He  stated,  also,  that  England 
maintained  a  vice-consul  and  France  a  consul  in  California, 
although  they  apparently  transacted  no  commercial  business.  It 
was  inferred  from  this  that  the  two  governments  had  designs 
on  that  province. 

While  he  awaited  developments  in  Mexico  before  sending 
instructions  and  a  commission  to  Slidell,  and  iniiuenced  probably 
by  the  news  received  from  the  consul  at  Monterey,  the  President 
caused  Buchanan  to  write  a  letter  to  Larkin,  under  date  of 
October  17,  1845.  Larkin  was  already  consul  at  ^Monterey,  and 
he  was  now,  in  addition,  made  a  confidential  agent  in  California. 
Polk's  desire  for  California  and  the  method  by  which  he  hoped 
to  acquire  it  are  made  very  clear  in  this  letter.  It  is  made 
equally  clear  that  whether  or  not  he  should  be  able  to  acquire 
it  for  the  United  States,  he  was  determined  to  resist  its  transfer 
to  either  Great  Britain  or  France.  "The  future  destiny"  of 
California,  wrote  Buchanan,  "is  a  subject  of  anxious  solicitude 
for  the  Government  and  people  of  the  United  States."    For  this 


28  Ibid.,  70-71. 

2!)  Mentioned  in  Buc-lianan's  letter  to  Larkin,  Oct.  17,  184.1,  infra. 


PBELVDE  TO  THE  MEXICAN  WAR  387 

reason  the  President  ''eonld  not  view  with  indifference  the 
transfer  of  California  to  Great  Britain  or  any  other  Power.  The 
system  of  colonization  by  foreign  Monarchies  on  the  North 
American  continent  must  and  will  be  resisted  by  the  United 
States."  Larkin  was  told  that  "tliis  Government  had  no  am- 
bitious aspirations  to  gratify  and  no  desire  to  extend  our  federal 
system  over  more  territory  than  we  already  possess,  unless  by 
the  free  and  spontaneous  wish  of  the  independent  people  of 
adjoining  territories."  After  reiterating  that  the  United  States 
would  "vigorously  interpose"  to  prevent  California  from  becom- 
ing a  British  or  a  French  colonj'',  Buchanan  continued : 

Whilst  the  President  will  make  no  effort  and  use  no  influence  to  induce 
California  to  become  one  of  the  free  and  independent  States  of  this  Union, 
yet  if  the  people  should  desire  to  unite  their  destiny  with  ours,  they  would 
be  received  as  brethren,  whenever  this  can  be  done  without  affording  Mexico 
just  cause  of  complaint.  Their  true  policy  for  the  present  in  regard  to  this 
question,  is  to  let  events  take  their  course,  unless  an  attempt  should  be  made 
to  transfer  them  without  their  consent  either  to  Great  Britain  or  Trance. 
This  they  ought  to  resist  by  all  the  means  in  their  power,  as  ruinous  to  their 
best  interests  and  destructive  of  their  freedom  and  independence. 

Larkin  was  asked  to  assure  the  Californians  of  the  friendship 
of  the  United  States  and  to  ascertain  their  feelings  toward 
this  and  other  countries.  He  was  instructed  further  to  gather 
various  statistics  and  to  inform  his  government  generally  regard- 
ing affairs  in  California.^"  Clearly  Polk  had  hopes  that  the 
Texas  program  might  be  reenacted  in  California.  Apparently, 
no  conquest  of  this  region  was  contemplated,  unless,  perhaps 
Great  Britain  or  France  should  attempt  to  seize  or  colonize  it. 
He  was  willing,  of  course,  to  purchase  both  California  and  New 
Mexico  and  thereby  settle  the  whole  question  both  peaceably  and 
speedily.  His  constitutional  authority  to  declare  the  so-called 
"disputed  territory"  to  be  a  part  of  the  United  States  has  been 


30  Buchanan  to  Larkin,  Oct.  17,  1845,  brought  to  California  by  Com- 
modore Stockton  (MS  in  Larkin  Papers,  Bancroft  Library,  Univ.  of  Calif.) 
There  is  a  printed  copy  in  Buchanan,  JVorls,  VI,  275-278. 


388  JAMES  K.  POLE 

seriously  questioned ;  it  may  be  questioned,  also,  whether  his 
promise  to  "receive  as  brethren"  the  Calif ornians  was  not  a 
stretching  of  executive  powers. 

The  President  appointed  Lieutenant  Archibald  H.  Gillespie, 
of  the  marine  corps,  confidential  agent  and  assigned  to  him  the 
duty  of  repairing  to  California  to  cooperate  with  Larkin.  He 
was  given  a  copy  of  the  written  instructions  to  Larkin,  and  was 
made  the  bearer  of  verbal  instructions  to  both  Larkin  and  Fre- 
mont. Just  what  these  verbal  instructions  were  no  one  has  been 
able  to  ascertain  with  any  degree  of  certainty.  Buchanan's  letter 
to  Larkin  bore  the  date  October  17,  but  Gillespie  was  still  in 
Washington  as  late  as  October  30.  On  that  date  Polk  recorded 
in  his  diary  that  he  had  just  held  a  confidential  conversation 
with  Gillespie  concerning  his  secret  mission,  and  added  that  ' '  his 
secret  instructions  &  the  letter  to  Mr.  Larkin, — will  explain  the 
object  of  his  mission.  "^^  The  letter  to  Larkin  tells  its  own  story, 
but  the  "secret  instructions"  to  Gillespie  have  been  the  subject 
of  considerable  speculation.  The  latter  will  be  considered  in 
connection  with  the  operations  of  Fremont. 

The  President  did  not  confine  his  activities  with  respect  to 
California  to  the  sending  of  Gillespie  with  instiuctions  for 
the  consul  at  Monterey.  While  Buchanan  was  preparing  these 
instructions,  Bancroft,  by  the  President's  order,  was  inditing 
secret  orders  for  Commodores  Stockton  and  Sloat.  These,  too, 
were  given  the  official  date  of  October  17,  1845. 

Commodore  John  D.  Sloat  had  been  for  some  time  in  com- 
mand of  the  luival  forces  on  the  Pacific,  and  as  early  as  June  24 
Bancroft  had  sent  him  "secret  and  confidential"  orders  to  seize 
San  Francisco  and  blockade  other  ports,  if  he  should  "ascertain 
with  certainty"  that  Mexico  had  declared  war  against  the  United 
States.^'  By  the  order  of  October  17  he  was  told  that  "in  the 
event  of  actual  hostilities"  he  was  to  dispose  of  his  entii'o  foi-ce 


31  Polk,  Di<ir}/,  I,  83-84. 

32  H.  Ex.  Doc.  60,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  231. 


PBELVDE   TO   THE  MEXICAN   WAE  389 

"so  as  to  carry  out  most  effcctuallj^  the  objects  specified  in  the 
instructions  forwarded  to  you  from  the  Department  in  view 
of  such  a  contingency."^^ 

Commodore  Robert  F.  Stockton  was  given  command  of  the 
frigate  Congress  which  had  been  equipped  at  Norfolk  for  duty 
in  the  Pacific.  His  sealed  orders,  which  were  not  to  be  opened 
until  he  had  passed  beyond  "the  Capes  of  Virginia,"  directed 
him  to  proceed  to  the  Sandwich  Islands,  and,  eventually,  to  join 
the  squadron  of  Commodore  Sloat.  To  Stockton  were  intrusted 
the  originals  of  the  instructions  to  Sloat  and  Larkin,  duplicates 
of  which,  as  we  have  seen,  were  sent  overland  in  care  of  Lieu- 
tenant Gillespie. 

On  November  9,  1845,  Parrott  reached  Washington  bearing 
a  note  from  the  Mexican  Secretarj^  of  Foreign  Affairs  which 
expressed  the  willingness  of  his  government  to  receive  a  com- 
missioner from  the  United  States.^^  Three  days  before  Parrott 's 
letter  arrived,  however,  Bancroft  had  received  a  dispatch  from 
Commodore  Conner  which  stated  that  Mexico  was  willing  to 
negotiate,  and  the  President  had  directed  Buchanan  immediately 
to  prepare  instructions  for  Slidell.  Slidell's  commission  was 
signed  on  the  tenth,  and  this  with  his  instructions  was  conveyed 
to  him  by  Lieutenant  Lanier  of  the  navy.  Parrott  was  selected 
as  his  secretary  of  legation. ^^ 

Slidell's  instructions  were  an  elaboration  of  the  plans  for 
territorial  expansion  which  the  President  had  laid  before  his 
cabinet  on  the  sixteenth  of  September.^''  To  Larkin  had  been 
assigned  the  task  of  winning  the  good  will  of  the  Californians, 
and  of  letting  them  know  that  they  would  be  welcomed  into  the 


33  See  Eives,  United  States  and  Mexico,  II,  168. 

34  Polk,  Diary,  I,  93.  Polk  says  that  Mexico  agreed  to  receive  a  minister. 
This,  however,  is  an  error,  for  the  Secretary  clearly  said  a  ' '  commissioner ' ' 
.  .  .  "to  settle  the  present  dispute"  (Pena  y  Pena  to  Black,  Oct.  15,  1845, 
in  H.  Ex.  Doc.  60,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  16). 

35  Polk,  Diary,  1,  91-94. 

36  See  above,  p.  385. 


390  JAMES   K.  POLE 

Union  should  they  see  fit  to  declare  their  independence;  to 
Slidell  authority  was  given  to  adjust  the  boundary  question,  and 
to  purchase  New  Mexico  and  California,  if  possible.  Taken 
together  these  documents  indicate  the  ardent  desire  of  the  Presi- 
dent to  extend  the  United  States  to  the  Pacific,  as  well  as  the 
methods  by  which  he  hoped  to  accomplish  his  purpose. 

The  instructions  to  Slidell  first  of  all  reiterated  the  substance 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  insisted  thai  the  United  States  could 
not  permit  the  establishment  of  European  colonies  in  North 
America.  He  was  instructed  to  notify  Mexico  that  the  United 
States  had  waited  long  and  patiently  for  Mexico  to  pa.y  the  just 
claims  of  American  citizens,  but  that  "these  claims  must  now 
speedily  be  adjusted  in  a  satisfactory  manner."  It  was  well 
known,  Buchanan  pointed  out,  that  Mexico  could  not  pay  in 
mone}',  but  "fortunately"  the  provision  in  the  joint  resolution 
of  annexation  relating  to  the  adjustment  of  boundaries  presented 
a  means  of  satisfying  these  claims,  "in  perfect  consistency  with 
the  interests  as  well  as  the  honor  of  both  Republics."  The  means 
was  the  assumption  of  the  claims  by  the  government  of  the  United 
States,  and  the  cession  of  territory  by  Mexico  as  a  compensation 
therefor.  With  this  introduction  Buchanan  proceeded  to  discuss 
boundaries  and  the  lands  that  might  be  claimed  or  purchased. 
The  independence  and  the  annexation  of  Texas  must  be  considered 
as  settled  facts.  The  United  States  based  her  claim  to  the  Rio 
Grande  as  the  boundary  of  Texas  on  the  act  passed  bj^  the  Texan 
Congress  on  December  19,  1836,  and  on  the  fact  that  that  river 
had  been  the  boundary  of  the  Louisiana  Purchase ;  altliough 
Buchanan  himself  admitted  that  all  rights  under  the  latter  had 
been  transferred  to  Spain  in  1819  by  the  Florida  treaty.  He  did 
not  claim  that  New  Mexico  had  belonged  to  Texas  or  had  come 
with  tliat  republic  into  the  possession  of  the  United  States.  To 
"obviate  the  danger  of  future  collisions,"  however,  the  Ameri- 
can government  would,  in  exchange  for  it,  assume  all  claims  of 
her  citizens  against  Mexico  and  pay  in  addition  five  millions  of 


PEELUDE  TO  THE  MEXICAN  WAE  391 

dollars.  In  case  Mexico  should  be  unwilling  to  cede  any  lands 
west  of  the  Rio  Grande,  then  the  claims  would  be  assumed  but 
the  five  millions  would  not  be  paid.  If  either  of  these  objects 
could  be  attained,  Slidell  was  authorized  to  conclude  a  treaty 
with  Mexico. 

Reeves,  in  his  American  Diplomacy  under  Tyler  and  Polk, 
makes  the  over-confident  assertion  that 

Parrott's  mission  and  Sli'dell's  instructions  taken  together  prove  two 
things:  (1)  that  the  Mexican  War  was  not  the  result  of  the  annexation  of 
Texas,  and  (2)  that  the  reopening  of  diplomatic  relations  with  Mexico  was 
for  the  purpose  of  securing  California  by  purchase. 37 

That  one  of  the  motives  for  seeking  to  reopen  diplomatic  relations 
was  the  desire  to  purchase  California  may  be  granted  at  once. 
But  precisely  how  Parrott's  mission  and  Slidell 's  instructions 
prove  that  the  acquisition  of  this  region  was  the  main  purpose 
of  the  administration,  or  that  war  did  not  result  from  the  annex- 
ation of  Texas  the  present  writer  is  miable  to  see.  Other  evidence, 
which  will  be  offered  presently,  indicates  that  Polk  decided  to 
wage  war  because  Mexico  had  failed  to  satisfy  the  American 
claims ;  but  instead  of  proving  that  the  Mexican  war  w^as  waged 
"for  the  fulfillment  of  Polk's  designs  upon  California, "^^ 
Slidell's  instructions  indicate  that  the  President,  at  the  time 
these  instructions  were  drafted,  was  ready  to  release  Mexico  from 
further  obligation  if  she  would  cede  only  a  part  of  New  Mexico. 
Should  he  find  it  impossible  to  make  better  terms,  Slidell  was 
specifically  authorized  to  conclude  a  treaty  by  which  the  United 
States  would  assume  all  claims  if  Mexico  in  return  would  cede 
that  part  of  New  Mexico  lying  east  of  the  Rio  Grande.  Had 
Slidell  been  able  to  conclude  such  a  treaty,  Polk  would  have 
been  deprived  of  all  means  of  bringing  pressure  to  bear  on 
Mexico,  except  unprovoked  military  conquest.  To  be  sure,  the 
President  was  eager  to  acquire  California.     Larkin  had  been 


37  Eeeves,  275.     He  is  speaking  here  of  Slidell's  original  instructions. 

38  Ibid.,  288. 


392  JAMES   K.  POLK 

instructed  to  assure  the  Californians  that  they  would  be  wel- 
comed into  the  Union  should  they  see  fit  to  separate  from  Mexico, 
and  now  Slidell  was  instructed  to  purchase  that  territory,  and 
was  told  that  "money  would  be  no  object  when  compared  with 
the  value  of  the  acquisition."  He  was  told,  also,  that  his  mission 
was  "one  of  the  most  delicate  and  important  which  has  ever 
been  confided  to  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,"  nevertheless 
there  was  not  the  slightest  hint  that  the  President  had  any  inten- 
tion of  resorting  to  force  in  the  event  that  Mexico  should  refuse 
her  consent  to  the  sale.  On  the  contrary,  as  above  noted,  Slidell 
was  to  conclude  a  treat}'  which  would  assume  all  claims  even 
though  Mexico  should  confine  her  cession  to  territory  on  the  east 
side  of  the  Rio  Grande.  It  would  seem  that,  at  this  time,  Polk's 
plan  to  acquire  California  was  limited  to  purchase  or  to  "mani- 
fest destin}'"  of  the  type  that  had  succeeded  so  well  in  Texas. 
The  outbreak  of  war  was  soon  followed  by  the  conquest  of  Cali- 
fornia, but  this  fact  alone  does  not  prove  that  the  war  "was 
waged  for  the  purpose  of  conquest,  for  the  fulfillment  of  Polk's 
designs  upon  California."  Polk  may  have  welcomed  the  war — 
possibl}^  he  may  have  provoked  it — but  his  offer  to  cancel  the 
claims  for  so  small  a  tract  of  land  seems  to  show  that  forcible 
conquest  was  not  his  intention  at  the  time  that  Slidell  was  sent 
to  Mexico. 

Slidell  was  sent  to  Mexico  in  the  capacity-  of  envoy  extra- 
ordinary and  minister  plenipotentiary,  not  simply  as  a  commis- 
sioner to  settle  disputes  incident  to  the  annexation  of  Texas. 
The  reception  of  a  minister  would  have  the  effect  of  fully  restor- 
ing diplomatic  relations  and  of  paving  the  way  for  the  discussion 
of  all  questions  concerning  which  that  minister  might  bear 
instructions — unpaid  claims,  for  example.  For  this  reason  Mex- 
ico declined  to  receive  Slidell.  According  to  a  statement  made 
long  afterwards  by  Bejamin  E.  Green, ^'^  secretary  of  legation 


39  The  statement  is  dated  Auj?.  8,  1889  (Tyler,  Letters  and  Times  of  the 
Tylers,  III,  17G). 


PEELUDE   TO   TEE  MEXICAN   WAH  393 

at  Mexico  in  1844,  President  Polk  had  been  informed,  before 
sending  Slidell,  that  President  Herrera  would  receive  a  commis- 
sioner, and  that  he  was  read}^  to  settle  all  disputes  and  to  cede 
New  Mexico  and  California  to  the  United  States.  He  was  told, 
on  the  other  hand,  according  to  the  same  statement,  that  the 
Herrera  government  doubted  its  ability  to  sustain  itself  against 
the  power  of  Santa  Anna  if  it  should  receive  an  ordinary  minister 
as  though  nothing  had  happened.  If  this  be  true,  then  Polk 
nnist  have  known  that,  in  all  probability,  Slidell  would  not  be- 
received,  and  his  sincerity  in  sending  the  envoy  may  be  seriously 
questioned.  But  it  seems  incredible  that  the  President  would 
deliberately  jeopardize  the  success  of  a  mission  which  promised 
to  procure  everything  he  could  desire,  even  California,  simply 
to  gratify  a  whim  of  sending  to  Mexico  the  particular  kind  of 
a  diplomatic  agent  which  she  did  not  want.  Some  allowance 
should  be  made  for  the  fact  that  Green's  statement  was  made 
many  j'cars  after  the  event  and  that  he  was  the  son  of  Duff 
Green,  the  champion  of  Calhoun  and  the  uncompromising 
opponent  of  Polk.*" 

On  December  2,  1845,  before  the  American  envoy  had  reached 
his  destination,  Polk  submitted  to  Congress  his  first  annual 
message.  In  it  he  officially  informed  that  body  of  the  annexation 
of  Texas,  despite  ' '  British  and  French  interference " ;  of  the 
severance  of  diplomatic  relations  by  Mexico;  and  of  Slidell 's 
mission.  While  expressing  a  "sincere  desire  for  a  peaceful 
adjustment  of  all  difficulties,"  the  message  hinted  at  drastic 
measures  in  the  event  that  negotiations  should  fail : 


40  It  is  true,  of  course,  that  Polk  had  before  him  the  letter  of  Pena  y 
Pefia,  which  agreed  to  receive  a  commissioner  and  said  nothing  about  a 
minister.  See  p.  389,  note  34.  It  is  true,  also,  that  Joel  R.  Poinsett 
wrote  soon  after  war  Avas  declared  that  "I  took  the  liberty  of  remonstrat- 
ing to  one  in  the  confidence  of  the  government  that  the  Mexican  govt 
would  not  and  dared  not  receive  our  Minister  Plenipotentiary  but  could  and 
would  receive  a  Commissioner  and  that  any  movement  of  our  troops  from  the 
Nueces  would  lead  to  hostilities.  The  reply  was  not  to  be  uneasy.  The 
Mexicans  would  not  cross  the  Rio  Grande  to  attack  our  troops  &  Genl  Taylor 
had  orders  to  remain  on  this  side  of  the  river,  that  a  war  with  Mexico 
depended  altogether  upon  the  state  of  our  relations  with  England"  (Poin- 
sett to  Van  Buren,  May  26,  1846,  Van  Burcn  Papers). 


394  .  JAMES   E.  POLK 

The  minister  appointed  has  set  out  on  liis  mission  and  is  probably  by  this 
time  near  the  Mexican  capital.  He  has  been  instructed  to  bring  the  negotia- 
tion •ndth  -which  he  is  charged  to  a  conclusion  at  the  earliest  practicable 
period,  which  it  is  expected  Avill  be  in  time  to  enable  me  to  communicate 
the  result  to  Congress  during  the  present  session.  Until  that  result  is 
known  I  forbear  to  recommend  to  Congress  such  ulterior  measures  of  redress 
for  the  wrongs  and  injuries  we  have  long  borne  as  it  would  have  been  proper 
to  make  had  no  such  negotiation  been  instituted. 

This  passage  indicates  that,  even  at  this  earl}'  date,  the  President 
believed  that  the  United  States  had  ample  ground  for  war  and 
that  he  would  not  hesitate  to  recommend  it  if  Slidell's  mission 
should  end  in  failure. 

Polk's  reference  to  British  and  French  interference  in  Texan 
affairs  and  his  allusions  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  connection 
with  the  Oregon  question  were  not  relished  in  British  official 
circles.  When  reporting  this  fact  to  the  President,  McLane  wrote 
tliat  "a  favorate  scheme  of  the  leading  powers  of  Europe  is  to 
compose  the  Mexican  troubles  by  giving  her  a  settled  monarchical 
form  of  Government,  and  supplying  the  monarch  from  one  of 
their  own  families.  "^^  Doubtless  McLane  greatly  exaggerated 
the  desire  for  a  Mexican  monarchy,  but  his  report  harmonized 
so  well  with  the  suspicions  already  held  by  the  administration 
that  his  opinions  were  probably  accepted  at  face  value. 

Slidell  arrived  at  the  Mexican  capital  on  December  6,  1845. 
His  secretary  of  legation,  Parrott,  soon  followed,  accompanied 


41  McLane  to  Polk,  Jan.  17,  1846,  Polk  Papers.  Before  the  receipt  of 
the  message  in  England,  the  British  press  had  spoken  in  praise  of  Polk's 
success  in  acquiring  Texas.  For  example,  the  morning  Chronicle  said: 
"That  immense  question,  the  annexation  of  Texas,  which  seemed  so  difficult 
to  solve  that  it  affriglited  the  boldest  men  and  parties,  has  been  achieved 
by  Mr.  Polk  in  a  thrice.  The  activity  of  English  envoys,  the  suppleness 
of  the  French,  the  efforts  of  the  most  able  and  most  eloquent  partisans  at 
home,  all  pointed  at  and  making  against  annexation!  All  obstacles  have 
been  overcome.  European  interference  has  given  color  of  reason  to  the  act 
of  annexation  which  it  wanted  before,  since  the  measure  was  one  which 
defeated  and  annulled  European  intervention.  Then  the  great  objection 
was  that  it  would  produce  war.  Annexation,  however  desirable,  argiied  the 
Wliigs,  is  not  worth  a  drop  of  blood;  but  lo!  it  has  not  cost  a  drop  of 
blood — the  Mexicans  are  paralyzed."  Quoted  by  the  Washington  Union, 
Jan.  2,  1846. 


PEELUDE  TO   THE  MEXICAN  WAR 


395 


by  Gillespie,  who  was  on  his  way  to  California  as  bearer  of  dis- 
patehes  to  Larkin  and  Fremont.     Black,  the  American  consul 
at  aiexico,  had  met  Slidell  at  Puebla  and  informed  him  that  the 
:^Iexican  o-overnment  was  much  perturbed  by  his  early  arrival, 
as  he  had  not  been  expected  until  January.    President  Herrera 
seems  to  have  feared  that  the  arrival  of  the  American  envoy 
would  be  used  by  his  enemies  to  undermine  his  power.     There 
was  foundation  for  this  belief.     Broadsides  appeared  warning 
the  people  that  Slidell  had  come  to  acquire  from  the  Herrera 
government  not  only  Texas  but  New  Mexico  and  the  Californias, 
consequently  to  receive  him  would  be  treasonable.    Peiia  y  Pena, 
the  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs,  promptly  refused  to  receive 
Parrott  as  secretary  of  legation,  because  of  his  former  activities 
in  Mexico;  but  as  to  Slidell,  he  adopted  a  temporizing  policy. 
His  first  objection,  as  already  stated,  was  the  early  date  of  the 
envoy's  arrival.     After  the  receipt  of  Slidell's  credentials,  the 
Secretary  had  a  more  tangible  ground  for  objection.    He  pointed 
out  to  Black  that  Mexico  had  agreed  to  receive  a  commissioner 
to  negotiate  the   Texas  dispute,   but  that  Slidell's  credentials 
represented  him  to  be  a  minister  resident.     On  this  ground  the 
]\rexican  government  declined  to  receive  the  American  diplomat.*- 
Slidell  did  not,  however,  regard  this  as  a  final  rejection,  for  on 
December  31,  Herrera  was  forced  to  relinquish  the  government 
of  Mexico,  and  on  January  2,  1846,  General  Paredes  became 
President,  ad  interim.    It  now  remained  for  Slidell  to  seek  recog- 
nition from  the  new  government,  and  he  repaired  to  Jalapa  to 
await  developments. 

On  January  28,  1846,  after  he  had  received  Slidell's  letter 
of  December  17  which  reported  that  the  Mexican  government 
had  declined  to  receive  him  until  it  had  given  the  matter  further 
consideration,  Buchanan  wrote  again  to  Slidell,  approving  his 

42  Black  to  Slidell,  Dec.  15;  Slidell  to  Buchanan,  Dee  17;  Peua  y 
Pena  to  Slidell,  Deo.  20,  1845  {H.  Ex.  Doc.  60,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  23-27, 
28-30,  37). 


396  JAMES   K.  POLK 

eondiu't  and  giving  him  further  directions.  As  it  was  morally 
certain,  said  Buchanan,  that  Paredes  would  gain  control  of  the 
government,  Slidell  was  directed  to  apply  again  for  recognition. 
The  President,  he  w^as  told,  desired  to  preserve  peace,  because 
botli  inclination  and  policj'  dictated  this  course.     . 

Should  the  Mexican  Government,  however,  finally  refuse  to  receive  you, 
the  cup  of  forbearance  will  then  have  been  exhausted.  Nothing  can  remain 
but  to  take  the  redress  of  the  injuries  to  our  citizens  and  the  insults  to  our 
Government  into  our  hands.  In  view  of  this  serious  alternative,  every 
honorable  effort  should  be  made  before  a  final  rupture. 

Slidell  was  therefore  to  wait  a  reasonable  time  for  Mexico  to 
decide  on  his  reception,  unless  he  should  discover  that  she  was 
inclined  to  trifle  with  "this  Government."  The  length  of  time 
and  the  evidence  of  trifling  w^ere  left  to  the  envoy's  discretion 
to  determine.  It  will  be  noted  that  the  President  regarded  a 
refusal  to  receive  Slidell  and  a  failure  to  pay  the  claims  imme- 
diately as  ample  grounds  for  taking  redress  into  his  own  hands — 
in  other  words,  for  making  war  on  Mexico.  Protection  of  Texas 
from  threatened  invasion  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  question 
then  under  discussion.  To  make  still  more  clear  the  President's 
intentions,  Slidell  was  told  in  another  paragraph  that  in  case 
Mexico  should  finally  decline  to  receive  him  he  was  to  demand 
his  passports  and  return  to  the  United  States.  "It  will  then 
become  the  duty  of  the  President  to  submit  the  whole  case  to 
Congress  and  call  upon  the  nation  to  assert  its  just  rights  and 
avenge  its  injured  honor."  Additional  naval  forces  had  been 
sent  to  the  Mexican  coast  and  "should  war  become  inevitable, 
the  President  will  be  prepared  to  conduct  it  with  vigor.  "^^ 

While  Slidell  was  seeking  an  audience  in  Mexico  an  agent  of 
Santa  Anna  (then  in  exile  in  Cuba)  appeared  in  Washington 
and  obtained  an  interview  with  President  Polk.  This  agent  was 
Colonel  Alexander  J.  Atocha,  a  Spaniard  by  birth  but  a  natural- 
ized citizen  of  the  United  States.    As  a  friend  of  Santa  Anna  he 


43  Buchanan,  Works,  VI,  363-365. 


PEELUDE   TO   THE  MEXICAN   WAE  397 

had  been  arrested  when  that  wily  ruler's  government  was  over- 
tlirown,  but  on  proving  his  American  citizenship  he  was  released 
and  bauislu'd.  He  had  called  on  Polk  in  June,  1845,  for  the 
purpose  of  urging  the  United  States  government  to  press  certain 
claims  which  he  held  against  Mexico.  He  had  now  returned  from 
a  visit  to  Santa  Anna  in  Havana,  prepared  to  lay  before  Polk 
the  views  of  the  ex-dictator.  In  his  diary  under  date  of  Febru- 
ary 13,  1846,  Polk  stated  that  Atocha  called  on  that  day,  and 
the  substance  of  the  conversation  was  recorded.  Atocha  repre- 
sented Santa  Anna  to  be  in  constant  communication  with  the 
Mexican  leaders. 

He  said  that  Santa  Anna  approved  the  revolution  headed  by  Paredes  and 
that  Santa  Anna  Avas  in  favour  of  a  Treaty  with  the  U,  S.,  and  that  in 
adjusting  a  boundary  between  the  two  countries  the  Del  Norte  should  be 
the  Western  Texas  line,  and  the  Colorado  of  the  West  down  through  the 
Bay  of  San  Francisco  to  the  Sea  should  be  the  Mexican  line  on  the  North, 
and  that  Mexico  should  cede  all  East  and  North  of  these  natural  boundaries 
to  the  U.  S.  for  a  pecuniary  consideration,  and  mentioned  thirty  millions 
of  Dollars  as  the  sum. 

This  amount,  Santa  Anna  believed,  would  pay  the  most  pressing 

debts   of   Mexico   and   support   the   army   until   conditions   had 

improved. 

Col.  Atocha  said  that  Santa  Anna  was  surprised  that  the  U.  S.  Naval 
force  had  been  withdrawn  from  Vera  Cruz  last  fall,  and  that  Gen  '1  Taylor 's 
army  was  kept  at  Corpus  Christi  instead  of  being  stationed  on  tlie  Del 
Norte ;  and  that  the  U.  S.  would  never  be  able  to  treat  with  Mexico,  with- 
out the  presence  of  an  imposing  force  by  land  and  sea,  and  this.  Col.  Atocha 
added,  was  his  own  opinion.  Col.  Atocha  did  not  say  that  he  was  sent  by 
Santa  Anna  to  hold  this  conversation  with  me;  but  I  think  it  probable  he 


was  so. 


Atocha    requested   that   the   conversation   should   be    considered 
confidential,  and  said  that  he  had  more  to  communicate." 

Polk  was  evidently  much  interested  in  the  views  expressed 
by  Atocha,  and  at  a  regular  cabinet  meeting  held  on  the  fol- 
lowing  dav   he   related   to   the   membei-s   the   substance    of   the 


44  Polk,  Diarij.  1,  222-225. 


398  JAMES  E.  POLE 

conversation.  The  idea  of  sending  a  confidential  ag'ent  to  confer 
with  Santa  Anna  was  mentioned.  Walker  was  inclined  to  favor 
such  a  course,  but  Buchanan  was  decidedly  opposed  to  it.  The 
President  said  that  althoug'h  he  did  not  propose  to  send  such  an 
agent,  if  one  sliould  be  sent,  C.  P.  Van  Ness,  former  minister  to 
Spain,  would,  be  the  best  man  that  could  be  selected.*^  Atocha 
called  again  to  see  the  President  on  the  sixteenth  of  February. 
After  discussing  relations  with  Mexico  for  nearly  an  hour  the  con- 
versation was  adjourned  until  afternoon  when  it  was  continued 
for  more  than  an  hour.  Atocha  repeated  what  he  had  said  on 
February  13.  Polk  told  him  that  Mexico  must  satisfy  the  claims 
of  American  citizens  and  that  if  her  government  had  any  propo- 
sition to  make,  such  as  he  had  suggested,  the  United  States  would 
consider  it  after  it  had  been  made.  Atocha  then  pointed  out 
that  no  government  of  Mexico  would  dare  to  make  such  an  offer 
and  that  it  "must  appear  to  be  forced  to  agree  to  such  a  propo- 
sition." It  was  the  opinion  of  Atocha  himself  and  of  Santa 
Anna  that 

our  [United  States]  army  should  be  marched  at  once  from  Corpus  Ohristi 
to  the  Del  Norte,  and  a  strong  Naval  force  assembled  at  Vera  Cruz,  that 
Mr.  Slidell,  the  U.  S.  Minister,  should  withdraw  from  Jalappa,  and  go  on 
board  one  of  our  ships  of  War  at  Vera  Cruz,  and  in  that  position  should 
demand  the  payment  of  [the]  amount  due  our  citizens;  that  it  was  well 
known  the  Mexican  Government  was  unable  to  pay  in  money,  and  that  when 
they  saw  a  strong  force  ready  to  strike  on  their  coasts  and  border,  they 
would,  he  had  no  doubt,  feel  their  danger  and  agree  to  the  boundary  sug- 
gested. He  said  that  Paredes,  Almonte,  &  Gen'l  Santa  Anna  were  all 
willing  for  such  an  arrangement,  but  that  they  dare  not  make  it  until  it 
was  made  apparent  to  the  Archbishop  of  Mexico  &  the  people  generally 
that  it  was  necessary  to  save  their  country  from  a  war  with  the  U.  States. 
He  said  the  last  words  which  Gen'l  Santa  Anna  said  to  him  Avhen  he  was 
leaving  Havanna  a  month  ago  was,  "when  you  see  the  President,  tell  him 
to  take  strong  measures,  and  such  a  Treaty  can  be  made  &  T  will  sustain  it. ' ' 

Atocha   said   that   Mexico   owed   half   a   million    dollars   to   the 
archbishop,  and  that  he  could  be  reconciled  by  assurance  that 
he  would  be  paid  as  soon  as  Mexico  had  obtained  tlie  money  from 
40  Ihid.,  226. 


PBELUDE   TO   THE  MEXICAN   WAE  399 

the  United  States.  He  reported  Santa  Anna  as  having  said  that 
he  could  be  in  Mexico  in  April  or  May  and  would  probably 
"go  into  power  again,"  but  that  he  and  Paredes  must  have 
money  to  sustain  themselves.  With  half  a  million  in  hand,  they 
could  make  the  treaty  and  retain  control  until  the  balance  had 
been  paid.  Arista,  he  said,  was  friendly  to  the  United  States 
and  in  favor  of  ceding  the  northern  departments  to  that  country 
— in  fact,  he  was  anxious  to  do  so,  as  he  owned  a  large  plantation 
near  Monterey.  Atocha  intimated  an  intention  to  return  to 
Havana  and  seemed  desirous  of  getting  Polk's  views  to  carry 
to  Santa  Anna,  but  the  President  remained  silent.  Polk  thought 
him  to  be  a  man  of  talents,  but  one  who  could  not  be  trusted ; 
"I  therefore  heard  all  he  said  but  communicated  nothing  to 
him. "^"^  We  may  well  believe  the  President's  statement  that 
he  listened  attentively  but  offered  no  hint  of  his  own  intentions, 
for  this  habit  was  one  of  his  best  known  characteristics.  Although 
he  believed  Atocha  to  be  a  person  who  could  not  be  relied  upon, 
events  which  followed  make  it  evident  that  he  looked  with  favor 
upon  the  suggestions  which  had  been  offered.  Some  of  them 
were  followed,  as  we  shall  soon  have  occasion  to  note,  in  the 
new  instructions  given  to  Slidell  and  in  the  request  made  to 
Congress  for  money  to  be  used  in  conducting  negotiations. 

That  Polk  was  influenced  by  Atocha 's  suggestions  there  can 
be  no  doubt,  and  that  his  first  impulse  was  to  follow  these  sug- 
gestions very  closely  is  made  evident  by  the  discussion  which  took 
place  in  the  cabinet  meeting  on  the  following  day,  February  17. 
In  giving  an  account  of  this  meeting  Polk  says  in  his  diary  that, 
after  relating  the  conversation  held  with  Atocha, 

I  expressed  the  opinion  that  it  would  be  necessary  to  take  strong  measures 
towards  Mexico  before  our  difficulties  with  that  Government  could  be  settled; 
and  I  proposed  that  in  addition  to  Mr.  Slidell 's  present  instructions,  he 
should  be  further  instructed  to  demand  an  early  decision  of  the  Mexican 
Government,  whether  they  woiild  receive  him  as  Minister  or  not;  and,  if 
they  received  him,  whether  they  would  without  unnecessary  delay  pay  the 


46  Ibid.,  228-230. 


400  JAMES   E.  POLE 

amount  due  to  American  claimants;  and  tliat  if  that  Government  refused 
to  do  one  or  both,  that  he  should  leave  the  country,  but  instead  of  return- 
ing immediately  to  the  U.  States  as  he  had  beeen  instructed  to  do,  he 
should  go  on  board  one  of  our  Vessels  of  War  at  Vera  Cruz,  and  there  remain 
until  he  had  further  instructions  from  his  Government. 

I  stated  that  in  that  event  I  would  send  a  strong  message  to  Congress 
calling  on  that  body  to  authorize  me  to  cause  another  demand  to  be  made 
by  Mr.  Slidell,  from  on  board  the  vessel  of  war,  on  the  Mexican  Government 
to  pay  our  demands,  and  if  this  was  refused  by  Mexico,  to  confer  authority 
on  the  Executive  to  take  redress  into  our  hands  by  aggressive  measures. 

Walker,  Marcy,  and  Bancroft  favored  the  plan  suggested  by  the 
President.  Johnson  was  inclined  to  hold  a  different  opinion,  but 
was  willing  to  acquiesce.  Buchanan  objected,  because — as  Polk 
thought — he  was  peeved  over  certain  appointments  and  because 
he  could  not  control  the  administration.  However,  it  was  decided 
that  Buchanan  should  prepare  new  instructions  for  Slidell,  in 
accordance  with  the  wishes  of  the  President.  But  within  an  hour 
after  the  meeting  had  adjourned  Buchanan,  who  was  in  no 
amiable  mood,  sent  to  the  President  by  messenger  a  draft  of 
instructions,  commencing  with  "I  am  directed  by  President"  etc. 
He  requested  Polk  to  make  corrections  in  pencil  and  return  it 
in  time  for  the  mail.  Polk  was  dissatisfied  with  the  draft  and 
replied  that  he  would  attend  to  it  on  the  following  day.  Buchanan 
immediately  sent  the  messenger  back  with  a  note  stating  his 
reasons  for  dissenting  from  the  decision  of  the  President.  On 
receiving  no  reply  Buchanan  sent  another  note  on  the  same 
subject,  but  again  he  received  no  response.  Polk  did  not  see 
Buchanan  on  the  following  day,  but  decided,  on  account  of  the 
Secretary's  hostility,  to  postpone  instructing  Slidell  for  the 
present.*^ 

The  Mexican  question  was  allowed  to  slumber  for  about  three 
weeks,  and  during  that  time  Oregon  claimed  the  attention  of 
both  the  President  and  Congress.     On  IMarch  9  dispatches  from 


47  Ibid.,  233-236,  238.  Polk  considered  the  conduct  of  his  Secretary  to 
be  decidedly  reprehensible,  and  he  closed  tlic  entry  for  the  day  with  the 
remark:  "The  draft  of  the  despatch  and  the  two  notes.  Numbered  1  &  2, 
I  will  preserve. ' ' 


PliELUDE  TO   THE  MEXICAN  WAB  401 

Slidell,  for  whicli  Polk  had  been  waiting,  arrived,  and  were  dis- 
cussed in  cabinet  meeting-  on  the  da}-  following.  The  essential 
features  of  new  instructions  to  Slidell  were  agreed  upon,  and 
Buchanan  was  directed  to  draft  them/**  While  the  new  instruc- 
tions, which  bore  the  date  of  March  12,  reflected  in  some  degree 
the  suggestions  offered  by  Atocha,  their  tone  was  somewhat  less 
bellicose  than  the  declaration  made  by  the  President  to  his 
cabinet  on  February  17.  The  change  was  probably  due  to  the 
opposition  of  Buchanan.  Slidell  was  directed  to  make  a  formal 
demand  to  be  received  by  the  new  government.  Apparently  the 
administration  had  slight  hopes  that  Paredes  would  comply  but 
Buchanan  pointed  out  that  the  demand  should  be  made  in  order 
to  satisfy  the  American  people  that  everything  had  been  done 
to  avoid  the  necessity  of  resorting  to  war.  "On  your  return  to 
the  United  States,  energetic  measures  against  Mexico  would  at 
once  be  recommended  by  the  President,  and  these  might  fail  to 
obtain  the  support  of  Congress,  if  it  could  be  asserted  that  the 
existing  Government  had  not  refused  to  receive  our  Minister." 
Slidell  was  to  make  it  known  to  Paredes  "in  some  discreet  man- 
ner" that  the  United  States  was  both  able  and  willing  to  relieve 
him  from  pecuniary  embarrassment  the  moment  that  a  treaty 
had  been  signed  and  ratified  by  Mexico. ^^  A  rumor  was  afloat, 
said  Buchanan,  of  a  design  of  European  powers  to  establish  a 
monarchy  in  Mexico  and  to  place  Prince  Henry  of  Spain  on  the 
throne.  He  thought  that  these  rumors  were  probably  idle  specu- 
lations, but  "should  Great  Britain  and  France  attempt  to  place 
a  Spanish  or  any  other  European  Prince  on  the  throne  of 
Mexico,  this  would  be  resisted  by  all  the  power  of  the  United 
States."  Whether  he  should  be  received  or  not  Slidell  was 
advised  to  delay  his  return  to  the  United  States,  for  the  Oregon 
question  was  rapidly  approaching  a  crisis  and  his  return  might 
influence   its  settlement  by   creating   public   alarm.^°     Nothing 

4s  ihid.,  282,  287. 

49  This  is  evidently  an  echo  of  the  suggestion  made  by  Atocha, 

50  Buchanan  to  Slidell,  March  12,  18-i6  (Buchanan,  Worl<:s,  VI,  402-406). 


402  JAMES   E.  POLK 

was  said  about  Slidell's  repairing  to  a  war  vessel  for  the  purpose 
of  making  another  demand,  as  Atocha  had  advised  and  Polk  had 
recommended  to  the  cabinet.  Apprehension  concerning  the 
Oregon  question  as  well  as  the  opposition  of  Buchanan  may 
have  been  responsible  for  the  President's  change  of  mind. 

Polk  seems  to  have  been  confident  that  Slidell  would  be 
received  by  Paredes.  At  a  cabinet  meeting  held  on  March  28, 
he  expressed  the  belief  that  Slidell's  dispatches  indicated  his 
reception  to  be  probable.  He  apprehended  that  the  greatest 
obstacle  to  the  conclusion  of  a  boundary  treaty,  such  as  Slidell 
had  been  instructed  to  procure,  would  be  the  want  of  authority 
to  make  a  prompt  payment  of  money  at  the  time  of  signing  it. 
Paredes  was  in  great  need  of  money  to  pay  his  troops  and  keep 
them  loyal,  and  Polk  was  of  opinion  that  if  Slidell  could  be 
authorized  to  pay  a  half  million  or  a  million  dollars  as  soon  as 
the  treaty  had  been  signed,  it  "might  induce  him  [Paredes]  to 
make  a  Treaty,  which  he  would  not  otherwise  venture  to  make. ' ' 
Some  of  the  cabinet  members  raised  the  question  of  how  this 
money  could  be  obtained  from  Congress  without  exposing  to  the 
public  and  to  foreign  nations  the  object  in  voting  it.  "That 
object,"  said  the  President, 

ag  may  be  seen  from  Mr.  Slidell's  instructions,  would  be  in  adjusting  a 
boundary  to  procure  a  cession  of  New  Mexico  &  California,  &  if  possible  all 
North  of  latitude  32°  from  the  Passo  [El  Paso]  on  the  Del  Norte  &  West 
to  the  Pacific  ocean;  or  if  that  precise  boundary  cannot  be  obtained,  then 
the  next  best  boundary  Avhich  might  be  practicable  so  as  at  all  events  to 
include  all  the  country  East  of  the  Del  Norte  and  the  Bay  of  San  Francisco. 
For  the  boundary  desired,  see  Mr.  Slidell's  instructions. 

The  cabinet,  except  the  Secretary  of  State,  agreed.  Buchanan 
thought  the  plan  of  asking  for  an  advance  appropriation  to  be 
impracticable.  Polk  called  attention  to  the  act  passed  in  1806 
to  enable  Jefferson  to  purchase  the  Floridas,  and  suggested  that 
members  of  Congress  might  be  consulted  informally  for  the 
purpose  of  ascertaining  the  probability  of  obtaining  the  appro- 
priation.    He  had  already  broached  the  subject  to  Ingersoll,  of 


PRELUDE   TO   THE  MEXICAN  WAR  403 

Pennsylvania,  and  Cullom,  of  Tennessee.  After  the  meeting  had 
adjourned  Polk  summoned  Benton  and  asked  his  opinion  con- 
cerning the  feasibility  of  the  plan.  Benton  concurred  in  the 
views  of  the  President  and  promised  his  cooperation."'^  On  ex- 
amining the  laws  Polk  found  another  precedent  for  his  proposed 
appropriation— the  two  millions  voted  in  1803  to  enable  Jefferson 
to  purchase  Louisiana.  He  conversed  with  Allen,  chairman  of 
the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  and  with  Senator 
Cass.  Both  approved  his  plan.  On  the  advice  of  Allen  and 
Benton  the  President  sent  for  Calhoun  and  asked  his  opinion  on 
the  proposed  appropriation  and  on  the  purpose  for  which  it  was 
to  be  used.  Calhoun  was  in  favor  of  procuring  a  boundary 
which  would  include  California,  and  said  that  he  had  contem- 
plated trying  to  procure  such  a  boundary  when  he  was  Secretary 
of  State.'  He  did  not,  however,  like  the  boundary  suggested  by 
the  President.  Neither  did  he  approve  the  plan  to  ask  for  an 
appropriation,  for  fear  it  might  interfere  with  the  settlement  of 
the  Oregon  question.^- 

While  the  President  was  exerting  his  influence  to  obtain  from 
Congress  an  appropriation  to  facilitate  negotiations,  a  dispatch 
arrived,  on  April  6,  from  the  American  consul  at  Vera  Cruz 
stating  that  Slidell  would  probably  not  be  received.  The  dis- 
patch was  read  in  cabinet  meeting  next  day,  and  Polk  recorded 
in  his  diary : 

I  stated  that  in  the  event  Mr.  Slidell  was  not  accredited,  and  returned  to 
the  U.  S.,  my  opinion  was  that  I  should  make  a  communication  to  Congress 
recommending  that  Legislative  measures  be  adopted,  to  take  the  remedy 
for  the  injuries  and  wrongs  we  had  suffered  into  our  own  hands. 

On  the  evening  of  the  seventh  dispatches  from  Slidell  arrived, 
informing  the  President  that  he  had  not  been  received  and  that 
he  had  demanded  his  passports.^^ 


51  Polk,  Diary,  1,  303,  303-308. 

52  ihid.,  309-313. 

53  Ibid.,  319,  322. 


404  JAMES  K.  POLK 

On  March  12,  tlie  day  on  which  Buchanan  penned  his  final 
instructions  to  Slidell,  the  Mexican  Minister  of  Foreign  Rela- 
tions notified  the  American  envoy  that  he  could  not  be  received. 
He  was  told  that  the  annexation  of  Texas  had  always  been  and 
was  still  regarded  by  Mexico  as  a  casus  belli.  In  spite  of  this 
fact  she  had  agreed  to  receive  a  commissioner  to  discuss  this 
question,  but  the  United  States  had  sent  instead  a  minister  resi- 
dent. Should  the  United  States  persist  in  its  present  course  the 
Mexican  government  would  "call  upon  all  her  citizens  to  fulfill 
the  sacred  duty  of  defending  their  country,"  and  if  war  should 
result,  the  entire  blame  would  rest  upon  the  United  States.  As 
soon  as  he  received  this  letter  Slidell  asked  for  his  passports,  and 
they  were  sent  to  him  by  Castillo  on  the  twenty-first  of  March.^* 
He  had  left,  therefore,  for  the  United  States  before  the  arrival 
of  Buchanan's  instructions  of  March  12.  With  one  government 
maintaining  that  aggressive  measures  must  follow  the  refusal  to 
receive  the  American  envoy,  and  the  other  asserting  that  an  in- 
sistence upon  his  reception  must  be  met  by  an  appeal  to  arms, 
it  will  be  seen  that  Slidell's  mission  played  an  important  part  in 
bringing  about  a  collision  between  the  two  nations.  To  be  sure, 
Mexico  still  regarded  the  annexation  of  Texas  as  a  casus  belli  and 
Castillo  did  not  expressly  state  that  she  was  prepared  to  acquiesce 
in  its  incorporation  into  the  American  Union,  but  at  least  he  still 
intimated  a  willingness  to  negotiate  on  this  limited  question. 

On  receipt  of  Slidell's  dispatch  which  announced  that  he  had 
been  rejected  and  had  demanded  his  passports,  the  President 
consulted  Benton  concerning  "the  steps  proper  to  be  taken  and 
especially  if  the  principal  Powers  of  Europe  should  attempt  to 
force  a  Foreign  Prince  on  the  throne  of  Mexico. ' '  He  consulted 
Houston,  of  Texas,  and  Allen,  of  Ohio,  also,  and  it  was  agreed  that 
nothing  should  be  done  until  it  had  been  ascertained  that  pass- 
ports had  actually  been  given  to  Slidell.'^"''     About  a  week  later 


54  Castillo   y    Lanzas   to    Slidell,   March    12    and    March    21;    Slidell    to 
Castillo,  March  17,  1846  (H.  Ex.  Doc.  60,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  67-72,  79). 

55  Polk,  Diary,  I,  32o-.327. 


PBELUDE  TO  THE  MEXICAN   WAR  405 

(April  18)  the  President  told  Calhoun  that  he  "saw  no  alter- 
native but  strong  measures  towards  Mexico."  Calhoun  depre- 
cated war  and  expressed  the  opinion  that  if  the  Oregon  question 
could  be  settled  first  there  would  be  no  difficulty  in  adjusting 
the  difficulties  with  Mexico,  for  he  believed  that  Great  Britain 
desired  to  prevent  a  war  between  the  United  States  and  Mexico. 
Polk,  on  the  contrary,  believed  that  the  British  minister  in  ]\Iex- 
ico  had  exerted  his  influence  to  prevent  Slidell's  reception.  Cal- 
houn urged  against  sending  a  message  to  Congress  on  Mexican 
affairs  until  the  Oregon  question  had  been  settled.  ' '  I  told  him, ' ' 
said  Polk, 

that  I  would  delay  a  reasonable  time,  but  that  whatever  the  settlement 
of  the  Oregon  question  might  be,  I  would  feel  it  my  duty  to  lay  the 
Mexican  question  before  Congress,  with  my  opinion  on  the  subject,  in 
time  for  their  action  at  the  present  Session. so 

Three  days  later  Polk  told  his  cabinet  that  "our  relations  with 
Mexico  could  not  be  permitted  to  remain  in  statu  quo" ;  that  he 
contemplated  asking  Congress  to  adopt  strong  measures,  but 
thought  it  prudent  to  await  news  from  England  before  taking 
this  step.  He  did  not  have  long  to  wait,  for  on  the  following 
day  (April  22)  a  dispatch  from  McLane  was  received.  McLane 
was  of  opinion  that  Great  Britain  M'ould  take  no  step  on  the 
Oregon  question  until  the  Senate  had  come  to  some  decision  on 
the  bill  to  terminate  joint  occupation  of  Oregon.  On  the  twenty- 
third,  the  conference  committee  of  the  two  houses  came  to  an 
agreement  on  the  bill  to  give  England  the  required  twelve  months' 
notice ;  and  on  the  twenty-fifth,  Polk  informed  his  cabinet  that 
he  deemed  it  to  be  his  duty  to  make  a  communication  to  Congress 
without  delay.  "I  expressed  my  opinion,"  the  President  re- 
corded, 

that  we  must  take  redress  for  the  injuries  done  us  into  our  own  hands, 
that  we  had  attempted  to  conciliate  Mexico  in  vain,  and  had  forborne 
until  forbearance  was  no  longer  either  a  virtue  or  patriotic  .  .  .  and  that 
we  should  take  a  bold  and  firm  course  towards  Mexico. 


56  Ibid.,  337-338. 


406  JAMES  K.  POLK 

Buchanan,  whose  opinion  was  first  requested,  thought  that  the 
President  shoukl  recommend  a  declaration  of  war,  while  the  other 
members  suggested  that  a  message  be  prepared  and  submitted  to 
tliem  within  the  course  of  a  week.  After  considerable  discussion 
Buchanan  was  requested  to  collect  materials  and  prepare  the 
draft  of  a  message  for  the  President's  consideration.^^  While 
Buclianan  was  preparing  "a  succinct  history"  of  wrongs  on 
which  to  base  a  message  to  Congress  the  President  once  more 
consulted  Benton.  The  Missouri  Senator  had  not  yet  made  up 
his  mind,  but  he  expressed  a  decided  aversion  to  a  war  with 
Mexico,  if  it  could  be  avoided.  He  advised  delay  until  the 
Oregon  question  had  been  either  settled  or  brought  to  a  crisis. 
"I  told  him,"  said  Polk,  "we  had  ample  cause  of  War,  but  that 
I  was  anxious  to  avoid  it  if  it  could  be  done  honourably  &  con- 
sistently with  the  interests  of  our  injured  citizens."  He  would 
delay,  he  said,  until  the  arrival  of  Slidell  in  Washington,  but 
he  could  not  permit  Congress  to  adjourn  without  laying  the 
subject  before  them.^^ 

It  should  be  noted  that  up  to  this  point  the  President  dwelt 
entirely  on  the  refusal  to  receive  Slidell  and  the  failure  to  adjust 
the  claims  of  American  citizens.  These  furnished,  in  his  opinion, 
ample  grounds  for  war.  This  fact  is  significant,  for  Mexico  was 
in  such  dire  financial  straits  that  she  could  not  paj^  the  claims 
except  by  a  cession  of  territory.  In  other  words,  the  President 
was  ready  to  wage  war  to  procure  a  territorial  compensation  for 
claims  against  Mexico.  He  does  not,  up  to  this  time,  mention 
any  military  aggressions  on  the  part  of  Mexico.  But  on  May  5 
Polk  received  a  dispatch  from  Taylor,  dated  April  15,  stating 
that  he  had  been  ordered  by  Ampudia  to  fall  back  across  the 
Nueces,  and  the  President  noted  in  his  diary  that  "the  probabil- 
ities are  that  hostilities  might  take  i)lace  soon."^''     On  May  8, 


"  Ibid.,  343,  344,  347,  354. 

58  lUd.,  375-376. 

50  Taylor  to  Adj.  G«n.,  April  15,  184()  {H.  Ex.  Doc.  60,  30  Cong.,  1  sess., 
138).     Polk,  Dim-}/,  I,  380. 


PHELVDE   TO   THE  MEXICAN  WAE  407 

Slidell,  who  had  just  returned  from  Mexico,  called  on  the  Presi- 
dent and  told  him  that  there  was  only  one  course  left — for  the 
United  States  to  take  the  redress  of  its  injuries  into  its  own  hands. 
"In  this  I  agreed  with  him,"  said  Polk,  "and  told  him  it  was 
onl}^  a  matter  of  time  when  I  would  make  a  communication  to 
Congress  on  the  subject,  and  that  I  had  made  up  my  mind  to  do 
so  very  soon."®"  The  cabinet  met  on  the  following  day  and  the 
President  informed  them  that,  although  no  open  act  of  aggression 
by  the  Mexican  army  had  been  reported,  it  was  imminent  that 
such  would  be  committed.  All  agreed  that  if  Taylor's  forces 
should  be  molested  the  President  ought  to  recommend  a  declar- 
ation of  war.  Polk  then  asked  each  member  whether,  in  his 
opinion,  a  message  should  be  sent  to  Congress  on  the  following 
Tuesday,'^^  and  whether  it  should  recommend  a  declaration  of 
war.  All  answered  in  the  affirmative  except  Bancroft,  who,  how- 
ever, favored  immediate  war  should  Mexico  commit  any  hostile 
act.  It  was  agreed  that  a  message  should  be  prepared  and  con- 
sidered at  the  next  meeting.®-  On  that  same  evening  a  dispatch 
from  Taylor  arrived,  giving  an  account  of  the  killing  of  Amer- 
ican dragoons  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Rio  Grande.  Polk  sum- 
moned the  cabinet  to  a  special  meeting,  and  it  was  agreed  unani- 
mously that  the  President  should  lay  the  matter  before  Congress 
and  urge  prompt  measures  to  enable  the  Executive  to  prosecute 
the  war.  At  noon  on  Monday,  May  11,  the  war  mesasge  was 
ready  and  on  its  way  to  the  capitol.  Mexico  herself  had  removed 
the  obstacle  which  had  worried  both  Bancroft  and  Buchanan. 
In  addition,  she  rendered  the  President  a  distinct  service  by 
enabling  him  to  base  his  war  message  on  more  tangible  grounds — 
grounds  which  all  friends  of  the  administration  could  endorse 
with  enthusiasm,  and  those  which  the  opponents,  for  patriotic 
reasons,  found  it  difficult  to  assail.    Before  the  message  was  sent 


60  Polk,  Diary,  I,  382. 

61  This  was  on  Saturday,  May  9. 

62  Polk,  Diary,  I,  384-385.  Buchanan  said  that  he  would  feel  better 
if  Mexico  had  committed  some  hostile  act,  but  as  matters  stood,  there  was 
ample  cause  for  war,  so  he  gave  his  assent. 


408  JAMES   E.  POLK 

to  Congress,  Benton  called,  by  appointment,  and  criticized  some 
parts  of  it.  He  was,  he  said,  in  favor  of  defending  our  territory, 
but  was  not  prepared  to  make  aggressive  war  on  ]\Iexico.  Al- 
tliough  he  had  remained  silent,  lie  had  not  favored  marching  the 
army  from  Corpus  Christi  to  the  Rio  Grande,  and  he  doubted 
that  the  territory  of  the  United  States  extended  west  of  the 
Nueces  river.  •'^ 

The  departure  of  Slidell  from  IMexico  ended  all  attempt  to 
adjust  the  international  dispute  by  negotiation.  Both  nations 
now  agreed  on  one  point  at  least — that  arms  alone  could  settle 
the  controversy.  But  which  nation  was  the  aggressor?  Which 
committed  the  first  overt  act  of  war ;  and  to  what  extent,  if  any, 
was  the  American  occupation  of  that  strip  of  territory  lying 
between  the  Nueces  and  the  Rio  Grande  the  real  cause  of  the  war? 
We  have  already  seen  that  Polk  was  ready  to  recommend  war 
because  Mexico  would  not  pay  the  American  claims  by  a  cession 
of  territory.  Let  us  now  consider  the  effect  of  Taylor's  march 
to  the  Rio  Grande  upon  Mexico's  decision  to  attack  the  enemy. 

As  a  department  of  Mexico  Texas  had  extended  to  the  Nueces 
only ;  the  land  lying  west  of  that  river  belonged  to  the  department 
of  Tamaulipas.  Except  Santa  Anna's  agreement  of  1836  and 
the  Elliot  treaty  of  1845,  Mexico  never  recognized  the  independ- 
ence of  Texas,  much  less  the  extension  of  her  boundary.  Texas 
of  course  claimed  everything  to  the  Rio  Grande,  but  throughout 
her  career  as  a  republic  the  territory  between  the  two  rivers 
remained  unoccupied  by  either  country  except  that  ^Mexico  held 
a  few  posts  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Rio  Grande.  The  legitimate 
extent  and  boundaries  of  Texas,  therefore,  were  not  determined 
when  that  republic  joined  the  American  Union,  and  the  joint 
resolution  of  annexation  left  them  as  vague  as  before.  "What, 
then,  is  Texas?"  was  the  embarrassing  question  asked  by  the 
Whigs,  as  soon  as  the  administration  took  steps  to  protect  the 
new  state  from  invasion.  Texas,  they  said,  was  bounded  by  the 
Nueces,  not  by  the  Rio  Grande;  and  they  denied  the  President's 


03  Ibid.,  386-390. 


PEELUDE   TO   THE  MEXICAN  WAR  409 

authority  to  send  an  anny  into  the  "disputed  territory"  between 
the  two  rivers."  The  ocenpation  of  this  territory  was  later  used 
by  Mexico  as  an  excuse  for  attacking  the  American  army;  but 
at  the  time  that  diplomatic  relations  were  severed,  the  (piestion 
of  boundary  was  not  a  definite  issue.  Almonte  demanded  his 
passports  and  left  Washington  soon  after  the  joint  resolution  had 
passed,  without  waiting  to  see  what  boundary  would  be  claimed. 
His  conduct  was  approved  by  his  government,  and  Mexico  con- 
tinued to  assert  her  determination  to  reconquer  Texas — not  sim- 
ply the  "disputed  territory,"  but  all  of  it.  There  was  no  inti- 
mation of  an  intention  on  her  part  to  acquiesce  in  the  annexation 
of  Texas  until  she  agreed  to  receive  a  commissioner  to  negotiate 
that  question,  and  she  declined  to  receive  Slidell  because  his 
credentials  were  unacceptable. 

Although  Polk  had,  before  annexation  was  completed,  an- 
nounced his  intention  to  claim  the  Rio  Grande  as  the  boundary 
of  Texas,  the  western  frontier  was  not  occupied  immediately. 
On  July  30,  1845,  Taylor  was  instructed  to  station  part  of  his 
forces  west  of  the  Nueces,  but  it  was  not  until  January  13,  1846, 
that  he  was  ordered  to  move  his  army  to  the  east  bank  of  the 
Rio  Grande.  On  receipt  of  this  order,  early  in  February,  Taylor 
at  once  made  preparations  to  carry  it  into  effect,  and  he  reported 
that  he  did  not  anticipate  that  his  advance  would  be  resisted. 
Before  leaving  Corpus  Christi,  Taylor  prepared  and  had  trans- 
lated into  Spanish  an  "order"  which  he  caused  to  be  circulated 
among  the  inhabitants  dwelling  along  the  Rio  Grande.  This 
order  stated  that  the  advance  to  the  Rio  Grande  was  not  a  hostile 
move,  and  that  both  the  personal  and  the  property  rights  of  the 
inhabitants  on  either  side  of  that  river  would  be  respected."' 

64  On  September  13,  1845,  the  National  Intelligencer  said  that  if  the 
Army  of  Observation  should  be  sent  beyond  the  Nueces  it  woukl  not  be  in 
Texas  and  not  defending  Texas.  "Is  the  disputed  territory,  then,  a  part 
of  Texas"?  No.  It  was  not  within  Texas,  as  a  part  of  Mexico.  It  has  not 
been  since  acquired  by  arms  or  treaty. ' ' 

cs  Tavlor  to  Adj.  Gen.,  Feb.  4  and  Feb.  IG,  1846  (H.  Ex.  Doc.  60.  30 
Cong.,  l"  sess.,  116-117).  "Order  No.  30,"  dated  March  8,  1846  (^ihid., 
119-120). 


410  JAMES  K.  FOLK 

The  march  of  Taylor  toward  the  Rio  Grande  was  undisputed 
by  the  Mexicans  until  he  reached  the  Arroyo  Colorado  on  March 
19.  Here  a  party  of  cavalry  was  encountered,  and  their  com- 
mander warned  Taylor  that  he  was  under  orders  to  tire  on  the 
Americans  should  they  attempt  to  pass  that  river.  The  warning 
was  unheeded  by  Taylor  and  the  Mexicans  retreated  without 
interposing  armed  resistance,  but  during  the  parley  one  of  the 
officers  placed  in  Taylor's  hands  a  bellicose  proclamation  which 
had  been  issued  on  March  18  by  General  Francisco  Mejia.  This 
document  is  of  interest,  not  only  as  being  the  first  specific  chal- 
lenge to  the  advance  of  the  American  army,  but  because  it  draws 
a  sharp  distinction  between  Texas  and  land  lying  between  the 
Nueces  and  Rio  Grande.  The  ' '  degenerate  sons  of  Washington, ' ' 
said  Mejia,  not  satisfied  with  annexing  Texas,  were  now  advanc- 
ing to  take  possession  of  a  large  part  of  Tamaulipas.  This  they 
had  begun  "whilst  endeavoring  to  lull  us  into  security,  by  open- 
ing diplomatic  relations. "  "  The  limits  of  Texas, ' '  he  continued, 
"are  certain  and  recognized;  never  have  they  extended  beyond 
the  river  Nueces ;  notwithstanding  which,  the  American  army  has 
crossed  the  line  separating  Tamaulipas  from  that  department." 
Even  though  Mexico  might  acquiesce  in  the  annexation  of  Texas, 

nevertheless  the  territory  of  Tamaulipas  would  still  remain  beyond  the 
law  of  annexation,  sanctioned  by  the  American  Congress;  because  that 
law  comprises  independent  Texas,  the  ground  occupied  by  the  rebellious 
colony,  and  in  no  wise  includes  other  departments,  in  which  the  Mexican 
government  has  unintcrj  rjujitedly  exercised  its  legitimate  autliority. 

All  Mexicans  were  therefore  exhorted  to  defend  their  country. '^^ 
While  Taylor  was  on  the  march  from  the  Arroyo  Colorado  to 
Point  Isabel  he  was  met  by  a  civil  deputation  from  Matamoras 
bearing  a  protest  from  the  prefect  of  the  northern  district  of 
Tamaulipas.  It  stated  that  Taylor's  march  was  regarded  as  an 
invasion  of  Mexico,  and  the  prefect  pointed  out  that  "nothing 
has  been  said  officially  by  the  cabinet  of  the  Union  to  the  Mexican 


o«/bi(Z.,  125-129. 


PBELUDE  TO   TEE  MEXICAN  WAR  411 

government,  respecting  the  extension  of  the  limits  of  Texas  to 
the  left  bank  of  the  Rio  Bravo."  The  citizens  of  the  district, 
he  said,  would  never  consent  to  separate  themselves  from  Mexico 
and  join  the  United  States.'^'  To  this  protest  Taylor  paid  no 
heed,  but  moved  on  to  take  a  position  opposite  Matamoras.  His 
batteries  bore  directly  on  the  public  square  of  that  town,  and 
"their  object,"  reported  Taylor,  "cannot  be  mistaken  by  the 
enemy."  A  parley  was  held  on  the  Mexican  side  of  the  river 
by  General  Worth  and  General  Vega  in  which  Worth  demanded 
an  interview  with  the  American  consul  at  Matamoras.  The  de- 
mand was  refused,  and  Worth  informed  the  Mexican  commander 
that  he  regarded  this  refusal  as  a  belligerent  act.  Worth  stated 
also  that  Taylor  would  regard  the  crossing  of  the  Rio  Grande  by 
Mexican  forces  as  an  act  of  war."^  On  March  31,  General  Mejia 
addressed  a  note  to  Taylor  stating  that  all  Mexicans  looked  upon 
the  occupation  of  the  east  bank  of  the  Rio  Grande  as  a  "positive 
declaration  of  war  on  the  Part  of  the  United  States."  Taylor's 
march  could  not  be  viewed  as  pacific,  "inasmuch  as  a  question 
of  limits  is  depending  between  our  respective  governments."  It 
could  not  be  so  viewed,  "because  it  is  not  easy  to  conceive  the 
reason  or  justice  of  taking  forcible  possession  of  the  very  terri- 
tory in  dispute,  pending  the  negotiation."^''  Had  such  a  com- 
munication been  addressed  to  President  Polk  he  might  have  had 
difficulty  in  explaining  the  peaceful  nature  of  the  advance  of  the 
American  army,  but  it  was  Taylor's  duty  to  obey  orders  and  not 
to  justify  his  movements.  He  very  wisely  declined  to  assume  the 
role  of  a  diplomat. 

On  April  11,  General  Ampudia  arrived  at  Matamoras  and 
took  command  of  the  Mexican  forces.  By  "explicit  and  definite 
orders  of  his   [my]   government,"  he  at  once  summoned  Taylor 


"TCardenes  to  Taylor,  March  23,  1846  (ibid.,  130-132). 

68  Tavlor   to  A<\].   Geu.,   April   6,   1846;   Mimites  of  the   parley  held   on 
March  28  (ibid.,  133-138). 

60  Ibid.,  1204. 


412  JAMES   K.  POLK 

to  retire  beyond  the  Nueces  'within  twenty-four  hours,  there  to 
remain  until  the  limits  of  Texas  should  be  determined  by  the  two 
governments.  "If  you  insist  in  remaining  upon  the  soil  of  the 
department  of  Tamaulipas, "  he  was  told,  "it  will  clearly  result 
that  arms,  and  arms  alone,  must  decide  the  question."  Taylor 
replied  on  the  same  day  that  he  would  remain  where  he  was, 
"leaving  the  responsibility  with  those  who  rashly  commence  hos- 
tilities." As  a  result  of  Ampudia's  note,  Taylor  immediately 
ordered  a  blockade  of  the  Rio  Grande,  which  cut  off  supplies  from 
Matamoras.^°  On  April  24,  Ampudia  was  superseded  by  General 
Arista,  who  at  once  notified  Taylor  that  Mexico  could  not  submit 
to  the  indignities  heaped  upon  her  by  the  United  States,  and  that 
hostilities  had  commenced.  Taylor  replied  on  the  following  day 
that  he  had  carefully  refrained  from  committing 

any  act  which  could  possibly  be  interpreted  into  hostility,  until  the  per- 
emptory summons  of  General  Ampudia  to  vacate  my  position  within 
twenty-four  hours,  rendered  it  necessary  to  take  some  action,  and  I  then 
chose  a  measure  not  in  itself  hostile,  but  a  simple  defensive  precaution, 
viz:  a  blockade  of  the  Rio  Bravo.'i 

Although  this  definition  of  a  blockade  may  have  relieved  the 
conscience  of  the  man  who  made  it,  such  a  bottling-up  of  the 
opponent  is  usually  regarded  as  an  act  of  war.  Ampudia  pro- 
tested vigorously  and  demanded  the  free  use  of  the  river,  but 
Taylor  refused  to  raise  the  blockade  "unless  indeed  you  desire 
an  armistice  pending  the  settlement  of  the  question  between  the 
two  governments."^" 

The  Mexican  President  likewise  considered  Taylor's  blockade 
to  be  an  act  of  war.  On  April  23,  Paredes  issued  a  proclamation 
directing  a  "defensive  war"  to  begin.  After  a  recital  of  the 
injuries  which,  since  1836,  the  United  States  had  inflicted  upon 
the  people  of  Mexico ;  the  sending  of  Slidell  as  minister  resident 


70  Ampudia  to  Taylor,  April  12;   Taylor  to  Ampudia,  April  12;   Taylor 
to  Adj.  Gen.,  April  15,  1846   {ibid.,  138-140). 

71  Ihid.,  1204-1200. 

"Taylor  to  Anipuili:i,  April  22,  184()   {ibid.,  144-147). 


PEELUDE   TO   THE  MEXICAN  WAR  413 

at  the  very  moment  when  the  American  troops  were  occupying 
Mexican  territory;  and  the  blockade  of  the  Rio  Grande  by  war 
■vessels :    Parades  asserted  that 

hostilities  therefore  have  been  begun  by  the  United  States  of  Amerit-a, 
who  have  undertaken  new  conquests  in  the  territory  lying  within  the  line 
of  the  Departments  of  Tamaulipas  and  Nueva  Leon  while  the  troops  of 
the  United  States  are  threatening  Monterey  in  Upper  California. 

He  had  therefore  directed  the  commanding  general  to  "attack 
the  army  which  is  attacking  us ;  to  answer  with  war  the  enemy 
who  makes  war  upon  us."  Like  Taylor,  Paredes  invented  a  defi- 
nition to  suit  his  purposes,  for  he  declared  the  proposed  hostilities 
to  be  not  a  war  against  the  government  of  the  United  States,  but 
simply  a  defense  of  Mexican  territory  which  had  been  invaded."^ 
Arista,  who  assumed  command  of  the  Mexican  forces  on  the 
day  after  Paredes  had  issued  his  proclamation,  took  immediate 
steps  to  cross  the  Rio  Grande.  General  Torrejon,  with  all  of  the 
cavalry  and  a  small  body  of  infantry,  was  sent  across  the  river 
above  Matamoras,  while  the  main  body  of  infantry  and  artillery 
was  to  cross  below  Matamoras  and  cut  Taylor  off  from  his  base 
of  supplies  at  Point  Isabel.'*  On  April  25,  Torrejon  encoun- 
tered a  scouting  party  of  sixty-three  American  dragoons,  under 
Captain  Thornton.  An  engagement  followed  in  which  sixteen 
Americans  were  killed  or  wounded  and  the  remainder  forced  to 
surrender.  The  prisoners  were  taken  to  Matamoras  and  treated 
kindly  by  the  Mexicans.'^    The  long-threatened  war  with  Mexico 


73  "I  solemnly  announce  that  I  do  not  decree  war  against  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  of  America,  because  it  belongs  to  the  august 
Congress  of  the  nation,  and  not  to  the  Executive,  to  decide  definitely  what 
reparation  must  be  exacted  for  such  injuries.  But  the  defense  of  Mexican 
territory  which  the  troops  of  the  United  States  are  invading  is  an  urgent 
necessity,  and  my  responsibility  before  the  nation  would  be  immense  if  I 
did  not  order  the  repulse  of  forces  Avhich  are  acting  as  enemies;  and  I 
have  so  ordered.  From  this  day  defensive  war  begins,  and  every  point 
of  our  territory  which  may  be  invaded  or  attacked  shall  be  defended  by 
force"  (Mexico  a  traves  de  los  Siglos,  IV,  559).  Rives,  The  United  States 
and  Mexico,  II,  141-142. 

"4  Rives,  02).  cit.,  143. 

75  Taylor  to  Adj.  Gen.,  April  26,  1846;  Reports  of  Captains  Thornton 
and  Hardee   (ibid.,  288,  290-292). 


414  JAMES  K.  POLK 

was  at  last  a  reality.  The  killing  of  Thornton's  dragoons  by  the 
Mexican  forces  under  Tor  re  j  on  was  soon  described  by  President 
Polk  as  an  unprovoked  act  of  war.  In  a  message  sent  to  Congress 
on  May  11,  1846,  the  President  asserted  that 

after  reiterated  menaces,  Mexico  has  passed  the  boundary  of  the  United 
States,  has  invaded  our  territory,  and  shed  American  blood  upon  the 
American  soil.  She  has  proclaimed  that  hostilities  have  commenced,  and 
that  the  two  nations  are  now  at  war. 

As  war  exists,  and,  notwithstanding  all  our  eiforts  to  avoid  it,  exists 
by  the  act  of  Mexico  herself,  we  are  called  upon  by  every  consideration 
of  duty  and  patriotism  to  vindicate  with  decision  and  honor,  the  rights, 
and  the  interests  of  our  country. 

He  therefore  recommended  prompt  and  energetic  measures  for 
bringing  the  war  to  a  speedy  and  successful  termination."'^ 

Whether  or  not  Taylor's  advance  into  the  "disputed  terri- 
tory" was  the  actual  cause  of  Mexico's  refusal  to  renew  diplo- 
matic relations  and  of  her  determination  to  resort  to  arms,  it  at 
least  served  as  an  excuse  for  such  a  course  on  her  part.  Although 
she  had  from  the  first  claimed  the  occupation  of  any  part  of  Texas 
to  be  an  invasion  of  Mexico  and  a  casus  helli,  she  had,  on  various 
occasions,  intimated  that  she  might  acquiesce  in  the  annexation 
of  Texas  and  discuss  its  limits.  It  was  not  until  Taylor  had 
crossed  the  Nueces  that  she  actually  took  steps  to  attack  the 
American  forces.  Polk  may  or  may  not  have  acted  within  his 
rights  in  assuming  the  boundary  claimed  by  Texas,  but  at  least 
there  was  some  justification  in  the  contention  of  the  Whigs  that 
he  precipitated  the  war  by  ordering  Taylor  to  the  Rio  Grande. 


76  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  IV,  442-443. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

WAR  IN  NORTHERN  MEXICO 

President.  Polk's  war  message  was  sent  to  Congress  on  May 
11,  1846.  After  a  brief  debate  of  two  hours  the  House,  by  a  vote 
of  one  hundred  and  seventy-four  to  fourteen,  passed  a  bill  which 
authorized  the  President  to  prosecute  the  war  that  exists  ' '  by  the 
act  of  the  Republic  of  Mexico."^  Garrett  Davis,  of  Kentucky, 
denied  the  truth  of  the  statement  just  quoted  and  asserted  that : 
"It  is  our  own  President  who  began  this  war"  by  sending  General 
Taylor  beyond  the  Nueces  river.  In  defense  of  the  administra- 
tion, the  Washington  Unimi  answered  this  contention  by  calling 
attention  to  the  fact  that  Mexico  had  always  claimed  Texas  to 
the  Sabine,  and  that  there  was  no  reason  for  believing  that  her 
invading  army  would  stop  at  the  Nueces.- 

Greater  opposition  was  encountered  in  the  Senate,  and  for  a 
time  the  President  feared  that  Benton  and  Calhoun  w^ould  join 
the  Whigs  and  thereby  defeat  the  House  bill.  However,  after  a 
day's  debate,  the  Senate,  having  added  a  few  amendments,  passed 
the  measure  by  a  vote  of  forty-two  to  two.  Benton  voted  for  the 
bill  and  Calhoun,  having  opposed  a  declaration  of  war,  declined 
to  vote  either  way.=^    Some  of  the  members  based  their  objections 

1  Cong.  Glohe,  29  Cong.,  1  sess.,  795.     Polk,  Biarij,  I,  392. 

2  "  No  man  has  yet  alleged,  so  far  as  we  knoAV,  that  a  Mexican  invasion 
of  Texas    if  permitted  by  us,  would  have  stopped  at  the  Nueces;  or  would 

have  thought   of  stopping  there The   claim  of  Mexico  is    m  terms, 

that  she  owns  Texas  up  to  the  Sabine.  She  makes  not  the  slightest  diffei- 
ence  in  any  one  of  her  state  papers  between  her  ownership  up  to  the  ^ueces 
and  her  ownership  up  to  the  Sabine.  In  a  great  multitude  of  state^papers 
of  old  date,  and  of  most  recent  date,  Mexico  says  that  Texas— a??  , -T^^T 
is  her  soil.  This  claim  to  the  ivhole  of  Texas  is  the  claim  on  which  she 
refused  negotiation.  On  this  claim,  and  none  other,  Almonte  threw  up 
his  passports.  On  this  claim  Mr.  Shannon  was  sent  home"  {Vnion,  May  lo, 
1846). 

3  Cong.  Globe,  loc.  cit.,  804.     Polk,  Diary,  1,  394. 


416  JAMES  K.  POLK 

on  the  lack  of  information  as  to  what  had  happened  on  the  Rio 
Grande ;  others  denounced  the  President  for  having  invaded  ter- 
ritory which  did  not  belong  to  the  United  States.  In  general, 
tlie  Van  Burenites  of  both  houses  supported  the  administration 
with  their  votes,  but  in  private  their  criticisms  were  quite  as  severe 
as  those  of  the  Whigs.  Although  Cambreleng  was  not  a  member 
of  Congress  at  the  time,  a  letter  \Vhich  he  wrote  to  the  ex-Presi- 
dent well  expresses  the  feelings  of  this  faction.  The  letter  is 
especially  interesting,  for  when  Polk  occupied  the  Speaker's  chair, 
Cambreleng  was  his  most  loyal  supporter.  Having  pronounced 
Polk  to  be  worse  than  John  Tyler  and  invoked  divine  pardon  for 
having  aided  in  his  election,  Cambreleng  said : 

With  regard  to  Mexico,  they  make  inquiry  through  a  consul — Mexico 
projioses  to  receive  a  Commissioner  to  treat  about  Texas  if  we  will  with- 
draw our  naval  forces — then  we  send  in  hot  haste,  and  most  secretly,  a 
Minister  Plenipotentiary,  at  a  moment  too  when  a  revolutionary  movement 
was  going  on  and  when  it  was  obvious,  that  our  minister  could  do  nothing 
whatever  but  help  Paredes  to  overthrow  Herera,  which  he  did  very  effec- 
tively and  returned  home  with  his  credentials.  [Taylor  marched  across 
Tamaulipas  and  blockaded  the  Mexicans]  as  if  he  had  instructions  [to 
make  war,  and  Mexico  had  no  choice  but  to  fight]. ^ 

The  bill  which  decreed  war  against  Mexico  was  signed  by  the 
President  on  IVEay  13,  and  General  Scott  was  given  command  of 
the  army  for  which  it  provided,  although  Polk  did  not  consider 
him  to  be  "in  all  respects  suited"  for  the  position. 

At  a  cabinet  meeting  held  on  the  same  evening  the  President 
and  his  Secretary  of  State  had  a  sharp  disagreement  concerning 
the  scope  and  the  objects  of  the  war.  Buchanan  had  brought  to 
the  meeting  the  draft  of  a  dispatch  which  was  to  be  sent  to 
American  ministers  at  foreign  courts.  Its  purpose  was  to  notify 
those  governments  of  the  declaration  of  war,  and  to  announce 
the  intentions  of  the  American  government.  In  his  draft  Bu- 
chanan disavowed  any  intention  of  dismembering  Mexico,  and 
of  making  conquests.     He  stated  specifically  that  the  war  had 


*  Cambreleng  to    Van    Burcn,   Washington,   May   16,    1846,    Van   Buren 
Papers. 


WAE  IN  NOETHERN  MEXICO  417 

not  been  undertaken  "with  a  view  to  acquire  either  California 
or  New  Mexico  or  any  other  portion  of  Mexican  territory."  Polk 
"thought  such  a  declaration  to  Foreign  Governments  unnecessary 
and  improper, ' '  and  believed  the  causes  for  war  set  forth  in  his 
message  to  be  entirel}^  adequate.  He  told  his  Secretary  that  while 
the  United  States  had  not  gone  to  war  for  the  purpose  of  conquest, 

yet  it  was  clear  that  in  niakiiig  peace  we  would  if  practicable  obtain 
California  and  such  other  portion  of  the  Mexican  territory  as  would  be 
sufficient  to  indemnify  our  claimants  on  Mexico,  and  to  defray  the  expenses 
of  the  war  which  that  power  by  her  long  continued  wrongs  and  injuries 
had  forced  us  to  wage,  i  told  him  it  was  well  known  that  the  Mexican 
Government  had  no  other  means  of  indemnifying  us. 

Buchanan  expressed  the  fear  that  Lord  Aberdeen  would  demand 
from  McLane,  United  States  minister  in  London,  a  statement  as 
to  whether  his  government  intended  to  acquire  Mexican  territory, 
especially  California.  Should  a  satisfactory  answer  be  withheld, 
he  feared  that  both  England  and  France  would  join  Mexico  in 
the  war  against  us.  Polk  replied  that  the  present  war  did  not 
concern  any  European  power,  a  demand  such  as  Buchanan  had 
mentioned  would  be  an  insult,  and  ' '  if  made  I  would  not  answer 
it,  even  if  the  consequence  should  be  a  war  with  all  of  them." 
He  would  give  no  pledges  as  to  the  terms  on  which  he  would  ulti- 
mately make  peace  with  Mexico.  Buchanan  insisted  that  if  as- 
surances were  not  givenwe  would  surely  have  war  with  England, 
and  probably  with  France,  for  neither  would  permit  California 
to  be  annexed  to  the  United  States.  "I  told  him,"  wrote  the 
President,  "that  before  I  would  make  the  pledge  which  he  pro- 
posed, I  would  meet  the  war  which  either  England  or  France 
or  all  the  Powers  of  Christendom  might  wage."  and  that  "neither 
as  a  citizen  nor  as  President  would  I  permit  or  tolerate  any  inter- 
meddling of  any  European  Power  on  this  Continent. ' '  Although 
Buchanan  still  maintained  that  unless  some  pledge  were  given 
the  Oregon  question  could  not  be  adjusted  and  that  England 
would  declare  war,  the  President  was  immovable  and  said  that 
he  woidd  take  the  responsibility  of  a  war  rather  than  give  a 


418  JAMES   K.  POLK 

pledge  which  would  prevent  him  from  "fairly  and  honourably" 
acquiring  California.  The  other  members  of  the  cabinet  sup- 
ported this  position,  and  Polk  was  "much  astonished  at  the  views 
expressed  by  Mr.  Buchanan  on  the  subject."  The  President  him- 
self drafted  a  paragraph  to  be  substituted  for  the  one  which 
Buchanan  had  submitted."' 
^  Scarcely  had  the  President  reduced  his  Secretary  of  State  to 
proper  subordination  when  difficulties  with  his  Whig  generals 
presented  themselves.''  He  had  planned  first  of  all  to  seize  the 
northern  provinces  of  Mexico  and  to  hold  them  until  the  enemy 
had  been  forced  to  make  peace.  Without  hesitation  Congress 
voted  the  necessary  troops  and  supplies,  but  the  question  of  se- 
lecting suitable  commanders  to  lead  the  troops  to  victory  caused 
the  President  no  little  anxiety  and  annoyance.  As  Scott  was  the 
ranking  general,  Polk  tendered  him  the  command  and  consulted 
him  concerning  military  arrangements,  but  he  regarded  the  gen- 
eral as  "visionary"  and  his  advice  as  of  no  great  value." 

From  the  beginning  of  his  administration  Polk  seems  to  have 
looked  upon  the  conquest  of  Mexico  as  an  easy  matter.  Like  most 
civilian  executives  he  did  not  fully  appreciate  the  time  required 
to  equip  an  army  for  active  service.  On  the  other  hand,  General 
Scott  took  both  himself  and  his  position  very  seriously,  and  was 
desirous  of  making  his  descent  upon  Mexico  as  imposing  as  pos- 
sible. He  was  a  competent  officer,  and  doubtless  his  intentions 
were  good,  but  his  vanity  and  tactless  utterances  soon  involved 
iiim  in  difficulties. 


5  Polk,  Diary,  I,  396-.399.  For  the  dispatcli  as  finally  sent  to  the 
American  ministers  abroad,  see  Buclianan,  Works,  VI,  484. 

6  I'olk  was  told  that  not  only  Seott  but  General  Wool  and  Adjutant 
General  Jones  were  using  their  influence  with  nienil)ers  of  Congress  to 
prevent  the  passage  of  a  bill  to  authorize  the  appointment  of  two  new 
major  generals  and  four  brigadier  generals   (I'olk,  Diary,  I,  418). 

7  "I  did  not  think  that  so  many  as  20,000  [the  number  wdiich  Scott 
had  requested  for  immediate  service]  volunteers  besides  the  regular  army 
was  necessary,  but  I  <lid  not  express  this  opinion,  not  being  willing  to  take 
the  responsibility  of  any  failure  of  the  campaign  by  refusing  to  grant  to 
Gen'l  Seott  all  he  asked"  (Polk,  Diary,  I,  400-401 ).  " 


WAR  IN  NOETHEEN  MEXICO  419 

Without  consulting  the  War  Department,  Scott  announced 
that  he  probably  would  not  be  ready  to  set  out  for  the  seat  of 
war  until  the  first  of  September.  Through  the  Secretary  of  War, 
the  President  notified  him  that  unless  he  should  proceed  to  the 
Rio  Grande  very  soon  he  would  be  superseded  by  another  com- 
mander. 

Polk  undoubtedly  bore  a  prejudice  against  the  general  from 
the  beginning  and  may  have  been  too  impatient  with  his  delay ; 
on  the  other  hand,  Scott's  amazing  indiscretions  soon  gave  the 
President  no  alternative  but  to  deprive  him  of  his  command. 
Not  satisfied  with  telling  applicants  for  military  positions  that 
these  places  had  been  created  "to  give  Commissions  or  rather 
pay  to  western  democrats,"  he  responded  to  Marcy's  notice  that 
the  President  desired  greater  promptness,  by  returning  a  most 
insulting  and  vainglorious  letter.  Although  Polk  had  verbally 
tendered  Scott  the  command  of  the  Mexican  expedition,  the  gen- 
eral now  complained  because  he  had  not  received  a  written  order 
assigning  him  to  the  command;  he  had,  nevertheless,  been  in- 
cessantly employed  in  making  preliminary  arrangements.  "In 
the  midst  of  these  multitudinous  and  indispensable  occupations," 
wrote  the  irate  general, 

I  have  learned  from  you  that  much  impatience  is  already  felt,  perhaps  in 
high  quarters,  that  I  have  not  already  put  myself  in  route  for  the  Eio 
Grande;  and  now,  with  fourteen  hours  a  day  of  preliminary  work  remain- 
ing on  mv  hands  for  many  days,  1  find  myself  compelled  to  stop  that 
necessarv'work  to  guard  myself  against,  perhaps,  utter  condemnation  in 
the  quarters  alluded  to.  I  am  too  old  a  soldier,  and  have  had  too  much 
special  experience,  not  to  feel  the  infinite  importance  of  securing  myself 
against  danger,  (ill  will  or  pre-condemnation,)  in  my  rear,  before  advancing 
upon  the  public  enemy. 

He  had  no  fear  of  the  enemy  ahead,  but  unless  he  could  feel 
confident  of  support  in  Washington  the  selection  of  another  com- 
mander was  advised.  For  fear  that  Marcy  and  Polk  might  not 
have  sufficient  mental  capacity  to  grasp  his  meaning,  the  general 
added:     "My  explicit  meaning  is,  that  I  do  not  desire  to  place 


420  JAMES   K.  POLK 

myself  in  the  most  perilous  of  all  positions — a  fire  upon  my  rear 
from  Washington,  and  the  fire  in  front  from  the  Mexicans."  So 
clear  was  his  explanation  that  both  men  saw  at  once  the  injustice 
of  placing  the  gallant  and  overworked  general  in  such  a  danger- 
ous predicament.  In  a  very  able  and  dignified — ^but,  at  the  same 
time,  withering — letter,  Marcy  notified  Scott  that,  instead  of 
leading  the  Mexican  expedition,  he  was  to  remain  in  Washington.** 
In  itself  Marcy 's  letter  was  galling  enough  to  the  pompous  gen- 
eral's pride,  but,  as  if  to  add  insult  to  injury,  it  was  handed  to 
him  just  "as  he  [I]  sat  down  to  a  hasty  plate  of  soup."  In 
another  letter  he  made  a  lame  attempt  to  explain  that  his  allu- 
sions to  "high  quarters"  meant  members  of  Congress  instead  of 
the  President,  but  he  could  not  refrain  from  sneering  at  Polk's 
"magnanimity"  in  not  having  him  court-martialed."  The  effron- 
tery exhibited  in  his  letters  indicates  that  the  general  was  still 
deluded  by  the  campaign  cry,  "Who  is  James  K.  Polk?"  Marcy 
enlightened  him,  for  the  time  being  at  least.  Indeed  the  Presi- 
dent felt  himself  to  be  fully  competent  to  discharge  the  duties 
which  the  Constitution  had  assigned  to  the  chief  executive.  To 
one  of  his  many  volunteer  advisers  he  remarked  that :  "  I  hoped 
my  friends  in  Congress  and  elsewhere  would  suffer  me  to  conduct 
the  war  with  Mexico  as  I  thought  proper,  and  not  plan  the  cam- 
paign for  me."^° 

As  already  noted,  Polk  did  not  anticipate  great  difficulty  in 
defeating  the  Mexican  armies.  Apparently,  he  feared  most  of 
all  the  influence  of  the  Mexican  priests.  He  thought  that  de- 
signing persons  in  Mexico  had  led  the  priests  to  believe  that  the 


•^  After  calling  attention  to  tlip  iniportanco  of  the  position  to  wiiicli 
Scott  had  been  assigned  by  the  President,  Marcy  said:  "How  couhl  you, 
under  these  circumstances,  arrest  your  labors  of  preparation,  and  suffer 
your  energies  to  be  crippled,  for  the  purpose  of  indulging  in  illiberal  im- 
putations against  the  man  who  has  just  bestowed  upon  you  the  highest 
mark  of  his  conlideuce  ? ' ' 

»  Polk,  Diary,  I,  395,  400,  413-415,  419-421.  The  correspondence  is 
printed  in  Niles'  Reg.,  LXX,  231-233. 

1"  Polk,  Diary,  I,  427. 


JIJA'  IN  NOllTUERN  MEXICO  421 

United  States  had  planned  to  pillage  their  churches  and  to  over- 
throw their  religion.  So  long  as  the  priests  harbored  such  fears 
they  would  do  much  to  incite  the  people  stubbornly  to  resist  the 
advance  of  the  American  army.  Being  desirous  of  weakening 
the  power  of  the  Mexican  government  by  winning  the  good  will 
of  the  people,  especially  in  the  northern  provinces,  Polk  attached 
great  importance  to  disabusing  the  minds  of  the  priests.  ' '  If  the 
Catholie'Priests  in  Mexico, ' '  he  told  Benton, 

can  be  satisfied  that  their  churches  and  religion  would  be  secure  the  con- 
quests of  the  Northern  Provinces  of  Mexico  will  be  easy  and  the  proba- 
bility is  that  the  war  would  be  of  short  duration;  but  if  a  contrary  opinion 
prevails  the  resistance  to  our  forces  will  be  desperate. 

He  therefore  sought  interviews  with  Bishop  Hughes,  of  New 
York,  and  the  Bishop  of  Missouri  and  asked  them  to  select  priests 
who  might  accompany  the  army  as  chaplains  and  assure  the  Mexi- 
can clerg}^  that  their  fear  of  Americans  was  groundless.  A  proc- 
lamation in  the  Spanish  language  which  promised  religious  free- 
dom and  kind  treatment  was  prepared  and  sent  to  General  Taylor 
with  instructions  that  it  should  be  distributed  among  the  inhabi- 
tants.^^ 

In  planning  the  campaign  against  Mexico  the  President  at- 
tached great  importance  to  getting  possession  of  California.  As 
early  as  May  26  he  proposed,  and  his  cabinet  unanimously  agreed, 
that  an  "expedition  be  immediately  fitted  out  against  Upper 
California"  if  it  should  be  found  that  the  mounted  regiments 
assembled  at  Independence,  Missouri,  could  reach  the  Sacramento 
region  before  winter.  On  May  30  he  again  impressed  upon  the 
cabinet  the  importance  of  having  military  possession  of  California 
when  the  time  for  making  peace  should  have  arrived.  "I  de- 
clared," said  he,  "my  purpose  to  be  to  acquire  for  the  U.  S. 
California,  New  Mexico,  and  perhaps  some  others  of  the  Northern 


ii/btfZ.,  408-411.  For  the  proclamation  see  H.  Ex.  Doc.  60,  30  Cong., 
1  sess.,  284-287.  In  it  the  Mexicans  were  told  that  their  government  was 
in  the  hands  of  "tyrants  and  usurpers,"  and  that  the  United  States  was 
doing  the  people  a  real  kindness  by  invading  their  country. 


422  JAMES   K.  POLE 

Provinces  of  Mexico  whenever  peace  was  made. ' '  Colonel  Stephen 
W.  Kearny,  who  had  already  been  transferred  from  Fort  Leaven- 
worth to  Santa  Fe  for  the  purpose  of  affording  protection  to 
American  traders,  was  now  selected  to  lead  the  expedition  to 
California.  By  a  new  commission  which  accompanied  his  in- 
structions he  was  made  a  brevet  brigadier-general.  A  requisition 
was  sent  to  the  governor  of  Missouri  for  one  thousand  mounted 
men  to  supplement  the  force  of  dragoons  under  Kearny's  com- 
mand. It  was  agreed  that  Kearny  should  be  authorized  to  take 
into  his  service  any  American  citizens  whom  he  might  find  in 
California.  He  was  to  be  given  authority,  also,  to  enlist  a  few 
hundred  of  the  Mormons  who  were  now  on  their  way  to  California, 
"with  a  view  to  conciliate  them,  attach  them  to  our  country,  & 
prevent  them  from  taking  part  against  us."  The  President  di- 
rected that  arms  and  provisions  should  be  sent  immediately  from 
New  York  to  the  Pacific  for  the  use  of  Kearny's  army.^-  About 
two  weeks  later  he  consulted  his  cabinet  on  the  propriety  of  send- 
ing from  New  York  by  sea  a  regiment  of  volunteers  to  join 
Kearny's  forces  in  California.  Benton,  whose  advice  was  sought 
by  the  President,  favored  sending  such  a  regiment,  but  he  be- 
lieved that  the  men  should  go  as  emigrants  and  be  discharged  in 
California  at  the  end  of  their  service."  This  policy  was  subse- 
quently adopted. 

Although  Polk  was  interested  primarily  in  the  acquisition  of 
California  and  New  Mexico  he  desired  to  procure,  if  possible,  a 
much  larger  area;  and  the  amicable  settlement  of  the  Oregon 


12  Polk,  DUiri/,  I,  429,  437-439,  443-444.  On  June  3,  J.  C.  Little,  a 
Mormon  from  Petersborough,  N.  H.,  called  on  Polk  for  the  purpose  of 
ascertaining  the  policy  of  the  government  towards  this  sect.  He  was  told 
that  they  would  be  treated  like  any  other  American  citizens  and  that  they 
wouhl  be  invited  to  enlist  in  the  anny.  Polk  did  not  mention  the  projected 
expedition  under  Kearny.  Little  offered  to  overtake  the  Mormons  and  to 
muster  .TOO  of  tliem  into  the  United  States  army;  but  fearing  that  they 
might  reach  California  before  Kearny  and  not  wishing  that  the  province 
should  be  at  the  mercy  of  Mormon  soldiers,  the  President  declined  the  offer. 
He  decided,  also,  that  Kearny  should  not  enlist  any  of  that  sect  until  after 
they  had  arrived  in  California  {ibid.,  445-446,  449-450). 

^3  Ibid.,  473,  481. 


WAli  IN  NOETHEEN  MEXICO  423 

question  by  the  treaty  signed  on  June  15  made  interference  by 
Great  Britain  less  probable.  The  extent  of  territory  which  he 
wished  to  acquire  is  stated  very  definitely  in  his  record  of  a 
cabinet  meeting  held  on  June  30,  1846.  At  this  meeting  an  ani- 
mated discussion  arose  between  Buchanan  and  Walker  regarding 
the  objects  to  be  attained  as  a  result  of  the  war.  Buchanan  ex- 
pressed himself  as  being  in  favor  of  making  the  Rio  Grande  the 
boundary  up  to  El  Paso,  in  latitude  about  32°  ;  from  this  point 
a  line  was  to  be  drawn  due  west  to  the  Pacific  ocean.  He  op- 
posed the  acquisition  of  any  land  south  of  32°  because  the  North 
would  be  unwilling  to  acquire  a  tract  that  was  likely  to  become 
slaveholding  territory.  Walker  held  very  different  opinions.  He 
proposed  that  the  boundary  should  begin  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Rio  Grande,  in  latitude  about  26°,  and  extend  directly  westward 
to  the  Pacific.  The  other  members  of  the  cabinet  took  no  part 
in  the  discussion,  but  Polk  agreed  with  Walker.  "I  remarked," 
wrote  the  President, 

that  I  preferred  the  26°  to  any  boundary  North  of  it,  but  that  if  it  was 
found  that  that  boundary  could  not  be  obtained  I  was  willing  to  take  6Z  , 
but  that  in  any  event  we  must  obtain  Upper  California  and  New  Mexico 
in  any  Treaty  of  Peace  we  would  make.i* 

At  this  point  we  may  leave  the  President  to  develop  his  pro- 
gram of  conquest  while  we  consider  a  parenthetical  episode  which 
affected  his  policy  of  territorial  expansion  but  which  was  not, 
apparently,  a  part  of  it. 

Long  before  General  Kearny  could  reach  California,  John  C. 
Fremont  had,  by  his  indiscretions,  come  into  collision  with  the 
Mexican  officials  of  that  province,  and  the  famous  "Bear  Flag" 
republic  had  been  proclaimed.  These  events,  however  interesting 
in  themselves,  call  for  small  space  in  a  biography  of  Polk,  for, 
so  far  as  any  known  evidence  exists,  they  formed  no  part  of  the 
President's  California  program  and  were  in  no  degree  inspired 
by  him.    The  only  possible  link  which  might  connect  these  events 

■^ilhid..  495-496. 


424  JAMES   K.  FOLK 

with  the  plans  of  the  administration  is  the  "secret  instructions" 
carried  by  Gillespie,  and  Fremont  had  already  resisted  Mexican 
authority  before  the  arrival  of  Gillespie  in  California.  Thomas 
O.  Larkin,  American  consul  at  Monterey,  who  doubtless  was  cog- 
nizant of  all  instructions  brought  by  Gillespie,  continued  to  use 
his  influence  for  peace  until  after  the  "Bear  Flag"  insurrection. 
Another  reason  for  believing  that  Fremont  and  his  adherents 
acted  without  authority  from  Washington  is  the  fact  that  the 
President,  in  all  of  his  known  instructions  to  naval  and  military 
officers,  laid  special  stress  on  winning  over  the  inhabitants  by 
kind  treatment.  Fremont  adopted  the  opposite  course,  and  even 
went  out  of  his  way  to  antagonize  them. 

During  Tyler's  administration  Fremont  had  made  two  expe- 
ditions into  the  western  country,  and  in  the  summer  of  1845  had 
undertaken  a  third.  Early  in  1846  he  reached  California,  and, 
after  making  brief  stops  at  Sutter's  Fort  and  San  Francisco,  he 
paid  a  visit  to  Larkin  at  Monterey.  He  explained  to  the  Mexican 
authorities  at  Monterey  that  he  was  bound  for  Oregon  on  a  scien- 
tific expedition,  and  his  statement  was  accepted  as  satisfactory. 

Instead  of  proceeding  to  Oregon,  Fremont,  having  gone  as 
far  north  as  San  Jose,  retraced  his  steps  until  he  had  reached  a 
point  not  far  from  Monterey.  The  excuse  for  his  return  south- 
ward, long  afterward  given  by  Fremont  himself,^^  was  the  desire 
to  find  a  seaside  home  for  his  mother ! 

His  original  entry  into  the  province  without  passports  was  a 
violation  of  Mexican  law,  and  when,  contrary  to  agreement,  he 
returned  to  the  vicinity  of  Monterey,  he  was  ordered  by  Jose 
Castro,  the  comandanie  general,  to  retire  from  the  departuKMil. 
After  sending  a  verbal  refusal  to  obey  this  order,  Fremont  re- 
paired to  Gavilan  Peak,  erected  a  log  fort,  and  hoisted  the  flag 
of  the  United  States.  Here  he  was  warned  by  Larkin  of  the 
danger  of  such  a  proceeding,  and,  after  much  vain  blustering,  he 
set  out  for  Sutter's  Fort,  which  he  reached  late  in  March. 


I"'  Fremont,  Memoirs,  I,  4.")7. 


IV A  E  IN  NORTHERN  MEXICO  425 

Breaking  camp  on  March  24,  Fremont  and  his  party  pro- 
ceeded nortliward  until  they  had  reached  Klamath  Lake,  where 
they  were  overtaken,  on  May  8,  by  messengers  who  announced 
that  Lieutenant  Gillespie  was  close  behind  bearing  dispatches 
from  the  government  of  the  United  States.  The  dispatches  turned 
out  to  be  a  letter  of  introduction  from  Buchanan,  a  letter  from 
Senator  Benton,  and  whatever  verbal  communications  Gillespie 
may  have  conveyed.  Despite  Fremont's  assertions  that  it  was 
made  known  to  him  ' '  that  to  obtain  possession  of  California  was 
the  chief  object  of  the  President,"  he  has  admitted  that  he  learned 
nothing  from  Buchanan's  letter  and  that  Benton's  epistle  was 
equally  harmless  except  when  "read  by  the  light  of  many  con- 
versations and  discussions  with  himself  and  others  at  Washing- 
ton."^** Concerning  the  verbal  instructions  related  by  Gillespie, 
we  are  told  by  Fremont  himself  that  they  "had  for  their  prin- 
cipal objects  to  ascertain  the  disposition  of  the  California  people, 
to  conciliate  their  feelings  in  favor  of  the  United  States. ' ' 

As  Fremont 's  subsequent  relations  with  the  Calif ornians  were 
anything  but  conciliatory,  and  as  he  received  no  communications 
from  Washington  other  than  those  just  mentioned,  and  finally, 
as  his  belligerent  attitude  toward  the  California  government  was 
so  out  of  harmony  witli  Polk's  general  policy  of  conciliation,  we 
must  conclude  that  Fremont's  later  activities  were  undertaken 
without  authority  from  the  President. 

After  Gillespie's  arrival  at  his  camp,  Fremont  returned  to 
the  Sacramento  Valley  in  California.  If  further  evidence  were 
necessary  to  prove  that  the  messenger  had  brought  no  orders  to 
precipitate  a  revolution,  it  is  furnished  in  letters  written  by  both 
men  under  date  of  May  24,  1846.     To  Benton,  Fremont  wrote 


i6<'The  letter  from  Senator  Benton,  while  apparently  of  friendship  and 
family  details,  contained  passages  and  sugg-estions  which,  read  in  the  light 
of  many  conversations  and  discussions  with  himself  and  others  at  Wash- 
ington, clearly  indicated  to  me  that  I  was  required  by  tlie  Government  to 
find  out  any  foreign  schemes  in  relation  to  California  and  so  far  as  might 
be  in  my  power,  to  counteract  them''   (ibid.,  489). 


426  JAMES   K.  POLK 

that  "I  shall  now  proceed  directly  homewards,  by  the  Colorado, 
biit  I  cannot  arrive  at  the  frontier  until  late  in  September." 
"He  now  goes  liome  from  here  [Peter  Lassen's],"  said  Gillespie 
when  speaking  of  Fremont  in  a  letter  to  Larkin  of  the  same 
date.^' 

While  Fremont  was  encamped  at  the  ''Buttes  of  Sacramento," 
General  Castro  at  Santa  Clara  was  collecting  a  body  of  troops 
for  the  purpose  of  going  to  Los  Angeles  to  attack  Governor  Pio 
Pico,  with  whom  he  had  had  a  disagreement.  With  this  object 
in  view  he  had  sent  a  man  named  Francisco  Arce  to  Sonoma  to 
purchase  mules  for  his  troops.  American  settlers,  having  con- 
cluded that  Castro  was  planning  to  attack  them,  reported  the 
purchase  to  Fremont.  A  party  led  by  Ezekiel  Merritt  set  out 
from  Fremont's  camp  and,  on  June  10,  captured  and  brought 
back  the  mules.  On  the  following  day  Merritt  set  out  for  So- 
noma and  captured  the  toM^n  on  the  fourteenth.  After  a  lively 
debate  California  was  declared  an  independent  republic  and  the 
"bear  flag"  chosen  as  its  emblem.  Fremont  did  not  participate 
personally  in  these  acts,  but  they  were  performed  with  his  knowl- 
edge and  consent. 

Captain  John  B.  Montgomery,  commander  of  the  United 
States  ship  Portsmouth  in  San  Francisco  Bay,  declined  to  iden- 
tify himself  with  the  "bear  flag"  episode.  The  revolutionists 
therefore  received  no  assistance  from  the  navy  until  the  arrival 
of  Commodore  Sloat,  on  July  2,  at  the  port  of  jNIonterey.  While 
off  the  Mexican  coast  Sloat  had  heard  of  Taylor's  victories  and 
of  the  blockade  of  Vera  Cruz,  and,  on  June  7,  had  set  out  for 
Monterey.  On  July  7,  Sloat,  after  five  days  of  hesitation  which 
was  due  probably  to  Larkin 's  desire  to  win  California  by  concil- 
iatory methods,^*^  caused  the  United  States  flag  to  be  raised  at 
Monterey.     On  the  following  day   Montgomery,  acting  under 


IT  Letter   to   Benton,   Fremont,   Mc^noirs,    I,   499.     Gillespie   to   Larkin, 
Larkin  Papers,  Bancroft  Library. 

18  Bancroft,  California,  V,  228,  note  G. 


WAB  IN  NOETHEEN  MEXICO  427 

orders  from  Sloat,  took  possession  of  the  posts  on  San  Francisco 
Bay.  The  party  at  Sonoma  now  abandoned  their  "bear  flag" 
republic  and  hoisted  the  stars  and  stripes. 

After  a  circuitous  voyage  via  the  Sandwich  Islands,  Com- 
modore Stockton,  on  board  the  Congress,  reached  Monterey  on 
the  fourteenth  of  July.  About  two  weeks  later  he  succeeded 
Sloat  as  commander  of  the  Pacific  squadron.  More  arrogant  than 
his  predecessor,  Stockton  rejected  peace  overtures  sent  from  Gov- 
ernor Pio  Pico  and  General  Jose  Castro,  then  at  Los  Angeles, 
and  demanded  their  unconditional  surrender.  Seeing  that  re- 
sistance was  futile,  these  officials  fled  to  Mexico,  and  Stockton, 
with  the  cooperation  of  Fremont  and  Gillespie,  took  possession 
of  southern  California.  Having  thus  completed  the  "first  con- 
quest" of  California,  Stockton,  acting  on  his  own  responsibility, 
undertook  to  establish  a  government  over  the  inhabitants.^" 

In  antagonizing  the  Californians  and  in  attempting  to  estab- 
lish a  civil  government  Stockton,  as  we  have  already  noted,  acted 
on  his  own  responsibility,  for  nothing  in  instructions  which  had 
been  received  by  himself  or  his  predecessor  authorized  his  arbi- 
trary procedure.  Instructions  prepared  by  Secretary  Bancroft 
under  the  direction  of  the  President — some  prior  and  some  sub- 
sequent to  Stockton's  arrival  in  California,  but  of  course  not 
received  at  the  time — expressed  very  definitely  the  desires  of  the 
administration  with  respect  to  California.  One  addressed  to  Sloat 
on  June  8,  1846,  ordered  him  to  "endeavor  to  establish  the  su- 
premacy of  the  American  flag  without  any  strife  with  the  people 
of  California."  If  California  should  be  inclined  to  separate  from 
Mexico  and  establish  ' '  a  government  of  its  own  under  the  auspices 
of  the  American  flag, ' '  he  was  to  encourage  such  action,  but  no 
authority  to  make  a  conquest  was  given.  The  United  States, 
said  Bancroft,  desired  to  make  California  a  friend  and  not  an 
enemy,  "to  hold  possession  of  it,  at  least  during  the  war;  and 


19  Except   where    noted,    this    suniiiiarj'    of   the   first    conquest    has    been 
drawn   principally  from   Rives,   TI,   chap.    34,   and   Bancroft,   California,   V. 


428  JAMES   K.  POLK 

to  hold  that  possession,  if  possible,  with  the  consent  of  the  inhabi- 
tants." On  July  12  he  stated  explicitly  why  possession  was  so 
much  desired  by  the  administration.  "The  object  of  the  United 
States,"  Sloat  was  told, 

has  lefereiife  to  ultiiiiate  peace  with  Mexico;  aud  if,  at  that  peace,  the 
basis  of  the  uti  possidetis  shall  be  established  the  government  expects, 
through  your  forces,  to  be  found  in  actual  possession  of  Upper  California. 

A  month  later,  August  13,  Bancroft  stated  that  "if  the  treaty 
of  peace  shall  be  made  on  the  basis  of  uti  possidetis,  it  may  leave 
California  to  the  United  States. ' '  Possession  at  the  date  of  peace 
negotiations,  and  not  a  revolution  as  had  been  effected  by  Fre- 
mont and  Stockton,  was  all  that  the  President  had  contemplated. 
To  be  sure,  Bancroft,  in  his  letter  of  July  12,  spoke  of  the  neces- 
sity of  establishing  some  sort  of  civil  government  under  the  pro- 
tection of  Sloat,  and  a  copy  of  Kearny's  instructions  was  in- 
closed ;  but  he  urged  that  "in  selecting  persons  to  hold  office,  due 
respect  should  be  had  to  the  wishes  of  the  people  of  California, 
as  well  as  to  the  actual  possessors  of  authority  in  that  province. ' '-° 
Necessarily  the  officers  in  California  did  not  know  the  contents 
of  these  letters,  for  two  of  them  were  written  after  they  had  taken 
I)Ossessiou  of  California;  still,  the  instructions  show  clearly  that 
Stockton  and  Fremont  did  not,  in  the  course  they  pursued,  cor- 
rectly divine  the  wishes  of  the  President. 

A  discussion  of  tlie  uprising  of  the  Californians  under  Gen- 
eral Flores,  the  second  conquest  by  the  United  States  forces,  and 
the  establishment  of  a  government  by  General  Kearny,  acting 
under  instructions  from  President  Polk,  must  be  postponed  while 
we  follow  the  advance  of  the  main  army  into  Mexico.  While  llic 
President  was'  making  plans  for  acquiring  new  territory,  and 
while  subordinates  without  his  sanction  were  making  conquests  on. 
the  Pacific  coast,  General  Taylor  was  winning  battles  for  his 
government,  and  laurels  for  liimsclf,  on  the  banks  of  the  Rio 
Grande. 


20  Instructions    of    Bancroft    to    Sloat,    Btockton    and    Biddlc,    .Juno    8, 
July  12  and  Aug.  13,  1846  {H.  Ex.  Doo.  60,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  237-241). 


WAB  IN  NOBTHEli'N  MEXICO  429 

The  first  bloodshed,  as  we  have  seen,  occurred  on  April  25 
when  Captain  Thornton's  dragoons,  after  a  loss  of  sixteen  men, 
were  surrounded  and  forced  to  surrender.  As  a  result  Taylor, 
by  authority  already  vested  in  him  by  the  President,  called  upon 
the  governors  of  Texas  and  Louisiana  for  eight  regiments  of  vol- 
unteers. Before  these  could  be  available,  however,  he  was  obliged 
to  meet  the  invading  Mexican  army  with  his  small  force  of  regu- 
lars. First  of  all  lie  constructed  and  garrisoned  a  fort  opposite 
Matamoras  and  with  his  main  army  returned  to  his  base  of  sup- 
plies at  Point  Isabel,  which  was  threatened  by  Arista. 

After  strengthening  the  position  at  Point  Isabel,  Taylor  set 
out  on  his  return  to  the  fort  opposite  Matamoras,  upon  which  an 
attack  had  been  made  and  the  commander,  Major  Brown,  killed. 
On  the  way  back  to  this  fort,  which  now  took  the  name  of  Fort 
Brown,  Taylor,  on  May  8,  met  and  defeated  Arista  at  Palo  Alto. 
At  daybreak  on  the  following  morning  the  Mexican  commander 
retreated  to  Resaca  de  la  Palma,  where  Taylor  overtook  him  in 
the  afternoon  and  won  another  victory.  The  Mexican  army  was 
completely  disorganized,  and  scattered  groups,  after  a  precipitate 
flight  across  the  Rio  Grande,  reassembled  at  Matamoras.  This 
place  was  abandoned  without  resistance  as  soon  as  Taylor  began 
to  cross  the  river  on  the  eighteenth  of  May.  "The  battles  of 
Palo  Alto  and  Resaca  de  la  Palma,"  wrote  General  Grant  long 
afterwards,  "seemed  to  us  engaged,  as  pretty  important  affairs; 
but  we  had  only  a  faint  conception  of  their  magnitude  until  they 
were  fought  over  in  the  North  by  the  Press  and  the  reports  came 
back  to  us."-^ 

In  these  battles  the  Mexican  forces  outnumbered  their  adver- 
saries more  than  two  to  one,  but  the  American  army  was  better 
equipped  and  led  by  a  more  capable  commander.  Fearless  and 
unassuming,  Taylor  enjoyed  the  confidence  of  his  soldiers.  They 
were  always  eager  to  respond  to  the  call  of  "Old  Rough  and 
Ready."'  Ever  prepared  to  do  his  duty,  Taylor  had  no  thirst 
for  military  glory.     In  a  private  letter  written  on  tlie  day  after 

^1  Grant,  Personal  Memoirs,  I,  99-100.     Grant  was  tlien  a  lieutenant. 


430  JAMES  K.  POLK 

his  occupation  of  Matamoras  he  said  that  "I  heartily  wish  the 
war  was  at  an  end."-- 

News  of  Taylor's  victories  reached  Washington  on  May  23, 
the  day  on  which  Polk  read  to  his  cabinet  Scott's  letter  about 
being  fired  upon  in  front  and  rear.  When  he  received  this  news 
the  President  made  no  comment  in  his  diary,  except  to  record 
the  fact  that  the  news  had  arrived,  but  three  days  later  he  sent 
a  message  to  the  Senate  nominating  Taylor  as  major-general  by 
brevet.-^  On  May  30,  just  one  week  after  the  receipt  of  Taylor's 
official  dispatch,  the  new  commission  was  ready  and  Marcy  for- 
warded it  to  the  general  along  with  an  assignment  to  the  chief 
command.  On  the  same  day  the  President  in  a  letter  to  Taylor 
praised  the  general's  "gallant  conduct  and  distinguished  ser- 
vices," and  stated  that  the  "battles  of  Palo  Alto  and  Resaca  de 
la  Palma  rank  among  our  most  brilliant  victories."-* 

There  is  no  reason  for  believing  that,  at  the  time  of  Taylor's 
promotion,  Polk  harbored  other  than  the  most  kindly  feelings 
toward  the  victorious  general.  The  delay  in  preparing  the  cor- 
dial letter  just  quoted  was  due  to  the  pressure  of  executive  busi- 
ness such  as  planning  the  California  expedition  and  reducing 
Scott  and  Gains-"'  to  proper  subordination.  Not  knowing  the 
reason  why  the  President's  expression  of  approval  had  been  de- 
layed, Taylor  felt  slighted,  and  his  distrust  of  the  administration 
was  aroused.  "It  is  strange  passing  strange,"  he  wrote  to  his 
son-in-law,  "that  I  have  heard  nothing  from  Washing  [ton]  since 
my  official  report  of  the  battles  of  the  8th  &  9th  reached  there, 
which  I  have  seen  published  in  the  National  Intelligencer  & 
Union."  He  hinted  at  politics  in  high  quarters,  and  mentioned 
a  rumor  that  members  of  Congress  from  the  South  and  West  had 
protested  to  the  President  against  his  being  superseded  by  Scott. 

22  Taylor  to  his  son-in-law,  Dr.  R.  C.  Wood,  May  19,  18-16,  Taijlor 
Letters,  4. 

23  Polk,  Diary,  I,  422,  425,  428.  Until  tliis  itroniotion  Taylor  had  been 
a  colonel  in  actual  rank,  but  brigadier-general  by  brevet. 

24  fl^.  Ex.  Boo.  GO,  30  Cong.,   1  sess.,  282-283. 

2-''  Gains  had,  witliout  authoritj',  been  enlisting  troops  for  the  Rio  Grande 
campaign. 


WAE  IN  NOBTHEBN  MEXICO  431 

He  hoped  that  the  report  was  untrue,  for  "I  consider  this  com- 
mand properly  liis,  &  I  have  no  wish  to  prevent  his  exercis- 
ing it."-" 

When  another  week  brought  no  word  from  Washington  Taylor 
became  convinced  that  the  administration  was  more  interested  in 
plaj'ing  politics  than  in  defeating  the  Mexicans.  Merit  and  long 
service,  in  his  opinion,  were  disregarded  at  the  national  capital ; 
"the  more  one  does  the  more  they  expect  of  him,  and  his  services 
or  standing  is  estimated  by  political  considerations."  He  was 
"perfectly  disgusted"  with  the  inefficiency  in  Washington,  for 
small  boats  and  wagons  could  be  brought  "from  Liverpool"  in 
less  time  than  it  had  taken  the  government  to  supply  them. 
"Was  I  a  prominent  or  ambitious  aspirant  for  civil  distinction 
or  honors,"  he  wrote,  "I  might  very  readily  suppose  there  was 
an  intention  somewhere  among  the  high  functionaries  to  break 
me  down ' ' ;  and  he  feared  that  such  would  be  the  result  of  the 
government's  policy,  "whether  from  design  or  not."  He  re- 
garded as  ' '  ridiculous ' '  a  report  which  had  just  reached  camp  to 
the  effect  that  Scott  had  declined  to  take  command  of  the  army 
for  fear  of  injuring  his  Presidential  prospects,  and  that  a  quarrel 
with  Polk  had  resulted  from  his  refusal.  "They  need  have  no 
apprehensions,"  he  added,  "of  being  interfered  with  by  me  for 
that  high  office,  which  I  would  decline  if  proffered  &  I  could 
reach  it  without  opposition. ' '- '  As  late  as  August  4  he  expressed 
the  hope  that  Scott  would  be  the  Whig  candidate  in  1848,  but 
he  put  away  the  crown  from  his  own  head  with  a  far  less  resolute 
hand.-^ 


2e  Taylor  to  R.  C.  Wood,  June  12,  1846,  Taijlor  Letters,  9-10.  Scott 
had  already  notified  Taylor  that  he  [Scott]  had  been  assigned  to  the  com- 
mand, but  would  not  go  to  Mexico  immediately. 

27  Taylor  to  R.  C.  Wood,  June  21,  1846,  ibid.,  12-14.  When  more  definite 
news  of  Scott's  quarrel  with  the  President  arrived,  Taylor  expressed  regret, 
for  it  would  keep  him  in  Mexico  "which  I  by  no  means  desire"  (Taylor 
to  R.  C.  Wood,  June  24). 

28  "  So  far  as  I  am  cpncerned  I  wish  to  have  nothing  to  do  Avith  that 
high  office;  &  if  I  had,  this  is  not  the  proper  time  to  discuss  the  subject; 
let  this  war  at  any  rate  te  first  brought  to  a  close"  (Taylor  to  R.  C.  Wood, 
ibid.,  35). 


432  JAMES   E.  POLE 

His  attitude  toward  the  administration  was  based  on  ground- 
less suspicions,  for  at  this  early  date  there  was  surely  no  desire 
to  "break  him  down."  Even  the  receipt  of  ]\Iarcy's  letter  which 
assigned  him  to  the  chief  command  and  inclosed  his  new  com- 
mission did  not  change  his  antipathy  toward  his  superiors.  The 
honor  of  his  promotion,  in  his  opinion,  was  more  than  overbal- 
anced by  his  assignment  to  command  an  expedition  which  "must 
be  a  failure  owing  to  the  ignorance  of  some  in  regard  to  some 
matters,  &  the  imbecility  of  others,  for  all  of  which  I  shall  be 
made  the  scape  goat."  He  must  have  received  Polk's  laudatory 
letter  in  the  same  mail,  but  of  this  he  made  no  mention.  He 
pronounced  Scott  "crazy"  because  of  his  letters  to  Marcy,  and 
he  was  certain  that  "Gen'l  S.  will  never  hear  the  last  of  a  fire 
from  his  rear,  or  a  hasty  plate  of  soup. ' '-" 

While  in  this  mood,  Taylor  questioned  the  good  faith  of  the 
government  in  its 'dealings  with  Mexico.  He  was  confident  that 
"our  ambitious  views  of  conquest  .&  agrandisement  at  the  ex- 
pense of  a  weak  power  will  only  be  restrained  &  circumscribed 
by  our  inability  to  carry  out  our  view."  He  did  not  rate  that 
ability  very  high,  for  he  predicted  that  if  the  Mexicans  should 
hold  out  for  six  or  eight  months  "we  will  be  fully  as  anxious  to 
make  peace  as  they  are. ' '  Three  weeks  later  he  hoped  that  peace 
negotiations  would  soon  begin,  but  he  feared  that  the  United 
States  would  claim  a  vast  amount  of  territory  as  a  war  indemnity 
and  for  "real  &  pretended  roberies  committed  on  our  commerce; 
which  will  no  doubt  be  double  &  treble  award  to  certain  claimants 
over  &  above  what  they  ever  lost."  No  land  grabbing  act  of  the 
British  government  had  been  "more  outrageous"  than  Polk's 
plan  to  take  permanent  possession  of  California.-^*' 


20  Taylor  to  R.  0.  Wood,  June  30  and  July  7,  1846,  ibid.,  18-2.',. 

J  -w  Taylor  to  R.  C.  Wood,  July  14,  Aug.  4,  and  Aug.  23,  184(i.  ibid..  28, 
37,  49.  Undoubtedly  Taylor's  distrust  was  increased  by  letters  from  Whig 
friends  in  the  United  States.  See  letters  from  Scott  and  Crittenden,  in 
Ooleman,  Life  of  John  J.  Crittenden,  2ofi,  278. 


WAB  IN  NOETHEEN  MEXICO  433 

Taylor  had  reason  enough  to  complain  of  the  want  of  trans- 
portation facilities,^^  although  the  cause  was  to  be  sought,  not  in 
any  desire  to  ' '  break  him  down, ' '  but  in  the  lack  of  preparation 
usually  experienced  at  the  outbreak  of  a  war,  and  more  especially 
in  the  ignorance  of  the  Washington  officials  concerning  every- 
thing in  Mexico. 

The  President  and  his  cabinet  knew  little  of  the  topography 
of  the  country,  or  of  its  seasons,  fertility,  and  accessibility.  Even 
the  geography  was  something  of  a  mystery.  As  a  result,  consid- 
erable confusion  and  frequent  misunderstandings  were  only  to 
be  expected.  For  the  necessary  information  the  executive  de- 
partments had  to  depend  largely  on  the  reports  of  General  Taylor ; 
and  the  general,  fearing  that  the  main  object  of  the  administra- 
tion was  to  make  a  "scape  goat"  of  him,  did  not  feel  free  to  offer 
advice  or  to  act  without  explicit  orders. 

In  a  letter  addressed  to  Taylor  on  June  8,  1846,  Marcy  stated 
that  nothing  had  been  heard  from  him  since  his  brief  dispatch 
announcing  the  victories  of  Palo  Alto  and  Resaca  de  la  Palma, 
but  it  was  assumed  that  Matamoras  had  been  occupied.  He  ex- 
pressed the  hope  that  Taylor  would  get  possession  of  all  places 
on  the  Rio  Grande  as  far  up  as  Laredo,  and  that  he  would  be 
able  to  capture  Monterey.  The  measures  to  be  pursued,  however, 
were  left  to  the  general's  "own  discretion  and  judgment."  The 
President  very  much  desired,  said  Marcy,  to  have  Taylor's  "views 
and  suggestions  in  relation  to  the  fall  campaign. ' '  Being  desirous 
of  prosecuting  the  war  with  vigor,  the  President  wished  to  know 
whether,  in  the  general's  opinion,  the  present  expedition  should 
be  conducted  with  a  view  of  striking  at  the  City  of  Mexico,  or 
of  operating  in  the  northern  provinces  only.  "Your  views  on 
this  point, ' '  said  Marcy,  ' '  will  doubtless  have  an  important  influ- 
ence upon  the  determination  of  the  government  here."  Informa- 
tion was  requested,  also,  on  overland  transportation  facilities  and 

31  "I  consider  there  is  an  entire  break  down  in  the  Qr  M  [quarter 
master's]  department  every  where"  (Taylor  to  R.  C.  Wood,  June  21,  1846, 
ibid.,  13). 


434  JAMES   K.  POLK 

on  the  probability  of  obtaining  adequate  provisions,  and  the  gen- 
eral's opinion  was  asked  concerning  the  number  and  character 
of  troops  to  be  employed.  Four  days  later  Seott  impressed  upon 
Taylor  the  importance  of  obtaining  information  regarding  move- 
ments and  designs  of  the  enemy,  and  authorized  him  to  pay 
'^ employes"  liberally  for  procuring  such  information.  Kearny's 
expedition  to  New  Mexico  and  California,  said  Scott,  would  neces- 
sarily be  independent  of  Taylor's  command,  but  that  of  General 
Wool  against  the  city  of  Chihuahua  would  be  under  Taylor's 
general  directions.  The  general  was  authorized  to  agree  to  an 
armistice  with  a  view  to  peace  negotiations,  provided  he  was 
convinced  of  the  enemy's  good  faith.^- 

In  his  reply  to  these  letters,  Taylor  stated  that  he  had  little 
definite  information  to  impart.  He  gave,  however,  his  opinions 
regarding  the  probabilities  of  obtaining  supplies  in  the  interior. 
Should  the  inhabitants  prove  friendly,  he  thought  that  his  army 
might  obtain  provisions  sufficient  to  enable  it  to  penetrate  as 
far  as  Saltillo ;  still,  in  his  opinion,  the  army  under  his  command 
should  confine  its  operations  to  the  northern  provinces  and 
should  not  attempt  to  reach  the  City  of  Mexico.  He  ' ' purposely" 
abstained  ' '  from  any  reference  to  movements  against  Tampico  or 
Vera  Cruz. ' '  He  complained  that  he  was  greatly  embarrassed  by 
the  lack  of  transportation  facilities  and  closed  his  letter  with  the 
remark  that: 

I  am  waiting  with  the  utmost  impatience  the  arrival  of  steamboats 
suited  to  the  navigation  of  this  river  to  establish  a  depot  at  Camargo,  and 
throw  the  troops  gradually  forward  to  that  point.33 

Although  General  Taylor  may  have  been  overcautious  in  offer- 
ing suggestions,  he  seems  to  have  reported  all  the  information  in 
his  possession.  But  officials  in  Washington,  especially  Quarter- 
master General  Jesup,  were  inclined  to  excuse  their  own  short- 
comings by  pleading  lack  of  information  from  Taylor,  and  the 


32  fl-.  Ex.  Doc.  60,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  323-327. 

33  Taylor  to  Adj.  Gen.,  July  2,  1846,  ihid.,  329-332. 


WAE  IN  NOETHEKN  MEXICO  435 

President  came  to  feel  that  the  general  did  not  possess  the  initia- 
tive and  the  vigor  necessary  for  the  command  which  had  been 
intrusted  to  him.  Polk  admitted  that  he  had  no  knowledge  of 
military  affairs,  but  he  had  "a  strong  conviction"  that  necessary 
equipments  had  been  too  long  delayed.  He  told  the  quarter- 
master general  that  some  of  his  subordinates  had  become  gentle- 
men of  leisure  who  ' '  required  to  have  a  coal  of  fire  put  on  their 
backs  to  make  them  move  promptly."  He  feared,  also,  that 
Taylor  was  not  the  man  for  the  general  command : 

He  is  brave  but  does  not  seem  to  have  resources  or  grasp  of  mind  enough 
to  conduct  such  a  campaign.  In  his  communications  to  the  War  Department 
he  seems  ready  to  obey  orders,  but  appears  to  be  unwilling  to  express  any 
opinion  or  to  take  any  responsibility  on  himself.  Though  he  is  in  the  country 
with  means  of  knowledge  which  cannot  be  possessed  at  Washington,  he  makes 
no  suggestion  as  to  the  plan  of  the  campaign,  but  simply  obeys  orders  and 
gives  no  information  to  aid  the  administration  in  directing  his  movement. 
He  is,  I  have  no  doubt,  a  good  subordinate  officer,  but  from  all  the  evidence 
before  me  I  think  him  unfit  for  the  chief  command.  Though  this  is  so,  I 
know  of  no  one  whom  I  can  substitute  in  his  place.s* 

These  remarks  greatly  exaggerated  Taylor's  taciturnity,  yet  the 
President  was  sorely  in  need  of  information  to  aid  him  in  direct- 
ing the  campaign.  When  in  October  an  expedition  to  Tampico 
and  Vera  Cruz  was  being  considered,  so  little  was  known  of  the 
character  of  the  coast  that  Polk  found  it  necessary  to  send  to 
Rhode  Island  for  F.  M.  Dimond,  former  consul  at  Vera  Cruz, 
"believing  that  from  him  reliable  information  could  be  obtained." 
Nearly  a  month  later  the  quartermaster  general  just  awoke  to 
the  fact  that :  ' '  Had  we  foreseen  the  nature  of  the  Rio  Del  Norte, 
and  built  suitable  steamboats  several  months  ago,  a  million  of 
dollars  might  have  been  saved  by  this  time."^^ 

34  Polk,  Diary,  II,  117-119. 

35  Ibid.,  180,  196.  Jesup  to  Marcy,  Nov.  7,  1846  (H.  Ex.  Dog.  60,  30 
Concr,  1  sess.,  564).  So  vigorously  had  Taylor  complained  of  inefficiency 
in  tlie  quartermaster's  department,  in  a  letter  dated  September  1,  that 
Jesup  was  sent  to  New  Orleans  so  that  he  might  personally  supervise  the 
equipping  of  Taylor's  army  (Corresp.  of  Taylor,  Marcy  and  Jesup,  m 
same  Doc,  5.57  ff.). 


436  JAMES  E.  POLK 

Although  the  President  was  lacking  in  military  experience, 
and  although,  according  to  his  own  testimony,  he  found  it  to  be 
"impossible  to  give  much  attention  to  the  details  in  conducting 
the  war, ' '  his  brain  was  most  fertile  w^hen  it  came  to  concocting 
schemes  for  undermining  the  control  of  the  Mexican  government 
over  its  own  citizens.  Ample  proof  of  this  is  furnished  in  a  con- 
fidential letter  sent  to  Taylor  under  date  of  July  9,  1846.  The 
letter  was  signed  by  Marcy,  but  was  drafted  by  Polk,  with  some 
assistance  from  Benton.  The  President  approved  Taylor's  con- 
ciliatory conduct  toward  the  Mexicans  and  urged  him  to  continue 
friendly  intercourse  with  the  inhabitants.  The  general  was 
instructed  to 

take  occasions  to  send  officers  to  the  headquarters  of  the  enemy  for  military 
purposes,  real  or  ostensible  ....  in  which  opportunity  may  be  taken  to 
speak  of  the  war  itself  as  only  carried  on  to  obtain  justice,  and  that  we  had 
much  ratlier  procure  that  by  negotiation  than  by  figliting. 

Racial  and  social  discords,  he  was  told,  made  it  possible  to  induce 
a  large  portion  of  the  people  to  wish  success  to  invaders  who  had 
no  desire  to  injure  them : 

In  all  this  field  of  division — in  all  these  elements  of  social,  political, 
personal,  and  local  discord — there  must  be  openings  to  reach  the  interests, 
passions,  or  principles  of  some  of  the  parties,  and  thereby  to  conciliate  their 
good  will,  and  make  them  co-operate  Avith  us  in  bringing  about  an  honorable 

and  a  speedy  peace Policy  and  force  are  to  be  combined;   and 

the  fruits  of  the  former  will  be  prized  as  highly  as  those  of  the  latter. 

Another  paragraph,  which  was  penned  by  the  President  alone 
and  which  he  considered  to  be  the  most  important,  was  still  more 
si)ecific  in  outlining  the  policy  of  the  administration : 

Availing  yourself  of  divisions  which  you  may  find  among  the  Mexican 
people  ....  it  Avill  be  your  policy  to  encourage  the  separate  departments 
or  States,  and  especially  those  wliicli  you  may  invade  and  occupy,  to  declare 
their  independence  of  the  central  government  of  Mexico,  and  either  to 
become  our  allies,  or  to  assume,  as  it  is  understood  Yucatan  has  done,  a 
neutral  attitude  in  the  existing  war  between  the  United  States  and  Mexico. 


WAB  IN  NOBTHEBN  MEXICO  437 

After  peace  had  been  concluded  such  departments  were  to  ' '  decide 
for  themselves  their  own  form  of  government. "  As  to  temporary 
governments  Taylor  was  authorized  to  follow  the  course  laid 
down  in  the  instructions  to  Kearny,  a  copy  of  which  was  inclosed. 
He  was  informed  that  an  expedition  against  Mexico  City  would 
probably  be  sent  from  Tampico  or  Vera  Cruz,  and  not  from  the 
Rio  Grande.  Information  was  requested,  and  Taylor  was  in- 
structed to  send  his  answer  "directly  to  the  President  of  the 
United  States. ""''''  Only  two  days  before  this  Houston,  of  Texas, 
had  introduced  in  the  Senate  a  resolution  which  extended  the 
thanks  of  Congress  to  Taylor  for  his  victories  on  the  Rio  Grande, 
and  requested  the  President  to  present  the  general  with  a  gold 
medal  "as  a  tribute  to  his  good  conduct,  and  generosity,  to  the 
vanquished."^' 

As  usual,  Buchanan  was  ready  with  a  dash  of  cold  water  for 
the  President's  scheme  of  benevolent  assimilation  of  Mexican 
territory.  He  was  in  favor  of  taking  and  holding  California  as 
far  as  Monterey  but  no  farther.  "He  was  opposed,  too,"  said 
the  President,  "to  giving  the  inhabitants  of  Tamaulipas  or  of  any 
of  the  Provinces  South  of  New  Mexico  any  encouragement  to 
annex  themselves  to  the  U.  S."  Both  Walker  and  Polk  preferred 
to  extend  the  boundary  farther  south,  and  the  President  was 
sorry  to  find  his  Secretary  of  State  "entertaining  opinions  so 
contracted  &  sectional.  "^^ 

About  the  same  time,  members  of  Congress  gave  the  President 
no  little  annoyance  by  introducing  resolutions  of  inquiry  con- 
cerning the  purposes  of  the  war  and  the  manner  of  conducting  it. 
On  June  29  the  Senate  had  passed  a  resolution,  introduced  by 
Johnson,   of  Maryland,   which  called  on  the  President  for  all 

36Marcy  to  Taylor,  July  9,  1846  (H.  Ex.  Boo.  60,  30  Cong.  1  sess., 
33.3-33(5)  >olk,  Dmry,  II,  16-17.  "I  will  preserve  the  original  draft  for 
future  reference, ''  Polk  recorded  in  his  diary,  "should  it  become  proper. 
I  do  this  because  it  is  a  document  of  more  than  ordinary  importance. 

37  Cong.  Globe,  29  Cong.,  1  sess.,  1064. 

38  Polk,  Diary,  II,  15-16. 


438  JAMES  K.  POLE 

correspondence  incident  to  the  raising  of  volunteer  troops.  Polk 
sent  for  Johnson,  on  July  6,  and  by  showing  him  the  correspond- 
ence convinced  him  that  it  would  be  unwise  to  comply,  for  the 
projected  conquest  of  California  would  be  revealed,  and  this 
would  "excite  the  jealousy  of  England  and  France,  who  might 
interfere  to  prevent  the  accomplishing  of  our  objects."^''  For 
the  purpose  of  ascertaining  why  nothing  had  been  done  by  Tay- 
lor's army  since  the  occupation  of  Matamoras,  Hannegan,  on 
July  8,  introduced  a  resolution  which  purposed  to  ask  the  Presi- 
dent for  information  concerning  all  orders  sent  to  the  general 
since  the  ninth  of  May.  By  his  renewal  of  friendship  wdth  Benton 
the  President  had  procured  an  able  defender,  and  the  Missouri 
Senator  was  successful  in  sending  this  resolution  to  the  table  by 
asserting  that  if  an  officer  should  furnish  the  information  sought 
he  would  be  court-martialed  and  shot.^*' 

In  truth,  the  executive  departments  had  little  information  to 
impart.  On  August  1,  Taylor  answered  the  letter  of  July  9, 
which  Benton  and  Polk  had  so  carefully  prepared,  by  saying  that 
he  had  little  to  add  to  his  dispatch  of  July  second.  He  still  de- 
clined to  venture  an  opinion  on  the  practicability  of  an  expedi- 
tion against  Vera  Cruz,  for  the  "Department  of  War  must  be 
much  better  informed  than  I  am  on  that  point."  He  told  the 
President  that  he  would  obey  his  order  to  seek  friendly  inter- 
course with  Mexican  generals,  and  to  induce  the  people  to  declare 
their  independence,  but  he  stated  very  frankly  that  he  did  not 
anticipate  much  success.*^ 

President  Polk's  subterranean  diplomacy  was  not  confined  to 
an  attempt  to  undermine  the  loyalty  of  Mexican  generals  and 
people.  Since  his  conversations  with  Atocha,  he  had  never  quite 
abandoned  the  hope  of  making  use  of  Santa  Anna,  and  he  now 
decided  to  assist  the  ex-dictator  in  regaining  power  in  Mexico. 


so  Ibid.,  13-14. 

40  Cong.  Globe,  29  Cong.,  1  sess.,  1068. 

41  Taylor   to   I'olk,   Aug.    1,   1846    (H.  Ex.   Doc.   60,   30   Cong.,   1   sess., 
336-338). 


WAE  IN  NOETHEEN  MEXICO  439 

On  May  13,  1846,  two  days  after  the  President  had  sent  his  war 
message  to  Congress,  Secretary  Bancroft  instructed  Commodore 
Conner  to  blockade  the  Gulf  ports  of  Mexico.  At  the  same  time, 
he  inclosed  a  "private  and  confidential"  order  which  read:  "If 
Santa  Anna  endeavors  to  enter  the  Mexican  ports,  you  Mall  allow 
him  to  pass  freely. "  Atocha,  it  Mall  be  remembered,  had  told  Polk 
that  Santa  Anna  M^ould  probably  return  to  Mexico  in  April  or 
May,  and  that  he  was  in  favor  of  ceding  territory  to  the  United 
States.  Apparently  the  President  had  this  conversation  in  mind 
when  he  caused  Bancroft  to  issue  the  order  to  Conner. ^- 

Early  in  June  Polk  decided  to  send  a  special  messenger  to 
Havana  for  the  purpose  of  learning  the  plans  of  Santa  Anna. 
The  messenger  selected  M^as  Alexander  Slidell  Mackenzie,  a  naval 
officer  and  a  nephew  of  John  Slidell,  the  minister  whom  Mexico 
had  rejected.  He  was  furnished  with  a  letter  from  Buchanan 
to  Campbell,  the  United  States  consul  at  Havana,  a  copy  of  Ban- 
croft 's  confidential  order  to  Conner,  and  verbal  instructions  from 
the  President.  Mackenzie  gave  the  purport  of  these  instructions 
when  reporting  to  Buchanan  the  result  of  his  interview  with 
Santa  Anna.^^  He  arrived  in  Havana  on  July  5  and,  by  Camp- 
bell, was  introduced  to  Santa  Anna.  From  Polk 's  verbal  instruc- 
tions he  had  prepared  a  memorandum,  and  this  he  read  to  the 
ex-President  of  Mexico.  In  substance  it  stated  that  the  United 
States  had  taken  up  arms  to  redress  its  grievances  and  was  deter- 
mined to  prosecute  the  war  M'ith  vigor,  but  that  the  President  was 
desirous  of  ending  the  conflict  speedily  if  an  honorable  peace 
could  be  made.  Believing  Santa  Anna  to  be  able  and  willing  to 
make  such  a  peace,  "the  President  of  the  United  States  M^ould  see 
with  pleasure  his  restoration  to  poM^er  in  Mexico. ' '  It  was  made 
clear  that  Polk  M'ould  insist  on  the  Rio  Grande  as  the  boundary 
of  Texas  and  that  he  must  at  least  have  enough  of  California  to 


y 


42  Ibid.,  744.     Polk,  Diary,  I,  229. 

43  Mackenzie  to  Buchanan,  June  [July]  7,  1846  (duplicate  in  Polk 
Papers).  This  letter  is  printed  in  full  in  Eeeves,  Diplomacy  under  Tyler 
and  Folic,  299-307. 


440  JAMES   E.  POLK. 

include  the  port  of  San  Francisco.  For  the  latter  concession  he 
would  pay  liberally,  and  his  present  intention  was  to  demand 
no  indemnity  for  the  expenses  of  the  war.  Although,  according 
to  Mackenzie 's  account,  Santa  Anna  aserted  that  the  Nueces  was 
the  real  boundary  of  Texas,  he  finally  agreed  to  make  all  neces- 
sai-y  concessions  rather  than  see  Mexico  delivered  into  the  hands 
of  a  foreign  prince  or  continue  under  the  monarchistic  govern- 
ment of  Paredes.  He  even  suggested  plans  under  which  Taylor 
could  most  easily  defeat  the  Mexican  armies,  and  advised  the 
occupation  of  Tampico.  Mackenzie  considered  these  suggestions 
of  such  importance  that  he  exceeded  his  instructions  and  carried 
them  directly  to  General  Taylor.  He  had  an  interview  with 
Taylor  late  in  July,'**  but  it  is  not  likely  that  the  general  was 
influenced  by  Santa  Anna's  recommendations. 

Mackenzie's  report  of  his  interview  wdth  Santa  Anna,  accord- 
ing to  a  note  appended  by  Buchanan,  reached  Washington  on 
the  third  of  August.  The  President  did  not  mention  the  subject 
in  his  diary  either  at  the  time  of  sending  the  messenger  or  when 
the  report  was  received.  In  January,  1848,  however,  after  he 
and  his  cabinet  had  decided  not  to  include  this  report  with  other 
documents  submitted  in  response  to  a  call  from  the  House,  the 
President  recorded  his  version  of  the  mission.  In  this  account 
Polk  stated  that  he  had  given  Mackenzie  no  written  instructions, 
and  that  he  had  sent  "no  message"  to  Santa  Anna.  In  reducing 
the  conversation  with  the  President  to  writing  and  in  reading  it 
to  Santa  Anna,  the  messenger  had  acted  wholly  without  authority. 
As  to  wlietlier  Mackenzie's  memorandum  correctly  reported  his 
conversation  Avith  Polk,  the  record  in  the  diary  is  somewhat  am- 
biguous. "It  is  fortunate,"  is  the  President's  connnent,  "that 
,  what  he  puts  into  my  mouth  could  do  me  no  injury,  if  it  was 
genuine  &  was  published;  but  it  would  exhibit  me  in  a  ridiculous 
attitude."  For  this  reason,  he  decided  to  withhold  it  from  the 
House.''' 


4*  Meade,  Life  and  Letters,  I,  11(5.  4.-.  polk,  Diary,  III,  290-292. 


WAB  IN  NOBTHEEN  MEXICO  441 

The  President  was  eager  to  settle  all  dift'erenees  with  Mexico  by  *^ 
diplomaey  instead  of  war,  provided  he  could  obtain  the  territory 
he  most  coveted.  Without  waiting  to  learn  the  results  of  Mac- 
kenzie 's  mission,  he  made  one  more  attempt  to  make  a  satisfactory 
treaty  with  the  government  of  Paredes.  On  Sunday,  July  20,  he 
sent  for  Benton  and  read  to  him  a  dispatch  which  had  been  pre- 
pared by  Buchanan.  It  was  addressed  to  the  Mexican  Minister  of 
Foreign  Relations.  Benton  approved  the  dispatch  and  advised 
that  it  should  be  sent.  A  week  later  a  revised  copy  was  forwarded 
to  Commodore  Conner  with  instructions  that  it  should  be  de- 
livered to  the  Mexican  government.  The  document  stated  that 
the  President  was  no  less  anxious  to  terminate  the  war  than  he 
had  been  to  avoid  it  in  the  beginning.  To  accomplish  this  pur- 
pose he  was  ready  to  send  an  envoy  who  would  be  clothed  with 
power  to  make  "a  peace  just  and  honorable  for  both  parties." 
Should  Mexico  prefer  to  negotiate  in  Washington,  her  envoy 
would  be  treated  with  kindness.  "In  the  present  communica- 
tion," said  Buchanan,  "it  is  deemed  useless  and  might  prove 
injurious,  to  discuss  the  causes  of  the  existing  war. '  '■*" 

Having  decided  to  seek  a  settlement  with  Mexico  through 
diplomatic  channels,  Polk  revived  the  plan  of  asking  Congress  for 
money  to  be  used  in  negotiating  a  treaty.  When  discussing  with 
Benton  the  dispatch  just  mentioned,  the  President  expressed  the 
belief  that  he  could  procure  both  California  and  New  Mexico  if 
Congress  would  furnish  him  with  two  million  dollars  which  might 
be  paid  to  Mexico  as  soon  as  a  treaty  had  been  signed.  Benton 
favored  such  an  appropriation  and  advised  Polk  to  consult  with 
members  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs.  The  President 
sent  for  McDuffie,  Cass,  and  other  members  of  the  committee. 
He  cited  the  appropriation  which  had  enabled  Jefferson  to  pur- 
chase Louisiana  and  urged  the  expediency  of  making  a  similar 
appropriation  now.     Archer,  the  Whig  member,  agreed  to  take 


4«  Buchauan  to  Min.  of  For.  Eel.,  July  27,  1846;  Buchanan  to  Conner, 
same  date  (Sen.  Ex.  Doe.  107,  29  Cong.,  2  sess.,  2-3).  The  former  is  also 
in  Buchanan,  Works,  VII,  40. 


442  JAMES  K.  POLK 

the  matter  up  with  Senators  of  liis  party.  Having  thus  paved 
the  way,  Polk  sent  a  confidential  message  to  the  Senate  on  August 
4,  1846,  and  along  with  it,  a  copy  of  the  dispatch  already  for- 
warded to  the  Mexican  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations.  Believing 
that  "the  best  mode  of  securing  perpetual  peace  and  good  neigh- 
borhood between  the  two  Republics"  would  be  the  acquision  of 
Mexican  territory,  he  asked  for  an  advance  appropriation  of  two 
million  dollars  as  a  means  of  facilitating  such  an  acquisition.*^ 
After  the  Senate  had  given  its  approval,  the  message  was  trans- 
mitted to  the  House  so  that  a  bill  might  be  drafted. 

As  soon  as  the  message  had  been  read  in  the  House,  McKay, 
of  North  Carolina,  presented  a  bill  which  provided  that  two 
million  dollars  be  appropriated  "for  the  purpose  of  defraying 
any  extraordinary  expenses  which  may  be  incurred  in  the  inter- 
course between  the  United  States  and  foreign  nations,"  said 
money  to  be  applied  under  the  direction  of  the  President.  While 
Polk's  plans  for  acquiring  California  were  not,  of  course,  gen- 
erally known  at  the  time,  the  Whigs  at  once  charged  that  the 
money  was  to  be  used  for  this  purpose,  either  by  direct  purchase 
or  indirectly  by.  bribing  Mexican  officials.  The  necessarily  indefi- 
nite wording  of  the  bill  gave  ample  room  for  partisan  interpre- 
tations. White,  of  New  York,  was  the  most  uncompromising 
critic  of  the  President.  He  asserted  that  Polk  himself  had,  in  his 
war  message,  furnished  abundant  evidence  that  this  war  had 
been  "projected,  planned,  and  provoked"  long  before  Congress 
had  been  consulted  in  the  matter.  He  intimated,  also,  that  the 
purpose  of  the  bill  was  to  extend  slaveholding  territory,  and  he 
challenged  any  Democrat  to  propose  an  amendment  which  would 
exclude  slaver}^  from  the  territory  to  be  acquired.  During  the 
evening  session  of  the  same  day  Wilmot  accepted  this  challenge 
by  offering  his  famous  "proviso"  that  slavery  should  not  be 
permitted  in  any  teritory  to  be  obtained  from  Mexico. 


4'  Polk,  Dkiry,  II,  50-66.     Eiehardson,  Messages,  IV,  456. 


WAE  IN  NOETHEEN  MEXICO  443 

The  position  taken  by  John  Quincy  Adams  is  interesting.  A 
viohnit  opponent  of  the  administration  on  nearly  every  occasion, 
he  had  supported  Polk's  claim  to  54°  40'  as  the  Oregon  boundary, 
and  he  now  warmly  advocated  the  appropriation  of  the  two  mil- 
lion dollars  for  which  the  President  had  asked.  For  the  sake  of 
clearness,  he  asked  McKay  to  substitute  "Mexico"  for  "foreign 
nations,"  but,  despite  his  sympathy  with  Wilmot's  amendment, 
he  was  ready  to  "vote  for  the  bill  in  any  form."  He  did  not 
believe  an  anti-slavery  amendment  to  be  necessary,  for  the  insti- 
tution had  been  abolished  by  Mexico  and  would  not  be  reestab- 
lished." Based  on  the  past,  this  was  sound  argument,  but  he 
could  not  forsee  what  the  future  would  bring  forth. 

The  McKay  bill,  supplemented  by  the  Wilmot  amendment, 
passed  the  House  by  a  vote  of  eighty-seven  to  sixty-four.  On  the 
day  following,  the  last  of  the  session,  it  was  considered  by  the 
Senate,  but  Davis,  of  Massachusetts,  prevented  a  vote  on  the 
measure  by  holding  the  floor  until  the  session  had  expired. 
Whether  the  Senate  would  have  pased  the  bill  as  amended  we  are, 
of  course,  unable  to  say,  but  the  President  believed  that  it  would 
have  struck  out  Wilmot's  "mischievous  &  foolish  amendment" 
and  that  the  House  would  have  concurred.  "What  connection 
slavery  had  with  making  peace  with  Mexico,"  said  he,  "it  is 
difficult  to  conceive."  In  order  to  preclude  all  doubt  concerning 
his  motives,  he  confided  to  his  diary  an  explicit  statement  of  his 
reasons  for  requesting  the  advance  appropriation.-'^ 

48 -There  are  no  slaves  in  California-slavery  is  abolished  theje-  and 
if  we  were  to  make  peace,  and  in  that  peace  to  acquire  California,  the  e 
could  be  no  law  of  slavery'  established  there,  unless  it  was  made  an  article 

"^  ''r-MTobi'ct'in  asking  this  appropriatioii  ha.  '^^'^''^^'^'XITLi!: 
4.1,-      r„-.,r      Tt  WIS  thi<?      Mexico  is  indebted  to  the  U.  S.  m  a  large  sum, 

•    1  .  :  ,„i,;,i,  +1,^  TT   S   can  have  will  be  a  cession  of  territory-     T^"e  U.  te. 

"^^'SI^^^^^^C^^^,  New  Mexico;  and  perhaps  son,e  territory 
Wh  of  tlfeS  Provinces.  For  a  suitable  cession  of  territory  we  are  willing 
fo  a'  ure  leleb  s  to  ou;  own  citizens  &  to  pay  an  additioiial  e-suleration 
M^    n  onmtion  induces  the  belief  that  Mexico  would  be  willing  to  settle  the 


444  JAMES  K.  POLK 

The  disappointment  which  resulted  from  the  defeat  of  the 
appropriation  bill  was  somewhat  assuaged  by  news  of  the  con- 
quest of  California  which  reached  Washington  on  the  last  day 
of  August.  The  welcome  information  and  a  copy  of  Sloat's 
proclamation  were  brought  by  a  messenger  who  had  just  come 
from  Mexico  City  bearing  dispatches  for  the  British  minister. 
The  diplomat  reported  the  news  to  Buchanan  immediately,  and 
the  President  noted  in  his  diary:  "This  important  intelligence 
comes  to  us  through  no  other  channel. ' '""  The  conquest,  however, 
was  of  little  immediate  value,  for  Polk  was  soon  to  learn  that 
Mexico  had  declined  to  accept  his  proffered  "honorable  peace." 

Santa  Anna,  and  not  Paredes,  dictated  the  answer  to 
Buchanan 's  letter  of  July  27  in  which  Mexico  was  invited  to  open 
peace  negotiations.  Relying  on  Polk's  assurances  that  he  would 
not  be  molested,  Santa  Anna  left  Havana  on  August  8^  1846,  on 


diflficulty  in  this  manner.  No  Government,  however,  it  is  believed,  is  strong 
enough  to  make  a  treaty  ceding  territory  and  long  maintain  power  unless 
they  could  receive,  at  the  time  of  making  the  treaty,  money  enough  to  sup- 
port the  army.  Whatever  party  can  keep  tlic  army  in  its  support  can  hold 
the  power.  The  present  Government  is  without  any  regular  revenue,  & 
without  a  prompt  payment  as  a  part  of  the  consideration  would  not  ven- 
ture to  make  a  Treaty.  Having  no  doubt  that  I  could  effect  an  adjustment 
of  the  pending  war  if  I  had  the  command  of  $2,000,000,  I  felt  it  to  be  my 
duty  to  ask  such  an  appropriation.  This  I  did  in  the  first  instance  by  a 
confidential  communication  made  to  the  Senate  in  Executive  Session  on  the 
4th  Instant.  The  Senate  on  the  6th  Inst,  passed  resolutions  approving  my 
views  and  declaring  that  it  was  proper  to  make  the  appropriation  asked. 
The  Ecsolution  approving  my  views  passed  the  Senate  by  a  vote  of  ayes  43 
to  nays  2,  and  the  Ecsolution  approving  the  ajipropriation  by  yeas  33  to 
nays  19  (  .  .  .  ).  With  a  full  knowledge  of  all  this  Senator  Davis  had 
recourse  to  the  desperate  resort  of  speaking  against  time,  to  defeat  a 
measure  which  he  had  been  unable  to  (lefeat  by  his  vote.  Had  the  appro- 
priation been  passed  I  am  confident  T  should  have  made  an  honorable  peace 
by  which  we  should  have  accjuired  California,  &  such  other  territory  as  we 
desired,  before  the  end  of  October.  Should  the  war  be  now  protracted,  the 
responsibility  will  fall  more  heavily  upon  the  head  of  Senator  Davis  than 
upon  any  other  man,  and  he  will  deserve  the  execrations  of  the  country. 
I  desired  when  I  made  the  communication  to  the  Senate  in  Executive  Ses- 
sion, to  consult  that  body  in  secret  Session,  to  the  end  that  the  appropriation, 
if  approved,  should  have  been  passed  quietly  and  without  attracting  public 
attention,  or  exciting  the  jealousy  of  the  Powers  of  Europe;  but  contrary 
to  my  Avishes  great  publicity  has  been  given  to  it  by  Congress''  {Dairif,  II, 
75-78). 

^>o  Ibid.,  108. 


WAE  IN  NOETHEEN  MEXICO  445 

board  the  British  ship  Arab,  and  eight  days  later  he  landed  in 
Vera  Cruz.  With  him  came  Almonte,  former  minister  to  the 
United  States,  and  Rejon  and  Basadre  who  had  been  members  of 
his  cabinet  at  the  time  he  was  forced  to  leave  Mexico.  The  way 
had  been  prepared  for  his  return  by  pronouncement  of  the  troops, 
and  General  Salas,  the  commander-in-chief,  stood  ready  to  do 
the  bidding  of  the  returned  exile. 

On  the  day  of  his  arrival,  August  16,  Santa  Anna  issued  an 
address  which  was  tilled  with  specious  promises  and  high  sound- 
ing phrases.''  If  these  were  to  be  accepted  at  face  value,  the 
ex-dictator  had  returned  a  sincere  patriot  and  a  champion  of  the 
Constitution  of  1824,  ready  to  subject  himself  "entirely  to  the 
decisions  of  the  constitutent  assembly,  the  organ  of  the  sovereign 
will  of  the  nation."  For  a  time,  Salas  continued  to  act  as  chief 
executive  while  Santa  Anna,  the  general-in-chief,  sojourned  at 
a  country  residence.  But  the  late  exile  selected  the  cabinet  and 
controlled  the  affairs  of  the  nation. 

By  the  last  of  August  internal  affairs  were  adjusted  suffi- 
ciently to  enable  the  new  government  to  consider  the  offer  made 
by  the  United  States.  In  reply  to  Buchanan's  note  Rejon,  the 
new  Secretary  of  Foreign  Relations,  said  that  the  general-in-chief 
could  not  but  "fix  his  attention  strongly"  on  the  passage  in  that 
note  which  suggested  the  omission  of  all  discussion  concerning 
the  causes  of  the  war.  He  felt  himself  unable  to  negotiate  on 
such  terms;  and  besides,  he  was  obliged  to  postpone  a  definite 
answer  until  the  Mexican  congress  had  met  on  the  sixth  of  Decem- 
ber.'- This  aggravating  snub  was  Polk's  reward  for  helping  to 
reinstate  Santa  Anna  in  Mexico.  Before  many  months  had  passed 
he  had  still  greater  reasons  for  regretting  that  he  had  listened 
to  the  advice  of  Atocha. 

Rejon 's  letter  reached  Washington  on  September  19  and  was 
considered  by  the  President  as  a  virtual  refusal  to  negotiate.    He 

51  A  copy  in  translation,  E.  Ex.  Doc.  60,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  777-785. 

52  Kejon  to  Buchanan,  Aug.  31,  1846  (H.  Ex.  Doc.  4,  29  Cong.,  2  sess.,  43.) 


446  JAMES   K.  POLK 

at  once  decided  that  the  character  of  the  war  should  be  changed 
so  tliat  the  Mexican  people  might  be  made  to  feel  the  conse- 
quences of  tlieir  government's  refusal  to  make  peace.  The  con- 
ciliatory policy  of  paying  liberally  for  supplies  was  now  to  be 
changed  for  one  of  forcible  seizures.  The  President  directed 
that  the  towns  in  Tamaulipas  should  be  occupied  and  that  a 
descent  should  be  made  upon  the  coast  at  Tampico.  Contrary 
to  his  usual  custom  of  refraining  from  all  labor  on  the  Sabbath, 
Polk  held  cabinet  meetings  on  September  20  in  order  to  hasten 
aggressive  movements  against  the  enemy.  Colonel  SteveiLson, 
who  had  been  put  in  command  of  the  New  York  regiment  destined 
for  service  in  California,  was  reprimanded  by  the  President  be- 
cause his  departure  had  been  so  long  delayed,  and  Polk  "inti- 
mated plainly  to  Col.  S.  that  if  further  delay  occurred  he  [I] 
would  cause  the  officers  who  produced  it  to  be  arrested  &  tried." 
During  the  next  few  days  much  energy  was  devoted  to  war  and 
naval  preparations.  Major-General  Patterson  was  selected  to 
command  the  Tampico  expedition,  and  Pillow  and  Shields  were 
chosen  as  his  assistants.  Polk  gave  personal  attention  to  the 
quartermaster's  department  so  that  there  might  be  no  delay. 
The  failure  of  his  diplomatic  overtures  and  the  lax  conduct  of 
subordinates  put  the  President  in  a  petulant  mood.  He  charged 
Whig  officials  with  indifference  regarding  military  operations, 
while  General  Scott,  instead  of  being  an  aide  to  the  War  Depart- 
ment, was  a  constant  embarrassment.  ' '  I  will  observe  his  course, ' ' 
wrote  the  President  in  his  diary,  "and  if  necessary  will  order 
liim  to  some  other  post."^^ 

While  making  preparations  for  war,  Polk  still  left  the  way 
open  for  negotiations  with  Mexico.  Under  his  direction,  Bu- 
chanan, on  September  26,  prepared  and  sent  a  reply  to  Rejon's 
note  of  August  31.  He  charged  the  Mexican  government  with 
having  distorted  the  meaning  of  his  former  letter.  He  told 
Rejon  that  "the  President  will  now  await  with  patience  and 


53  Polk,  Diary,  II,  143-151. 


WAB  IN  NOIiTHEEN  MEXICO  447 

with  hope  the  final  decision  of  the  Mexican  Government."  He 
informed  the  minister,  however,  that  in  the  meantime  the  war 
would  be  prosecuted  vigorously,  and  there  was  a  veiled  threat 
that  Mexico  would  be  required  to  pay  the  costs.  Buchanan's 
original  draft  had  stated  explicitly  that  Mexico  must  indemnify 
the  United  States  for  the  expenses  of  the  war,  but  Polk  and 
Marcy  deemed  it  politic  to  reserve  this  blunt  demand  until  nego- 
tiations had  opened.^*  Commodore  Conner  was  instructed  to 
notify  Slidell  at  New  Orleans  immediately  in  the  event  that  the 
Mexican  government  should  at  any  time  show  a  disposition  to 

negotiate.^^ 

From  the  middle  of  May,  when  he  occupied  Matamoras,  until 
the  first  of  September,  General  Taylor  spent  the  time  in  training 
and  equipping  an  army  for  an  advance  upon  Monterey.  Due 
to  General  Gaines's  unauthorized  call  for  volunteers,  Taylor  was 
overwhelmed  with  troops,  but  the  quartermaster  had  failed  to 
furnish  him  with  adequate  supplies  or  means  of  transportation. 
Commenting  on  the  impatience  felt  by  people  in  the  United  States, 
and  even  by  volunteer  troops,  because  the  army  did  not  advance 
into  I^Iexico,  Lieutenant  Meade  said  in  a  letter : 

These  wise  people  forget  that  soldiers  cannot  march  or  fight  unless  they 
have  something  to  eat,  and  when  in  a  country  totally  devoid  of  resources, 
they  must  carry  with  them  the  means  of  sustaining  physical  nature,  and  m 
consequence  must  have  the  means  of  carrying  their  provisions  and  other 
supplies. 

He  thought  that  Scott  was  right  in  not  wishing  to  go  immediately 
to  the  Rio  Grande,  there  to  idle  away  his  time  "waiting  for 
wagons  and  pork";  but  "unfortunately,  he  [Scott]  chose  to 
ascribe  political  reasons  to  what,  I  believe,  was  simply  military 
ignorance  on  the  part  of  Mr.  Polk."^*^ 

54  Polk,  Duiry,  II,  156-158.  Buchanan  to  Min.  of  For.  Eel.,  Sept.  26, 
1846  (  H.  Ex.  Doc.  4,  29  Cong.,  2  sess.,  44-4.0 ). 

55  Buchanan  to  Conner,  Oct.  1,  1846  {Works,  VII,  90). 

5G  Meade,  Life  and  Letters,  I,  101-111  -This,  with  ^s  'hasty  plate 
of  soup,'  "continued  Meade,  "has  rumed  him  forever,  for  it  is  uch 
better?;  this  country  for  a  man  to  commit  ^f^-. -^^^^^t^?/'^  "^^^' 
himself  ridiculous;  the  former  he  may  get  over,  the  latter,  never. 


448  JAMES   K.  POLK 

By  the  last  of  August  Taylor  had  collected  his  invading  force 
at  Camargo,  and  within  a  few  days  his  armj'  was  advancing  on 
Monterey.  The  march  was  tedious,  and  on  arriving  at  that  place 
he  found  it  to  be  well  fortified.  The  attack  upon  the  city  began 
on  September  20,  and  on  the  twenty-fourth  Ampudia,  the  Mexican 
commander,  offered  to  evacuate  the  city  if  Taylor  would  permit 
the  troops  to  retain  their  arms  and  other  movable  property. 
Taylor  at  first  demanded  ' '  a  complete  surrender  of  the  town  and 
garrison,  the  latter  as  prisoners  of  Avar"  ;  but  he  finally  consented 
to  allow  the  Mexicans  to  march  out  with  all  of  their  arms  and 
accoutrements.  He  also  agreed  to  a  truce  of  eight  w'eeks,  or 
until  further  orders  had  been  received  from  their  respective  gov- 
ernments." The  period  of  inactivity  was  destined  to  be  longer 
than  that  agreed  upon  in  the  truce,  for  the  President  soon  deter- 
minted  to  modify  his  plan  of  reducing  Mexico  to  submission. 

The  special  messenger  whom  Taylor  had  dispatched  with  a 
report  of  the  battle  of  Monterey  reached  Washington  on  Sunday, 
October  11,  and  the  President  was  much  displeased  because  the 
general  had  agreed  to  the  armistice.^®  At  a  cabinet  meeting  held 
on  the  following  day  all  agreed  that  the  general  had  committed 
a  ' '  great  error. ' '    After  the  meeting,  Polk  noted  in  his  diary : 

But  two  reasons  could  have  justified  the  terms  granted  to  the  enemy 
in  the  capitulation.  The  first  is,  if  he  believed  that  he  could  not  capture 
them ;  &  the  2nd.  is,  that  Gen  '1  Ampudia  may  have  induced  him  to  believe 
that  in.  consequence  of  the  recent  change  of  i-ulers  in  Mexico  that  Govern- 
ment was  disposed  to  make  peace.  If  the  first  reason  existed  Gen'l  Taylor 
has  not  stated  it  in  his  despatches,  and  we  have  no  information  to  justify 


57  Taylor's  reports  {H.  Ex.  Doo.  4,  29  Cong.,  2  sess.,  83-102).  A  good 
account  of  this  battle  is  given  in  Eives,  United  States  and  Mexivo,  II, 
chap.  37. 

58  "In  agreeing  to  this  armistice  Gen'l  Taylor  violated  his  express 
orders  &  I  regret  that  I  cannot  approve  his  course.  He  had  the  enemy  in 
his  power  &  sliould  have  taken  them  prisoners,  depriving  them  of  tlieir 
arms,  discharge  them  on  their  parole  of  honour,  and  preserved  the  advan- 
tage which  he  had  obtained  by  pushing  on  without  delay  further  into  the 
country,  if  the  force  at  his  command  justified  it.  .  .  .  It  was  a  great 
mistake  in  Gen  '1  Taylor  to  agree  to  an  armistice.  It  will  only  enable  the 
Mexican  army  to  reorganize  and  recruit  so  as  to  make  another  stand" 
{Diary,  II,  181). 


WAB  IN  NOBTHERN  MEXICO  449 

the  existence  of  this  reason,  though  it  may  have  existed.  If  the  second 
reason  Avas  the  one  upon  which  he  acted,  then  Gen'l  Ampudia  has  over- 
reached &  deceived  him The  Cabinet  were  united  in  the  opinion 

that  if  Gen'l  Taylor  had  captured  the  Mexican  army,  deprived  them  of  their 
arms,  and  discharged  them  upon  their  parole  of  honour  not  to  bear  arms 
during  the  war  or  until  they  Avere  regularly  exchanged,  that  it  would  have 

probably  ended  the  war  with  Mexico It  was  agreed  unanimously 

that  orders  should  be  forthwith  sent  to  Gen  '1  Taylor  to  terminate  the 
armistice  to  which  he  had  agreed,  and  to  prosecute  the  war  with  energy 
and  vigor. 50 

Taylor's  agreement  had,  in  fact,  placed  his  government  in  a 
most  awkward  position,  but  the  difficulty  was  due  more  to  the 
sloM^  means  of  communication  than  to  bad  judgment  on  the  part 
of  the  general  or  the  administration.  On  receipt  of  Rejon's  letter 
Polk  decided  immediately,  as  we  have  already  noted,  to  strike  a 
blow  at  both  northern  Tamaulipas  and  Tampico,  and  Marcy,*"' 
on  September  22,  notified  Taylor  of  the  change  in  the  President 's 
plans.  General  Patterson  was  at  the  same  time  ordered  by  the 
President  to  invade  Tamaulipas.  To  be  sure  Taylor  had  no  knowl- 
edge of  this  arrangement  when  he  made  the  agreement  with 
Ampudia,  but  his  armistice,  if  permitted  to  remain  in  force,  would 
paralyze  in  a  great  measure  the  aggressive  movement  which  had 
been  assigned  to  Patterson. 

The  letter  in  which  Marcy  instructed  Taylor  to  terminate  the 
armistice  was  not  so  drastic  as  the  comments  in  Polk's  diary 
would  lead  one  to  expect.  In  fact,  it  contained  no  phrase  that 
should  have  given  offense  to  the  victorious  general.  The  Presi- 
dent, he  said,  regretted  that  "it  was  not  deemed  advisable  to 
insist  upon  the  terms  which  you  had  first  proposed,"  but  he 
added  that  the  "circumstances  which  dictated  doubtless  jus- 
tified the  change."  After  explaining  the  new  plan  of  campaign 
and  the  necessity  of  beginning  operations  at  once,  he  instructed 
Taylor  to  give  the  notice  necessary  for  ending  the  truce.®^ 


59  Polk,  Diary,  II,  183-184. 

60  H.  Ex.  Doe.  60,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  341-343. 

fii  Marcy  to  Taylor,  Oct.  13,  1846   {ihid.,  355-357). 


450  JAMES   E.  POLK 

Although  nothing  in  Marcy  's  communication  could  reasonably 
be  construed  as  a  reflection  upon  Taylor,  the  ever-suspicious 
general  drew  from  it  evidence  of  a  conspiracy  to  discredit  him 
and  to  deprive  him  of  his  command.  While  admitting  that 
Marcy 's  letter  praised  him,  he  detected  in  it  a  very  cold  tone. 
He  believed  that  the  administration  was  hostile  to  him  simply 
because  his  friends  had  been  indiscreet  enough  to  connect  his 
name  with  the  Presidency .^'^  In  his  reply  to  the  War  Department, 
l;ie  stated  that  with  his  limited  force  he  could  not  have  prevented 
the  escape  of  the  enemy  from  Monterey,  and  that  his  equipment 
did  not  warrant  the  pursuit  of  Ampudia  into  a  country  devoid 
of  supplies.  He  admitted  that  he  had  been  influenced,  also,  by 
Ampudia 's  statement  that  Santa  Anna  was  in  favor  of  making 
peace,  and  with  a  thrust  at  the  President,  he  added :  "  It  is  not 
unknown  to  the  government  that  I  had  the  very  best  reason  for 
believing  the  statement  of  General  Ampudia  to  be  true. '  '•'^  This 
pointed  reference  to  Polk's  part  in  the  reinstatement  of  Santa 
Anna  must  have  been  read  at  the  White  House  with  anything  but 
pleasure,  yet  Taylor  could  not  be  blamed  for  believing  that  the 
President  desired,  most  of  all,  a  peaceable  adjustment  with  Mex- 
ico. All  of  his  instructions  had  emphasized  this  point.  He  was 
aware  of  Polk 's  overtures  to  Santa  Anna  and  of  his  recent  offer  to 
the  Paredes  government.  Since  he  had  not  received  Marcy 's  in- 
structions of  September  22  his  agreement  with  Ampudia  accorded 
very  well  with  the  policy  of  his  government,  so  far  as  he  knew 
it  at  the  time.  Still,  he  had  no  reason  to  complain  because  he 
had  been  instr-ucted  to  end  the  truce,  and  the  political  motives 
which  dictated  these  instructions  existed  only  in  his  own  very 
active  imagination.  The  main  difficulty,  as  already  stated,  was 
the  slow  means  of  communication  which  made  it  impossible  for 
either  the  general  or  the  administration  to  know  the  conditions 


62  Taylor  to  Wood,  Nov.  10,  1846,  Taylor  Letters,  07. 
e3  Taylor  to   Adj.    Gen.,   Nov.   8,   1846    (H.   Ex.   Doc.    60,    30   Cong.,   1 
sess.,  359-360). 


WAR  IN  NOETHEEN  MEXICO  451 

which  governed  the  actions  of  the  other.  Even  before  the  armis- 
tice had  been  disapproved,  Taylor  felt  abused  because  the  Presi- 
dent had  tried  to  facilitate  the  advance  upon  Tamaulipas  by  send- 
ing orders  directly  to  General  Patterson,"*  but  in  this  case,  also, 
Polk's  action  was  governed  by  military  rather  than  political 
considerations. 

Santa  Anna's  declaration  in  favor  of  restoring  the  constitu- 
tion of  1824  led  President  Polk  to  abandon  the  hope  of  inducing 
the  northern  provinces  of  Mexico  to  declare  their  independence 
of  the  central  government.  Since  the  main  purpose  of  Taylor's 
advance  into  Nueva  Leon  and  Coahuila,  and  that  of  Wool  into 
Chihuahua,  had  been  to  effect  this  separation,  the  President 
decided  that  both  of  these  expeditions,  especially  the  latter,  had 
now  become  ' '  comparatively  unimportant. "  Accordingly  he  sug- 
gested at  a  cabinet  meeting  that  Taylor  should  be  authorized  to 
remain  at  IMonterey,  and,  if  he  saw  fit,  to  order  Wool  to  the  same 
place.  He  suggested,  also,  that  the  most  effective  means  of  bring- 
ing Mexico  to  terms  would  be  an  invasion  from  Vera  Cruz.  Marcy 
embodied  these  views  in  a  letter  to  Taylor  and  his  letter  was  care- 
fully discussed  at  a  special  cabinet  meeting.  In  the  meantime 
Marcy  s  draft  had  been  shown  to  Scott  whereupon  the  general 
expressed  a  desire  to  command  the  Vera  Cruz  expedition,  and 
recommended  an  army  of  twenty-five  or  thirty  thousand  men. 
But  Polk  had  not  forgotten  Scott's  indiscreet  letters,  conse- 
quently the  request  was  not  granted.  After  a  discussion  of  more 
than  two  hours  instructions  were  agreed  upon  and  delivered  to 
Robert  JM.  McLane  who  had  been  selected  as  special  messenger. 
They  covered  the  points  already  noted,  and  the  choice  between 
remaining  at  Monterey  or  advancing  into  the  interior  was  left 
entirely  to  Taylor's  discretion.     He  was  informed  that  General 


64  < 'I  conceive  that  this  mode  of  regulating  details  and  ordering  detach- 
ments direct  from  the  Department  of  "War  is  a  violation  of  the  integrity  of 
the  chief  command  in  the  field,  pregnant  with  the  worst  of  evils,  and  against 
which  I  deem  it  my  duty  respectfully  but  earnestly  to  protest"  (Taylor 
to  Adj.  Gen.,  Oct.  15,  1846,  ibid.,  354). 


452  JAMES  E.  POLE 

Patterson  would  probably  command  the  Vera  Cruz  expedition, 
and  he  was  asked  to  send  about  two  thousand  of  his  regulars  to 
this  commander,  if,  in  his  judgment,  they  could  be  spared.  On 
the  other  hand,  he  was  forbidden  to  send  them  if,  in  his  opinion, 
his  own  position  would  be  endangered.*'^ 


65  Polk,  Diury,  II,   198-205.     Marcy  to   Taylor,  Oct.  22,   1846    (H.  Ex. 
Doc.  60,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  363-367). 


CHAPTER  XIX 

CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  THE  CITY  OF  MEXICO 

For  some  time  after  instructing  Taylor  to  remain  at  Mon- 
terey the  President  remained  undecided  as  to  what  policy  he 
would  pursue.  He  had  difficulty  in  making  up  his  mind  whether, 
after  the  capture  of  Vera  Cruz,  the  army  should  simply  hold  the 
territory  in  possession  and  wait  for  Mexico  to  treat,  or  whether 
an  advance  to  Mexico  City  should  be  undertaken.  Before  any 
decision  had  been  reached.  Colonel  Richard  B.  Mason  was  sent 
to  California  via  Panama,  and  instructed  to  command  the  troops 
in  that  region  until  the  arrival  of  General  Kearny.^ 

Financial  as  well  as  military  considerations  impeded  the 
formation  of  a  definite  war  policy.  Department  estimates  caused 
so  much  apprehension  concerning  the  cost  of  the  war  that  the 
number  of  volunteers  asked  for  by  Marcy  was  cut  down  from 
25,000  to  10,000  men.  No  decision  had  been  reached  as  to  whether 
the  government  should  simply  preserve  the  status  quo,  or  "pro- 
secute the  war  into  the  heart  of  Mexico."  Buchanan  advocated 
the  former  policy  and,  apparently,  Polk  did  not  wish  to  decide 
the  question  either  way  until  he  had  consulted  the  Senator  from 
Missouri.  Benton  called  by  appointment  on  the  same  evening 
(November  7)  and  expressed  himself  as  strongly  in  favor  of 
taking  Vera  Cruz  and  of  following  this  up  with  a  crushing  move- 
ment against  Mexico  City.  To  confine  the  military  operations 
simply  to  holding  the  territory  then  in  possession  would,  in  his 
opinion,  prolong  the  war  and  ruin  the  Democratic  party ;  for 
"ours  were  a  go-ahead  people  and  ....  our  only  policy  either 


1  This  action  resulted  from  Polk's  want  of  confidence  in  Colonel 
Stevenson  who  had  been  sent  round  the  Horn  with  the  New  York  volunteers 
(Polk,  Diary,  II,  209,  215). 


454  JAMES  K.  POLK 

to  obtain  a  peace  or  save  ourselves  was  to  press  the  war  boldly." 
He  believed  that  coiiunissioners  vested  with  authority  to  offer 
peace,  "before  a  battle,  during  the  battle,  &  after  it  was  over," 
should  accompany  the  army  headquarters,  and  he  offered  to  be 
one  of  the  number.  Three  days  later  the  Senator  suggested  that 
some  man  of  "talents  and  resources"  and  of  military  training 
ought  to  be  made  lieutenant-general,  and  he  modestly  offered  to 
accept  the  position  if  it  should  be  created  by  Congress.  After 
alluding  to  his  original  preference  for  Van  Buren  he  declared 
that  he  was  now  ready  to  give  Polk  his  unqualified  support.  To 
make  his  declaration  more  emphatic,  he  reminded  the  President 
that  he  [Benton]  had  quarreled  with  General  Jackson  and  had 
subsequently  defended  him  "in  the  gloomy  period  of  the  Bank 
panic.  "^  The  would-be  commissioner  continued  to  urge  the 
necessity  of  an  advance  upon  the  Mexican  capital,  but  the  Presi- 
dent was  reluctant  to  undertake  such  an  expedition  if  it  could 
be  avoided.  By  November  17,  however,  Polk  had  decided  to 
attack  Vera  Cruz,  although  he  still  "considered  it  to  be  an  open 
question,  to  be  determined  according  to  circumstances  hereafter, 
whether  a  column  should  be  sent  from  Vera  Cruz  against  the 
City  of  Mexico. ' '  If,  by  that  time,  Mexico  should  decline  to  make 
peace,  he  would  be  "decidedly  in  favour"  of  taking  the  capital 
city.^ 

The  selection  of  a  commander  for  the  Vera  Cruz  expedition 
caused  the  President  great  anxiety.  He  would  gladly  have  chosen 
Benton ;  but  the  Missouri  Senator  would  not  accept  a  rank  lower 
than  that  of  lieutenant-general,  and  there  was  no  reason  for  be- 
lieving that  Congress  would  create  such  an  office.  Polk  had  lost 
faith  in  Taylor's  ability  as  a  commanding  officer.  He  had  also 
come  to  regard  him  a.s  the  partisan  dupe  of  Bailie  Peyton  and 
George  "W.  Kendall,  "who  were  cunning  &  shrewd  men  of  more 
talents  than  himself,  and  liad  controlled  liiiii  for  political  pur- 
poses."   ' '  His  constant  effort  has  been  to  throw  the  responsibility 

2  I'olk,  Diarti,  II,  221-223,  227-228.  3  jbid.,  241. 


CAMPAIGN  AGAIN  til   THE   CITY  OF  MEXICO  455 

of  any  disaster  which  might  happen  on  the  administration.  In 
this  he  had  been  most  ungrateful  for  the  kindness  which  he  has 
received  at  my  hands."  These  impressions  had  been  derived,  in 
part,  from  Taylor's  dispatches.  In  addition,  Polk's  mind  had 
been  poisoned  by  adverse  criticisms  contained  in  private  letters 
written  to  him  by  his  friend  and  benefactor,  General  Pillow.* 
Taylor  had  quite  a  different  story  to  tell  about  responsibility. 
He  told  Crittenden  in  a  letter  that : 

When  it  was  supposed  I  was  in  great  peril  from  which,  had  I  not  suc- 
ceeded in  extricating  myself,  the  administration  &  its  friends  were  prepared 
to  throw  the  whole  responsibility  on  me— [by  sajang  that  he  had  no 
authority  to  take  a  position  on  the  Eio  Grande]. •'> 

For  some  time  Polk 's  aversion  for  Scott  precluded  all  thought 
of  assigning  him  to  the  chief  command.  Scott  had,  in  Sep- 
tember, requested  that  he  might  be  sent  to  Mexico,  and  at 
that  time  his  request  was  denied.*'  When,  however,  a  majority 
of  the  cabinet,  at  a  meeting  held  on  November  17,  reluctantly 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  Scott  ought  to  be  appointed  in  spite 
of  his  faults,  Polk  consented  to  "think  further  on  the  subject," 
although  "after  his  very  exceptional  letter  in  May  last  nothing 
but  stern  necessity  and  sense  of  public  duty  could  induce  me  to 
place  him  at  the  head  of  so  important  [an]  expedition."  Benton 
was  consulted,  and  when  he,  too,  advised  that,  under  present 
circumstances,  Scott  should  be  appointed,  the  President  at  last 
felt ' '  constrained  to  assign  him  to  this  command. ' '  When  notified 
of  his  appointment  Scott  was,  according  to  Polk's  account,  so 
grateful ' '  that  he  almost  shed  tears. '  '^  If  so,  his  gratitude  proved 
to  be  ephemeral. 


i  Ibid.,  227,  229,  236,  241.  Peyton,  it  will  be  recalled,  had  been  one  of 
Polk's  most  hated  political  opponents  in  Tennessee.  At  this  time  he  was  a 
member  of  General  Worth's  staff.  Kendall  was  editor  of  the  New  Orleans 
Picayune  and  accompanied  Taylor's  army  in  the  capacity  of  war  cor- 
respondent. 

5  Taylor  to  Crittenden,  Sept.  15,  1846,  Crittenden  Papers. 

6  Scott  to  Marcy,  Sept.  12;  Marcy  to  Scott,  Sept.  14,  1846  (E.  Ex.  Boc. 
60,  30  Cong.,  1  sessL,  372-373). 

-  Polk,  Diary,  II,  241-245. 


456  JAMES  K.  FOLK 

Meanwhile  the  President  was  busily  engaged  in  preparing  his 
annual  message  to  Congress.  The  original  draft  was  shown  to 
Benton,  and  the  Senator  suggested  certain  alterations. 

In  his  Thirty  Years'  View,  Benton  stated  that  the  draft  con- 
tained a  "recommendation  to  Congress  to  cease  the  active  pro- 
secution of  the  war,  to  occupy  the  conquered  part  of  the  coun- 
try (....)  with  troops  in  forts  and  stations,  and  to  pass  an 
act  establishing  a  temporary  government  in  the  occupied  part ; 
and  to  retain  the  possession  until  the  peace  was  made."  He 
stated  further  that  he  persuaded  the  President  to  give  up  the 
"sedentary  project."  Apparently  these  statements  grossly  ex- 
aggerated the  facts,  for  they  agree  neither  with  the  President's 
general  war  policy,  nor  with  his  own  description  of  his  original 
drafts.    His  diary  for  December  1  reads : 

I  had  proposed  in  my  draft  to  submit  to  Congress  the  propriety,  at  the 
same  time  that  the  war  should  be  vigorously  prosecuted  [italics  mine]  to 
establish  a  line  of  boundary  securing  to  the  U.  S.  a  sufficient  territory  to 
afford  indemnity  for  the  expenses  of  the  war,  and  to  our  citizens  who  hold 
pecuniary  demands  against  Mexico.  I  proposed,  also,  that  a  more  perman- 
ent Government  should  be  provided  by  Congress  over  the  conquered  provinces 
than  the  temporary  Governments  which  had  been  established  by  our  own 
Military  and  Naval  commanders  according  to  the  laws  of  war.  Col.  Benton 
thought  these  passages  should  be  omitted,  and  submitted  to  me  in  Avriting 
the  reasons  for  this  opinion. 

Whether  wise  or  unwise,  these  recommendations  certainly  did 
not  advise  a  "sedentary"  policy.  The  fact  that  Walker,  who 
wanted  all  of  Mexico,  preferred  Polk's  draft  to  that  of  Benton  is 
another  indication  that  the  President  had  no  intention  of  ter- 
minating "the  active  prosecution  of  the  war."  Although  no  sug- 
gestion to  this  effect  seems  to  have  been  included  in  Polk's  draft, 
certain  modifications  were  made  in  order  to  please  the  Missouri 
Senator,  for  otherwise  it  was  feared  that  he- would  oppose,  and 
probably  could  defeat,  everything  which  the  President  was  about 
to  recommend.^ 


8  Benton,  Thirty  Years'  View,  II,  693.     Polk,  Diary,  II,  258-260. 


CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  THE   CITY  OF  MEXICO  457 

On  December  7,  1846,  the  twenty-ninth  Congress  began  its 
second  session  and,  on  the  next  day,  received  the  President's 
annual  message.  In  it  Polk  repelled  the  charge  made  by  some 
of  his  ojoponents  that  the  war  with  Mexico  was  unjust  and  un- 
necessary. "A  more  effectual  means,"  said  he,  "could  not  have 
been  devised  to  encourage  the  enemy  and  protract  tbe  war  than 
to  advocate  and  adhere  to  their  cause,  and  thus  give  them  '  aid  and 
comfort. '  ' '  The  intended  application  of  this  quotation  from  the 
constitutional  definition  of  treason  could  not  be  misunderstood, 
and  Polk  at  once  became  the  object  of  violent  denunciation.  In 
order  to  disprove  the  charges  that  had  been  made,  he  gave  a 
history  of  events  leading  up  to  the  war,  laying  emphasis  on  the 
fact  that  Mexico  had  violated  two  treaties  in  which  she  had 
agreed  to  pay  American  claimants  damages  awarded  to  them  by 
a  joint  commission.  The  first  of  these  treaties  was  negotiated  in 
1839.  The  second,  which  postponed  the  dates  of  payment,  de- 
clared upon  its  face,  said  the  President,  that  "  'this  new  arrange- 
ment is  entered  into  for  the  accommodation  of  Mexico.'  "  "Not- 
withstanding this  new  convention  was  entered  into  at  the  request 
of  Mexico**  and  for  the  purpose  of  relieving  her  from  embarrass- 
ment, the  claimants  have  only  received  the  interest  due  on  the 
30th  of  April,  1843,  and  three  of  the  twenty  installments." 


9  In  this  connection  a  letter  of  Waddy  Tliompson,  who  negotiated  these 
treaties,  is  of  interest:  "In  the  unquestionable  vindication  of  the  Mexican 
Avar  by  the  President  I  see  that  much  prominence  is  given  to  two  points  both 
of  which  I  claim  exclusive  credit  of  as  they  were  both  not  only  without 
instructions  but  in  violations  of  the  orders  of  the  state  department.  By  the 
Treaty  of  1839  the  Mexican  government  liad  the  option  to  pay  the  awards 
in  cash  or  in  Treasury  notes.  These  latter  were  worth  then  not  more  than 
20  cents  in  the  dollar  and  now  are  worth  even  less.  But  the  Avhole  debt 
could  have  been  paid  with  less  than  one  fifth  of  its  nominal  amount.  The 
brevity  of  a  letter  will  not  allow  me  to  state  to  you  the  various  means  by 
which  I  managed  to  close  the  eyes  of  Mexico  to  the  advantages  which  they 
possessed.  But  I  did  so  and  on  my  oivii  responsibility  made  a  provisional 
arrangement  subject  to  tlie  ratification  of  my  government.  It  was  approved 
■with  certain  alterations.  Mr.  Webster  sent  me  the  draft  of  a  Treaty. 
The  preamble  stated  that  this  new  arrangement  was  made  at  the  instance 
and  desire  of  the  American  claimants.  I  took  the  responsibility  of  chang- 
ing this  and  stated  in  my  despatch  accompanying  the  Treaty  that  if  Mexico 
failed  to  comply  with  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  it  would  give  us  a  much 
stronger  justification  for  inforcing  payment  than  if  it  had  been  stated  in 


458  JAMES   E.  POLK 

The  President  maintained  that  the  United  States  had  liad 
ample  grounds  for  war  long  before  the  Mexican  army  crossed 
the  Rio  Grande.  He  asserted,  also,  that  hostilities  had  not  been 
precipitated  by  Taylor's  advance  to  the  western  frontier,  for 
'^  Mexico  herself  had  never  placed  the  war  which  she  has  waged 
upon  the  ground  that  our  army  occupied  the  intermediate  ter- 
ritory between  the  Nueces  and  the  Rio  Grande."  After  an 
elaborate  argument  which  proved,  to  his  own  satisfaction  at  least, 
the  Rio  Grande  to  be  the  rightful  boundary  of  Texas,  he  said 
that  it  would  be  ''difficult  to  justify  the  Executive,  whose  duty 
it  is  to  see  that  the  laws  be  faithfully  executed  if  ....  he  had 
assumed  the  responsibility  of  yielding  up  the  territory  west  of  the 
Nueces. ' ' 

One  passage  in  the  message  relating  to  conquered  territories 
was  subsequently  attacked  in  the  Senate.  Having  urged  a 
vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war  the  President  went  on  to  say  that : 

In  the  Provinces  of  New  Mexico  and  of  the  Californias  little,  if  any, 
further  resistance  is  apprehended  from  the  inliabitants  to  the  temporary 
governments  which  have  thus,  from  the  necessity  of  the  ease  and  according 
to  the  laws  of  war,  been  established.  It  may  be  proper  to  provide  for  tlie 
security  of  these  important  conquests  by  making  adequate  apijropriation 
for  the  purpose  of  erecting  fortifications  and  defraying  the  expenses  neces- 
sary incident  to  the  maintenance  of  our  possession  and  authority  over  them. 


the  Treaty  that  the  change  in  the  Treaty  had  been  made  at  the  instance  of 
the  claimants.  I  see  that  it  is  so  regarded  by  the  President  in  his  message. ' ' 
Concerning  article  six  of  the  treaty  of  1843,  which  Polk  had  also  men- 
tioned, Thompson  said :  ' '  The  sixth  clause  of  the  Treaty  which  provides 
for  a  new  convention  for  claims  not  then  adjusted  was  inserted  by  me  not 
only  without  instructions,  but  it  was  disapproved  by  Mr.  Webster  but 
nevertheless  retained"  (Thompson  to  Bucliaiian,  Doc.  13,  1846,  Buchaimn 
Papers).  In  tliis  same  letter,  Thompson  spoke  of  letters  which  he  and 
Webster  had  written  to  Bocanegra,  Mexican  Secretary  of  Foreign  lielatious, 
in  1842.  These  are  printed  in  the  appendix  of  his  book,  EecoUcctions  of 
Mexico.  There  Thompson  agrees  that  Webster  had  written  liis  letter  before 
having  seen  his  [  Tliompson 's],  but  in  the  letter  to  Buchanan  he  accuses 
Webster  of  plagiarism:  "Mr.  Webster  stole  my  reply  to  Mr.  Bocanegra 's 
letter  to  him  and  to  tlie  diplomatic  corps  and  published  it  as  his  own — in 
a  letter  to  me.  He  says  in  his  letter  to  me  endorsing  his  reply  to  Mr. 
Bocanegra  that  lie  had  not  received  mine  when  he  wrote  his.  In  this  he 
lied.  That  is  tlie  word  and  no  other  word  will  express  the  idea.  He  had 
received  it  &  stole  it,  and  then  lied  about  it.  Telling  a  falsehood  to  conceal 
a  larceny — a  petty  larceny  if  you  please — of  tliis  I  have  the  proof. ' '  But  cf. 
Becolleotions,  284^304. 


CAMPAIGN   AGAINST    THE    CITY    OF    MEXICO  459 

As  will  bo  seen  later,  some  members  of  Congress  interpreted  this 
as  a  recommendation  to  provide  for  permanent  possession,  before 
any  treaty  had  been  made. 

So  far  as  it  related  to  the  war,  the  message  concluded  with  a 
renewal  of  the  request  for  an  appropriation  of  two  million  dollars 
to  be  used  at  the  discretion  of  the  President  for  diplomatic  pur- 
poses. The  reasons  which  had  induced  him  to  ask  for  that  amount 
at  the  preceding  session,  said  he,  "still  exist,"  and  he  believed 
that  it  would  have  been  granted  then  if  a  vote  had  been  taken.^" 
When  the  message  came  up  for  discussion  in  the  Senate,  West- 
cott,  of  Florida,  moved  that  the  part  relating  to  conquered  terri- 
tories, above  quoted,  be  referred  to  the  Committee  on  Territories. 
Benton  objected,  and  a  discussion  ensued  as  to  whether  the  Presi- 
dent's recommendation  had  contemplated  the  establishment  of 
permanent  governments.  Westcott  contended  that  no  other  mean- 
ing could  be  drawn  from  it,  while  Benton  insisted  that  it  meant 
nothing  of  the  kind.  No  decision  was  reached,  for,  on  motion 
made  by  Crittenden,  the  question  was  sent  to  the  table." 

In  the  House,  Garrett  Davis,  of  Kentucky,  caused  a  heated 
debate  by  introducing  a  resolution  which  requested  the  President 
to  submit  for  examination  all  orders  to  military  and  naval  officers 
relating  to  the  establishment  of  civil  governments  in  the  con- 
quered provinces.  He  had  in  mind,  of  course,  the  governments 
set  up  in  New  Mexico  and  California  by  General  Kearny  and 
Commodore  Stockton,  and  he  wished  to  know  whether  the  acts  of 
those  officers  had  been  authorized  by  the  President;  if  so,  he 
demanded  to  know  "by  what  imperial  or  regal  authority  his 
majesty  undertook  to  act  in  the  premises."  If  Polk,  said  Davis, 
had  authorized  the  organization  of  civil  governments  in  foreign 
provinces,  he  was  guilty  of  usurpation;  and  if  the  Santa  Fe 
region  was  a  part  of  Texas,  as  the  message  seemed  to  assert,  then, 
the  President  had  no  right  to  set  up  a  government  over  a  portion 

10  Eic-hardson,  Messages,  IV,  472-495.      . 

11  Cong.  Globe,  29  Cong.,  2  sess.,  42-44.  *« 


460  JAMES   E.  POLK 

of  a  sovereign  state.  Similar  arguments  were  made  by  Schenck, 
of  Ohio,  and  by  other  opponents  of  the  administration.  The 
defense  of  the  President  was  led  by  Douglas,  although  many 
other  Democrats  rallied  loyallj^  to  his  support.  After  a  week's 
debate,  the  resolution  was  passed  on  the  fifteenth  of  December.^- 

The  establishment  of  a  government  in  California  by  Stockton 
and  Fremont  has  already  been  discussed.  A  brief  summary  will 
indicate  the  objectionable  features  of  Kearny's  conquest  of  New 
Mexico  which  led  the  House  to  call  upon  the  President  for 
information. 

Leaving  Fort  Leavenworth  late  June,  1846,  in  command  of  a 
small  force  made  up  of  United  States  dragoons  and  Missouri 
volunteers,  Kearny  reached  Santa  Fe  on  August  18  and,  without 
resistance,  took  possession  of  the  capital  of  New  Mexico.  Four 
days  later  a  proclamation  was  issued  in  which  Kearny  announced 
that  he  would  hold  the  department  "as  a  part  of  the  United 
States,  and  under  the  name  of  the  'territory  of  New  Mexico.'  " 
After  promising  a  representative  government  at  an  early  date, 
the  proclamation  added  that 

The  United  States  hereby  absolves  all  persons  residing  within  the  boundaries 
of  New  Mexico  from  any  further  allegiance  to  the  republic  of  Mexico, 
and  hereby  claims  them  as  citizens  of  the  United  States. 

Before  tlie  end  of  September  he  had  framed  and  put  into  opera- 
tion an  elaborate  civil  government  under  the  title  of  the  ' '  Organic 
law  for  the  territory  of  New  Mexico.  .  .  ."^•■' 

Kearny's  authority  for  thus  assuming  the  role  of  lawgiver 
was  based  on  the  following  confidential  instructions  sent  to  him 
by  the  Secretary  of  War  on  June  3,  1846 : 

Should  you  conquer  and  take  possession  of  New  Mexico  and  Upper 
California,  or  considerable  places  in  either,  you  will  establish  temporary 

civil   governments    therein You   may    assure    the    people    of   those 

provinces  that  it  is  the  wish  and  design  of  the  United  States  to  provide 
for  tlicm  a  free  government,  with  the  least  possible  delay,  similar  to  that 


^2  Ibid.,  12-33. 

13  For  the  proclamation,  "organic  law,"  and  other  documents,   see  H. 
Ex.  Doc.  60,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  169ff. 


CAMPAIGN  AGAINST   THE   CITY  OF  MEXICO  461 

which  exists  in  our  territories.  They  will  then  be  called  upon  to  exercise 
the  rights  of  freemen  in  elec'ting  their  own  representatives  to  the  terri- 
torial legislature.  It  is  foreseen  that  what  relates  to  the  civil  government 
will  be  a  difficult  part  of  your  duty,  and  much  must  necessarily  be  left  to 
your  own  discretion. i* 

The  explicit  directions  given  in  this  letter,  supplemented  as  they 
were  by  wide  discretionary  powers,  seem  to  give  ample  authority 
for  the  action  taken  by  General  Kearny.  Furthermore,  when 
Polk  received  the  news,  on  October  2,  that  Kearny  had  pro- 
claimed New  Mexico  to  be  "a  part  of  the  United  States,"  he 
noted  in  his  diary  that  "Gen'l  Kearny  has  thus  far  performed 
his  duty  well."^=  Whether,  had  no  objections  been  raised,  he 
would  have  given  similar  approval  to  the  "organic  law,"  we 
have  no  means  of  knowing.  This  document  did  not  reach  Wash- 
ington until  November  23,  and,  according  to  their  own  state- 
ments, it  was  not  examined  by  either  Marcy  or  Polk  until  after 
information  regarding  it  had  been  requested  by  the  House. ^^ 

Whatever  he  might  have  done  with  respect  to  Kearny's  ter- 
ritorial governments  had  Congress  interposed  no  objections,  Polk 
now  realized  that  part,  at  least,  of  Kearny's  work  could  not  be 
justified.  At  a  cabinet  meeting  held  on  December  19,  Buchanan 
expressed  the  opinion  that  the  House  resolution  ought  not  to  be 
answered,  but  the  President  decided  to  transmit  the  desired 
documents.    In  the  evening  he  made  the  following  comment : 

Among  them  was  a  document  from  Brigadier  Gen'l  Kearney,  containing 
a  form  of  Government  over  the  conquered  territory  of  New' Mexico,  which 
among  other  things  declared  that  territory  to  be  a  part  of  the  U.  S.  and 
provided  for  the  election  of  a  Delegate  to  the  Congress  of  the  U.  S.  In 
these  and  some  other  respects  he  exceeded  the  power  of  a  military  com- 
mander over  a  conquered  territory.  It  was  agreed  that  in  my  message  to 
Congress  I  must  disapprove  this  part  of  the  Document,  though,  without 
censuring  the  Gen'l,  who  had  misconceived  the  extent  of  his  authority, 
but  who  had,  no  doubt,  acted  from  patriotic  motives. 

14  Marcy  to  Kearny,  June  3,  1846   (ihid.,  244). 

15  Polk,"  Dwr?/,  II,  169-170. 

isMarcy's  report  to  the  President,  Dec.  21,  1846  (H.  Ex.  Doc.  60,  30 
Cong.,  1  sess.,  151).  Polk's  Message  of  Dec.  22,  1846.  Nothing  is  said 
in  the  Diary  about  this  document  until  the  matter  had  been  brought  up  in 
the  House. 


462  JAMES   E.  POLE 

A  message  to  this  effect,  with  an  additional  statement  that  ''such 
excess  has  resulted  in  no  practical  injury,"  was  sent  to  the  House 
a  few  days  later.  And  yet,  not  two  months  before  this,  the  Presi- 
dent had  expressed  satisfaction  because  Kearny  had  proclaimed 
New  Mexico  to  be  a  part  of  the  United  States  !^^ 

"While  awaiting  information  respecting  territorial  govern- 
ments, the  House  engaged  in  an  acrimonious  debate  on  the  Presi- 
dent's  annual  message  and  the  causes  of  the  war.  Polk  was 
assailed  for  having  stated  in  his  message  that  his  opponents  had, 
by  their  attacks  upon  the  administration,  been  giving  "aid  and 
comfort"  to  the  enemy.  In  turn,  he  was  charged  with  having 
given  ' '  aid  and  comfort ' '  to  Santa  Anna,  the  most  powerful  and 
unscrupulous  of  the  enemies.  Whigs  averred  that  the  President 
had  wantonly  plunged  the  country  into  a  war  of  aggression  in 
order  to  show  the  world  ' '  who  James  K.  Polk  was. ' '  Even  those 
who  had  voted  for  the  declaration  of  war  now  asserted  that  the 
executive  was  conducting  "an  unconstitutional  war."  Most 
abusive  of  all  was  Gentry,  of  Tennessee.  Polk,  he  said,  was  a 
"petty  usurper"  who  "had  come  into  power  without  the  will 
of  the  people  of  these  States,  and  almost  without  the  wish  or 
knowledge  even  of  his  own  party"  ;  and  his  message  was  "nothing 
but  a  low  demagogical  attempt  to  deceive  the  nation — to  tell  just 
enough  of  the  truth  to  cause  the  people  to  believe  a  lie."  On 
the  other  hand  the  President  was  ably  defended  by  his  Demo- 
cratic supporters^'^  who  maintained,  not  only  that  his  message 
had  given  a  true  history  of  relations  with  Mexico,  but  that  Polk 's 
remark  about  giving  "aid  and  comfort"  to  the  enemy  had  been 
amply  vindicated  by  utterances  which  were  being  made  on  the 
floor  of  the  House.  The  receipt  of  the  special  message,  accom- 
panied by  the  orders  issued  to  military  and  naval  officers,  pro- 
duced no  change  in  the  character  of  the  discussion.     The  Whigs 


17  Polk,  Diary,  II,  170,  281-282.     Kichardson,  Messages,  IV,  .50G-507. 

If*  In  defendinf^f  tlie  I'rcsidcnt,  Bayly,  of  Virfjinia,  arraigned  the  arjifu- 
ments  and  the  attitude  of  Garret  Davis  in  such  .scathing  terms  that  a  chal- 
lenge followed.  The  arrest  of  Bayly  by  the  municipal  authorities  prevented 
a  duel   (Polk,  Diary,  II,  297). 


CAMPAIGN   AGAINST    THE    CITY    OF    MEXICO  4G3 

still  continued  to  fulminate  against  the  "President's  war,"  and 
to  characterize  the  establishment  of  civil  governments  in  the  con- 
quered provinces  as  an  unwarranted  assumption  of  unconstitu- 
tional powers. 

The  man  thus  portrayed  as  a  usurper  whose  imperial  ambi- 
tions neither  Congress  nor  the  Constitution  had  been  able  to  check 
believed  himself  to  be  hampered  by  want  of  adequate  authority. 
Upon  his  shoulders  rested  the  responsibility  of  military  victory, 
yet  the  officers  at  his  disposal  were,  in  his  opinion,  disloyal  to 
the  administration  and  interested  solely  in  their  own  political 
advancement.  However  erroneous  this  opinion  may  have  been, 
there  is  no  reason  for  doubting  that  Polk  believed  both  Scott  and 
Taylor  to  be  incompetent  and  unreliable.  Having  arrived  at  the 
conclusion  that  Taylor  was  a  "narrow  minded,  bigotted  partisan" 
who  had  been  "made  giddy  with  the  idea  of  the  Presidency,"  the 
chief  executive  felt  the  need  of  a  commander  more  in  sympathy 
with  the  administration.  He  had  selected  Scott  to  lead  the  attack 
on  Vera  Cruz,  not  because  he  had  great  confidence  in  the  gen- 
eral 's  ability  or  his  loyalty,  but  for  the  reason  that  Scott  was  the 
only  man  in  the  army  "who  by  his  rank  could  command  Tay- 
lor. '  '1^  The  admixture  of  war  and  politics  had  created  a  dilemma 
from  which  the  President  saw  but  one  avenue  of  escape,  namely, 
to  follow  the  advice  of  Benton,  and  ask  Congress  to  authorize  the 
appointment  of  a  lieutenant-general. 

Before  Scott  had  had  time  to  reach  the  seat  of  war  Polk  began 
to  sound  members  of  Congress  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining 
whether  a  bill  to  create  such  an  office  could  be  passed.  He  even 
sent  for  Calhoun  and  asked  his  assistance,  explaining  that  Benton 
would  be  appointed  should  Congress  see  fit  to  create  the  position. 
Calhoun,  however,  was  "decidedly  opposed  to  having  such  an 
officer, "■-''  and  Polk's  best  friends  doubted  that  Congress  could 

19  Polk,  Diary,  II,  249,  277. 

20  Ihid.,  282.  Calhoun  believed  that  the  President  was  governed  by 
political  motives — by  a  desire  to  deal  a  blow  at  Taylor  and  Scott  (Calhoun 
to  Duff  Green,  April  17,  1847,  Eep.  Am.  Hist.  Assn.,  1899,  II,  727). 


464  JAMES  K.  POLK 

be  induced  to  take  favorable  action.  Indeed,  the  President  him- 
self did  not  believe  that  the  necessary  law  could  be  procured,  but 
Benton  urged  him  to  make  the  recommendation,  "and  if  Con- 
gress rejected  it  the  responsibility  would  be  theirs."  Influenced 
partly  by  his  own  desire  to  have  a  Democratic  commander  and 
partly  by  the  dread  of  Benton's  opposition,  Polk  drafted  a 
message  on  Christmas  day  in  which  he  asked  Congress  for 
authority  to  appoint  a  lieutenant-general.-^ 

Although  a  bill  for  creating  the  coveted  office  was  tabled  by 
the  Senate  on  January  15,  the  President  by  his  action  succeeded 
in  retaining,  for  a  time  at  least,  the  good  will  of  the  Missouri 
Senator.  This  in  itself  was  of  no  small  importance,  for  the  de- 
fection of  Calhoun  and  his  coterie  of  adherents  had  converted 
the  normal  Democratic  majority  into  a  minority,  and  Benton 
wielded  a  far  greater  influence  than  did  Calhoun.  On  the  day 
that  the  Senate  tabled  the  bill,  Polk  noted  in  his  diary : 

With  a  large  nominal  majority  in  both  Houses,  I  am  practically  in  a 
minority.  The  several  cliques  &  sections  of  the  Democratic  party  are  mani- 
festly more  engaged  in  managing  for  their  respective  favourites  in  the  next 
Presidential  election,  than  they  are  in  supporting  the  Government  in  pros- 
ecuting the  war,  or  carrying  out  any  of  its  great  measures.  The  only 
corrective  is  in  the  hands  of  the  people.  I  will  do  my  duty  to  the  country 
and  rejoice  that  with  my  own  voluntary  free  will  &  consent  I  am  not  to  be 
a  candidate.     This  determination  is  irrevocable.'-s 

He  was  greatly  discouraged  because  Congress  delayed  legislation 
on  war  measures  which  he  had  recommended,  among  them  pro- 
vision for  ten  additional  regiments  of  regular  troops.  ' '  Instead, ' ' 
said  he,  "of  acting  upon  the  great  measures  of  the  country,  they 
are  spending  day  after  day  and  week  after  week  in  a  worse  than 
useless  discussion  about  slaverv."-^    His  discomfort  was  increased 


21  "I  found  Col.  B.  fixed  upon  this  point,''  said  the  Diary.  "  If  I  do 
not  propose  it,  it  is  manifest  from  my  interview  witli  him  that  both  he 
and  his  friends  will  be  greatly  dissatisfied"  (Polk,  Diary,  II,  275,  28(i,  293). 
The  message  was  sent  to  Congress  on  December  29. 

22  Ibid.,  328. 

2^  Ibid.,  334.  He  referred  to  the  debate  on  King's  slavei-y  restriction 
resolution  introduced  in  the  House  on  Jan.  4,  1847. 


CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  THE   CITY  OF  MEXICO  465 

by  cabinet  opposition  to  the  advance  upon  the  Mexican  capital 
and  to  the  acquisition  of  any  territory  except  New  Mexico  and 
California,  although  the  members  believed  that  other  northern 
provinces  should  be  encouraged  to  declare  their  independence. 
Even  Walker,  Avho  up  to  this  time  had  advocated  expansion  on  a 
large  scale,  now  gave  his  approval  to  a  restrictive  policy.  Donel- 
son,  also,  from  his  post  at  Berlin,  entered  a  protest  against  unre- 
stricted expansion.  Since  war  had  come,  he  believed  the  Rio 
Grande  boundary  to  be  necessary  and  Upper  California  to  be 
desirable ;  but  he  was  decidedly  averse  to  holding  central  Mexico. 
Even  California,  in  his  opinion,  was  not  indispensable,  for  it 
would  eventually  become  an  independent  nation  any  way.  He 
hoped  that  Polk  would  not  listen  to  those  who  desired  to  incor- 
porate Mexico  into  the  Union. ^* 

On  January  13,  1847,  when  the  President  was  downcast  be- 
cause of  obstacles  which  impeded  a  vigorous  prosecution  of  the 
war,  a  harbinger  of  peace  appeared  in  the  person  of  Colonel 
Atocha.  He  came  not  as  an  avowed  agent  of  Santa  Anna,  but 
as  one  who  professed  to  have  intimate,  though  unofficial,  knowl- 
edge of  the  plans  and  purposes  of  his  crafty  patron.  He  showed 
to  Benton  personal  letters  received  from  Santa  Anna,  Almonte, 
and  Rejon,  all  of  which  expressed  a  desire  for  peace  with  the 
United  States.  With  Atocha 's  permission,  Benton  showed  the 
letters  to  Polk  and  Buchanan.  All  agreed  that  he  had  been  sent 
by  Santa  Anna  as  a  confidential  agent  charged  with  the  duty  of 
ascertaining  the  terms  on  which  Polk  would  make  peace.  When 
asked  about  the  terms  which  would  be  agreeable  to  Santa  Anna, 
Atocha  said  that  Mexico  would  consent  to  the  Rio  Grande  as 
the  boundary  of  Texas,  but  "reserving  a  space  of  territory  be- 
tween that  River  &  the  Nueces  as  a  barrior  between  the  two 


2ilbid.,  301.  Donelson  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  22,  1846  (rec'd  Jan.  27,  '47), 
Buchanan  Papers.  In  a  letter  -written  two  weeks  later,  he  said  that 
Europeans  did  not  like  Polk 's  message  and  were  opposed  to  his  war  policy,  y 
They  feared,  he  said,  that  Mexico,  when  defeated,  would  desire  admission 
into  the  Union  aad  would  be  admitted  (Donelson  to  Buchanan,  Jan.  8, 
1847,  Buch-anan  Papers). 


466  JAMES  E.  POLK 

countries."  He  said,  also,  that  Mexico  would  cede  California  for 
a  consideration  of  fifteen  or  twenty  million  dollars,  but  on  the 
subject  of  New  Mexico  he  seemed  to  have  no  authority  to  speak. 
He  advised  that  commissioners  should  meet  in  Havana  and  that, 
pending  negotiations,  the  blockade  at  Vera  Cruz  should  be  raised. 
As  a  concession  to  Mexican  pride,  he  urged  that  the  invitation 
to  negotiate  should  come  from  the  United  States. 

For  several  days  the  President  held  consultations  with  Benton 
and  with  members  of  the  cabinet.  Although  willing  to  open  peace 
negotiations,  he  rejected  some  of  the  suggestions  which  had  been 
made  by  Atocha.  New  Mexico  as  well  as  California  must  be 
ceded  to  the  United  States,  and  the  proposal  to  create  a  neutral 
zone  between  the  Nueces  and  the  Rio  Grande  must  not  be  enter- 
tained. The  blockade  of  Vera  Cruz  would  not  be  raised  until  a 
treaty  had  been  made,  for  if  it  were  raised  and  no  treaty  resulted, 
the  administration  would  be  subjected  to  ridicule.  At  a  cabinet 
meeting  held  on  January  16  Buchanan  was  directed  to  prepare 
a  letter  to  the  Mexican  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations.  In  it  the 
Mexican  government  was  invited  to  appoint  peace  commissioners 
who  were  to  meet  similar  representatives  from  the  United  States 
at  either  Havana  or  Jalapa.  On  seeing  the  letter,  Atocha  ob- 
jected to  the  passage  which  said  that  the  war  would  be  prosecuted 
vigorously  until  a  treaty  had  been  signed.  On  his  suggestion,  the 
President  consented  to  vest  the  commissioners  with  authority, 
"in  their  discretion  after  meeting  the  Mexican  commissioners," 
to  raise  the  blockade  and  to  suspend  hostilities.  The  letter  was 
so  modified  and  delivered  to  Atocha,  and  Secretary  Walker 
arranged  to  have  a  revenue  cutter  convey  him  from  New  Orleans 
to  Vera  Cruz.  He  was  not  regarded  as  an  official  bearer  of  dis- 
patches but  as  "an  individual  to  whom  a  sealed  letter  was 
entrusted  to  be  delivered. '  '-^ 


25  Polk,  Diary,  II,  323,  325-327,  331-334,  335-336,  339.  The  letter  to 
the  Mexican  Minister  is  printed  in  Buchanan,  Work.t,  VII,  198-199,  also  in 
Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  1,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  36. 


CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  THE   CITY  OF  MEXICO  407 

Polk's  desire  for  a  diplomatic  victory  was  strengthened  by 
obstacles  which  seemed  to  preclude  military  success.  Congress 
appeared  to  be  more  interested  in  practical  politics  than  in 
"strengthening  the  Executive  arm,"  and  the  President  had  no 
faith  in  either  the  competency  or  the  loyalty  of  his  commanders 
in  the  field.  Coincident  with  Scott's  arrival  in  New  Orleans  on 
his  way  to  the  seat  of  war  the  newspapers  of  that  city  published 
a  full  account  of  the  administration's  plan  of  campaign.  No 
one  except  the  general  could  have  imparted  the  information, 
and  the  President  at  once  attributed  this  violation  of  secrecy  to 
Scott's  "inordinate  vanity."-"  To  cap  the  climax  a  New  York 
newspaper  published  a  letter,  written  by  Taylor  to  Gaines,  in 
which  the  administration  was  denounced  and  its  military  plans 
completely  exposed.-"  Apparently  the  "Whig  generals"  were 
determined  to  prevent  the  Mexican  army  from  being  taken  by 
surprise.  In  his  private  letters,  Taylor  said  that  keeping  him 
"in  the  dark"  seemed  to  be  the  "great  object"  of  the  adminis- 
tration,-^ and  generosity  may  have  led  him  to  protect  his  Mexican 
adversaries  from  similar  annoyance  ! 

The  President  decided  that  the  administration  could  be  vindi- 
cated most  effectively  by  the  publication  of  all  correspondence 
which  had  passed  between  Taylor  and  the  War  Department,  and, 
evidently  by  his  request,  a  resolution  calling  for  these  documents 
was  introduced  in  the  House  by  Thompson,  of  Mississippi.-" 
Ashmun,  of  Massachusetts,  offered  an  amendment  which  solicited 
information  concerning  the  secret  agent  who  had  been  sent  to 
confer  with  Santa  Anna  at  Havana.     This  amendment  and  the 

2Glbid  327-328.  "I  have  no  doubt,"  Polk  wrote  a  few  weeks  later 
''the  Mexican  Government  and  Military  commanders  are  as  well  apprised 
of  the  secret  instructions  which  were  given  to  Gen'l  Scott  when  he  lett 
Washington  as  he  is  himself.  His  vanity  is  such  that  he  could  not  keep 
the  most  important  secrets  of  the  Government  which  were  given  to  him 
{ihid.,  393-394). 

27  Ibid.,  393-394. 

28Tavlor  to  Wood,  Jan.  26,  1847,  Taylor  Letters,  82. 

29  Polk,  Diary,  II,  362.  Cong.  Globe,  22  Cong.,  2  sess.,  296.  Taylor 
was  reminded  by  Marcy  (Jan.  27)  that  his  offense  had  made  him  liable  to 
dismissal  {U.  Ex.  Doc.  60,  30  Cong.,  1  sess,  391). 


468  JAMES  K.  POLK 

appointment  of  the  returned  exile  to  the  position  of  "lieutenant 
general  for  Mexico ' '  gave  an  opportunity  for  a  new  assault  upon 
the  President,  although  the  speakers  were  unable  to  add  many 
items  to  the  catalog  of  iniquities  which  they  had  been  compiling 
since  the  opening  of  the  session. 

The  Thompson  resolution  was  passed  by  the  House  and  the 
correspondence  was  published,  yet  Congress  seemed  unwilling  to 
cooperate  with  the  President  by  enacting  the  laws  which  he  had 
recommended.  "I  am  in  the  unenviable  position,"  he  wrote  on 
February  5,  "of  being  held  responsible  for  the  conduct  of  the 
Mexican  "War,  when  I  have  no  support  either  from  Congress  or 
from  the  two  officers  (Scott  &  Taylor)  highest  in  command  in 
the  field.  How  long  this  state  of  things  will  continue  I  cannot 
forsee."  For  this  state  of  affairs  he  blamed  factious  members 
of  his  own  party  who  were  more  interested  in  the  next  Presi- 
dential election  than  in  the  welfare  of  the  country.     Said  he : 

In  truth  faction  rules  the  hour,  while  principles  &  patriotism  is  for- 
gotten. While  the  Democratic  party  are  thus  distracted  and  divided  and 
are  playing  this  foolish  and  suicidal  game,  the  Federal  Party  are  united 
and  never  fail  to  unite  with  the  minority  of  the  Democratic  party,  or  any 
faction  of  it  who  may  break  off  from  the  body  of  their  party,  and  thus 
postpone  and  defeat  all  my  measures. 3o 

This  statement  was  verified  within  the  next  few  days  when  Cal- 
houn and  his  friends  united  with  Whigs  in  temporarily  blocking 
the  passage  of  a  bill  for  raising  ten  additional  regiments  of 
troops.  As  a  result  Polk  now  regarded  Calhoun  as  the  "most 
mischievous  man  in  the  Senate,"  and  he  attributed  the  South 
Carolinian's  hostility  to  the  fact  that  he  had  not  been  retained 
in  the  cabinet.^^  Senator  Turney,  a  friend  of  the  President, 
charged  Calhoun  with  impeding  necessary  legislation  by  depriv- 
ing his  party  of  a  majority  in  the  Senate.  He  proclaimed  this 
fact  to  the  people  so  that  they  might  "place  the  responsibility 
exactly  in  the  proper  quarter."''-    However,  the  rejection  of  the 


30  Polk,  Diary,  II,  368. 

31  Ibid.,  371-372.  32  Cong.  Globe,  29  Cong.,  2  sess.,  395. 


CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  THE  CITY  OF  MEXICO  469 

ten-regimeut  bill,  as  reported  from  the  conference  committee, 
proved  not  to  be  final ;  after  a  reconsideration,  it  was  passed  by 
the  Senate  on  the  tenth  of  February.  Congress  had  already 
authorized  the  emission  of  twenty-three  million  dollars  in  treas- 
ury notes,  for  war  purposes.  The  satisfaction  which  Polk  ex- 
perienced as  a  result  of  this  new  turn  of  events  was  counter- 
balanced by  his  disgust  because  members  of  Congress  demanded 
for  their  personal  friends  all  offices  which  had  been  created  by 
the  military  bill.  "Take  the  day  altogether,"  he  wrote  on  Feb- 
ruary 15,  "I  am  sure  I  have  never  been  so  wearied  and  annoyed 
in  my  life."^^ 

When  the  Senate  voted,  in  the  first  instance,  to  reject  the  ten- 
regiment  bill,  the  Washington  Union  characterized  this  action  as 
' '  Another  Mexican  Victory  " : 

If  Santa  Anna,  Ampudia,  or  any  other  Mexican  general  could  snatch 
from  our  soldiers  a  corresponding  victory,  we  should  place  them  upon  the 
same  elevation  where  their  compatriots,  friends,  and  fellow-soldiers  in  the 
Senate  of  the  United  States  now  stand. 

By  a  resolution  passed  on  February  13  the  editors,  Ritchie  and 

Heiss,  were  denied  admission  to  the  floor  of  the  Senate — an  action 

concerning  which  the  President  wrote : 

It  is  a  second  Duane  case,  &  strikes  a  blow  at  the  liberty  of  the  jiress. 
The  foul  deed  was  perpetrated  by  the  votes  of  the  undivided  Federal 
Senators,  and  Senators  Calhoun  &  Butler  of  S.  C.  &  Yulee  &  Wescott  of 
Florida.34 

On  March  3,  1847,  the  twenty-ninth  Congress  ended  its  labors. 
Although  Polk's  opponents  had  filled  pages  of  the  Congressional 
Glohe  in  charging  him  with  miscellaneous  crimes  and  misde- 
meanors, he  had  nevertheless  been  provided  with  men  and  money 
so  that  he  might  continue  his  "unholy  war"  against  Mexico. 
The  bill  for  granting  him  three  million  dollars  to  be  used  in 
negotiating  a  peace  was  also  enacted  into  law,  but  not  until  the 
"Wilmot  proviso,"  which  sought  to  exclude  slavery  from  all 
territory  to  be  acquired,  had  been  rejected  by  both  houses. 

33  Polk,  Diary,  II,  380. 

^iCong.  Globe,  29  Cong.,  2  sess.,  S92,  417.     Polk,  Biarii,  II,  378.    . 


470  JAMES   K.  POLK 

During  the  last  evening  of  the  session,  while  the  President 
was  at  the  eapitol  for  the  purpose  of  signing  bills,  an  incident 
occurred  which  tested  not  only  his  patience  but  his  courage  as 
well.  Among  the  bills  which  were  expected  to  pass  was  one 
authorizing  the  appointment  of  two  major-generals  and  three 
brigadier-generals.  His  original  intention  had  been  to  ignore 
New  York,  when  filling  these  positions,  for  he  knew  that  he  could 
not  satisfy  both  Democratic  factions  in  that  state — one  led  by 
Marcy  and  the  other  by  Senator  Dix,  the  close  friend  of  Van 
Buren.  However,  Marcy  insisted  that  one  of  the  lesser  positions 
should  be  given  to  his  friend,  General  Clark,  while  Dix  emphati- 
cally opposed  the  appointment.  As  a  compromise,  Polk  decided 
to  appoint  Enos  D.  Hopping,  who,  although  affiliated  with  the 
Marcy  faction,  had  been  recommended  for  a  colonelcy  by  both 
wings  of  the  party.  Although  both  Marcy  and  Senator  Dickenson 
threatened  to  resign  if  Clark  were  not  appointed,  Polk  defied 
their  attempt  to  "bully"  him,  and  appointed  Hopping  as  soon 
as  the  bill  had  been  signed.  "I  had  become  perfectly  indiffer- 
ent, ' '  was  his  comment,  ' '  whether  Mr.  Dickinson  and  Mr.  Marcy 
resigned  or  not.  I  knew  that  neither  of  them  could  be  sustained 
in  such  a  course  for  such  a  cause.  "^° 

Among  the  appointments  made  and  confirmed  during  the  clos- 
ing hours  of  the  session  was  that  of  Benton  as  major-general. 
He  had  solicited  the  appointment,  and  had,  at  the  time,  attached 
no  conditions  to  his  acceptance,  but  it  soon  developed  that  he 
had  no  intention  of  serving  unless  the  President  would  assign  him 
to  the  chief  command  of  the  army  and  invest  him  w' ith  ' '  plenary 
Diplomatic  powers  to  conclude  a  Treaty  of  peace."  The  cabinet 
objected  to  clothing  Benton  with  diplomatic  powers,  and,  besides, 
Polk  himself  had  planned  to  send  Buclianan  as  conuuissioner, 
should  Mexico  consent  to  negotiate,  lie  would  gladly  have  put 
Benton  at  the  head  of  the  army  if  he  could  liave  done  so  without 
recalling  the  four  major-generals  already  in  the  field.    According 


S".  Polk.  Diarii,  II,  399-405 


CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  TEE  CITY  OF  MEXICO  471 

to  his  own  statement,  he  would  "have  no  hesitation"  so  far 
as  Scott  and  Tayk)r  were  concerned,  but  he  thought  it  would 
be  unjust  to  recall  Butler  and  Patterson.  When  informed  of  the 
President's  decision,  Benton  declined  to  accept  the  appointment.^^ 

Polk  was  ready  to  go  a  long  way  to  avoid  offending  the  Mis- 
souri Senator,  for  Benton  was  the  only  man  in  public  life  for 
whom  he  seemed  to  harbor  a  feeling  of  awe.=^^  He  was  influenced 
still  more,  however,  by  his  aversion  for  the  Whig  generals  and 
by  his  desire  to  transfer  the  chief  command  to  a  member  of  his 
own  party.  At  the  time  that  Benton  was  appointed,  Polk  was 
especially  hostile  to  General  Scott  on  account  of  alleged  discrimi- 
nation against  Democratic  officers.^^ 

Since  the  congressional  batteries  had  ceased  their  "fire  upon 
his  rear,"  the  President  could  devote  more  attention  to  the  enemy 
across  the  Rio  Grande.  After  consultation  with  Benton  and  the 
cabinet  he  decided  to  raise  the  blockade  of  the  Mexican  ports  and 
to  substitute  a  tariff,  the  proceeds  of  which  were  to  be  used  for 
war  purposes.  He  took  steps  to  hasten  the  recruiting  and  equip- 
ping of  the  new  regiments  which  Congress  had  voted,  and  to 
eliminate  the  "extravagance  &  stupidity"  of  the  quartermaster's 
department.^'' 


30  Ibid.,  406-413. 

37  Rnt  there  were  limits  to  his  concessions.  It  was  about  this  time 
tha  he  lef  sed  to  appoint  Benton's  son-in-law  (Jones)  to  office,  because 
he  "was  a  short  time  ago  the  editor  of  a  Federal  paper  m  New  Orleans" 
(Hid.,  455).  ,,   ,  ,    , 

3s  He  had,  said  the  President,  "arbitrarily  &  without  cause  degraded 
ColoneTHarney,  of  Tennessee.  "Gen'l  Taylor  had  acted  with  the  same 
Droscriptive  sp  rit,  not  only  towards  Col.  Harney,  but  other  gallant 
Eioc  atic  offi^^^^^^^^^  Against  the  advice  of  his  cabinet,  Polk  directed 
?ha  Hanley  should  be  restored:  -I  told  the  Secretary_  of  Wa.^  that  i 
he  was  unwilling  to  write  the  letter  ...  I  would  do  it  myself.  .  .1 
am  r^solverthaf  Col.  Harney  ^^-^  -^  be  sacrificed  o  propitiate  the 
personal  or  political  malice  of  Gen'l  Scott"  (ihid.,  384-386). 

39 -The  truth  is,"  he  wrote,  "that  the  old  army  officers  have  become 
so  in  the  habit  of  enjoying  their  ease,  sitting  in  parlours  and  on  carpeted 
Hoors,  that  most  of  them  have  no  energy  and  are  content  ^^  jpg  on  n  a 
regular  routine  without  knowing  whether  they  are  taking  care  of  the  public 
interest  or  not"   {ibid.,  431). 


472  JAMES  E.  POLK 

Wliile  the  President's  mind  was  thus  engrossed  with  details 
concerning  military  contracts  and  pack-mules,  Atocha  returned 
to  Washington,  on  March  20,  bearing  Mexico 's  reply  to  his  offer 
to  negotiate  a  peace.  "The  question  of  Texas,"  said  the  Minister 
of  Foreign  Relations,  "was  a  cover  to  ulterior  designs,  which 
now  stand  disclosed ' ' ;  nevertheless  his  government  would  ' '  accede 
cheerfully"  to  the  invitation  to  appoint  commissioners,  but  such 
appointment  would  not  be  made  ' '  unless  the  raising  of  the  block- 
ade of  our  ports  and  the  complete  evacuation  of  the  territory  of 
the  Republic  by  the  invading  forces  shall  be  previously  accepted 
as  a  preliminary  condition. '  '*" 

For  the  present  this  communication  put  an  end  to  all  hope 
of  a  peaceable  adjustment,  for  Polk  at  once  declared  the  condi- 
tions to  be  "wholly  inadmissible,"  leaving  no  alternative  but  a 
"crushing  movement"  against  Mexico.  Buchanan  interposed  ob- 
jections to  an  advance  upon  the  Mexican  capital,  but 

I  [Polk]  replied  that  I  differed  with  him  in  opinion,  &  that  I  would 
not  only  march  to  the  City  of  Mexico,  but  that  I  would  pursue  Santa 
Anna's  army  wherever  it  was,  and  capture  or  destroy  it.  I  expressed  the 
opinion  that  if  I  had  a  projjer  commander  of  the  army,  who  would  lay 
aside  the  technical  rules  of  war  to  be  found  in  books,  which  required  a 
long  train  of  baggage  wagons;  one  who  would  go  light  &  move  rapidly, 
I  had  no  doubt  Santa  Anna  &  his  whole  army  could  be  destroyed  or 
captured  in  a  short  time. 

On  the  same  evening  rumors  reached  Washington  that  Taylor's 
army  was  in  great  danger,  consequently  the  President  was  still 
more  determined  to  deal  Santa  Anna  a  speedy  and  crushing 
blow.''^ 

It  is  necessary  at  this  point  to  turn  aside  from  the  adminis- 
trative side  of  the  war  in  order  to  give  a  brief  sketch  of  the 
militaj-y  operations  of  Kearny  in  California,  and  of  Scott  *in  his 
campaign  from  Vera  Cruz  to  Mexico  City. 


40  Monasterio  to  Buchanan,  Feb.   22,   1847    (Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  1,   30  Cong., 
1  sess.,  37-38).     Also,  Buchanan,  Works,  VII,  223-224. 

41  Polk,  Diary,  II,  432-434. 


CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  THE   CITY  OF  MEXICO  473 

On  September  25,  1846,  liaviiig  put  his  "organic  law"  in 
operation  in  New  Mexico,  Kearny,  with  a  force  of  three  hundred 
dragoons,  set  out  for  California.  At  Socorro,  on  October  6,  he 
met  the  scout.  Kit  Carson,  who  was  on  his  way  to  Washington 
with  dispatches  from  Stockton  and  Fremont  announcing  the  con- 
quest of  California  and  the  subjugation  of  its  inhabitants.*-  As 
this  news  seemed  to  indicate  that  no  further  trouble  was  to  be 
expected,  Kearny  sent  back  two  hundred  of  his  dragoons,  and 
retained  but  one  hundred  as  a  personal  escort.  He  forwarded 
the  dispatches  by  another  messenger,  and  Carson  (much  against 
his  will)  was  required  to  guide  the  way  to  California. 

Eeaching  the  junction  of  the  Colorado  and  Gila  rivers  on 
November  23,  Kearny's  army  intercepted  a  messenger  bearing 
mail  from  California  to  Sonora,  and  from  tlie  letters  examined, 
Kearny  received  his  first  intelligence  of  the  uprising  of  the  Cali- 
fornians  under  General  Flores.*^  On  December  2  he  reached 
Warner's  rancho,  the  most  eastern  settlement  in  California.  Here 
he  was  visited  by  an  Englishman  named  Stokes,  who  volunteered 
to  carry  a  letter  to  Commodore  Stockton,  at  San  Diego.  On 
receipt  of  this  letter  (December  3)  Stockton  sent  a  small  force 
of  thirty-nine  men,  under  Captain  Gillespie,  to  cooperate  with 
Kearny.  At  San  Pascual,  on  December  6,  Kearny's  army  fought 
a  battle  with  a  Mexican  force  under  Captain  Andres  Pico.  A 
greater  number  of  Americans  than  Mexicans  were  killed,  but  as 
Pico  retreated,  leaving  Kearny  in  possession  of  the  field,  it  was 
called  a  victory.**  As  soon  as  the  troops  had  recovered  suffi- 
ciently, Kearny  proceeded  on  his  way  to  the  coast.    At  several 


42  Porter,  General  Stephen  W.  Kearny  and  the  Conquest  of  California, 
11.  This  interesting  pamphlet  is  a  strong  defense  of  Kearny 's  conduct 
in  California. 

43  Emory,  Notes  of  a  Military  Reconnoissance ;  H.  Ex.  Doc.  41,  30  Oong., 
1  sess.,  9t>.  This  document  gives  a  detailed  account  of  Kearny's  march 
from  Ft.  Leavenworth  to  San  Diego. 

*i  Bancroft,  Hist,  of  California,  V,  341  ff.  See  also  Porter,  op.  cit.,  who 
criticizes  Bancroft  and  defends  Kearny. 


474  JAMES  E.  POLE 

points  Pico  harassed  his  little  army ;  but  on  the  evening  of  De- 
cember 10  he  was  met  by  a  body  of  marines  sent  by  Stockton,  and 
two  days  later  he  reached  San  Diego  in  safety.''^ 

Kearny's  instructions,  as  we  have  seen,  authorized  him  to 
take  possession  of  California  and  to  establish  a  temporary  civil 
government.  All  orders  relating  to  that  country  which  were 
issued  by  the  War  Department  clearly  indicated  that  the  Presi- 
dent desired  Kearny  to  have  the  chief  command  as  soon  as  he 
had  reached  California.  Despite  this  fact  Stockton,  who  had 
constituted  himself  ' '  commander-in-chief  and  governor, ' '  declined 
to  surrender  the  command,  even  after  Kearny  had  exhibited  his 
instructions,  and  until  the  arrival  of  other  land  forces,  the  general 
was  not  in  a  position  to  assert  his  rights.  He  declined  to  accept 
a  subordinate  command  under  Stockton,  yet  in  the  "second  con- 
quest" of  California,  which  soon  followed  his  arrival,  he  loyally 
cooperated  with  the  commodore. 

When  Kearny  reached  San  Diego  he  found  the  country,  ex- 
cept a  few  of  the  seaports,  in  possession  of  the  Flores  revolution- 
ists, whose  headquarters  were  at  Los  Angeles.  It  had  already 
been  planned  that  Fremont  should  attack  Los  Angeles  from  the 
north.  After  consulting  with  Kearny,  Stockton  decided  to  move 
north  from  San  Diego  for  the  purpose  of  striking  Los  Angeles 
from  the  south.  Having  made  the  necessary  preparations  the 
army  left  San  Diego  on  December  29  under  the  nominal  com- 
mand of  Stockton,  although  Kearny  seems  actually  to  have  di- 
rected the  operations.  An  engagement  occurred  on  January  8  at 
San  Gabriel  River,  and  another  on  the  following  day  near  Los 
Angeles.  Flores  and  Pico  now  abandoned  that  city;  the  former 
fled  to  Mexico,  while  the  latter  moved  northward  and  surrendered 
to  Fremont  on  favorable  terms.  Although  Stockton  and  Kearny 
were  displeased  with  Fremont 's  assumption  of  authority  in  grant- 
ing these  terms  to  the  enemy,  they  decided  to  avoid  further 


4.-.  Emory,  Notes,  etc.,   112-113. 


CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  THE   CITY  OF  MEXICO  475 

trouble  b}'  ratifying  the  agreement.^*'  The  "second  conquest"  of 
California  was  now  complete,  and  no  further  resistance  was 
offered  to  the  authority  of  the  United  States. 

Stockton  and  Fremont,  still  ignoring  General  Kearny's  author- 
ity, proceeded  once  more  to  set  up  a  civil  government.  Kearny  re- 
turned to  San  Diego,  and  soon  after  repaired  to  Monterey,  where 
he  found  Commodore  Shubrick,  the  successor  of  Stockton.  Shu- 
brick  promptly  recognized  Kearny's  authority,  and  the  general 
took  steps  to  organize  a  civil  government.  Monterey  was  made 
the  capital  city  and  on  March  1,  1847,  Kearny  assumed  the  office 
of  governor.  Having  put  the  government  in  operation,  he  turned 
it  over  to  Colonel  Richard  B.  Mason,  on  May  31,  and  set  out  for 
Washington.  By  his  order,  Fremont  accompanied  him,  under 
separate  escort,  and  at  Fort  Leavenworth  the  pathfinder  was 
put  under  arrest  and  ordered  to  report  to  the  adjutant-general 
in  Washington.^'  Both  arrived  at  the  capital  city  about  the 
middle  of  September  and  laid  their  respective  complaints  before 
the  Government.  President  Polk  was  very  favorably  impressed 
with  Kearny.  He  regarded  the  general  as  "a  good  officer  &  an 
intelligent  gentleman"  and  one  who  had  "performed  valuable 
and  important  services  in  his  late  expedition  to  New  Mexico  & 
California.  "*« 

After  Kearny  had  filed  charges  against  Fremont,  Polk  dis- 
cussed with  the  cabinet  the  propriety  of  constituting  a  court  of 
inquiry  instead  of  a  court-martial.  The  latter  tribunal  was  se- 
lected. Benton  and  his  soij-in-law,  William  Carey  Jones,  en- 
deavored to  have  the  scope  of  investigation  broadened  so  that 
Fremont  might  bring  counter  charges  against  his  opponents,  but 
Polk  would  grant  no  favors  even  though  he  expected  that  his 
refusal  would  subject  him  to  the  wrath  of  the  whole  Benton 


40  Porter,  op.  cit.,  25-29. 

47  Bancroft,  Hist,  of  Cah,  V,  451-452.     Porter,  op.  cit.,  32-33. 

4s  Polk,  Diari/,  III,  168,  175. 


476  JAMES   E.  POLK 

clan/''  Fremont  was  convicted  and  sentenced  to  dismissal  from 
the  army.  The  President  approved  the  sentence  of  the  court, 
except  on  the  charge  of  mutiny,  but  remitted  the  penalty  and 
ordered  Fremont  to  report  for  duty.  The  pathfinder,  however, 
declined  to  accept  this  clemency,  and  sent  in  his  resignation.  As 
the  President  had  anticipated,  approval  of  the  court's  verdict 
caused  an  immediate  break  with  Benton.  All  intercourse  be- 
tween the  two  men  ceased  as  soon  as  Polk's  decision  was  an- 
nounced. About  a  year  later  a  member  of  the  Blair  family  told 
Secret-ary  Mason  that  Benton  was  about  to  publish  one  of  Polk's 
letters  which  would  injure  him  in  the  eyes  of  the  public.  Unter- 
rified  by  the  threat,  the  President  noted  in  his  diary : 

I  told  Judge  Mason  that  he  had  no  such  letter.  I  do  not  know  what 
this  means.  I  am,  however,  at  the  defiance  of  both  Blair  &  Benton.  The 
former  has  proved  himself  to  be  unprincipled  and  the  latter,  I  fear,  is  no 
better.  From  the  day  I  approved  the  sentence  of  the  Court  martial  in 
Col.  Fremont's  case,  Col.  Benton,  for  no  other  cause  than  that  I  dared  to 
do  my  duty,  has  been  exceedingly  hostile  to  me.  He  has  not  called  on  me, 
nor  have  I  spoken  to  him  for  more  than  twelve  months.  [Also,  February 
10,  1849.]  There  is  every  indication  now  that  he  [Benton]  will  join  the 
Whigs  in  the  support  of  Gen'l  Taylor,  at  all  events  until  he  can  get  offices 
for  his  three  sons-in-law.  If  I  had  failed  to  do  my  duty  in  Col.  Fremont 's 
case,  and  given  an  office  which  he  sought  for  his  Whig  son-in-law  (Jones) 
he  would  never  have  quarreled  with  me.  His  course  towards  me  and  my 
administration  for  more  than  a  year  past  has  been  selfish  and  wholly 
unprincipled.50 

It  was  mainly  on  Benton's  recommendation  that  Kearny  had 
been  selected  to  lead  the  expedition  to  California,  yet,  after  the 


*o"i  have  always  been  upon  good  terms  "nth  Col.  Benton,"  Polk  noted 
in  his  diary,  "but  he  is  a  man  of  violent  passions  and  I  should  not  be  sur- 
prised if  he  became  my  enemy  because  all  his  wishes  in  reference  to  his 
family"  are  not  gratified.  ...  "I  am  resolved  that  Col.  Fremont  shall 
be  tried  as  all  other  officers  are  tried.  I  will  grant  him  no  favours  or 
privileges  which  I  would  not  grant  to  any  other  officer,  even  though  I  sliould 
incur  his  displeasure  &  that  of  his  friends  by  refusing  to  do  so"  (ihid., 
177,  198,  204).  See  also  page  203  where  John  Randolph  Benton,  the 
Senator's  son,  threatened  Polk  for  declining  to  give  him  an  office. 

•"'0  Polk,  Diary,  IV,  227,  330.  For  Benton's  account  of  the  court-martial, 
see  his  Thirty  Years'  View,  II,  715-719. 


CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  THE  CITY  OF  MEXICO  477 

court-martial,  the  Senator  embraced  every  opportunity  to  deal 
a  blow  at  his  former  friend.  When,  in  August,  1848,  Polk  nomi- 
nated Kearny  to  be  brevet  major-general,  Benton  declared  that 
he  would  "speak  out  the  balance  of  the  Session,  and  defeat  all 
public  measures  before  Congress,  rather  than  suffer  the  vote  on 
Genl  Kearny's  nomination  to  be  taken."  In  fulfillment  of  this 
threat  he  harangued  the  Senate  for  thirteen  days  with  execration 
of  Kearny  and  laudation  of  Fremont,  at  the  end  of  which  he  an- 
nounced that  he  would  "break  off,"  although  he  had  not  finished 
a  third  of  what  he  had  intended  to  say.^'^  His  effort  failed  to 
produce  the  desired  result,  for  Kearny's  appointment  was  con- 
firmed and  he  repaired  to  Mexico  for  service  under  Scott. 

As  already  noted,  Scott  was  chosen  to  supersede  Taylor  after 
Congress  refused  to  create  the  position  of  lieutenant-general.  He 
received  notice  of  his  appointment  on  November  18,  1846,  and 
within  a  few  days  he  w^as  on  his  way  to  Mexico.  From  New  York 
he  sent  an  effusive  letter  to  Taylor — praising  that  general's  gal- 
lantr^"  and  achievements  but  notifying  him  that  he  would  be 
deprived  of  a  large  part  of  his  army.  He  realized  that  his  action 
would  be  "infinitely  painful"  to  Taylor,  but  he  relied  upon  the 
general's  "patriotism  to  submit  to  the  temporary'  sacrifice  with 
cheerfulness."'^^  According  to  the  plans  of  operation  decided 
upon  in  Washington  before  Scott's  departure,  Taylor's  duties 
were  to  be  confined  to  holding  the  territory'  already  conquered, 
yet,  as  will  soon  appear,  Scott  greatly  misjudged  the  cheerfulness 
with  which  Taylor  would  leave  himself  exposed  to  attacks  of  the 
enemy. 

On  November  12,  nearly  two  weeks  before  Scott  had  written 
from  New  York,  Taylor  informed  the  War  Department  that  he 


51  "I  mean  to  show,"  he  said,  "that  this  brevet  nomination  of  Gen- 
eral Kearny  ought  to  be  rejected ;  that  the  affair  of  San  Pasqual  was  a 
disastrous  defeat,  through  his  mismanagement;  that  his  conduct  in  New 
Mexico  was  unfortunate,  and  in  California  criminal;  and  that  infamy,  not 
honor,  settles  upon  his  name"  (Polk,  Diary,  TV,  59.  Cong.  Globe,  30  Cong., 
1  sess.,  App.,  977-1040). 

52  Scott  to  Taylor,  Nov.  25,  1846  (H.  Ex.  Doc.  60,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  373). 


478  JAMES   K.  POLK 

was  about  to  press  forward  into  the  enemy's  country.  As  late 
as  January  7,  1847,  he  was  only  "unofficially  advised"  of  Scott's 
presence  in  Mexico.  By  that  time  he  had  driven  the  Mexicans 
from  Saltillo,  Parras,  and  Victoria,  while  Commodore  Perry  had 
captured  the  port  of  Tampico.^^ 

Althougli  Scott  arrived  in  New  Orleans  on  December  19,  it 
was  not  until  the  middle  of  January  that  his  several  communi- 
cations reached  Taylor,  and  that  the  victorious  general  learned 
that  he  was  to  be  deprived  of  a  large  part  of  his  army.  With  his 
usual  indiscretion,  Scott  had  not  only  disclosed  his  plans  to  the 
newspapers  while  at  New  Orleans,  but  when  giving  orders  to  his 
subordinates,  he  intimated  that  Taylor  was  purposely  keeping 
at  a  distance  so  that  he  might  avoid  the  orders  of  his  superior. 
In  a  letter  written  to  Scott,  Taylor  indignantly  repelled  this 
insinuation  and  complained  of  being  left  to  face  an  enemy  twenty 
thousand  strong  with  only  a  thousand  regulars  and  a  few  vol- 
unteers.   "I  cannot,"  he  wrote, 

misunderstand  the  object  of  the  arrangements  indicated  in  your  letters. 
1  feel  that  I  have  lost  the  confidence  of  the  government,  or  it  would  not 
have  suffered  me  to  remain,  up  to  this  time,  ignorant  of  its  intentions,  with 
so  vitally  affecting  interests  committed  to  my  charge. 

He  felt  "personally  mortified  and  outraged"  by  such  treatment, 
yet  he  promised  to  obey  the  orders  of  his  government  so  long  as 
he  remained  in  Mexico.  Soon  after  this,  in  a  letter  to  the  ad- 
jutant-general, he  gave  vent  to  his  resentment  because  he  had  not 
been  notified  by  special  messenger  of  the  government's  determi- 
nation to  supersede  him.  He  had  been  assigned  to  the  command 
by  the  President,  and  had  he  "chosen  to  be  punctilious,"  he 
would  have  declined  to  part  with  his  troops  without  direct  orders 
from  the  same  authority.  However,  he  had  decided  not  to  follow 
this  course,  and  liis  only  regret  was  that  the  "President  did  not 
think  proper  ...  to  relieve  me  from  a  position  where  I  can  no 
longer  serve  the  country  with  that  assurance  of  confidence  and 


53  Letters  of  Taylor  to  Adj.  Gen.  (ibid.,  374^388). 


CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  THE   CITY  OF  MEXICO  479 

siippoi-t  SO  indispensable  to  success."  He  requested  that  this 
letter  might  be  submitted  to  the  President."  By  this  time 
Tajdor  was  thinking  of  srrving  the  country  in  another  capacity. 
Nearly  two  months  earlier  he  had  decided  to  accept  the  nomi- 
nation for  the  Presidency,  should  it  be  tendered  to  him.^'"' 

Scott's  answer  to  Taylor's  letter  was  conciliatory  in  tone. 
He  passed  over  the  caustic  remarks  which  it  contained  by  ex- 
pressing a  "wish  to  forget  them."  After  explaining  that  condi- 
tions had  made  it  necessary  to  deal  directly  with  Taylor's  subor- 
dinates without  previously  consulting  him,  he  asked  the  general 
to  abandon  Saltillo  and  to  make  no  detachments,  except  for 
reconno'issance  beyond  Monterey.^" 

A  few  days  after  Scott  had  sent  this  letter,  and  before  it  had 
reached  its  destination,  Taylor  received  word  that  a  reconnoi- 
tering  party  which  he  had  sent  out  on  the  road  to  San  Luis  Potosi 
had  been  captured.  He  considered  this  disaster  to  be  a  direct 
result  of  the  "intrigue"  of  Marcy  and  Scott  to  discredit  him, 
and  he  resolved  to  tight  Santa  Anna,  "be  the  consequences  what 
they  may."^'  His  determination  to  hold  Saltillo  at  all  hazards 
was  not  altered  by  the  receipt  of  Scott's  letter  asking  him  to 
withdraw  to  Monterey.  It  reached  him  while  he  was  at  Agua 
Nueva,  eighteen  miles  beyond  Saltillo,  and  he  notified  Scott  that 
he  would  remain  there  unless  "positively  ordered  to  fall  back 
by  the  government  at  Washington.  "=^  In  a  private  letter  he 
alluded  to  the  correspondence  with  Scott  and  said  that  "he  & 
myself  now  understand  each  other  perfectly,  &  there  can  for  the 
future  be  none  other  than  official  intercourse  between  us."    His 


54Tavlor  to  Scott,  Jau.  15;  Taylor  to  Adj.  Gen.,  Jan.  27,  1817  {ibid.. 
863,  1101). 

55  Taylor  to  Wood,  Dee.  10,  1846,  Taylor  Letters,  76. 

56  Scott  to  Taylor,  Jan.  26,  1847  {H.  Ex.  Doc.  60,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  864). 

57  ' '  We  now  begin  to  see  the  fruits  of  the  arrangements  recently  niaile 
in  Washington,  by  an  intrigue  of  Marcy,  Scott  &  Worth  to  take  from  me 
nearly  the  whole  of  the  regular  forces  under  my  command,  while  in  the 
immediate  front  of  the  enemy  if  not  in  their  presence"  (Taylor  to  Wood, 
Jan,  30,  1847,  Taylor  Letters,  84). 

58  Tavlor  to  Scott,  Feb.  7,  1847  (H.  Ex.  Doc.  60,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  1162). 


480  JAMES  K.  POLK 

enemies,  in  his  oi^inion,  believed  that  he  would  leave  Mexico  in 
disgust  and  that  they  might  use  such  action  to  his  disadvantage, 
"but  in  this  I  shall  disappoint  them.""® 

The  main  Mexican  army,  commanded  by  Santa  Anna,  was 
stationed  at  San  Luis  Potosi.  Taylor's  perversity  in  refusing  to 
take  Scott 's  advice  about  falling  back  to  ]\Ionterey  left  his  army 
in  danger  of  being  annihilated  by  a  greatly  superior  force.  How- 
ever, he  took  a  gambler's  chance  and  won  the  battle  of  Buena 
Vista.  He  had  planned  originally  to  meet  the  enemy  at  Agua 
Nueva,  but,  on  Santa  Anna's  approach,  he  fell  back  to  Buena 
Vista,  within  seven  miles  of  Saltillo.  The  battle  opened  on  the 
afternoon  of  February  22  and  lasted  until  dark  on  the  following 
day,  when  Santa  Anna  retreated  toward  San  Luis  with  his  thor- 
oughly demoralized  army.  According  to  his  own  report,  Taylor's 
force  numbered  4500  men,  while  Santa  Anna  commanded  20,000.*'° 

Taylor's  first  reward  for  defeating  the  enemy  at  Buena  Vista 
was  the  receipt  of  a  reprimand  from  the  President  and  the  Secre- 
tary of  "War.  Marcy's  letter,  dated  Januarj^  27,  rebuked  him  for 
having,  in  his  letter  to  Gaines,  criticized  the  administration  and 
exposed  the  plans  of  campaign.  Ignoring  his  own  indiscretion 
which  had  called  forth  the  rebuke,  Taylor  was  now  "satisfied," 
according  to  his  own  statement,  that  "Scott,  Marcj^  &  Co.  have 
been  more  anxious  to  break  me  down"  than  to  defeat  Santa 
Anna.  Marcy  had  supposed  him  to  be  powerless  since  his  troops 
had  been  taken  away,  and  consequently  afraid  to  defend  himself ; 
"but  he  will  find  himself  somewhat  mistaken,  &  I  have  no  doubt 
when  he  gets  my  reply  to  his  abusive  &  contemptable  letter,  he 
will  regret  the  course  he  has  pursued."  Believing  Marcy  to  be 
"entirely  incompetent,"  he  thought  that  friends  of  soldiers  who 
had  fallen  at  Buena  Vista  should  hold  meetings  and  memorialize 
the  President  to  remove  him  and  to  recall  Scott  to  Washington.''^ 


■>^  Taylor  to  Wood,  Feb.  9,  1847,  Taylor  Letters,  85,  87. 

00  Taylor  to  Scott,  March  1,   1847    (H.  Ex.  Doc.  60.  30  Cong.,  1  sess., 
1168). 

01  Taylor  to   Wood,  March  20,  1847,  Taylor  Letters,  90-91. 


CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  THE   CITY   OF  MEXICO  481 

Two  weeks  later  he  received  a  letter  from  Marcy«-  which  ex- 
pressed the  President's  "high  appreciation"  of  his  "distin- 
guished services,"  but  this  did  not  in  the  least  remove  his  dis- 
trust of  the  administration.  It  will  be  seen,  however,  that  the 
distrust  on  both  sides  resulted  for  the  most  part  from  misunder- 
standings due  to  the  slow  means  of  communication. 

Although  General  Scott,  as  we  have  seen,  arrived  at  New 
Orleans  on  December  19,  1846,  it  took  until  the  middle  of  Feb- 
ruary to  assemble  troops  and  make  other  preparations  for  his 
attack  upon  Vera  Cruz.  On  February  15  he  set  out  from  the 
Brazos  de  Santiago,  and,  after  stopping  at  Tampico  and  Lobos 
Island,  his  fleet  of  transports  appeared  off  the  coral  island  of 
Vera  Cruz  harbor  on  the  fifth  of  March.  Not  knowing  that  Santa 
Anna  had  gone  to  attack  Taylor,  Scott  expected  that  his  landing 
would  be  vigorously  opposed;  but  instead,  he  was  able  to  land 
his  troops  on  the  sandy  beach  in  front  of  the  city  without  resist- 
ance from  the  enemy.  For  about  four  days  American  land  bat- 
teries and'  the  warships  of  Commodore  Conner  kept  up  a  con- 
tinuous bombardment,  and  on  March  29  the  Mexican  commander 
offered  to  capitulate.  Scott  took  possession  of  both  the  city  of 
Vera  Cruz  and  the  castle  of  San  Juan  de  Uhia.''^' 

After  the  battle  of  Buena  Vista,  Santa  Anna  set  out  for 
Mexico  City,  where  he  took  the  oath  of  office  as  President  and 
adjusted  a  revolt  of  the  clerical  party .«*  Leaving  the  govern- 
ment in  charge  of  a  substitute  President,  he  left  the  city  on  April 
2,  1847,  and  prepared  to  meet  Scott  at  the  pass  of  Cerro  Gordo, 
about  twenty  miles  east  of  Jalapa.  He  occupied  a  position  very 
difficult  to  approach,  but  in  the  battle  of  Cerro  Gordo,  which 
occurred  on  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth,  the  forces  of  General 
Scott  won  a  comparatively  easy  victory.  Within  a  few  days 
Jalapa  and  Perote  were  occupied  without  resistance,  and  on  the 

62Marcy  to  Taylor.  April  3,  1847  (H.  Ex.  Doc.  60,  30  Cong.,  1  sess., 
1133). 

63  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  1,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  216-230. 
64.  See  Eives,  United  States  and  Mexico,  II,  391  ff. 


482  JAMES   E.  POLK 

fifteenth  Worth  took  possession  of  Piiebla.  While  Scott  was  at 
Jalapa,  Trist  arrived  on  the  scene  bearing  a  commission  to  nego- 
tiate a  treaty,  but  a  discussion  of  the  controversy  which  followed 
his  arrival  is  reserved  for  another  place. 

Late  in  May  Scott  left  Jalapa  and  established  his  headquarters 
at  Puebla.  Here  he  remained  for  several  weeks,  impatiently 
awaiting  reinforcements.  His  time,  however,  was  fully,  if  not 
profitably,  occupied  in  quarreling  and  making  friends  with  Trist, 
in  bombarding  the  War  Department  with  complaints  and  denun- 
ciations, and  in  a  futile  attempt  to  procure  a  peace  treaty  by 
bribing  the  Mexican  officials. 

During  the  same  period  Santa  Anna  was  in  Mexico  City 
making  preparations  to  defend  the  capital.  By  an  act  passed 
on  April  20,  two  days  after  the  battle  of  Cerro  Gordo,  the  Mex- 
ican congress  had  authorized  him  to  ' '  adopt  all  necessary  mea- 
sures to  carry  on  the  war,"  but  had  deprived  him  of  the  power 
of  making  peace  except  with  the  consent  of  the  congress.*'^  While 
engaged  in  his  military  preparations  he  received  Polk's  offer  to 
negotiate  a  treaty,  which  Trist  had  transmitted  by  the  aid  of  the 
British  minister.  The  action  taken  by  Santa  Anna  and  his  con- 
gress will  be  discussed  in  the  next  chapter ;  it  may  be  said  here, 
however,  that  nothing  resulted  at  this  time  from  Trist 's  attempt 
to  negotiate.  After  he  had  received  for  his  own  use  ten  thousand 
dollars  from  Scott's  secret  service  fund,  the  Mexican  President 
decided  that  the  time  for  peace  had  not  yet  arrived. 

While  encamped  at  Puebla,  Scott 's  army  had  been  augmented 
by  troops  which  had  arrived  during  the  summer.  The  health  of 
his  soldiers  was  much  improved,  and  they  had  been  made  efficient 
by  constant  drill.  By  the  seventh  of  August,  nearly  four  months 
after  the  battle  of  Cerro  Gordo,  all  of  the  reinforcements  had 
arrived  and  the  army  began  its  march  on  the  City  of  Mexico. 
The  first  engagement  occurred  at  Contreras,  where  on  the  nine- 
teenth and  twentieth  of  August  Scott's  army  won  a  signal  victory 

65  Ibid.,  434. 


CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  THE  CITY  OF  MEXICO  483 

over  its  adversaries.*"'  On  tlie  following  day  the  Mexicans  were 
again  defeated,  and  this  time  thoroughly  demoralized,  in  the 
battle  of  Churubusco.  It  is  quite  probable  that  if  Scott  had 
chosen  to  pursue  the  enemy  he  could  have  entered  the  capital  and 
ended  the  war.^' 

Scott,  however,  did  not  follow  up  the  advantage  gained  at 
Churubusco.  Instead,  he  agreed  to  an  armistice  in  order  to 
afford  an  opportunity  for  Trist  to  enter  into  negotiations  with 
commissioners  appointed  by  Santa  Anna.  In  his  report  to  the 
Secretary  of  War  he  admitted  that  he  might  have  occupied  the 
capital  "with  but  little  additional  loss,"  but  Trist  and  himself 
had  "been  admonished  by  the  best  friends  of  peace — intelligent 
neutrals  and  some  American  residents— against  precipitation." 
This  admonition  and  the  fear  that  by  "driving  away  the  govern- 
ment" peace  would  be  delayed  were  the  reasons  assigned  for 
consenting  to  an  armistice.««  The  "intelligent  neutrals"  were 
members  of  the  British  legation,  and  their  opinions  seem  to  have 
carried  more  weight  than  did  the  wishes  of  his  own  government. 
As  will  appear  in  the  next  chapter,  Santa  Anna's  commissioners 
declined  to  accept  the  terms  offered  by  Trist,  and  the  armistice 
resulted  simply  in  giving  the  Mexican  army  a  chance  to  re- 
cuperate. 

The  commissioners  held  their  last  meeting  on  September  6, 
and  on  the  same  day  Scott  addressed  a  note  to  Santa  Anna.  In 
it  he  stated  that  the  armistice  had  been  violated  and  that  it  would 
be  terminated  at  noon  on  the  following  day,  unless  by  that  time 
he  should  receive  "complete  satisfaction"  for  the  offenses  which 
had  been  committed.  Santa  Anna's  reply  was  anything  but 
satisfactory,  for  he  not  only  contradicted  Scott's  assertions  but, 

66  In  reporting  this  battle  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  Seott  wrote:  "I 
doubt  whether  a  more  brilliant  or  decisive  victory  ...  is  to  be  toimd  on 
record"   {Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  1,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  308). 

67  Eipley,  War  with  Mexico,  II,  283.  Ripley  ser^^ed  on  General  Pillow's 
staff. 

68  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  1,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  314. 


484  JAMES   K.  POLK 

in  turn,  charged  tlie  American  commander  with  violating  the 
principles  of  civilized  warfare.®"  Such  an  exchange  of  courtesies 
meant,  of  course,  that  hostilities  would  be  renewed. 

Unofficial  news  of  Scott's  victories  and  subsequent  armistice 
reached  Washington  on  the  fourteenth  of  September.  As  the 
President  had  recently  decided  to  force  a  peace  by  ordering  Scott 
to  prosecute  the  war  relentlessly  and  to  defray  his  expenses  by 
levying  contributions,  he  was  not  well  pleased  when  he  learned 
of  the  truce.    He  noted  in  his  diary : 

Judging  at  this  tlistance,  I  would  think  he  should  have  improved  his 
victories  by  pressing  the  Mexican  Government  to  an  immediate  decision 
upon  the  terms  of  peace  which  Mr.  Trist  was  authorized  to  offer  to  them, 
and  if  they  refused  these  terms  I  think  he  should  have  taken  immediate 
possession  of  the  City,  and  levied  contributions  upon  it  for  the  support  of 
his  army.  I  fear  the  armistice  was  agreed  to  by  the  Mexican  Commander 
only  to  gain  time  to  re-organize  his  defeated  army  for  further  resistance. "o 

On  October  4,  although  he  had  already  heard  of  the  capture 
of  Mexico  City,  the  President  decided  to  recall  Trist.  "Mexico," 
he  wrote,  "must  now  first  sue  for  peace,  &  when  she  does  we  will 
hear  her  propositions."'^  Apparently,  he  had  little  hope  that 
the  fall  of  the  capital  would  induce  the  enemy  to  make  peace, 
for  two  days  later  Marcy,  under  his  instructions,  sent  to  Scott 
new  orders  for  continuing  the  war.  He  was  told  that  reenforee- 
ments  were  on  the  way.  It  was  hoped  that  they  would  enable 
him  to  "carry  on  further  aggressive  operations;  to  achieve  new 
conquests ;  to  disperse  the  remaining  army  of  the  enemy  in  your 
vicinity,  and  prevent  the  organization  of  another."  It  was  ex- 
pected that  he  would  conduct  operations  in  the  most  effective 
way  to  "induce  the  rulers  and  people  of  Mexico  to  desire  and 
consent  to  such  terms  of  peace  as  we  have  a  right  to  ask  and 
expect."     One  means  of  effecting  this  result  was  the  levying  of 


00  Scott  to  Santa  Anna,   Sept.   6;    Santa  Anna  to   Scott,   Sept.   7,   ISVi 
{Sen.  Ex.  Doe.  52,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  340-348). 

70  Polk,  nUiry,  III,  156,  170-172. 

71  i])id.,  185-186. 


CAMPAIGN  AGAINST   THE   CITY  OF  MEXICO  485 

military  contributions.'-  These  instructions  did  not  reach  Mexico 
City  until  the  middle  of  November,  and  at  that  time  Scott  did 
not  feel  disposed  to  follow  them. 

On  September  8,  the  day  following  the  termination  of  the 
armistice,  Scott  ordered  Worth  to  make  an  attack  on  the  Molino 
del  Rey  (king's  mill),  which  was  erroneously  reported  to  be  used 
as  a  cannon  foundry."  Worth  succeeded  in  capturing  the  mill, 
but  not  without  severe  loss.  A  few  days  later  General  Pillow 
made  a  "successful,  but  bloody"  attack  upon  the  fortifications  at 
Chapultepec.'*  Scott's  army  now  began  its  advance  on  the  cap- 
ital city.  Santa  Anna  offered  further  resistance  at  Belen  and 
San  Cosme,  but,  on  the  night  of  September  13,  he  evacuated  the 
capital  and  withdrew  to  Guadalupe  Hidalgo. 

Although  defeated  and  driven  from  the  capital,  Santa  Anna 
was  not  ready  to  lay  down  his  arms.  Being  no\v  thoroughly  dis- 
credited, there  was  but  one  hope  of  maintaining  his  authority, 
namely,  by  achieving  some  unexpected  military  victory.  He 
therefore  determined  to  fall  upon  the  small  garrison  which  Scott 
had  left  to  hold  possession  of  Puebla.  Having  issued  a  decree 
in  which  he  resigned  the  Presidency  and  assigned  the  duties  of 
this  office  to  Pefia  y  Peiia  and  two  associates,  he  set  out  for 
Puebla,  where  he  arrived  on  the  twenty-first  of  September.  His 
attempt  to  overwhelm  the  garrison  ended  in  failure,  as  did,  also, 
an  attempt  to  capture  a  force  under  General  Joseph  Lane  which 
was  on  its  way  from  Vera  Cruz  to  Mexico  City.  While  near 
Huamantla,  Santa  Anna  received  an  order  from  Queretaro,  dated 
October  7,  Avhich  directed  him  to  turn  over  his  command  to  a 
subordinate  and  to  appear  before  a  court  of  inquiry.  He  com- 
plied with  tlie  first  part  of  the  order,  but  not  with  the  second. 


72Marcy  to  Seott,  Oct.  (i,  1847  (Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  52,  30  Cong.,  1  sess., 
138-140). 

73  Hitchcock,  Fi/f  1/  Years  in  Camp  and  Field,  296. 

74  "In  later  years,"  was  Grant's  comment,  "if  not  at  the  time,  the 
battles  of  Molino  del  Eey  and  Chapultepec  have  seemed  to  me  to  have  been 
whollv  unnecessary"   (Grant,  Memoirs,  I,  152-154). 


486  JAMES   K.  POLK 

After  keeping  under  cover  in  Mexico  until  the  following  spring, 
he  set  out  for  Jamaica,  there  to  await  a  favorable  opportunity  to 
regain  his  lost  power. 

The  order  which  came  from  Queretaro,  and  which  deprived 
Santa  Anna  of  his  command,  was  dictated  by  Peiia  y  Peiia,  who 
claimed  the  right  to  exercise  the  office  of  President,  not  by  virtue 
of  Santa  Anna's  decree,  but  by  the  constitution  and  the  laws  of 
the  republic.  We  are  not  here  interested  in  the  validity  of  this 
claim.  For  our  present  purpose  we  are  interested  simply  in  the 
fact  that  Pena's  action  removed  Santa  Anna  from  control  and 
opened  the  way  for  a  resumption  of  negotiations.  These  and 
earlier  negotiations  will  be  discussed  in  the  following  chapter. 


CHAPTER   XX 

TREATY  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO 

In  January,  1847,  as  we  have  noted  in  the  preceding  chapter, 
President  Polk,  in  response  to  overtures  made  by  Atoeha,  invited 
the  Mexican  government  to  send  commissioners  to  Havana  or  to 
Jalapa  for  the  purpose  of  negotiating  a  treaty  with  diplomatic 
representatives  of  the  United  States.  In  March,  Atoeha,  who 
had  carried  the  invitation  to  Mexico,  returned  to  Washington  with 
the  reply  that  Mexico  would  not  consent  to  appoint  commissioners 
unless  the  raising  of  the  blockade  and  the  evacuation  of  Mexican 
territory  "shall  be  previously  accepted  as  a  preliminary  con- 
dition." Polk  at  once  pronounced  such  terms  to  be  "wholly 
inadmissible"  and  decided  to  deal  a  crushing  blow  at  Mexico  City. 

Before  Atoeha  had  set  out  on  his  journey  to  Mexico,  and  while 
the  personnel  of  the  proposed  commission  was  under  discussion, 
Buchanan  expressed  a  desire  to  be  chosen  as  one  of  the  number. 
"I  told  him,"  wrote  the  President,  "it  struck  me  favourably, 
but  that  if  he  went  he  must  do  so  in  his  character  of  Secretary 
of  State,  &  go  alone  &  without  being  associated  with  others."^ 
When  the  conditons  demanded  by  Mexico  became  known  there 
was,  of  course,  no  immediate  necessity  for  making  an  appoint- 
ment. 

The  idea  of  creating  a  commission  which  might  accompany 
the  army  and  take  advantage  of  the  first  opportunity  to  negotiate 
a  peace  appears  to  have  originated  in  the  fertile  brain  of  Senator 
Benton.     He  suggested  such  a  commission  in  December,  1846, 


i"I  told  him,"  Polk  continued,  "that  would  be  due  to  his  position,  & 
that  the  adniinistration,  if  he  went  alone,  would  be  entitled  to  the  whole 
credit  of  the  arrangement.  It  seemed  to  strike  him  favourably.  Indeed 
I  had  no  doubt  he  was  highly  delighted  with  the  idea"  (Polk,  Diary,  H, 
338). 


488  JAMES  K.  POLK 

Avhen  the  President  had  under  consideration  the  appointment  of 
Benton  to  the  position  of  lieutenant-general.  His  plan  provided 
for  three  commissioners  who  were  to  accompany  the  main  army 
and  who  were  to  be  clothed  with  full  diplomatic  powers.  Polk 
approved  the  suggestion  and  mentioned  Slidell  as  one  of  the 
number.  To  this  Benton  interposed  vigorous  objections  and,  in 
turn,  proposed  the  names  of  John  J.  Crittenden,  Silas  Wright, 
and  himself.  The  President  was  willing  to  nominate  any  of  the 
men  named,  but  he  did  not  wish  to  slight  Slidell,  who  had  already 
performed  valuable  services  in  Mexico.  Benton  would  not  yield 
his  objections  to  Slidell 's  appointment,  and  the  matter  was 
dropped.-  The  Senator's  next  attempt  to  procure  a  diplomatic 
appointment  was  his  request,  during  the  following  March,  that 
the  President  should  make  him  commander-in-chief  of  the  army 
and  invest  him  with  power  to  negotiate  a  treaty.^ 

When,  on  March  20,  1847,  Atocha  returned  to  Washington 
bearing  an  unsatisfactory  reply  to  the  American  offer,  the  Presi- 
dent announced  to  the  cabinet  his  intention  to  "lay  aside  the 
technical  rules  of  war  to  be  found  in  books ' '  and  to  crush  Santa 
Anna  at  all  hazards.*  His  belligerent  mood,  however,  did  not 
preclude  a  desire  for  peace  at  the  earliest  possible  moment. 

Nothing  occurred  which  led  the  President  to  believe  that 
Mexico  might  of  necessity  be  ready  to  accept  his  peace  terms 
until  April  10,  when  news  of  the  fall  of  Vera  Cruz  reached  Wash- 
ington. The  effect  of  this  news  upon  Polk's  determination  to 
appoint  an  ambulatory  commissioner  and  liis  reasons  for  selecting 
Nicholas  P.  Trist  to  fill  the  position  are  recorded  in  his  own 
memorandum  of  a  cabinet  meeting  held  on  that  day : 

The  subject  of  consideration  today  was  the  Mexican  War.  I  had 
several  times  mentioned  to  Mr.  Buchanan  the  importance  of  having  a 
commissioner  vested  with  Plenipotentiary  powers,  who  should  attend  the 
headquarters  of  the  army  ready  to  take  advantage  of  circumstances  as 
they  might  arise  to  negotiate  for  peace.     1   stated  to  the  Cabinet  to-day 


2  Ibid.,  2fi2-270.  ■'!  Ibid..  41  L\ 

*  Ibid.,  4.32.     On  tliis  same  day  the  mails  brought  the  news  of  the  battle 
of  Buena  Vista. 


TREATY  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO  489 

that  such  was  my  opinion,  and  that  I  thought  it  more  imjtortant  since  the 
news  of  the  recent  victories,  and  especially  since  the  information  received 
this  morning  of  the  fall  of  Vera  Cruz  &  the  Castle  of  San  juan  D 'Ulloa. 
All  the  members  of  the  Cabinet  present  concurred  in  this  ojjinion.  The 
embarrassment  in  carrying  it  out  consisted  in  the  selection  of  a  suitable 
commissioner  or  commissioners  who  would  be  satisfactory  to  the  country. 
This  was  a  great  difficulty.  Such  is  the  jealousy  of  the  different  factions 
of  the  Democratic  party  in  reference  to  the  next  Presidential  Election 
towards  each  other  that  it  is  impossible  to  appoint  any  prominent  man  or 
men  without  giving  extensive  dissatisfaction  to  others,  and  thus  jeopar- 
dizing the  ratification  of  any  Treaty  they  might  make.  In  this  also  the 
Cabinet  were  agreed.  I  stated  that  I  preferred  that  the  Secretary  of  State 
should  be  the  sole  commissioner  to  negotiate  the  Treaty,  &  that  I  wouhl 
have  no  hesitation  in  deputing  him  on  that  special  service  if  the  Mexican 
authorities  had  agreed  to  appoint  commissioners  on  their  part,  but  as  they 
had  refused  to  do  this  he  could  not  attend  the  head-quarters  of  the  army 
for  an  indefinite  period  of  time  and  with  no  assurance  whether  the  Mex- 
ican authorities  would  agree  to  negotiate.  Mr.  Buchanan  expressed  his 
entire  concurrence  in  this  view.  He  said  he  would  be  willing  to  go  in 
person  if  there  was  any  assurance  that  negotiations  would  be  speedily 
opened,  but  under  the  circumstances  &  with  our  present  information  he 
could  not,  of  course,  think  of  going.  Mr.  Buchanan  then  suggested  that 
Mr.  N.  P.  Trist,  the  chief  clerk  of  the  Department  of  State,  might  be 
deputed  secretly  with  Plenipotentiary  powers  to  the  head-quarters  of  the 
army,  and  that  it  might  be  made  known  that  such  a  person  was  with  the 
army  readj'  to  negotiate.  Mr.  Trist,  he  said,  was  an  able  man,  perfectly 
familiar  with  the  Spanish  character  and  language,  &  might  go  with  special 
as  well  as  defined  instructions.  The  suggestion  struck  me  favourably. 
After  much  conversation  on  the  subject  it  was  unanimously  agreed  by  the 
Cabinet  that  it  would  be  proper  to  send  Mr.  Trist,  and  that  he  should  take 
with  him  a  Treaty  drawn  up  by  the  Secretary  of  State  approved  by  the 
Cabinet,  which  he  should  be  authorized  to  tender  to  the  Mexican  Govern- 
ment, and  to  conclude  [a  treaty]  with  them  if  they  would  accept  it;  but 
that  if  they  would  not  accept  it,  but  would  agree  to  appoint  commis- 
sioners to  negotiate,  that  Mr.  Trist  should  in  that  event  report  the  fact  to 
his  Government,  when  Mr.  Buchanan  could  go  out  as  the  commissioner. 

After  the  entire  cabinet  had  approved  such  a  mission,  Trist  was 
sent  for  and  the  nature  of  the  mission  explained.  He  accepted 
the  appointment.  He  and  all  others  cognizant  of  the  President's 
diplomatic  venture  were  pledged  to  profound  secrecy.^ 


^  Ibid.,  46.5-468.  Of  the  necessity  for  secrecy  Polk  A\Tote:  "To  give 
publicity  to  such  a  movement  before  it  was  commenced,  and  to  have  the 
federal  papers  giving  their  own  version  of  it,  and,  as  their  habit  is,  to  have 


490  JAMES   K.  POLK 

Although  Trist,  as  we  have  just  noted,  was  selected  on  the 
recommendation  of  Buchanan,  his  past  career  and  his  qualifica- 
tions were  not  entirely  unknown  to  tlie  President.  He  had  studied 
law  under  Jefferson,  whose  granddaughter  he  had  married,  and 
after  a  brief  term  of  service  as  clerk  in  the  Treasury  Department 
President  Jackson  had  made  him  his  private  secretary.  In  1833 
he  was  appointed  consul  at  Havana  by  Jackson,  and,  after  eight 
years  of  service  in  that  capacity,  he  was  recalled  by  Tyler  because 
he  had  been  charged  by  Great  Britain  with  having  aided  the  slave 
trade  in  Cuba.  Similar  charges  had  been  made  during  Van 
Buren's  administration,  and  even  his  brother-in-law,  Thomas 
Jefferson  Randolph,  advised  Van  Buren  to  remove  him  unless 
they  were  disproved.  "Mr.  Trist  is  disinterested  and  honor- 
able, ' '  said  Randolph,  ' '  his  judgment  I  have  never  confided  in ; 
whatever  his  errors  may  have  been  they  have  been  doubtless  of 
his  judgment,  but  indiscretions  may  be  carried  too  far.""  This 
characterization  seems  apposite  to  his  entire  career.  Bad  judg- 
ment and  inordinate  conceit  were  his  besetting  sins. 

Shortly  after  Polk's  inauguration,  Trist  began  to  importune 
the  new  President  for  office  and  to  enlist  the  influence  of  the 
Donelson  family  in  his  behalf.^  Unsuccessful  at  first,  he  was, 
on  August  28,  1845,  given  a  commission  as  chief  clerk  in  the 
Department  of  State. ^ 

In  appointing  Trist  to  conduct  the  negotiations  with  Mexico 
the  President,  as  it  turned  out,  made  a  most  unfortunate  selec- 
tion; yet  in  passing  judgment   upon   the   President's   act,   the 


them  by  every  moans  in  their  power  thwarting  the  objects  of  tlie  Govern- 
ment by  disc'ouraginfj  the  enemy  to  accede  to  the  measure,  would  in  all 
Ijrobability  bo  to  defeat  it,  hence  the  necessity  of  secrecy."  Trist 's  appoint- 
ment was  not,  of  course,  ratified  by  the  Senate. 

c  Eandolph  to  Van  Buren,  Dec.  16,  1839,  Van  Buren-  Palmers. 

"  Trist  to  Polk,  March  14  and  April  2,  Trist  Papers.  Polk 's  name 
does  not  appear  on  the  latter,  but  it  speaks  of  "your  Inaugural."  With 
customary  indiscretion  lie  lectured  the  President  on  the  meaning  of 
sovereignty. 

f' Buchanan  to  Trist  on  that  date  "hereby  appointing"  him  to  that 
position  {Trist  Papeys). 


TEEATT  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO  491 

special  task  which  was  assigned  to  the  commissioner  slionld  be 
taken  into  consideration.  He  was  given  a  definite  project  of  a 
treaty  for  submission  to  the  Mexican  government,  with  but  little 
discretion  to  alter  its  terms.  In  case  Mexico  should  prove  un- 
willing to  accept  the  essential  parts  of  the  project,  but  never- 
theless willing  to  negotiate,  it  was  Polk's  intention  to  appoint 
Buchanan  or  some  other  qualified  person,  or  persons,  to  conduct 
the  negotiations.  A  task  so  definitely  limited  did  not  require  a 
diplomat  of  the  first  rank. 

Having  decided  to  send  Trist  to  Mexico,  Polk  directed  P>u- 
chanan  to  prepare  a  project  of  a  treaty  and,  also,  a  reply  to  the 
Mexican  communication  which  had  been  brought  back  by  Atocha. 

Buchanan's  draft  of  a  treaty  was  submitted  and  fully  dis- 
cussed at  a  cabinet  meeting  held  on  the  thirteenth  of  April.  It 
fixed  the  boundary  of  Texas  at  the  Rio  Grande,  and  provided  that 
New  Mexico  and  both  Upper  and  Lower  California  should  be 
ceded  to  the  United  States.  Another  article  stipulated  that  the 
United  States  should  have  the  right  of  transit  across  the  isthmus 
of  Tehuantepec.  In  addition  to  the  assumption  of  the  claims  of 
its  citizens  against  Mexico,  the  United  States  was  to  pay  the 
sum  of  fifteen  million  dollars.  In  the  President's  opinion,  the 
sum  named  was  too  large,  but,  if  necessary,  he  was  willing  to  go 
as  high  as  thirty  millions.  The  Secretary  of  State  still  opposed 
increasing  the  amount.  Walker  attached  greater  importance  to 
the  free  passage  across  the  isthmus  than  to  the  cession  of  both 
New  Mexico  and  the  Californias.  If  this  could  be  procured  he 
was  willing  to  pay  thirt}^  millions,  otherwise  not.  H-e  wished  it 
to  be  made  a  sine  qua  non.  "To  this,"  said  Polk,  "I  objected 
&  stated  that  it  constituted  no  part  of  the  object  for  which  we 
had  entered  the  War" — an  indirect  admission  that  he  had  en- 
tered the  war  to  acquire  territory.  Finally,  all  agreed  to  accept  v 
the  President 's  terms.  Nothing  was  made  a  sine  qua  non  except 
the  acquisition  of  Upper  California  and  New  Mexico — the  Rio 


492  JAMES   K.  FOLK 

Grande  boundary  being  considered  as  already  settled.^  The  pro- 
ject in  its  final  form  provided  for  cession  to  the  United  States 
of  both  Californias  and  New  Mexico,  while  the  United  States 
agreed  to  assume  the  claims  and  to  pay  fifteen  million  dollars ;  but 
Trist's  instructions  stipulated  the  modifications  which  he  might 
make. 

The  instructions  covered  the  points  agreed  upon  at  the  cabinet 
meeting  of  April  13  (see  note  9)  and,  in  addition,  authorized 
Trist  to  incorporate,  if  necessary,  an  article  guaranteeing  rights 
to  the  inhabitants  similar  to  those  stipulated  in  the  treaty  by 
which  Louisiana  had  been  acquired.  Should  such  an  article  be 
included  he  was  to  insist  upon  a  provision  which  would  invali- 
date all  recent  land  grants.  Should  he  fail  to  make  a  treaty,  he 
was  authorized  to  arrange  for  a  peace  commission,  provided  that 
"a  reasonable  prospect  shall  exist"  that  Mexican  commissioners 
would  agree  to  the  ultimata  already  specified  by  the  United 
States. 

Under  the  same  date  (April  15)  as  the  instructions  to  Trist, 
Buchanan  prepared  a  letter  to  the  Mexican  Minister  of  Foreign 
Relations.  It  was  a  reply  to  the  minister's  note  of  February  22 
which  Atocha  had  brought  back  and  in  which  Santa  Anna  had 
declined  to  treat  unless  the  blockade  were  raised  and  Mexican 
territory  evacuated.  It  also  informed  the  Mexican  government 
of  the  purpose  of  Trist's  mission.  In  this  letter  Buchanan  said 
that  a  demand  such  as  Mexico  had  made  was  both  unprecedented 
and  unreasonable — that  "the  war  can  never  end  whilst  Mexico 
refuses  even  to  hear  the  proposals"  which  the  United  States  has 
always  been  ready  to  make.     "The  President,"  he  continued, 


0  Polk,  Diary,  II,  468,  471-475.  The  maximum  amounts  to  be  paid  were 
to  be  governed  bv  the  cessions  procured — $30,000,000  for  all  desired; 
.$2.").000,000,  without  passage  across  the  isthmus;  .$20,000,000  if  only  Upper 
California  and  New  Mexico  could  be  obtained.  Trist  was  to  reduce  these 
amounts,  if  possible.  Polk 's  vieAvs  on  territorial  expansion  are  expressed 
very  clearly  in  his  diary  entry  for  January  5,  1847:  "NeAV  Mexico  and 
California  is  all  that  can  ever  probal)ly  be  acquired  by  Treaty,  and  indeed 
all  that  I  think  it  important  to  acquire"  {ibid.,  308). 


TEEATY  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO  493 

"will  not  again  renew  the  offer  to  negotiate,  at  least  until  he 
shall  have  reason  to  believe  that  it  would  be  accepted  by  the 
Mexican  Government. '  '^° 

On  April  16,  1847,  Trist  set  out  for  Mexico  bearing  his  in- 
structions and  the  project  of  a  treaty  and,  also,  Buchanan's  letter 
to  the  Mexican  minister.  Marcy  instructed  Scott  to  deliver  the 
last  mentioned  document  to  the  Mexican  commander  with  a 
request  that  it  should  be  laid  before  the  government.^'  The 
secrecy  with  which  the  President  tried  to  envelop  the  mission'- 
was  of  short  duration.  On  April  21  he  was  chagrined  by  dis- 
covering in  the  New  York  Herald  a  letter  which  gave  a  very 
accurate  account  of  Trist 's  mission  and  its  purposes."  William 
S.  Derrick,  a  Whig  clerk  in  the  State  Department,  who  had  as- 
sisted in  copying  the  documents,  at  once  became  the  object  of 
suspicion,  but  the  source  of  the  leakage  could  not  be  ascertained. 

Arriving  at  Vera  Cruz  on  May  6,  1847,  Trist  hastened  to  tell 
Buchanan  "the  results  of  his  [my]  reflections"  since  his  depar- 
ture from  Washington  as  well  as  his  opinions  on  affairs  in  Mex- 
ico." With  characteristic  egotism  he  immediately  assumed  re- 
sponsibilities which  were  never  intended  for  him.  A  military 
detachment,  selected  by  himself,  was  sent  on  ahead  as  bearer  to 
General  Scott  of  Buchanan's  letter  to  the  Mexican  government, 

10  Project  and  instructions,  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  52,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  81-89. 
Buchanan  to  Min.  of  For.  Eel.,  April  15,  1817  {Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  1,  30  Cong., 
1  sess.,  38-40).  All  are  printed  in  Buchanan,  Works,  VII,  267-279.  Trist 's 
commission  and  a  copy  of  his  authority  from  Walker  to  draw  on  the  U.  S. 
treasury  for  $3,000,000  (both  dated  April  15)  are  among  Trist 's  papers. 

11  Marcy  to  Scott,  April  14,  1847  (Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  52,  30  Cong.,  1  sess., 
118-119). 

12  On  the  day  of  Trist 's  departure  Polk  wrote  in  his  diarj':  "Had  his 
mission  and  the  object  of  it  been  proclaimed  in  advance  at  Washington 
I  have  no  doubt  there  are  persons  in  Washington,  and  among  them  Editors 
of  the  National  Intelligencer,  who  would  have  been  ready  and  willing  to 
have  despatched  a  courrier  to  Mexico  to  discourage  the  Government  of  that 
weak  and  distracted  country  from  entering  upon  negotiations  for  peace" 
(Diary,  II,  479). 

rs  Ihid..  482-483.     "I  have  not  been  more  vexed  or  excited,"  noted  the 
President,  "since  I  have  been  President  than  at  this  occurrence." 
14  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  52,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  153-156. 


494  JAMES   K.  POLE 

the  confidential  instructions  from  Marcy,  as  well  as  a  letter  from 
Trist  himself.  His  failure  to  deliver  these  documents  directly 
was  the  main  cause  of  the  misunderstanding  which  followed. 

Marcy 's  letter  to  Scott^^  explained  that  Trist  had  been  in- 
vested with  authority  to  arrange  for  a  suspension  of  hostilities, 
and 

Should  he  make  known  to  you,  in  writing,  that  the  contingency  has 
occurred  in  consequence  of  which  the  President  is  willing  that  further 
military  operations  should  cease,  you  will  regard  such  notice  as  a  direction 
from  the  President  to  suspend  them  until  further  orders  from  the  depart- 
ment, unless  continued  or  recommended  by  the  enemy. 

In  addition,  Scott  was  informed  that  Trist  bore  a  communication 
from  Buchanan  to  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations,  and  he  w^as 
instructed  to  "transmit  that  despatch  to  the  commander  of  the 
Mexican  forces,  with  a  request  that  it  may  be  laid  before  his 
government. ' ' 

The  communication  which  Scott  was  thus  ordered  to  trans- 
mit to  the  Mexican  general  had  been  sealed,  but  Trist  carried  a 
copy  which  the  Washington  officials  expected  him  to  show  to 
Scott  at  the  time  of  delivering  the  original.  As  already  noted, 
however,  Trist  did  not  personally  deliver  the  communication  to 
General  Scott.  He  forwarded  it  from  Vera  Cruz,  wnthout  in- 
closing a  copy ;  besides,  his  own  letter,  which  accompanied  it,  did 
not  explain  fully  the  nature  of  his  mission. 

When  the  documents  reached  Scott  at  Jalapa  on  May  7  other 
things  besides  the  absence  of  Trist 's  copy  of  Buchanan's  letter 
tended  to  make  the  general  both  suspicious  and  irritable.  Wliile 
at  New  Orleans  he  had  learned  of  the  President's  attempt  to 
make  Benton  a  lieutenant-general,  and,  as  a  result,  he  regarded 
Polk  as  "an  enemy  more  to  be  dreaded  than  Santa  Anna  and  all 
his  hosts. "^^  Although  "very  slightly"  acquainted  in  Wash- 
ington, Trist  and  Scott  had,  according  to  the  general's  account, 


i->  Dated  April  14   (ibid.,  118-119). 
i«  Scott,  Autobiography,  II,  400,  403. 


TEEATY  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO  495 

developed  "feelings  of  mutual  dislike."  Indeed,  Scott  foolishly- 
thought  that  Trist's  "well-known  prejudice  against  him  [me] 
had  had  much  weiglit  in  his  appointment."  Then,  too,  the  gen- 
eral had  concluded  from  a  conversation  held  in  Washington  that 
Polk  had  originally  intended  to  invest  him  with  diplomatic 
powers — a  fact  which  made  him  all  tlie  more  resent  Trist's  ap- 
pearance in  Mexico." 

Nettled  by  w^hat  he  considered  to  be  encroachments  upon  his 
authority,  and  without  waiting  to  learn  all  of  the  facts,  Scott 
entered  into  an  indiscreet  and  insolent  correspondence  with  both 
Trist  and  Marcy.  "I  have  just  received  your  note  of  yester- 
day," he  wrote  to  Trist,  "accompanied  by  communications  to 
me  from  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  one  (sealed!)  from  the  De- 
partment of  State  to  the  minister  of  foreign  affairs  of  the  re- 
public of  Mexico."  After  complaining  that  the  army  had  been 
weakened  by  sending  the  detachment  to  carry  the  dispatches  from 
Vera  Cruz,  and  declining  to  "commit  the  honor"  of  his  govern- 
ment by  having  any  direct  agency  in  "forwarding  the  sealed 
despatch  you  have  sent  me  from  the  Secretary  of  State,"  the 
general  indignantly  continued: 

I  see  that  the  Secretary  of  War  proposes  to  degrade  me,  by  requiring 
that  I,  the  commander  of  this  army,  shall  defer  to  you,  the  chief  clerk  of 
the  Department  of  State,  the  question  of  continuing  or  discontinuing 
hostilities. 

I  beg  to  say  to  him  and  to  you,  that  here,  in  the  heart  of  a  hostile 
country,  from  which,  after  a  few  weeks,  it  would  be  impossible  to  with- 
draw this  army  without  a  loss,  probably,  of  half  its  numbers  ....  this 
army  must  take  military  security  for  its  own  safety.  Hence,  the  question 
of  an  armistice  or  no  armistice  is,  most  peculiarly,  a  military  question, 
appertaining,  of  necessity,  if  not  of  universal  right,  in  the  absence  of 
direct  instructions,  to  the  commander  of  the  invading  forces;  consequently, 

i-  Ibid.,  576.  There  is  no  reason  for  believing  that  Polk  ever  intended 
to  give  Scott  such  an  appointment.  The  entries  in  his  diary  concerning 
possible  commissioners  do  not  mention  Scott's  name,  and  from  the  first, 
he  had  a  vorv  poor  opinion  of  the  General 's  discretion  and  judgment.  Scott 's 
own  account  admits  that  Polk  merely  left  him  ' '  half  at  liberty  to  believe ' ' 
that  lie  might  be  associated  A\-ith  Wright  or  some  other  eminent  statesman, 
for  "What  could  have  been  more  natural ?"(! ) 


496  JAMES   E.  POLK 

if  you  are  not  clothed  with  military  rank  over  me,  as  well  as  with  diplo- 
matic functions,  I  shall  demand,  under  the  peculiar  circumstances,  that, 
in  your  negotiations,  if  the  enemy  should  entertain  your  overtures,  you 
refer  that  question  to  me,  and  all  the  securities  belonging  to  it.i* 

We  need  not  wonder  that  Trist  was  provoked  by  tlie  tone  of 
Scott's  letter;  still,  there  was  no  good  reason  why  he  should 
commit  the  folly  of  following  the  example  set  by  his  adversary. 
A  little  common  sense  on  his  part  might,  no  doubt,  have  smoothed 
the  ruffled  feathers  of  the  irate  general.  Common  sense,  how- 
ever, was  a  quality  of  which  Trist  seldom  availed  himself.  In- 
stead of  awaiting  a  personal  interview,  at  which  he  might  have 
shown  his  own  instructions  and  a  copy  of  Buchanan's  "sealed" 
letter,  thereby  removing  the  general 's  misapprehensions,  he  chose 
to  answer  Scott  not  only  in  writing  but  in  language  still  more 
abusive  than  that  used  bj'  the  general  himself. 

A  man  possessed  of  Trist 's  peculiar  characteristics  very  nat- 
urally preferred  written  replies  to  oral  explanations.  Quite  as 
vain  as  Scott  himself,  proud  of  his  rhetoric  and  insinuating  in- 
vective, he  was  so  facile  a  writer  that  he  could  cover  folio  pages 
more  easily  tlian  most  persons  can  write  sentences.  The  fatigue 
experienced  by  any  one  who  peruses  his  tedious  and  rambling 
discourses  was  equaled,  apparently,  by  the  pleasure  which  their 
author  had  in  penning  them.  It  would  have  been  unreasonable, 
therefore,  to  expect  him  to  forego  the  pleasure  of  writing,  even 
though  a  commonplace  interview  might  more  effectively  have 
answered  the  purpose  for  which  he  had  been  sent  to  Mexico. 

While  camped  at  San  Juan  del  Rio,  on  May  9,  he  began  his 
reply,  and  installments  were  added  whenever  the  army  halted 
on  its  march  to  Jalapa.  It  was  finished  after  that  place  had  been 
reached  and  sent  to  Scott,  along  with  another  letter,  on  the 
twenty-first  of  May. 


18  Scott  to  Trist,  May  7,  1847  (Sen.  Doc.  52,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  120-121). 
A  copy  of  this  letter,  accompanied  by  a  very  crisp  note,  was  sent  to  Marcy 
on  the  same  day  (ibid.,  119). 


TREATY  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO  497 

Some  of  his  remarks  were  sensible  and  to  the  point.  When 
he  had  sent  his  brief  note  from  Vera  Cruz,  he  told  Scott,  he  did 
not  anticipate  that  a  correspondence  between  them  would  arise, 
"or  that  any  communication  whatever  would  be  made  on  your 
part  until  I  should  have  the  pleasure  of  congratulating  you  in 
person  upon  the  brilliant  success  which  has  attended  your  move- 
ments." He  pointed  out,  also,  that  his  instructions,  which  he 
had  intended  to  show  on  his  arrival,  would  have  made  clear  to 
the  general  that  hostilities  were  to  be  suspended  only  after  the 
conclusion  of  a  treaty,  and  not  at  the  caprice  of  the  chief  clerk 
of  the  State  Department.  He  reminded  Scott  that  the  order  to 
transmit  the  diplomatic  note  to  the  Mexican  counnander  had  come 
directly  from  the  President— an  officer  who  surely  had  a  right 
to  issue  it.  Commodore  :^erry,  he  said,  had  not  caviled  at  a 
similar  order  sent  to  him— due  perhaps  to  the  want  of  "discern- 
ment" or  to  "his  not  having  equal  reason  for  believing  his  own 
personal  consequence  to  be  so  excessive. 

Having  made  clear  to  Scott  that  the  purposes  of  the  govern- 
ment had  been  misapprehended,  Trist  might  well  have  rested  his 
case.  He  chose,  however,  to  show 'the  general  that  these  mis- 
apprehensions had  resulted  from  Scott's  own  density  of  intellect, 
jealousy  and  self-esteem.  After  stating  that  there  had  been  no 
intention  to  interfere  with  the  general's  proper  military  func- 
tions, he  continued: 

In  a  word,  sir,  the  course  determined  upon  by  our  government,  respect- 
ing the  suspension  of  hostilities,  is  what  any  man  of  plain,  unsophisticated 
common  sense  would  take  for  granted  that  it  must  be;  and  it  is  not  what 
your  exuberant  fancy  and  overcultivated  imagination  would  make  it. 

Marcy's  letter,  however,  was  rather  ambiguous  on  this  point,i'» 
whatever  might  have  been  taken  for  granted.  In  a  sarcastic  vein 
Trist  accused  Scott  of  being  piqued  because  the  President  had 
not  selected  him  to  negotiate  with  Mexico.  Admitting  that 
Polk  might  not  have  been  "duly  sensible"  of  Scott's  superior 

19  See  above,  p.  494. 


498  JAMES   K.  POLK 

qualifications  for  performing  such  a  service,  yet,  he  did  not  see 
that  the  bhiiiie  shouki  rest  upon  tlie  one  who  luid  been  selected 
to  perform  it.  In  any  ease,  said  he,  it  was  the  general's  duty  to 
obey  orders  from  Washington,  whether  documents  were  sealed 
or  unsealed. 

This  reply  to  the  "tirade  against  our  government,"  as  Trist 
called  Scott's  letter,  was  inclosed  in  another  letter  dated  May 
20,  1847.  After  informing  the  general  that  more  important 
business  would  "compel  me  to  decline  the  honor  of  maintaining 
a  correspondence  with  you,"  he  ordered  Scott  to  transmit 
Buchanan's  note  to  its  intended  destination.-"^  Happy  in  the 
belief  that  he  had  "finished"  the  "greatest  imbecile"  that  he  had 
ever  encountered,  Trist  thought,  apparently,  that  his  fulmina- 
tions  would  be  approved  by  the  President.-^ 

On  May  20 — the  day  before  he  had  been  finished  by  receiving 
Trist 's  letters — Scott  wrote  from  Jalapa  an  insolent  letter  to 
Secretary  Marcy.  He  had,  of  course,  received  Marcy's  somewhat 
ambiguous  instructions,  but  he  had  made  no  attempt  to  learn 
from  Trist  the  real  intentions  of  his  government.    In  it  he  said : 

Mr.  Trist  arrived  here  on  the  14th  instant.  He  has  not  done  me  the 
honor  to  call  upon  nie.  Possibly  he  has  thought  the  compliment  of  a 
first  visit  was  due  to  him!  I  learn  that  he  is  writing  a  reply  to  my 
answer  to  him  dated  the  7th  instant.  ...  Tt  is  not  probable  that  I  shall 
find  leisure  to  read  his  reply,  much  less  to  give  a  rejoinder. 


20  SoK  Ex.  Doc.  52,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  159-  KiS. 

21  On  May  15,  while  the  letter  to  Scott  was  being  prepared,  he  said  in  a 
letter  to  Mrs.  Trist:  "There  is  a  most  extraordinary  state  of  things  here 
between  myself  &  General  Scott — decidedly  the  greatest  imbecile  (and  rend- 
ered so  by  his  utter  selfishness  &  egregious  vanity)  that  I  ever  had  any  thing 
to  do  with.  If  I  don 't  finish  him  I  will  give  any  body  leave  to  say  that 
all  the  time  I  have  passed  in  study  has  been  passed  in  vain.  Show  this  to  Mr. 
B[uchanan]  who  can  show  it  to  the  President."  His  egotism  and  his  desire 
for  notoriety  is  still  further  exlvibited  in  a  letter  Avritten  to  Mrs.  Trist  on 
May  21.  She  was  instructed  to  tell  Buchanan  that  he  had  made  his  letter 
to  Scott  long  "in  order  that  he  [Scott]  should  not  have  a  hair's  breadth  of 
ground  left  to  support  hiin.  and  because  I  knew  that  this  correspondence 
will  make  much  noise  &  jiroduce  such  excitement  that  what  is  said  in  my 
letter  will  be  read  by  100  persons  to  duc  who  would  read  the  same  thing 
better  said  in  editorials  of  the  Union  or  any  other  paper.  This  is  my 
conviction,  &  this  is  wliat  supports  me  tlirough  the  task.  If  I  liave  not 
demolished  liini.  then   1  give  uj)''   {Trist  Papers). 


TBEATY  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO 


499 


It  should  be  noted  that  when  this  was  written  Scott  had  received 
no  couiniunication  from  Trist  except  a  brief  announcement  of 
his  arrival  at  Vera  Cruz.  The  fact  that  Trist  subsequently  proved 
himself  to  be  quite  as  devoid  of  judgment  as  was  Scott  himself 
can  be  no  excuse  for  the  general's  attitude  at  this  time.  Besides, 
no  matter  what  Trist 's  qualifications  may  have  been,  he  was, 
nevertheless,  the  diplomatic  representative  of  the  President,  and 
it  was  no  part  of  Scott's  proper  military  functions  to  abuse  or 
to  ignore  him.  As  superior  in  authority  to  both  of  them  the 
President  had  a  right  to  command  their  services. 

In  another  paragraph,  Scott  expressed  resentment  because 
Polk  had  thought  of  investing  both  Benton  and  Taylor  with  diplo- 
matic powers,  while  the  same  had  been  withheld  from  himself. 
It  was  quite  natural,  perhaps,  that  he  should  have  felt  hurt 
because  of  this  discrimination,  but  surely  he  had  no  right  to 
claim  functions  not  purely  military. 

His  complaint  regarding  Marcy's  instructions  was  based  on 
more  valid  grounds,  although  he  had  wholly  misinterpreted  the 
wishes  of  the  administration.  "I  understand  your  letter,"  he 
told  Marcy,  "as  not  only  taking  from  me  ...  .  all  voice  or 
advice  in  agreeing  to  a  truce  with  the  enemy,  but  as  an  attempt 
to  place  me  under  the  military  command  of  Mr.  Trist."  After 
quoting  a  passage  from  the  Secretary 's  letter,  he  added :  ' '  That 
is,  I  am  required  to  respect  the  judgment  of  Mr.  Trist  here  on 
passing  events,  purely  military,  as  the  judgment  of  the  President, 
who  is  some  two  thousand  miles  off!"  There  was,  he  said,  one 
other  instance  like  it  in  American  history— when  Bancroft  ni 
1845  instructed  Taylor  to  obey  the  orders  of  Donelson— and  "I 
wrote  to  General  Tavlor,  with  the  permission  of  both  Mr.  Ban- 
croft and  yourself,  to  correct  that  blunder. ' '  He  closed  by  statnig 
that  he  would  cheerfully  obey  direct  orders  of  the  President,  but 
not  those  of  the  "chief  clerk  of  the  State  Department. "^^ 

22  Scott  to  Marcy,  May  20,  1847    (Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  52,  30  Cong.,  1  sess., 
124^127). 


500  JAMES  K.  FOLK 

Scott  was  neither  "finished"  nor  "demolished"  b.y  Trist's 
rhetorical  effusions,  which  were  handed  to  him  as  he  was  about 
to  leave  Jalapa.  On  May  29,  having  readied  Puebla,  he  acknowl- 
edged their  receipt  and  informed  their  autlior  that  he  had  taken 
the  precaution  to  have  them  opened  in  the  presence  of  staff 
officers.    Said  he : 

My  first  impulse  was  to  return  the  farrago  of  insolence,  conceit  and 
arrogance  to  the  author;  but  on  reflection,  I  have  determined  to  preserve 
the  letters  as  a  choice  specimen  of  diplomatic  literature  and  manners. 
The  Jacobin  convention  of  France  never  sent  to  one  of  its  armies  in  the 
field  a  more  amiable  and  accomplished  instrument.  If  you  were  armed 
with  an  ambulatory  guillotine,  you  would  be  the  personification  of  Danton, 
Marat,  and  St.  Just,  all  in  one. 

After  expressing  gratitude  to  the  President  for  not  having  de- 
graded him  by  associating  him  with  Trist  on  a  peace  commission, 
Scott  asked  the  diplomat  to  make  his  future  communications 
purely  official,  for 

If  you  dare  to  use  the  style  of  orders  or  instructions  again,  or  to 
indulge  yourself  in  a  single  discourteous  phrase,  I  shall  throw  back  the 
communication  with  the  contempt  and  scorn  which  you  merit  at  my 
hands. -3 

While  the  President  was  absent  from  Washington,  attending 
Commencement  exercises  at  the  University  of  North  Carolina, 
Marcy  received  and  answered  Scott's  note  of  May  7,  in  which  the 
general's  first  letter  to  Trist  (same  date)  had  been  inclosed. 
In  a  statesman-like  manner — and  a  style  in  i)leasing  contrast 
with  the  extravagant  language  employed  by  the  general  and  the 
diplomat — the  Secretary  of  War  pointed  out  that  Scott's  "dis- 
tressing apprehensions  of  being  degraded ' '  had  resulted  entirely 
from  his  not  having  waited  to  ascertain  the  nature  of  Trist's 
mission.  He  had  no  doubt  that  "more  reflection  and  better 
information"  would  remove  the  general's  fears.  Trist,  said 
Marcy,  had  been  instructed  to  submit  all  documents  to  Scott  for 

23  Scott  to  Trist,  May  29,  1847  {ihid.,  172-173).  Original  in  Trist  Papers. 


TREATY  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO  501 

examination ;  and  had  the  general,  instead  of  declining  to  see 
Trist,  read  the  docnments,  he  would  have  seen  that  nothing 
unusual  had  been  asked  of  him.-* 

Apparently,  the  Washington  officials  believed  that  the  teapot 
tempest  raging  at  Jalapa  would  be  quelled  by  the  information 
contained  in  Marcy's  letter,  for  Polk  made  no  mention  of  the 
incident  in  his  diary  until  the  arrival,  on  June  12,  of  Scott's 
insulting  letter  of  May  20th.  This,  of  course,  was  written  before 
Seott  had  received  Marcy's  letter;  but  it  showed  that  the  general 
had  made  no  effort  to  ascertain  the  facts,  although  Trist  had 
been  at  his  camp  for  nearly  a  week.  In  another  respect  this  com- 
munication was  more  offensive  than  the  note  of  May  7,  which 
had  been  received  during  the  President's  absence.  That  had 
been  addressed  to  Trist  and  simply  inclosed  in  a  brief  note  to  the 
Secretary  of  War  ;  the  letter  just  received  was  addressed  to  Marcy 
himself,  and,  as  noted  above,  was  both  impudent  and  defiant. 
Little  wonder  that  Polk  pronounced  it  "highly  exceptionable  in 
character. ' '    He  wrote  in  his  diary : 

It  appears  that  Gen  '1  Scott  has  taken  offense  because  Mr.  Trist  was 
sent  to  his  Head  Quarters  as  a  Commissioner  invested  with  Diplomatic 
Powers  &  full  authority  to  conclude  a  Treaty  of  peace.  He  desired  to 
be  invested  with  this  power  himself,  and  although  Mr.  Trist  had  been 
at  his  camp  for  six  days  at  the  date  of  his  despatch,  he  states  he  had  not 
seen  him.  It  is  clear  from  his  despatch,  as  well  as  one  of  previous  date 
enclosing  a  letter  from  Gen  '1  Scott  to  Mr.  Trist,  that  he  would  not  co- 
operate with  Mr.  Trist  in  accomplishing  the  object  of  his  mission,  the 
conclusion  of  an  honourable  peace.  His  two  last  despatches  are  not  only 
insubordinate,  but  insulting  to  Mr.  Trist  and  the  Government.  I  gave 
my  views  on  the  subject,  in  which  the  Cabinet  unanimously  concurred. 
In  accordance  with  them  I  directed  the  Secretary  of  War  to  prepare  a 
despatch  to  General  Seott  rebuking  him  for  his  insubordinate  course,  and 
repeating  the  order  in  a  peremptory  manner  to  him  to  carry  the  despatch 
borne  to  him  by  Mr.  Trist  addressed  to  the  Mexican  Government  to  that 
Government,  and  requiring  an  immediate  answer,  to  be  returned  by  the 
bearer  of  the  despatch,  whether  he  had  obeyed  or  intended  to  obey  the 
former  order   of  the   Secretary  of  "War.     He  deserves   for  his  conduct  in 


24  Marcy  to  Scott,  May  31,  1847   (Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  52,  30  Cong.,  1  sess., 
121-124). 


502  JAMES   E.   POLK 

this  matter  to  be  reinovetl  from  the  eommaiid.  I  t'oncluile[il],  however,  to 
delay  acting  on  his  conduct  until  his  answer  to  the  communication  which 

I  this  day  ordered  to  be  addressed  to  him  shall  be  received Gen'l 

Scott  arrogates  to  himself  the  right  to  be  the  only  proper  channel  through 
whom  the  U.  S.  Government  can  properly  communicate  with  the  Govern- 
ment of  Mexico  on  any  subject;  which  is  an  assumption  wholly  unwar- 
rantable &  which  I  will  not  tolerate.  The  truth  is  that  I  have  been  com- 
pelled from  the  beginning  to  conduct  the  war  against  Mexico  through  the 
agency  of  two  Gen  'Is  highest  in  rank  who  have  not  only  no  sympathies 
with  the  Government,  but  are  hostile  to  my  administration.  Both  of 
them  have  assumed  to  control  the  Government.  To  this  I  will  not  submit 
&  will  as  certainly  remove  Gen  '1  Scott  from  the  chief  command,  as  she 
[he]  shall  refuse  or  delay  to  obey  the  order  borne  to  him  by  Mr.  Trist. 
My  doubt  is  whether  I  shall  delay  to  remove  him  until  I  can  hear  further 
from  him. 25 

A  few  days  later  the  President  declared  that  should  Scott 
persist  in  disobeying-  orders  he  would  have  the  general  arrested 
and  tried  by  court-martial.  But  his  caution  was  stronger  than 
his  resentment.  He  took  no  step  until  he  had  consulted  the 
cabinet,  and  although  fearful  that  Scott's  "arrogance  &  inord- 
inate vanity"  might  have  jeopardized  peace  by  causing  delay, 
he  decided  to  await  further  news  from  Mexico.  Marey  and 
Buchanan  were  instructed  to  inform  the  commander  and  the 
diplomat  that  their  conduct  had  been  highly  displeasing  to  the 
President.  Surely  he  had  ample  cause  for  being  displeased,  for 
seldom,  if  ever,  has  an}'  President  had  to  cope  with  such  folly 
and  such  insolence  on  the  part  of  his  agents. 

Elated  by  the  thought  that  he  had  "finished''  General  Scott, 
won  the  approval  of  the  President,  and  achieved  fame  by  news- 
paper commendation,  Trist  must  have  been  shocked  when  in- 
formed by  Buchanan  that  his  orders  to  Scott  were  botli  super- 
fluous and  unwarranted.  He  was  told  that  when  he  had  placed 
the  communication  to  the  Mexican  government  in  the  hands  of 
Scott  his  "whole  duty  respecting  it  was  then  perfoi-med";  and 
if  the  general  did  not  obey  orders  he  was  answerable  neither  to 
the  Department  of  State  nor  to  the  commissioner,  but  to  the 


2s  Polk,  Diarii,  III,  .jT-oO. 


TEEATY  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO  503 

military  branch  of  the  government.  He  was  directed  by  the 
President,  said  Buchanan,  to  avoid  personal  altercations,  and  to 
submit  to  Scott  his  instructions  and  the  project  of  a  treaty.-" 

Marcy's  letter  to  Scott  once  more  expressed  surprise  that  the 
general  could  have  so  misconceived  his  instructions.  There  had, 
said  the  Seci-etary,  been  no  intention  to  jiut  him  under  the  com- 
mand of  Trist  in  any  particular.  The  President  had  ordered 
him  [Scott]  to  transmit  a  document  to  the  Mexican  connuander 
and 

ho  [Polk]  is  ^vliolly  unable  to  conceive  how  you  can  reconcile  with  duty  and 
subordination  the  making  of  it  a  topic  of  remark,  I  may  say  of  incidental 
reproof  of  your  common  superior,  in  an  official  communication  to  a  sub- 
ordinate officer  in  anotlier  branch  of  the  public  service.27 

While  Marcy  was  writing  the  above  letter  another  note  from 
Scott  was  on  its  way  to  Washington.  Unlike  its  predecessor  this 
note  did  not  breathe  defiance,  but  with  childlike  petulance  the 
general  asked  to  be  recalled.  He  inclosed  a  copy  of  his  rejoinder 
to  Trist 's  last  epistle  which,  with  his  usual  facility  at  phrase 
coining,  he  called  a  "flank  battery"  planted  against  him  amidst 
critical  military  operations.  "Considering,"  said  he,  "the  many 
cruel  disappointments  and  mortifications  I  have  been  made  to 
feel  since  I  left  Washington,  or  the  total  want  of  suppoi't  and 
sympathy  on  the  part  of  the  War  Department  which  I  have  so 
long  experienced,  I  beg  to  be  recalled."-^ 

The  President  was  absent  on  a  tour  of  the  northeastern  states 
when  Scott's  letter  reached  Washington.  After  his  return,  this 
letter  as  well  as  a  communication  from  Trist,  dated  June  3,  was 
considered  at  a  cabinet  meeting  held  on  the  ninth  of  June.  Polk 
had  good  reason  for  thinking  that  these  dispatches  disclosed  a 
"wretched  state  of  things"  in  Mexico.     He  writes: 


20  Buchanan  to  Trist,  June  14,  1847  {Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  52,  30  Cong.,  1  sess., 
112-113). 

27  Marcy  to  Scott,  June  lo,  1847  {ibid.,  127-129). 

28  Scott  to  Marcy,  June  4,  1847  {ihid.,  130-131). 


504  JAMES   K.   POLK 

Gen'l  Scott  has  written  foolish  &  hitter  letters  to  Mr.  Trist  &  Mr. 
Trist  has  written  as  foolish  a  letter  to  him.  Between  them  the  orders 
of  the  Secretary  of  War  &  the  Secretary  of  State  have  been  disregarded; 
the  danger  has  become  imminent  that  because  of  the  personal  controversy 
between  these  self  important  personages,  the  golden  moment  for  conclud- 
ing a  peace  with  Mexico  may  have  passed.  Gen'l  Scott's  last  despatch 
to  the  Secretary  of  War  is  full  of  passion  &  vanity  &  is  highly  insub- 
ordinate. In  view  of  the  whole  case  &  of  the  present  critical  condition 
of  affairs  in  Mexico,  I  submitted  to  the  Cabinet  for  their  advice  whether 
they  should  not  both  be  recalled. 

The  cabinet  agreed  in  condemning  the  conduct  of  both  men,  but 
it  was  not  deemed  expedient  to  recall  them.  Consenting  to  await 
further  developments,  the  President  directed  Buchanan  and 
Marcy  to  command  their  respective  subordinates  to  "cease  their 
correspondence  and  personal  controversy  and  to  act  in  harmony, 
each  in  his  respective  sphere,  in  obeying  the  orders,  and  carrying 
out  the  views  of  the  government."  He  suggested  sending  some 
one  to  act  with  Trist,  and  mentioned  Pierre  Soule  in  this  con- 
nection ;  but  no  appointment  was  made.-** 

On  July  14  Colonel  Wilson  set  out  for  Mexico,  bearing  the 
new  instructions  which  had  been  prepared  by  the  two  cabinet 
officers  and  revised  by  the  President.  In  his  letter  to  Trist, 
Buchanan  once  more  emphasized  the  fact  that  so  far  as  the  com- 
munication to  the  Mexican  government  was  concerned  Trist  was 
simply  the  bearer  of  the  dispatch  for  delivery  into  the  hands  of 
General  Scott.  In  all  other  respects  his  functions  were  purely 
diplomatic,  and  it  was  no  part  of  his  duty  to  discipline  or  super- 
vise the  commander-in-chief.  Having  repeated  the  President's 
order  to  confine  his  activities  to  the  diplomatic  field,  Buchanan 
authorized  Trist  to  make  certain  modifications  in  the  boundary 
which  had  been  proposed  in  the  original  treaty  project.^" 


29  Polk,  Diarii,  III,  76-77. 

30  Buchanan  to  Trist,  July  13,  1847  (rec'd  by  Trist  on  Sept.  6)  {Sen. 
Ex.  Doc.  52,  30  Cong.,  1  scss.,  113-117).  Original  in  TrM  Papers.  In  a 
private  letter  written  to  Trist  on  the  same  date  Buchanan  said :  "I  most 
deeply  regret  your  quarrel  with  General  Scott.  It  has  been  made  the  text 
for  much  Whig  abuse  &  misrepresentation.  Still  we  must  bear  it  as  we 
can.      Ccvcrnor   Marcy  has  written   a    powerful   letter   to   General   Scott  by 


TREATY  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO  505 

Marcy's  letter  to  Scott  was  a  very  clear-cut  and  admirable 
document.  With  conuucndable  patience  he  again  pointed  out  that 
in  no  way  had  the  government  given  Scott  cause  for  offense.  He 
assured  the  general  that  anything  done  by  Trist,  except  the  mere 
delivery  of  the  dispatch  addressed  to  the  Mexican  government, 
had  been  wholly  unwarranted.  In  answer  to  Scott's  request  to 
be  recalled,  Marcy,  by  the  President's  order,  denied  the  request 
and  indignantly  repelled  the  charges  upon  which  it  had  been 
based. ^^ 

The  new  instructions  did  not  reach  their  destination  until 
September  6,  and  by  that  time  there  was  no  need  of  urging  co- 
operation on  the  part  of  the  commissioner  and  the  commander- 
in-chief.  They  had  become  fast  friends ;  indeed,  before  the 
instructions  had  been  drafted  they  had  already  taken  steps  to 
negotiate  a  treaty. 

On  April  20,  1847,  soon  after  the  battle  of  Cerro  Gordo,  the 
]\Iexican  congress  had  passed  a  law  by  which  Santa  Anna  had 
been  deprived  of  the  power  to  negotiate  with  the  United  States. 
Nevertheless,  within  ten  days,  overtures  were  made  to  General 
Scott,  through  the  British  minister,  but  nothing  resulted  from 


the  messenger  which  Avill  bear  you  this.  The  President 's  apprehensions 
are  great  lest  the  misunderstandings  may  defeat  or  delay  the  conclusion  of 
a  Treaty.  Still  he  is  well  disposed  to  do  you  justice"  (Trist  Papers). 
In  a  letter  dated  June  3,  1847,  Trist  had  inclosed  a  communication  from 
an  unnamed  person  regarding  a  boundary  line.  The  main  point  of  it  Avas 
that  the  line  should  be  modified  so  as  to  include  El  Paso  within  tlie  United 
States.     Trist  recommended  this  alteration.     See  Doc- 52,  168-172. 

31  "Of  'the  many  cruel  disappointments  and  mortifications  I  (you) 
have  been  made  to  feel  since  I  (you)  left  Washington,'  you  have  omitted  to 
specify  a  single  one,  and  whether  they  are  real  or  imaginary  is  left  in  great 
uncertainty.  The  sending  of  Mr.  Trist  to  Mexico  as  a  commissioner  of 
peace,  and  the  suspicion  you  cherished  that  you  had  been  degraded  by  his 
.being'  clothed  with  military  authority  to  interfere  with  your  rightful  com- 
mand, are  probably  prominent  among  these  'cruel  disappointments  and 
mortifications.'  The  exposition  which  has  been  made  of  that  case,  shows 
the  lamentable  extent  to  which  error  may  prevail  in  personal  matters  when 
prejudice  and  suspicion  pre-occupy  the  mind.  Should  your  other  undis- 
closed 'cruel  disappointments  and  mortifications'  be  of  a  like  unsubstan- 
tiated character,  as  it  is  presumed  they  are,  you  may  well  conclude  tliat  tliey 
constitute:'  no  sufficient  motive  with  the  President  to  grant  the  indulgence 
you  ask"  (Marcy  to  Scott,  July  12,  18-47;  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  52,  loc.  cit.)^ 


506  JAMES   K.   POLK 

them.^-  Late  in  May  Santa  Anna  abandoned  Puebla  and  re- 
paired to  Mexico  City  where  he  resumed  the  Presidency  and 
prepai-ed  to  defend  the  capital.  Scott  reached  Puebla  on  May 
28  where  he  remained  several  weeks  awaiting  reenforcements. 
Trist  followed  Scott  to  Puebla  and  established  himself  at  the 
headquarters  of  General  Persifer  F.  Smith,  but  for  some  time 
there  was  no  intercourse  between  him  and  the  connnander-in-chief . 

Scott,  as  we  have  seen,  had  refused  to  deliver  Buchanan's 
dispatch  to  the  Mexican  government  and,  on  June  6,  Trist  ad- 
dressed a  note  to  Charles  Bankhead,  the  British  minister  at 
Mexico  City,  asking  if  he  would  deliver  Buchanan's  note  and 
make  known  verbally  to  the  Mexican  government  that  Trist  had 
arrived  at  army  headquarters."*''  Bankhead  immediately  sent 
Edward  Thornton,  Secretary  of  Legation,  to  receive  the  dispatch 
and  to  consult  with  both  Scott  and  Trist.  Thornton,  who  reached 
Puebla  on  June  10,  told  Trist  that  Seiior  Baranda,  the  Minister 
of  Foreign  Relations,  had  frequently  expressed  a  desire  to  dis- 
cover some  way  of  opening  negotiations  with  the  United  States, 
but  tliat  he  lacked  the  courage  to  avow  it  openly  and  had  re- 
signed. The  voting  of  three  million  dollars  for  diplomatic  pur- 
poses by  the  United  States  Congress  had,  said  Thornton,  made 
a  bad  impression  in  Mexico,  for  many  believed  that  the  money 
was  to  be  used  in  bribing  certain  Mexican  officials.^*  Trist  in- 
closed copies  of  his  notes  to  Bankhead  in  a  letter  to  Buchanan, 
dated  June  13,  in  which  he  complained  because  Scott  would  give 
him  no  information  concerning  affairs  in  Mexico.^^ 

As  soon  as  Thornton  had  returned  to  the  capital  Bankhead 
delivered  Buchanan's  dispatch  (of  April  15)  to  Domingo  Ibarra 
who  had  recently   succeeded   Baranda   as  Minister   of  Foreign 


32  Rives,  United  States  and  Mexico,  II,  432-435. 

33  Trist  to  Bankhead,  June  6,  1847   (Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  5^,  30  Cong.,  1  scss.. 
181-183).     Copy  also  in  Trist  Papers. 

34  Thornton's  report   to  Bankhead,   quotod   in   Rives,    United   States  and 
Mexico,  II,  440-441. 

30  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  52,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  178-181. 


TREATY  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO  507 

Relations.  In  a  brief  note,  dated  June  22,  .Ibarra  informed 
Buchanan  that  the  "decision  on  tlie  affair"  would  rest  with  the 
Mexican  congress.^*'  Two  days  later  Thornton  arrived  at  Puebla 
with  Ibarra's  note,  and  notified  both  Scott  and  Trist  that  Santa 
Anna  had  called  a  special  session  of  the  congress  so  llial  it  might 
consider  the  question  of  peace  negotiations. 

Since  the  Mexican  government  had  thus  taken  a  stej)  in  the 
direction  of  arranging  for  peace,  the  question  of  meeting  possible 
overtures  now  presented  itself  to  the  American  representatives. 
They  were  not  as  yet  on  speaking  terms,  and  since  Trist  was  the 
one  who  had  been  assigned  the  duty  of  conducting  negotiations, 
he  was  forced  to  make  the  first  move.  Consequently,  on  June  25, 
the  day  after  Thornton's  return  from  Puebla,  he  addressed  a 
note  to  General  Scott.  In  it  he  stated  that  since  the  information 
given  to  himself  and  to  Scott,  by  Thornton,  seemed  to  indicate 
that  ]\Iexico  was  inclined  to  treat,  he  wished  to  notify  the  gen- 
eral that  he  was  ready  to  negotiate  a  treaty.  He  inclosed  a  copy 
of  his  commission. ^^  Scott  acknowledged  the  receipt  of  his  note, 
and  "this,"  wrote  Trist  to  Buchanan,  "constituted  the  com- 
mencement of  our  official  intercourse  with  reference  to  the  duties 
with  which  I  am  charged."^*  It  was  not,  however,  the  beginning 
of  their  friendship. 

The  next  step  in  the  ' '  official  intercourse ' '  seems  to  have  been 
a  note  written  to  Trist  by  General  Worth,  which  stated  that  Don 
Emanuel  Ibarra,  a  brother  of  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations, 
lived  near  by.  He  was,  said  Worth,  an  intelligent  man,  and  in 
favor  of  peace.  On  the  same  day  some  one  replied,  stating  that 
Trist  wished  to  thank  Worth  for  the  information,  but  was  too  ill 


36  Ibarra  to  Buehaiiau,  June  22,  1847  (Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  1,  30  Cong.,  1  sess., 
40-41). 

37  Trist  to  Scott,  June  25,  1847,  Trist  Papers.  This  seems  to  be  the 
only  copy  of  the  letter  available.  Eives  (II,  442)  says  that  no  copy  has 
been  preserved.  Trist  inclosed  a  copy  of  this,  as  well  as  one  of  Scott's 
reply  to  it,  in  his  dispatch  No.  8,  July  7,  1847,  but  neither  the  dispatch 
nor  the  letters  reached  the  Department  of  State  (see  H.  Ex.  Doc.  60,  30 
Cong.,  1  sess.,  830,  and  note). 

38  Trist  to  Buchanan,  July  23,  1847  {H.  Ex.  Doc.  60,  as  cited  above,  831). 


508  JAMES   E.   POLE 

to  write.""  At  the  same  time,  Scott  sent  to  Trist  a  letter  written 
by  Thornton  which  seems  to  contain  the  first  suggestion  about 
bribing  Mexican  officials.  On  July  3,  Trist  wrote  to  Thornton 
as  follows : 

Your  note  to  Mr.  Hargous,  in  which  you  refer  to  the  impossibility  that 
I  frankly  told  you  existed  to  my  adopting  your  suggestion  upon  a  certain 
point,  has  been  sent  to  me  for  perusal  by  Gen  '1  Scott,  who  moreover  offers 
at  once  to  make  every  arrangement  which  may  be  necessary  for  imme- 
diately carrying  that  suggestion  into  the  fullest  effect,  which  circumstances 
may  admit. 

This  being  the  present  state  of  the  case,  I  shall,  of  course,  be  thankful 
for  any  information  pertinent  to  the  subject.  If  there  be  any  person, 
who,  in  your  opinion,  could  be  safely  intrusted  with  the  whole  affair,  I 
should  very  gladly  put  it  into  his  hands.*o 

Evidently  the  following  copy  of  a  letter  is  the  one  referred  to, 
although  the  date  appended  is  somewhat  confusing : 

(Copy) 
My  dear  Sir: 

Mr.  Trist  does  not  seem  to  think  there  is  the  smallest  possibility  of 
making  use  of  money  in  Mexico  for  what  I  mentioned  to  you;  however 
I  told  him  how  he  might  do  it  por  si  acaso.  Should  it  be  in  your  way, 
pray  use  your  influence  with  Gen '1  Scott  to  allow  a  reasonable  time  for 
taking  the  note  into  consideration  before  advancing. 

Yours  very  truly, 
L.  Hargous  Esq., 
&c  &c  &c 
Nemo  the  name  of   the  ■\\Titer  of  the   above   letter   is   omitted   out   of 
National  delicacy.     The  writer  was  at  the  time  on  a  vist  to  Mr.  Trist,  at 
Puebla— about  June  24,  1847. 

Winfield  Scott, 

Puebla,  July  19,  1847.'*i 


39  Worth  to  Trist,  July  2,  1847;  copy  of  unsigned  letter  to  Worth  of 
same  date  (Trist  Papers). 

40  Trist  (the  copy  is  unsigned,  but  is  in  Trist 's  hand)  to  Thornton, 
July  3,  1847,  Triit  Papers.  A  pencil  note  on  the  margin  says  that  a  copy 
was  "enclosed  in  my  No.  8"  to  Buchanan.  No.  8,  as  already  noted, 
did  not  reach  its  destination.  Louis  Hargous  was  an  American  merchant 
in  Mexico  City. 

41  On  the  side  margin  is  written:  "(the  writer  of  this  was  Edw. 
Thornton)."  Since  Trist  mentioned  what  seems  to  be  this  note  in  his 
letter  of  July  .3  to  Thornton,  apparently  a  copy  (the  above)  was  made 
for  him  on  the  date  appended,  i.e.  on  July  19.     This  is  in  the  TriM  Papers. 


TREATY  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO  nOD 

Officially,  both  Scott  and  Trist  had  evinced  a  disposition  to 
cooperate ;  but,  as  yet,  there  was  no  indication  that  a  personal 
reconciliation  was  near  at  hand.  Nevertheless,  a  reconciliation 
came  within  a  few  days,  and  the  incident  which  seems  to  have 
effected  it  was  quite  as  trivial  as  was  the  cause  of  their  bitter 
feelings  toward  each  other.  Scott's  sensitive  nature  frequently 
led  him  to  make  dire  threats,  yet  he  was  an  extremely  kind- 
hearted  man,  even  when  dealing  with  his  adversaries.  The  fol- 
lowing brief  note  and  the  act  of  kindness  mentioned  in  it,  seems 
to  have  won  Trist 's  heart  completely,  and  to  have  been  the  first 
step  in  the  amicable  adjustment  of  their  differences: 

My  dear  Sir: 

Looking  over  my  stores,  I  find  a  box  of  Guava  marmalade  which,  perhaps, 
the  physician  may  not  consider  improper  to  make  part  of  the  diet  of  your 
sick  companion. 

Yrs  very  truly 

Winfield  Scott, 
Genl.  P.  F.  Smith,  July  6,  1847.42 

&c  &c  &c 

The  marmalade  seems  to  have  had  an  immediate  effect  upon 

Trist 's  health  and  his  disposition,  for  on  the  following  day  he 

told  Buchanan  in  a   letter  that  his  health  had   improved  and 

that 

With  Gen '1  Scott's  reply  to  my  letter,  I  received  a  message  from  him 
evincing  so  much  good  feeling  that  it  afforded  me  the  sincerest  pleasure 
to  meet  it  as  I  did,  in  a  way  which  should  at  once  preclude  all  constraint 
&  embarrassment  between  us.^s 

Indeed,  their  mutual  ''good  feeling"  and  admiration  soon  became 
so  pronounced  that  they  rated  each  other's  judgment  higher 
than  that  of  their  respective  chiefs,  in  the  cabinet,  or  even  the 
judgment  and  the  authority  of  the  President  of  the  United  States. 


42  The  ' '  sick  companion ' '  was  Trist,  who  was  staying  at  Smith 's 
headquarters.  On  the  back  of  the  note  Trist  wrote:  "Brought  to  my 
bed  side  by  Genl  Smith,  and  left  there  with  the  box  of  guava,  as  I  lay 
ill  at  Puebla." 

43  Trist  to  Buchanan,  July  7,  1847,  Tri^i  Papers.  This  is  a  copy  of 
the  dispatch  ' '  No.  8  ' '  which  never  reached  Washington. 


510  JAMES   K.   POLK 

The  first  fruit  of  the  reconciliation  between  the  two  men  was 
the  consideration  of  bribing  the  Mexican  government  to  consent  to 
peace  negotiations.  It  is  evident  from  the  above  correspondence 
that  Thornton  had  discussed  the  subject  with  Trist,  but  whether 
he  or  some  one  else  named  the  definite  amount  of  money  asked 
by  the  ]\Iexicans  is  not  clear.  Trist  himself  mentioned  "specific 
information  obtained  from  various  sources, ' '  and  Hitchcock  wrote 
that  English  merchants  in  Mexico  ' '  say  a  peace  can  be  had  for  a 
little  money. ' '  In  another  place  he  said  that  ' '  our  agents  in  this 
business  are  Englishmen."^*  It  is  probable  that  Thornton  him- 
self gave  Trist  the  information,  and  that  he  had  received  the 
demand  for  money  from  one  close  to  the  Mexican  President. 

On  July  15  Trist  and  Scott  held  a  conference,  and  on  the 
following  day  the  former  addressed  a  rambling  letter  to  the 
latter,  fully  committing  himself  to  the  plan  of  paying  a  bribe. 
"We  are  both  convinced,"  said  he,  "beyond  a  shadow  of  a  doubt, 
that  the  only  way  in  ivhich  the  indefinite  pratracti&n  of  this  war 
can  possibly  he  prevented  .  .  .  .  is  hy  the  secret  expenditure  of 
money  at  the  city  of  Mexico."  The  amounts  named  as  "neces- 
sary &  sufficient ' '  were  ten  thousand  dollars  in  advance  and  one 
million  dollars  on  the  ratification  of  a  treaty.  He  admitted  that 
nothing  of  the  kind  had  been  contemplated  by  his  government 
and  that  he  had  no  authority  to  take  such  action,  but  this  fact  he 
deemed  it  his  "duty  to  disregard."  Concurring  in  Scott's  view 
that  a  part  of  the  war  fund  might  be  used  most  advantageously 
in  buying  peace — the  real  object  of  the  war — he  requested  the 
generaP-"'  to  join  with  him  in  giving  the  requisite  pledge  that  the 
money  would  be  paid.  Trist  believed  that  such  a  pledge  would 
"entirely  supersede  the  necessity  for  the  occupation  of  the 
capital."" 


44  Hitchcock,  Fifty  Years  in  Camp  and  Field,  266,  268. 

*'>  Scott  was,  of  course,  more  eaj!;er  tliaii  Trist  to  give  the  pledge.  It 
hail,  however,  been  arranged  beforehand  that  the  request  should  come 
from  Trist,  as  commissioner.     See  Hitchcock,  op.  rit.,  267. 

41!  Trist  to  Scott,  July  16,  1847,  Trist  Papers,  both  the  original  draft 
and  a  ' '  fair  copy. ' ' 


TBEATY  OF  G  UA  DA  LUPE  HI  DA  LGO  511 

Scott  was  already  fully  coinuiitted  to  the  plan  of  purchasing 
a  treaty,  but  in  a  transaction  so  irregular  he  naturally  desired 
the  approval  of  his  generals,  especially  that  of  General  Pillow 
who  was  a  close  personal  and  political  friend  of  the  President. 
On  receipt  of  Trist  's  note,  therefore,  he  called  together  his  chief 
officers— including  Pillow,  Quitman,  Twiggs,  Shields,  and  Cad- 
^valader— in  order  that  he  might  "post  them  up"  and  win  their 
approval.  According  to  Colonel  Hitchcock,  who  was  present  at 
the  meeting,  Pillow  "fully  and  eloquently"  supported  the  scheme 
after  Scott  had  explained  that  it  was  customary  to  use  money 
wJien  dealing  with  such  people  as  the  Mexicans.  Quitman  ap- 
proved the  ' '  motives ' '  which  had  inspired  the  plan,  but  was  not 
in  favor  of  paying  bribe  money.  Twiggs  "approved  the  whole 
scheme."  Shields  had  misgivings,  but  was  willing  to  leave  the 
whole  matter  to  Trist.  Cadwalader  expressed  no  opinion.*'  As 
a  result  of  the  conference  Scott  "very  cheerfully"  responded 
to  Trist 's  letter  on  the  following  day.    He  said: 

I  fully  concur  with  you,  with  several  of  the  general  officers  of  this 
army  &  with  many  foreigners  of  high  standing,  here  &  at  the  capital,  who 
have  volunteered  their  opinions,  that  the  occupation  by  the  U.  States' 
forces  of  twenty  of  the  principal  places  in  this  Eepublic,  in  addition  to 
those  in  our  hands,  would  not,  probably,  in  a  year  or  more,  force  the 
Mexican  authorities  to  sue  for,  or  accept  a  peace  on  any  terms  honorable 
or  just  to  our  country — without  the  administration,  or  pledge  in  advance, 
of  douoers  to  some  of  the  principal  authorities  in  this  miserably  governed 
country.  We  have  both  learned,  thro '  the  most  unquestionable  channels,  that 
this  is  invited  &  expected  as  an  indispensable  condition  precedent  to  any 
negotiation.  Indeed  the  minimums  have  been  specifically  indicated: — ten 
thousand  dollars,  in  hand,  to  one  high  functionary,  &  a  million  (to  be 
divided,  probably  among  many)  on  the  ratification  of  a  definite  treaty  of 
pestce. 

He  had,  he  said,  already  sent  the  ten  thousand  dollars,  and  he 
agreed  to  unite  with  Trist,  at  the  proper  time,  in  giving  a  pledge 
to  pay  the  million  dollars.  This  amount  was  to  be  paid  by  means 
of  a  draft  on  the  War  Department  under  the  head  of  "army 

47  Hitchcock,  Fifti/  Years  in  Camp  and  Field,  266-268.  Some  of  the  men 
concerned  later  gave  a  very  different  version  of  their  respective  attitudes. 


512  JAMES   K.   POLK 

contingencies,"  and  Trist  was  asked  to  send  a  note  of  explana- 
tion to  the  Secretary  of  War.  Concerning  the  ethics  of  the  con- 
templated action,  he  wrote : 

In  regard  to  the  morality  of  the  transaction  in  question,  I  have,  like 
yourself,  not  the  slightest  doubt.  We  have  tempted  the  integrity  of  no  one. 
The  overtures  Ave  propose  to  meet,  if  corrupt,  come  from  parties  previously 
corrupted,  &  we  only  profit  by  that  corruption  to  obtain  an  end  (peace) 
highly  advantageous  to  both  the  U.  States  &  Mexico.  Such  transactions 
have  always  been  considered  allowable  in  war.-*** 

The  Mexican  congress,  to  which  Santa  Anna  had  referred 
Buchanan's  note  of  April  15,  declined  to  take  any  part  in  diplo- 
matic affairs.  A  committee  of  that  body  held  that  the  Acta  de 
Reformas  of  May  18,  1847,  had,  by  readopting  the  Constitution 
of  1824,  rendered  inoperative  the  law  of  April  20  which  had 
deprived  Santa  Anna  of  his  power  to  conduct  negotiations. 
Although  the  congress  might  easily  have  solved  the  difficulty  and 
prevented  ambiguity  by  specifically  repealing  the  law  of  April 
20,  it  laid  the  matter  on  the  table  without  deciding  the  question 
of  the  President's  authority."*" 

It  is  probable  that  Santa  Anna  never  intended  to  make  peace, 
and  that  he  made  overtures  merely  for  the  purpose  of  procuring 
money  from  the  American  officials.  But  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
he  had  been  promised  a  much  larger  sum,  on  the  conclusion  of 
a  treaty,  it  is  more  likely  that  his  refusal  to  carry  out  his  under- 
standing with  Trist  and  Scott  was  due  to  the  attitude  of  his 
congress.  At  any  rate  he  gave  this  as  an  excuse.  On  July  24 
a  note  from  Thornton  reached  the  camp  at  Puebla.  It  stated 
that  while  Santa  Anna  was  in  favor  of  peace  he  could  not  induce 
his  congress  to  repeal  the  resolutions  which  had  made  it  treason 
for  him  to  negotiate  with  the  United  States.  The  American 
army  must,  said  Thornton,  advance  on  the  capital,  and  it  will  be 
met  by  a  flag  of  truce  before  Penon  has  been  reached.  "So," 
wrote  Hitchcock,  who  recorded  in  his  diary  the  substance  of 


48  Scott  to  Trist,  July  17,  1847,  original,  in  Trist  Papers. 
•10  See  Rives,  United  States  and  Mexico,  II,  44:4-446. 


TBEATT  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO 


513 


Thornton's  letter,  "the  idea  of  peaee  is  all  knocked  into  a  coek«l 
hat  '■»    As  a  result,  doubtless,  of  Tliornton's  adv.ee,  Scot  ,  ac- 
cording to  a  letter  written  by  Hitchcock  some  months  later 
prepared  a  men.oran.lum  and  sent  a  copy  to  Santa  Anna.    In  it 
the  Mexican  President  was  infortned  that  Seott  was  «bout  to 
advance  upon  the  capital,  an.l  that  he  would  «ther  "defeat  th 
enemy  in  view  of  the  city,"  should  resistance  be  offered;  o.  he 
.ould  halt  and  give  the  government  an  "^VoMJ^^mo 
oeace"    As  it  turned  out,  the  program  outlined  in  this  memo 
Lidum  was  ouite  eioseiy  followed,  but  appareiitly  the  general 
did  not,  at  the  time  it  was  prepared,  have  much  hope  of  a  peace 

'"  TriitrScott  .vere  now  fast  friends,  and  each  expressed  to 
his  chief  in  the  cabinet  a  desire  that  the  acrimonious  letters  which 
both  had  sent  to  Washington  might  be  suppressed      Tr.st  now 
b    Led  that  the  general's  whole  conduct  had  been  elia-ten.ed 
by  the  "purest  public  spirit,"  while  Scott  now  found  the_ com- 
missioner to  be  "able,  discreet,  courteous,  and  a™'abl-        iU 
this  time  Scott  had  not  received  Marcy's  most  sev  re  c   ticism 
of  his  conduct,  but  he  resented  the  rebuke  -»;--   '"  *  '  ^f ,  ; 
retary's  letter  of  May  31st.    Although  he  had  this  let  e,  in  his 
po^ssion  for  nearly  three  weeks,  he  told  Marey  «-t    -e-i 
^•I  .10  not  here  *«antly  ^^-^  ^^I^T  o  Te  -- 
f  Jlrrned^r fartrids  tim^e  had  been  occupied  in 

.^Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  65,  30  Cong.,  ^  ^'''l^^^'X.in  his  diarv  of  a  dinner 

52  Under  date  of  July  30  Hitchcock  speaks  "^  ^^^      f/^^ , .  Everything 

given  bv  Pillow  to  the  other  generals  '^^^^ J/^f ;, ?^'e\ar  to  the  utmost 

?ow  shoVs  that  the  fl-^<^^-l\^'^^i  now  S  that  our   attempt  to   enter 

^^^^^"^  S^r  S'toi'^Mernrined    opposition"     (mteheock, 

"'■:^i^i  Buchanan.  ^^^^^^^  ^^  SL^^sS  [Ss^ 
Doc.  60,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  831,  IJll  iUi-^  ^  ^^^.^  j^^g  ^^^n) 

Scott  said:   '' You  will  perceive^  that  ^^^        J^        ^^^^  ,^  ^     ^^zen 
liZ  Sl^S^a^,  indVeirknTw^ie  obligations  imposed  under  all 


514  JAMES   K.   POLK 

trying  to  i)ur('liase  a  treaty  from  Santa  Anna,  and  before  the 
news  of  that  questionable  transaction  reached  Washington  many 
interesting  events  had  occurred. 

The  first  division  of  the  American  army  left  Puebla  on  August 
7,  1847,  followed  on  the  next  day  by  Trist  and  Scott,  one  bearing 
the  olive  branch,  the  other  the  sword.^*  The  latter  was  first  to 
be  used,  for,  not  until  the  battles  of  Contreras  and  Churubusco 
had  been  fought  was  the  Mexican  President  ready  for  the  olive 
branch.  On  the  evening  of  August  20,  after  his  defeat  at  Churu- 
busco, he  sought,  through  the  British  legation,  to  arrange  for  a 
suspension  of  hostilities.  A  deputation  from  the  legation — in- 
cluding Thornton,  the  secretary,  and  Mackintosh,  the  consul- 
general — met  Scott  at  San  Augustin,  "ostensibly  to  ask  for  a 
safe-guard  for  the  English  Minister  and  British  subjects,  but 
really  to  prepare  the  way  for  peace. '  '^^ 

Near  midnight  of  the  same  day  Pacheco,  the  Mexican  Minister 
of  Foreign  Relations,  called  on  Bankhead  and  asked  him  to  use 
his  influence  in  inducing  Scott  to  save  the  city  from  being  sacked. 
The  British  minister,  according  to  his  own  account,  would  not 
interfere  further  than  to  transmit  a  letter  from  Pacheco  to  Trist. 
It  was  decided,  however,  that  the  letter  should  be  addressed  to 
Buchanan  (as  a  reply  to  his  note  of  the  previous  April)  instead  of 
Trist.  Bankhead  himself  wrote  to  Trist,  and  expressed  the  hope 
that  peace  might  be  concluded  at  an  early  date.  Both  letters 
were  sent  to  the  commissioner.''^'' 

The  note  addressed  to  Buchanan  stated  that  Santa  Anna  had 
continued  the  fight  until  tlie  American  army  had  readied  the 

circumstances  by  an  enlijjhtened  patriotism."  Due  to  negligence  on  the 
part  of  the  messenger,  this  letter  did  not  reach  Washington  until  Decem- 
ber, 1848. 

J54  From  Ayotla  Trist  wrote:  "It  is,  indeed,  a  nohic  army,  full  of  con- 
fidence   in    itself,    and    full    of    confidence    in    its    commander To 

appreciate  the  man,  to  Jcnow  him  at  all,  one  must  see  him  in  this  sphere." 
To  Buchanan,  Aug.  14,  1847  (Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  52,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  187). 

ss  Hitchcock,  ¥ift\i  Years  in  Camp  and  Field,  280. 

56  Pacdieco  to  Buchanan,  Aug.  20,  1847  (Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  52,  30  Cong.,  1 
ses9.,  189).  Bankhead  to  Trist.  same  date,  TriM  Paper.t.  For  Bankhead 's 
report  to  his  government,  see  Kives,  II,  496-497. 


TREATY  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO  515 

gates  of  the  capital,  and  that  he  had  now  resolved  to  hear  the 
proposals  which  the  American  commissioner  had  been  instructed 
to  make.  In  doing  so,  said  Pacheco,  the  President  was  acting 
under  the  powers  conferred  upon  liim  by  the  constitution.  This 
meant,  of  course,  that  Santa  Anna  was  ready  to  ignore  the  law 
of  April  20,  which  made  it  treason  for  him  to  negotiate  with  the 
United  States.  This  law  may,  indeed,  have  been  rendered  void 
by  the  subsequent  readoption  of  the  constitution,  but  since  the 
law  in  question  had  not  been  specifically  repealed,  some  doubt 
remained  as  to  the  legality  of  any  treaty  he  might  make. 

On  the  morning  of  August  21,  while  Scott  and  Trist  were 
on  their  way  from  San  Angel  to  Tacubaya,  they  were  met  by  a 
''fine  carriage"  containing  General  Mara'y  Villamil,  bearer  of 
the  letters  written  by  Pacheco  and  Bankhead  to  the  American 
officials.    Trist  read  the  letters,  and  a  conference  was  held.^'    The 
letter  addressed  to  Trist  did  not  expressly  ask  for  an  armistice, 
but  apparently  Mara  verbally  made  it  known  that  such  was  the 
wish  of  the  Mexican  President.     With  more  magnanimity  than 
judgment  Scott,  instead  of  demanding  that  the  request  for  a 
cessation  of  hostilities  should  come  from  the  defeated  commander, 
proposed  an  armistice  in  a  note  addressed  to  Santa  Anna.    The 
proposal  was  accepted,  and  two  days  later  an  armistice  was  ar- 
ranged.=«     The  agreement  made  at  Puebla  probably  was  Scott's 
real  reason  for  taking  the  initiative  ;  the  reasons  which  he  gave  to 
the  Secretary  of  War  were  a  desire  to  leave  Mexico  "somethnig 
on  which  to  rest  her  pride,"  and  the  fear  that  a  more  drastic 
course  would  "scatter  the  elements  of  government"  and  make 
the  negotiation  of  a  treaty  impossible.^" 

After  some  delay  commissioners  were  appointed  by  Santa 
Anna,  and  with  them  Trist  held  his  first  meeting  on  August  27, 


57  Hitchcock,  op.  cit.,  279. 

58  The  correspondence   and   armistice   are   printed    in   Sen-.   Ex.   Doc.   5., 
30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  308-312. 

.0  Scott  to  Marcy,  Aug.  28,  1847  {Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  1,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  314). 


516  JAMES  K.   POLK 

1847.*'°  He  soon  discovered  that  the  powers  of  the  Mexicans 
simply  permitted  them  to  receive  his  propositions  for  transmission 
to  Santa  Anna.  He  told  them  that  he  had  been  authorized  to 
treat  only  with  commissioners  provided  with  full  powers ;  never- 
theless, he  delivered  to  them  a  statement  of  the  propositions 
which  he  was  ready  to  make.''^ 

As  soon  as  the  American  project  had  been  received,  Pacheco 
drafted  instructions  to  the  commissioners  and  furnished  them 
with  full  powers,  but  the  instructions  required  them  to  make  such 
extravagant  demands  that  the  commissioners  immediately  offered 
their  resignations.  As  a  result,  Santa  Anna,  through  Pacheco, 
authorized  the  commissioners  to  make  such  modifications  as  the 
' '  circumstances  of  the  country  may  exact. '  '"- 

The  Mexican  diplomats  met  Trist  on  September  1,  and  for 
two  days  the  questions  at  issue  were  discussed.  The  terms  of 
settlement  now  suggested  by  the  Mexicans  were  much  like  those 
mentioned  by  Atocha  in  the  preceding  January.  He  had  spoken 
of  the  Rio  Grande  as  a  boundary,  with  a  neutral  strip  on  the 
American  side;  they  asked  for  the  Nueces  as  a  boundary,  with 
all  territory  between  that  river  and  the  Rio  Grande  as  neutral 


00  The  Mexican  commissioners  were  ex-President  Herrera,  Bernardo 
Couto,  Ignacio  Mara  y  Villamil,  Miguel  Atristain,  and  Jose  Arroyo. 

61  Trist  to  Buchanan,  Aug.  27,  1847  {Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  52,  30  Cong.,  1  sess., 
191-192).  On  the  morning  of  August  27  an  attack  made  by  a  Mexican 
mob  on  American  supply  wagons  threatened  to  prevent  negotiations,  but 
an  apology  temporarily  smoothed  over  this  difficultv.  For  details,  see 
Eives,  II,  510-511. 

62  For  the  instructions  (in  translation)  and  tlie  correspondence  relat- 
ing to  them,  see  Sen^.  Ex.  Doc.  52,  as  cited  above,  330-335.  By  their 
instructions  the  commissioners  were  to  demand:  Mexico  would  relinquish 
Texas — not  as  a  result  of  annexation,  but  of  negotiation.  Its  boundary 
must  be  the  Nueces,  and  the  United  States  must  i)ay  for  the  land  one 
half  of  the  price  fixed  by  Texas  laws.  AH  debt  claims  against  Mexico 
must  Vje  cancelletl,  as  "an  equivalent  for  entering  into  negotiation ''( !) 
and  ten  leagues  on  either  side  of  the  boundary  was  to  be  neutral  terri- 
tory. Cession  of  New  Mexico  and  California  must  be  refused,  but,  as  a 
last  resort,  a  factory  port  at  San  Francisco  might  be  granted  to  the 
United  States.  A  passage  over  the  Isthmus  of  Tehuantepec  was  to  be 
refused.  Duties  on  American  goods  brought  into  Mexico  must  be  paid. 
The  United  States  must  restore  Mexican  forts  to  the  condition  in  which 
they  were  found.  Lastly,  tlie  commissioners  were  to  insist  on  indemnity 
for  all  damages  done  by  tlie  American  army. 


TEEATY  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO  517 

ground  in  which  no  settlement  might  be  made  by  either  party. 
He  had  claimed  no  authority  to  discuss  a  cession  of  New  Mexico ; 
they  said  that  their  instructions  forbade  a  cession  of  this  terri- 
tory. He  had  stated  that  Mexico  was  willing  to  cede  Upper 
California  for  a  money  consideration ;  they  were  ready  to  cede 
the  upper  part  of  this  territory,  but  insisted  that  Mexico  must 
retain  all  of  Lower  California  and  a  land  connection  with  it. 
They  declined  to  grant  a  transit  across  the  Isthmus  of  Tehuan- 
tepec.  Trist  offered  to  withdraw  the  claim  for  Lower  California 
and  the  transit  across  the  isthmus,  if  Mexico  would  cede  Upper 
California  and  New  Mexico  for  a  money  payment.  He  agreed, 
also,  to  submit  the  Nueces  boundary  question  to  his  government 
for  consideration ;  they,  in  turn,  agreed  to  submit  to  their  gov- 
ernment the  terms  which  he  had  proposed."^  Four  days  later, 
and  before  Trist  had  taken  steps  to  refer  the  matter  to  President 
Polk,  another  meeting  was  held,  and  the  Mexican  commissioners 
presented  a  counter-project  and  an  explanatory  note.  The  ces- 
sion of  New  Mexico  was  refused,  an  offer  to  cede  Upper  Cali- 
fornia north  of  37°  was  made,  and  it  was  suggested  that  England 
should  be  asked  to  guarantee  the  proposed  treaty.  Trist,  of 
course,  declined  to  accept  these  terms  and,  for  the  time  being, 
negotiations  w^ere  abandoned.  This  in  itself  automatically  abro- 
gated the  armistice,  but  General  Scott  chose  to  terminate  it  on 
the  ground  that  its  terms  had  been  violated  by  the  interference 
of  Mexicans  with  American  supply  wagons.*** 

At  the  very  moment,  almost,  when  Santa  Anna  was  rejecting 
the  project  of  a  treaty  offered  by  the  United  States,  President 
Polk  was  announcing  his  intention  to  demand  additional  terri- 
tory from  Mexico.  On  September  4  he  told  his  cabinet  that, 
unless  the  next  dispatch  from  Trist  should  announce  that  a  treaty 
had  been  signed,  the  commissioner  ought  to  be  instructed  to 


63  Trist  to  Buchanan,  Sept.  4,  1847,  and  inelosures   (Doc.  52,  as  cited 
above,  195-201). 

64  Commissioners  to  Trist,  Sept.  6,  1847;   Trist 's  reply,  Sept.  7;  Scott 
to  Santa  Anna,  Sept.  6  {ihid.,  375-380,  214-222,  346). 


518  JAMES   K.   POLK 

demand  more  territory.  Three  days  later  he  expressed  himself 
as  in  favor  of  acquiring  Tamaulipas.  The  question  of  modifying 
Trist's  instructions  was  discussed,  but  when,  on  the  ninth,  a 
rumor  reached  Washington  that  the  Mexican  congress  had  been 
called  for  the  purpose  of  considering  the  American  proposals, 
Polk  noted  in  liis  diary:  "I  sincerely  hope  that  a  Treat}'  of 
peace  may  have  been  concluded  and  signed."**^ 

The  mail  of  September  14  brought  the  President  both  en- 
couragement and  disappointment.  By  it  he  learned  of  the  vic- 
tories at  Contreras  and  Churubusco,  but,  also,  of  the  armistice 
which  followed  them.  The  same  mail  contained  Trist's  brief 
dispatch  of  August  29,  in  which  the  government  was  informed 
that  negotiations  had  begun.  Polk  was  not  pleased  with  the 
armistice.  He  believed  that  Scott  should  have  demanded  an 
immediate  decision  on  the  terms  offered  by  the  United  States, 
and  in  the  event  of  their  rejection  by  Mexico,  he  should  have 
entered  the  capital  and  levied  a  contribution  for  the  support  of 
his  army.  "I  fear,"  noted  the  President,  "that  the  armistice 
was  agreed  to  by  the  Mexican  Commander  only  to  re-organize 

his  defeated  army  for  further  resistance I  shall  wait 

very  anxiously  for  further  information  from  the  army."  He 
waited  until  October  4,  and,  as  no  favorable  news  arrived,  he 
decided  that  Trist  should  be  recalled  and  that  Scott  should  be 
directed  to  levy  contributions  on  the  enemy. ^'^ 

Letters  embodying  these  views  were  prepared  by  Buchanan 
and  Marcy  and  forwarded  to  their  respective  representatives  in 
Mexico.  The  Mexican  counter-project  Buchanan  pronounced 
"a  most  extraordinary  document,"  and  the  proposal  of  such 
terms  "a  mere  mockery."    The  commissioners  must  have  known, 


-^    65Duirij,  III,  161,  164,  167. 

««"Mr.  Trist  is  recalled,"  said  he,  "because  his  remaining  longer 
with  the  army  could  not,  probably,  accomplish  the  objects  of  his  mission, 
and  because  his  remaining  longer  might,  &  probably  would,  impress  the 
Mexican  Government  with  the  belief  that  the  U.  S.  were  so  anxious  for 
peace  that  they  would  ultimate[ly]  conclude  one  upon  the  Mexican  terms. 
Mexico  must  now  first  sue  for  peace,  &  when  she  does  we  will  hear  lier 
propositions"  (ibid.,  170-172,  185-186), 


TEEATY  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO  519 

he  said,  that  the  United  States  woukl  never  relinciuisli  New 
Mexico,  Upper  California,  or  the  territory  between  the  Nueces 
and  the  Rio  Grande.  The  assertion  made  by  the  Mexicans  that 
Trist  had  agreed  to  refer  to  his  government  the  surrender  of  the 
last  mentioned  territory  was  not  believed  in  Washington.  If,  at 
the  time  of  receiving  Buchanan's  letter,  a  treaty  had  been  signed, 
Trist  was  to  bring  it  home  with  him ;  otherwise  he  was  to  suspend 
all  negotiations  and  return  home  "by  the  first  safe  opportunity." 
The  letter  to  Scott  instructed  him  to  support  his  army  by 
contributions  levied  on  the  enemy.  Any  proposals  from  Mexico 
to  reopen  negotiations  were  to  be  forwarded  by  him  to  the 
President."^ 

Polk  has  been  criticized  for  ordering  the  employment  of 
measures  which  might  destroy  all  organized  government  in 
Mexico,  and  for  demanding  that  future  peace  offers  must  come 
from  the  enemy.  His  reason  for  adopting  this  policy,  whether 
valid  or  not,  was  his  belief  that  Mexico  would  never  come  to 
terms  so  long  as  she  held  the  erroneous  opinion  that  the  govern- 
ment at  Washington  was  over-anxious  for  peace,  or  too  weak  to 
continue  hostilities."*  In  a  private  letter  the  Secretary  of  State 
said  that  "the  spirit  of  the  Country  is  now  thoroughly  aroused 
&  the  war  will  be  prosecuted  with  the  utmost  vigor.  This  is  the 
character  of  the  American  people.  They  find  that  peace  cannot 
be  made  with  Mexico  upon  honorable  terms  &  they  are  deter- 
mined to  see  it  out.""^  Owing  to  the  fact  that  there  was,  for  some 
time,  no  communication  between  Vera   Cruz  and  the  interior, 


67  Marey  to  Scott,  Oct.  6,  1847;  Buchanan  to  Trist,  same  date  {Sen. 
Ex.  Doc.  52,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  91-93,  138-140).  The  original  of  the  latter, 
as  well  as  a  duplicate  and  triplicate  are  in  the  Trist  Papers.  Some  one 
(undoubtedly  Trist)  has  underlined  in  red  the  part  which  says  that  the 
United  States  will  never  surrender  Upper  California  or  the  land  between 
the  rivers  Nueces  and  Eio  Grande.  The  dates  of  receipt  are  noted. 
*^  68  In  the  letter  to  Trist,  just  cited,  Buchanan  said:  "They  [the 
Mexicans]  must  attribute  our  liberality  to  fear,  or  they  must  take 
courage  from  our  supposed  political  divisions.  Some  such  cause  is  neces- 
sary to  account  for  their  strange  infatuation."  For  criticism  of  Polk's 
change  of  policy,  see  Eives,  II,  523-525. 

69  Buchanan  to  Trist,  Oct.  7,  1847,  Trist  Papers. 


520  JAMES   K.   POLK 

these  letters  did  not  reach  Trist  until  November  16  and  the  same 
mail  contained  another  dispatch  from  Buchanan,  dated  October 
25th.  "When  this  dispatch  was  written  the  Secretary  of  State 
had  received  the  letter  from  Trist  which  submitted  the  Mexican 
proposal  regarding  a  neutral  territory  between  the  Nueces  and 
the  Rio  Grande.  The  Secretary  liad,  he  said,  been  instructed  by 
the  President  to  say  that  he  "could  not  for  a  single  moment 
entertain  the  question  of  surrendering  a  portion  of  Texas." 
Surprise  and  regret  were  expressed  because  the  commissioner 
had  "gone  so  far  beyond  the  carefully  considered  ultimatum" 
as  to  refer  it  to  his  government.  "The  President,"  he  added, 
"has  directed  me  to  reiterate  your  recall."  In  a  private  note 
Buchanan  said  that  he  was  "extremely  sorry"  to  be  obliged  to 
write  such  a  dispatch,  but 

to  propose  to  consult  the  Gov't  whether  they  would  abandon  that  portion 
of  the  country  where  Mexico  attacked  our  forces  &  on  our  right  to  which  the 
Whigs  have  raised  such  an  unfounded  clamor,  will  be  a  fruitful  cause  of 
assault  against  us  in  the  next  Congress.  I  hope,  however,  there  may  never 
be  a  necessity   for  sending  this   dispatch   to   either   House   of   Congress.'o 

Notice  of  his  recall  and  of  the  adoption  of  a  more  drastic 
military  policy  were  destined  to  have  small  influence  upon  Trist 's 
diplomatic  activities,  for  soon  after  the  dispatches  had  arrived  an 
opportunity  was  presented  for  reopening  negotiations.  He  and 
General  Scott  were  now  boon  companions,'^^  and  while  setting  a 
high  value  on  their  own  combined  judgment,  each  deemed  an 
order  from  the  President  and  his  cabinet  to  be  a  nuisance  which, 
in  important  cases,  should  be  disi'cgarded.  If,  therefore,  the 
commissioner  and  tlie  general  believed  that  a  treaty  ought  to  be 
made,  why  should  the  President  interfere ! 


70  Buchanan  to  Trist,  Oct.  25,  1847,  Trist  Papers.  Eec'd  Nov.  16. 
The  official  dispatch  is  printed  in  Doc.  52,  as  cited  above,  94-95. 

71  On  October  18  Trist  wrote  to  his  wife:  "I  am  General  Scott's  friend 
for  life.  I  know  him  thoroughhi :  he  is  the  soul  of  honor  &  probity,  and 
full  of  the  most  sterling  qualities  of  heart  &  head:  affectionate,  generous, 

forgiving,  and  a  lover  of  justice Tell  all  my  intimate  friends  of 

the  entire  revolution,  from  the  conception  I  had  formed  of  Gen  S.  in  my 
ignorance  of  his  character,  to  what  I  now  Icnow  of  him"  {Trist  Papers). 


TREATY  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO  521 

After  the  interruption  of  negotiations  and  the  renewal  of 
hostilities  Scott's  army  had  won  the  battles  of  Molino  del  Rev 
and  Chapultepec  and  had  captured  Mexico  City.  On  September 
16  Santa  Anna,  then  at  Guadalupe,  resigned  the  Presidency  and 
directed  that  the  office  should  be  held  by  Pefia  y  Pefia,  president 
of  the  supreme  court,  until  the  Mexican  congress  should  other- 
wise direct.  He  then  set  out  on  an  unsuccessful  expedition 
against  a  small  force  of  Americans  stationed  at  Puebla.  Peila 
assumed  the  office,  not  however  by  virtue  of  the  retiring  Presi- 
dent's decree,  but  in  accordance  with  the  constitutional  provision 
that  the  head  of  the  supreme  court  should  succeed  to  the  Presi- 
dency in  the  event  of  a  vacancy.  After  removing  Santa  Anna 
from  his  military  command,  the  new  President  succeeded  in  estab- 
lishing a  government— one  of  doubtful  legality  in  certain  re- 
spects—but one  which  prevented  anarchy  until  the  congress  could 
provide  another.  On  November  11  that  body  selected  General 
Anaya  to  be  President  ad  interim,  and  the  new  executive  at  once 
made  Peiia  y  Peiia  his  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations.'- 

Nearly  a  month  before  he  had  received  notice  of  his  recall 
Trist  had  taken  steps  to  renew  peace  negotiations.  On  October 
20,  during  the  brief  administration  of  President  Pena  y  Pena, 
he  sent  a  letter,  through  the  British  legation,  to  Luis  de  la  Rosa, 
the  then  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations.  This  letter  was  dated 
September  7,  1847,  for  the  reason  that  it  purported  to  be  a  reply 
to  the  commissioners  with  whom  he  had  negotiated  before  the 
armistice    had   been    terminated."      Rosa    notified    Trist"*    that 

T2  Technically,  Peua  was  not  president  of  the  court — that  office  being 
vacant — but  as  senior  member,  he  acted'  as  president.  Hence  his  right 
to  assume  the  Presidency  was  somewhat  doubtful.  Trist  to  Buchanan, 
Jan.  26,  1848  (Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  52,  30  Co;ig.,  1  sess.,  281).  For  other  details, 
see  Rives,  II,  584-589. 

T3  Trist  to  Buchanan,  Oct.  31,  1847  (copy  in  Trist  Papers).  Printed 
in  part  in  Sen.  Ex.  Doo.  52,  as  above  cited,  212-213.  The  part  omitted 
tells  of  Thornton's  endeavor  to  induce  the  Mexicans  to  negotiate.  The 
letter  to  the  commissioners  may  be  found  in  Doc.  52,  214  ff.  In  a  letter 
dated  Oct.  25  Trist  told  Buchanan  that  there  was  a  general  desire  on 
the  part  of  both  Mexicans  and  foreigners  for  the  annexation  of  all 
of  Mexico  to  the  United  States  (copy  in  Tri^t  Papers).  This  part  is 
omitted  from  the  same  letter  printed  in  Doc.  52,  205-212. 

74  Rosa  to  Trist,  Oct.  31,  1847   (Doc.  52,  as  above  cited,  227-228). 


522  JAMES   K.   POLK 

commissioners  would  be  appointed,  but  this  promise  was  not 
fulfilled  until  after  Anaj'a  had  become  President. 

On  November  22  the  new  minister,  Pefia,  notified  Trist  that 
President  Anaya  had  appointed  peace  commissioners.  Two  of 
the  men  selected,  Bernardo  Couto  and  Miguel  Atristain,  had 
been  members  of  the  commission  which  had  declined,  in  Septem- 
ber, to  accept  the  American  project.  The  others  were  Manual 
Rincon  and  Gonzago  Cuevas.  The  former  declined  to  serve  and 
his  place  was  not  filled.  Peiia's  note  was  transmitted  to  Thorn- 
ton, who  accompanied  it  by  a  letter  of  his  own.  In  this,  Thornton 
stated  that  he  had  informed  Peiia  of  Trist 's  recall,  and  that  the 
minister  was  ''thunderstruck"  and  disappointed.  Thornton  ex- 
pressed the  hope  that  Trist  might  go  on  with  the  negotiations, 
since  the  Mexican  government  had  been  induced  to  appoint  com- 
missioners by  the  prospect  of  a  speedy  peace.  Peace  could  be 
had  now,  he  said,  but  delay  might  jeopardize  the  prospect  of  a 
peaceful  settlement."''  This  argument  seems  eventually  to  have 
appealed  witli  great  force  to  Trist 's  shallow  intellect.  He  did 
not,  however,  immediately  follow  the  advice  offered,  for,  two 
days  later,  he  formally  notified  Pefia  of  his  recall  and  stated 
that  any  communications  regarding  peace  should  be  handed  to 
General  Scott  for  transmission  to  Washington.'" 

In  thus  declining,  in  the  first  instance,  to  proceed  with  the 
negotiations  after  he  had  received  notice  of  his  recall,  Trist  was 
not  actuated  by  respect  for  superior  authority ;  he  was  influenced 
solely  by  the  belief  tluit  any  other  course  would  be  futile.  On 
tlie  same  day  that  he  formally  notified  Pena  of  his  recall  he  told 
Thornton  in  a  letter  tliat  no  dread  of  "the  displeasure  of  those 
entrusted  willi  liic  power  of  dispensing  office"  would  deter  him 


75  Pena  to  Trist,  Nov.  22,  1847;  Thornton  to  Trist  (formal  lotter  of 
same  date)  {Doc.  52,  as  above  cited,  98-09,  L':U).  Thornton  to  Trist 
(confidential),  same  date,  Trist  Papers.  Thornton's  confidential  letter 
was  written  at  Pena's  urjjent  request.  See  Thornton  to  Pahnerston, 
Nov.  29,  1847,  quoted  by  Rives,  II,  595. 

70  Trist  to  Pefia,  Nov.  24,  1847  (Doc.  52,  as  above  cited,  99-100).  Orig- 
inal, recalled  by  Tri.st,  in  Trist  Papers. 


TREATY  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO  523 

from  "disobeying  positive  &  peremptory  instructions,""  if  the 
President  had  not  deprived  him  of  "all  shadow  of  authority  to 
do  anything  whatever."  However,  when  Peila  y  Pefia  argued 
that  the  offer  made  prior  to  the  receipt  of  his  recall  had  com- 
mitted Ills  government,  when  the  British  dii)lomats  urged  prompt 
action,  and  when  General  Scott  "encouraged  him,  nevertheless, 
to  finish  the  good  work  he  had  begun ' '  and  expressed  the  belief 
that  such  action  would  be  ' '  duly  ratified  at  Washington, ' '  a  man 
of  small  mental  caliber  and  excessive  vanity,  like  Trist,  could 
hardly  fail  to  be  influenced.'* 

Despite  all  this  pressure  he  did  not  decide  immediately  to 
disregard  his  instructions.  On  November  27  he  drafted  an- 
other dispatch  to  Buchanan.  In  it  he  petulantly  resented  the 
President's  criticism  of  his  course  in  offering  to  refer  to  Wash- 
ington the  question  relating  to  the  boundary  of  Texas.  After 
pointing  out  the  futility  of  demanding  that  Mexican  peace  pro- 
posals must  be  sent  to  Washington,  he  urged  that  a  new  com- 
mission should  be  chosen  to  negotiate  with  the  one  already  ap- 
pointed by  Mexico.  He  then  expected  to  leave  Mexico  in  about 
twelve  days.'"  That  he  had  at  this  time  no  intention  of  making 
a  treaty  is  made  clear  by  a  letter  written  to  Mrs.  Trist  on  the 
following  day.  "I  have,"  said  he,  "bid  adieu  for  ever  to  official 
life.  This  decision  is  irrevocable."  She  was  asked  to  tell  Bu- 
chanan, with  kindest  regards,  that  Trist  would  not  resume  his 
place  in  the  State  Department,  for  he   [Buchanan]   "will  soon 


77  But,  he  added,  "not  only  am  I  divested  entirely  of  the  ofificial  char- 
acter which  I  lately  held,  and  with  it  of  all  shadow  of  authority  to  do 
anything  whatever;  but  I  deem  it  certain,  that,  in  the  actual  state  of 
things  at  Washington,  the  cause  of  Peace  could  not  fail  to  be  seriously 
prejudiced,  were  I  to  pursue  any  other  course  than  that  of  the  most 
absolute  &  unqualified  acquiescence  in  the  Executive  will,  as  announced 
to  me. ' '  He  will  go  to  Washington,  he  says,  and  do  what  he  can  for 
peace:  "In  a  word,  the  signing  of  a  Treaty  of  Peace  is  reserved  for 
another  hand  than  mine"  (Trist  to  Thornton,  Nov.  24,  1847  [copy], 
Trist  Papers). 

-s  Peiia  to  Couto,  Nov.  24,  1847,  quoted  by  Rives  II,  596.  Scott,  Auto- 
biography, II,  576. 

-'■>  Trist  to  Buchanan,  Nov.  27,  1847  (Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  52,  30  Cong.,  1  sess., 
228-230).     Complete  copy  in  Trist  Papers. 


524  JAMES   E.   POLE 

see  the  impossibility  of  this,  or  my  having  anything  to  do  with 
Mr.  Polk."  Apparently  the  last  remark  was  induced  by  the 
belief  that  the  President  had  been  unduly  influenced  by  General 
Pillow.^" 

We  are  not  left  in  doubt  concerning  the  date  of  Trist's  de- 
cision to  reopen  negotiations,  for,  with  characteristic  egotism, 
he  announced  with  loud  trumpet  the  very  hour  on  which  he  de- 
cided to  play  Caesar  and  cross  the  Rubicon.  In  a  letter  to  his 
wife,  he  said : 

Procure  the  key  to  this  cipher  (...)  and  decipher  the  following,  to  be 
read  to  him  [Buchanan]  most  secretly.  This  determination,  I  came  to, 
this  day,  at  12  o'clock.    It  is  altogether  my  own. 

Enowing  it  to  be  the  very  last  chance,  and  impressed  with  the  dreadful 
consequences  to  our  country  which  cannot  fail  to  attend  the  loss  of  that 
chance.  [Here  follows  cipher  which  was  interpretd  to  mean]  I  will  make 
a  treaty,  if  it  can  be  done,  on  the  basis  of  the  Bravo,  by  32°;  giving  15 
millions  besides  the  3  millions  cash. si 

In  spite,  however,  of  this  precision  as  to  the  time  of  making 
his  decision,  Trist  seems  to  have  told  the  Mexican  commissioners 
at  least  a  day  earlier  that  he  probably  would  take  the  responsi- 
bility of  disobeying  his  instructions."-     He  had  become  obsessed 


«o  Say  to  Buchanan,  lie  wrote,  "that  a  baser  villain,  and  dirtier 
scoundrel  does  not  exist  out  of  the  Penitentiary,  nor  in  it,  than  Genl 
Pillow.  This  is,  not  an  opinion,  but  a  matter  of  fact,  which  will  be  proved 
to  the  world."  He  told  Mrs.  Trist  that  he  expected  to  leave  for  the 
United  States  about  December  6.  Instead,  he  wrote  his  famous  letter 
on  that  date.  In  a  letter  written  to  John  A.  Dix  (copy  in  Trist  Papers) 
on  October  31  he  had  expressed  his  opinion  of  Polk's  political  generals. 
In  it  he  urged  Dix  to  beware  of  precipitancy  in  the  confirmation  of  gen- 
erals, lest  the  Senate  should  become  involved  in  "a  deep,  damning, 
irretrievable  disgrace — which  no  earthly  power,  nor  all  earthly  powers 
combined,  can  avert." 

«i  Trist  to  Mrs.  Trist,  Dec.  4,  1847,  TriM  Papers.  In  a  similar  strain 
he  told  Edward  Thornton  that  "this  letter  will  occasion  you  great  sur- 
prise, but  no  greater  than  I  should  myself  have  experienced  a  few  hours 
ago,  had  a  seer,  in  whose  prophetic  powers  I  put  faith,  foretold  to  me 
that  I  was  to  write  it"  (Trist  to  Thornton,  Dec.  4,  1847,  TriM  Papers). 
This  letter  with  blanks  for  Thornton 's  name  is  printed  in  Doc.  52,  as 
cited  above,  266-268.  Thornton 's  reply,  dated  Dec.  11,  is  in  the  Trist 
Papcr.i.  He  commends  Trist's  jiroposcd  action  and  feels  certain  that  the 
United  States  "will  highly  apj)laud  your  ilecision."  He,  too,  expressed 
the  belief  that  peace  could  be  had  ' '  now  or  never. ' ' 
<<  82  Couto  to  Pefia,  Dec.  3,  1847,  quoted  by  Kives,  II,  597. 


TEEATY  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO  525 

Avith  the  belief  that  "if  the  present  opportunity  be  not  seized 
at  once,  all  chance  for  making  a  treaty  at  all  will  be  lost  for  an 
indefinite  period — probably  forever"  (letter  to  Thornton,  just 
cited)  ;  and  a  desire  for  fame  doubtless  helped  to  reenforce  this 
belief. 

Having  decided  to  make  a  treaty,  if  possible,  Trist  informed 
Buchanan  of  the  fact  in  a  very  extraordinary  letter,  the  manu- 
script of  which  covered  sixty-five  large  pages.  It  is  not  only 
prolix  and  extremely  tiresome,  but,  in  addition,  is  one  of  the  most 
gratuitously  insulting  documents  in  our  diplomatic  annals.  He 
assigned,  as  reasons  for  resuming  negotiations  in  spite  of  his 
recall,  a  conviction  that  his  government  still  desired  peace ;  a 
belief  that  a  treaty  could  be  made  then,  but  not  later ;  certainty 
that  Mexico  would  not  and  could  not  consent  to  yield  more  than 
his  instructions  had  demanded ;  and  the  belief  that  his  recall  had 
been  based  on  "a  supposed  state  of  things  in  this  country  entirely 
the  reverse  of  that  which  actually  exists."  Had  he  limited  him- 
self to  these  general  statements  the  letter  might  not  merit  severe 
criticism,  whatever  might  be  thought  of  his  assumption  of  author- 
ity. But  Trist  never  knew  when  he  had  said  enough ;  his  pen 
rambled  on  where  his  brain  declined  to  follow.  Consequently, 
each  topic  was  amplified — but  not  illuminated — by  a  seemingly 
endless  profusion  of  words. 

Under  the  first  heading  he  gave  a  dissertation  on  the  Presi- 
dent's responsibilities,  and  then  proceeded  to  philosophize  upon 
Polk's  mental  operations.  Having  reached  the  conclusion  that 
the  President  must  still  desire  peace,  he  pointed  out  that  the 
executive  indignation  mentioned  in  Buchanan's  recent  letter  was 
entirely  wasted  on  a  weak  power  like  Mexico.  Despite  his  cer- 
tainty that  the  President  must  still  desire  peace,  he  hinted  very 
pointedly  that  Polk  wished  to  convert  a  defensive  war  into  one 
of  conquest,  and  for  such  a  wish  he  should  be  ashamed  of  himself. 
Later  in  the  letter  he  again  recurred  to  the  subject  of  annexing 
all  of  Mexico.     He  believed  ultimate  absorption  to  be  desirable ; 


526  JAMES   K.   POLK 

but  a  dissolution  of  the  Uuiou  would  be  preferable  to  the  calamity 
of  immediate  annexation.*^ 

As  if  disregarding  his  instructions  and  questioning  Polk's 
motives  were  not  enough,  Trist  had  the  bad  taste  and  the  audacity 
to  volunteer  opinions  which  could  have  no  other  effect  than  to 
wound  and  to  exasperate  the  President.  Well  knowing,  of  course, 
that  the  Washington  Union  reflected  the  President's  views,  he 
declared  its  criticism  of  Scott's  armistice  to  be  "balderdash," 
"stuff,"  and  "nonsense,"  which  no  one  outside  of  Washington, 
"however  low  in  understanding,"  would  believe.  Again,  a  tact- 
ful subordinate  would  not  have  told  the  President  that  his  close 
friend,  General  Pillow,  was  an  "intriguer"  of  "incomprehensible 
baseness  of  character."  Trist  did  this.  He  asserted,  also,  that 
because  the  President  had  relied  on  ' '  supposition ' '  and  ' '  private 
representations"  from  this  intriguer,  "everything  was  seen  up- 
side down."  Having  referred  to  Pillow  and  Santa  Anna  as 
"twin  phenomena"  in  "moral  obliquity,"  he  did  not  hesitate  to 
speak  of  the  former  as  "an  individual  who  gives  himself  out  as 
the  maker  of  the  President  (by  having  procured  his  nomination 
at  the  Baltimore  convention),  and  as  the  President's  other  self — 
a  pretension  wliieh  I  have  reason  to  believe  but  too  well  founded." 
Even  the  "justice"  done  the  President  in  charitably  excusing 
his  shortcomings  by  attributing  them  to  "a  blind  confidence" 
in  Pillow  did  not  help  matters  very  much.  It  could  not  have 
given  Polk  extreme  pleasure  to  read  that  "infallibility  of  judg- 
ment ....  is  not  among  the  attributes  of  the  President  of  the 
United  States,"  or  to  be  told  that  Scott's  armistice,  instead  of 
being  a  blunder,  had  rescued  the  administration  and  the  Demo- 
cratic party  fi-om  a  "perilous  position.'"**     While  reading  his 


S3  In  this  very  letter  Trist  told  Buchanan  how  easily  annexation  could 
be  accomplished;  and,  accordinjif  to  Lionel  Davidson,  agent  of  the  Roth- 
schilds in  Mexico,  he  had,  late  in  November,  been  in  favor  of  permanent 
occupation  (Davidson  to  Thornton,  Nov.  21^,  1847,  Trist  Paprrft).  And 
yet  he  condemned  Polk  for  his  supposed  desire  to  acquire  the  republic. 

84  Trist  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  6,  1847  (Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  5S,  30  Cong.,  1  sess., 
231-26(5).     Complete  copy  also  in   Trust  Papers. 


TBEATY  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO  527 

tedious  letters  one  is  tempted,  at  times,  to  give  Trist  credit  for 
sincerity — to  think  that  he  really  believed  himself  to  be  perform- 
ing deeds  of  heroism ;  albeit  such  charity  for  his  motives  must  be 
at  the  expense  of  his  intelligence.  On  the  other  hand,  certain 
letters  written  to  his  wife  show  a  want  of  sincerity,  and  brand 
him  as  a  man  who  craved  notoriety. 

The  American  diplomat 's  decision  to  cut  the  Gordian  knot  in 
order  to  save-  both  Mexico  and  his  country  from  impending  dis- 
aster did  not  result  in  an  immediate  reopening  of  negotiations. 
The  Mexican  officials  who  had  been  so  anxious  for  him  to  remain 
now  pleaded  want  of  authority,  and  interposed  various  pretexts 
for  delay.  Since  the  impediments  to  formal  discussions  on  the 
part  of  the  diplomats  were  not  removed  until  the  latter  part  of 
December,  we  may  turn  our  attention  to  Washington  for  the 
purpose  of  ascertaining  the  views  of  the  administration. 

On  Ocober  6,  as  we  have  seen,  the  President  ordered  Trist 's 
recall,  not  on  account  of  the  commissioner's  misconduct,  but 
because  it  was  thought  that  he  would  be  unable  to  make  a  treaty. 
When,  however,  Polk  learned  that  the  commissioner  had  agreed 
to  consult  his  government  regarding  a  neutral  zone  between  the 
two  rivers,  he  remarked  that  "Mr.  Trist  has  managed  the  nego- 
tiation very  bunglingly  and  with  no  ability."-"^  The  recall  was 
repeated  in  still  more  emphatic  terms. 

Having  no  reason,  of  course,  for  believing  that  Trist  would 
disobey  his  instructions,  Polk  gave  his  attention  to  the  war  policy 
which  he  purposed  to  recommend  when  Congress  should  have 
assembled  in  December.  It  was  necessary  that  his  message  should 
be  drafted  with  extreme  care  because  the  control  of  the  House 
had  now  passed  to  his  opponents.  At  a  cabinet  meeting  held 
on  November  9,  Buchanan,  whose  Presidential  aspirations  had 
revived,  told  Polk  that  his  message  must  advise  one  of  two  courses 
— ^to  designate  the  part  of  Mexico  which  the  United  States  would 
hold  as  indemnity,  or  to  occupy  all  of  that  country  by  a  greatly 

85  Polk,  Diwij,  III,  199. 


528  JAMES  K.   POLK 

increased  miltiary  force.  He  did  not  recommend  either  course, 
but  tlie  President  thought  that  he  favored  the  latter.  As  Bu- 
chanan had  up  to  this  time  wished  to  confine  the  acquisition  of 
territory  within  very  narrow  limits,  Polk  believed  that  the  change 
was  due  to  political  considerations.  Since  there  seemed  to  be  some 
uncertainty  as  to  the  policy  of  the  administration,  the  President 
read  a  paragraph  which  he  intended  to  include  in  his  message. 

My  views  as  thus  reduced  to  writing  [said  he]  were  in  substance  that 
we  would  continue  the  prosecution  of  the  war  with  an  increased  force, 
hold  all  the  country  we  had  conquered  or  might  conquer,  and  levy  contri- 
butions upon  the  enemy  to  support  the  war,  until  a  just  peace  was  ob- 
tained; that  we  must  have  indemnity  in  territory,  and  that  as  a  part 
indemnity  the  Californias  &  New  Mexico  should  under  no  circumstances 
be  restored  to  Mexico;  but  that  they  should  henceforth  be  considered  a 
part  of  the  U.  S.,  &  permanent  territorial  Governments  be  established  over 
them;  and  that  if  Mexico  protracted  the  war,  additional  territory  must  be 
required  as  further  indemnity.s'' 

During  the  next  two  weeks  the  President  revised  what  he  had 
written,  and,  at  his  request,  Buchanan  drafted  a  paragraph 
which  embodied  the  Secretary's  opinions  on  a  proper  Mexican 
policy.  Both  drafts  were  presented  for  discussion  at  a  cabinet 
meeting  held  on  the  twenty-third  of  November.  Avowing  a  wish 
to  take  all  of  Mexico,  Walker  preferred  Buchanan's  draft,  for 
he  believed  that  its  construction  would  make  such  acquisition 
possible.  "I  replied,"  wrote  Polk,  "that  I  was  not  prepared  to 
go  to  that  extent;  and  furthermore  that  I  did  not  desire  that 
anything  I  said  in  the  message  should  be  so  obscure  as  to  give 
rise  to  doubt  or  discussions  as  to  what  my  true  meaning  was.  "'^" 
This  remark  indicates  that  Trist's  fears  regarding  the  President's 
change  of  i)olicy  were  wliolly  unwarranted. 

On  December  7  Polk  submitted  to  Congress  his  third  annual 
message.  He  told  of  Trist's  mission  and  of  his  failure  to  conclude 
a  treaty.  The  commissioner  had,  he  said,  been  instructed  to  de- 
mand a  cession  of  territory  as  indemnity,  for  in  no  other  way 
could  Mexico  satisfy  the  claims  of  the  United  States. 


86  76id.,  216-218.  B7  ihid.,  229. 


TREATY  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO  529 

The  doctrine  of  no  territory  is  the  doctrine  of  no  indemnity,  and  if 
sanctioned  would  be  a  public  acknowledgment  that  our  country  was  wrong 
and  that  the  war  declared  by  Congress  with  extraordinary  unanimity  was 
unjust  and  should  be  abandoned — -an  admission  unfounded  in  fact  and 
degrading  to  the  national  character. 

He  recited  the  substance  of  Trist's  instructions  and  urged  the 
necessity  of  acquiring  New  Mexico  and  the  Californias.  The  war 
had  abrogated  the  treaties  regarding  claims,  making  it  necessary 
for  the  United  States  to  pay  American  claimants  and  to  reim- 
burse itself  by  taking  territory.  California,  he  said,  should  be 
acquired  in  order  to  forestall  the  attempt  by  any  other  nation 
to  infringe  upon  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  He  disagreed  with  those 
who  advocated  the  policy  of  retiring  to  a  fixed  line  and  confining 
the  war  to  defensive  operations.  Instead,  he  recommended  the 
establishment  of  governments  in  New  Mexico  and  California,  and 
a  vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war.  Having  outlined  his  policy, 
he  added :  "It  has  never  been  contemplated  by  me,  as  an  object 
of  the  war,  to  make  a  permanent  conquest  of  the  Republic  of 
Mexico  or  to  annihilate  her  separate  existence  as  an  independent 
nation,"  but  a  peace  "must  bring  with  it  indemnity  for  the  past 
and  securitv  for  the  future."**^ 


"*  88  Eichardson  Messages,  IV,  533-546.  Walker  still  favored  the  absorp- 
tion of  all  of  Mexico.  A  paragraph  in  the  first  draft  of  his  financial 
report  to  Congress  practically  advocated  such  a  policy,  but  on  the  Presi- 
dent's advice  this  paragraph  was  omitted  (Polk,  Diary,  III,  241-242). 
Among  the  TriM  Papers  is  an  interesting  letter  written  by  a  young  Mexi- 
can to  his  father.  It  was  written  in  Washington  and  bears  neither  date 
nor  signature,  but  an  accompanying  newspaper  shows  the  writer  to  have 
been  Carlos  Landa,  and  a  comparison  with  events  mentioned  in  Polk's 
diary  shows  that  the  letter  was  written  in  December,  1847.  Landa  visited 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  on  December  13  and  reported  that  "Walker 
•is  entirely  in  favour  of  the  annexation  of  the  whole  of  Mexico  to  the 
United  States;  he  told  me  so  frankly  &  also  spoke  of  the  manner  of 
governing  it  during  the  first  years  by  a  suitable  form  of  government 
which  should  not  be  in  opposition  to  the  institutions  of  this  country." 
Regarding  Walker  as  the  most  important  member,  he  concluded  that 
Polk  and  the  rest  of  the  cabinet  likewise  desired  annexation.  He  visited 
Van  Buren,  Corcoran,  Calhoun,  and  other  prominent  politicians.  He  says 
that  Walker  was  stricken  with  epilepsy  on  December  9;  Polk  in  his 
diary  for  that  day  notes  that  Walker  "had  been  taken  suddenly  ill  & 
had  fallen  down  in  the  Treasury  building. ' ' 


530  JAMES   K.   POLK 

The  message  was  vehemently  'assailed  in  both  houses  of  Con- 
gress. As  in  the  preceding  session,  the  history  of  the  outbreak 
of  the  war  was  discussed  in  all  its  details.  These  recitals  shed 
no  new  light  on  the  subject,  for  already  nearly  every  argument 
had  been  pressed  into  service  to  show  that  Polk  had  wantonly 
usurped  authority  so  that  he  might  rob  a  sister  republic  of  her 
territory.  On  January  3,  1848,  by  a  vote  of  eighty-five  to  eighty- 
one,  the  House  formally  declared  that  the  war  had  been  "unneces- 
sarily and  unconstitutionally  begun  by  the  President  of  the 
United  States."  Among  the  new  Whig  members  who  had  the 
pleasure  of  adding  their  votes  to  the  denunciation  of  the  Presi- 
dent was  Abraham  Lincoln.  With  that  consummate  skill  in 
debate  which  was  later  to  expose  the  sophistry  of  the  "Little 
Giant,"  he  averred  that  Polk  had  falsified  tlie  history  of  our 
difficulties  with  Mexico  by  telling  a  half  truth.  The  statements 
in  the  message  reminded  him  of  instances  he  had  known  of  a 
lawyer's  "struggling  for  his  client's  neck  in  a  desperate  case, 
employing  every  artifice  to  work  round,  befog,  and  cover  up  with 
many  words  some  point  arising  in  the  case  which  he  dare  not 
admit  and  yet  could  not  deny.  "^" 

Resolutions,  too,  there  were  in  plenty.  Dickinson  presented 
one  on  December  14  which  asserted  that  the  "true  policy"  of  the 
government  required  the  annexation  of  contiguous  territory.  In 
the  Senate,  on  the  following  day,  Calhoun  offered  a  counter  reso- 
lution to  the  effect  that  a  conquest  of  Mexico  would  be  disastrous 
to  the  United  States,  and  that  "no  line  of  policy  in  further  prose- 
cution of  the  war  should  be  adopted."  On  the  twenty-second, 
Lincoln  made  his  debut  as  a  legislator  by  calling  upon  the  Presi- 
dent to  designate  the  exact  ' '  spot ' '  on  which  the  war  had  begun, 
and  for  proof  as  to  the  ownership  of  that  spot."" 


»»  Coufj.  Globe,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  95,  .155.  The  quotation  is  taken  from 
Lincoln,  Works  (Tandy  ed.),  337-,  which  differs  slightly  from  that  reported 
in  the  Globe. 

«o  Cong.  Globe,  loc.  cit.,  64. 


TREATY  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO  531 

Three  days  after  his  message  had  been  sent  to  Congress  the 
President  received  a  letter  from  General  Pillow  which  told  of 
the  attempt  made  by  Scott  and  Trist  to  procure  a  treaty  by  the 
use  of  bribe  money.  At  a  meeting  held  on  December  11  he  told 
the  cabinet  of  the  news  he  had  received,  and  expressed  "in  the 
strongest  terms"  his  condemnation  of  their  conduct.  Scott  s 
immediate  recall  was  discussed,  but  it  was  thought  prudent  to 
seek  further  definite  information  from  Generals  Shields  and  Quit- 
man, who  were  expected  to  arrive  in  Washington  within  a  few 
days.-'^  Although  he  must  have  known  better,^-  Shields,  when 
consulted,  asserted  that  bribery  had  not  been  considered,  and 
that  the  discussion  had  related  simply  to  paying  part  of  the 
•money  for  the  territory  in  advance  of  the  ratification  of  the 
treaty.  Polk  did  not  accept  this  version  of  the  matter,  and  re- 
solved that  those  implicated  in  the  scheme  must  be  punished,  even 
though  his  friend  Pillow  might  be  one  of  the  number.  For  the 
present,  however,  he  was  obliged  to  await  further  information 
concerning  the  "infamous  transaction.'"'^ 

Before  news  of  the  bribery  episode  had  reached  Washington, 
Polk  and  his  cabinet  had  discussed  the  feasibility  of  promising 
protection  to  the  peace  party  in  Mexico,  if  they  would  form  a 
government  and  agree  to  make  a  treaty.  Incensed  on  account  of 
the  bribery  scandal  and  because  Scott  had  arrested  Pillow  and 
Worth,  the  President,  against  the  advice  of  members  of  the  cabi- 
net, determined  to  recall  both  Scott  and  Trist.  The  question  of 
their  successors  had  now  to  be  considered.  Marcy  and  Walker 
felt  that  Taylor  should  be  put  in  command  of  the  army,  but  Polk 
,  fixed  upon  General  W.  0.  Butler.    His  intention  to  invest  Butler 

91  Polk,  Diary,  III,  245-246. 

02  See  HitcJicoek,  Fifty  Tears  in  camp  and  Field,  267-268. 

93  Polk,  Diary,  III,  253,  262-3,  340,  383-4.  In  a  letter  to  Marcy,  Scott 
stated  that  he  had  used  secret  service  money  simply  "to  purchase  valu- 
able information"  {E.  Ex.  Doc.  60,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  1085)— a  statement 
Avhich  Polk  pronounced  "evasive,  and  leaves  the  irresistible  inference 
that  such  a  transaction  took  place  and  that  it  will  not  bear  the  light" 
{Diary,  III,  346).  Of  course  the  transaction  did  take  place.  See  above, 
pp.  510-512. 


532  JAMES   K.   POLK 

with  diplomatic  powers  was  opposed  by  Buchanan,  who  insisted 
that  the  commissioner  should  be  a  civilian.  A  choice  was  made 
unnecessary  by  the  arrival  of  news  that  Trist  had  already  re- 
opened negotiations.-'^  The  President's  belief  that  Taylor  was 
wlioUy  out  of  sympathy  with  himself  and  his  administration  was 
by  no  means  erroneous.  On  one  point  only  did  the  two  men 
agree — they  both  distrusted  and  detested  General  Scott.  "Be- 
tween ourselves,"  wrote  Taylor  to  his  son-in-law  on  hearing  of 
the  victories  near  Mexico  City, 

Geu  '1  Scott  would  stoop  to  anythiug  however  low  &  eontemptable  as  any 
man  in  the  nation,  to  obtain  power  or  place,  &  be  as  arbitrary  in  using 
it  w'hen  in  possession;  between  him,  Trist  &  the  powers  that  be,  old  Harry 
may  take  the  hindmost,  they  are  all  of  a  piece. 

When,  about  a  month  later,  a  false  report  of  Polk 's  death  reached 
camp,  the  hero  of  Buena  Vista  remarked :  ' '  While  I  regret  to 
hear  of  the  death  of  any  one,  I  would  as  soon  have  heard  of  his 
death  if  true,  as  tliat  of  any  other  individual  in  the  whole 
Union.  "-'^  Perhaps  his  own  brief  term  in  the  White  House 
caused  him  to  realize  more  clearly  the  perplexities  which  con- 
front the  chief  executive  of  the  nation. 

On  January  4,  1848,  Polk  was  much  surprised  to  read  in  a 
letter  sent  from  Vera  Cruz  by  Colonel  Wilson  that  Trist  was 
negotiating  with  the  Mexican  commissioners. 

Mr.  Trist  [was  his  commoiit]  has  acknowledged  the  receipt  of  his  letter 
of  recal[lj,  and  he  possesses  no  diplomatic  powers.  He  is  acting,  no  doubt, 
upon  Gen'l  Scott's  advice.  He  has  become  a  perfect  tool  of  Scott.  He  is, 
[in]  this  measure,  defying  the  authority  of  his  Government.  .  .  .  He  seems 
to  have  entered  into  all  Scott 's  hatred  of  the  administration,  and  to  be 
lending  himself  to  all  Scott's  evil  purposes.  He  may,  I  fear,  greatly 
embarrass  the  Government. 

Next  day  Mrs.  Trist  showed  to  Buchanan  the  letter  of  December 
4  in  which  her  husband  announced,  in  cipher,  that  he  would 
make  a  treaty  in  accordance  with  liis  original  instructions."" 


04  Polk,  Diary,  III,  251,  266,  280-281. 

05  Taylor  to  Wood,  Sept.  27,  Nov.  2,  1847,  Taylor  Letters,  136,  148. 

00  Polk,  Diary,  III,  283,  286.    For  Trist 's  cipher  letter,  see  above,  p.  524. 


TEEATY  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO  533 

Before  the  President  had  recovered  from  the  amazement 
caused  by  Trist's  open  defiance  of  authority,  his  vexation  was 
increased  by  a  call  from  the  House  for  a  copy  of  Slidell's  in- 
structions and  for  information  regarding  the  return  of  Santa 
Anna  and  Paredes  to  Mexico.  With  the  concurrence  of  the 
cabinet  Polk  decided  to  furnish  the  House  with  Conner's  in- 
structions regarding-  Santa  Anna,  but  Slidell's  instructions  and 
all  relating  to  McKenzie's  mission  were  withheld  on  the  ground 
that  their  publication  would  be  prejudicial  to  public  interest.'''^ 

Truly  the  new  year  had  brought  anything  but  pleasure  to  the 
chief  executive.  One  annoyance  succeeded  another  in  such  rapid 
succession  that  his  patience  was  taxed  to  the  utmost.  Three  days 
after  he  had  declined  to  give  the  House  full  information  on  dip- 
lomatic affairs,  the  mail  brought  Trist's  celebrated  sixty-five  page 
letter  (of  December  6)  in  which  the  President  was  told  that  the 
commissioner  had  decided  to  save  the  administration  and  the 
party  from  a  "perilous  position,"  and  the  country  from  dis- 
aster, by  making  a  treaty  with  Mexico.  No  wonder  that  he  pro- 
nounced this  epistle  to  be  the  "most  extraordinary  document" 
he  had  ever  read. 

His  despatch  is  arrogant,  impudent,  and  very  insulting  to  his  Govern- 
ment and  even  personally  offensive  to  the  President.  He  admits  he  is 
acting  without  authority  and  in  violation  of  the  positive  order  recalling 
him.  It  is  manifest  to  me  that  he  has  become  the  tool  of  Gen '1  Scott  and 
his  menial  instrument,  and  that  the  paper  was  written  at  Scott's  instance 
and  dictation.  I  have  never  in  my  life  felt  so  indignant,  and  the  whole 
Cabinet  expressed  themselves  as  I  felt.  I  told  Mr.  Buchanan  that  the 
paper  was  so  insulting  and  contemptably  base  that  it  require [d]  no 
lengthy  answer,  but  that  it  did  require  a  short,  but  stern  and  decided 
rebuke,  and  directed  him  to  prepare  such  a  reply.  I  directed  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  to  write  at  once  to  Maj  'r  Gen  '1  Butler,  directing  him,  if  Mr. 
Trist  was  still  with  the  Head  Quarters  of  the  army,  to  order  him  off,  and 
to  inform  the  authorities  of  Mexico  that  he  had  no  authority  to  treat. 
If  there  was  any  legal  provision  for  his  punishment  he  ought  to  be  severely 
handled.     He  has  acted  worse  than  any  man  in  the  public  employ  whom 


07  Ibid.,  287-291.     Eichardson,  Messages,  IV,  565-567.     For  McKenzie's 
mission,  see  p.  439. 


534  JAMES   K.   POLK 

I  have  ever  known.  His  despatch  proves  that  he  is  destitute  of  honour 
or  principle,  and  that  he  has  proved  himself  to  be  a  very  base  man.  I 
was  deceived  in  him.  I  had  little  personal  knowledge  of  him,  but  could 
not  have  believed  [it]  possible  that  any  man  would  have  acted  so  basely 
as  he  would  liavo  [has]  doner's 

Preparation  of  letters  to  Trist  and  Butler  (who  had  super- 
seded Scott)  was  delayed  for  several  days  while  Polk  and  the 
cabinet  discussed  the  propriety  of  submitting  Trist 's  treaty  to 
the  Senate,  if  it  should  turn  out  that  he  had  already  signed  one. 
Some  of  the  members  urged  that  unless  the  President  had  deter- 
mined to  reject  such  a  treaty  the  suggested  notice  to  the  Mexican 
government  might  prove  embarrassing.  Polk  was  now  unwilling 
to  restrict  his  demands  to  those  embodied  in  Trist 's  instructions, 
and  .yet  he  declined  to  say  that  he  would  not  accept  a  treaty  made 
in  accordance  with  those  instructions.  Consequently  General 
Butler  was  told  that  if  Trist  had  actually  concluded  a  treaty  he 
was  to  send  it  to  Washington,  where  it  would  be  disposed  of  as 
the  President  should  deem  best ;  if  none  had  been  concluded,  he 
was  to  inform  the  Mexican  government  that  the  United  States 
would  not  recognize  a  treaty  made  by  the  former  commissioner."" 

Polk  waited  for  additional  information  regarding  his  insub- 
ordinate diplomat.  The  Mexican  mail  arrived  on  February  7, 
but  contained  no  dispatches  from  either  Trist  or  Scott.  It 
brought,  however,'  a  letter  from  the  irrepressible  Atocha,  and  as 
usual  he  was  ready  to  engage  in  underground  diplomacy. 
"Atocha  is  a  great  scoundrel,"  was  the  President's  comment, 

and  liis  letter  contained  the  infamous  suggestion  tliat  he  should  be  fur- 
nished with  money  to  bribe  the  Mexican  Congress  to  induce  them  to  ratify 
a  Treaty  of  peace,  though  he  does  not  state  whether  a  Treaty  had  been 
signed  by  Mr.  Trist  or  not. 


98  Polk,  Diary,  III,  300-301. 

00  Ibid.,  313-317.  Marcy  to  Butler,  Jan.  2l),  1848  {Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  52, 
30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  146).  On  "February  2  the  President,  in  response  to  a  call, 
sent  to  the  Senate  correspondence  relating  to  Trist 's  negotiations  with  the 
Mexican  commissioners  at  the  time  of  Scott's  armistice  (Richardson,  Mcs- 
,<ia(/es,  IV,  569). 


TREATY  OF  GUABALUPK  HIDALGO  535 

He  said  that  Trist  claimed  to  possess  a  bribe  fund,  and  Polk 
thought  it  likely  that  the  commissioner  was  base  enough  to  nuike 
such  an  assertion.  Silence,  in  Polk's  opinion,  indicated  a  con- 
spiracy on  the  part  of  Trist  and  Scott,  antl  he  had  little  doubt 
that  a  treaty  would  be  made:  "a  few  daj^s  more  will,  I  ti'ust, 
develo])  what  they  have  been  doing.  "^°'^ 

While  he  awaited  developments,  troubles  nearer  home  fully 
occupied  the  time  and  taxed  the  patience  of  the  overworked  ex- 
ecutive. The  hoards  of  office  seekers  multiplied.  The  Whigs, 
not  satisfied  with  aiding  the  enemy  by  "unpatriotic  sentiments" 
and  annoying  resolutions,  were  now,  in  the  President's  opinion, 
"insidiously  attempting  to  produce  a  panic  in  the  money  market 
and  thereby,  if  possible,  to  break  down  the  Treasury,  and  thus 
compel  the  inglorious  withdrawal  of  our  army  from  Mexico." 
There  were  dissensions  within  the  Democratic  party  among  the 
supporters  of  rival  aspirants  for  the  Presidency,  and  Polk  sus- 
pected Buchanan  of  using  his  position  in  the  cabinet  as  a  means 
of  injuring  General  Cass.  Members  of  the  party  urged  the  Presi- 
dent to  cease  reiterating  his  determination  not  to  accept  another 
nomination,  for  they  said  that  he  might  be  nominated  regardless 
of  his  own  wishes.  "To  all  of  them,"  says  the  Diary,  "I  have 
given  the  same  answer,  &  repeated  my  sincere  desire  to  retire  & 
my  fixed  purpose  to  do  so."  At  this  same  time  he  was  called 
upon  to  perform  a  duty  which  was  personally  disagreeable,  and 
one  which  would  bring  additional  opposition  to  his  administra- 
tion. He  approved  the  conviction  of  Colonel  Fremont  for  dis- 
obedience to  the  orders  of  General  Kearny,  and,  although  the 
sentence  of  dismissal  was  remitted,  he  fully  expected  to  incur  the 
powerful  opposition  of  Senator  Benton.^'"  The  suspense  regard- 
ing Trist 's  activities  was  broken  on  February  19  by  the  arrival 
of  a  messenger  bearing  the  treaty  of  peace.     Before  discussing 


100  Polk,   Diani,   III,   328-330. 

T^oi  Ibid.,   319-322,   327.      After   the   approval    of   the   court's   decision, 
Benton,  as  noted  elsewhere,  ceased  speaking  to  the  President. 


536  JAMES   K.   POLK 

its  reception,  however,  we  may  turn  our  attention  to  the  negoti- 
ations by  which  it  had  been  concluded. 

As  noted  above,  negotiations  did  not  begin  as  soon  as  Trist 
had  announced  his  intention  to  remain  in  Mexico.  Pena  y  Peiia, 
the  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations,  said  that  the  appointment  of 
commissioners  must  be  confirmed  by  the  senate  and  that  the  new 
congress  would  not  meet  until  January.  Both  Edward  Thornton 
and  Percy  W.  Doyle,  who  had  recently  returned  to  his  post  as 
secretary  of  the  British  legation,  urged  the  Mexican  goveriiment 
to  waive  formalities,  but,  for  a  time,  their  arguments  produced 
no  effect.  Although  Trist  held  informal  interviews  with  the  com- 
missioners, not  until  late  in  December  did  Peiia  consent  to  take 
the  responsibility  of  instructing  the  commissioners  to  treat  with 
the  American  diplomat.  Even  then,  in  true  Mexican  fashion, 
he  required  them  to  ask  for  impossible  concessions ;  and  before 
an  agreement  had  been  reached.  President  Anaya's  term  of  office 
had  expired.  As  a  quorum  of  the  congress  had  not  yet  assembled, 
his  successor  could  not  be  elected,  therefore  Pena,  as  head  of  the 
supreme  court,  again  assumed  the  office  of  President.  Once 
more,  also,  Luis  de  la  Rosa  was  made  Minister  of  Foreign  Re- 
lations. 

Negotiations  were  resumed,  but  the  new  government  at  first 
seemed  less  disposed  than  the  old  to  make  the  necessary  conces- 
sions. The  commissioners  sat  in  Mexico  City,  while  the  seat  of 
government  was  at  Queretaro,  consequently  much  time  was  lost 
in  transmitting  messages  between  the  two  places. 

Before  the  change  of  government  Trist  had  nuide  it  clear 
that  the  Rio  Grande  boundary  and  the  inclusion  of  San  Diego 
within  Upper  California  would  be  insisted  upon  by  the  United 
States.  He  said,  also,  that  his  government  would  not  i)ay  Mexico 
more  than  fifteen  million  dollars.  On  assuming  office  Rosa  ob- 
jected to  the  boundary  mentioned  by  Trist,  and  insisted  tliat  the 
sum  to  be  paid  must  be  at  least  thirty  millions.  Doubtless  he 
would  linve  intorjiosed  obstacles  indefinitely  liad   it  not  been  for 


TREATY  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO  537 

threatened  uprisings  in  some  of  the  Mexican  states,  and  had 
Scott  not  taken  steps  to  renew  military  operations.  When  argu- 
ments had  failed,  Trist  threatened  to  break  otf  negotiations  unless 
a  treaty  could  be  signed  by  the  first  of  February,  while  Doyle 
urged  both  Rosa  and  the  commissioners  to  avert  the  calamity  of 
a  rencAval  of  hostilities.  Such  pressure  could  not  be  withstood. 
On  January  31  a  messenger  left  Queretaro  for  Mexico  City  bear- 
ing documents  which  authorized  the  commissioners  to  sign  the 
treaty  as  agreed  upon  wdth  Trist.  Not  until  the  afternoon  of 
February  2  were  all  details  arranged  and  copies  in  both  languages 
completed.  In  accordance  with  the  wishes  of  the  Mexican  com- 
missioners, the  treaty  was  not  signed  in  the  capital  where  the 
meetings  had  been  held.  For  attixing  the  signatures  they  re- 
paired to  the  near-by  town  of  Guadalupe  Hidalgo,  and  from  that 
place  the  treaty  took  its  name.^°- 

In  the  treaty  the  United  States  procured  the  things  which 
had  been  made  ultimata  in  Trist 's  instructions.  The  Rio  Grande 
was  recognized  as  the  boundary  of  Texas ;  Upper  California  and 
New  Mexico,  but  not  Lower  California,  were  ceded  to  the  United 
States.  In  return,  Mexico  was  to  be  paid  fifteen  million  dollars ; 
and  in  addition,  the  United  States  agreed  to  pay  all  liquidated 
claims  of  American  citizens  against  Mexico,  and  to  assume  un- 
adjusted claims  to  the  extent  of  three  and  a  quarter  million 
dollars.  Mexico  was  specifically  relieved  from  the  payment  of 
claims  not  covered  by  the  treaty.  The  privilege  of  transit  across 
the  Isthmus  of  Tehauntepec,  desired  by  the  American  govern- 
ment, was  not  granted.  In  a  word,  Trist  contented  himself  with 
the  minimum  which  the  administration  had,  in  April,  1847, 
authorized  him  to  accept.  As  soon  as  the  signatures  had  been 
affixed  the  treaty  was  borne  to  Washington  by  James  D.  Freanor, 
a  war  correspondent  of  the  New  Orleans  Delta,  better  known 

102  For  further  details  concerning  the  last  stage  of  negotiations,  see 
Eives,  Uniiecl  States  and  Mexico,  II,  602-613.  Some  of  the  Mexican  pro- 
jects in  the  Trist  Papers  were,  according  to  a  note  appended  by  Trist, 
translated  by  Thornton  and  the  copies  are  in  his  handwriting.  Evidently 
he  was  familiar  with  all  of  the  proceedings. 


538  JAMES  K.   POLK 

by  his  pen  name,  "Mustang."  Trist  had  already  asked  Scott  to 
disregard  his  positive  orders  and  to  "pledge  his  word"  that  he 
would  suspend  liostilities.^"^ 

Freanor  arrived  in  Washington  on  February  19,  1848,  and 
Buchanan  placed  the  treaty  in  the  President's  hands  at  nine 
0  'clock  of  the  same  evening.  As  Trist  had  announced  his  inten- 
tion to  resume  negotiations,  no  suri)rise  was  expressed  when  the 
document  arrived.  After  a  hasty  reading  of  the  treaty,  Polk 
confided  to  his  diary : 

Mr.  Trist  was  recalled  in  October  last,  but  chose  to  remain  in  Mexico 
and  continue  the  negotiations.  The  terms  of  the  Treaty  are  Avithin  his 
instructions  which  he  took  out  in  April  last,. upon  the  important  question 
of  boundary  and  limits.  There  are  many  provisions  in  it  which  will  re- 
quire more  careful  examination  than  a  single  reading  will  afford.  Mr. 
Trist  has  acted  very  badly,  as  I  have  heretofore  noted  in  this  diary,  but 
notwithstanding  this,  if  on  further  examination  the  Treaty  is  one  that  can 
be  accepted,  it  should  not  be  rejected  on  account  of  his  bad  conduet.^o-* 

To  this  sensible  attitude  of  not  permitting  personal  pique  to 
warp  his  judgment  on  matters  of  state  the  President  steadily 
adhci'cd.  Although  Trist 's  arrogance  and  unwarranted  insolence 
had  greatly  exasperated  him,  the  simi^le  fact  of  negotiating  with- 
out instructions  probably  did  not  worry  Polk  very  much.  In 
April,  1847,  while  Trist 's  instructions  were  being  prepared,  Bu- 
chanan received  a  letter  from  Moses  Y.  Beach,  of  the  New  York 
Sun,  whom  the  President  had  appointed  as  secret  agent  in  Mexico, 
and  the  agent  intimated  that  he  might  make  a  treaty.  He  had 
not,  of  course,  been  clothed  with  diplomatic  powers,  yet  after 
reading  Beach 's  letter  Polk  noted  in  his  diary : 

Jt  is  clearly  to  be  inferred  from  his  letter  that  he  will  make  a  Treaty 
with  them  if  he  can.  Should  he  do  so,  and  it  is  a  good  one,  I  will  waive 
his  authority  to  make  it,  and  submit  it  to  the  Senate  for  ratification.  It 
will  be  a  good  joke  if  he  should  assume  the  authority  and  take  the  whole 
country  by  surprise  &  make  a  Treaty.^"" 


103  Trist  to  Scott,  Jan.  28,  1848,  Trist  Papers. 

104  Polk,  Diary,  III,  345. 

los  I'olk,  T^iarv,   II,  477.     Beach's  commission   is  printed   in  Buchanan, 
Works,  VIJ,  Hit." 


TBEATY  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO  589 

Probably  Trist  may  have  heard  the  President  make  similar  re- 
marks, and,  if  so,  they  ma.y  have  had  some  influence  on  his  own 
conduct  in  Mexico.  However  this  may  have  been,  Polk,  in  the 
present  instance,  failed  to  see  the  humorous  side  of  the  trans- 
action. 

So  important  did  the  President  regard  an  early  disposal  of 
the  treaty  that  he  -waived  his  scruples  against  Sunday  labor  and 
summoned  the  cabinet  to  a  special  meeting  on  the  evening  of  the 
twentieth  of  February.  Of  this  meeting  we  have  two  accounts, 
one  in  Polk's  diary  for  the  day,  another  by  his  nephew  and 
private  secretary,  J.  Knox  Walker.  After  a  general  discussion 
Polk  asked  the  opinion  of  each  member  concerning  the  advisa- 
bility of  submitting  the  document  to  the  Senate  for  ratification. 
All  agreed  that  the  tenth  article  relating  to  land  grants  in  Texas 
should  be  stricken  out.  On  the  question  of  accepting  the  treaty, 
thus  amended,  the  cabinet  was  divided — Buchanan  and  Walker 
advised  a  rejection  of  the  whole  treaty,  while  Marcy,  ]\Iason, 
Johnson,  and  Clifford  were  in  favor  of  accepting  all  but  the  tenth 
article.  After  Buchanan's  opposition  to  extensive  annexation 
his  present  attitude  so  nettled  the  President  that  he  asked  the 
pointed  question:  "Will  you  take  the  responsibility  of  its  re- 
jection?" Buchanan's  reply,  that  he  would  "take  all  the  re- 
sponsibility which  properly  pertains  to  me  as  Secy  of  State 
giving  such  advice,"  led  Polk  to  believe  that  the  Secretary  was 
playing  politics  at  the  expense  of  his  chief.  He  reminded  Bu- 
chanan that  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  Secretary  had  drafted 
instructions  to  American  ministers  at  foreign  courts  which  as- 
serted that  the  government  had  no  intention  of  taking  territory 
from  Mexico — an  assertion  which  the  President  had  required  him 
to  omit.  He  reminded  him,  also,  of  his  persistent  opposition  to 
the  acquisition  of  any  land  except  Upper  California  and  New 
Mexico — now  he  objected  to  the  treaty  because  it  did  not  procure 
a  large  enough  area.  Buchanan  admitted  this.  He  told  the 
President  that  he  might  go  further  and  mention  his  (Buchanan's) 


540  JAMES  E.   POLK 

opposition  to  Scott 's  march  from  Vera  Cruz  to  Mexico  City.  But, 
he  added,  his  advice  was  not  taken,  and  "I  am  not  now  willing 
to  acquire  for  indemnity  what  I  would  then  have  been  very  will- 
ing to  take.  The  line  of  the  Sierra  Madre  will  give  us  'indemnity 
for  the  past  &  security  for  the  future.'  "  No  agreement  was 
reached  at  this  meeting.^"* 

Another  meeting  was  held  on  the  following  day,  and  the 
President  announced  that  he  had  decided  to  submit  the  treaty 
to  the  Senate  for  ratification,  with  a  recommendation  that  the 
tenth  article  be  stricken  out.  The  reasons  assigned  for  this  de- 
cision are  recorded  in  his  diary : 

They  were,  briefly,  that  the  treaty  conformed  on  the  main  question  of 
limits  &  boundary  to  the  instructions  given  to  Mr.  Trist  in  April  last;  and 
that  thougli,  if  the  treaty  was  now  to  be  made,  I  should  demand  more 
territory,  perhaps  to  make  the  Sierra  Madra  the  line,  yet  it  was  doubtful 
whether  this  could  be  ever  obtained  by  the  consent  of  Mexico.  I  looked, 
too,  to  the  consequences  of  its  rejection.  A  majority  of  one  branch  of 
Congress  is  opposed  to  my  administration ;  they  have  falsely  charged  that 
the  war  was  brought  on  and  is  continued  by  me  with  a  view  to  the  con- 
quest of  Mexico;  and  if  I  were  now  to  reject  a  Treaty  made  upon  my  own 
terms,  as  authorized  in  April  last,  with  the  unanimous  approbation  of  the 
Cabinet,  the  probability  is  that  Congress  would  not  grant  either  men  or 
money  to  prosecute  the  war.  Should  this  be  the  result,  the  army  now  in 
Mexico  would  be  constantly  wasting  and  diminishing  in  numbers,  and  I 
might  at  last  be  compelled  to  withdraw  them,  and  thus  loose  the  two 
Provinces  of  New  Mexico  &  Upper  California,  which  were  ceded  to  the 
U.  S.,  by  this  Treaty.  Should  the  opponents  of  my  administration  succeed 
in  carrying  the  next  Presidential  election,  the  great  probability  is  that 
the  country  would  loose  all  the  advantages  secured  bj--  this  Treaty.  I 
adverted  to  the  immense  value  of  Upper  California;  and  concluded  by 
saying  that  if  I  were  now  to  reject  my  own  terms,  as  offered  in  April  last, 
I  did  not  see  how  it  was  possible  for  my  administration  to  be  sustained. io7 

On  the  next  day,  February  22,  he  sent  the  treaty  to  the  Senate, 
accompanied  by  a  message  which  recommended  that  all  except 


io«  Polk,  Dianj,  III,  345-346.  Walker's  account  is  in  the  PoUc  Papers. 
In  a  note  he  says  that  he  prepared  it  Fe})ruary  22,  two  days  after  the 
meeting.  He  does  not  say  whether  he  ha^l  been  })resent  at  the  meeting, 
but  comment  in  Polk's  Diary,  III,  351,  indicates  that  he  had  been. 

107  Polk,  Biarii,  III,  347-348. 


TREATY  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO  541 

tlu'  tentli  article  should  be  ratified.  With  it  he  transmitted  copies 
of  the  instructions  given  to  both  Slidell  and  Trist,  which  np  to 
this  time  had  been  withhehl.^"* 

Truly,  the  Pi-esident  had  been  placed  in  an  awkward  position 
by  his  officious  diplomat.  The  war  had  been  unpopular  even 
while  IMexico  had  refused  to  treat,  and  Polk  had  good  reasons 
for  believing  that  he  could  not  hope  for  means  with  which  to 
continue  it,  if  lie  should  reject  his  own  terms.  During  his  entire 
career  he  had  shown  excellent  judgment  as  to  what  was  and  what 
was  not  attainable,  and  besides,  the  treaty  gave  him  all  that  he 
had  set  his  heart  upon.  Tamaulipas  or  part  of  Sonora  might  be 
desirable,  if  it  could  be  obtained  without  difficulty;  but  Polk 
was  not  the  man  to  risk  losing  the  objects  which  he  had  set  out 
to  procure,  when  the  prospect  of  better  terms  was  by  no  means 
certain.  Despite  all  that  his  opponents  might  say  it  seems  clear 
that  the  President  never  welcomed  a  war,  and  he  neglected  no 
opportunity  which  gave  prospect  of  ending  it.  He  was  deter- 
mined to  have  Upper  California  and  New  Mexico  at  any  cost, 
for  these  formed  a  part  of  his  original  program.  His  interest  in 
further  acquisition  was  never  very  great.  Buchanan's  sudden 
desire  for  more  territory  confirmed  rather  than  altered  Polk's 
decision,  for  he  believed  that  the  Secretary  was  inspired  by  purely 
selfish  motives. 

He  wished  [wrote  the  President]  to  throw  the  whole  responsibility  on 
me  of  sending  the  Treaty  to  the  Senate.  If  it  was  received  well  by  the 
country,  being  a  member  of  my  administration,  he  would  not  be  injured 
by  it  in  his  Presidential  aspirations,  for  these  govern  all  his  opinions  & 
acts  lately;  but  if,  on  the  other  hand,  it  should  not  be  received  well,  he 
could  say,  "I  advised  against  it.  "lo" 

Doubtless  Polk  was  justified  in  attributing  to  political  motives 
Buchanan's  recent  change  of  front  on  the  territorial  question. 
At  any  rate  he  had  lost  faith  in  the  Secretary's  loyalty  to  the 

108  Eichardson,  Messages,  IV,  573-574. 

109  Polk,  Diary,  III,  350. 


o42  JAMES   K.   POLE 

administration.  He  had  not  concealed  his  resentment  when  dis- 
cussing the  treaty,  and  a  few  days  later  he  had  occasion  to  speak 
still  more  pointedly.  Buchanan  told  him  that  it  was  rumored  in 
the  streets  that  he  was  to  be  removed  from  the  cabinet  because 
a  friend  of  his  named  Nugent,  a  correspondent  for  the  New  York 
Herald,  had  criticized  tlie  administration.  Polk  told  him  that 
the  rumor  was  untrue,  but  that  the  vile  effusions  signed  by 
Nugent  had  been  attributed  to  the  Secretary  of  State.  He  re- 
mai'ked  "  in  a  stern  manner ' '  that  Buchanan  himself  must  judge 
of  the  propriety  of  having  a  member  of  the  cabinet  holding  fa- 
miliar intercourse  with  an  unprincipled  person  who  "was  in  daily 
habit  of  calumniating"  the  President.  ' '  Their  object, ' '  said  Polk, 
"seems  to  be  to  abuse  Gen'l  Cass,  Mr.  Woodbury,  and  myself, 
and  to  praise  Mr.  Buchanan.  The[y]  falsely  represent  that  I 
am  intriguing  to  obtain  the  nomination  for  a  re-election  to  the 
Presidency."  He  did  not  doubt  that  Buchanan  had  encouraged 
these  attacks,  for  his  own  purposes;  but  he  did  not  wish  to  act 
on  suspicion  alone.  "If,"  said  he,  "I  obtain  any  reliable  proof 
that  Mr.  Buchanan  has  given  countenance  to  Galvienses  [Nugent] 
he  shall  not  remain  in  the  Cabinet.  He  denies  that  he  has  done 
so,  and  I  am  bound  to  believe  him."  When  informed  by  Clifford 
that  both  Walker  and  Buchanan  had  spoken  of  resigning  on 
account  of  the  controversy  over  the  treaty,  he  declared  that  he 
would  follow  his  own  course,  regardless  of  consequences.  Al- 
though surprised  to  hear  that  Walker  had  made  such  remarks, 
he  was  neither  surprised  nor  perturbed  by  the  hostility  of  the 
Secretary  of  State.  "I  expressed  to  Mr.  Clifford,"  says  the 
Diary,  "an  indifference  as  to  the  course  which  Mr.  Buchanan 
miglit  think  proper  to  pursue,  but  told  him  there  Avas  not  the 
sliglitest  danger  of  his  resigning.  "^^•^ 

iio/J/iVZ.,  ;^>5.S-355,  359.  Galvienses  was  Nuo;eiit's  pen  name.  "Mr. 
Buchanan's  real  trouble,"  was  another  comment  in  the  Diary,  "is  that 
he  cannot  use  my  administration  and  shape  his  [itsj  course  according 
to  his  own  ever  varying  whims,  in  order  to  promote  his  aspirations  to 
the  Presidency.  He  cares  not  for  the  success  or  glory  of  my  administra- 
tion further  tiian  he  can  make  it  subservient  to  liis  own  political  aspira- 
tions. 


TREATY  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO  543 

When  he  had  received  the  treaty  and  submitted  it  to  the 
Senate  the  President  no  doubt  believed  that  he  had  received  the 
last  of  Trist's  abusive  epistles.  If  so,  he  was  greatly  mistaken. 
Indeed,  Freanor  had  brought  two  more  along  with  the  treaty, 
but  by  an  oversight  tliey  had  not  been  delivered  to  Polk  until 
two  days  after  that  document  had  been  sent  to  the  Senate.  The 
,  first  bore  the  date  of  December  29,  and  the  main  point  developed 
M'as  that  Polk's  annual  message  had  jeopardized  peace  negoti- 
ations by  aiding  the  puros,  the  party  which  desired  to  annex  all 
of  Mexico  to  the  United  States.  The  particular  part  of  the 
message  criticized  was  that  which  suggested  that  necessity  might 
force  the  United  States  to  establish  a  government  with  which  it 
could  make  a  treaty.  By  preventing  the  moderados,  now  in  con- 
trol, from  making  peace,  the  puros  hoped,  by  continuing  hostil- 
ities, to  force  the  United  States  to  take  all  of  Mexico,  or  at  least 
to  establish  some  form  of  protectorate  over  it.  The  second  letter, 
of  January  12,  1848,  dealt  with  the  difficulty  of  suspending  hos- 
tilities, and  was  still  more  offensive  than  the  other.  At  the  time 
of  Trist's  recall,  Polk  had  required  the  commander-in-chief  to 
transmit  all  peace  proposals  to  Washington ;  at  the  same  time, 
Scott  was  instructed  to  pursue  the  war  with  renewed  vigor.  Such 
an  arrangement,  said  Trist,  prevented  any  suspension  of  hostil- 
ities while  peace  proposals  were  under  consideration — except  by 
disobedience  of  orders — and  was  "a  wanton  sporting  with  the 
lives  of  men,"  a  course  which,  if  followed,  would  cause  the 
whole  civilized  world  to  "burst  forth  with  one  universal  cry  of 
horror."^" 

The  arrogant  character  of  these  letters  completely  exhausted 
the  patience  of  the  President,  and  their  author  was  characterized 
as  "an  impudent  and  unqualified  scoundrel."  Through  Marcy, 
Polk  instructed  General  Butler  to  prevent  Trist  from  exercising 
any  official  authority  in  Mexico  and  to  drive  him  away  from  the 
army  headquarters.     When  Marcy  hesitated  to  issue  so  drastic 


111  Trist  to  Buchanan    {Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  52,  30  Cong.,   1   sess.,  274-280). 


544  JAMES   K.   POLK 

an  order,  the  President  not  only  dictated  its  terms  but  prepared 
a  note  for  the  files  of  the  War  Department  to  show  that  Polk 
himself  had  assumed  the  entire  responsibility.^^- 

Had  Polk  received  at  this  time  another  long  letter  written 
by  Trist,  he  would,  if  possible,  have  been  still  more  exasperated. 
It  bears  a  date  earlier  than  Freanor's  departure  for  Washington, 
but  apparently  it  was  not  sent  until  later.  Besides  giving  a 
detailed  account  of  the  negotiations,  Trist  made  some  really  sen- 
sible remarks  concerning  the  obligation  of  the  United  States  to 
protect  its  adventurous  citizens  who  had  engaged  in  hazardous 
enterprises  in  Mexico.  As  usual,  however,  he  could  not  refrain 
from  saying  disagreeable  things.  In  his  discussion  of  the  boun- 
dary he  committed  the  unpardonable  sin  of  asserting  that  the 
land  between  the  Nueces  and  the  Rio  Grande  was  as  much  a  pari 
of  Tamaulipas  (and  not  of  Texas)  as  the  counties  of  Accomac 
and  Northampton  were  a  part  of  Virginia. ^'^  If  so,  the  Presi- 
dent was  justly  entitled  to  the  sobriquet  ' '  Polk  the  mendacious, ' ' 
for  his  war  message  had  been  premised  on  a  falsehood  and  hos- 
tilities had  been  wantonly  provoked. 

Private  letters  written  at  this  time  show  that  Trist  derived 
real  pleasure  from  playing  enfant  ternhle.  He  had  developed 
an  inveterate  hatred  for  both  Polk  and  Buchanan,  and  he  seemed 
to  believe  that  he  possessed  information  which,  when  disclosed, 
would  make  the  throne  totter.  He  presumed  that  the  arrival 
of  his  treaty  had  caused  a  commotion,  but  it  could  have  been 
'^nothing  to  the  uproar  that  is  to  come." 

Until  I  shall  be  ready  to  speak,  [he  continued  with  a  solemnity  born 
of  conceit],  let  them  remain  in  the  doubt  and  the  hoj>es,  as  to  my  future 
course,  inspired  by  the  falseness  &  baseness  of  their  own  ignoble  hearts. 
Let  them  go  on  hoping  that  I  am,  or  may  be  made,  like  themselves;  capable 
of  being  houf/ht,  if  not  to  active  villany,  at  least  to  passive;  to  silence,  if 
to  nothing  else. 


112  Polk,   Diarii,    111.   357-358.     Marcy   to   Butler,   Feb.   25,   1848    (Sen. 
Ex.  Doc.  52,  as  aijove  cited,  14S-150). 

113  Trist  to  Buchanan,  Jan.  25,  1848  (Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  52,  30  Cong.,  1  sess., 
290).  .  S>  , 


TBEATY  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO  545 

These  remarks  are  interesting  as  coming  from  one  of  the  two 
men  who  alone  had  been  guilty  of  huying  others.  The  disclosures 
which  he  expected  to  cause  the  *' uproar"  were  Polk's  confiden- 
tial correspondence  with  Pillow,  whom  Trist,  in  his  letter,  was 
pleased  to  call  a  reptile. 

As  to  whether  he  was  entitled  to  payment  for  the  extra  time 
put  in  since  his  recall,  Trist 's  mind  was  not  quite  clear;  but  he 
would  accept  nothing  which  might  depend  upon  even  the  ' '  official 
decision"  of  the  President. 

His  official  mind  is  too  corrupt  or  too  imbecile.  Nothing  proceeding 
from  it — in  the  way  of  advantage,  at  least — shall  touch  me.  I  say  the 
same  of  every  man  capable  of  retaining  a  seat  in  his  cabinet  during  the 
last  3,  4  or  5  months. 

The  court  of  inquiry  selected  to  investigate  the  charges  made 
against  Pillow  and  other  accused  military  officers  was,  in  Trist 's 
opinion,  a  "pitiable  device  of  the  pitiable  being  in  the  Presi- 
dential chair."  When  notified  by  General  Butler  that  he  must 
leave  Mexico,  Trist  once  more  paid  his  compliments  to  the  Presi- 
dent and  denied  his  authority  to  order  a  private  citizen  out  of 
a  foreign  countr3^    He  w'as  probably  right  in  holding  that 

I  deem  it  mj'  duty  to  deny  the  lawfulness  of  any  requirement  from  the 
President  of  the  United  States,  pretending  to  impose  upon  me  the  obli- 
gation, either  to  leave  the  Eepublic  of  Mexico  or  to  return  to  the  United 
States.  I  recognize  no  authority  in  that  functionary  competent  to  create 
any  such  obligation.  The  pretension  to  create  it,  &  the  use  of  the  armed 
power  confided  to  him,  for  the  purpose  of  enforcing  it,  are,  to  my  mind, 
alike  usurpations;  usurpations  differing  but  slightly  in  the  shades  of 
enormity.ii* 

The  President,  as  we  have  seen,  sent  Trist 's  treaty  to  the 
Senate  on  February  22,  but  on  account  of  the  illness  and  death 
of  John  Quincy  Adams  its  consideration  was  delayed  several  days. 


114  Trist  to  Mrs.  Trist,  March  2,  1848;  Trist  to  Butler,  March  17, 
1848,  Trust  Papers,  In  a  letter  dated  March  18  he  told  Butler  that  he 
would  not  embarrass  him  by  resisting  the  order.  He  had,  on  February  1, 
written  to  his  wife  that  he  would  go  to  West  Chester  and  keep  a  board- 
ing school.  "For  my  own  part,  I  will  live  on  bread  &  water  before  I 
ever  again  hold  office  of  any  kind."     Also  in  Trist  Papers. 


546  JAMES   K.   POLK 

Immediately,  however,  unofficial  reports  predicted  that  the  treaty 
would  probably  be  rejected.  Cave  Johnson  shared  this  belief, 
and  he  told  the  President  of  a  rumor  that  both  Buchanan  and 
Walker  had  been  exerting  their  influence  against  ratification. 
Polk  was  still  more  perturbed  by  another  "astounding"  rumor — 
also  reported  by  Johnson — which  charged  Walker  with  giving 
aid  to  the  Presidential  candidacy  of  General  Taylor.  "If  I 
ascertain  this  to  be  true, ' '  was  the  comment  in  his  diary,  ' '  it  will 
be  inconsistent  with  the  success  of  my  measures  for  Mr.  Walker 
to  remain  in  my  Cabinet.  I  will  require  strong  proof  however 
before  I  can  believe  it  to  be  true.""' 

The  Whigs  and  a  small  group  of  Democrats  who  had  been 
devising  means  of  compelling  the  President  to  end  the  war,  now 
that  a  treaty  had  been  made,  did  their  utmost  to  cause  its  re- 
jection. The  prospect  for  ratification  was  not  encouraging.  On 
February  28  Senator  Sevier,  chairman  of  the  Committee  of  For- 
eign Affairs,  reported  to  Polk  that  all  of  the  committee  except 
himself  had  resolved  to  recommend  that  the  treaty  should  be 
rejected  and  that  the  President  be  advised  to  send  to  Mexico  a 
new  commission,  invested  with  power  to  make  a  new  treaty.  They 
did  not,  said  Sevier,  object  to  the  treaty  itself  but  to  the  fact 
tliat  Trist  had  no  authority  to  make  it.  The  absurd  suggestion 
offered  by  the  committee  did  not  appeal  to  Polk's  practical  mind : 

I  told  him  I  Sevier]  I  condemned  the  insubordination  &  insolent  con- 
duet  of  Mr.  Trist,  but  that  the  Treaty  itself  was  the  subject  for  consider- 
ation and  not  his  conduct,  and  that  if  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  were 
such  as  could  be  accepted,  it  would  be  worse  than  idle  ceremony  to  sr-nd 
out  a  grand  commission  to  re-negotiate  the  same  Treaty.  I  told  him,  also, 
that  if  the  Senate  advised  me  to  send  out  such  a  commission,  I  hoped  they 
would  advise  me  also  what  they  would  accept.  .  .  .  Extremes  sometimes 
meet.  .  .  .  They  have  done  so  in  this  instance.  Mr.  Webster  is  for  no 
territory  and  Mr.  Hannegan  is  for  all  Mexico,  and  for  opposite  reasons 
both  will  oppose  the  Treaty.  It  is  difficult,  upon  any  rational  principle, 
to  assign  a  satisfactory  reason  for  anything  Col.  Benton  may  do,  especially 
in  his  present  temper  of  mind,  wholly  engrossed  as  he  seems  to  have  been 
for  some  months  past  with  the  case  of  his  son-in  law.  Col.  Fremont. 


115  Polk,  Diarif,  III,  361. 


TBEATY  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO  547 

His  suspicion  that  Walker  and  Buchanan  would  use  their  in- 
fluence against  ratification  seems  to  have  been  removed  by  their 
volunteering  to  urge  Senators  to  vote  against  the  plan  for  cre- 
ating a  new  eommission.^^'^ 

While  the  President  was  conversing  with  Sevier,  the  Senate 
was  passing  resolutions  which  requested  him  to  submit  all  corre- 
spondence that  had  passed  between  Trist  and  the  State  Depart- 
ment. Without  consulting  the  cabinet,  he  decided  to  send  it  all, 
despite  its  exceptionable  character.  On  the  next  day  he  was  told 
that  the  fate  of  the  treaty  was  extremely  doubtful  and  that  about 
a  dozen  Democrats  would  vote  against  it  because  of  their  desire 
for  more  territory.  Not  for  this  reason,  but  from  personal  mo- 
tives, Polk  feared  most  of  all  the  opposition  of  Benton : 

He  has  heretofore  maintained  that  the  true  boundary  of  Texas  was 
the  Nueces  instead  of  the  -Rio  Grande,  &  he  is  apt  to  think  that  nothing 
is  done  properly  that  he  is  not  consulted  about.n' 

If  some  Democrats  declined  to  uphold  the  administration  by 
supporting  the  treaty,  so,  also,  were  certain  Whigs  unwilling  to 
put  ratification  on  a  purely  party  basis.  Polk  was  especially 
pleased  when  on  March  1  he  was  told  by  the  banker,  W.  W. 
Corcoran,  that  Joseph  Gales,  of  the  National  Intelligencer,  had  re- 
fused to  prepare  an  article  against  ratification,  when  requested 
to  do  so  by  Whig  Senators.  For  several  days  after  this  the  fate 
of  the  treaty  hung  in  the  balance,  its  chief  opponents  being 
Webster  and  Benton.  Polk  blamed  the  insurgent  Democrats  most 
of  all,  for  as  he  said,  "if  the  Democratic  party  were  united  in 
favour  of  the  Treaty,  I  doubt  whether  a  single  Whig  would  vote 
against  it."  Both  parties,  in  his  opinion,  were  interested  pri- 
marily in  the  approaching  Presidential  election,  and  he  did  not 
believe  that  Whigs  would  care  to  incur  the  odium  of  casting  a 
strictly  party  vote."* 

After  much  heated  discussion  and  many  calls  upon  the  Presi- 
dent for  information  (among  other  things  for  "information  in 

ii<i  Ibid.,  363-367.  iiT/biJ..,  367.  us  ihid.,  368-371. 


548  JAMES  K.   POLK 

regard  to  any  disposition  or  overtures  on  the  part  of  any  consid- 
erable portion  of  tlie  Mexican  people  to  be  annexed  to  the  U. 
States"),  the  Senate,  by  a  vote  of  thirty-eight  to  fourteen,  ratified 
the  treaty  on  the  tenth  of  March.  The  tenth  article  and  the  secret 
article  relating  to  an  extension  of  time  for  ratification  were  elim- 
inated as  the  President  had  recommended.  Other  modifications 
made  by  tlie  Senate,  on  its  own  account,  caused  Polk  to  fear  that 
Mexico  might  decline  to  ratify  the  treaty.  He  greatly  appreci- 
ated the  assistance  given  by  Senator  Mangum,  of  the  Committee 
of  Foreign  Affrirs,  who  "though  a  Whig,  is  a  gentleman" — 
apparently  a  rare  combination,  in  the  President's  opinion.^^^ 

As  soon  as  there  was  any  indication  that  the  treaty  would  be 
ratified,  Polk  began  to  oast  about  for  a  suitable  commissioner 
whom  he  might  send  to  Mexico  to  urge  its  acceptance.  He  fixed 
upon  Louis  McLane,  of  Maryland,  and  when  he  declined  to  serve, 
Senator  Sevier,  of  Arkansas,  was  appointed.  Scarcely,  however, 
had  Sevier's  appointment  been  ratified  by  the  Senate  when  he 
was  taken  ill  and,  in  order  to  save  time,  Attorney-General  Clif- 
ford was  chosen  to  be  his  associate.  Clifford  set  out  for  Mexico 
at  once,  while  Sevier's  health  was  sufficiently  improved  within 
the  next  few  days  to  enable  him  to  follow  his  colleague. 

Ratification  of  the  treaty  by  the  Senate  did  not  entirely  relieve 
Polk's  anxiety,  for  he  feared  that  his  opponents  might  yet  defeat 
it  by  indirect  methods.  Evidence  of  a  disposition  to  employ  such 
methods  was  seen  in  a  motion,  .offered  in  executive  session  on 
March  14,  to  remove  the  injunction  of  secrecy  from  the  Senate 
proceedings.     Its  adoption  would  expose  to  the  Mexicans  the 


iio/ftid.,  369,  .'{77,  381.  When  the  records  of  the  executive  session 
were  finally  made  public  on  May  31  it  was  discovered  that  several  rather 
drastic  resolutions  had  been  offered.  Webster,  for  example,  moved  that 
all  discussion  of  the  treaty  be  posti)oned  and  that  the  President  be 
asked  to  appoint  a  new  commission.  Houston  held  that  since  Trist  had 
no  authority  to  negotiate,  his  treaty  was  ''utterly  void,''  and  oujjht  to 
be  rejected.  Both  Houston  and  Jefferson  Davis  wanted  more  territory, 
while  Baldwin,  of  Connecticut,  tried  to  incorporate  into  the  treaty  a 
provision  for  excludinff  slavery  from  all  territory  to  be  acquired.  The 
proceedings  are  printed  in  Sen.  Ex.  Doc,  52,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  4  ff. 


TEEATT  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO  549 

confidential  instructions  which  had  been  given  to  Slidell  and 
Trist  and,  also,  the  division  of  opinion  in  the  Senate.  They 
might  as  a  result  be  induced  to  reject  the  modified  treaty  in  the 
hope  of  obtaining  better  terms.  No  action  was  taken  on  this 
resolution  until  the  last  of  May,  but  in  the  meantime  the  New 
York  Herald  began  to  publish  Polk's  message  which  had  accom- 
panied Trist 's  treaty  to  the  Senate  and,  also,  Slidell's  instructions 
and  parts  of  the  diplomatic  correspondence.  As  Nugent,  the 
Washington  correspondent  for  that  paper,  was  known  to  be  on 
intimate  terms  with  Buchanan,  the  Secretary  of  State  at  once 
became  the  object  of  suspicion.  Polk  was  loth  to  believe  that 
Buchanan  could  be  guilty  of  such  treachery;  still,  he  advised 
Senators  to  make  a  thorough  investigation,  and  he  was  prepared 
to  dismiss  the  Secretary  if  it  should  be  found  that  he  had  in  any 
way  been  connected  with  giving  out  the  documents.  When  sum- 
moned before  a  Senate  committee,  Nugent  refused  to  disclose  the 
name  of  the  person  who  had  furnished  him  with  copies  of  the 
documents,  but  he  stated  in  writing  that  it  was  not  Buchanan. 
Polk  believed  the  Secretary  of  State  to  be  both  weak  and  self- 
seeking,  yet  he  was  very  much  gratified  to  have  Buchanan  "re- 
lieved from  so  injurious  an  imputation."^-" 

Ratification  of  the  treaty  by  the  Senate  did  not  terminate 
discussion  on  military  affairs.  It  was  not  certain,  of  course, 
that  Mexico  would  accept  the  alterations  which  had  been  made, 
consequently  the  administration  forces  urged  that  the  pending 
ten-regiment  bill  should  be  enacted  into  law.  Polk's  whole  war 
policy  was  assailed  and  defended,  as  before,  while  opposition 
members  kept  annoying  the  President  with  requests  for  addi- 
tional information.  Among  other  items  called  for  by  the  Senate 
was  a  copy  of  the  letter  which,  in  1845,  Gillespie  had  carried  to 
Thomas  0.  Larkin,  United  States  consul  at  Monterey,  California. 
Our  chief  interest  in  this  resolution  is  that  when  commenting 
upon  it  in  his  diary  Polk  distinctly  implied  that  Fremont  had 

120  Polk,  Diary,  III,  396-409. 


550  JAMES  K.  POLE 

not  been  authorized  to  foment  a  revolution  in  California.  He 
transmitted  a  copy  of  the  letter  to  the  Senate  in  executive  session, 
so  that  if  it  were  made  public,  and  trouble  should  result,  the 
responsibility  would  rest  upon  the  Senate  and  not  upon  himself.^-^ 

Clifford  arrived  in  Mexico  City  with  the  modified  treaty  on 
April  11,  1848,  Sevier  four  days  later.  Under  the  President's 
supervision  Buchanan  had  prepared  instructions  which  were  to 
g-uide  them  in  their  discussions  with  tlie  jMexican  officials.  Among 
other  things  they  were  to  avoid  diplomatic  notes  whenever  pos- 
sible and  to  hold  personal  conferences,  which  would  be  more 
conducive  to  a  speedy  adjustment  of  differences  of  opinion.  In 
a  letter  to  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations,  written  at  the  same 
time,  Buchanan  explained  in  detail  the  changes  which  had  been 
made  by  the  Senate.  While  his  letter  was  very  friendly  in  tone, 
a  pointed  reference  to  the  fact  that  ' '  four  votes,  taken  from  the 
majority,  and  added  to  the  minority,  would  have  defeated  the 
treaty"  was  intended  to  impress  upon  the  Mexican  government 
the  futility  of  asking  for  better  terms. ^-- 

During  the  period  of  more  than  two  months  betAveen  the 
signature  of  the  treaty  and  the  arrival  of  Clifford  and  Sevier  in 
Mexico  the  several  factions  in  that  country  had  had  time  to  dis- 
cuss the  question  of  making  peace  with  tlie  United  States,  al- 
tliough  the  details  of  the  treaty  were  not  known  to  the  public. 
The  puros,  or  radicals,  being  anxious  for  annexation  to  the  United 
States,  naturally  were  hostile  to  ratification.  For  an  entirely 
different  reason  the  propertied  class  looked  forward  with  dismay 
to  the  withdrawal  of  the  American  army,  because  they  feared 
that  adequate  protection  of  their  property  would  be  gone.  Ac- 
coi'diiig  to  his  own  account,  "certain  leaders"  desired  Seott  to 
pi-o('laiiu  himself  dictator  for  six  years,  with  the  eventual  purpose 
of  joining  the  United  States.    The  general  "ultimately  declined" 


121  Ihid.,  395,  399.    Eichardson,  Messages,  IV,  57& 

122  Buchanan  to  Min.  of  For.   Eel.,  March   18,   1848    (J3".  Ex.  Doc.   60, 
30  Cong,.  1  sess.,  67). 


TREATY  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO  551 

the  invitation.  One  of  his  reasons  was  that  lie  had  already  sug- 
gested annexation  and  "President  Polk's  Government  carefully 
withheld  its  wishes  from  him  thereon."'-'' 

The  work  of  the  American  commissioners  was  delayed  by  the 
fact  tliat  the  Mexican  congress,  which  alone  could  ratify  the 
treaty,  had  not  convened  at  the  time  of  their  arrival.  Although 
the  members  had  been  elected  in  March,  not  until  the  first  week 
in  May  did  a  quorum  assemble  in  Queretaro.  The  apparent 
reluctance  of  the  Mexican  government  to  meet  the  issue  led  Polk 
to  believe  that  ratification  "may  be  regarded  as  doubtful."'-* 

After  meeting,  however,  the  congress  acted  Avith  unusual 
promptitude.  President  Peila  y  Peiia  in  his  message,  although 
regretting  that  the  treaty  had  been  modified,  nevertheless  ad- 
vised its  ratification.  In  addition,  his  ministers  of  war  and 
finance  showed  by  verbal  reports  that  Mexico  was  too  weak  to 
continue  hostilities  if  the  treaty  should  be  rejected.  On  May  19 
the  chamber  of  deputies  gave  its  assent  and  the  Minister  of 
Foreign  Relations  invited  Clifi'ord  and  Sevier  to  visit  Queretaro 
and  present  their  credentials  to  the  President.  They  arrived  on 
May  25,  just  after  the  senate  had  ratified  the  treaty.  Ratifica- 
tions were  exchanged  on  the  thirtieth  and  the  commissioners  re- 
turned to  Mexico  City  and  arranged  for  the  fulfillment  of  the 
financial  obligations  of  the  treaty.'^^ 

"At  6  o'clock  this  morning,"  wrote  Clifford  on  June  12, 

the  flag  of  the  United  States  was  taken  doAvn  from  the  national  palace  in 
this  city  and  that  of  the  Mexican  republic  was  hoisted.  The  customary 
honors  were  paid  to  both,  and  the  ceremony  passed  off  in  perfect  quiet, 
although  the  great  square  was  thronged. i^c 

With  this  formality  the  two  years'  war  with  Mexico  had  been 
brought  to  a  successful  termination.     President   Polk  had  not 


123  Scott,  Autobiography,  II,  581-582.     Doyle  to  Palmerston,  Feb.   13, 
1848,  quoted  by  Rives,  II,  643-644. 

124  Polk,  Diary,  III,  447. 

125  Sevier  and  Clifford  to  Buchanan,  May  25  and  30,  1848  (H.  Ex.  Doc. 
60,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  72-73).     See  also  Rives,  II,  651-653. 

126  H.  Ex.  Doc.  60,  as  cited  above,  74. 


552  JAMES  E.   POLE 

onh'  ' '  conquered  a  peace, ' '  but  in  all  essential  details  he  had 
effected  his  program  of  national  expansion.  Determined  from 
the  beginning  to  add  California  and  New  Mexico  to  our  national 
domain,  he  pursued  this  object  with  a  dogged  persistence  which 
neither  opposition  nor  denunciation  could  weaken.  Whatever 
may  be  thought  of  his  motives  or  his  methods,  to  him  is  due  the 
credit  (or  censure,  if  you  please)  of  extending  to  the  Pacific  the 
boundaries  of  the  United  States. 

The  letter  in  which  Sevier  and  Clifford  had  announced  that 
tlie  treaty  had  been  ratified  by  the  Mexican  congress  reached  the 
President  on  the  fifteenth  of  June.  Comment  in  his  diary  is 
limited  to  a  statement  that  the  letter  had  been  received,  for  he 
was  ill  at  the  time  and  his  mind  was  occupied  with  the  contem- 
plated purchase  of  Cuba.  His  pleasure  at  being  relieved  from 
the  burdens  of  war  may  be  judged  by  a  remark  made  on  the 
second  anniversary  of  its  beginning:  "It  is  two  years  ago  this 
day  since  War  was  declared  by  Congress  against  Mexico.  They 
have  been  two  years  of  unceasing  labour  and  anxiety  with  me. '  '^-'^ 

On  July  4,  just  as  the  President  had  returned  from  the  cere- 
monies connected  with  laying  the  corner  stone  of  the  Washington 
monument,  a  messenger  arrived  with  the  treaty  of  Guadalupe 
Hidalgo.  He  at  once  directed  Buchanan  to  prepare  a  procla- 
mation so  that  it  might  be  signed  on  "the  anniversary  of  Inde- 
pendence. ' '  His  private  secretaries  were  set  to  work  at  copying 
a  message  which  had  already  been  prepared,  and  two  days  later 
this  and  the  treaty  were  submitted  to  both  houses  of  Congress. 
Among  the  documents  sent  with  the  treaty  was  a  copy  of  the 
instructions  given  to  Slidell  in  1845.  When  the  House  had  asked 
for  these  instructions  earlier  in  the  session,  their  request  had 
been  denied,  but  now,  as  the  President  noted,  "the  reasons  for 
witliholding  them  at  that  time  no  longer  exist." 

As  a  true  expansionist  the  President  fully  appreciated  the. 
importance  of  his  achievements.     "The  results  of  the  Avar  with 


y-i-!  Polk,  Diani,  III,  448,  492. 


TREATY  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO  553 

Mexico,"  said  his  message,  "have  given  the  United  States  a 
national  charat-ter  whieli  our  country  never  before  enjoyed." 
New  Mexico  and  California  "constitute  of  tliemselves  a  country 
large  enough  for  a  great  empire,  and  their  ac(iuisition  is  second 
only  in  importance  to  that  of  Louisiana  in  1803. ' '  He  saw,  on  the 
other  hand,  that  evil  as  well  as  good  might  follow  in  the  wake 
of  the  war,  and  he  took  advantage  of  the  occasion  to  warn  Con- 
gress against  unwise  legislation.  In  organizing  governments  for 
the  new  territories,  he  invoked  a  spirit  of  concession  and  concil- 
iation, so  that  sectional  discords  might  be  avoided  and  the  Union 
be  preserved.  The  army  should  be  reduced  to  its  ante-bellum 
footing,  for  "our  standing  army  is  to  be  found  in  the  bosom  of 
society."    A  true  disciple  of  Jefferson,  he  urged  that 

Upon  the  restoration  of  peace  we  should  adopt  the  policy  suited  to  a 
state  of  peace.  In  doing  this  the  earliest  practicable  payment  of  the 
public  debt  should  be  a  cardinal  principle  of  action.  Profiting  by  the  ex- 
periences of  the  past,  we  should  avoid  the  errors  into  which  the  country 
was  betrayed  shortly  after  the  close  of  the  war  with  Great  Britain  m 
1815  In  a  few  years  after  that  period  a  broad  and  latitudmous  con- 
struction of  the  powers  of  the  Federal  Government  unfortunately  received 
but  too  much  countenance.  Though  the  country  was  burdened  with  a 
heavy  public  debt,  large,  and  in  some  instances  unnecessary  and  extrava- 
gant, expenditures  were  authorized  by  Congress.  The  consequence  was 
that  the  payment  of  the  debt  was  postponed  for  more  than  twenty  years, 
and  even  then  it  was  onlv  accomplished  by  the  stern  will  and  unbending 
policy  of  President  Jackson,  who  made  its  payment  a  leading  measure  of 
his  Administration. 12S 

Some  of  Polk's  friends,  including  Houston  and  Davis,  of  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Military  Affairs,  did  not  share  his  views 
concerning  a  reduction  of  the  army.  Not  satisfied  with  his  recom- 
mendation, the  House,  also,  asked  him  for  additional  informa- 
tion. On  August  1  he  submitted  a  report  from  the  Secretary 
of  War,  and  along  with  it,  a  message  saying  that  he  had  "seen 
no  reason  to  change  the  opinion"  expressed  in  the  preceding 

i28Eichardson,  Messages,  IV,  587-593.  The  original  ^^jf^^i^^^^ 
message  contained  a  paragraph  on  the  "misnamed  &  ^.^Pl^'^^l  ,t^  „^,^ 
system,'  but  by  the  advice  of  the  cabinet  it  was  omitted  (Polk,  Diani, 
III,  496). 


554  JAMES  K.   POLK 

July.  He  was  "decidedly  opposed"  to  an  increase  in  the  army, 
and  he  attributed  the  anxiety  for  more  adequate  defense  to  self- 
seeking  military  men  and  extravagant  Whigs.  Concerning  the 
latter  he  said  in  his  diary  : 

Some  Whig  members  of  Congress  favour  the  measure  because  it  is  in 
harmony  with  their  general  policy.  They  favour,  as  a  party,  large  ex- 
penditures, high  tariffs,  &  Banks,  and  in  addition  to  this  they  would  be 
pleased  to  have  a  large  increase  of  the  standing  army  fastened  on  the 
country,  which  they  would  for  political  effect  charge  to  be  a  consequence 
of  the  Mexican  War.129 

The  forebodings  of  the  President  regarding  the  sectional  bit- 
terness which  might  result  from  attempts  to  establish  govern- 
ments for  the  new  territories  were  not  without  foundation.  The 
Wilmot  Proviso  had  not  been  forgotten,  and  already,  indeed,  the 
debate  on  the  Oregon  bill  foreshadowed  the  breakers  ahead. 
Renewed  agitation  of  the  slavery  question  resulted  from  the 
Mexican  war,  but  was  not  a  part  of  it;  its  consideration  as  a 
domestic  question  is  reserved  for  another  chapter. 


i^'J  Richardson,  Messages,  IV,  603.     Polk,  Diary,  IV,  48. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

OREGON 

The  treaty  of  peace  which  terminated  the  Revolution  fixed  the 
boundary  between  the  United  States  and  Canada  east  of  the 
Mississippi  River.  By  the  purchase  of  Louisiana  with  its  indefi- 
nite boundaries,  in  1803,  the  United  States  acquired  whatever 
claims  France  might  have  to  territory  lying  west  of  the  Missis- 
sippi ;  and  by  the  Florida  treaty  of  1819  Spain  ceded  to  the 
United  States  all  her  claims  to  territory  lying  west  of  Louisiana 
and  north  of  the  forty-second  parallel  of  north  latitude.  In 
general  terms,  all  this  was  clear  enough,  but  the  difficult  problem 
was :  What,  precisely,  are  the  proper  limits  of  these  claims  ? 

The  British  claim  to  the  Pacific  coast  region  was  based  mainly 
on  the  explorations  made  by  Captain  Cook  in  1776 ;  the  interior 
of  the  Oregon  region  was  claimed  as  a  result  of  the  discovery  of 
the  Frazer  River  valley  by  Alexander  MacKenzie  in  1793.  In 
1789,  however,  the  Spaniards,  who  laid  claim  to  all  of  this  region, 
sent  out  from  Mexico  an  exploring  expedition.  At  Nootka  Sound 
they  seized  two  British  ships  and  nearly  precipitated  a  war 
between  the  two  countries.  The  matter  was  adjusted  by  a  con- 
vention signed  in  1790  which  admitted  the  right  of  British  sub- 
jects to  establish  trading  posts  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  on 
commerce  with  the  natives.  The  question  which  came  to  be  dis- 
puted later  was  whether,  in  this  convention,  Spain  had  trans- 
ferred to  England  the  ownership  of  thfe  land,  or  sin>ply  the  tem- 
porary use  of  it.  .Russia,  also,  had  laid  claim  to  this  region,  but 
by  treaties — one  with  the  United  States  in  1824,  and  another  with 
England  in  1825 — had  relinquished  everything  south  of  54°  40' 
north  latitude. 


556  JAMES  K.   POLK 

111  addition  to  claims  derived  from  Spain  and  France,  the 
United  States  based  her  title  to  Oregon  upon  discoveries  and 
settlements  made  by  her  own  citizens.  In  1792,  Captain  Robert 
Gray,  of  Boston,  had  explored  the  Columbia  River  and  named  it 
after  his  ship;  and  in  1811,  John  Jacob  Astor  had  founded  the 
trading  post  of  Astoria.  This  place  had  been  taken  by  the  British 
during  the  War  of  1812,  but  under  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of 
Ghent  it  was  restored  in  1818. 

After  1825,  when  Russia  limited  her  claims,  the  Oregon  ques- 
tion was  reduced  to  this :  Does  either  Great  Britain  or  the  United 
States  have  a  valid  title  to  all  of  the  territory  west  of  the  Rocky 
Mountains  and  included  between  42°,  the  northern  boundary  of 
California,  and  54°  40',  the  southern  boundary  of  Alaska ;  if  not, 
how  should  it  be  divided  ?  The  United  States  claimed  this  region 
by  right  of  discovery — both  direct  and  acquired ;  on  similar 
grounds  Great  Britain  claimed  it,  at  least  as  far  south  as  the 
Columbia  River. 

Prior  to  Polk's  administration  several  attempts  had  been 
made  to  establish  a  definite  boundary  line  between  the  United 
States  and  Canada.  In  the  treaty  of  1818  the  forty-ninth  parallel 
was  agreed  upon  as  the  boundary  from  the  Lake  of  the  Woods 
to  the  Rocky  Mountains.  The  country  west  of  the  mountains 
was  left  open  to  what  was  commonly  called  joint  occupation ;  that 
is,  each  nation  might  make  use  of  it  Avithout  prejudice  to  the 
claims  of  the  other.  In  1827  "joint  occupation"  was  continued 
indefinitely,  but  either  nation  might  terminate  the  agreement 
by  giving  twelve  months'  notice  to  the  other. 

At  an  early  date  members  of  Congress  began  to  take  an  inter- 
est in  Oregon.  In  December,  1820,  the  House  appointed  a  com- 
mittee and  assigned  it  the  duty  of  considering  the  propriety  of 
taking  possession  of  the  territory.  A  month  later  the  committee's 
report  was  submitted  by  P^'loyd,  of  Virginia.  In  substance  it 
recommended  that  the  government  should  take  steps  to  safe- 
guard the  interests  of  the  United  States  on  the  Pacific  coast. 


OEEGON  557 

No  action  resulted  from  this  recommendation,  but  two  years 
later  after  England  had  (1821)  extended  her  laws  over  the  ter- 
ritory, another  committee  was  appointed  to  consider  the  sub- 
ject. Their  report  was  similar  to  that  made  in  1820,  but  again 
no  action  resulted. 

A  bill  to  authorize  the  occupation  of  the  Oregon  River  valley 
was  introduced  in  the  House  in  December,  1828.  Its  most  active 
sponsor,  Floyd,  of  Virginia,  urged  the  necessity  of  extending 
over  this  region  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  and  of  constructing 
military  forts  to  insure  the  protection  of  Americans.  Gurley, 
of  Louisiana,  proposed  an  amendment  under  which  lands  might 
be  granted  to  colonists  from  the  United  States.  Polk  opposed 
both  the  bill  and  the  amendment  on  the  ground  that  they  would 
violate  the  treaty  of  "joint  occupation"  with  Great  Britain.  He 
pointed  out  that  those  who  participated  in  the  debate  had  "con- 
fined themselves  to  the  expediency  of  the  measure,  and  have  had 
no  reference  to  the  present  state  of  our  negotiations  in  refer- 
ence to  the  preliminary  question  of  title  to  the  country."  After 
quoting  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  1818,  he  remarked  that  "The 
question  is  not  now  whether  it  was  wise  to  make  this  treaty,  but, 
having  made  it,  what  is  its  spirit  and  meaning?"  Until  the 
treaty  has  been  abrogated,  he  said,  it  is  the  "supreme  law  of  the 
land,"  and  it  can  not  be  abrogated  until  twelve  months'  notice 
has  been  given.  He  moved  that  the  Committee  of  the  Whole 
be  discharged  from  further  consideration  of  the  bill  and  that  the 
subject  be  referred  to  the  Committee  on  Territories.  He  moved 
further  that  this  committee  be  instructed  to  report  in  favor  of 
extending  over  the  American  citizens  in  that  region  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  courts  of  Michigan  Territory,  and  of  providing  for 
the  exploration  an(i  purvey  of  the  Northwest  coast.  Neither  this 
nor  solutions  offered  by  other  members  were  accepted  by  the 
House.  On  January  9,  1829,  Polk  voted  with  the  majority  in 
rejecting  the  entire  bill.^ 


^  Beg.  of  Deb.,  20  Cong.,  2  sess.,  125-15.3.     Also,  Abridg.  of  Deb.,  X, 
273-315. 


558  JAMES  E.   POLE 

In  1833  the  Missionary  Board  of  the  Methodist  church  selected 
a  number  of  missionaries  and  sent  them  forth  to  found  a  settle- 
ment in  Willamette  Valley.-  Two  years  later  President  Jackson 
sent  William  A.  Slacum  to  investigate  conditions  in  that  region, 
and  in  December,  1837,  Slacum 's  favorable  report  was  laid 
before  Congress.''  On  February  7,  1838,  Linn,  of  Missouri,  intro- 
duced in  the  Senate  a  bill  to  organize  Oregon  as  a  territory 
and  to  establish  on  the  Columbia  River  both  a  port  of  entry  and 
a  custom  house.*  As  early  as  December  29, 1829,  Linn  had  offered 
a  resolution  which  purposed  to  give  the  twelve  months'  notice 
necessary  for  terminating  the  conventions  of  1818  and  1827.^  In 
both  cases  Congress  declined  to  take  any  action,  but  interest  in 
Oregon  continued  to  increase.  Every  year  added  to  the  num- 
ber who  exhorted  Congress  to  do  something  for  the  protection  of 
American  citizens  in  that  country.  Great  Britain,  it  was  lirged, 
had  extended  her  laws  throughout  Oregon  as  early  as  1821 ;  why 
sliould  the  United  States  continue  to  disregard  the  rights  of  its 
citizens? 

The  arrival  in  Washington  of  Lord  Ashburton,  in  April,  1842, 
gave  rise  to  the  hope  that  the  whole  vexed  question  of  boundary 
might  be  adjusted,  for  the  northwest  as  well  as  the  northeast 
boundary  was  included  in  the  scope  of  the  British  diplomat's 
instructions.''  But,  as  Tyler  informed  Congress  in  his  second 
annual  message,  "it  became  manifest  at  an  early  hour  in  the 
late  negotiations"  that  any  attempt  to  settle  the  Oregon  ques- 
tion "would  lead  to  a  protracted  discussion,  which  might  em- 
brace in  its  failure  other  more  pressing  matters."^ 

Eager  to  succeed  where  otliers  liad  failed,  Tyler  proposed  a 
ti'ipartite  treaty  whereby  he  hoped  to  settle  not  only  the  Oregon 
question,  but,  also,  the  diplomatic  difficulties  with  Mexico  which 


2  Gray,  History  of  Oregon,  106  ff.      *  Cong.  Globe,  25  Cong.,  2  sess.,  168. 

3  Sen.  Doc.  S4,  25  Cong.,  2  sess.         s  Abridg.  of  Deb.,  XIV,  18. 
"Aberdeen  to  H.  S.  Fox,  Oct.  18,  1842  (Sen.  Doc.  1,  29  Cong.,  1  sess., 

139). 

"  Ric-hanlson,  Messages,  IV,  196. 


OREGON  559 

had  resulted  fi-om  the  revolt  of  Texas  and  the  non-payment  by 
Mexico  of  American  damage  claims.  He  was  willing  to  let  Eng- 
land have  Oregon  down  to  the  Columbia  Kiver  if  she  in  turn 
would  induce  Mexico  to  recognize  the  independence  of  Texas 
and  to  make  territorial  concessions  to  the  United  States.  Eng- 
land was  to  cancel  certain  claims  against  Mexico  and  to  induce 
her  to  cede  to  the  United  States  that  part  of  California  lying 
north  of  the  thirty-sixth  parallel,  and  as  a  compensation  for  this 
service  the  United  States  was  to  relinquish  her  claim  to  that 
part  of  Oregon  lying  north  of  the  Columbia  River.  At  the  time 
that  he  formulated  this  plan,  Tyler  apparently  had  little  doubt 
that  England  would  readily  agree,  or  that  the  combination  w^hich 
he  had  suggested  would  reconcile  opposing  interests  in  the  United 
States.  ' '  Texas  might  not  stand  alone, ' '  he  told  Webster,  ' '  nor 
would  the  line  proposed  for  Oregon.  Texas  would  reconcile  all 
to  the  line,  while  California  would  reconcile  or  pacify  all  to 
Oregon."®  Despite  this  hopeful  language,  however,  he  en- 
deavored, after  he  had  retired  from  office,  to  represent  this  whole 
matter  as  a  passing  fancy  to  which  little  importance  should  be 
attached.    ' '  I  never  dreamed, ' '  he  wrote, 

of  ceding  this  country  [between  49°  and  the  Cohinibia]  unless  for  the  greater 
equivalent  of  California  which  I  fancied  G.  Britain  might  be  able  to  obtain 
for  us  through  her  influence  in  Mexico— and  this  was  but  a  dream  of  policy 
which  was  never  embodied.^ 

Nothing,  of  course,  came  of  Tyler's  ingenious  scheme  for 
killing  so  many  birds  with  one  stone.  Ashburton  expressed,  un- 
officially, the  belief  that  Great  Britain  would  not  oppose  a  ces- 
sion of  territory  by  Mexico  to  the  United  States,  but  that  she 
could  take  no  part  in  the  transaction.^"  While  there  was  never 
any   prospect   that    Tyler's   plan   would   succeed,    had   it   been 

8  Tyler,  Letters  and  Times  of  the  Tylers,  II,  260-261.  See  also  Webster 
to  Everett,  Jan.  29,  1843  (Curtis,  Life  of  Webster,  II,  175). 

0  Tyler  to  his  son,  Dec.  11,  1845,  MS  in  Library  of  Congress.  Also 
printed  copy  in  Tyler,  op.  cit,.  447. 

loSchafer,  "British  Attitude  toward  the  Oregon  Question,"  Am.  Hist. 
Rev.,  XVI,  no.  2,  p.  293. 


560  JAMES  K.   POLE 

accepted  by  the  other  governments  concerned  the  Mexican  war 
might  possibly  have  been  averted.  Webster  soon  left  the  cabinet 
and  the  President  turned  his  attention  to  the  annexation  of  Texas. 
The  Oregon  question  remained  unsettled  and  became  one  of  the 
leading  issues  of  the  campaign  of  1844. 

A  bill  introduced  in  the  Senate  on  December  19,  1842,  by 
Linn,  of  Missouri,  gave  opportunity  for  debate  on  the  Oregon 
question  and  prepared  the  way  for  the  approaching  Presidential 
campaign.  Among  other  things  the  bill  provided  for  the  building 
of  forts  along  the  route  to  Oregon  and  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Columbia  River,  and  for  the  granting  of  land  to  American 
settlers.  It  can  hardly  be  said  that  the  discussion  was  sectional 
in  character,  although  westerners  were  more  insistent  than  others 
that  the  government  should  take  some  action.  Webster  attributed 
the  agitation  entirely  to  politics,^ ^  but  it  is  evident  that  many 
were  sincerely  interested  in  westward  expansion. 

The  chief  opponents  of  Linn's  bill  were  Senators  Calhoun 
and  McDuffie,  of  South  Carolina.  The  former  declared  that  the 
passage  of  the  land-grant  section  would  violate  the  treaty  w^ith 
Great  Britain.  Besides,  he  opposed  the  whole  bill  on  the  ground 
that  precipitate  action  might  result  in  the  loss  of  the  entire 
territory.  England,  he  said,  could  transfer  troops  by  sea  in  a 
very  short  time,  while  it  would  take  months  for  our  army  to 
reach  Oregon  by  overland  routes.  Consequently  the  sound  policy 
for  the  United  States  to  pursue  was  that  of  ''wise  and  masterly 
inactivity."  McDuffie  was  averse  to  the  bill,  not  because  he 
feared  that  its  passage  might  result  in  the  loss  of  Oregon,  but 
because  he  regarded  the  territory  as  an  incubus  which  ought  to 
be  discarded.  He  would  not  give  "a  pinch  of  snuff  for  the  whole 
territory,"  because  it  was  totally  unsuited  as  a  home  for  civilized 
beings.*-  Benton  and  Linn  made  strong  arguments  in  favor  of  the 
bill,  and  refuted  in  detail  the  positions  taken  by  the  Senators  from 


11  Webster  to  Everett,  Jan.  29,  1843,  as  cited  above. 

12  Cong.  Globe,  27  Cong.,  3  sess.,  198-200;  idem,  App.,  138-141.    Benton, 
ThirUj  Years'  View,  II,  471-472. 


OBEGON  561 

South  Carolina.  Sevier,  of  Arkansas,  resisted  an  attempt  to 
strike  out  the  section  for  granting  hind  to  settlers,  for  he  justly 
regarded  this  provision  to  he  "the  very  life  and  soul  of  the  hill."'^ 
After  i)assing  the  Senate  by  a  vote  of  twenty-four  to  twenty-two, 
the  hill  was  sent  to  the  House  where  it  remained  to  the  end  of 
the  session  without  being  voted  upon. 

The  importance  of  the  Linn  bill  can  not  be  measured  by  its 
failure  to  reach  a  vote  in  the  House,  for  it  elicited  a  debate  in 
Congress  and  an  agitation  in  the  press  which  focused  the  attention 
of  the  people  on  Oregon  and  made  it  an  important  campaign 
issue.  Then,  too,  its  introduction  caused  British  statesmen  to 
give  the  subject  more  serious  attention.  Palmerston  went  so  far 
as  to  declare  in  the  House  of  Commons  that  should  the  bill  be 
passed  and  put  in  operation  "it  would  be  a  declaration  of  war."^* 

Dissatisfied  because  Webster  had  not  procured,  in  the  Ash- 
burton  treaty,  all  that  the  United  States  had  claimed  on  the 
Maine  border,  and  fearful  that  Everett,  in  London,  might,  under 
Tyler's  directions,  compromise  the  Oregon  question,  opposition 
members  took  steps  to  prevent  such  action  on  the  part  of  the 
executive.  On  December  28,  1843,  Senator  Allen,  of  Ohio,  moved 
a  call  upon  the  President  for  the  instructions  given  to  our  minister 
in  London  as  well  as  the  correspondence  that  had  passed  between 
the  two  governments.  On  January  8,  1844,  Semple,  of  Hlinois, 
moved  that  the  President  be  requested  to  give  the  notice  neces- 
sary for  terminating  the  convention  of  1827.^"'  It  was  soon  ascer- 
tained that  no  negotiations  were  in  progress  in  London  and  con- 
sequently Semple 's  resolution  was  defeated,  but  the  debate 
helped  to  agitate  public  opinion.  Extremists  objected  to  any 
negotiation  whatever  on  the  ground  that  it  would  be  an  admission 
that  Great  Britain  might  have  some  claim  to  the  territory. 

Negotiations  were  soon  renewed,  however,  but  in  Washing- 
ton instead  of  at  the  court  of  Saint  James.     The  man  selected 


13  Cong.  Globe,  27  Cong.,  3  sess.,  153. 

i-t  Hansard,  Parliamentary  Debates,  LXVII,  1217. 

15  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  1  sess.,  77,  116. 


562  JAMES  K.  POLK 

by  Lord  Aberdeen  for  the  American  mission  was  Richard 
Pakenham  (later  Sir  Richard),  and  early  in  1844  he  arrived 
in  Washington.  If  his  official  instructions  were  to  be  followed 
there  was  small  prospect  of  an  adjustment,  for  they  required 
him  to  insist  upon  the  Columbia  River  as  the  southern  boundary 
of  Oregon.  It  is  evident,  however,  that  Aberdeen  himself  did 
not  expect  the  United  States  to  accept  this  proposal,  and  that 
he  was  prepared  to  concede  better  terms  if  he  could  obtain  the 
sanction  of  Parliament  and  of  public  sentiment  in  England. 
In  a  private  letter  dated  March  4,  1844,  Pakenham  was  in- 
structed to 

endeavor,  without  committing  yourself  or  your  gov't,  to  draw  from  the 
American  negotiator  a  proposal  to  make  the  49th  degiee  of  latitude  the 
boundary,  with  the  proviso  that  the  ports  to  the  south  of  that  parallel  to 
the  Columbia  inclusive,  shall  be  free  ports  to  Q.  Britain. is 

The  tone  of  this  letter  augured  well  for  the  future. 

Upshur's  tragic  death  interrupted  negotiations  before  they 
had  fairly  begun,  and  the  task  of  discussing  the  Oregon  boundary 
with  Pakenham  devolved  upon  John  C.  Calhoun  to  whom  Tyler 
now  intrusted  the  State  Department.  According  to  statements 
made  later,  Tyler  and  Calhoun  were  reluctant  to  resume  nego- 
tiations, consequently  the  Secretary  of  State  decided  that  the 
''true  policy"  was  "to  do  nothing  to  excite  attention,  and  leave 
time  to  operate."^''  Nevertheless  both  Calhoun  and  Pakenham 
presented  and  advocated  the  claims  of  their  respective  govern- 
ments— including  an  offer  from  Great  Britain  to  submit  the  whole 
subject  to  arbitration — but  as  neither  side  would  yield  the  essen- 
tial points,  the  Oregon  question  remained  unsettled  at  the  close 
of  Tyler's  administration. 

" Reannexation  of  Texas"  and  "i-eoccupation  of  Oregon" 
were  twin  planks  in  the  platform  adopted  by  the  Democratic 


16  Quoted  by  Schafer,  "The  British  Attitude  toward  the  Oregon  Ques- 
tion, 1815-184(5,"  Am.  Hist.  Bev.,  XVI,  296  (Jan.,  1911). 

1- Calhoun  to  Mason,  May  30,  1845  (Ecport  Am.  Hist.  Assn..  1899,  H, 
660).    Tyler  to  Calhoun,  Oct.  7,  1845  (ibid.,  1059). 


OBEGON 


563 


convention  of  1844.  Although  tlie  former  was  the  main  topic  of 
discussion  during  the  campaign,  the  party  was  nevertheless 
committed  to  the  claim  that  "all  of  Oregon"  was  the  property  of 
the  United  States.  The  candidates  accepted  the  platform  without 
reservation,  while  the  rank  and  file  voiced  their  approval  by 
lusty  shouts  of  "54°  40'  or  fight."  Did  the  platform  and  the 
campaign  cry  mean  what  they  said,  or  were  they  intended  simply 
to  arouse  enthusiasm  and  to  win  votes  for  the  party  ?  In  either 
case  the  victorious  candidate  was  placed  in  an  awkward  position ; 
to  accept  less  than  "all  of  Oregon"  would  repudiate  the  party 
pledge,  while  insistence  upon  the  demand  made  in  the  platform 
would  almost  certainly  result  in  war  with  Great  Britain. 

In  his  inaugural  address  President  Polk  bluntly  asserted  that 
"our  title  to  the  country  of  the  Oregon  is  'clear  and  unquestion- 
able!' "  He  did  not  say  "all  of  Oregon,"  but  left  it  to  be  in- 
ferred that  this  was  what  he  meant.  In  addition,  he  recommended 
that  the  laws  of  the  United  States  should  be  extended  over  the 
people  who  had  established  their  homes  in  that  distant  region. 
If  the  propriety  of  his  recommendations  may  be  questioned,^* 
the  fault  lay  with  the  party  which  had  framed  the  platform 
rather  than  with  the  President  who  was  pledged  to  carry  it  out." 

The  new  President's  inaugural  reached  England  late  in 
March  and  his  remarks  on  the  American  title  to  Oregon  were 
by  no  means  relished  in  London.  In  Parliament  and  in  the  press 
they  elicited  expressions  of  surprise  and  denunciation.  Opposi- 
tion members  were  especially  resentful.  On  the  contrary,  Lord 
Aberdeen  was  disposed  to  treat  the  matter  lightly  and  to  regard 
the  address  as  a  declamation  rather  than  an  official  document.-" 

18  See  Benton,  Thirfy  Years'  View,  II,  649,  and  von  Hoist,  Hist,  of  the 
U.  S.,  Ill,  159. 

19  It  is  interesting,  however,  to  note  that  Polk  reversed  the  position 
which  he  had  taken  in  1828.    See  above,  p.  557. 

20  "I  wish  to  observe  that  this  speech  is  not  an  address  made  to  Con- 
gress—it is  a  speech  made  to  the  public,  the  Congress  not  being  sitting 
Undoubtedly,  no  speech  of  such  a  nature  could  be  made  by  the  President 
of  the  United  States  without  drawing  towards  it  the  most  serious  atten- 
tion. Nevertheless,  it  .loos  not  possess  the  importance  of  an  ofl&cial  mes- 
sage, forming  a  part  of  legislative  proceedings." 


56-4  JAMlfS  K.   POLK 

He  believed  that  a  peaceful  settlement  was  still  possible ;  if  not, 
he  could  only  say  that  "we  possess  rights  which,  in  our  opinion, 
are  clear  and  unquestionable ;  and,  by  the  blessing  of  God,  and 
with  your  support,  those  rights  we  are  fully  prepared  to  main- 
tain.'' In  the  House  of  Commons,  Sir  Robert  Peel  expressed  a 
desire  for  an  amicable  adjustment,  but  he  severely  criticized 
President  Polk  for  referring  to  "other  contingencies  than  a 
friendly  termination"  of  pending  negotiations.-^  The  London 
Times  held  that  the  interests  of  both  countries  would  be  served 
best  by  a  compromise  adjustment  like  that  which  settled  the  dis- 
pute over  the  northeast  boundary ;  nevertheless  it  thought  that 
Americans  should  be  warned  that  their  pretensions,  if  persisted 
in,  nuist  surely  result  in  war.  The  editor  was  not  disposed  to 
aggravate  "the  very  serious  difficulties  with  which  the  indiscreet 
language  of  Mr.  Polk  has  already  surrounded  the  Oregon  ques- 
tion," still,  the  extravagant  claims  of  the  President  could  never 
be  admitted.^^ 

During  April  and  May  the  British  newspapers  discussed 
the  diplomatic  situation  in  all  its  bearings,  and  speculated  as. 
to  what  ])oli('y  Polk  really  meant  to  pursue.  Only  one,  the 
London  Colonial  Magazine,  believed  that  a  war  with  the  United 
States  would  be  "productive  of  good";  the  others  cared  little 
about  Oregon  itself,  but  they  resented  the  "blustering  attitude" 
of  the  American  President  and  ])eople.  For  example,  the  Times, 
on  ^lay  9,  said : 

As  long  as  Ave  saw  in  these  grotesque  exhibitions  of  national  vanity 
nothing  hut  the  expedients  of  presidential  candidates,  or  the  squibs  of  elec- 
tioneering rivals,  the  foreign  policj'  of  the  United  States  had  nothing  very 
serious  or  very  formidable  in  its  vacant  thunders.  But  the  election  being 
over,  and  the  new  president  installed  by  the  voices  of  the  democratic  party 
for  the  next  four  years,  foreign  nations  acquire  something  more  than  an 
indirect  interest  in  his  character  and  position.  If  President  Polk  intends 
to  sustain  the  lieroic  line  in  whidi  he  passed  through  his  electioneering 
l^robation  and  entered    upon  his  liigli   oflice,  he  may  rely  on  having  before 


21  Hansard,  Pari  Deb.,  LXXIX,  121,  12S,  199. 

22  London  Times,  April  5,  1845,  quoted  by  Nilcs'  Peg.,  LXVIII,  114-115. 


OREGON  565 

luni  a  career  of  uo  ordinary  toil,  agitation,  and  peril.  But  if  he  purposes 
to  subside  into  a  positive  business-like  president,  more  like  the  foreman  of 
a  thriving  business  in  the  city  than  the  champion  of  an  empire,  the  sooner 
ho  descends  from  the  high  horse  the  better;  and  he  Avould  have  done  well 
to  throw  aside  the  embroidered  vestments  of  the  candidate  before  he  deliv- 
ered the  inaugural  address  of  the  president.  Nobody  supposes  that  in  using 
the  very  exaggerated  and  unbecoming  language  in  which  Mr.  Polk  spoke  of 
the  American  claims  to  Oregon,  he  intended  deliberately  to  breathe  defiance 
to  the  Queen  of  Great  Britain,  or  to  threaten  the  rights  of  Her  Majesty 's 
subjects  with  instant  violence.  He  intended  simply  to  flatter  a  delusion 
common  in  all  democratic  states,  but  especially  amongst  the  democratic 
party  in  the  United  States,  which  forces  the  statesman  whom  they  have 
chosen  to  govern  their  country  to  gratify  their  ovra  popular  vanity  by 
affecting  a  temerity  and  an  overbearing  recklessness  towards  foreign  nations 
which,  as  individuals,  neither  the  president,  nor  any  of  his  vociferous  sup- 
porters, can  be  supposed  to  feel. 

Rulers  of  democracies,  said  the  London  Standard,  on  May  15, 
are  apt  to  be  inclined  to  war  for  the  purpose  of  increasing  their 
power  and  their  patronage.  To  this  fact  it  attributed  the  claims 
set  forth  by  President  Polk,  and  therefore  it  did  not  believe  that 
the  people  would  support  him,  except  verbally.  Americans 
could  not  possibly  gain  anything  by  precipitating  hostilities, 
"therefore  we  hold  a  war  to  be  extremely  improbable,  if  not  an 
absolute  impossibility,  let  Mr.  Polk  do  all  that  he  can."  The 
Examiner  (April  25)  considered  Oregon  "really  valueless  to 
England  and  to  America."  It  therefore  congratulated  Lord 
Aberdeen  on  his  conciliatory  attitude,  and  advocated  arbitration 
or  a  partition  of  the  territory.-^ 

The  utterances  of  British  statesmen  greatly  exasperated  tlie 
"old  hero"  of  the  Hermitage  who,  in  characteristic  style,  urged 
the  President  to  combat  British  pretensions  by  a  vigorous  and 
uncompromising  policy : 

Weak  and  debilitated  as  I  am  I  could  not  resist  endeavoring  to  wade 
through  the  debate  in  the  English  parliament— comments  on  your  inaugural 
as  it  relates  to  oragou.  This  is  the  rattling  of  British  drums  to  alarm  us, 
and  to  give  life  to  their  friends  in  the  United  States,  such  as  the  Hartford 
convention  men— the  blue  light  federalists  &  abolitionists,  and  to  prevent 

23  Extracts  from  these  papers  quoted  in  NUes'  Reg.,  LXVIII,  236-239. 


566  JAMES  K.   POLE 

if  Britain  can,  the  reannexation  of  Texas,  by  shadowing  forth  war  & 
rumors  of  war,  to  alarm  the  timid,  &  give  strength  to  the  traitors  in  our 
country  against  our  best  interests  &  growing  prosperity.  This  bold  avowal 
by  peel  &  Russell  of  perfect  claim  to  oragon  must  be  met  as  boldly,  by  our 
denial  of  their  right,  and  confidence  in  our  own — that  we  view  it  too  plain 
a  case,  of  right,  on  our  side  to  hesitate  one  moment  upon  the  subject  of 
extending  our  laws  over  it  &  populating  with  our  people — permit  me  to 
remind  you  that  during  the  canvass,  I  gave  a  thousand  pledges  for  your 
cour[a]ge  &  firmness,  both  in  war  &  in  peace,  to  carry  on  the  administration 
of  our  government.  This  subject  is  intended  to  try  your  energy — dash 
from  your  lips  the  council  of  the  times  on  this  question,  base  your  acts 
upon  the  firm  basis,  of  asking  nothing  but  what  is  right  &  permitting 
nothing  that  is  wrong — war  is  a  blessing  compared  with  national  degreda- 
tion.  The  bold  manner  of  peels  &  Eussells  annunciation  of  the  British 
right  to  oragogon,  the  time  &  manner  require  a  firm  rebuke  by  you  in 
your  annual  message,  and  has  opened  a  fair  field  to  compare  their  claim 
to  oragon  with  their  right  to  the  Territory  claimed  by  Britain  on  our  north 
East  boundary,  &  which  we  were  swindled  out  of,  there  being  on  file  in 
archives  of  England  the  maps  on  Avhieh  was  laid  down  our  boundary  agree- 
able to  the  treaty  of  1783,  which  Lord  Browman  said  in  eulogy  of  Lord 
Ashburton  shewed  that  England  in  her  claim  to  that  territory  had  not  a 
leg  of  right  to  stand  upon — Just  so  with  oragon,  &  peel  &  Russell  both 
well  know  it — stiU.  now,  a  perfect  right  to  oragon  is  claimed — make  a  note 
of  this,  &  in  your  annual  message  expose  England's  perfidy  to  the  whole 
civilized  wor[l]d.  To  prevent  war  with  England  a  bold  &  undaunted 
front  must  be  exposed.  England  wdth  all  her  Boast  dare  not  go  to  war. 
You  will  pardon  these  my  friendly  suggestions.  The  Whiggs  have  held 
you  forth  to  England  as  feeble  &  inenergetic,  &  would  shrink  at  the  threat 
of  war — I  am  sure  you  will  meet  this  with  that  energy  «fc  promptness  that 
is  due  to  yourself,  &  our  national  charaeter.s* 

As  will  be  seen  presently,  Polk  did  not,  in  the  first  instance 
at  least,  follow  this  fatherly  advice.  But  ere  the  President  had 
decided  to  renew  the  compromise  offer  which  his  predecessors 
had  made,  General  Jackson  had  passed  to  a  land  where  "peel  & 
Russell"  no  longer  disturbed  his  repose.  Even  if  he  had  lived 
it  is  highly  improbable  that  his  views  M-ould  have  influenced  the 
President's  foreign  policy.  Polk  was  ever  ready  to  pay  homage 
to  Jackson  on  matters  of  no  vital  importance.  But  when  the 
occasion  demanded  independent  action — as  in  the  discarding  of 

-•»  Jackson  to  Polk,  May  2,  1845,  Polk  Papers. 


OREGON  5G7 

Blair  and  Lewis — he  did  not  hesitate  to  follow  his  own  judgment, 
even  at  the  risk  of  incurring  the  General's  displeasure. 

In  the  selection  of  a  minister  to  represent  the  United  States 
at  London  Polk  was  hampered  by  political  considerations.  How- 
ever, his  embarrassment  was  somewhat  lessened  by  the  fact  that 
negotiations  wore  already  pending  in  Washington  and  by  the 
slight  probability  that  they  would  be  transferred  to  London. 
Since  Calhoun  had  not  been  retained  in  the  cabinet,  many  Demo- 
crats thought  that  he  should  be  given  the  British  mission ;  even 
Jackson  considered  England  to  be  the  proper  place  for  him, 
"there  to  combat  with  my  Lord  Aberdeen  the  abolition  ques- 
tion."-^ But  Calhoun  made  it  known  that  he  would  not  accept 
the  position ;  so,  also,  did  his  friends,  Pickens  and  Elmore,  de- 
cline the  appointment.-''  Having  failed  in  his  overtures  to  the 
Calhoun  wing  of  the  party,  the  President,  through  Bancroft, 
sounded  Van  Buren  on  the  subject.  In  reply  Van  Buren  stated 
his  belief  that  an  ex-President  should  not  accept  a  foreign  mis- 
sion unless  there  was  a  crisis  to  meet.  He  did  not  believe  a 
crisis  to  exist,  but  if  the  President  thought  otherwise,  he  v^^ould, 
of  course,  regard  it  as  his  duty  to  go.-'  Levi  Woodbury  declined 
the  appointment  for  "domestic  reasons,"  and  Louis  McLane,  of 
Baltimore,  was  finally  chosen.-^ 

About  the  middle  of  May,  while  Bancroft  was  in  correspond- 
ence with  Van  Buren  and  before  any  official  communications  had 
passed  between  Buchanan  and  Pakenham,  the  recently  estab- 
lished Washington  Union  announced  what  it  believed  to  be  Polk 's 
Oregon  policy: 

Some  say  we  want  war — some  that  we  ' '  cannot  be  kicked  into  war. ' ' 
Several  predict  that  there  will  be  war.  Now,  without  undertaking  to  say 
positively  that  there  will  he  war,  or  that  there  will  not  be  war,  we  venture 


23  Jackson  to  Polk,  Dec.  16,  1844,  ibid. 

20  After  declining  the  mission  himself  Calhoun  spoke  favorably  of 
Elmore,  but  he  thought  General  Hamilton  to  be  best  qualified  for  the 
position  (A.  V.  Brown  (undated)  to  Polk,  ibid.). 

2"  Van  Buren  to  Bancroft,  May  12,  1845,  Kan  Buren  Papers. 

28  Correspondence  with  Woodbury  and  McLane,  Polk  Papers. 


568  JAMES  E.   POLE 

to  predict  that  it  is  not  Mr.  Polk 's  Avish  to  plunge  his  country  into  war, 
and  still  less  to  sacrifice  her  rights  and  her  honor.  He  -will  never  abandon 
either;  and  without  meaning  to  bluster  or  to  brave  the  British  ministers, 
we  undertake  to  say  that  this  is  the  general  and  enthusiastic  seutiment 
of  the  American  nation.  The  President  will  carry  out  the  wishes  of  the 
people.  It  Avill  not  be  his  fault  if  our  differences  about  Oregon  should 
terminate  in  hostilities;  but  it  will  be  his  fault,  and  a  fault  which  we  are  sure 
he  would  never  encounter,  to  sacrifice  our  ' '  clear  and  unquestionable  claims ' ' 
and  our  sacred  honor  to  any  visionary  danger,  or  to  any  apprehensions  of 
danger."     "Young  Hickory,"  it  added,  will  make  good  his  title.29 

Although  this  article  purported  to  give  merely  the  views  of  the 
editor,  Ritchie,  no  doubt  it  had  the  previous  endorsement  of  the 
President.  Apparently  its  purpose  was  to  prepare  the  people 
for  a  compromise  adjustment  of  the  Oregon  question,  but,  also, 
to  inform  the  British  minister  that  the  administration  would  not 
be  intimidated  by  the  prospect  of  a  war. 

When  the  Tyler  administration  declined  to  accept  the  terms 
offered  by  Great  Britain,  Pakenham,  in  a  note  dated  September 
12,  1844,  asked  Calhoun  to  specify  what  arrangement  he  was 
"prepared  to  propose  for  an  equitable  adjustment  of  the  ques- 
tion." Calhoun  did  not  see  fit  to  comply  with  this  request,  and 
four  months  after  Polk 's  inauguration  no  formal  reply  to  Paken- 
ham's  note  had  been  made.  On  July  12,  1845,  however,  in  a 
communication  to  the  minister,  Buchanan  set  forth  the  American 
claims  and  offered  to  accept  the  forty-ninth  parallel  as  a  com- 
promise boundary.  Whatever  Polk's  private  reasons  for  thus 
suddenly  reversing  the  policy  announced  in  his  inaugural  may 
have  been,  his  official  reasons  were  set  forth  in  a  letter  which 
Buchanan,  on  the  same  day,  addressed  to  Louis  IMcLane,  the 
American  minister  in  London.    In  it  he  said : 

The  President,  at  a  very  early  period  of  his  administration,  was  called 
upon  to  decide  whether  he  would  break  off  or  continue  this  negotiation. 
Placed  in  a  responsible  position,  he  first  inquired  whether  the  national 
honor  required  that  he  should  abruptly  terminate  it  by  demanding  the 
whole  territory  in  dispute.  War  before  dislionor  is  a  maxim  deeply  engraven 
upon  the  hearts  of  the  American  People ;  and  this  maxim  ever  shall  regulate 


20  Union  (semiweekly),  May  12,  1845, 


OREGON  569 

liis  romUu-r  towards  foreign  nations.  But  it  was  inii)ossible  for  him  to 
conceive  that  there  could  be  dishonor  in  pursuing  the  course  whicli  liad 
been  adopted  by  Mr.  Monroe,  his  patriot  Revolutionary  predecessor,  more 
than  a  quarter  of  a  century  ago,  and  had  been*  cither  expressly  sanctioned 
or  acquiesced  in  by  all  succeeding  administrations.so 

In  his  note  to  Pakeiiham,  Buchanan  gave  a  comprehensive 
statement  of  the  American  claims  to  Oregon — both  direct  and 
indirect.'''  ''The  title  of  the  United  States,"  he  said,  "to  that 
portion  of  the  Oregon  territory  between  the  valley  of  the 
Columbia  and  the  Russian  line  in  54°  40'  North  Latitude,  is 
recorded  in  the  Florida  Treaty, ' '  which  transferred  to  the  United 
States  all  of  the  claims  of  Spain.  He  refuted  the  claims  which 
Great  Britain  based  on  the  Nootka  Sound  convention,  for,  as  he 
said,  no  title  to  land  had  been  acquired  by  this  convention.  The 
valley  of  the  Columbia,  said  he,  belonged  to  the  United  States 
by  virtue  of  the  discoveries  of  Captain  Gray,  the  explorations  of 
Lewis  and  Clark,  and  the  settlements  made  by  Astor  and  other 
American  citizens. 

"Such  being  the  opinion  of  the  President  in  regard  to  the 
title  of  the  United  States,"  Buchanan  told  Pakenham,  "he  would 
not  have  consented  to  yield  any  portion  of  the  Oregon  territory, 
had  he  not  found  himself  embarrassed,  if  not  committed,  by  the 
acts  of  his  predecessors."  But  as  they  had  uniformly  proceeded 
upon  "the  principle  of  compromise,"  Polk  felt  constrained  to 
do  likewise.  He  had  therefore  instructed  Buchanan  again  to 
propose  that  the  Oregon  country  be  divided  by  the  forty-ninth 
parallel  from  the  Rocky  Mountains  to  the  Pacific  Ocean,  with 
free  ports  for  Great  Britain  on  the  portion  of  Vancouver's  Island 
lying  south  of  that  parallel. 


30  Buchanan  to  McLane,  July  12,  1845  (Buchanan,  Worls,  VI,  190). 
He  emphasized  the  fact  that  even  General  Jackson  had  been  satisfied  with 
joint  occupation.  But  he  passed  over  the  other  important  fact  that  none 
'of  Polk's  predecessors  ha<l  barred  themselves  from  compromise  by  em- 
phatically claiming  title  to  all  of  the  territory. 

31  In  a  letter  written  to  John  G.  Palfrey,  June  24,  1848,  Buchanan  said 
that  it  was  from  Greenhow's  Oregon  and  California  "that  my  information 
as  to  the  facts  in  support  of  our  claim  was  principally  derived"  (Works, 
VIII,  106). 


570  JAMES  E.  POLE 

The  line  proposed  will  carry  out  the  principle  of  continuity  equally  for 
both  parties,  by  extending  the  limits  both  of  ancient  Louisiana  and  Canada 
to  the  Pacific  along  the  same  parallel  of  latitude  Avhich  di\'ide  tliem  east 
•  of  the  Rocky  Mountains;  and  it  will  secure  to  each  a  sufficient  number  of 
commodious  harbors  on  the  northwest  coast  of  America.32 

Pakenham  replied  on  the  twenty-ninth  of  July.  He  con- 
troverted every  argument  which  Buchanan  had  made,  and  in 
addition,  he  endeavored  to  place  the  American  Secretary  of 
State  in  a  somewhat  awkward  position.  If,-  said  he,  Spain  had 
had  exclusive  title  to  Oregon  down  to  the  Florida  treaty  of  1819, 
then  Gray  as  well  as  Lewis  and  Clark  had  been  interlopers  on 
Spanish  territory  and  their  discoveries  could  not  give  the  United 
States  a  valid  title  to  the  Columbia  River  valley.  On  what 
grounds,  he  asked, 

unless  it  be  upon  the  principle  which  forms  the  foundation  of  the  Nootka 
convention,  could  the  United  States  have  acquired  a  title  to  any  part  of  the 
Oregon  territory  previously  to  the  treaty  of  1819,  and  independently  of  its 
provisions? 

The  Nootka  convention,  he  continued,  was  not  the  "main  re- 
liance" of  Great  Britain  in  this  discussion,  but  it  barred  the 
United  States  from  acquiring  "exclusive  dominion"  from  Spain 
by  the  Florida  treaty.  He  argued  at  length  to  show  that  the 
Nootka  convention  was  still  in  force,  and  that  none  of  the  Amer- 
ican explorations  had  given  the  United  States  exclusive  title  to 
any  part  of  Oregon.  Although  he  had  not  referred  Buchanan's 
letter  to  his  own  government,  Pakenham  concluded  his  reply  by 
declining  the  offer  made  by  the  President,  and  by  expressing 
the  hope  that 

the  American  plenipotentiary  will  be  prepared  to  offer  some  further  pro- 
posal for  the  settlement  of  the  Oregon  question  more  consistent  Avith  fairness 
and  equity,  and  witli  the  reasonable  expectations  of  the  British  goveriiment.33 

The  British  minister's  categorical  rejection  of  Polk's  offer 
came  as  a  shock  to  the  administration  and  aroused  the  fighting 


32  Buchanan  to  Pakenham,  July  12,  1845  (Buchanan,  Works,  VT,  194  S.). 

33  Pakenham  to  Buchanan,  July  29,  1843   (ibid.,  212-220). 


OBEGON  571 

blood  of  tlu'  President.  Regarding  Pakenhain's  note  as  insolent, 
Polk  decided  to  withdraw  his  offer  of  compromise  and  to  reassert 
claim  to  the  whole  territory.  In  the  belief  that  the  relations 
with  England  had  become  critical  in  the  extreme,  he  personally 
dietated  the  main  features  of  the  reply  to  the  British  minister. 
In  order  to  prevent  misunderstandings  concerning  his  directions 
to  Buchanan,  or  discussions  in  cabinet,  he  began  keeping  a  diary 
in  which  the  events  of  each  day  were  recorded.  This  daily  record 
is  of  great  historical  importance,  for  it  not  only  gives  informa- 
tion nowhere  else  available,  but  it  displays  the  motives  which 
inspired  the  President's  policies — at  least  the  motives  which  he 
desired  posterity  to  accept  as  the  key  to  his  official  acts.^* 

The  diary  opens  on  August  26,  1845,  and  the  day's  record 
is  concerned  principally  with  cabinet  discussion  of  the  Oregon 
question.  As  early  as  August  7,  after  the  Prussian  minister 
had  informed  Bancroft  of  a  threatened  invasion  of  Texas  by 
Mexico,  Polk  urged  Buchanan,  who  was  on  a  visit  to  his  home, 
to  return  to  Washington  as  soon  as  possible.  ' '  I  must  confess, ' ' 
he  said,  after  explaining  the  Mexican  situation,  "that  the  de- 
velopments which  are  taking  place,  as  well  as  my  daily  reflec- 
tions, make  it,  in  my  opinion,  more  and  more  important  that  we 
should  progress  without  delay  in  the  Oregon  negotiation."^^ 
By  August  26,  the  date  of  the  cabinet  meeting  just  mentioned, 
the  President  had  become  impatient  because  of  Buchanan's  delay 
in  drafting  a  reply  to  Pakenham's  note  of  July  29.  He  asked 
the  Secretary  when  the  reply  would  be  ready  for  consideration 
by  the  cabinet ;  but,  without  waiting  to  learn  what  Buchanan 
had  prepared,  he  proceeded  to  tell  the  cabinet  "the  settled  deci- 
sion to  which  his  mind  had  come."  In  his  reply  to  Pakenham, 
Buchanan  w^as  directed  to  "assert  and  enforce  our  right  to  the 
whole  of  the  Oregon  territory  from  42°  to  54°  40'  North  Lati- 
tude."   He  was  to  state  that  the  President  had  offered  to  agree 


34  For  his  own  version  of  his  reasons  for  keeping  a  diary,  see  Diary,  H 
100-101. 

35  Polk  to  Buchanan,  Aug.  7,  1845,  Buchanan  Papers. 


572  JAMES  K.   POLK 

upon  the  forty-ninth  parallel  solely  in  deference  to  his  prede- 
cessors and  because  of  his  desire  to  preserve  peace  between  the 
two  nations.  Since  the  British  minister  had,  without  referring 
the  matter  to  his  government,  rejected  the  compromise  "in 
language,  to  say  the  least  of  it,  scarcely  courteous  or  respectful" 
the  offer  was  now  to  be  withdrawn.  "Let  the  argument  of  our 
title  to  the  whole  country  be  full,"  said  the  President,  "let  the 
proposition  to  compromise  at  latitude  49°  be  withdrawn,  and 
then  let  the  matter  rest,  unless  the  British  Minister  chose  to 
continue  the  negotiation." 

Buchanan  agreed  with  the  President  so  far  as  the  assertion 
of  title  and  the  withdrawal  of  the  compromise  offer  were  con- 
cerned, but  he  believed  that  a  paragraph  should  be  added  to  the 
effect  that  Polk  would  consider  any  proposition  which  Pakenham 
might  submit.  To  such  an  implied  invitation  for  further  nego- 
tiation the  President  objected.  "Let  our  proposition  be  abso- 
lutely withdrawn  &  then  let  the  British  Minister  take  his  own 
course."  With  his  usual  timidity,  Buchanan  urged  that  should 
Polk's  views  be  carried  out,  war  would  result,  but  the  President 
replied  that  "if  we  do  have  war  it  will  not  be  our  fault." 
Buchanan  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  answer  to  Pakenham 
ought  to  be  postponed  until  it  could  be  ascertained  whether  there 
would  be  a  war  with  Mexico,  but  Polk,  after  asserting  that  there 
was  no  connection  between  the  two  questions,  insisted  upon  an 
immediate  reply  to  Pakenham 's  note.  To  his  remark  that  the 
United  States  would  do  its  duty  towards  both  nations  and  leave 
the  rest  to  God  and  the  Country,  Buchanan  retorted  that  "God 
would  not  have  much  to  do  in  justifying  us  in  a  war  for  the 
country  North  of  49°."  Secretary  Walker  concurred  in  the 
President's  views,  and  the  other  members  expressed  no  opinions. 
L^ndeterred  by  the  opposition  of  his  Secretary  of  State,  Polk 
called  a  special  cabinet  meeting  for  the  following  day  and  directed 
BiK'liaiian  to  have  a  draft  of  his  answer  to  Pakcidiam  ready  for 
considci'atioM.     The  draft  ])i'('S('ii1c(l  by  Bucliaiian  at  the  special 


OBEGON  573 

meeting  was  considered  satisfactoiy — even  admirable — so  far  as 
the  historical  array  of  facts  relating  to  the  title  was  concerned, 
but  the  President  ordered  changes  to  be  made  in  the  part  relating 
to  tlie  withdrawal  of  the  compromise  offer.  Although  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  argued  that  the  answer  ought  to  be  postponed, 
Polk  ordered  him  to  deliver  it  as  soon  as  it  could  be  copied.  At 
the  close  of  the  discussion  the  other  members  of  the  cabinet  gave 
their  hearty  support  to  the  policy  adopted  by  the  President. 
Having  thus  declined  to  make  further  overtures  to  John  Bull, 
Polk,  on  the  following  da}',  directed  that  orders  be  sent  to  General 
Taylor  that  in  case  Mexico  should  declare  war  or  begin  hostilities 
he  was  to  drive  her  army  across  the  Rio  Grande  and  invade 
Mexico.^'" 

The  note  to  Pakenham,  in  its  completed  form,  was  an  able 
document.  The  historical  part,  prepared  by  Buchanan,  presented 
the  claims  of  the  United  States  to  the  whole  territory  with  pre- 
cision and  clearness.  The  Nootka  Sound  convention,  he  asserted, 
had  not  procured  for  Great  Britain  any  territorial  rights,  and 
all  privileges  acquired  by  that  agreement  had  been  cancelled  by 
a  subsequent  war  with  Spain.  To  Pakenham 's  contention  that 
the  admission  of  Spain's  title  to  Oregon  before  1819  would  in- 
validate all  claims  based  by  the  United  States  on  discovery, 
Buchanan  retorted  that  "this  is  a  most  ingenious  method  of 
making  two  distinct  and  independent  titles  held  by  the  same 
nation  worse  than  one — of  arraying  them  against  each  other, 
and  thus  destroying  the  validity  of  both."  The  United  States, 
said  he,  now  possessed  both  its  own  and  the  Spanish  titles ;  either 
was  better  than  that  of  England,  and  certainly  the  two,  com- 
bined, could  not  be  weaker  than  one. 

The  compromise  offer  was  officially  withdrawn,  but  Polk's 
original  intention  of  making  no  allusion  to  further  negotiations 
was  not  carried  out.  Presumably  in  deference  to  the  wishes  of 
Buchanan,  it  was  stated  that  ''the  President  still  cherishes  the 


36  Polk,  Diary,  I,  1-9. 


57i  JAMES  E.   POLE 

hope  that  this  long-pending  controversy  may  yet  be  finally  ad- 
justed in  such  manner  as  not  to  disturb  the  peace  or  interrupt  the 
harmony  now  so  happily  subsisting  between  the  two  nations."" 
In  taking  such  a  firm  stand  the  President  may  have  been 
influenced,  to  some  extent  at  least,  by  the  knowledge  that  Paken- 
ham's  prompt  rejection  of  the  compromise  offer  had  not  been 
authorized  by  his  government.  On  August  19,  Polk  had  received 
a  private  letter  from  McLane  which  stated  that 

The  result  of  all  I  have  learned  is  that  this  Government  is  earnestly  desirous 
of  adjusting  the  Oregon  question,  &  willing  to  do  so  upon  liberal  terms. 
Their  chief  difficulty  arises  from  the  opposition  4'  influence  of  the  Hudson  's 
Bay  Company. 

His  information,  he  said,  had  not  come  directly  from  Lord  Aber- 
deen, but  he  felt  certain  that  England  would  agree  to  the  fort}'- 
ninth  parallel  to  the  Straits  of  Fuca,  leaving  Vancouver's  Island 
to  Great  Britain. ^^  At  the  same  time  Robert  Armstrong,  the 
American  consul  at  Liverpool  and  an  intimate  friend  of  the 
President,  wrote  that  it  was  generally  understood  that  England 
held  a  mortgage  on  California.  Great  Britain,  he  urged,  must 
never  possess  California ;  Oregon  should  be  made  the  bone  of 
contention  to  prevent  it.^^ 

Several  weeks  passed  during  which  neither  party  attempted 
to  break  the  diplomatic  deadlock.  At  a  cabinet  meeting  held  on 
October  21,  however,  a  dispatch  sent  by  McLane  on  the  third  was 
read  and  discussed.  In  an  interview  with  McLane,  Lord  Aber- 
deen had  expressed  regret  because  Pakenham  had  rejected  the 
American  offer.    After  condemning  Pakenham 's  act,  he  intimated 


37  Buchanan  to  Pakenham,  Aug.  .'50,  1845  (Buchanan,  ll'orls,  VI,  2.31- 
254).  On  the  same  (la,y  that  Buchanan  delivered  his  official  note,  Calhoun 
wrote  from  his  lionie  in  South  Carolina  deploring  the  possibility  of  a 
rupture  with  England.  "It  is  beyond  the  power  of  man,"  said  he,  "to 
trace  the  consequences  of  a  war  between  us  and  England  on  the  subject 
of  Oregon.  All  that  is  certain  is,  that  she  can  take  it  &  hold  it  against 
us,  as  long  as  she  has  the  supremacy  on  the  ocean  &  retains  her  Eastern 
dominions.  The  rest  is  rapt  in  mystery"  (Calhoun  to  Buchanan,  Aug.  30, 
1845,  ibid.,  230). 

38  Copy  of  McLane  to  I'olk,  Aug.  4,  1845,  Buchanan  Papers. 
3»  Armstrong  to  Polk,  Aug.  4,  1845,  Polk  Papers. 


OREGON  575 

a  willingness  to  agree  iijion  a  modified  proi)osition,  and  asked 
whether  President  Polk  would  negotiate  further  on  the  subject. 
Anticipating  that  Pakenham  had  received  new  instructions  by 
the  same  mail  and  w^ould  make  new  overtures,  Buchanan  asked 
the  President  what  answer  he  should  make.  Polk  promptly 
replied  that 

all  that  could  be  said  to  him  was,  that  if  he  had  auy  further  proposition 
to  make  on  his  part,  it  would  be  received  and  considered No  intima- 
tion sliould  be  given  to  him  of  what  the  views  or  intentions  of  the  adminis- 
tration were,  &  [but]  leave  him  to  take  his  own  course. 

He  declared,  also,  that  should  Pakenham  propose  to  agree  upon 
the  adjustment  recently  offered  by  the  United  States  he  would 
not  accept  the  proposal.  Sliould  the  minister  make  some  other 
oifer,  this  would  either  be  rejected  or  submitted  to  the  Senate 
for  its  advice.  To  Buchanan's  question  whether  he  might  inform 
the  British  diplomat  that  a  proposition  made  by  him  would  be 
submitted  to  the  Senate,  the  President  answered  that  such  a 
course  "would  be  improper;  the  British  Minister  had  no  right 
to  know  our  councils  or  intentions."  Although  the  Secretary 
of  State  prophesied  war,  Polk  was  obdurate  and  refused  to 
modify  his  views.  He  told  the  cabinet  that  in  his  first  message 
to  Congress  he  "would  maintain  all  our  rights,  would  reaffirm 
Mr.  Monroe's  ground  against  permitting  any  European  power 
to  plant  or  establish  any  new  colony  on  the  North  American 
Continent. ' '" 

The  conjecture  that  Pakenham  had  received  new  instructions 
from  Lord  Aberdeen  seems  to  have  been  well  founded,  for  two 
days  after  the  cabinet  meeting  he  called  at  the  State  Department 
and  expressed  regret  because  the  American  offer  had  been  with- 
drawn. He  suggested  that  negotiations  might  be  reopened  by 
the  signing  of  a  protocol,  but  as  he  was  not  prepared  to  make  a 
definite  offer  of  terms,  Buchanan  was  not  at  liberty  to  accept  the 
proposal.    When  the  conversation  was  reported  to  the  President, 


40  Polk,  Diary,  I,  62-65. 


576  JAMES  K.   POLK 

he  insisted  that  "the  British  Government  must  move  first,"  and 
he  doul)ted  tliat  an.y  offer  wouhl  be  made  which  the  United  States 
could  accept.*^ 

Up  to  this  time  there  had  been  an  estrangement  between  the 
President  and  Senator  Benton,  as  a  result  of  the  latter 's  violent 
criticism  of  tlie  course  pursued  by  the  Baltimore  convention. 
Due,  however,  to  a  common  interest  in  Oregon  and,  also,  to  the 
influence  of  Buchanan,  a  reconciliation  was  effected.  "With 
Polk's  consent,  Buchanan  showed  Benton  the  correspondence 
that  had  passed  between  himself  and  the  British  minister;  he 
intimated,  also,  that  the  Senator  would  be  kindly  received  if  he 
should  feel  inclined  to  call  upon  the  President.  Benton  approved 
the  action  that  had  been  taken  and  expressed  a  desire  to  con- 
verse with  the  President,  therefore  a  meeting  was  arranged  for 
the  twenty-fourth  of  October.  Polk  was  already  preparing  his 
message  to  Congress,  and  it  is  evident  that  he  was  anxious  to 
win  Benton 's  support  for  the  policy  which  he  was  about  to  recom- 
mend. The  Missourian's  judgment  was  not  always  sound,  but  he 
wielded  an  influence  which  could  not  be  disregarded. 

During  the  interview  the  two  men  agreed  upon  the  following 
points:  that  the  twelve  months'  notice  for  abrogating  the  con- 
vention of  1827  should  be  given ;  that  the  laws  of  the  United 
States  should  be  extended  over  Oregon  in  the  same  degree  that 
British  laws  had  been  extended  in  1821;  that  forts  should  be 
built  on  the  route  to  Oregon ;  and  that  the  Indian  policy  of  the 
United  States  should  be  extended  to  the  whole  region.  On  some 
phases,  however,  Benton  w^as  not  prepared  to  go  so  far  as  the 
President ;  he  thought  that  Great  Britain  possessed  a  good  title 
to  the  Frazer  River  valley,  and  he  was  willing  to  accept  the  forty- 
ninth  parallel  as  a  sastisf actory  boundary.  To  Polk 's  suggestion 
of  reasserting  the  Monroe  Doctrine  against  all  colonization  on  the 
North  American  continent,  he  rej)lie(l  tliat  while  foreign  nations 
should  be  excluded   from   California    and    the   Columbia   River 

■»'  Ibid.,  66-67. 


OREGON  577 

valley,  the  Frazer  River  valley  was  already  occupied  by  the 
British/-  From  the  date  of  this  interview  until  the  court-martial 
of  Fremont  the  Senator  gave  his  support  to  the  administration. 
And  his  support  was  of  no  small  importance,  although  his  arro- 
gance and  dictatorial  manner  often  taxed  the  patience  of  the 
President. 

Three  days  after  his  conversation  with  Benton  {i.e.,  October 
27),  the  President  received  a  call  from  T.  W.  Ward,  Boston 
agent  for  the  Baring  Brothers.  After  speaking  of  the  absurdity 
of  a  war  between  the  two  nations  and  of  the  unsettled  business 
conditions  which  had  resulted  from  war  rumors.  Ward  intimated 
a  desire  to  know  whether  Polk  would  persist  in  claiming  title  to 
the  whole  of  Oregon.  His  visit  did  not  elicit  the  desired  informa- 
tion, for  the  President  told  him  that  "no  one  but  myself  &  my 
Cabinet  could  know  what  had  occurred  or  what  was  likely  to 
occur."  Two  hours  later  Buchanan  sent  to  the  President  a 
diplomatic  note  which  he  had  just  received  from  the  British 
minister,  and  as  it  bore  the  date  of  October  25,  Polk  concluded 
that  it  had  been  held  back  until  Pakenham  had  learned  the  result 
of  Ward's  interview  with  the  President.^^ 

When  presenting  the  note  to  Buchanan,  Pakenham  remarked 
that  he  would  regard  it  as  official  or  unofficial  as  he  might  deem 
best  after  he  had  ascertained  the  answer  which  it  would  receive. 
A  reply  was  prepared  by  Buchanan  and  carefully  edited  by  the 
President  after  its  contents  had  been  discussed  at  two  cabinet 
meetings.  Against  the  wishes  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  who 
desired  to  leave  the  way  open  for  further  negotiation,  Polk 
directed  him  not  to  submit  his  answer  or  to  reveal  its  contents 
unless  Pakenham  would  decide,  in  advance,  to  regard  his  note 
as  official.  He  was  unwilling,  he  said,  to  do  anything  "which 
would  have  the  appearance  of  inviting  Great  Brittain  to  make 
another  proposition."  When  told  that  no  answer  would  be  made 
except    to    an    official    communication,    Pakenham,    after    some 


*2  Ibid.,  55,  70-71.  ^^  Ibid.,  73-75. 


578  JAMES  K.   POLK 

anxious  hesitation,  witlidrew  the  note.  During  the  conversation 
he  denied  that  he  liad  rejected  the  American  offer,  but  had  merely 
refused  to -accept  it — a  distinction  which  he  held  to  be  of  great 
importance.  Copies  of  the  note  and  the  reply  which  had  been 
prepared  were  sent  to  McLane  so  that  he  might  know  precisely 
what  had  transpired. ^^  The  President,  at  this  same  time,  was 
holding  conversations  with  Lieutenant  Gillespie,  preparing  him 
for  liis  mission  to  California  with  secret  instructions  for  Larkin, 
the  consul  at  Monterey,  and  two  weeks  later  Slidell  was  sent  to 
negotiate  with  Mexico. 

During  the  latter  half  of  November  Polk  was  busily  engaged 
in  drafting  his  first  annual  message  to  Congress.  He  discussed 
the  proposed  recommendations  with  Ritchie  and  with  several 
members  of  Congress,  and  all  parts  of  his  original  draft  were 
read  and  considered  at  cabinet  meetings.  In  general  -all  mem- 
bers of  the  cabinet,  except  Buchanan,  concurred  in  the  Presi- 
dent's views;  tlie  Secretary  of  State  dissented  from  his  Oregon 
policy  and  seriously  considered  leaving  the  cabinet  to  accept  the 
position  of  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court.  He  made  various 
suggestions  which  were  intended  to  soften  the  tone  of  the  message, 
and  when  they  were  not  adopted  the  President  noted  that  ''Mr. 
Buchanan  seemed  to  be  depressed  in  spirits,  and,  as  I  thought, 
greatly  concerned  lest  the  controversy  about  Oregon  might  lead 
to  War.  "*^  When  his  own  protests  luid  failed  he  tried  to  in- 
fluence the  President  by  saying  that  many  members  of  Congress 
were  in  favor  of  accepting  parallel  forty-nine  as  the  boundary, 
but  Polk  replied  that  he,  too,  had  conversed  with  congressmen, 
nine-tenths  of  whom  were  in  favor  of  "going  the  whole  length." 
The  diary  states  further  that : 

Mr.  B.  expressed  the  opinion  with  some  earnestness  that  the  country 
would  not  justify  a  war  for  the  country  North  of  49°,  and  that  my  greatest 
danger  would  be  that  I  would  be  attacked  for  holding  a  warlike  tone.     I 


iilhid.,  75-82.     Buchanan  to  McLane,  Oct.  28  and  Nov.  5,  1845   (Bu- 
chanan, WorJcs,  VI,  285-286,  289). 
*■'  Polk,  Bxnry,  I,  102. 


OEEGON  579 

told  him  that  my  greatest  danger  was  tliat  I  would  be  attacked  for  liaving 
yielded  to  what  had  been  done  by  my  predecessors  and  in  deference  alone, 
as  he  knew,  to  their  acts  and  commitments,  [and  for  having]  agreed  to  offer 
the  compromise  of  49°.  I  told  htm  that  if  that  proposition  had  been  ac- 
cepted by  the  Brittish  Minister  my  course  would  have  met  with  great  opposi- 
tion, and  in  my  opinion  would  have  gone  far  to  overthrow  the  administra- 
tion ;  that,  had  it  been  accepted,  as  we  came  in  on  Texas  the  probability 
was  we  would  have  gone  out  on  Oregon.  I  told  him  we  had  done  our  duty 
by  offering  49°,  and  that  I  did  not  regret  that  it  had  been  rejected  by  the 
Brittish  Minister Tlie  truth  is  Mr.  Buchanan  has  from  tlihe  begin- 
ning been,  as  I  tliink,  too  timid  and  too  fearful  of  War  on  the  Oregon 
question,  and  has  been  most  anxious  to  settle  the  question  by  yielding  and 
making  greater  concessions  than  I  am  willing  to  ma.ke.46 

The  twenty-ninth  Congress  convened  on  the  first  of  December, 
and  on  the  following  day  Polk  submitted  his  first  annual  message. 
"While  he  congratulated  Congress  on  "the  continued  prosperity" 
of  the  country,  he  nevertheless  felt  called  upon  to  make  many  im- 
portant recommendations.  Foreign  relations  were  given  first 
attention,  and  on  the  topics  of  Texas  and  Oregon  the  views  ex- 
pressed by  the  President  were  uncompromising,  if  not  menacing, 
in  tone. 

After  giving  a  brief  history  of  the  attempts  made  by  his  pre- 
decessors to  settle  the  Oregon  boundary  question,  the  President 
informed  Congress  of  the  offer  which  he  had  made  and  which 
Great  Britain  had  rejected.  He  had  become  convinced  that 
England  would  not  agree  to  any  adjustment  which  the  United 
States  ought  to  accept,  consequently  "the  proposition  of  com- 
promise which  had  been  made  and  rejected  was  by  my  direction 
subsequently  withdrawn  and  our  title  to  the  whole  of  Oregon 
Territory  asserted,  and,  as  is  believed,  maintained  by  irrefragable 
facts  and  arguments."  Since  England  by  her  rejection  of  the 
compromise  offer  had  relieved  the  President  from  being  further 
influenced  by  the  acts  of  his  predecessors  and  had  left  him  free 
to  assert  the  full  rights  of  the  United  States,  two  things  were 
recommended :    first,  notice  should  be  given  that  the  convention 


46/fe!V7.,  107-108. 


580  JAMES  E.   POLE 

of  "joint  occupancy"  made  in  1827  will  be  terminated  at  the 
end  of  twelve  months;  and  second,  "it  will  become  proper  for 
Congress  to  determine  what  legislation  they  can  in  the  meantime 
adopt  without  violating  this  convention."' 

While  thus  fully  admitting  the  right  of  Congress  to  determine 
the  degree  of  protection  which  might  be  given  to  American 
citizens  in  Oregon  before  the  termination  of  joint  occupancy, 
Polk  nevertheless  freely  suggested  the  laws  which  he  considered 
to  be  proper  and  necessary.  "Beyond  all  question,"  said  he, 
"the  protection  of  our  laws  and  our  jurisdiction,  civil  and  crim- 
inal, ought  to  be  immediately  extended  over  our  citizens  in 
Oregon."  They  should  be  extended  to  the  same  extent  that 
England  had  extended  her  laws  in  1821.  Forts  should  be  built 
along  the  route  to  Oregon  to  facilitate  emigration  to  that  region. 
He  doubted  that  land  grants  could  be  made  until  the  convention 
had  expired,  but  emigrants  might  rest  assured  that  they  would 
be  given  land  as  soon  as  "joint  occupancy"  had  ended. 

So  far  as  Great  Britain  was  concerned,  the  most  objectionable 
part  of  the  message  was  that  which  outlined  the  policy  to  be 
followed  by  the  United  States  after  the  convention  of  1827  had 
expired.    "At  the  end  of  a  year's  notice,"  said  the  President, 

should  Congress  tliink  it  proper  to  make  provision  for  giving  that  notice, 
Ave  shall  have  reached  a  period  when  the  national  rights  in  Oregon  must 
either  be  abandoned  or  firmly  maintained.  That  they  can  not  be  abandoned 
without  a  sacrifice  of  both  national  honor  and  interest  is  too  clear  to  admit 
of  doubt. 

The  claim  of  Great  Britain  to  the  Columbia  as  a  boundary  "can 
never  for  a  moment  be  entertained  by  the  United  States  without 
an  abandonment  of  their  just  and  clear  territorial  rights,  their 
own  self-respect,  and  the  national  honor."  Evidently  with  Cali- 
fornia as  well  as  Oregon  in  mind,  he  reasserted  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  against  European  colonization  on  the  North  American 
continent.*^ 


•»T  Richardson,  Messages,  IV,  392-399. 


OREGON  581 

According  to  the  account  recorded  in  Polk's  diary,  Demo- 
crats generally — even  many  of  Calhoun's  friends — expressed  en- 
thusiastic approval  of  his  message.-**  Archer,  a  "Whig  member 
from  Virginia,  was  especially  pleased  with  the  part  relating  to 
Oregon,  and  remarked  that  ''he  believed  he  was  half  a  Polk- 
man."  "Well!"  said  Benton,  "you  have  sent  us  the  message," 
and  "I  think  we  can  all  go  it  as  we  understand  it,"  to  which 
Polk  replied  (alluding  to  Jackson's  famous  remark)  that  the 
Senator  had  very  high  authority  for  saying  "as  we  understand 
it."  The  real  meaning  of  Benton's  remark,  as  further  conversa- 
tion developed,  was  that  England's  title  to  the  region  drained  by 
Frazer's  River  was  quite  as  good  as  that  of  the  United  States 
to  the  valley  of  the  Columbia.*'' 

The  President  was  not  moved  to  modify  his  uncompromising 
policy  by  the  opinions  expressed  by  so  influential  a  person 
as  Senator  Benton;  neither  did  the  continued  opposition  of 
Buchanan  disturb  his  equanimity.  At  a  cabinet  meeting  held  on 
December  9,  the  Secretary  of  State,  after  stating  that  he  antici- 
pated a  call  from  Pakenham,  asked  the  President  what  reply  he 
ought  to  make  if  the  British  minister  should  interrogate  him  on 
the  Oregon  question.  "Suppose,"  said  he,  "Mr.  Pakenham  in- 
quires whether  any  further  proposition  which  the  British  Gov- 
ernment might  make  would  be  received,  what  shall  I  say  to  him  ? ' ' 
Polk  replied  that  Pakenham  had  no  right  to  ask  such  a  question. 
The  minister,  he  said,  knew  the  contents  of  the  annual  message 
and  of  the  diplomatic  correspondence  he  had  received;  let  him 
take  his  own  course  without  any  intimation  as  to  how  any  future 
offer  would  be  received.  "Mr.  B.  repeated  his  anxiety  to  settle 
the  question  at  49°  &  avoid  war.  I  told  him  that  I  did  not  desire 
war,  but  that  at  all  hazards  we  must  maintain  our  just  rights." 
Pakenham  called  two  days  later,  and,  after  expressing  an  earnest 
desire  for  peace,  desired  to  know  what  the  United  States  proposed 


48  Among  those  mentioned  were  Cass,  McDuffie,  Holmes,  Seddon,  Hunter, 
and  Wilmot. 

49  Polk,  Diary,  I,  116-117. 


582  JAMES  K.  POLE 

to  do  at  the  end  of  the  year's  notice,  but  Buchanan  was,  of  course, 
unable  to  give  him  a  satisfactory  reply.^''  In  spite  of  his  "high 
tone,"  Polk  seems  to  have  been  rather  uneasy  because  England 
was  reported  to  be  engaged  in  "warlike  preparations,"  and 
McLane  was  instructed  to  ascertain  whether  they  had  been 
induced  by  possible  hostilities  over  Oregon."^ 

On  December  23  "a  grave  discussion"  took  place  in  the 
cabinet  regarding  the  probabilities  of  a  war  with  Great  Britain. 
Buchanan  expressed  himself  as  decidedly  in  favor  of  vigorous 
preparations  for  defense,  and  in  such  a  policy  the  President 
heartily  concurred.  The  Secretaries  of  War  and  Navy  were 
directed  to  communicate  the  views  of  the  administration  to  the 
military  and  naval  committees  of  Congress  and  to  aid  them  in 
drafting  suitable  bills.  Still  in  fear  of  war,  Buchanan  inquired 
whether,  in  case  Pakenham  should  offer  to  compromise  on  the 
forty-ninth  parallel,  leaving  Vancouver's  Island  to  England, 
Polk  would  submit  the  offer  to  the  Senate  for  its  advice.  ' '  I  told 
him,"  wrote  the  President, 

if  an  equivalent,  by  granting  to  the  IT.  S.  free  ports  North  of  49°  on  the 
sea  &  the  Straits  of  Fuca  should  also  be  offered,  I  would  consult  confiden- 
tially three  or  four  Senators  from  different  parts  of  the  Union,  and  might 
submit  it  to  the  Senate  for  their  previous  advice. 

As  this  was  the  first  intimation,  since  the  withdrawal  of  the 
American  offer,  that  Polk  might  modify  his  claims,  in  deference 
to  the  Senate,  Buchanan  regarded  the  commitment  so  important 
that  he  reduced  to  writing  what  the  President  had  said.^- 

Pakenham  called  at  the  State  Department  on  December  27, 
and,  after  an  unsuccessful  attempt  to  induce  Buchanan  to  recall 
his  withdrawal  of  the  American  offer,  proposed  to  refer  "the 
whole  question  of  an  equitable  division  of  that  territory  [Oregon] 
to  the   arbitration   of  some   friendly  sovereign   or  State."      In 


50  7buZ.,  119-121. 

51  Buchanan  to  McLane,  Dec.  13,  1845  (Buchanan,  Works,  VI,  341-342). 

52  He  appended  the  memorandum:  "I  took  dov^'u  the  foregoing  from 
the  lips  of  the  President  in  the  presence  of  the  Cabinet"  (Polk,  Diary,  I. 
133-136). 


OREGON  .  583 

anticipation  of  such  an  ofifer  Polk  and  his  cabinet  had,  on  that  very 
same  day,  decided  to  reject  it,  if  it  should  be  made.  Buchanan 
could  not,  of  course,  reject  the  offer  without  referring  it  to  the 
President,  but  he  frankly  told  the  British  diplomat  that  he  did 
not  believe  it  would  be  accepted.  Pakenham  regretted  that  there 
seemed  to  be  no  way  of  reopening  negotiations  and  intimated 
that  the  American  government  did  not  desire  an  amicable  settle- 
ment. He  said,  on  the  other  hand,  that  "the  British  government  \ 
would  be  glad  to  get  clear  of  the  question  on  almost  any  terms ;  j 
that  they  did  not  care  if  the  arbitrator  should  award  the  whole 
territory  to  us."^^  This  frank  remark  indicated  that  England 
cared  little  about  Oregon— except  that  she  did  not  wish  to  be 
coerced— and  the  prospects  of  an  amicable  adjustment  seemed 
very  much  brighter.^* 

In  his  answer  to  Pakenham,  which  had  been  carefully  edited 
by  the  President,  Buchanan  explained  why  the  offer  of  arbitra- 
tion could  not  be  accepted.  The  offer  to  refer  to  an  arbitrator 
the  "equitable  division"  of  Oregon,  said  he,  "assumes  the  fact 
that  the  title  of  Great  Britain  to  a  portion  of  the  territory  is 
valid,  and  thus  takes  for  granted  the  very  question  in  dispute ' ' ; 
the  President  could  not  admit  such  an  implication,  for  he  believed 
that  England  had  no  claim  to  any  part  of  the  land.  Pakenham 
now  asked  if  the  United  States  would  agree  to  submit  to  arbitra- 
tion the  question  as  to  whether  either  nation  possessed  a  valid 
title  to  the  whole  territory,  and  his  query  was  answered  in  the 
negative,  because  the  President  did  not  "believe  the  territorial 
rights  of  this  nation  to  be  a  proper  subject  for  arbitration.  "^^ 

53  Pakenham  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  27,  1845;  memorandum  of  the  interview 
in  Buchanan,  Works,  VI,  349-353. 

54  Pakenham 's  report  of  his  government's  attitude  agrees  with  a 
statement  made  bv  Ashbell  Smith:  "In  the  conversation  Lord  Aberdeen 
remarked  that  the  British  government  did  not  care  a  pin,  comparatively, 
about  Oregon  and  the  Puget  sound  country;  but  that  the  universal  con- 
viction in  England  was  that  the  country  to  the  Columbia  river  belonged  of 
right  to  Great  Britain  and  that  the  United  States  was  attempting  to  bully 
England  out  of  it"  (Smith,  Reminiscences  of  the  Texas  RepuMic,  41).  . 

55  Buchanan  to  Pakenham,  Jan.  3  and  Feb.  4;  Pakenham  to  Buchanan, 
Jan.  16,  1846  (Buchanan,  Works,  VI,  355,  357,  370). 


584  JAMES  E.   POLK 

Polk's  unyielding  attitude  did  not  necessarily  mean  that  he 
either  expected  or  desired  a  rupture  with  England.  Apparently, 
he  believed  that  he  would  yet  be  offered  a  proposition  to  which 
he  could  agree.  When,  on  January  4,  Black,  of  South  Carolina, 
asked  him  to  use  his  influence  with  Congress  to  induce  that  body 
to  postpone  the  date  for  abrogating  the  convention  of  1827,  he 
declined  with  the  remark  that  "the  only  way  to  treat  John  Bull 
was  to  look  him  straight  in  the  eye ;  that  he  [I]  considered  a  bold 
&  firm  course  on  our  part  the  pacific  one."'^**  Despite,  therefore, 
the  blunt  answers  to  Pakenham,  McLane  was  authorized  to  let 
Lord  Aberdeen  know,  "cautiously  and  informally,"  that,  while 
the  President  himself  would  accept  nothing  less  than  the  whole 
of  Oregon,  he  would,  should  Great  Britain  offer  the  forty-ninth 
parallel  as  a  boundary,  refer  the  proposition  to  the  Senate  for 
its  advice.  Anything  less  advantageous  to  the  United  States 
would  be  rejected  by  the  President  without  such  a  reference ; 
"it  is  manifest,  therefore,  that  the  British  Government  should 
at  once  present  their  ultimatum.""  A  few  days  before  these 
instructions  had  been  sent  Polk  had  suggested  to  his  cabinet  that 
a  settlement  might  possibly  be  made  on  the  basis  of  a  mutual 
reduction  of  tariffs  and  the  payment  to  England  of  a  sum  of 
money  for  the  surrender  of  her  Oregon  claims.  This  sum  was 
to  enable  her  to  indemnify  the  Hudson's  Bay  Company.  The 
subject  was  postponed  for  further  discussion  and  seems  never  to 
have  been  seriously  eonsidered.^^ 

Before  he  had  received  the  above-mentioned  instructions  Mc- 
Lane, in  a  private  letter  to  Buchanan,  said  that  although  the 
Oregon  question  was  becoming  more  critical  every  day,  yet  he 
believed  that  tlie  President  had  it  in  his  power  to  adjust  the 
matter  "upon  a  basis  of  a  reasonable  compromise,"  should  he 
feel  inclined  to  do  so.  He  believed,  also,  ''that  it  may  he  made 
to  appear  in  the  end  that  his  [Polk's]  mode  of  conducting  the 

58  Polk,  Diary,  1,  155. 

•"'T  Buchanan  to  McLano,  Jan.  29,  1846  (Buchanan,  Worlcs,  VI.  366-368). 

ss  Polk,  Diary,  I,  191. 


OREGON  585 

negotiation  had  enabled  Jiim  to  do  what  his  predecessors  had  been 
unable  to  accomplish."''"  The  latter  suggestion  was  entirely  su- 
perfluous, for  the  President  was  already  endeavoring  to  create 
such  an  impression  by  his  method  of  conducting  the  negotiations. 
His  judgment  proved  to  be  sounder  than  that  of  his  critics.  His 
uncompromising  attitude  did  not  result  in  the  war  which  they 
so  confidently  predicted,  but,  eventually,  in  another  and  better 
offer  from  the  British  government. 

In  the  meantime  Congress  was  engaged  in  a  spirited  debate 
upon  the  President's  message  and  the  validity  of  the  American 
title  to  Oregon.  In  the  Senate,  on  December  8,  Benton  presented 
a  memorial  from  the  people  of  Oregon  which  stated  that  they 
had  set  up  a  temporary  government  and  asked  its  approval  by 
Congress.  They  requested  Congress  to  create  for  them  a  terri- 
torial government,  or  at  least  to  give  them  civil  and  military 
protection.""  Next  day  Cass  introduced  resolutions  which  in- 
structed the  military  and  naval  committees  to  inquire  into  the 
defensive  needs  of  the  country. 

When  first  presented,  Cass's  resolutions  elicited  no  comments, 
but  when,  on  December  15,  he  came  to  urge  their  adoption  the 
character  of  his  speech  caused  no  little  consternation.  Negoti- 
ations, he  said,  had  failed  to  settle  the  dispute,  and  Great  Britain 
was  assuming  a  menacing  attitude ;  adequate  military  prepar- 
ation was  the  best  means  of  avoiding  war.  The  President,  in  his 
opinion,  could  never  recede  from  the  position  he  had  taken,  and 
it  was  better  ' '  to  fight  for  the  first  inch  of  national  ten-itory  than 
for  the  last."  Allen,  the  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign 
Affairs,  agreed  that  the  best  method  of  averting  war  was  to  pre- 
pare for  it,  "but  the  only,  or  rather  the  most  effectual,  preparation 
which  could  be  made  in  the  United  States  for  this  state  of  things, 
was  the  preparation  of  the  hearts  of  the  people."  Webster, 
Crittenden,  and  Niles  deplored  warlike  talk,  and  thought  that 


59  McLane  to  Buchanan,  Feb.  3,  1846,  Buchanan  Papers. 

60  Unless  otherwise  stated,  the  opinions  and  remarks  of  congressmen 
have  been  derived  from  the  Congressional  Globe  under  dates  given. 


586  JAMES  K.   POLE 

Cass's  remarks  Avere  most  unfortunate.  Webster  did  not  believe 
that  Polk  expected  war,  and,  in  his  opinion,  the  message  had  been 
intended  as  an  ultimatum  to  induce  England  to  make  a  better 
offer.  Sevier,  on  the  other  hand,  would  not  accept  this  interpre- 
tation. There  would  certainly  be  war,  he  said,  for  the  United 
States  could  not  recede,  and  Great  Britain  would  not;  the  only 
recou7-se  for  the  United  States  was  to  drive  the  British  out  of 
the  territory.  There  was  little  opposition  to  the  resolutions  them- 
selves— the  criticism  was  aimed  at  the  remarks  which  they  called 
forth — and  they  passed  near  the  close  of  the  day  (December  16) 
by  a  unanimous  vote. 

The  Senate  having  taken  the  first  step  in  "preparing  the 
hearts  of  the  people"  for  war,  Allen,  on  the  eighteenth,  presented 
a  joint  resolution  which  advised  the  President  "to  give,  forth- 
with," the  necessary  notice  for  terminating  the  convention  of 
1827  with  Great  Britain.  On  the  same  day  Atchison,  of  Missouri, 
moved  to  instruct  the  Committee  on  Territories  to  inquire  into 
the  expediency  of  organizing  a  government  for  Oregon.  During 
the  next  two  weeks  Texas  rather  than  Oregon  claimed  the  at- 
tention of  the  Senate,  but  on  December  29  Hannegan,  of  Indiana, 
offered  a  resolution  which  declared  all  of  Oregon  to  be  "  part  and 
parcel"  of  the  United  States,  and  that  "there  exists  no  power 
in  this  Government  to  transfer  its  soil,  and  the  allegiance  of  its 
citizens,  to  the  dominion,  authority,  control,  and  subjugation  of 
any  foreign  prince,  state,  or  sovereignty." 

The  Oregon  question  was  introduced  in  the  House  on  the 
second  day  of  the  session  when  Ingersoll  read  a  petition  from  the 
citizens  of  that  region  asking  for  a  territorial  government.  It 
was  read  and  laid  on  the  table,  but  on  December  15  Douglas 
succeeded  in  having  it  referred  to  the  Committee  on  Territories, 
of  which  he  was  chairman.  On  the  nineteenth,  Douglas  reported 
from  his  committee  a  bill  which  provided  for  the  protection  of 
the  rights  of  American  citizens  until  the  termination  of  joint 
occupation.    It  was  read  twice  and  referred  to  the  Committee  of 


OREGON  587 

the  Whole,  there  to  be  made  a  special  order  for  the  first  Tuesday 
in  January,  and  to  continue  such  from  day  to  day  until  it  had 
bepn  adopted  or  rejected.  Scarcely  had  the  reference  been  made 
when  Winthrop,  of  Massachusetts,  offered  resolutions  to  the  effect 
that  the  differences  with  England  were  still  open  to  negotiation 
or  arbitration,  and  that  war  would  be  highly  discreditable  to 
both  nations.  Douglas  responded  immediately  with  resolutions 
which  asserted  that  the  title  to  any  part  of  the  territory  south  of 
54°  40'  was  not  open  to  compromise  or  arbitration.  From  the 
Committee  on  Military  Affairs,  Brinkerhoff,  on  December  31,  re- 
ported a  bill  for  constructing  forts  along  the  route  to  Oregon ; 
this,  also,  was  referred  to  the  Committee  of  the  Whole. 

While  the  House  had  been  discussing  the  proposed  govern- 
ment for  Oregon,  its  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  had  been 
trying  to  agree  upon  a  joint  resolution  for  giving  notice  to  Eng- 
land that  the  convention  of  1827  would  be  terminated.  As  the 
members  were  unable  to  agree,  Ingersoll,  the  chairman,  on  Jan- 
uary 5,  reported  a  resolution  for  the  majority  of  his  committee. 
It  directed  that  the  President  "forthwith  cause  notice  to  be 
given"  that  the  convention  would  be  abrogated  twelve  months 
after  the  notice  had  been  served.  Garrett  Davis,  of  Kentucky, 
then  reported  that  the  minority  of  the  committee — ^himself  and 
two  colleagues — believed  that  the  convention  could  be  abrogated 
by  the  treaty-making  power  only.  The  House,  he  said,  had  noth- 
ing to  do  with  it ;  Congress  neither  made  the  convention  nor  could 
unmake  it,  except  by  a  declaration  of  war.  The  contention  of 
the  minority  was  well  founded,  even  though  the  objectors  were 
governed  more  by  partisan  feelings  than  by  constitutional  scru- 
ples. Although  the  convention  of  1827  did  not  specify  by  whom 
the  notice  should  be  given,  the  natural  inference  was  that  it  meant 
the  treaty-making  power. 

As  soon  as  the  reports  had  been  read,  the  House  proceeded 
at  once  to  consider  the  resolution.  Giddings,  who  opened  the 
debate,   stated  that   heretofore  he  had   opposed   expansion,  but 


588  JAMES  K.   POLK 

since  the  South  had  succeeded  in  annexing  Texas  he  now  wanted 
all  of  Oregon.  The  South,  he  said,  was  not  interested  in  Oregon, 
and  he  believed  that  Polk  would  surrender  all  north  of  the  forty- 
ninth  parallel.  Rhett  repelled  the  charge  that  southern  men  who 
opposed  giving  notice  to  England  were  governed  by  sectional 
motives.  His  own  reason  for  opposing  the  notice  was  that  John 
Quincy  Adams  favored  it ;  he  would  be  ' '  blackballed ' '  in  South 
Carolina  if  he  should  vote  on  the  same  side  as  the  member  from 
Massachusetts.  Cobb,  of  Georgia  (January  9),  regretted  that 
southern  men  should  question  the  title  to  all  of  Oregon ;  if  Con- 
gress should  fail  to  back  up  Polk's  message,  Great  Britain  would 
be  still  less  inclined  to  settle  the  question.  In  his  opinion,  it 
would  be  very  unfair  for  Congress  to  shirk  the  responsibility  by 
leaving  the  discretion  to  the  President.  The  Washington  Union 
in  urging  abrogation  of  the  convention  pointed  out  that  so  long 
as  joint  occupation  continued  England  had  no  interest  in  the 
settlement  of  the  question,  for  ''she  lias  now  all  that  sJic  asks 
for."''' 

As  the  debate  proceeded,  many  arguments — some  of  them 
most  unique — were  offered  in  support  of  the  notice  and  for  the 
claim  to  the  whole  territory.  Levin,  of  Pennsylvania  (January 
9),  based  the  claim  to  all  of  Oregon  upon  the  "genius  of  Ameri- 
can institutions"  and  the  "laws  of  God";  Kenned}^  of  Indiana, 
upon  the  "American  multiplication  table,"  the  operation  of  which 
made  it  necessary  for  the  people  to  have  more  room.*^-  Brinker- 
hoff,  of  'Ohio,  was  captivated  by  the  convincing  logic  of  Bu- 
chanan's  defense  of  the  American  title  as  was  "the  Queen  of 
Sheba,  when  gazing  on  the  architectural  wonders  of  Jerusalem. ' ' 


61  Union,  Jan.  12,  1846.  "If  we  are  to  govern  Oregon  peaceably,"  said 
the  Union  on  January  16,  "we  must  first  get  rid  of  'joint  occupation.' 
If  we  are  to  govern  any  part  of  Oregon  peaceably,  we  must  first  get  rid 
of  'joint  Occupation'  in  that  jiart. '' 

"2  "Our  people  are  spreading  out  with  the  aid  of  the  American  inulti- 
])lication  tal)le.  Go  to  the  West  and  see  a  young  man  with  his  7iiate  of 
eighteen;  after  the  lapse  of  thirty  years,  visit  him  again  and  instead  of 
two,  you  will  find  twenty-two.  That  is  what  J  call  the  American  multi- 
plication table"  (Cong.  Globe,  Jan.  10,  1846). 


OBEGON  589 

Sawtelle,  of  iMaine,  praised  Polk  for  his  firm  stand,  for  he  wanted 
no  compromise  like  the  Ashbnrton  treaty;  "we  want  no  more 
half-English  half-American  secretaries  to  barter  away  any  other 
portion  of  our  territory."  Douglas  would  not  be  satisfied  so 
long  as  Great  Britain  held  an  inch  of  territory  on  the  northwest 
coast,  and  he  commended  the  President  for  reasserting  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine.  He  seems  clearly  to  have  believed  that  Polk  would 
not  conclude  a  treaty  of  any  kind  with  Great  Britain.  Had  he 
believed  otherwise  he  would  hardly  have  uttered  the  remark  about 
to  be  quoted,  for  his  language  would  brand  the  President  as 
unworthy  of  confidence  as  soon  as  the  treaty  had  been  signed. 
After  citing  the  passage  in  Polk's  message  which  stated  that  in 
future  no  European  colony  might  be  planted  in  North  America 
with  the  consent  of  the  United  States,  he  asserted  that  the  con- 
clusion of  any  treaty  with  England— whether  the  line  esablished 
were  49°  or  54°  40' — would  be  giving  such  consent.  "But  the 
President,"  said  he, 

Has  anuounced  distinctly  to  the  world,  as  our  settled  policy,  that  that 
consent  cannot  be  given.  Sir,  he  who  knows  the  character  of  the  man — 
he  who  knows  the  stern  integrity  of  his  political  character— he  who  knows 
the  consistency  of  his  whole  political  life — he  who  knows  his  fidelity  to 
his  principles,  must  know  that,  during  his  four  years,  this  "settled  policy" 
will  not  be  unsettled  by  him.  Sir,  he  is  not  the  man  to  put  the  distinct 
declaration  forth  to  the  world  in  the  name  of  his  Government  of  a  settled 
policy,  and  then  to  sneak  back  from  it,  to  violate  it,  to  disgrace  himself 
and  his  nation  during  that  very  presidential  term  in  which  he  gave  the 
notice.  Then,  I  say,  that  during  these  four  years,  it  is  a  settled,  irrevoc- 
ably settled  question,  that  no  treaty  fixing  a  boundary  for  the  northern 
part  of  Oregon  can  be  made.  Sir,  the  making  of  any  treaty  fixing  a 
boundary,  would  be  a  palpable  violation  of  the  very  principle  the  President 
has  put  fo/th  in  his  message.«3 

Great  difference  of  opinion  existed  as  to  who  possessed  the 
power  and  whose  duty  it  was  to  notify  England  that  the  conven- 
tion would  be  abrogated.  Could  the  President  alone  do  so,  or 
must   he    have   the    advice    and    consent    of   the    Senate;    could 


•53  Jan.  27,  1846  {Cong.  Globe,  29  Cong.,  1  sess.,  259-260). 


590  JAMES  K.   FOLK 

Congress  alone,  or  with  the  approval  of  the  President,  serve  the 
notice ;  if  Congress  alone  lacked  power  to  give  the  notice,  could 
it  direct,  or  simply  advise,  the  President,  to  do  so?  The  Whigs, 
generally,  favored  leaving  the  question  of  serving  the  notice  to 
the  discretion  of  the  President  so  that  he  might  bear  the  respon- 
sibility, although  many  of  them  professed  to  be  certain  that  notice 
would  be  followed  by  war.  On  January  7,  Hilliard,  of  Alabama, 
moved  an  amendment  which  empowered  the  President  to  give 
or  to  withhold  notice ;  Democrats  opposed  the  amendment  and 
declared  it  to  be  both  partisan  and  cowardly.  ' '  But  a  few  months 
ago,"  said  Thurman,  of  Ohio, 

Many  of  them  [the  Whigs]  professed  to  be  unacquainted  as  to  who  Mr. 
Polk  was.  But  so  rapid  had  been  their  progress,  that  they  had  not  only 
found  out  who  he  was,  but  they  had  ascertained  that  he  was  entitled  to 
such  confidence  that  they  proposed  to  confer  upon  him  what  they  argued 
was  the  war-making  power. •'■* 

Andrew  Johnson  condemned  southern  men  who  had  accepted  the 
Baltimore  platform  and  supported  the  candidate  and  who  now 
refused  to  sustain  the  President ;  Strong,  of  New  York,  quoted 
the  London  Examiner  as  proof  that  England  hoped  to  profit  by 
a  division  in  the  Democratic  party. 

Had  John  Randolph  been  living  at  this  time  he  would  have 
beheld  another  alliance  quite  as  strange  as  that  between  "puritan 
and  blackleg,"*'^  for  the  "puritan,"  Adams,  now  sided  with  the 
Oregon  Democrats.  He  did  not,  he  said,  expect  to  add  much  to 
the  argument,  for  in  no  debate  had  the  subject  been  "more  thor- 
oughly and  completely  exhausted."  He  wished  to  have  the  con- 
vention of  1827  abrogated  so  that  the  United  States  might  get 
actual  possession,  for  "that  is  the  only  thing  we  now  want,  to 
have  a  perfect,  clear,  indisputable,  and  undoubted  right  to  the 


81  When  Polk  was  nominated,  said  Cathcart,  of  Indiana,  the  Whigs 
cried,  "Who  is  James  K.  Polk?";  "and  yet  these  immaculate  apostles  of 
consistency  are  willing  to  vote  this  tremendous  power  [the  war  power] 
into  the  hands  of  this  very  same  James  K.  Polk!  " 

"5  On  the  alliance  of  Adams  and  Clay  in  1824,  see  Schouler,  lliai.  of 
the  V.  S.,  MI,  .'.67. 


OliEGON  591 

territory  of  Oregon."  The  government  should  therefore  give 
notice  to  England,  and  occupy  the  territory.  In  his  Memoirs, 
Adams  makes  the  interesting  statement  that  neitlier  Monroe  nor 
he,  when  President,  really  intended  to  divide  the  territory  with 
Great  Britain :    . 

This  offer  was  formerly  made  under  the  impression  that  it  would  not 
be  accepted,  but  that  its  effect  would  be  to  preserve  the  peace  between  the 
two  countries,  and  postpone  the  issue  of  the  controversy  until  the  time 
should  come  when  we  should  be  able  to  maintain  our  claims  by  an  appeal, 
if  necessary,  to  arms.'^o 

His  independence  and  his  want  of  sympathy  with  the  attitude 
of  his  political  associates  is  manifested  in  his  remarks  concerning 
a  conversation  held  with  Representative  Moseley,  of  New  York: 

He  is  a  member  of  the  Whig  party,  the  policy  of  which  among  the 
people  appears  to  be  concentrating  itself  upon  a  system  of  opposition  to 
the  present  Administration  on  the  ground  of  its  propensity  to  war  with 
Great  Britain.  Dangers  of  war,  and  a  very  contemptuous  estimate  of  the 
object  for  which  they  suppose  the  President  is  provoking  it,  are  the  only 
theme  upon  which  they  dwell,  without  suf3ficiently  considering  that  their 
terrors  and  prognostics  may  furnish  to  Mr.  Polk  motives  and  pretexts  for 
yielding  to  the  pretensions  of  our  adversary,  and  sacrificing  our  own  just 
claims  to  the  territory  in  dispute,  of  which  I  think  there  is  much  greater 
danger  than  of  a  war  for  the  maintenance  of  them.oT 

The  President's  adversaries  were  unable  to  agree  concerning 
the  most  effective  method  of  opposing  his  Oregon  policy.  In- 
surgent Democrats,  as  a  rule,  argued  against  abrogating  the 
British  convention  because,  as  they  said,  war  would  result.  Some 
of  the  Whigs  offered  similar  arguments ;  others,  as  we  have  seen, 
were  willing  to  invest  Polk  with  power  to  abrogate  the  conven- 
tion, and  to  make  him  responsible  for  the  consequences.  Tooms, 
of  Georgia,  Campbell,  of  New  York,  Ewing,  of  Tennessee,  as  well 
as  others,  did  not  regard  the  American  title  to  be  "unquestion- 
able" except  to  the  Columbia  River  valley;  they  were  ready, 

6«  Adams,  Memoirs,  XII,  221. 
c-  Ibid.,  226. 


592  JAMES  E.   POLE 

therefore,  to  agree  upon  the  forty-ninth  parallel.  King,  of 
Georgia,  wished  to  settle  the  question  by  arbitration,  while  Davis, 
of  Mississippi,  like  Calhoun,  advocated  "masterly  inactivity." 
He  thought  that  Polk  was  in  need  of  being  saved  from  his  friends ; 
if  the  title  to  Oregon  was  as  ' '  perfect ' '  as  the  President  claimed, 
it  was  dishonorable  for  him  and  his  predecessors  to  have  offered 
to  compromise  Avith  Great  Britain. 

On  February  9,  1846,  the  Committee  of  the  Whole  ceased 
debating  and  prepared  to  vote  on  the  bill  as  reported  from  the 
Committee  of  Foreign  Affairs.  Numerous  amendments  were 
offered,"^  but  few  modifications  were  permitted.  After  much 
wrangling  the  House  resolved  by  a  vote  of  one  hundred  sixtj^- 
three  to  fifty-four  that  the  President  ' '  cause  notice  to  be  given ' ' 
to  Great  Britain  that  the  convention  of  1827  would  be  abrogated 
at  the  end  of  twelve  months.  A  second  paragraph  explained  that 
such  action  was  not  intended  to  preclude  further  "negotiations 
for  an  amicable  settlement."  In  this  form  the  resolution  was 
sent  to  the  Senate  for  its  approval. 

The  House  resolution  reached  the  Senate  on  the  tenth  but 
instead  of  giving  it  immediate  consideration,  that  body  continued 
to  debate  various  joint  resolutions  which  had  been  proposed  by 
its  own  members.  Among  these  was  one  that  had  been  offered 
by  Crittenden,  on  January  26,  and  this,  with  slight  modifications, 
was  the  one  finally  adopted  as  an  amendment  to  the  House  reso- 
lution. Before  its  adoption,  however,  the  Senate  indulged  in  a 
prolonged  and  acrimonious  debate. 

The  question  of  abrogating  the  convention  of  1827  was  dis- 
cussed from  every  possible  angle,  and  yet  very  little  new  light 
was  contributed  by  either  the  friends  or  the  opponents  of  the 
administration.  Although  not  a  political  supporter  of  the  Presi- 
dent, Clayton,  of  Delaware,  was  willing  to  trust  Polk's  judgment 


68  For  example,  as  to  whether  Polk  should  be  rocjuesteil,  required,  or 
left  to  his  discretion,  with  respect  to  giving  notice  to  England.  Some 
wanted  a  long  preamble,  others,  provision  for  further  negotiation  (Cong. 
Globe,  29  Cong.,  1  sess.,  345-350). 


OBEGON  593 

in  the  matter  of  giving  notice.  He  expressed  the  belief  that  war 
would  not  result  from  abrogation  of  the  convention,  and  quoted 
the  Manchester  Guardian  to  show  that  the  British  were  in  favor 
of  such  action."^  Relying  with  the  utmost  confidence  on  Polk's 
"honesty,  integrity,  and  firmness,"  Colquitt,  of  Georgia,  was 
ready  to  follow  the  recommendations  made  in  the  President's 
message,  for 

It  has  been  very  properly  said  that  no  message  that  ever  emanated  . 
from  a  President  of  the  United  States  has  met  with  more  general  appro- 
bation on  the  part  of  the  people  than  the  one  to  which  I  now  allude.  It 
is  able,  dignified,  and  peaceful.  All  that  he  has  said  and  all  that  he  has 
done,  and  all  that  he  has  offered  to  do,  has  met  a  favorable  response  from 
the  public. 

Colquitt  did  not  believe,  however,  that  the  American  title  w^as 
so  clear  as  to  preclude  further  negotiation,  and  he  was  confident 
that  Polk  would  not  reject  a  reasonable  offer  to  settle  the  dispute. 
In  the  course  of  his  remarks  Colquitt  twitted  Hannegan,  of 
Indiana,  with  having  been  indifferent  to  the  acquisition  of  Texas. 
"Both  Texas  and  Oregon,"  replied  Hannegan,  "were  united  in 
the  Baltimore  convention.  But  I  dreaded— if  Texas  went  first— 
I  dreaded  Punic  faith.  Yes,  Punic  faith. "'«  Others  besides 
Hannegan  accused  southern  members  with  having  declined,  for 
sectional  reasons,  to  support  the  President's  Oregon  policy,  but 
for  the  most  part  these  accusations  seem  to  have  been  groundless. 
One  of  the  most  exhaustive  speeches  in  support  of  Polk's 
policy  was  delivered  by  John  A.  Dix,  of  New  York.    He  did  not 

66  "With  respect  to  the  notice  for  terminating  the  joint  occupation  of 
Oregon,"  said  the  Guardian,  "we  are  not  sure  that  President  Polk  may 
not  receive  it  from  the  English  Government  before  he  can  possthhj  he  m  a 
condition  to  give  it  himself.  But  whether  givpu  by  the  one  side  or  the  other, 
we  do  not  conceive  that  it  will  add  materially,  if  at  all,  to  the  chance  of  a 
hostile  collision." 

70  "Texas  and  Oregon,"  said  Hannegan  on  December  30,  1845,  "were 
born  the  same  instant,  nursed  and  cradled  in  the  same  cradle— the  Balti- 
more convention— and  thev  were  at  the  same  instant  adopted  by  the 
democracv  throughout  the  land.  There  was  not  a  moment's  hesitation, 
until  Tex'as  was  admitted;  but  the  moment  she  was  a.lmitted,  the  peculiar 
friends  of  Texas  turned,  and  were  doing  what  they  could  to  strangle 
Oregon !  ' ' 


594  JAMES  E.   POLE 

agree  Avith  Allen 's  assertion  that  the  time  for  discussing  the  title 
"had  gone  by,"  nor  with  Clayton's  contention  that  "it  had  not 
yet  arrived."  His  argument  in  support  of  the  American  claim 
was  so  thorough  and  conclusive  that  Benton,  who  followed  him, 
declared  that  "He  [Dix]  has  left  nothing  for  me  to  say  on  the 
point  of  title,  familiar  as  I  have  been  with  that  subject  for  thirty 
years.  ""^  The  exhaustive  character  of  Dix's  speech  may  have 
been  sufficient  reason  for  Benton's  eschewing  the  subject  of  title 
himself,  but  a  better  reason,  perhaps,  was  his  own  real  belief, 
as  he  had  already  informed  the  President,  that  England  held  a 
valid  title  to  Frazer's  River  valley.  Dix  had  relieved  him  from 
the  necessity  of  dwelling  on  this  subject,  and  had  left  him  free 
to  employ  more  general  terms  in  his  defense  of  the  administra- 
tion. Whatever  his  mental  reservations  may  have  been,  he  sup- 
ported Polk 's  Oregon  policy  with  enthusiasm,  the  first  fruit  of  the 
recent  reconciliation.  "I  concur  with  the  President,"  said  he, 
"in  what  he  has  done — both  in  what  he  has  offered — in  what  he 
has  rejected — and  in  what  he  has  recommended  to  Congress  to 
do."  In  his  opinion,  the  policy  pursued  had  produced  a  good 
effect  both  at  home  and  abroad,  had  removed  misapprehensions, 
and  created  a  feeling  favorable  to  friendly  negotiation.  He  had 
no  fear  of  war,  for  both  governments  were  in  good  humor  and 
desirous  of  peace. 

To  Webster,  Polk's  Oregon  policy  was  a  riddle  which  baffled 
solution.  He  desired  to  know  what  the  President  intended  to  do, 
for  he  did  not  act  like  a  man  who  expected  a  war : 

There  is  nothing  in  his  recommendations  to  the  other  House,  nor  to  this, 
indicative  of  such  an  expectation.  There  is  nothing  of  preparation  for 
defense,   indicating   that   the   President   expects   war.      Well,   then,   he   can 


71  "He  has  placed  the  American  title  to  the  Oolumbia,"  Benton  con- 
tinued, "and  to  the  coast  north  of  it,  on  ground  from  which  it  can  never 
be  removed,  and  which  must  ])ut  an  end  to  the  argument  wherever  that 
speech  is  read.  A  sjieech  more  perfect  in  its  proofs — better  sustained  by 
history — more  crowded  witli  material  pertinent  to  the  issue — more  satis- 
factory to  all  lovers  of  truth  and  justice — more  judiciously  conceived  and 
victoriously  executed,  I  have  never  heard  delivered. ' ' 


OEEGON  595 

expect  nothing  but  a  continuance  of  this  dispute,  or  its  settlement  by  nego- 
tiation. 1  am  bound  to  suppose  that  he  expects  its  settlement  by  negotia- 
tion. What  terms  of  negotiation?  What  basis  of  negotiation?  What 
grounds  of  negotiation?  Everything  that  we  hear  from  the  Executive  de- 
partment is  "the  whole  or  none";  and  yet  negotiate!  Sir,  it  is  vain  to 
conceal  from  ourselves,  from  the  country,  or  from  the  world,  the  gross  incon- 
sistency of  this  course  of  conduct.  It  is  the  spirit  of  that  correspondence 
[Buchanan's]  to  Avhich  my  honorable  friend  has  alluded,  that  the  whole  of 
Oregon  is  ours,  and  that  nothing  can  be  done  which  admits  the  existence  of 
a  doubt  as  to  our  right  to  the  whole,  or  the  possibility  of  a  right  existing 
in  another;  and  yet  Ave  are  to  negotiate!  Pray,  Avhat  is  negotiation?  Does 
the  Administration  expect  that,  by  negotiation,  it  can  persuade  the  British 
Government  to  surrender  the  whole  territory  to  us?  Is  that  its  expecta- 
tion? It  may  do  that.  I  cannot  say  it  will  not.  If  that  is  the  expectation 
of  our  Government,  why  then,  of  course,  it  will  try  its  hand  at  it.  I  wish 
it  success!  That  is  to  say,  I  wish  the  country  could  be  rid  of  the  dispute. 
Take  the  whole  of  Oregon,  if  you  can  get  it;  but,  at  all  events,  settle  the 
question  between  the  two  countries  fairly  and  reasonably.  But  I  say  I 
do  not  understand  the  position  in  Avhich  the  Executive  government  has 
placed  itself ;  in  favor  of  negotiation  all  the  time ;  but  all  the  time  refus- 
ing to  take  anything  less  than  the  whole!  What  consideration — what  com- 
promise— what  basis — what  grounds,  therefore,  for  negotiation?  If  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  has  made  up  its  mind — I  speak  of  the 
Executive  government — that,  so  far  as  it  is  concerned,  it  Avill  not  treat  for 
anything  less  than  the  whole  of  Oregon,  then  it  should  say  so,  and  throw 
itself  on  the  two  houses  of  Congress  and  on  the  country.     It  should  say  so. 

He  promised  to  support  the  administration  in  maintaining 
the  rights  of  the  United  States,  but  insisted  upon  knowing 
whether  the  President  intended  to  negotiate  or  to  make  war.  In 
his  own  opinion,  the  latter  course  would  be  very  unwise — the 
question  should  be  adjusted  by  a  compromise.'^- 


"2  ' '  The  speech  of  Mr.  Webster,  Mr.  Calhoun,  and  others  in  the  Senate 
advocating  peace  and  the  Brittish  title  to  a  large  portion  of  the  country, ' ' 
wrote  the  President  some  weeks  later,  "have  made  the  Brittish  Govern- 
ment &  people  more  arrogant  in  their  tone  and  more  grasping  in  their 
demands.  If  war  should  be  the  result,  these  peace  gentlemen  &  advocates 
of  Brittish  pretensions  over  those  of  their  own  country  wdll  have  done 
more  to  produce  it  than  any  others"  (Polk,  Diary,  I,  345).  Webster  had 
denounced  the  war  spirit  as  early  as  November  7,  1845,  in  a  speech  in 
Faneuil  Hall:  "The  man  who  shall  incautiously,  or  led  on  by  false  am- 
bition or  party  pride,  kindle  those  fires  of  war  over  the  globe  on  this 
[Oregon]  question,  must  look  out  for  it — must  expect  himself  to  be  con- 
sunaed  in  a  burning  conflagration  of  general  reproach"  (Curtis,  Life  of 
Webster,  II,  258). 


596  JAMES  K.   POLK 

Polk  tokl  Benton  that  he  had  endeavored  to  Avrite  his  message 
"in  plain  English,  &  thought  no  part  of  it  could  be  misunder- 
stood.''" Nevertheless,  members  of  Congress  seemed  to  find  it 
ambiguous,  and  Webster's  remarks  caused  another  attempt  to 
fathom  its  meaning.  Colquitt  was  certain  that  the  President  did 
not  mean  to  insist  absolutely  on  procuring  the  whole  of  Oregon. 
Allen  was  equally  certain  that  Polk  would  accept  nothing  less, 
since  Great  Britain  had  rejected  the  offer  he  had  made.  When 
asked  by  Reverdy  Johnson,  however,  whether  his  assertions  had 
been  authorized  by  the  President,  Allen  had  to  admit  that  he 
possessed  no  information  except  that  contained  in  the  official 
message.  When  making  his  declaration,  Allen  knowingly  mis- 
represented the  President.  In  fact  Allen  himself  had,  on  Decem- 
ber 24,  1845,  advised  Polk,  in  case  England  should  offer  to  com- 
promise on  the  forty-ninth  parallel,  to  submit  the  offer  confiden- 
tially to  the  Senate  before  acting  upon  it.  Polk  "agreed  in  the 
propriety  of  the  course  he  advised, ' '  but  did  not  authorize  Allen 
to  speak  for  him.^*  Haywood,  a  Democrat  from  North  Carolina, 
although  willing  to  accept  49°,  wished  to  intrust  the  Avhole  ques- 
tion to  Polk,  for  he  would  not 

do  the  President  so  much  wrong  as  to  suppose  that,  if  we  passed  the  notice, 
and  thus  put  into  his  hand  a  great  moral  -weapon,  that  he  could  be  guilty 
of  so  miserable  a  trick  as  to  use  it  to  the  dishonor  of  his  country  on  the 
one  hand,  or  the  reckless  provocation  of  war  on  the  other.^o 

Reverdy  Johnson  thought  that  the  President  was  bound  to  accept 
the  forty-ninth  parallel,  if  offered  by  England.  "  'Who  is  James 
K.  Polk?'  was  a  question  once  asked.  We  all  know  now  w4io  he 
is,  though  there  are  some  who  do  not  know  what  he  is."  He  is 
President  of  the  United  States,  said  Johnson,  and  if  he  had  felt 
bound  by  the  offers  made  by  his  predecessors,  certainly  he  could 
not  reject  an  offer  once  made  by  himself.    Atchison,  of  Missouri, 


73  Polk,  Diary,  I,  117. 
-*Ibxd.,  139. 

~''  Like   Allen,   Haywood   had   not   been   autliorizod   to    speak   for   the 
President  {xhid.,  262). 


OBEGON  597 

was  unable  to  see  how  his  colleagues  could  discern  compromise 
in  the  President's  declarations.  Polk  had  accepted  the  Baltimore 
platform,  and  both  his  inauguaral  and  his  message  had  claimed 
all  of  the  territory:  ''The  very  moment  he  gave  up  any  por- 
tion of  Oregon,  every  honest  man  would  condemn  it."'" 

The  debate  in  the  Senate  on  the  question  of  giving  notice  to 
England  continued  until  the  middle  of  April.  Many  of  the  "Whigs 
and  a  few  of  the  Democrats  opposed  the  joint  resolution,"  but 
Democrats,  generally,  rallied  to  its  support.  The  advocates  of 
the  resolution  still  differed  in  opinion  as  to  the  result  of  abro- 
gating the  convention ;  some  argued  that  such  action  would  lead 

76  W  C.  Eives,  of  Virginia,  believed  that  Polk  and  his  supporters  in 
Congress  were  simply  playing  polities:  "Surely,  such  a  spectacle  was 
never  exhibited  before  in  anv  country  as  is  now  presented  m  ours,  i^very 
conciliatory  advance  of  the  British  government  unceremoniously  repelled— 
the  most  extreme  claims  urged  on  our  side— a  tone  of  menace  &  .'iisdain 
freely  indulged  by  the  chosen  champions  of  the  administration  m  both 
Houses— everything  done  which  could  apparently  provoke  a  wor— and  yet 
I  learn  a  settled  purpose  to  accept  any  compromise  that  can  be  obtained 
The  minds  of  the  whole  nation  kept  in  constant  &  painful  anxiety  &  all 
its  business  operations  deranged,  to  enable  a  knot  of  small  politicians  to 
play  brag  for  the  retention  of  public  office,  &  to  acquire  credit,  with  a 
people  whom  they  hope  thus  to  delude,  for  superior  patriotism  spirit  & 
valour'  It  is  impossible  to  speak  with  patience,  of  such  low  &  despicable 
manoevering,  even  if  it  can  be  carried  on  without  committing  the  peace 
of  the  country.  But  the  game  is  a  most  hazardous  one,  &  Mr.  Folk  may 
yet  find  he  has  not  the  skill  to  play  it  out"  (Rives  to  McLean  Feb  18 
1846,  McLean  Papers).  Tooms.  of  Georgia,  likewise  charged  the  Pi;esident 
with  insincerity:  "I  do  not  think  a  war  in  the  least  Probable.  Mr.  Folk 
never  dreamed  of  any  other  war  than  a  war  upon  the  Whigs.  He  is 
playing  a  low  grog-shop  politician's  trick,  nothing  more.  He  woubl  be 
as  much  surprised  and  astonished  and  frightened  at  getting  into  war  with 
England  as  if  the  Devil  were  to  rise  up  before  him  at  his  bidding.  . 

His  partv  were  alreadv  committed  to  him  to  54°  40',  they  would  stand  by 
him,  and  he  expected  finally  to  be  forced  by  the  Bntish  Whigs  am 
Southern  Calhoun  men  to  compromise;  but  he  greatly  hoped  that  he  would 
not  be  forced  even  to  this  alternative  until  he  had  '  all  Oregon  on  every 
Democratic  banner  in  the  Union  for  his  'second  heat  '  I  have  no.  the 
least  doubt  but  that  he  fully  calculated  that  the  '  notice '  would  be  rejected 
by  a  combination  between  the  Whigs  and  Calhoun  men  of  this  Congress 
and  then  he  could  have  kept  it  open  for  a  new  pres.lential  ^'amraign 
(Tooms  to  G.  W.  Crawford,  Feb.  6,  1846,  in  Bep.  Am.  Hist.  Assn.,  1911,  II, 

73-74).  .         .X,  •  . 

77  ' '  Most  of  the  Whigs  in  the  Senate  incline  to  remain  rather  quiet, 
and  to  follow  the  lead  of  Mr.  Calhoun.  He  is  at  the  head  of  a  party  of 
six  or  seven,  and  as  he  professes  still  to  be  an  administration  ma.i  it  is 
be«t  to  leav^  the  work  in  his  hands,  at  least  for  the  present "  (Webster 
to  Sears,  Jan.  17,  1846,  in  Webster,  Private  Corr.,  11,  215). 


598  JAMES  K.   POLK 

to  compromise  and  settlement,  others,  that  the  sequel  would  be 
occupation  of  the  entire  territory.  No  agreement  could  be  reached 
as  to  wliat  the  President  would  do  if  the  resolution  should  pass, 
and  nothing  came  from  the  ' '  Executive  Mansion ' '  to  aid  in  solv- 
ing the  mystery.  ' '  Was  there  ever  such  a  case  known, ' '  exclaimed 
Mangum,  of  North  Carolina,  "as  an  Executive  without  an  organ 
of  his  views  and  opinions  in  either  House  of  Congress?" — the 
Union  had  definitely  stated  that  no  one  could  speak  for  him ; 
"that  no  man,  beyond  his  Cabinet,  knew  his  views."  It  had  not 
been  so  in  Jackson's  time,  said  Mangum,  and  it  would  not  be  so 
now  if  Clay,  Benton,  or  Calhoun  were  at  the  head  of  the  govern- 
ment. "The  present  Administration,"  he  continued,  was  "re- 
markable chiefly  for  one  thing  in  the  management  of  this  ques- 
tion, and  that  was,  its  secretiveness."'*  In  answer  to  Mangum, 
Cass  so  far  lifted  the  veil  as  to  disclose  that  both  Polk  and 
Buchanan  had  given  their  approval,  in  advance,  to  his  [Cass's] 
resolutions  which  called  upon  the  army  and  navy  departments  for 
information  regarding  the  defensive  strength  of  the  country. 
As  to  Polk's  intentions  for  the  future,  however,  Cass  had  nothing 
to  impart.  In  the  opinion  of  the  President  himself  the  debate 
had 

taken  a  strange  direction;  that  instead  of  examining  and  discussing  my 
views  as  communicated  in  these  documents  [message  and  correspondence], 
Senators  had  been  guessing  and  conjecturing  what  I  might  do  hereafter, 
and  were  approving  or  condemning  what  they  supposed  T  might  or 
might  not  do."» 


T8  A  few  days  before,  March  30,  Barrow,  of  Louisiana,  said:  "There 
never  before  had  been  a  period  when  some  one  in  the  Senate  was  not 
authorized  to  speak  for  the  Executive,  acquainted  with  his  views,  and 
ready  to  put  those  right  who  misconstrued  his  language  or  his  views." 

79  Polk,  Diary.  I,  285-286.  In  a  letter  written  a  little  later  Crittenden 
said:  "Bitter  dissensions  are  already  manifested  among  our  opponents; 
they  are  about  equally  divided  in  the  Senate.  They  quarrel  about  what 
the  President's  sentiments  and  purposes  are  in  relation  to  Oregon, — each 
interprets  the  'oracle'  to  suit  himself,  and  eacdi  jiretends  to  speak  for  liim, 
while  all  are  suspicious  and  jealous  of  him  and  of  each  other.  They  know 
that  one  side  or  the  other  is  cheated  and  to  be  cheated,  but  they  can't  yet 
exactly  tell  which,  in  the  mean  time  they  curse  Polk  hypothetically.  If 
he  don't  settle  and  make  peace  at  forty-nine  or  some  other  ]iarallel  of 
compromise,  the  one  side  curses  him;  and  if  he  yields  an  inch  or  stops  a 


OREGON  599 

After  the  Senate  had  discussed  its  own  resolution  for  more 
than  two  months,  Allen  who  had  originally  reported  it  from  his 
committee  moved,  on  April  16,  that  it  be  sent  to  the  table  and 
that  the  Senate  proceed  to  consider  the  resolution  which  had  been 
passed  by  the  House  on  the  ninth  of  February.  The  motion  was 
carried,  and  Reverdy  Johfison  at  once  offered  an  amendment  to 
the  House  resolution.  It  was  almost  an  exact  replica  of  the  Crit- 
tenden proposal  which,  along  with  other  amendments  to  the  Allen 
resolution,  had  just  been  laid  on  the  table.  After  some  discus- 
sion, and  attempts  to  alter  it,  the  Johnson  amendment  was  passed 
by  a  vote  of  30  to  24.  The  resolution  as  passed  by  the  House 
had  directed  the  President  to  notify  England  that  the  conven- 
tion would  be  abrogated;  as  amended  by  the  Senate,  Polk  was 
"authorized,  at  his  discretion"  to  give  such  notice.  After  the 
amendment  had  been  passed,  but  before  the  whole  resolution,  as 
amended,  had  reached  a  vote,  Allen  bitterly  assailed  the  modifica- 
tion made  by  the  Senate  and  announced  his  intention  to  vote 
against  the  measure.  The  preamble,  he  said,  advised  negotiation, 
while  the  main  clause  left  the  question  of  notice  to  the  discretion 
of  the  President:  "they  throw  the  whole  subject  back  to  the 
President,  to  be  managed  in  future  according  to  his  discretion, 
after  having  condemned  him  for  a  want  of  discretion  in  his  past 
management."  The  measure  was  passed  by  a  vote  of  40  to  14. 
The  effect  of  attaching  this  amendment  to  the  House  resolution 
may  not,  as  Allen  asserted,  have  been  to  array  each  house  against 
the  other,  and  both  against  the  President;  but  the  affirmative 
vote  on  the  preamble  must  have  made  it  clear  to  Polk  that  the 
Senate  would  ratify  a  compromise  treaty  and  that,  in  all  prob- 
ability, it  would  not  cooperate  with  him  in  an  aggressive  Oregon 
policy.  Undoubtedly  this  action  of  the  Senate  had  some  influence 
in  modifying  his  diplomatic  program. 


hair's  breadth  short  of  fifty-four  degrees  forty  miuntes,  the  other  side 
damns  him  without  redemption.  Was  ever  a  gentleman  in  such  a  fix? 
He  might  almost  say  like  Satan,  that  'hell  was  around  him'  "  (Crittenden 
to  Letcher,  March  9,  1846,  in  Coleman,  Life  of  John  J.  Crittenden,  235). 


600  JAMES  K.   POLK 

On  April  18  the  House  proceeded  to  consider  the  joint  resohi- 
tion  as  amended  by  the  Senate.  After  adopting  an  amendment 
offered  by  Owen,  of  Indiana,  by  wliich  the  President  was  "author- 
ized and  requested"  to  serve  notice  upon  Great  Britain,  the 
measure  was  passed  by  a  vote  of  144  to  40.  Two  days  later  the 
House  received  notice  that  the  Senate  had  rejected  the  Owen 
amendment  and  had  adhered  to  its  own.  A  conference  was  then 
arranged.  Slight  modifications  were  made  in  the  Senate  pre- 
amble, but  the  main  part  of  the  resolution  was  left  unchanged. 
In  the  final  form  the  President  was  "authorized,  at  his  discre- 
tion" to  give  the  notice,  and,  by  a  vote  of  142  to  46,  the  resolu- 
tion was  passed  by  the  House  on  the  twenty-third  of  April. ^° 
The  President  regretted  that  action  had  been  so  long  delayed 
and  that  the  preamble  had  been  prefixed  by  the  Senate ;  but 
"after  all,"  he  added  philosophically,  "Congress  by  authorizing 
the  notice,  have  sustained  the  first  great  measure  of  my  adminis- 
tration, though  not  in  a  form  that  is  altogether  satisfactory  or 
one  that  was  preferred."*^  He  decided  at  once  to  transmit  the 
notice  directly  to  the  British  government  instead  of  giving  it  to 
Pakenham. 


80  The  Van  Buren  Democrats  supported  the  administration  by  their 
votes,  although  some  of  them  did  so  reluctantly.  Undoubtedly  C.  C. 
Cambrolengr  voiced  the  sentiments  of  many  of  them  when  he  wrote: 
"Heaven  forgive  me  for  having  had  any  hand  in  laying  the  foundation  of 
this  blundering  administration.  Tyler  was  bad  enough  but  he  had  this 
advantage- — there  was  no  mock-mystery  nor  genuine  duplicity  in  his  con- 
duct— if  he  betrayed  his  friends  he  was  an  honest  knave,  without  any 
hypocritical  cant  about  the  sabbath  &c  &c.  But  apart  from  that  I  am 
utterly  astonished  at  the  little  judgment  and  less  integrity  which  has  dis- 
tinguished the  course  of  this  administration.  First  as  it  regards  England — 
when  some  three  or  four  months  ago  she  was  making  war  like  jirepar- 
ations — McLane  was  instructed  to  inquire  of  Aberdeen  whether  these 
preparations  were  intended  for  us — and  now  it  appears  that  before  that 
enquiry  was  made,  Bancroft  was  'confidentially'  recommending  ten  war 
steamers — the  Bureaus  forty  war  steamers  and  Marcy  fifty  thousand  vol- 
unteers with  the  knowledge  and  approbation  of  the  President!  .  .  .  How 
nncandid  and  dishonorable  must  the  conduct  of  the  President  and  his 
prime  minister  appear  in  the  eyes  of  all  honest  men"  (Cambreleng  to 
Van  Buren,  May  16,  1846,  Van  Buren  Papers). 

81  Polk,  Diary,  I,  348. 


OHEGON  GOl 

While  the  resohition  for  giving  notice  to  England  was  under 
discussion  attempts  were  made  by  both  friends  and  opponents 
of  the  measure  to  induce  the  President  to  alter  or  to  supplement 
the  views  expressed  in  his  annual  message.  Opponents  of  the 
resolution  wished  him  to  commit  himself  to  compromise;  its 
friends,  on  the  contrary,  desii-ed  additional  pledges  that  he  would 
insist  upon  the  whole  of  Oregon. 

The  first  to  approach  him  was  James  A.  Black,  a  South  Caro- 
lina member  of  the  House  and  a  personal  friend  of  Calhoun. 
Calhoun  was  much  opposed  to  the  resolution,  and  his  friends  had 
endeavored  to  effect  a  compromise  with  certain  western  Senators 
who  were  its  chief  advocates.  Black  visited  Polk  on  January  4, 
1846,  and  told  him  that  he  had  just  held  a  conversation  with 
Senators  Semple,  of  Illinois,  and  Atchison,  of  Missouri.  He 
thought  they  would  agree  not  to  press  the  notice  resolution  if  the 
South  would  unite  with  the  .West  in  supporting  the  other  meas- 
ures recommended  in  Polk's  message,  including  that  for  granting 
lands  to  Oregon  settlers.  He  therefore  asked  the  President  to 
induce  his  western  friends  to  postpone  action  on  the  resolution. 
Polk  declined  to  follow  Black's  suggestion,  for,  as  he  said,  his 
mind  had  not  changed  since  he  had  recommended  that  notice 
should  be  given.    ' '  I  remarked  to  him, ' '  he  noted  in  his  diary, 

that  the  only,  way  to  treat  John  Bull  was  to  look  him  straight  in  the  eye; 
that  I  considered  a  bold  &  firm  course  on  our  part  the  pacific  one;  that 
if  Congress  faultered  or  hesitated  in  their  course,  John  Bull  would  imme- 
diately become  arrogant  and  more  grasping  in  his  demands.82 

The  advocates  of  notice  and  54°  40'  were  quite  as  unsuccessful 
in  their  efforts  to  commit  the  President  to  a  definite  future  policy. 
As  representatives  of  a  caucus  of  Senate  Democrats,  Hannegan 
and  Atchison  interviewed  Polk  on  the  seventh  of  March  and  put 
the  direct  question  whether  he  would  insist  upon  54°  40',  or,  if 
necessary,  compromise  on  49°.  "I  answered  him  [Hannegan]," 
Polk  recorded, 


82  Ibid.,  154-155. 


602  JAMES  K.   POLK 

that  I  would  answer  no  man  what  I  would  do  in  the  future;  that  for  what 
I  might  do  I  would  be  responsible  to  God  and  my  country  and  if  I  should 
hereafter  do  anything  whieh  should  be  disapproved  by  himself  or  others, 

it  would  be  time  enough  to  condemn  me I  said,  I  am  charged 

with  the  Foreign  relations  of  the  country,  and  it  was  unheard  of  that 
the  President  should  declare  in  advance  to  any  one  out  of  his  Cabinet 
his  intentions  in  reference  to  them.ss 

Although  the  President  declined,  at  all  times,  to  commit  him- 
self as  to  his  future  course,  he  was  careful,  on  the  other  hand,  to 
leave  the  way  open  for  possible  concessions.  On  several  occasions 
he  informed  both  extremists  and  compromisers  that  if  England 
should  offer  the  forty-ninth  parallel  as  a  boundary  he  might, 
before  acting,  submit  the  question  to  the  Senate.  He  was  careful, 
also,  to  let  both  factions  know  that  no  member  of  Congress  had 
been  authorized  to  speak  for  him,  and  that  the  policy  outlined 
in  his  annual  message  would  remain  unchanged  unless  modified 
by  a  future  official  communication.** 

The  want  of  harmony  among  Democrats  in  the  Senate  was 
highly  displeasing  to  the  President,  and  the  more  so  because  he 
attributed  it  to  personal  ambition  rather  than  to  honest  difference 
of  opinion.    "Tlie  truth  is,"  he  wrote,  on  April  22,  1846, 

that  in  all  this  Oregon  discussion  in  the  Senate,  too  many  Democratic 
Senators  have  been  more  concerned  about  the  Presidential  election  in  '48 
than  they  have  been  about  settling  Oregon  either  at  49°  or  54°  40'. 
"Forty-eight"  has  been  with  them  the  Great  question,  and  hence  the 
division  in  the  Democratic  party.  I  cannot  but  observe  the  fact,  and  for 
the  sake  of  the  country  I  deplore  it.  I  will  however  do  my  duty  what- 
ever may  happen.  I  will  rise  above  the  interested  factions  in  Congress, 
and  appeal  confidently  to  the  people  for  support.^-; 


84  Ibid.,  262-263  and  passim. 
»3lbid.,  273. 

85  Polk,  Diary,  I,  345.  On  March  9  he  had  observed:  "This  whole 
excitement  in  the  Senate  has  grown  out  of  the  aspirations  of  Senators  and 
their  friends  for  the  PresidencJ^  Mr.  Allen  has  such  aspirations  himself. 
Mr.  Haywood  probably  prefers  Gov.  Wright  of  N.  York.  Gen  '1  ('ass  has 
aspirations  Init  is  more  prudent  tlian  some  others.  Mr.  Calhoun  has  aspi- 
rations. My  fear  is  that  these  factions  looking  to  the  election  of  my 
successor  in  1848,  will  so  divide  and  weaken  the  Democratic  party  by  their 
feuils  as  to  defeat  my  measures  and  render  my  administration  unsuccessful 
and    useless.      Each    one    of    the    factions    doubtless    desire [s]    to    use    the 


OREGON  603 

Although  the  joint  iTsoliition  in  its  final  form  was  not,  as  we 
have  seen,  entirely  satisfactory  to  the  President,  he  accepted  it 
as  preferable  to  no  action  at  all.**"  He  had  two  reasons  for  desir- 
ing some  action  on  the  part  of  Congress,  even  though  details 
might  be  unsatisfactory.  He  suspected  that  a  majority  in  the 
Senate  would  gladly  see  notice  in  any  form  defeated  and  would 
therefore  effect  their  purpose  if  the  House  would  decline  to  yield. 
He  believed,  also,  that  Great  Britain  would  not  make  another 
offer  until  Congress  had  taken  final  action,  and  evidently  he  was 
confident  that  the  serving  of  notice  would  induce  such  an  offer. 
Consequently  when  the  fate  of  the  joint  resolution  was  hanging 
in  the  balance,  he  and  members  of  the  cabinet  sought  interviews 
with  their  friends  in  the  House,  and  apparently  it  was  due  to 
their  influence  that  that  body  consented  to  accept  the  Senate 
amendment.^^ 

While  the  question  was  still  undecided,  no  one  perused  the 
published  correspondence  with  more  care  nor  followed  the  debates 
with  more  interest  than  the  veteran  diplomat,  Albert  Gallatin. 
Having  negotiated  the  conventions  of  "joint  occupation,"  he 
naturally  took  an  interest  in  their  abrogation,  and  he  now  pre- 
pared a  series  of  articles  in  which  he  considered  both  the  validity 
of  the  respective  titles  and  the  expediency  of  abrogating  the  con- 
ventions. He  was  not  in  favor  of  giving  immediate  notice  to 
Great  Britain,  for,  ' '  in  the  present  state  of  excitement,  an  imme- 
diate amicable  arrangement  is  almost  hopeless."    In  his  opinion, 


administration  for  their  own  advancement,  and  out  of  this  circumstance  has 
grown  the  excitement  &  unfortunate  collision  in  the  Senate.  They  will 
all  be  disappointed.  I  am  not  a  candidate  for  re-election  myself  and  will 
lend  myself  to  none  of  them.  I  will  not  be  identified  with  any  of  them. 
I  will  do  my  duty  to  the  country  &  if  my  measures  fail  the  responsibility 
shall  rest  where  it  belongs. ' '  He  also  attributed  Buchanan  's  recent  war- 
like attitude  to  a  desire  to  supplant  Cass  in  the  good  graces  of  the  ex- 
tremists (ibid.,  280,  297). 

8'i  While  the  Senate  amendment  was  before  the  House,  he  told  Cullom, 
of  Tennessee,  that:  "I  would  have  preferred  a  naked  notice;  that  next 
to  that  I  preferred  the  House  Resolutions;  but  it  being  now  ascertained 
by  repeated  votes  in  the  Senate  that  neither  could  be  had,  I  decidedly 
preferred  the  Senate  form  of  notice  to  no  notice  at  all"  (Diary,  I,  341). 

87  Polk,  Diary,  I,  334-337. 


604  JAMES  E.   POLK 

the  first  and  iudispensable  step  towards  an  amicable  arrangement  consists 
in  the  investigation,  not  so  much  of  the  superiority  of  one  claim  over  the 
other,  as  of  the  question  whether  there  be  sufficient  grounds  to  sustain  the 
exclusive  pretensions  of  either  Governmnet. 

This  was  substantially  the  policy  advocated  by  Lord  Aberdeen. 

Unlike  J.  Q.  Adams,  Gallatin  did  not  believe  that  either  nation 
possessed  an  exclusive  title  to  the  Oregon  territory ;  therefore, 
both  might  recede  from  their  extreme  pretensions  "without  im- 
pairing national  honor  and  dignity."  Clear  title  for  the  United 
States  must,  in  his  opinion,  be  based  on  the  claims  derived  from 
Spain,  and  he  did  not  regard  the  Spanish  title  as  unquestionably 
complete.  He  did  not,  however,  accept  Pakenham's  contention 
that  the  claim  which  the  United  States  based  on  the  Spanish  title 
and  that  based  on  settlements  made  by  American  citizens  were 
mutually  exclusive.  Believing  that  the  President,  in  view  of  the 
policy  outlined  in  his  message,  would  be  bound  to  assert  title  to 
the  whole  of  Oregon,  should  the  convention  be  abrogated,  he  was 
in  favor  of  withholding  the  notice  and  of  dividing  the  territory 
by  negotiation.^^ 

On  April  13,  when  it  seemed  probable  that  the  resolution  for 
giving  notice  to  England  would  pass,  the  House,  in  Committee 
of  the  Whole,  gave  its  attention  to  the  bill,  which  Douglas  had 
reported  in  December,  for  extending  judicial  and  military  pro- 
tection to  American  citizens  in  Oregon.  Among  other  things  this 
measure  proposed  to  extend  to  Oregon  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Iowa  supreme  court,  to  build  forts,  to  make  grants  of  land  to 
settlers,  and  to  establish  a  mail  route  between  Saint  Joseph, 
Missouri,  and  the  mouth  of  the  Columbia  River.  Tlie  debate  was 
not  prolonged,  and  the  aliginnent  of  advocates  and  opponents 
was  much  the  same  as  it  had  been  wlien  the  resolution  concerning 
notice  was  under  discussion.  There  was  difference  of  opinion 
among  those  who  favored  the  bill  as  to  whether  jurisdiction 
should  be  extended  to  the  whole  territory  or  to  the  southern 


88  Gallatin,  The  Oregon  Question,  1-33,  passim. 


OHEGON  605 

part  only.     Adams  once  more  championed  the  American  title 
to  the  wliole  of  Oregon  and,  in  defense  of  his  consistency,  called 
attention  to  the  fact  that  he,  in  the  Florida  treaty,  had  procured 
the  Spanish  claims  to  that  region.    When  asked  if  the  relinquish- 
ment of  Texas  by  the  United  States  had  not  been  ' '  a  considera- 
tion" in  procuring  these  Spanish  claims,  he  replied  emphatically 
that  "it  was  no  consideration  at  all"— that  the  two  territories 
had   in    no   way    been    associated    in    the    Florida   negotiations. 
Douglas,  the  chief  spokesman  for  the  bill,  advocated  extending 
jurisdiction  without  designating  boundary  limits  as  the  better 
way  of  procuring  the  desired  effect  with  the  least  annoyance  to 
Great  Britain.    He  desired  to  have  it  understood,  however,  that 
he  was  not  in  favor  of  yielding  an  inch  of  territory  south  of 
54°  40',  for  any  administration,  present  or  future,  which  would 
consent  to  relinquish  any  portion  of  Oregon  would  be  guilty  of 
"perfidy."     As   already   noted,   such   comments   from   Douglas 
and  other  ardent  supporters  of  the  administration  seem  to  indi- 
cate that  Polk's  most  intimate  friends  did  not  believe  that  he 
would  consent  to  a  compromise.     Surely  they  could  not  have 
intended  to  brand  him  in  advance  as  a  man  about  to  commit  an 
act  of  ' '  perfidy ' '  and  ' '  treachery. ' ' 

After  certain  amendments  had  been  added,  one  of  which  ex- 
tended the  jurisdiction  of  the  Iowa  courts  to  ''all  that  portion 
of  the  territory  of  the  United  States  which  lies  west  of  the  Rocky 
Mountains,"  without  defining  limits,  the  House,  on  April  18, 
passed  the  bill  and  sent  it  to  the  Senate  for  its  concurrence. 

The  Senate  Committee  on  Territories  disapproved  the  House 
bill.  On  May  21  its  chairman  reported  that,  since  a  majority 
deemed  immediate  legislation  on  the  subject  to  be  inexpedient 
the  committee  desired  to  be  discharged  from  further  consideration 
of  the  bill. 

During  the  debate  which  followed  the  presentation  of  this 
report  Benton  expressed  his  real  views  on  the  American  title  to 
Oregon,   a  subject  which   he  had   avoided  when  discussing  the 


606  JAMES  E.   POLK 

resolution  for  giving-  notice  to  Great  Britain.  Oregon,  he  said, 
included  three  main  divisions:  the  islands,  Frazer's  River  valley, 
and  the  Columbia  River  valley.  To  the  last  only  did  the  United 
States  possess  a  clear  title.  He  therefore  moved  to  recommit  the 
House  bill  to  the  committee  and  that  it  should  be  instructed  to 
offer  the  following  amendments :  ( 1 )  to  extend  the  laws  of  the 
United  States  over  the  territory  to  the  same  extent  that  England 
had  extended  hers ;  (2)  the  bill  to  become  effective  at  the  termina- 
tion of  the  convention;  (3)  certain  provisions  for  the  administra- 
tion of  justice  and  for  fortifications;  (4)  the  boundaries  to  be 
settled  by  trpaty,  but  until  this  had  been  done  the  line  of  49° 
should  be  rej^arded  as  the  northern  limit  of  American  territory. 
Cass  assailed  Benton's  arguments  and  his  proposed  instructions, 
and,  on  Crittenden's  suggestion,  the  latter  were  withdrawn. 
Within  two  weeks  further  action  by  Congress  was  made  unneces- 
sary by  the  conclusion  of  the  Oregon  treaty  which  divided  the 
tei'ritory  between  the  two  nations. 

As  the  President  had  anticipated,  the  passage  of  the  joint 
resolution  for  abrogating  the  convention  of  1827  was  soon  fol- 
lowed by  a  new  overture  from  the  British  government.  A  dis- 
patch from  McLane  arrived  on  June  3,  1846,  and  gave  the  sub- 
stance of  a  proposition  which  Lord  Aberdeen  had  said  would 
soon  be  made  to  the  United  States  by  Pakenham.  The  proposi- 
tion, as  outlined  by  McLane,  was  so  unsatisfactory  that  Polk 
was  "certain"  that  it  must  be  rejected. ^"^  However,  when  the 
subject  was  brought  before  the  cabinet  on  the  following  day,  all 
members  present  were  inclined  to  think  that  the  project  ought 
to  be  submitted  to  the  Senate  for  advice.  The  most  objectionable 
feature  of  the  British  proposal  was  a  stipulation  which  guar- 
anteed free  navigation  of  the  Columbia  River  to  the  Hudson's 
Bay  Company.     Buchanan  suggested  that  this  privilege  might 


80  "If  I  reject  it  absolutely  ami  make  no  other  proposition  the  ]>rol)al>le 
result  will  be  war.  If  I  submit  it  to  the  Senate  and  they  should  advise 
its  acceptance  I  should  be  bound  by  their  advice  vet  I  should  do  so  re- 
luctantly" (Diary,  I,  444-445). 


OREGON  C07 

be  limited  to  the  duration  of  the  company's  existing  charter, 
which  would  expire  in  1859."" 

When  the  cabinet  met  again,  on  June  6,  lUiclianan  laid  before 
it  the  formal  proposition  of  the  British  government,  which  had 
arrived  in  the  meantime  and  been  delivered  to  him  by  Pakenham. 
It  proposed  to  divide  Oregon  by  the  forty-ninth  parallel  from 
the  Rocky  ]\Iountains  to  the  Straits  of  Fuca,  thence  through  the 
main  channel  to  the  sea.  Two  reservations  were  stipulated : 
first,  the  Hudson's  Bay  Company  and  actual  British  occupants 
M^ere  to  retain  title  to  their  lands  lying  south  of  49°,  but  subject 
10  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States;  second,  free  use  of  the 
Columbia  was  retained  for  the  Hudson's  Bay  Company  and  for 
BriMsh  subjects  when  trading  with  that  company.  The  question 
was  raised  as  to  whether,  according  to  the  proposal  submitted, 
the  privilege  of  navigation  to  be  accorded  to  the  Hudson's  Bay 
Company  would  cease  at  the  expiration  of  its  existing  charter  in 
1859.  Without  waiting  to  decide  this  question,  the  President 
asked  the  cabinet  whether  he  should  submit  the  oifer,  as  received, 
to  the  Senate  with  a  request  for  its  advice.  Walker,  Marcy,  Ban- 
croft, and  Johnson  advised  him  to  submit  the  offer  to  the  Senate. 
Buchanan,  who  had  recently  assumed  a  belligerent  attitude,  said 
that  his  opinion  would  depend  upon  the  character  of  the  message 
which  would  accompany  the  document.  "He  said  the  54°  40' 
men  were  the  true  friends  of  the  administration  and  he  wished 
no  backing  out  on  the  subject."  Although  nettled  by  this 
poniard-thrust  about  "backing  out"  the  President  suppressed  his 
feelings  and  even  prevented  Walker  from  openly  resenting  the 
insinuation.  He  told  the  cabinet  that  in  case  he  should  decide 
to  submit  the  British  offer  to  the  Senate,  he  would  reiterate  the 
views  already  expressed  in  his  annual  message.  Should  the 
Senate  advise  its  acceptance,  with  or  without  modifications,  he 
would  follow  the  advice ;  ' '  but  if  they  declined  to  express  an 
opinion,  or  by  the  constitutional  majority  to  give  their  advice,  I 


90  Polk,  Biary,  I,  447-448. 


608  JAMES  K.   POLK 

should  reject  the  proposition. "  After  hearing  this,  Buchanan 
advised  that  the  proposal  be  submitted  to  the  Senate,  but  he 
declined  to  prepare  a  message  embodying  the  President 's  views.''^ 
The  ill  feeling  caused  by  Buchanan's  attitude  continued  for 
several  days.  Other  members  of  the  cabinet  freely  criticized  his 
conduct  and  recalled  that  he  had  repeatedly  advocated  the 
renewal  of  the  compromise  offer.  After  a  conversation  on  the 
subject  with  Marcy  and  Bancroft,  the  President  wrote  : 

My  impression  is  that  Mr.  Buchanan  intends  now  to  shun  all  responsi- 
bility for  the  submission  of  the  Brittish  proposition  to  the  Senate,  but 
still  he  may  wish  it  to  be  done  without  his  agency,  so  that  if  the  54°  40' 
men  complain,  he  may  be  able  to  say  that  my  message  submitting  it  i\id 
not  receive  his  sanction.  I  shall  be  disappointed  if  any  message  which 
can  be  drawn  will  receive  his  assent.  He  will  choose  to  dissent  and  if 
it  is  condemned  he  will  escape  all  responsibility.  In  his  despatches  to 
Mr.  McLane  I  have  more  than  once,  &  in  the  presence  of  tho  Cabinet, 
caused  paragraphs  to  be  struck  out  yielding  as  I  thought  too  much  to 
Great  Brittain,  and  now  it  is  most  strange  that  he  should  take  suddenly, 
and  without  the  assignment  of  any  reason,  the  opposite  extreme,  and  talk 
as  he  did  yesterday  of  "backing  out  from  54°  40'."  His  course  is  one 
which  I  cannot  approve.  Mr.  Marcy  and  Mr.  Bancroft  both  condemned 
it  in  decided  terms.^^ 

Buchanan  called  on  the  following  day  and  expressed  doubts 
concerning  the  wisdom  of  submitting  to  the  Senate  the  correspond- 
ence which  passed  between  McLane  and  himself  on  the  Oregon 
question.  Although  he  surmised  that  these  doubts  had  been 
prompted  by  the  Secretary's  fear  that  his  inconsistency  might 
be  exposed,  Polk  permitted  him  "to  select  what  portions  of  the 
correspondence,  if  any,  should  be  sent."  His  indulgence  was 
rewarded  by  renewed  insolence,  for  Buchanan  not  only  refused 
once  more  to  draft  a  message  for  the  President,  but  he  had  the 

01  Ibid.,  451-454.  Polk  attributed  Buchanan 's  change  of  front  to  a 
desire  to  curry  favor  with  the  extremists.  "It  was  not  until  within  a 
short  time  since  that  he  gave  indications  of  a  change  of  position.  The 
first  indication  1  had  of  it  was  a  remark  which  fell  from  him  incidentally 
when  speaking  of  the  subject,  to  the  purport  that  Gen '1  Cass  had  made 
character  by  his  course  in  the  Senate  on  the  suhiect.  Gen'l  C.  was  a 
54°  40'  man." 

02  Ibid.,  456. 


OBEGON  609 

audacity  to  rcniai-k  that  ''wlicu  you  have  done  your  message  I 
will  then  prepare  sucli  a  one  as  I  think  ought  to  be  sent  in."  At 
last  thoroughly  aroused  by  the  insolence  of  his  Secretary,  the 
President  indignantly  asked : 

For  wliat  piirpose  will  you  prepare  a  message?  You  have  twice  refused, 
though  it  is  a  subject  relating  to  your  Department,  to  give  me  any  aid  in 
prei)aring  my  message;  do  you  wish,  after  I  have  done,  to  draw  up  a  paper 
of  your  own  in  order  to  make  an  issue  with  me"? 

Buchanan  at  once  resumed  his  normal  state  of  timidity  and 
explained  that  his  remark  had  been  entirely  misunderstood. 
Nevertheless,  when  Polk  submitted  his  message  to  the  cabinet 
for  discussion,  the  Secretary  of  State  raised  so  many  objections 
that  some  of  the  passages  were  eliminated.*''^ 

On  June  10  the  President  transmitted  the  British  proposal 
to  the  Senate  and,  in  an  accompanying  message,  requested  advice 
as  to  whether  it  should  be  accepted.  He  made  it  clear  that  his 
own  opinions,  as  expressed  in  his  annual  message,  remained  un- 
changed, and  that  he  would  reject  the  ofifer  unless  the  Senate  by 
a  "'constitutional  majority"  should  recommend  its  acceptance. 
After  two  days  of  deliberation  the  Senate,  by  a  vote  of  38  to  12, 
advised  him  to  accept  the  proposal,  and  on  the  fifteenth  Buchanan 
and  Pakenham  signed  the  treaty  which  terminated  the  long- 
debated  Oregon  question.^*  As  shown  by  the  vote,  not  many  of 
the  extremists  were  ready  to  risk  a  war  by  rejecting  the  British 
overture.  Most  uncompromising  of  all  was  Allen,  chairman  of 
the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs.  On  the  day  that  the  treaty 
was  signed,  after  a  free  expression  of  his  feelings,  he  resigned 
from  the  committee. 


93  Ibid.,  459-462. 

04  Richardson,  Messages,  IV,  449-450.  Polk,  Diary,  I,  467,  470.  The 
treaty  may  be  found  in  Malloy,  Treaties  and  Conventions,  I,  656.  It  fixed 
the  boundary  at  49°,  from  the  Rocky  Mountains  to  the  Straits  of  Fuca, 
leaving  all  of  Vancouver's  Island  to  England;  the  Hudson's  Bay  Company 
retained  the  use  of  the  Columbia  River  on  the  same  footing  as  citizens  of 
the  United  States;  that  company  and  British  occupants  retained  title  to 
land  already  possessed  south  of  49°. 


610  JAMES  K.   POLE 

The  adjustment  of  the  Oregon  question  by  an  extension  of  the 
existing  boundary  between  the  United  States  and  Canada  "was 
eminently  fair  to  both  nations.  Indeed  it  was  the  only  sensible 
solution  of  the  long-standing  dispute.  The  more  one  examines  the 
respective  claims  the  more  apparent  it  becomes  that  neither  party 
possessed  a  "clear  and  unquestionable"  title  to  the  entire  terri- 
tory. Was,  therefore,  President  Polk  justified  in  asserting  claim 
to  ' '  all  of  Oregon, ' '  and  if  so,  must  be  he  condemned  for  accept- 
ing less?  Neither  query  can  be  answered  by  an  unqualified  yes 
or  no.  Whether  wise  or  unwise,  whether  designed  or  controlled- 
by  circumstances,  Polk's  Oregon  policy  was  not  so  inconsistent 
as  his  opponents  represented  it  to  be.  He  offered  to  divide  the 
territory,  and  when  this  offer  was  declined  he  steadfastly  refused 
to  make  another  offer  of  any  kind.  While  he  continued  to  assert 
that  the  American  title  to  the  whole  territory  was  "clear  and 
unquestionable,"  at  no  time  did  he  say  that  he  would  decline  a 
compromise,  if  offered  by  England.  On  the  contrary,  he  told 
both  supporters  and  opponents  in  Congress  that  if  England 
should  offer  49°,  or  anything  approaching  it,  he  would  seek  the 
advice  of  the  Senate  before  rejecting  the  proposal.  As  Webster 
said  in  the  Senate,  Polk  did  not  at  any  time  act  like  a  man  who 
expected  war,  and  the  President  told  Black  that  he  "considered 
a  bold  &  firm  course  on  our  part  the  pacific  one."  He  stated 
repeatedly  that  he  did  not  look  for  an  offer  from  England  until 
Congress  had  passed  the  resolution  terminating  joint  occupation, 
and,  although  he  did  not  specifically  say  so,  he  inferred  that  its 
passage  would  undoubtedly  be  followed  by  an  overture  from  that 
government.  This  opinion  was  well  founded — the  "bold  and 
firm  course"  of  abrogating  tlie  convention  proved,  indeed,  to  be 
the  pacific  one,  for  Great  Britain  very  soon  afterward  made  the 
offer  to  compromise."^     Without  loss  of  time,  Polk  did  what  he 


95  Commenting  on  tlie  success  of  I'olk's  policy,  Eicliard  Kush  wrote: 
"For  one,  I  am  unshaken  in  the  belief,  that  it  was  the  President's  open- 
ing message  to  the  first  congress  he  met  on  the  second  of  December  last, 
that  produced  the  settlement  of  the  Oregon  difficulty.     It  was  like  a  great 


OEEGON  6H 

had  long  promised  to  do;  he  submitted  the  proposal  to  the  Senate, 
but  with  a  warning  that  unU^ss  that  body  shoukl  advise  its  accept- 
ance he  would  reject  the  oft'er  and  adhere  to  the  party  platform. 
It  would  have  been  unfair  to  expect  the  President  to  stand  alone 
in  demanding  the  full  measure  asked  by  that  platform  after  the 
debates  in  Congress  and  the  press  had  made  it  plain  that  neither 
Congress  nor  the  people  would  approve  his  rejection  of  a  reason- 
able offer.  It  was  not  cowardly  to  ascertain  the  wishes  of  the 
Senate  on  so  important  a  question,  and  it  would  have  been  crim- 
.  inal  to  provoke  a  war  for  the  sake  of  maintaining  a  campaign 
cry,  when  it  was  evident  that  neither  Congress  nor  the  people 
desired  it  to  be  maintained. 


bomb-shell  thrown  into  the  British  cabinet.  It  took  them  by  surprise, 
and  first  roused  them  to  the  unavoidable  necessity  of  a  settlement.  I 
thought  when  it  appeared,  that  it  would  lead  to  war — so  bold  was  it, 
though  every  word  was  just;  whereas  it  led  to  peace"  (Eush  to  Trist, 
Sept.  21,  1846,  Trisl  Papers). 


CHAPTER  XXII 
SLAVERY  AND  TERRITORIAL  GOVERNMENTS 

Although  a  lawyer  by  profession,  Polk  owned  slaves  and 
employed  them  in  cultivating  his  plantation  in  Mississippi.  As 
a  southern  man  he  despised  abolitionists,  yet  at  no  time  during 
his  career  does  he  seem  to  have  taken  a  deep  interest  in  the  slavery 
question — especially  in  the  extension  of  the  slaveholding  area. 
Like  Jackson,  he  desired  to  extend  the  boundaries  of  the  United 
States  and  to  increase  its  power  and  prestige,  but  neither  man 
was  interested  in  promoting  the  spread  of  slavery.  In  support- 
ing the  annexation  of  Texas  and  in  planning  the  acquisition  of 
other  Mexican  territory  Polk  acted  as  an  expansionist,  and  not 
as  a  slaveholder. 

As  early  as  1826,  while  a  proposed  amendment  to  the  Consti- 
tution was  being  debated,  remarks  made  in  the  House  by  mem- 
bers from  New  England  led  Polk  to  express  his  views  on  the 
slavery  question : 

1  have  regretted  exceedingly,  sir,  that  scarcely  any  subject  of  general 
concern  can  be  agitated  here,  without  having  this  unfortunate  subject 
of   slavery,   either   collaterally,   or   incidentally,   brought   into   view,   and 

made  to  mingle  in  our  deliberations When  this  country  became 

free  and  independent,  this  species  of  population  was  found  amongst  us. 
It  had  been  entailed  upon  us  by  our  ancestors,  and  was  viewed  as  a  com- 
mon evil;  not  confined  to  the  locality  where  it  was,  but  affecting  the 
whole  nation.  Some  of  the  States  which  then  possessed  it  have  since 
gotten  clear  of  it:  thej'  were  a  species  of  property  that  differed  from  all 
other:    they  were  rational;  they  were  human  beings.i 

Fully  admitting  that  the  institution  was  an  evil,  he  did  not  believe 
tliat  this  fact  should  affect  the  solution  of  great  national  questions. 


J  Abridg.  of  Deb.,  IX,  16-17. 


SLAVEBY  AND   TEEEITOEIAL   GOFEENMENTS  613 

As  Speaker  of  the  House,  Polk  was  called  upon  to  decide  many- 
points  in  which  the  slavery  question  was  involved.  His  task  was 
simplified  by  the  operation  of  the  so-called  gag  rule  under  which 
nearly  all  petitions  and  uiepaorials  relating  to  the  subject  were 
referred  automatically  to  the  "committee  of  oblivion."  As  a 
party  man,  he  rigorously  enforced  this  rule,  but  in  cases  which 
did  not  clearly  fall  within  its  scope  he  did  not  seem  disposed  to 
support  the  extreme  southern  view.  For  example,  when  an 
attempt  was  made,  on  February  6,  1837,  to  prevent  John  Quincy 
Adams  from  presenting  abolition  petitions  submitted  by  other 
states  than  Massachusetts,  Speaker  Polk  decided  that  "every 
member  had  a  right  to  present  a  petition,  come  from  what  quarter 
it  might."-  This  decision  ran  counter  to  the  well-known  southern 
claim  that  while,  under  the  Constitution,  all  citizens  possessed 
the  right  to  petition  for  a  redress  of  their  own  grievances,  they 
had  no  right  to  concern  themselves  about  the  grievances  of  others. 

The  Speaker 's  decision  in  favor  of  Adams  was  not  induced  by 
admiration  for  the  ex-President  or  by  approval  of  his  conduct. 
In  a  manuscript  to  be  found  among  his  papers'*  Polk  complained 
that  Adams,  by  his  petitions,  "has  consumed  so  much  of  the 
present  session  of  Congress,  to  the  delay  of  the  public  business, 
to  the  annoyance  of  the  whole  House,  and  the  degredation  of  his 
own  character."  After  asserting  that  it  was  necessary  to  have 
a  general  rule,  since  the  House  could  not  take  time  to  consider 
each  petition,  he  continued : 

Mr.  Adams  was  unwilling  to  submit  to  the  decision  of  the  majority. 
On  every  petition  day,  he  made  constant  attempts  to  wreck  that  decision, 
to  violate  the  rules,  and  defy  the  authority  of  the  House.  Upon  the 
plainest  propositions  he  would  take  appeals  from  the  Speaker's  decisions, 
and  consume  time  in  debating  the  appeal 

Mr.  Adams  knew  ....  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  Speaker  to  observe 
and  execute  the  rules  and  orders  adopted  by  the  House  for  its  govern- 
ment  


2  Cong.  Globe,  24  Cong.,  2  sess.,  164. 

3  "Notes  on  Mr.  Adams'  letter  to  the  Quincy  Patriot,"  undated,  Polk 
Papers. 


614  JAMES  K.   POLK 

The  Speaker  carries  out  and  enforces  the  decisions  of  the  majority  & 
therefore  he  represents  in  his  letter  that  the  ' '  Speaker  and  the  majority 
of  the  House"  have  undertaken  to  exercise  "arbitrary  authority."  If 
Mr.  Adams  is  unwilling  to  submit  to  the  decisions  of  the  majority  of  the 
House,  he  is  unfit  to  be  a  member  of  th{it  body.  He  seems  to  have  an 
utter  aversion  to  decisions  made  by  majorities.  This  principle  lies  at 
the  foundation  of  all  our  institutions.  Majorities  must  govern,  and  it 
cannot  be  helped  if  a  few  such  refractory  spirits  as  Mr.  Adams  are 
unwilling  to  submit  to  that  Government. 

The  manuscript  is  of  considerable  value,  for,  as  Polk  was  the 
presiding  officer,  his  opinions  on  tliis  important  subject  cannot 
be  found  in  official  records. 

On  one  occasion  during  his  term  as  governor  of  Tennessee, 
Polk  was  called  upon  to  repel  outside  interference  with  the 
"peculiar  institution."  In  the  summer  of  1840  a  "World's  Con- 
vention" met  in  London  to  consider  ways  and  means  of  abolishing 
slavery  and  the  slave  trade.  Letters  were  addressed  to  officials 
in  the  United  States,  and,  among  others,  to  Governor  Polk.  In 
his  last  message  to  the  legislature,  October  7,  1841,  the  governor 
stated  that  he  had  received  two  such  letters. 

Viewing  these  communications  [said  he],  as  an  impertinent  and  mis- 
chievous attempt  on  the  part  of  foreigners  to  interfere  with  one  of  the 
domestic  institutions  of  this  State,  and  having  received  the  countenance 
of  a  member  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States,  under  wdiose  official 
frank  one  of  the  packages  containing  them  came  to  me,  I  declined  enter- 
ing into  a  correspondence  with  a  foreign  convention,  but  addressed  to  the 
member  of  Congress  alluded  to  the  letter,  a  copy  of  wdiich  is  herewith 
transinitted  to  you,  accompanied  by  the  communication.* 

His  answer  asserted  the  right  of  a  state  to  control  its  own  affairs, 
but  it  was  a  vindication  of  state  rights  rather  than  a  defense  of 
slavery.    In  the  words  of  a  local  editor,  he 

came  boldly  and  manfully  out  before  the  country  with  a  letter  containing 
the  sound  doctrine  of  the  Constitution  of  our  Union,  and  rebuked  the 
foreign  interference  with  our  State  affairs  in  a  spirit  as  becoming  to  the 
patriot  and  the  man  as  it  was  honorable  to  the  State  over  whicdi  he 
presided  as  Chief  Magistrate.^ 


*  Term.  Sen.  Jour.,  1841^2,  22-42. 
!>  Nashville  Union,  April  15,  1841. 


SLAVEBT  AND  TEBEITOEIAL   GOVERNMENTS  615 

Agitation  in  favor  of  annexing  Texas  to  the  United  States 
began  as  soon  as  that  province  had  declared  its  independence  in 
1836.  Althongh  its  principal  snpporters  were  southern  men  there 
is  little  evidence  that  they  were  moved  by  a  desire  to  extend  the 
institution  of  slavery.''  When,  however,  Tyler  turned  his  atten- 
tion to  the  annexation  of  Texas,  the  question  took  on  a  more  dis- 
tinctly southern  aspect ;  and  Calhoun,  in  his  correspondence  as 
Secretary  of  State,  brought  slavery  into  prominence  by  distinctly 
asserting  that  the  United  States  desired  to  annex  Texas  in  order 
to  protect  that  institution.  When  commenting  on  this  correspond- 
ence, early  in  1845,  the  Democratic  Review  declared  that  Calhoun, 
the  apostle  of  state  rights,  had,  in  fact,  nationalizecl  the  slavery 
question : 

What  has  become  of  this  position  [that  the  national  government  can  not 
interfere  vAt\\  slavery  in  the  District  of  Columbia]  after  a  Southern  Presi- 
dent and  a  Southern  Secretary  of  State — and  that  Secretary,  John  C.  Cal- 
houn, of  all  men  living! — have  so  nationalized,  so  federalized,  the  question, 
as  we  have  lately  seen  done?  When  that  has  been  not  only  acted  upon,  but 
avowed,  argued,  vehemently  urged — that,  and  that  almost  exclusivley — as 
the  ground  for  a  large  and  momentous  measure  of  national  policy  I^ 

In  general,  Calhoun's  intimate  friends  were  interested  in  Texas 
because  they  were  interested  in  slavery.  For  example,  Dixon 
H.  Lewis  deemed  annexation  to  be  "the  greatest  question  of 
the  Age ' '  on  account  of  the  political  power  which  it  would  bring 
to  the  South.  "It  will,"  he  wrote,  "umte  the  hitherto  divided 
South,  while  it  will  make  Abolition  &  Treason  synonymous  & 
thus  destroy  it  in  the  North.'"*  This  feeling,  however,  was  not 
shared  by  the  Jackson  Democrats. 

When  his  views  as  a  candidate  for  the  Vice-Presidency  were 
solicited,  Polk  declared  himself  to  be  unequivocally  in  favor  of 
annexing  Texas.**    Neither  his  public  utterances  nor  his  private 

6  For  a  discussion  of  this  whole  subject,  see  Justin  H.  Smith,  Annex- 
ation of  Texas. 

"^  Dem.  Bev.,  January,  1845,  article  on  Abolitionists.  The  whole  article 
is  w-orth  reading. 

8  Lewis  to  Cralle,  March  19,  1844,  Cralle  Papers. 

9  Answer  to  S.  P.  Chase  et  ah,  April  23,  1844,  Polk  Papers.  Printed, 
also,  in  various  newspapers. 


616  JAMES  E.   POLK 

letters  indicate  any  interest  in  extending  slavery  ;  on  the  contrary, 
the  correspondence  with  his  most  intimate  friends  shows  a  desire 
to  avoid  an  affiliation  with  the  southern  wing  of  the  party.  It 
has  been  noted  elsewhere  that  Polk's  bosom  friend.  Cave  Johnson, 
tried  to  induce  A^an  Buren  to  declare  himself  in  favor  of  annex- 
ation, and  that  Polk  was  anxious  to  cooperate  with  that  wing 
of  the  party  which  was  indifferent  or  hostile  to  slavery.  After 
Polk's  nomination,  Johnson  warned  liim  repeatedly  that  the 
southern  faction  would  try  to  claim  and  to  control  him.  When 
issuing  invitations  to  the  Nashville  ratification  meeting,  great 
care  was  taken  to  preclude  any  attempt  to  identify  the  candidate 
with  the  South  Carolina  radicals.^'^ 

Throughout  the  campaign  of  1844  neither  Polk  nor  his  asso- 
ciates urged  additional  protection  for  the  South,  much  less  for 
slavery ;  nevertheless,  both  of  these  subjects,  to  a  certain  degree, 
became  party  issues.  Some  excitement  was  created  by  the  ap- 
pearance of  a  pamphlet  entitled  ''The  South  in  Danger."  It  was 
prepared  by  Robert  J.  Walker,  chairman  of  the  Democratic  na- 
tional committee,  and  its  object  was  to  show  that  Whigs  and 
Abolitionists  had  united  in  the  North  and  that  all  in  the  South 
should  join  in  defeating  them.  It  was  published  without  Polk's 
knowledge  and  was  deplored  by  his  intimate  friends."  Despite 
the  fact  that  the  candidate  and  his  chief  supporters  were  inter- 
ested in  territorial  expansion  rather  than  in  slavery,  his  opponents 
undoubtedly  believed  with  John  Quincy  Adams  who,  on  hearing 
the  result  of  the  election,  wrote :  "  It  is  the  victory  of  the  slavery 
element  in  the  constitution  of  the  United  States.  "^- 

Having  received  notice  that  the  Mexican  government  had 
agreed  to  renew  diplomatic  relations.  President  Polk,  in  August, 
1846,  asked  Congress  for  an  appropriation  of  two  million  dollars 


I'J  Johnson  to  Polk,  June  21  and  June  28,  1844,  Folk  Papers. 

11  W.  E.  Cramer  to  Polk,  Oct.  4,  1844;  Armstrong  to  Polk,  Nov.  5,  1844, 
ibid.  The  Walker  pam])hlet  was  published  by  the  "Democratic  Associ- 
ation of  Washington,  1).  C. "  and  bore  the  date  Sept.  25,  1844. 

1- Adams,  Memoirs,  XII,  10;{. 


SLAVE  BY  AND  TEHFITOHIAL   GOFEENMENTS  617 

to  be  usi'il  ill  coiidueting  negotiations.  In  making  this  request  the 
President  unwittingly  precipitated  an  "irrepressible  conflict" 
which  ceased  only  with  the  end  of  the  Civil  War. 

When  he  asked  for  this  appropriation  Polk  had  no  thought 
of  slavery.  He  desired  to  buy  Mexican  territory  and  he  wished 
to  be  able  to  assure  the  Mexican  government  that  he  could  pay 
an  installment  of  the  purchase  price  as  soon  as  a  treaty  had  been 
concluded.  But  when  the  subject  came  before  the  House  the 
slavery  question  emerged,  for  Wilmot  introduced  his  w^ll-known 
"proviso''  by  which  slavery  would  be  excluded  from  all  territory 
to  be  acquired  by  the  use  of  the  appropriation.  After  adopting 
what  the  President  called  Wilmot 's  "mischievous  &  foolish 
amendment,"  the  House  passed  the  bill  by  a  vote  of  87  to  64. 
The  amended  bill  came  before  the  Senate  on  the  last  day  of  the 
session,  and,  as  Davis,  of  Massachusetts,  obtained  the  floor  and 
refused  to  yield  it,  no  vote  could  be  taken.  Polk  was  astonished 
and  chagrined  by  the  unexpected  turn  of  events.  He  blamed 
Wilmot  for  having  introduced  an  irrelevant  topic,  but  he  blamed 
Davis  still  more  for  preventing  the  Senate  from  acting  on  the 
measure.  "What  connection  slavery  had  with  making  peace  with 
Mexico,"  is  the  remark  in  his  diary,  "it  is  difficult  to  conceive. "^^ 
While  this  comment  undoubtedly  expressed  the  real  attitude  of 
the  President,  it  has  nevertheless  been  charged  that  his  request 
for  the  money  was  "caused  by  the  burning  desire  to  acquire 
additional  slave  territory."^* 

On  August  5,  1846,  the  day  after  the  request  for  the  two 
millions  had  been  sent  to  the  Senate,  General  Armstrong  arrived 
from  London  bearing  the  ratified  Oregon  treaty.  On  the  same 
day  the  President  asked  Congress  to  frame  a  territorial  govern- 
ment and  to  adopt  regulations  for  making  land  grants  to  settlers 
in  that  region.  But  the  session  was  nearing  its  close,  and  Congress 
adjourned  without  having  taken  action  on  the  subject. 


13  Polk,  Diary,  II,  75.    He  believed  that,  if  permitted,  the  Senate  would 
have  eliminated  the  proviso  and  that  the  House  would  liave  acquiesced, 
i-t  Jay,  Eeview  of  the  Mexican  War,  184. 


618  JAMES  K.   POLK 

When  Congress  reassembled  in  December,  Polk  renewed  his 
request  for  a  two  million  dollar  appropriation.  He  renewed, 
also,  liis  recommendation  that  Oregon  should  be  provided  with  a 
territorial  government. ^^ 

On  December  23,  in  response  to  the  latter  recommendation, 
Douglas  reported  from  the  Committee  on  Territories  a  bill  to 
establish  a  government  in  Oregon ;  it  was  read  twice  and  referred 
to  the  Committee  of  the  Whole.  The  twelfth  section  of  this  bill 
extended  to  Oregon  both  the  privileges  and  the  restrictions  of  the 
Ordinance  of  1787,  the  most  important  restnction,  of  course, 
being  the  prohibition  of  slavery. 

On  the  evening  of  the  same  day  Wilmot  called  by  appointment 
on  the  President,  and  the  proviso  which  he  had  attached  to  the 
appropriation  bill  at  the  last  session  was  the  topic  of  conversation. 
Wilmot  told  the  President  that  he  would  not  again  offer  his  pro- 
viso, but  that  he  w^ould  have  to  vote  for  slavery  restriction  if  it 
should  be  proposed  by  another  member.  In  his  record  of  this 
interview  Polk  thus  stated  his  opinions  on  the  slavery  question  : 

I  told  him  I  did  not  desire  to  extend  slavery,  that  I  would  be  satisfied 
to  acquire  by  treaty  from  Mexico  the  Provinces  of  New  Mexico  &  the  Cali- 
fornias,  and  that  in  these  Provinces  slavery  could  probably  never  exist,  and 
the  great  probability  was  that  the  question  would  never  arise  in  the  future 
organization  of  territorial  or  State  Governments  in  these  territories.  I 
told  him  that  slavery  was  purely  a  domestic  question,  and  to  restrict  the 
appropriation  which  had  been  asked  for,  so  as  to  require  the  President  to 
insert  it  in  a  Treaty  with  a  Foreign  Power,  was  not  only  inappropriate 
and  out  of  place,  but  if  such  a  Treaty  were  made  it  must  be  opposed  by 
every  Senator  from  a  slave-holding  State,  and  as  one  third  of  the  Senators 
could  reject  a  Treaty,  it  could  not  be  ratified,  though  it  might  be  satisfactory 
in  all  other  respects. 

This  argument,  of  course,  overstated  the  effect  of  the  Wilmot 
proviso,  for  no  one  had  asked  that  it  should  be  incorporated  into 
the  treaty.  Wilmot  answered  that  in  any  case  he  would  be  satis- 
fied with  a  simple  legislative  declaration,  and  that  he  would  not 
again  take  the  initiative  in  asking  for  this.^" 


ir.  Richardson,  Messages,  IV,  495,  504. 
10  Polk,  Diary,  II,  288-290. 


SLAVEBT  AND  TEEEITOBIAL  GOVEENMENTS  619 

In  spite  of  Polk's  effort  to  bury  the  slavery  discussion  by  an 
agreement  with  Wihnot,  the  question  of  excluding  the  institution 
from  territories  was  soon  brought  before  the  House.  On  January 
4,  1847,  Preston  King,  of  New  York,  offered  a  bill  to  appropriate 
two  million  dollars  for  diplomatic  purposes  the  second  section 
of  which  was  virtually  a  restatement  of  the  Wilmot  proviso. 
King  was  not  permitted  to  introduce  this  bill,  and  on  February  1, 
when  another  bill  for  granting  the  President  three  million  dollars 
came  up  for  discussion  in  the  House  Wilmot,  in  spite  of  the 
promise  made  to  Polk,  moved  to  amend  the  bill  by  adding  his 
anti-slavery  proviso.'^  When  informed  of  King's  bill  Polk  noted 
in  his  diarj' : 

The  sla^Tery  question  is  assuming  a  fearful  &  most  important  aspect. 
The  movement  of  Mr.  King  to-day,  if  persevered  in,  will  be  attended  with 
terrible  consequences  to  the  country,  and  cannot  fail  to  destroy  the  Demo- 
cratic party,  if  it  does  not  ultimately  threaten  the  Union  itself.  [At  the 
close  of  a  cabinet  meeting  held  on  the  following  day,  he  again  reverted  to 
the  subject.]  Slavery  has  no  possible  connection  Avith  the  Mexican  War, 
and  with  making  peace  with  that  country.  Should  any  territory  be  acquired 
by  a  Treaty  with  Mexico,  Congress  will  have  the  full  power  to  raise  the 
question  of  slavery  in  it  upon  the  organization  of  a  territorial  Government 
in  it,  or  upon  its  admission  as  a  state  of  the  Union.  Its  introduction  in  con- 
nection with  the  Mexican  War  is  not  only  mischievous  but  wicked.  It  is, 
moreover,  practically  an  abstract  question.  There  is  no  probability  that  any 
territory  will  ever  be  acquired  from  Mexico  in  which  slavery  could  ever 
exist. 

Buchanan  expressed  himself  as  willing  to  extend  the  Missouri 
Compromise  line  to  the  Pacific,  and  in  this  view  all  other  mem- 
bers of  the  cabinet  agreed.  Polk  declined  to  commit  himself  on 
this  method  of  dealing  with  the  subject,  although  urged  to  do  so 
by  both  Buchanan  and  Walker.  ' '  Though  willing  myself, ' '  said 
he,  "to  assent  to  the  proposition,  I  was  not  ready,  until  I  saw 
further  developments,  to  recommend  it  to  Congress  as  the  policy 
of  the  administration."    On  the  same  evening  he  presented  the 

17  Cong.  Globe,  29  Cong.,  2  sess.,  105,  303. 


620  JAMES  K.   POLE 

proposition  to  Beutou  in  order  to  see  if  it  would  meet  with  his 
approval,  but  the  Senator  declined  to  give  an  immediate  answer.^ ^ 
While  the  President  was  not  interested  in  the  extension  of 
slavery,  he  was,  on  the  other  hand,  unable  to  appreciate  the  fact 
that  there  might  be  such  a  thing  as  honest  opposition  to  the  spread 
of  that  institution.  Except  as  it  affected  party  interests  he  seemed 
quite  as  indifferent  toward  the  subject  as  Douglas  was  at  a  later 
date  when  he  declared  that  he  did  not  care  whether  slavery  was 
''voted  down  or  voted  up."  Polk  attributed  all  agitation  of  the 
subject  to  the  same  cause  that  he  attributed  everything  which 
thwarted  his  plans — a  desire  to  promote  the  interests  of  candi- 
dates for  the  Presidency.  Politicians  of  both  parties  and  both 
sections  were  criticized  for  their  unpatriotic  conduct.  Comment- 
ing on  the  delay  in  enacting  war  measures,  he  wrote  in  his  diary : 

Even  the  question  of  slavery  is  thrown  into  Congress  and  agitated  in 
the  midst  of  a  Foreign  War  for  political  purposes.  It  is  brought  forAvard  at 
the  North  by  a  few  ultra  Northern  members  to  advance  the  prospects  of 
their  favourite.  No  sooner  is  it  introduced  than  a  few  ultra  Southern 
members  are  manifestly  well  satisfied  that  it  has  been  brought  forward, 
because  by  seizing  upon  it  they  hope  to  array  a  Southern  party  in  favour 
of  their  favourite  candidate  for  the  Presidency.  There  is  no  patriotism 
on  either  side,  it  is  a  most  wicked  agitation  that  can  end  in  no  good  and 
must  produce  infinite  mischief.is 

On  the  day  after  this  was  written  he  told  Crittenden  that 

I  deprecated  the  agitation  of  the  slavery  question  in  Congress,  and 
though  a  South- Western  man  &  from  a  slave-holding  State  as  well  as  him- 
self, I  did  not  desire  to  acquire  more  Southern  Territory  than  that  which 
I  had  indicated  [California  and  New  Mexico],  because  I  did  not  desire  by 
doing  so  to  give  occasion  for  the  agitation  of  a  question  which  might  sever 
and  endanger  the  Union. 20 

King's  appropriation  bill,  with  the  section  prohibiting  slavery 
in  all  territory  to  be  acquired,  not  only  raised  the  issue  with" 
respect  to  anticipated  cessions  from  Mexico,  but  it  affected  also 


IS  Polk,  Diary,  Tl,  304-,309.  At  a  meeting  held  on  January  Hi  the 
cabinet  agai!i  uiKuiimonsly  a(hised  the  extension  of  the  l'>()°  MO'  line  to  the 
Pacific. 

19  Polk,  Diart),  II,  348.  20 /?,»;..  350. 


SLAVEBY  AND  TEERITOEIAL   GOVERNMENTS  621 

the  Oregon  bill.  It  will  be  remembered  that  the  twelfth  seetion 
of  the  measure  proposed  by  Douglas  extended  to  Oregon  the 
Ordinance  of  1787.  When  the  bill  came  up  for  discussion  on 
January  14,  1847,  Burt,  of  South  Carolina,  moved  to  amend  this 
section  by  adding  an  explanatory  statement  to  the  effect  that 
the  restrictions  of  the  Ordinance  were  extended  to  Oregon  ' '  inas- 
much as  the  whole  of  the  said  territory  lies  north  of  36°  30'  north 
latitude.""  While  willing,  apparently,  to  let  slavery  be  excluded 
from  Oregon,  Burt  nevertheless  denied  categorically  the  power 
of  Congress  to  prohibit  slavery  in  any  state  or  territory.  He 
argued  at  some  length  to  prove  that  neither  the  Ordinance  of 
1787  nor  the  Missouri  Compromise  was  a  constitutional  law. 
This  denial  of  the  federal  government's  power  to  exclude  slavery 
from  aiwj  territory  was  soon  echoed  by  other  southern  members; 
consequently,  an  attempt  was  made  to  eliminate  the  prohibition 
from  the  Douglas  bill  or  else  to  defeat  it  altogether. 

The  President  was  embarrassed,  and  his  opponents  assisted, 
by  the  hearty  support  given  to  his  policy  of  territorial  acqui- 
sition by  southern  enthusiasts,  both  in  Congress  and  in  the  press. 
For  example,  the  Charleston  Patriot  trusted  "that  our  southern 
Kepresentatives  will  remember  that  this  is  a  southern  war, ' '  and 
the  Charleston  Conner  asserted  that  the  war  w^ould  widen  the 
field  of  southern  enterprise  and  power.^^ 

In  tlie  House,  Seddon,  of  Virginia,  declared  King's  bill  to  be 
grossly  unconstitutional.  "It  more  than  violates  a  single  specific 
clause  of  that  instrument.  It  outrages  its  whole  scope  and  spirit, 
and  subverts  the  very  basis  of  its  being. ' '    Bedinger,  of  the  same 


21  Cong.  Globe,  29  Cong.,  2  sess.,  178. 

22  The  f  oniier  is  quoted  in  Jay,  Bevieiv  of  the  Mexican  War,  1 82.  See  also 
other  excerpts  from  southern  papers  there  given.  The  latter  is  thus  quoted 
by  Eathbun  of  New  York:  ''Every  battle  fought  in  Mexico,  and  every 
dollar  spent  there,  but  insures  the  acquisition  of  territory  vi'hich  must 
widen  the  field  of  southern  enterprise  and  power  in  the  future.  And  the 
first  result  will  be  to  readjust  the  whole  balance  of  power  in  the  Confed- 
eracy so  as  to  give  us  control  over  the  operations  of  the  Government  in  all 
time  to  come.  If  the  South  be  but  true  to  themselves,  the  day  of  our  de- 
pression and  suffering  is  gone,  and  gone  forever"  (Cong.  Globe,  as  cited 
above,  .364). 


622  JAMES  K.  POLK 

state,  still  loved  the  Union ;  but  he  would  cease  to  love  his  wife 
(if  he  had  one),  "if,  like  the  farfamed  Mrs.  Caudle,  she  were 
forever  taunting  me  with  what  she  chose  to  regard  as  a  great 
deformity  and  annoyance."-^  Should  the  North  persist  in  its 
purpose  to  restrict  slavery,  he  saw  no  remedy  short  of  a  disso- 
lution of  the  Union.  During  the  debate  on  the  Oregon  bill  Rhett, 
also,  denied  absolutely  the  power  of  Congress  to  exclude  slavery 
from  territories,  for  they  belonged  to  the  states  and  not  to  the 
United  States. 

For  that  [Oregon]  territory  [said  he],  we  care  but  little,  since  it  is 
not  probable  that  a  single  planter  would  ever  desire  to  set  his  foot  within 
its  limits.  But  the  right  is  important,  because  it  applies  to  future  acqui- 
sitions of  territory;  and  by  refusing  to  acknowledge  the  obligations  of 
the  Missouri  compromise,  you  force  open  the  whole  question  of  power.^i 

The  question  of  the  control  of  Congress  over  slavery  in  ter- 
ritories came  before  the  Senate  by  a  more  indirect  route.  On 
January  19,  1847,  Sevier  reported,  from  the  Committee  on  For- 
eign Relations,  a  bill  for  granting  the  President  three  million 
dollars  with  which  to  conduct  negotiations  with  Mexico.  When 
it  came  up  for  discussion  on  February  1,  Berrien,  of  Georgia, 
a  southern  Whig,  gave  notice  of  his  intention  to  offer  an  amend- 
ment. His  amendment,  among  other  things,  declared  that  "the 
war  with  Mexico  ought  not  to  be  prosecuted  by  this  Government 
with  any  view  to  the  dismemberment  of  that  republic,  or  the 
acquisition  by  conquest  of  any  portion  of  her  territory. ' '  A  few 
days  later  Cass  offered  a  substitute  which  authorized  the  Presi- 
dent to  demand  indemnity  from  Mexico.  To  those  who  desired 
an  extension  of  slavery  Berrien's  amendment  was  quite  as  of- 
fensive, except  in  principle,  as  the  Wilmot  proviso  itself;  for 
no  acquisition  of  territory  meant  no  extension  of  political  power. 
During  the  debate,    Berrien    warned   southerners  that  slavery 

23  ' '  These  northern  Mrs.  Caudles, ' '  he  continued,  '  *  will  not  let  us  rest 
by  night  or  by  day.  We  get  no  sleej)  for  them!  Their  eternal  din  will 
drive  us  to  distraction.  They  interfere  with  our  domestic  matters;  thoy 
enter  our  very  kitchens,  and  intrude  ui)on  our  most  sacred  household 
affairs!  "  {Cong.  Globe,  29  Cong.,  2  sess.,  App.,  86).  For  Seddon 's  renuirks, 
see  ibid.,  76. 

24  Ibid.,  346. 


SLAFEBY  AND   TEBBITOBIAL   GOVEBNMENTS  623 

Avould  surel^y  be  excluded  from  all  land  acquired ;  therefore  both 
the  interest  and  the  safety  of  the  South  * '  demands  that  we  should 
oppose  ourselves  to  any  and  every  acquisition  of  territory." 

Berrien  was  not  the  only  southern  man  who  was  averse  to 
territorial  acquisition.  Whigs  would  naturally  oppose  any  policy 
advocated  by  the  administration,  but  there  was  a  still  more  jrotent 
reason  why  certain  Democrats,  as  well  as  Whigs,  did  not  favor 
expansion.  This  reason  was  a  conviction  that  slavery  would  be 
excluded;  and  that  while  their  section  could  not  hope  to  gain 
any  advantage,  further  agitation  of  the  subject  might  result  in 
a  dissolution  of  the  Union.  Why,  asked  Morehead,  of  Kentucky, 
should  a  policy  (of  expansion)  be  followed  which  would  pre- 
cipitate discord  over  slavery  and  probably  destroy  the  institu- 
tion ?  In  the  House,  Alexander  H.  Stephens  vigorously  opposed 
the  acquisition  of  territory  and  gave  as  one  of  his  reasons  his  fear 
of  the  results  of  slavery  agitation.  He  had  faith  in  the  strength 
of  the  Union,  but  he  had  "no  disposition  to  test  its  strengh  by 
running  against  that  rock  upon  which  Mr.  Jefferson  predicted 
we  should  be  finally  wrecked." 

Calhoun  joined  the  Whigs  just  mentioned  in  combating  the 
President's  expansion  policy.  He  saw  even  more  clearly  than 
they  did  the  approaching  "irrepressible  conflict."  In  a  lugu- 
brious speech  made  in  the  Senate  on  February  24  he  declared  that 

Every  Senator  knows  that  I  was  opposed  to  the  war;  but  none  knows 
but  myself  the  depth  of  that  opposition.  With  my  conception  of  its 
character  and  consequences,  it  was  impossible  for  me  to  vote  for  it.  .  .  . 
On  the  passage  of  the  act  recognizing  the  war,  I  said  to  many  of  my 
friends  that  a  deed  had  been  done  from  which  the  country  would  not  be 
able  to  recover  for  a  long  time,  if  ever;  and  added,  it  has  dropped  a 
curtain  between  the  present  and  the  future,  which  to  me  is  impenetrable; 
and  for  the  first  time  since  I  have  been  in  public  life,  I  am  unable  to  see 
the  future.  I  also  added,  that  it  has  closed  the  first  volume  of  our  political 
history  under  the  Constitution,  and  opened  the  second,  and  that  no  mortal 
could  tell  what  would  be  written  in  it.  .  .  .  Since  then  less  than  a  year 
has  elapsed;  but  in  that  short  period  enough  has  already  been  developed 
to  make  what  was  then  said  look  like  prophecy.25 


25  Cong.  Globe,  29  Cong.,  2  sess.,  500.     Also,  Calhoun,  Works,  IV,  371. 


624  JAMES  E.   POLK 

The  thing  which  had  developed,  of  course,  was  the  inclination 
of  the  North  to  resist  the  spread  of  slavery,  and  Calhoun  fully 
realized  that  that  section  possessed  the  power  if  the  people  should 
decide  to  make  use  of  it.  His  first  remedy  for  the  impending 
disaster  was  to  prevent,  if  possible,  the  acquisition  of  more  ter- 
ritory. Later,  when  he  became  convinced  that  this  could  not  be 
done,  he  felt  constrained  to  deny  that  Congress  possessed  the 
power  to  restrict  the  institution. 

Already,  indeed,  Calhoun  had  been  offered  an  opportunity 
for  asserting  the  latter  doctrine.  On  February  15  Douglas  had 
attempted  in  the  House  to  extend  the  Missouri  Compromise  line 
through  the  territory  to  be  acquired,  as  an  alternative  to  ex- 
eluding  slavery  from  all  of  it.  His  amendment  for  this  purpose 
was  rejected  by  a  considerable  majority.  Four  days  after  this 
action  had  been  taken,  Calhoun  announced  in  the  Senate  that  he 
was  "against  any  compromise  line."  He  had  always,  he  said, 
considered  the  Missouri  Compromise  to  have  been  a  great  error, 
although  he  had  acquiesced  in  respecting  it  in  order  to  preserve 
peace.  But  since  its  rejection  as  a  solution  of  the  new  territorial 
question,  he  was  now  ready  to  insist  upon  the  full  rights  of  the 
South  in  all  territories.  An  enumeration  of  these  rights  he  em- 
bodied in  a  series  of  resolutions  which  Benton  was  unkind  enough 
to  call  a  "string  of  abstractions."  In  substance  the  resolutions 
declared  territories  to  be  the  property  of  the  several  states,  con- 
sequently Congress  did  not  possess  the  constitutional  power  to 
prevent  a  citizen  of  a  state  from  migrating  with  his  slaves  to  any 
of  the  territories.-" 

The  real  reason  why  Calhoun  and  his  sui)porters  felt  obliged 
to  abandon  the  historic  method  of  compromise  and  to  deny  the 
power  of  Congress  over  slavery  in  territories  is  obvious;  they 
were  confronted  by  a  condition  of  affairs  which  had  never  before 
existed.  In  all  land  previously  acquired  slavery  was  already 
established,    therefore    the    institution    might    continue    unless 


20  Cong.  Globe,  loc.  cit.,  4.53-455.     Calhoun.   IVorls,  IV,  339-349. 


SLAFEBY  AND  TEBBITOEIAL   GOVERNMENTS  625 

specifically  prohibitL'd  by  Congress.  In  the  proposed  acquisition 
slavery  had  been  abolished  by  Mexican  law,  and,  according  to 
international  custom,  this  law  would  continue  in  force  until  sup- 
planted by  positive  legislation  on  the  subject  by  the  United  States. 
Now  Congress  had  never  specifically  authorized  slavery  anywhere, 
and  there  could  be  no  hope  that  it  would  do  so  in  the  present 
instance.  Consequently  a  new  doctrine  must  be  promulgated ; 
it  must  deny  the  power  of  Congress  to  exclude  slave  property 
from  land  which  belonged  to  the  several  states.  For  the  sake  of 
consistency  the  doctrine  must  apply  to  Oregon  as  well  as  to  the 
proposed  Mexican  cession.-'  The  issue  was  now  squarely  joined. 
The  advocates  of  the  Wilmot  proviso  claimed  full  power  to  ex- 
elude  slavery  from  all  territories,  while  Calhoun  and  his  ad- 
herents denied  in  toto  the  existence  of  such  a  power.  After 
Congress  had  adjourned,  Benton  told  his  constituents  that  at  last 
extremes  had  met — Calhoun  and  the  abolitionists  had  joined 
hands  in  subverting  the  Union.-^ 

Congress  adjourned  on  March  3,  1847,  without  having  pro- 
vided a  government  for  Oregon.  A  bill  for  this  purpose  had 
passed  the  House  on  January  16,  but  on  the  last  day  of  the  session 
it  was  laid  on  the  table  by  the  Senate.    Under  Polk's  direction, 


-'  The  Baltimore  American,  Feb.  17,  1847,  pointed  out  very  clearly  why 
southern  members,  after  applauding  the  plan  suggested  by  Cass,  Buchanan, 
and  Dickinson  for  letting  the  people  of  the  territories  decide  the  question, 
turned  suddenly  to  oppose  it.  ' '  To  leave  to  the  territories  themselves  the 
absolute  decision  of  the  existence  of  slavery  upon  their  soil,  might  do  very 
well  if  slavery  had  been  previously  established  there,  as  was  the  case  when 
Louisiana  was  purchased,  when  Florida  was  acquired,  and  when  Texas  was 
annexed.  But  in  the  present  case  it  would  not  do.  The  old  formula  must 
be  changed.  The  long  and  fondly  cherished  doctrine  of  state  sovereignty, 
so  convenientlv  inchoate  in  a  territory  as  the  germ  of  a  state — even  this 
must  be  abandoned."     Quoted  in  Niles'  Beg.,  Feb.  19,  1848,  LXXIII,  392. 

28  The  Calhoun  resolutions,  said  he,  "go  the  precise  length  of  the 
northern  abolitionists,  and  with  the  same  practical  consequence,  only  in 
a  reversed  form.  The  abolition  creed  is,  that  the  admission  of  slavery  in 
any  part  of  the  Union  is  a  violation  of  the  constitution,  and  a  dissolution 
of  the  Union;  the  new  resolutions  declare  that  the  prohibition  of  slavery 
in  any  territory  of  the  Union  is  a  violation  of  the  constitution  and  the 
rights  of  the  states,  and  a  subversion  of  the  Union!  So  true  it  is,  that 
extremes  meet,  and  that  all  fanaticism, 'for  or  against  any  dogma,  termi- 
nates at  the  same  point  of  intolerance  and  defiance"  (speech  at  St.  Louis 
(no  date  given),  quoted  in  Niles'  Beg.,  June  5,  1847,  223). 


626  JAMES  E.  POLE 

Buchanan  expressed  to  the  people  of  Oregon  the  President's  re- 
gret because  they  had  been  left  by  Congress  without  a  govern- 
ment. Ignoring  the  real  difficulty,  Buchanan  stated  that  the 
failure  of  Congress  to  act  had  not  resulted  from  indifference  to 
the  interests  of  the  territory,  but  to  a  pressure  of  business  which 
did  not  allow  time  to  perfect  the  details  of  the  bill  \'°  Just  be- 
fore adjourning,  however.  Congress  passed  the  ''three  million 
bill"  which  enabled  the  President  to  use  this  sum  in  conducting 
negotiations  with  Mexico.  As  we  have  seen,  efforts  were  made 
to  attach  to  this  bill  either  the  Wilmot  proviso  or  an  extension 
of  the  Missouri  compromise  line,  but  all  such  restrictions  were 
rejected. 

During  the  session  which  had  just  closed  Calhoun  felt  that 
he  had  attained  a  commanding  position.  ' '  My  friends, ' '  he  wrote, 
"think  I  never  stood  higher,  or  stronger  than  I  now  do";  and 
he  was  "now  certain  that  there  will  be  no  more  Baltimore  nomi- 
nations, or  if  there  should  be,  the  nominee  will  be  assuredly  de- 
feated. ' '  Through  Benton,  he  said,  the  administration  was  trying 
to  build  up  the  old  Van  Buren  party,  but  tlieir  efforts  would  end 
in  failure.^**  After  Congress  had  adjourned,  he  went  home  to 
begin  an  active  compaign  for  uniting  the  South  in  defense  of 
slavery.  He  desired,  first  of  all,  to  prevent  the  reelection  of 
Polk,  or  the  election  of  any  of  his  adherents ;  if  Calhoun  himself 
could  not  be  elected,  he  was  ready  to  support  General  Taylor. ^^ 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  while  northern  Whigs  and  "proviso" 
Democrats  were  denouncing  the  President  as  a  slavery  extension- 
ist,  Calhoun  and  his  supporters  were  identifying  him  with  Van 
Buren  and  other  enemies  of  ' '  southern  institutions. ' ' 


29  Buchanan,  Works,  VII,  258. 

30  Calhoun  to  Thos.  G.  Clemsou,  Jan.  'AO,  LS47,  in  l^ep.  Am.  Hist.  Assn., 
1899,  II,  717. 

31  ' '  The  days  of  hunkcrism  is  numbered.  Mr.  Polk  is  the  last  of  the 
dynasty.  It  never  can  rise  attain  to  power.  ...  As  nuu-h  as  I  am  op- 
posed to  military  chieftains  for  presidents,  I  shall,  thus  thinking,  be 
content  to  see  him  [Taylor]  elected  against  Mr.  Polk,  or  any  one,  who 
contributed  to  make  the  war;  and,  let  me  add,  against  the  nominee  of  a 
convention,  either  democrat,  or  Whig"  (Oallioiiii  to  Clemson,  May  6,  1847, 
ibid.,  728). 


SLAVEET  AND  TEEBITOBIAL   GOVEENMENTS  627 

Earl}'  iu  April  the  President  was  informed  by  his  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  that  Calhoun  was  soliciting  signatures  for  an  address 
to  the  people  on  the  subject  of  slavery.  "I  remarked  to  Mr. 
Mason,"  says  the  Diary, 

that  Mr.  Calhoun  had  become  perfectly  desperate  in  his  aspirations  to 
the  Presidency,  and  had  seized  upon  this  sectional  question  as  the  only 
means  of  sustaining  himself  in  his  present  fallen  condition,  and  that  such 
an  agitation  of  the  slavery  question  was  not  only  unpatriotic  and  mis- 
chievous, but  wicked. 

He  was  as  little  pleased  with  a  story  told  by  Benton  to  the  effect 
that  the  supporters  of  Silas  Wright  "would  be  rejoiced  at  the 
opportunity  to  take  issue  with  Mr.  Calhoun  on  such  a  question. ' ' 

The  truth  is,  [he  continued],  there  is  no  patriotism  in  either  faction 
of  the  party.  Both  desire  to  mount  slavery  as  a  hobby,  and  hope  to  secure 
the  election  of  their  favourite  upon  it.  They  will  both  fail  and  ought  to. 
The  people  of  the  U.  States,  I  hope,  will  cast  off  all  such  intrigues,  and 
make  their  own  selection  for  the  Presidency,  and  this  if  they  are  wise 
they  will  do.  I  now  entertain  a  worse  opinion  of  Mr.  Calhoun  than  I 
have  ever  done  before.  He  is  wholly  selfish,  I  am  satisfied  has  no  patriot- 
ism. A  few  years  ago  he  was  the  author  of  Nullification  &  threatened 
to  dissolve  the  Union  on  account  of  the  tariff.  During  my  administration 
the  reduction  of  duties  which  he  desired  has  been  obtained,  and  he  can 
no  longer  complain.  No  sooner  is  this  done  than  he  selects  slavery  upon 
which  to  agitate  the  country,  and  blindly  mounts  that  topic  as  a  hobby. 
Gov.  Wright's  friends  in  Congress  as  unjiatriotically  have  shown  by  their 
course  that  they  desire  to  mount  the  same  hobby  in  the  North  and  hope 
to  be  successful  by  their  opposition  to  slavery.  They  both  forget  that  the 
Constitution  settles  [those]  questions  which  were  the  subjects  of  mutual 
concession  between  the  North  and  South.  I  am  utterly  disgusted  at  such 
intriguing  men  in  high  place,  &  hope  they  will  be  rebuked  by  the  people.32 


32  Polk,  Diary,  II,  457-459.  Although  PoLk  was  wrong  in  attributing 
the  sectional  discord  wholly  to  President-making,  it  was  true  that  the 
slavery  question  was  being  used  on  both  sides  of  Mason  and  Dixon's  line 
to  break  down  party  lines  and  to  solidify  public  opinion  either  for  or 
against  the  "peculiar  institution."  A  few  months  later  Holmes,  of  S.  C, 
wrote:  "I  wish  the  Southern  Representatives  would  consent  to  act  to- 
gether without  regard  to  Whig  or  Democrat.  The  Wilmot  Proviso  is 
paramount  to  all  Party.  We  are  in  great  danger.  The  North  is  resolved 
to  crush  Slavery — are  we  equally  in  the  South  resolved  at  all  hazards  to 
defend  it?"  (Holmes  to  Cobb,  Aug.  21,  1847,  in  Bep.  of  Am.  Hist.  Assn. 
1911,  II,  88). 


628  JAMES  K.   POLK 

What  the  President  desired  most  of  all  was  to  eliminate  the 
slavery  question  entirely  and  to  have  Congress  confine  its  atten- 
tion to  the  policies  of  his  administration.  However,  since  the 
slavery  question  had  emerged,  he  could  not  maintain  simply  a 
negative  attitude  with  respect  to  it.  He  was  compelled,  against 
his  will,  to  adopt  some  positive  program  for  dealing  with  slavery 
in  the  territories.  As  early  as  January  5,  1847,  the  cabinet  sug- 
gested an  extension  of  the  Missouri  Compromise  line,  but  at  that 
time  Polk  declined  to  commit  himself. ^^ 

About  a  week  after  the  cabinet  had  made  this  suggestion 
Atocha  appeared  in  Washington  and  the  prospect  of  an  early 
acquisition  of  Mexican  territory  seemed  brighter.  Since  Congress 
persisted  in  discussing  slavery,  some  positive  plan  on  the  part 
of  the  administration  seemed  desirable.  In  his  diary  for  January 
16  Polk  lamented  that  the  session  was  nearly  half  over  and  that 
Congress,  instead  of  enacting  necessary  military  measures,  was 
engaged  in  "a  worse  than  useless  discussion  about  slavery. ' '  He 
and  the  cabinet  deprecated  this  discussion,  but  "all  feared  it 
W'Ould  be  impossible  now  to  arrest  it."  Although  every  member 
of  the  cabinet  advised  an  extension  of  the  36°  30'  line  through 
the  territory  to  be  acquired,  Polk  was  not  ready  to  commit  him- 
self to  this  solution.'^  In  fact,  the  President  does  not  seem  to 
have  decided  upon  any  definite  policy  during  the  session,  although 
he  intimated  to  Crittenden  that  the  Missouri  Compromise  line 
would  be  extended  f^  and  as  Congress  voted  the  three  million 
dollars  without  attaching  the  Wilmot  restriction,  slavery  for  the 
time  being  ceased  to  be  a  vital  question. 

In  June,  the  President  decided  to  made  a  tour  of  tlie  nortli- 
eastern  states.  Although  we  have  no  direct  evidence  that  polit- 
ical considerations  induced  him  to  make  this  decision,  it  is  quite 


33  See  above,  p.  619. 

3-t  Polk,  Diary,  II,  335. 

35  He  told  Crittenden  that  the  slavery  question  in  California  and  New 
Mexico  would  not  l)e  a  practical  one  "because  there  would  be  but  a 
narrow  ribbon  of  territorv  South  of  the  Missouri  compromise  line"  (Diary, 
Jan.  23,  II,  350). 


SLAVERY  AND  TEEEITOBIAL   GOVERNMENTS  629 

probable  that  he  hoped,  by  making  the  journey,  to  retain  the 
support  of  northern  Democrats  and  to  prevent  further  defections 
on  account  of  slavery  agitation.  Among  those  who  accompanied 
him  was  Edmund  Burke,  commissioner  of  patents  and  his  close 
personal  friend.  No  doubt  Burke  voiced  the  President's  views 
when,  on  the  eve  of  the  journey,  he  told  Franklin  Pierce  that 
the  signs  of  the  times  portended  a  coalition  of  the  South  and 
West  against  the  North.  He  attributed  this  state  of  affairs  to 
the  ' '  foolish  course ' '  pursued  by  the  ' '  proviso ' '  Democrats ;  "  it  is 
clear  that  the  Northern  and  Southern  Democracy  are  now  divided, 
a  consummation  which  the  federalists  of  the  North  have  sought 
for  fifty  years  to  accomplish.  "^*^  Polk  did  not,  during  the  sum- 
mer, decide  upon  any  definite  policy  with  respect  to  slavery  in 
the  territories,  though  his  approval  (somewhat  reluctant,  to  be 
sure)  of  Buchanan's  open  espousal  of  an  extension  of  the  36°  30' 
line  indicated  that  he  would  not  oppose  this  plan  as  a  solution  of 
the  question. ^^ 

When  Congress  convened  in  December,  1847,  the  President, 
in  his  third  annual  message,  informed  that  body  of  the  failure 
of  Trist's  mission.  He  recommended  that  California  and  New 
Mexico  should  be  retained  permanently  by  the  United  States  and 
that  Congress  should  at  once  provide  each  of  these  territories  with 
a  civil  government.  In  this  connection  he  made  no  allusion  to 
slavery,  but  he  concluded  his  message  by  quoting  Washington's 
admonition  regarding  the  value  of  union  and  the  calamity  of 
sectional  controversies. 

How  unimportant  [said  Polk]  are  all  our  differences  of  opinion  upon 
minor  questions  of  public  policy  compared  with  its  preservation,  and  how 
scrupulously  should  we  avoid  all  agitating  topics  which  may  tend  to  dis- 
tract and  divide  us  into  contending  parties,  separated  by  geographical 
lines,  whereby  it  may  be  weakened  or  endangered. 

On  December  8,  two  days  after  Congress  had  convened,  the 
Vice-President  laid  before  the  Senate  a  memorial  from  the  Oregon 


36  Burke  to  Pierce,  June  21,  1847,  Pierce  Papers. 

37  Polk,  Diary,  III,  142.     Buchanan  to  Berks  County  Democrats   (Bu- 
chanan, Works,  VII,  385). 


630  JAMES  K.   POLK 

"Legislative  Assembly''  praying  for  the  confirmation  of  their 
land  titles  and  for  the  adoption  of  measures  to  promote  education. 
This  assembly  had  been  created  by  the  people  of  Oregon,  without 
authority  from  the  United  States  government.  The  movement 
to  establish  a  temporary  government  began  as  early  as  1843,  and 
one  section  of  the  "Organic  Laws"  prohibited  slavery. ^'^ 

On  December  14,  before  any  consideration  had  been  given  to 
this  memorial,  Dickinson,  of  New  York,  submitted  resolutions 
which  attempted  to  define  the  policy  of  the  government  for  both 
acquiring  and  governing  territories.  They  asserted  that  "true 
policy"  required  the  United  States  to  strengthen  its  political  and 
commercial  relations  on  the  continent  by  the  acquisition  of  con- 
tiguous territory,  and  that  in  all  such  territories  the  people  should 
be  left  free  to  settle  ' '  all  questions  concerning  the  domestic  policy 
therein,"  without  any  restrictions  imposed  by  the  federal  govern- 
ment. In  other  words,  Dickinson  advocated  the  "popular  sover- 
eignty" program  which  Douglas  later  mounted  as  a  hobby  in 
1854.  In  his  well-known  "Nicholson  letter"  Cass  made  a  bid 
for  the  Presidential  nomination  by  casting  doubt  on  the  power 
of  Congress  over  slavery  in  territories  and  by  espousing  the  doc- 
trine of  "popular  sovereignty."^" 

The  Dickinson  resolutions  were  followed  by  others  in  wliich 
individual  Senators  endeavored  to  commit  the  government  to  what 
each  deemed  to  be  the  ' '  true  policy ' '  respecting  territories.  One 
offered  by  Calhoun  opposed  holding  Mexico  as  a  province,  or 
incorporating  it  into  the  LTnion.  As  a  substitute  for  the  Dickin- 
son plan,  Yulee,  of  Florida,  offered  a  resolution  which  declared 
that  territory  owned  or  to  be  acquired  by  the  United  States  "is 
the  common  property  of  the  Union,"  and  that  neither  the  fech'ral 
nor  the  territorial  government  can  prevent  any  citizen  from  enjoy- 
ing full  rights  therein.  Hale,  of  New  Hampshire,  offered  another 
substitute  which  purposed  to  exclude  slavery  entirely  from  lands 


38  Gray,  History  of  Oregon,  chaps,  xiii-xiv. 

30  Cass  to  A.  O.  P.  Nicholson,  Dec.  24,   1847.     Printed  in  Nilcs'  Beg., 
Jan.  8,  1848,  LXXIII,  293. 


SLAVEEY  AND   TERKITORIAL   GOVERNMENTS  631 

that  might  be  acquired.  All  of  these  proposals  were  defeated, 
yet  they  afforded  an  opportunity  for  airing  divergent  views  and 
for  illustrating  the  impossibility  of  arriving  at  any  practical 
settlement  of  the  slavery  question. 

On  January  10,  1848,  Senator  Douglas  presented  a  bill  for 
establishing  a  territorial  government  in  Oregon,  and  on  February 
9  Caleb  Smith,  of  Indiana,  reported  from  the  House  Committee 
on  Territories  a  bill  for  the  same  purpose.  Both  measures  were 
referred  to  committees,  and  for  some  time  war  legislation  pre- 
cluded their  consideration. 

The  Douglas  bill  did  not  come  before  the  Senate  until  May 
31,  and  then  Hale  moved  to  amend  by  adding  section  twelve  of 
the  Senate  bill  of  the  last  session — the  section  which  extended  to 
Oregon  the  Ordinance  of  1787.  Calhoun  opposed  the  inclusion 
of  a  slavery  restriction,  while  others  like  Hannegan  and  Benton 
thought  such  restriction  to  be  unnecessary,  since  slaves  would 
never  be  taken  to  Oregon.  Benton  was  unwilling  to  have  neces- 
sary legislation  delayed  by  the  introduction  of  this  "pestiferous 
question."  He  was  especially  anxious  that  military  protection 
should  be  extended  immediately  to  the  people  of  Oregon.  But 
Hale  was  obdurate,  and  insisted  upon  a  positive  prohibition  of 
slavery.  ' '  If  this  Union, ' '  said  he,  ' '  with  all  its  advantages,  has 
no  other  cement  than  the  blood  of  human  slavery,  let  it  perish ! ' ' 
When  the  discussion  was  resumed  on  June  5,  Foote  moved  to 
amend  by  inserting  in  section  twelve  the  words:  "provided  the 
same  [the  slavery  restriction]  be  compatible  with  the  laws  and 
Constitution  of  the  United  States."  In  this  way  he  undoubtedly 
hoped  to  obtain  a  "Dred  Scott  decision"  at  that  early  date.  After 
Underwood,  of  Kentucky,  had  denied  the  authority  of  Congress 
to  interfere  with  local  institutions  and  Baldwin,  of  Connecticut, 
had  declared  that  slaves  were  held  solely  by  state  laws  and  that 
when  a  slave  left  the  confines  of  a  slave  state— even  if  accompa- 
nied by  his  master  on  a  temporary  sojourn— "his  shackles  fell 
off,"  Badger,  of    North  Carolina,  offered,  as  a  substitute  for 


632  JAMES  K.   POLE 

Foote's  proposal,  a  proviso  which  would  exempt  the  people  of 
Oregon  from  the  operation  of  the  sixth  article  (the  one  prohibit- 
ing slavery)  of  the  Ordinance  of  1787.  Foote  accepted  the  modi- 
fication. After  considerable  discussion  this  amendment  was  with- 
drawn by  the  mover  on  June  23,  and  Davis,  of  Mississippi,  pre- 
sented another  which  asserted  that  nothing  in  the  bill  should  be 
so  construed  as  to  prohibit  slavery  in  Oregon  while  it  remained  a 
territory. 

After  a  long  delay  the  House,  on  March  28,  proceeded  to 
consider  Caleb  Smith's  Oregon  bill.  In  a  most  ingenious  speech 
Gayle,  of  Alabama,  asserted  that  all  laws  by  which  Congress  had 
excluded  slavery  from  territories  had  been  based  on  precedent 
merely  and  had  not  been  authorized  by  the  Constitution.  He 
held  that  territories  were  legally  states  before  entering  the 
Union;*''  on  the  other  hand,  he  denied  that  their  government 
thereby  possessed  the  power  to  exclude  slavery.  In  reply,  Smart, 
of  Maine,  declared  that  Congress  not  only  had  the  power  but  was 
bound  by  the  will  of  the  majority  to  prevent  slavery  from  entering 
all  territories. 

The  President,  as  we  have  seen,  was  reluctant  to  announce  a 
definite  policy  regarding  slavery  in  territories,  even  though  the 
Van  Burenites  believed  this  to  be  the  issue  nearest  his  heart." 
3oth  he  and  his  cabinet  opposed  the  Wilmot  proviso,*-  and,  since 
a  negative  policy  could  not  be  pursued  indefinitely,  Polk  at 
last  decided  to  advocate  an  extension  of  the  Missouri  Compromise 
line. 


40  "Now,  sir,  how  can  a  'new  State  be  admitted  into  the  Union'  mUess 
it  was  a  State  before  admission?" 

■41  "The  slavery  question,"  wrote  John  M.  Niles,  "is  evidently  first 
&  foremost  with  the  administration;  it  overrides  the  Mexican  Avar  &  any 
other  question.  The  slave  power  rules  as  tyrannically  here  as  it  can  in 
Louisiana;  that,  is  made  the  test  &  tie  of  fealty  to  the  administration" 
(Niles  to  Van  Buren,  Dec.  16,  1847,  Van  Buren  Papers). 

42  After  Clifford  had  been  sent  to  Mexico  the  President  announced  his 
intention  to  select  some  northern  man  to  fill  his  place.  All  members  ex- 
pressed an  unwillinf-uess  to  be  associated  with  a  Wilmot  proviso  man 
(Polk,  Diary,  III,  431). 


SLAVEBY  AND  TEEIUTOBIAL   GOVEBNMENTS  633 

As  already  noted,  the  President  desired  most  of  all  to  elimi- 
nate the  subject  of  slavery,  but  forces  beyond  his  control  made 
it  apparent  that  this  could  not  be  done.  Indeed,  since  the  Treaty 
of  Guadalupe  Hidalgo  had  been  ratified  by  Mexico,  the  question 
of  governments  for  California  and  New  Mexico  had  become  more 
urgent  than  ev€r.  Congress  persisted  in  discussing  slavery  and 
there  seemed  to  be  no  prospect  of  an  agreemnt  on  the  subject. 
On  May  26  a  messenger  arrived  from  Oregon  and  laid  before 
the  President  a  memorial  from  the  legislative  assembly  of  that 
territory,  stating  that  the  Indians  were  making  war  on  the  inhab- 
itants. Polk  transmitted  the  memorial  to  Congress  along  with 
a  message  recommending  the  immediate  creation  of  a  government 
for  Oregon.  He  said  nothing  about  slavery.*^  But  on  June  24, 
in  a  conversation  with  Senator  Hannegan  concerning  "the  dis- 
tracting subject  of  slavery,  which  is  embarrassing  the  Bill  to 
establish  a  Territorial  Government  in  Oregon,"  he  advised  the 
Senator  to  ' '  bring  forward  &  press  the  adoption  of  the  Missouri 
compromise  line  &  extend  it  to  the  Pacific. ' '  Hannegan,  as  well 
as  the  entire  cabinet,  agreed  with  Polk  that  ' '  the  adoption  of  the 
Missouri  compromise  was  the  only  means  of  allaying  the  excite- 
ment &  settling  the  question."  The  President  sent  for  other 
members  of  Congress  and  urged  them  to  support  this  policy  in 
order  to  checkmate  the  action  of  the  Barnburners : 

The  necessity  for  settling  the  question  is  the  greater  since  the  con- 
vention of  Barnburners,  held  at  Utica,  New  York,  on  the  22nd  Instant, 
have  bolted  from  the  regular  Democratic  nominations  made  at  the  Balti- 
more convention  in  May  last,  and  have  nominated  Martin  Van  Buren  for 
President  and  Henry  Dodge  of  Wisconsin  for  Vice  President  distinctly 
upon  the  ground  of  the  Wilmot  Proviso.  This  is  a  most  dangerous  attempt 
to  organize  Geographical  parties  upon  the  slavery  question.  It  is  more 
threatening  to  the  Union,  than  anything  which  has  occurred  since  the 
meeting  of  the  Hartford  convention  in  1814.  Mr.  Van  Buren 's  course  is 
selfish,  unpatriotic,  and  wholly  inexcusable.  The  effect  of  this  movement  of 
the  seceding  and  discontented  Democrats  of  New  York  will  be  effectually 


43  Polk,  Diary,  III,  463.     Message   dated   May  29,   1849    (Richardson, 
Messages,  IV,  584). 


634  JAMES  K.   POLK 

co[u]nteracted  if  the  slave  question  can  be  settled  by  adopting  the  Missouri 
compromise  line  as  applied  to  Oregon,  New  Mexico,  &  Upper  California  at 
the  Present  Session  of  Congress.  If  the  question  can  be  thus  settled  haiinony 
■will  be  restored  to  the  Union  and  the  danger  of  forming  geographical  parties 
be  avoided.  For  these  reasons  I  am  using  my  influence  with  members  of 
Congress  to  have  it  adopted.** 

He  was' quite  indifferent  regarding  the  extension  of  slavery, 
but  he  was  vitally  concerned  over  preserving  the  Union  and  in- 
suring the  success  of  his  party.  He  did  not  believe  that  sound 
principles,  or  what  he  considered  to  be  such,  should  be  jeopar- 
dized by  a  sudden  change  in  the  popular  viewpoint.  After  the 
Baltimore  convention,  Cass  showed  to  Polk  the  first  draft  of  his 
letter  of  acceptance,  one  sentence  of  which  declared  that  the 
government  should  keep  pace  with  public  opinion.  ' '  I  suggested 
to  him,"  is  the  comment  in  the  Diary,  that  the  assertion 

might  be  misconstrued  to  mean  that  constitutional  principles  might  be 
changed,  in  order  to  accommodate  themselves  to  what  might  seem  from 
time  to  time  to  be  public  opinion,  which  I  thought  was  an  untenable  & 
dangerous  doctrine. ■is 

A  few  days  after  his  conversation  with  Hannegan  the  Presi- 
dent discussed  the  Oregon  bill  with  Senators  Bright,  of  Indiana, 
and  Foote,  of  Mississippi.  He  dictated  an  amendment  which 
would  extend  the  36°  30'  line  to  the  Pacific.  When  Bright  intro- 
duced the  amendment  in  tlie  Senate,  Calhoun  again  asserted  that 
Congress  could  not,  without  violating  tlie  Constitution,  prevent 
a  slaveholder  from  carrying  his  property  to  any  territory.*" 

During  the  first  two  weeks  in  July,  Polk  conversed  with  va- 
rious southern  members  of  both  houses,  nearly  all  of  whom  were 
ready  to  accept  an  extension  of  the  36°  30'  line.  Judge  Catron 
wrote  from  Nashville  that  the  position  taken  by  those  who  denied 
the  power  of  Congress  over  slavery  in  acquired  territory  could 
not  be  maintained.    He  was  in  favor  of  excluding  the  institution 


*■*  Polk,  Diary,  III,  501-503. 

•15  Ibid.,  471-472. 

•*«  Ibid.,  504-505.     Cong.  Globe,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  875-876. 


SLAVEBY  AND  TEBEITOEIAL   GOVEBNMENTS  635 

from  Oregon  and  believed  that  it  would  be  wise,  politically,  to 
do  so.*'  The  pleasure  which  Polk  derived  from  the  support  of 
so  many  southern  men  was  offset  by  the  acerbity  of  Alexander  II. 
Stephens.  By  a  resolution  introduced  on  July  10  Stephens  called 
upon  the  President  for  information  concerning  the  governments 
which  had  been  set  up  in  California  and  New  Mexico.  In  a 
violent  speech  he  scathingly  denounced  the  President  and  General 
Pillow,  and  characterized  the  former  as  ' '  Polk  the  mendacious. '  '*^ 

In  the  Senate,  on  July  12.  after  Jetferson  Davis  had  upheld 
the  right  of  a  slaveowner  to  locate  with  his  "property"  in  any 
territory,  Clayton,  of  Delaware,  moved  that  the  question  of  slav- 
ery in  territories  be  referred  to  a  committee  of  eight  to  be  selected 
by  ballot — four  from  the  North  and  four  from  the  South.  Dur- 
ing the  discussion  of  this  proposal  Westcott,  of  Florida,  asserted 
that  should  the  Wilmot  proviso  be  attached  to  the  bill,  ' '  we  have 
a  Chief  Magistrate  at  the  other  end  of  the  avenue  who  would 
put  his  veto  on  it. ' '  However  true  this  statement  may  have  been, 
it  must  have  been  based  upon  pure  conjecture,  for  Polk  would 
hardly  have  given  advance  information  to  a  man  whom  he  de- 
tested as  he  did  Westcott.  The  Senate  passed  the  resolution  and 
Clayton  was  made  chairman  of  the  select  committee. ^'^ 

Calhoun  was  made  a  member  of  the  Clayton  committee  and, 
on  July  14,  Polk  expressed  to  the  Senator's  friend,  Elmore,  a 
hope  that  he  might  recede  from  his  extreme  position  and  accept 
the  36°  30'  line  as  a  compromise.     He  could  not  with  propriety, 


47  "Were  I  in  Congress,  not  a  moment's  hestiation  would  be  felt  in 
voting  for  the  exclusion  of  slavery  from  [in?]  the  Oregon  bill;  and  if 
this  is  done,  with  the  sanction  of  the  Democratic  party — as  it  must  be  in 
the  Senate,  the  Barnburners  may  hang  their  harp  on  the  willows,  so  far 
as  capital  is  sought  from  this  slavery  question;  not  that  I  think  so  much 
will  come  of  it  as  has  been  supposed,  for  Mr.  V.  Buren  will  have  to  carry 
his  abolition  brethern,  who  will  be  very  apt  to  absorb  his  party,  &  to 
incorporate  his  good  self,  &  Son  John."  Catron  "w'd  feel  much  gratified 
to  see  this  slavery  question  adjusted  by  a  compromise  on  36°  30' — the  true 
division  as  I  think"  (Catron  to  Polk,  July  12,  1848,  Poll-  Papers). 

■48  Polk,  Diary,  IV,  14.     Cong.  Globe,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  912. 

40  Cong.  Globe,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  927-928,  932. 


636  JAMES  K.   POLK 

he  said,  ask  Calhoim  to  call  and  discuss  the  subject,^"  so  Elmore, 
two  days  later,  brouglit  the  Senator  to  call  upon  him.  After 
Polk  had  expressed  a  "decided  opinion"  in  favor  of  adjusting 
the  slavery  question  by  an  extension  of  the  compromise  line, 
Calhoun  said  that  the  Clayton  committee  had  as  yet  been  unable 
to  agree  upon  a  solution.  He  stated  that  a  suggestion  had  been 
made  in  committee  which  he  was  willing  to  accept :  that  the  ex- 
isting Oregon  laws  which  prohibited  slavery  be  allowed  to  operate 
until  changed  by  the  territorial  legislature ;  and  that  the  govern- 
ments of  California  and  New  Mexico  be  prevented  by  Congress 
from  legislating  on  the  subject  of  slavery,  leaving  the  question, 
should  it  arise,  to  be  decided  by  the  local  judiciary.  Polk  was 
willing  to  accept  this  adjustment,  although  he  preferred  an  ex- 
tension of  the  compromise  line.  Calhoun  now  produced  the 
loaded  dice  by  which  he  hoped  to  win  the  game  so  far  as  the 
Mexican  cessions  were  concerned : 

He  said  that  much  would  depend  on  me,  in  appointments  to  be  made 
of  Governor,  Secretary,  &  Judges;  that  they  might  be  Northern  men  in 
Oregon,  but  that  they  ought  to  be  Southern  men  in  California  &  New 
Mexico,  who  would  maintain  the  southern  views  on  the  subject  of  slavery. 
The  tone  of  his  conversation  on  this  point  seemed  to  be  designed  to  elicit 
a  pledge  from  me  to  this  effect.  I  at  once  felt  the  delicacy  of  my  situa- 
tion &  promptly  replied  that  that  was  a  subject  upon  which  I  could  not 
speak,  that  if  the  laws  passed  in  the  fonn  suggested  I  would  do  my  duty, 
and  jocosely  added  that  my  friends,  as  Gen '1  Harrison's  Cincinnati  Com- 
mittee in  1844  [1840?]  said  for  him,  must  have  a  "generous  confidence" 
that  I  would  do  so.^'i 

Calhoun  returned  on  the  following  day  and  reported  that  the 
committee  had  agreed  upon  the  general  terms  above  mentioned, 
but  that  the  northern  members  insisted  upon  a  provision  which 
would  allow  appeals  from  the  territorial  courts  to  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States.     He  and  two  other  members  would 


50  "I  told  him  I  could  not  invite  Mr.  Calhoun  to  call,  1st,  because  he 
was  an  older  man  than  myself,  had  been  longer  in  public  life,  and  2nd, 
because  he  niiglit  su])po3e  tliat  I  desired  to  exercise  some  official  influence 
over  him. ' ' 

51  Polk,  Diary,  TV,  19-21. 


SLAVE  FY  AND   TEEEITORIAL   GOVERNMENTS  637 

not  admit  this  pi'ovision,  and  he  now  suggested  that  the  whole 
subject  might  be  postponed  until  the  next  session  of  Congress. 
Since  Polk  urged  immediate  action,  the  Senator,  after  another 
vain  attempt  to  carry  his  point  in  committee,  finally  yielded  on 
the  subject  of  appeal.  "There  is  now  some  prospect,"  wrote  the 
President, ' '  that  the  question  may  be  settled  at  the  present  session 
of  Congress,  and  I  sincerely  hope  it  may  be."  On  July  18,  Clay- 
ton reported  a  bill  which  left  undisturbed  the  prohibition  in 
Oregon.  The  status  of  slavery  was  left  for  the  Supreme  Court 
to  determine,  and  until  this  had  been  done,  the  territorial  govern- 
ments were  not  to  legislate  on  the  subject.^- 

When  the  bill  came  up  for  discussion,  on  July  22,  Niles,  of 
Connecticut,  asked  Clayton  whether  his  bill  answered  the  im- 
portant question  whether  Congress  had  or  had  not  the  i:»ower  to 
interfere  with  slavery  in  territories.  He  replied  that  it  ' '  neither 
affirms  nor  denies  the  power,  and  herein  consists  the  compro- 
mise." Northern  members  were  unable  to  discern  a  compromise 
in  a  measure  which  left  slave-owners  free  to  enter  California  and 
New  Mexico  without  hindrance,  except  an  improbable  decision  of 
a  pro-slavery  court.  The  northern  press  was  equally  suspicious. 
Said  the  New  York  Evening  Post: 

Talk  as  we  may  of  the  impartiality  of  our  courts,  a  judge  from  the 
Southern  States,  allied  to  the  aristocracy  of  those  States,  would  share 
their  prejudices  and  decide  according  to  their  views.  This  compromise  is, 
therefore,  an  ingenious  method  of  giving  Mr.  Calhoun  his  own  way  in  the 
controversy. 

And  the  New  York  Trihiine: 

We  protest  against  this  juggle.  We  say  it  [slavery]  has  acquired  no 
right  to  a  single  foot  of  the  new  territory;  the  South  avers  the  contrary. 
We  press  Congress  for  a  decision,  and  it  is  refused  us.  Instead  of  de- 
ciding Congress  undertakes  to  run  the  matter  through  so  many  different 
crucibles,  that  slavery  will  finally  be  established  and  that  inveterate  old 
rascal.  Nobody,  be  alone  responsible  for  it.  .  .  . 

A  governor  and  three  Judges  arc  to  be  the  law  makers  and  the  law 
expounders  in  each  Territory — said  governor  and  judges  being  appointed 


52  Ibid.,  21-24.     Cong.  Globe,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  950. 


(538  JAMES  K.   POLK 

by  Polk,  and  of  course  chosen  from  among  the  most  determined,  wily  and 
unscrupulous  champions  of  slavery  extension.  Nobody  can  pretend  to 
doubt  how  they  will  construe  the  constitution. '>3 

The  discussion  in  the  Senate  continued  until  the  morning  of  July 
27,  when,  after  an  all-night  session  during  which  numerous 
amendments  were  rejected,  the  measure  as  submitted  by  the  select 
committee  was  passed.  On  the  following  day,  after  a  brief  debate, 
the  House  laid  the  Senate  bill  on  the  table  and  proceeded  to  con- 
sider its  own  Oregon  government  bill. 

The  President  was  sorely  disappointed  by  this  action  on  the 
part  of  the  House.  He  was  especially  mortified  because  the 
defeat  of  the  bill  had  been  accomplished  by  the  votes  of  New 
York  Barnburners  and  Democrats  "who  are  timid  &  afriad  to 
risk  their  popularity  at  home."  The  result  of  leaving  the  slavery 
question  unsettled,  to  be  agitated  by  "ambitious  aspirants  & 
gamblers,''  would  be  to  produce  an  organization  of  parties  on 
geographical  lines  and  to  endanger  the  Union.  He  did  not  doubt 
that  the  bill  would  have  passed  if  there  had  been  no  Presidential 
election  pending.  The  Whigs  were  desirous  of  preventing  any 
adjustment  during  the  present  session, 

doubtless  in  the  expectation  that  in  the  chapter  of  accidents  growing  out 
of  the  excitement  &  agitation  which  must  follow,  that  they  may  stand 
some  chance  to  elect  a  Whig  President.  I  deplore  as  a  national  calamity 
the  want  of  patriotism  which  seems  to  actuate  the  conduct  of  the  leaders 
of  the  "Whig  party  in  Congress;  and  I  exceedingly  regret  that  any  portion 
of  the  Northern  Democrats  from  timidity  or  other  causes  have  been  in- 
duced to  act  with  them.'"'* 

By  the  eighth  of  August  he  had  become  convinced  that  Con- 
gress would  not,  at  the  present  session,  create  governments  for 
New  Mexico  and  California,  yet  he  believed  that  the  Oregon  bill, 
with  its  clause  excluding  slavery,  might  be  passed.  He  asked 
the  cabinet  whether,  in  case  this  bill  should  pass,  he  ought  to 
sign  it.    Each  member  responded  that,  since  the  whole  territory 


53  Both  quoted  in  Nilcs '  Beg.,  LXXIV,  55-56. 
51 1'olk,  Diary,  IV,  33-35. 


SLAFEEY  AND   TERIUTOBIAL   GOVERNMENTS  G39 

lay  north  of  36°  30',  he  ought  to  do  so.  He  then  asked  whether 
he  ought  to  aceompany  his  approval  with  a  message  stating  that 
he  had  signed  the  bill  because  the  territory  lay  north  o£  the 
Missouri  Comjironiise  line.  Buchanan  feared  that  such  a  state- 
ment might  injure  the  campaign  of  General  Cass;  the  others 
believed  that  it  should  be  made,  either  in  a  message  or  in  the 
Washington  Union. ^^ 

The  House  passed  its  own  bill  on  August  2  and  sent  it  to  the 
Senate  for  approval.  The  Senate  attached  certain  amendments 
which  the  House  promptly  rejected,  and  it  looked  for  a  time  as 
if  no  agreement  could  be  reached.  Polk  was  ready  to  approve 
slavery  resti'iction  for  Oregon,  but  he  told  the  cabinet  that  he 
did  not  wish  it  to  be  inferred  that  he  would  sanction  a  restriction 
south  of  36°  30'.^« 

In  taking  his  stand  against  the  application  of  the  Wilmot 
proviso  to  all  territory  it  is  evident  that  the  President  was  ani- 
mated not  by  a  wish  to  extend  slavery  but  by  a  desire  to  preserve 
the  Union.  He  believed  that  the  Union  could  be  saved  by  an 
extension  of  the  compromise  line — and,  perhaps,  in  no  other  way. 
He  had  set  his  heart  on  liaving  the  whole  territorial  question 
settled  by  the  adoption  of  such  a  policy.  The  elimination  of 
Oregon  would  make  the  adjustment  more  difficult,  consequently 
he  preferred  to  have  the  matter  setled  by  a  measure  that  would 
apply  to  all  three  territories.  He  believed  that  the  South  was 
entitled  to  the  privilege  of  occupying  with  its  "property"  the 
southern  part  of  the  Mexican  session;  but,  personally,  he  was 
most  interested  in  allaying  sectional  discord.  He  was  equally 
insistent — in  defiance  of  southern  pressure — upon  prohibiting 
slavery  north   of  36°    30',  although   he  samewhat   doubted  the 


55  Ibid.,  61-62. 

^fi"I  expressed  the  opinion  that  if  I  approved  and  signed  the  Bill  in 
the  usual  form  without  assigning  my  reasons,  my  opinion  in  regard  to 
California  &  New  Mexico  would  not  be  understood,  and  that  it  might  be 
inferred  that  I  had  yielded  the  question  in  regard  to  the  Territory  South 
as  well  as  North  of  the  Missouri  compromise  line,  which  would  not  be 
true"  (ibid.,  67-68). 


640  JAMES  K.   POLE 

constitutional  power  of  Congress  to  apply  such  a  restriction.  In 
this,  too,  he  was  moved  not  by  any  feeling  against  tlie  institution, 
but  by  the  opinion  that  nothing  else  w^ould  satisfy  the  North  and 
prevent  further  agitation.  In  a  word,  his  attitude  toward  slavery 
was  one  of  indifference. 

When,  on  the  morning  of  August  13,  Polk  learned  that  the 
Senate,  at  the  close  of  all-night  session,  had  passed  the  House 
Oregon  bill,  with  its  prohibition  of  slavery,  he  realized  that  he 
must  decide  the  question  of  affixing  or  withholding  his  signature. 
Although  disappointed  because  the  compromise  line  had  not,  at 
the  same  time,  been  extended  through  the  Mexican  cession,  he 
nevertheless  decided  to  approve  the  Oregon  bill  and,  in  a  mes- 
sage, to  state  his  reasons  for  so  doing.  Buchanan  did  not  wish 
Polk  to  state  in  the  message  that  he  would  veto  any  bill  which 
purposed  to  exclude  slavery  south  of  36°  30' ;  Mason,  Marcy, 
and  Ritchie  advised  such  an  announcement.  While  the  President 
was  drafting  his  message  to  the  House,  Senator  Turney,  of  Ten- 
nessee, called  and  urged  him  to  veto  the  bill ;  and  Hannegan, 
although  he  had  voted  for  the  bill,  offered  to  sustain  a  veto. 
Calhoun  and  Burt,  of  South  Carolina,  importuned  him  to  veto 
the  measure,  but  he  informed  them  that  he  would  sign  it,  "al- 
though I  would  do  so  reluctantly"  ; 

I  told  him  [Calhoun]  that  if  the  question  of  imposing  the  restriction 
was  an  original  one  arising  for  the  first  time,  I  would  have  serious  doubts 
of  its  constitutionality.  I  remarked  that  there  might  be  questions  arise 
effecting  [affecting]  the  very  existence  of  the  Union,  upon  which  we  ought 
to  yield  individual  opinions,  in  deference  to  what  our  predecessors  had 
done,  and  I  considered  this  one  of  them. 

He  reminded  Calhoun  that  the  Clayton  committee  of  which  the 
Senator  was  a  member  had  been  willing  to  exclude  slavery  from 
Oregon,  and  that  many  southern  Senators  had  voted  for  tlie 
Clayton  bill.  He  reminded  him  also  that  Burt,  who  was  present, 
had  proposed  the  amendment  in  the  House  for  prohibiting  slavery 
in  Oregon,  on  the  ground  that  the  territory  lay  north  of  the 
compromise  line.    Calhoun  pleaded  for  a  veto,  but 


SLAVERY  AND  TEBBITOBIAL   GOFEENMENTS  641 

I  repeated  that  1  would  sign  it,  and  told  him  that  if  I  were  to  veto  it 
after  all  that  had  occurred,  and  in  the  present  excited  state  of  Congress 
&  of  the  public  mind,  I  should  do  more  to  inflame  that  excitement  &  to 
array  the  country  into  geographical  parties  and  to  rend  the  Union,  than 
any  act  which  had  ever  been  done  by  any  President  or  any  man  in  the 
country.    He  left  me  fully  understanding  my  opinions  &  what  I  would  do.^T 

Congress  had  agreed  to  adjourn  on  August  14,  the  day  after 
Polk  had  held  the  above-mentioned  conversation  with  Calhoun. 
The  President  rose  early  and  carefully  revised  his  message  to 
the  House  before  the  cabinet  had  assembled  for  the  purpose  of 
accompanying  him  to  the  capital.  To  Buchanan's  caustic  remark 
concerning  Ritchie 's  assistance  in  the  preparation  of  the  message 
Polk  retorted  indignantly  that  none  of  the  editor's  suggestions 
had  been  followed.  The  Secretary  then  reiterated  his  opposition 
to  sending  the  message. 

Shortly  after  Polk  had  reached  the  Vice-President's  room  at 
the  capitol  he  was  informed  that  both  houses  were  engaged  in 
a  debate  against  suspending  the  joint  rule  under  which  bills 
could  not  be  submitted  to  the  President  for  his  signature  on  the 
last  day  of  the  session.  Unless  it  were  suspended  not  only  the 
Oregon  bill  but  the  army  appropriation  bill  would  fail.  The 
President  communicated  to  several  members  his  determination  to 
call  an  extra  session  on  the  following  day  if  this  session  should 
terminate  without  passing  the  appropriation  bill.  The  joint  rule 
was  suspended  and  both  bills  presented  for  his  approval.  As 
he  was  about  to  affix  his  signature,  Calhoun  asked  him  not  to 
assign  his  reasons  in  a  message,  but  the  request  was  denied.  Nomi- 
nations to  fill  the  offices  created  by  the  Oregon  bill  were  made  and 
confirmed.  When  the  hour  for  ending  the  sessoin  had  arrived 
the  House  was  so  pressed  for  time  that  it  adjourned  in  confusion 
without  having  read  the  President 's  message.'^^ 

In  his  message  Polk  told  the  House  that  he  had  signed  the 
territorial  bill,  even  though  New  Mexico  and  California  had  been 


57  Polk,  Diary,  IV,  70-74. 

58  Ibid.,  74-77. 


642  JAMES  K.   POLK 

left  without  governments,  because  Oregon  urgently  needed  legal 
organization  and  protection.  Turning  to  the  cause  of  sectional 
discord,  he  thus  stated  the  position  of  the  slaveholder : 

In  the  progress  of  all  governments  questions  of  such  transcendent 
importance  occasionally  arise  as  to  cast  in  the  shade  those  of  a  mere  party 
character.  But  one  such  question  can  now  be  agitated  in.  this  country, 
and  this  may  endanger  our  glorious  Union,  the  source  of  our  greatness 
and  all  our  political  blessings.  This  question  is  slavery.  With  the  slave- 
holding  States  this  does  not  embrace  merely  the  rights  of  property,  how- 
ever valuable,  but  it  ascends  far  higher,  and  involves  the  domestic  peace 
and  security  of  every  family. 

After  commending  the  ' '  mutual  concession ' '  shown  by  the  f ram- 
ers  of  the  Constitution  in  dealing  with  the  subject  of  slavery, 
as  well  as  the  compromise  adjustments  of  the  Missouri  and  Texas 
questions,  he  stated  that  he  had  not  felt  at  liberty  to  withhold 
his  approval  of  the  Oregon  bill,  because  all  of  the  territory  lay 
north  of  36°  30'.  "Had  it  embraced  territories  south  of  that 
compromise, ' '  he  continued,  ' '  the  question  presented  for  my  con- 
sideration would  have  been  of  a  far  different  character,  and  my 
action  upon  it  must  have  corresponded  with  my  convictions." 
Since  the  extension  of  the  Missouri  Compromise  line  would  leave 
but  a  small  area  in  which  the  people  might  hold  slaves,  if  they 
saw  fit,  "is  this  a  question  to  be  pushed  to  such  extremities  by 
excited  partisans  on  the  one  side  or  the  other,  in  regard  to  our 
newly  acquired  distant  possessions  on  the  Pacific,  as  to  endanger 
the  Union  of  thirty  glorious  States,  which  constitute  our  Con- 
federacy?"^'' 

Nowhere  in  his  political  career  did  Polk  speak  so  emphati- 
cally as  a  southern  man  as  he  did  in  this  message,  and  yet,  as 
we  have  just  noted,  Calhoun  tried  to  dissuade  him  from  sending 
it  to  the  House.  It  is  unlikely,  even  at  this  time,  that  Polk  was 
desirous  of  spreading  slavery,  but  he  feared  that  unless  some  con- 
cession were  made  to  the  South  a  dissolution  of  the  Union  would 


59  Richardson,  Messages,  IV,  606-609. 


SLAVERY  AND  TEBBITOEIAL  GOVERNMENTS  643 

result.  His  desire  for  some  immediate  and  permanent  settlement 
of  the  slavery  controversy  was  intensified  by  the  defection  of  the 
Barnburners  and  the  consequent  weakening  of  the  Democratic 
party.  If  the  vexed  question  could  not  be  settled  during  his 
administration  there  was,  in  his  opinion,  grave  danger  that  no 
adjustment  could  be  made  which  the  South  would  accept. 

Chagrined  because  the  Van  Buren  Democrats  had  cooperated 
with  the  Whigs  in  defeating  the  California  and  New  Mexico  ter- 
ritorial bills,  he  resolved,  as  soon  as  Congress  had  adjourned,  to 
punish  leading  Barnburners  for  inciting  insurrection  in  Demo- 
cratic ranks.  His  punitive  measures  must  of  necessity  be  con- 
fined to  persons  actually  holding  offices,  and  of  these  the  most 
objectionable  was  Benjamin  F.  Butler,  whom  he  had  made  United 
States  Attorney  for  the  southern  district  of  New  York.  At  the 
Barnburner  convention,  which  had  recently  met  at  Buffalo  to 
nominate  Van  Buren,  Butler  had  made  a  speech  in  which  he  had 
denounced  the  administration  and  had  practically  defied  the 
President  to  remove  him.  Polk  accepted  the  challenge  and  sum- 
marily removed  Butler  from  office.  He  would  not  have  removed 
the  attorney  ' '  for  his  mere  opinions  upon  abstract  questions,  nor 
for  his  free  expression  of  them,"  but  Butler's  action  in  throwing 
obstacles  in  the  way  of  successful  administration  of  the  govern- 
ment had  forfeited  his  right  to  an  office  of  honor  and  profit.  In 
Polk 's  opinion,  Butler  was  now  ' '  one  of  the  worst  enemies  of  the 
Democratic  party  and  its  principles  in  the  Union,"  and  his  news- 
paper organs  in  New  York  were  more  hostile  to  the  administration 
than  any  of  the  Whig  papers : 

Indeed  the  whole  party  of  Barn-burners  in  New  York,  of  which  Mr. 
Butler  is  a  leading  &  controlling  member,  are  not  only  abusive  of  me  & 
my  administration,  but  they  seem  to  challenge  and  defy  me  to  remove 
Mr.  Butler,  in  the  hope,  no  doubt,  that  they  may  enlist  the  public  sym- 
pathy over  him  as  a  martyr  for  opinion's  sake.  By  his  removal  to-day  I 
have  gratified  [them],  &  they  may  make  the  most  of  it.^o 


60  Polk,  Diary,  Sept.  1,  1848,  IV,  114-115. 


644  JAMES  K.   POLE 

The  harrowing  question  of  slavery  in  the  territories  could  not 
be  disposed  of  so  easily  as  could  obnoxious  office  holders.  As 
soon  as  Congress  had  adjourned,  the  redoubtable  Missouri  Sen- 
ator gave  the  President  new  cause  of  annoyance  by  writing  an 
officious  letter  to  the  people  of  California.  Benton  informed  the 
Californians  that  since  Congress  had  failed  to  legislate  for  them 
they  were  without  a  lawful  government."^  Therefore  he  exhorted 
them  to  meet  in  convention  and  frame  a  government  under  which 
they  could  take  care  of  themselves  until  Congress  should  act. 
He  sketched  the  type  of  government  which  would  suit  their  pur- 
poses and  suggested  that  a  governor  would  be  necessary  to  ad- 
minister it.  The  Senate,  he  said,  had  voted  seven  million  dollars 
to  pay  the  people  of  California  for  miltiary  services,  but  the  bill 
for  this  purpose  had  been  killed  in  the  House  committee  by  lies 
against  Colonel  Fremont. 

Polk  Avas  much  perturbed  by  this  letter  and  sought  advice 
from  his  cabinet  as  to  the  best  means  of  counteracting  its  influ- 
ence. Without  admitting  that  the  governments  established  in 
the  new  territories  had  ''been  void  from  the  beginning"  he  was 
aware  that  the  military  governments  had  "ceased  to  exist"  and 
that  "the  Executive  had  no  authority  to  organize  a  civil  Govern- 
ment over  them."  Benton's  "extraordinary  letter,"  he  told  the 
cabinet,  had  been  sent  to  California 

by  Col.  Fremont,  the  son-in-law  of  the  writer,  an<l  the  inference  is  plain 
enough  that  he  means  they  shall  make  Col.  Fremont  the  Governor  of  the 
Independent  Government  they  shall  form.  Indeed  1  think  it  pretty  (dear 
that  this  was  the  main  object. 

He  believed  that  the  Secretary  of  State  should  infoi-m  the  Cali- 
fornians, by  letter,  that  the  President  would  urge  Congress  to 


61  "The  edicts  promulgated  by  your  temporary  Governors  (Kearny 
and  Mason,  each  an  ignoramous)  so  far  as  these  edicts  went  to  change  the 
laws  of  the  lan<l,  arc  null  and  void,  and  were  so  from  the  beginning.  .  .  . 

"Having  no  lawful  government,  nor  lawful  ofiicers,  you  can  have  none 
that  can  have  authority  over  you  except  by  your  own  consent.  Its  sanc- 
tion must  be  in  the  will  of  the  majority"  (Benton  to  the  People  of  Cali- 
fornia, Aug.  27,  1848.  Printed  in  Nile's'  Beg.,  LXXIV,  244.  Also  in  AJta 
California,  Jan.  11,  1849). 


SLAFEEY  AND  TEBBITOBIAL  GOVERNMENTS  645 

frame  a  governmezit  for  them,  and  that  they  "need  not  be  de- 
ceived by  the  semi-official  and  officious  proclamation  of  Senator 
Benton. ' '"-  A  few  days  later  the  matter  was  again  brought  before 
the  cabinet,  and  the  more  the  subject  was  discussed  the  greater 
number  of  legal  difficulties  did  it  present.  Polk  thought  it 
probable  that  the  military  government  in  California  was  still 
"a  Government  de  facto,"  yet  he  was  not  certain  that  the  Presi- 
dent could  enforce  obedience  to  it.  Touey,  the  Attorney  General, 
thought  that  "the  sovereignty  of  the  territory  rested  in  the 
people,  and  that  they  could,  in  the  absence  of  the  action  of 
Congress,  govern  themselves  as  they  chose. ' '  Mason  and  Walker 
believed  that  the  sovereignty  rested  with  the  people  of  the  United 
States  and  that  Toucy's  view  would  permit  even  the  establish- 
ment of  a  monarchy.    ' '  I  stated, ' '  wrote  Polk, 

that  it  was  a  subject  which  from  its  novelty  was  surrounded  with  many 
difficulties,  but  I  thought  instructions  could  be  prepared  which  would  avoid 
the  decision  of  any  abstract,  doubtful  question. 

He  instructed  Buchanan  to  tell  the  people  that  they  had  no 
right,  under  the  Constitution,  to  abrogate  their  de  facto  govern- 
ment and  form  one  of  their  own.  These  views  were  embodied 
in  a  letter  written  by  the  Secretary  of  State  and  intrusted  to 
"William  V.  Voorhies,  who  was  about  to  set  out  for  California  in 
the  capacity  of  postal  agent  for  that  territory."^ 

The  election  of  a  Whig  President  made  Polk  more  anxious 
than  ever  for  an  adjustment  of  the  territorial  question  during 
his  own  term  of  office.  His  fourth  annual  message  contained 
an  urgent  plea  for  the  immediate  establishment  of  civil  govern- 
ments in  New  Mexico  and  California.  The  reasons  for  the  failure 
to  do  this  at  the  last  session,  he  said,  "are  well  known  and  deeply 
to  be  regretted,"  and  it  would  be  irrational  further  to  agitate  a 
domestic  question  which  is  coeval  with  the  existence  of  the 
government  itself. 

62  Polk,  Diary,  IV,  135-138. 

63  Ihid.,  140-143.  Buchanan  to  Voorhies  (Buchanan,  Worls,  VIII,  211- 
215). 


6i6  JAMES  K.  POLK 

In  the  eyes  of  the  worhl  and  of  posterity  how  trivial  and  insignificant 
will  be  all  our  internal  divisions  and  struggles  compared  with  the  preserva- 
tion of  this  Union  of  the  States  in  all  its  vigor  and  with  all  its  countless 
blessings!  No  patriot  would  foment  and  excite  geographical  and  sec- 
tional divisions.  No  lover  of  his  country  would  deliberately  calculate 
the  value  of  the  Union. 

Although  a  staunch  Union  man,  the  President's  conception  of 
the  rights  of  a  slaveholder  in  the  territories  was  quite  as  south- 
ern as  that  of  Calhoun  himself.  The  people  of  every  state,  he 
told  Congress,  had  helped  to  conduct  the  war,  consequently  "it 
would  not  be  just  for  any  one  section  to  exclude  another  from 
all  participation  in  tlie  acquired  territory."  Whether  slavery 
would  enter  these  territories,  even  if  left  to  the  slaveholding 
states,  was  believed,  he  said,  to  be  rather  abstract  than  practical ; 
but  however  that  might  me,  "the  quesion,  involving,  as  it  does 
a  principle  of  equality  of  rights  of  the  separate  and  several 
States  as  equal  copartners  in  the  Confederacy,  should  not  be 
disregarded. ' ' 

His  views  on  the  constitutional  aspects  of  the  question  were 
quite  as  southern  as  those  on  the  political  side.  The  Constitu- 
tion, he  pointed  out,  had  imposed  upon  Congress  no  duty  to 
legislate  on  the  subject  of  slavery  in  the  territories,  "while  their 
power  to  do  so  is  not  only  seriously  questioned,  but  denied  by 
many  of  the  soundest  expounders  of  that  instrument." 

Considering  the  several  States  and  the  citizens  of  the  several  States 
as  equals  and  entitled  to  equal  rights  under  the  Constitution,  if  this  were 
an  original  question  it  might  well  be  insisted  on  that  the  principle  of 
non-interference  is  the  true  doctrine  and  that  Congress  could  not,  in  the 
absence  of  any  express  grant  of  power,  interfere  with  their  relative  rights. 

Since  Congress,  however,  had,  when  dealing  with  previously  ac- 
quired territory,  divided  the  area  between  slavery  and  freedom, 
he  was  in  favor  of  adjusting  the  present  dispute  in  a  similar 
manner,  but  if 

Congress  shall  now  reverse  the  decision  by  which  the  Missouri  compromise 
was  effected,  and  shall  propose  to  extend  the  restriction  over  the  whole 
territory,  south  as  well  as  north  of  the  parallel  36°  30',  it  will  cease  to  be 
a  compromise,  and  must  be  regarded  as  an  original  question. 


SLAVERY  AND  TEKBITOlllAL   GOFEENMENTS  647 

After  this  implied  threat  to  veto  any  bill  for  i)rohibitiiig  slavery 
south  of  36°  30',  he  expresesd  a  willingness  to  accept  an  exten- 
sion of  the  compromise  line,  the  policy  of  letting  the  people  decide 
for  themselves,  or  the  submission  of  the  whole  subject  to  the 
decision  of  the  courts."* 

If  the  President  had  entertained  hopes  that  his  message  would 
arouse  Congress  to  take  action,  they  seem  to  have  vanished  soon 
after  his  recommendations  had  been  submitted.  In  less  than  a 
week  he  expressed  to  the  cabinet  a  fear  that  Congress  would  do 
nothing  and  that  California  would  establish  an  independent 
government  and  be  lost  to  the  Union.  The  rapid  influx  of  popu- 
lation would  make  the  demand  for  civil  government  imperative, 
and  he  believed  that  "the  leading  Federalists  (alias  Whigs) 
would  be  glad  to  avail  themselves  of  the  opportunity  to  give  up 
the  country  for  the  purpose  of  relieving  Gen'l  Taylor  of  his 
embarrassments  upon  the  Wilmot  Proviso."  This  party,  he 
said,  had  always  opposed  expansion,  and  had  combated  the  pur- 
chase of  Louisiana  with  as  much  vigor  as  they  had  opposed  the 
present  acquisition.  Although  the  prospect  seemed  discouraging, 
he  urged  the  members  of  the  cabinet  to  use  their  influence  with 
their  friends  in  Congress.  "It  is, "  said  he,  ' ' a  question  of  rising 
above  ordinary  considerations.  We  have  a  country  to  serve  as 
well  as  a  party  to  obey.  "•'^ 

Even  though  the  President  was  ready  to  go  nearly  as  far  as 
Calhoun  in  defending  "southern  rights,"  apparently  his  atti- 
tude w^as  not  prompted  by  an  interest  in  slavery  per  se.  He  was 
willing — even  anxious — to  admit  California  immediately  as  a 
state,  although  there  was  every  probability  that  slavery  would 
be  prohibited  by  its  constitution. ''''     On  December  11,  Douglas 


64  Kiehardson,  Messages,  IV,  640-642. 

65  Polk,  Diary,  IV,  231-233. 

66  Indeed,  if  newspapers  may  be  taken  as  an  index  of  public  opinion, 
it  was  certain  that  slavery  would  be  excluded,  for  the  only  two  journals 
in  California  were  emphatic  on  this  point.  The  California  Star  of  March 
2.5,  1848,  asserted  that  ninety-nine  hundredths  of  the  population  opposed 
the  imposition  of  "this  blight"  upon  the  territory,  and  the  "simple  recog- 
nition of  slavery  here ' '  would  be  a  greater  misfortune  than  to  remain  in 


648  JAMES  K.   POLK 

had  introduced  in  the  Senate  a  bill  for  admitting  both  territories 
as  one  state,  but  Polk  believed  the  area  to  be  too  large  and  the 
settlements  too  scattered  for  a  single  government.  He  summoned 
Douglas  and  advised  the  admission  of  California  as  a  state,  and 
the  creation  of  a  government  for  New  Mexico  by  a  separate  bill. 
Douglas  approved  this  policy,  but  Calhoun,  when  consulted,  re- 
fused to  commit  himself.  On  that  very  day,  however,  the  House 
by  a  considerable  majority  voted  its  approval  of  the  Wilmot 
proviso,  some  of  the  Democrats  reversing  the  votes  which  they 
had  east  during  the  preceding  session.  Polk  now  saw  no  hope 
of  an  adjustment  except,  possibly,  the  admission  of  the  whole 
territory  as  a  state  under  the  bill  offered  by  Douglas."'" 

Not  content  with  approving  the  Wilmot  proviso  the  House,  on 
December  21,  instructed  its  committee  to  bring  in  a  bill  for 
abolishing  the  slave  trade  in  the  District  of  Columbia.  South- 
ern members  were  much  excited  and  took  immediate  steps  to 
arrange  for  a  caucus.  When  informed  of  this  fact,  Polk  declared 
slavery  agitation  to  be  "a  mere  political  question  on  Avhich 
demagogues  &  ambitious  politicians  hope  to  promote  their  own 
prospect  for  political  promotion. ' '  About  seventy  members,  both 
Democrats  and  Whigs,  attended  the  caucus,  and,  after  appoint- 
ing a  committee  to  prepare  an  address  to  be  sent  to  southern 
states  if  the  anti-slave-trade  bill  should  be  pressed,  it  adjourned 
to  meet  at  a  later  date.*'^ 

In  another  effort  to  procure  some  positive  action,  tlie  President 
sent  for  Senator  Butler,  of  South  Carolina,  chairman  of  the 
Judiciary  Committee  to  which  the  Douglas  bill  had  been  referred. 
He  told  Butler  that  no  territorial  bill  which  did  not  include  the 
Wilmot  proviso  could  pass  the  House,  and  that  if  such  a  bill 


the  present  state  of  disaster.  The  Calif ornian  of  October  11  was  certain 
that  the  people  preferred  to  remain  as  they  were  rather  than  have  * '  this 
bliirhting  curse"  put  upon  them.  On  December  1.3  Benton  presented  in 
the  Senate  a  petition  from  a  New  Mexico  convention  which  asked  Consjress 
to  protect  the  people  there  from  the  introduction  of  slavery  {Cong.  Globe, 
30  Cong.,  2  sess.,  ,3.3). 

07  Polk,  Diary,  IV,  232-235.  es  Jhid.,  248-253. 


SLAVERY  AND   TEBBITOBIAL   GOVERNMENTS  649 

should  pass  both  houses  he  would  be  compelled  to  veto  it.  The 
only  way  to  save  California  was  to  admit  her  as  a  state ;  he 
therefore  asked  Butler's  aid  in  bringing  this  about.  Like  Cal- 
houn, Butler  left  the  President  in  doubt  as  to  what  he  would  do. 
Polk  then  sent  for  Douglas  who,  after  considerable  persuasion, 
agreed  to  alter  his  bill  so  that  California  might  be  admitted 
and  a  territorial  government  be  provided  for  New  Mexico.*"* 

The  adjourned  meeting  of  the  southern  caucus  was  scheduled 
for  January  15,  1849,  and  on  the  fourtheenth  Polk  held  a  con- 
sultation with  several  of  the  southern  leaders.  They  told,  him 
that  the  address  to  southern  states,  which  Calhoun  had  prepared, 
was  of  such  a  nature  that  neither  they  nor  their  friends  could 
sign  it.  The  President  approved  their  decision,  for  he  thought 
that  such  an  address  would  be  mischievous.  When  nearly  all 
of  the  Whigs  and  many  of  the  Democrats  who  attended  the  caucus 
declined  to  sign  Calhoun's  address,  it  was  returned  to  the  com- 
mittee for  report  at  a  future  meeting.  On  the  following  day 
Calhoun  called  on  the  President  and  said  that  the  South  could 
no  longer  delay  in  resisting  the  aggressions  of  the  North  upon 
its  rights.  Polk  advised  the  admission  of  California  and  spoke 
with  approval  of  a  plan  suggested  by  Douglas  for  joining  to 
Texas  all  of  the  remaining  territory  south  of  36°  30'.  When 
Calhoun  opposed  every  suggestion  and  declined  to  offer  a  solu- 
tion of  his  own  Polk  became  convinced  that  the  Senator  did  not 
desire  an  amicable  adjustment.  "I  was  firm  and  decided,"  said 
he,  ''in  my  conversation  with  him,  intending  to  let  him  under- 
stand distinctly  that  I  gave  no  countenance  to  any  movement 
which  tended  to  violence  or  the  disunion  of  the  States."'" 

The  President  had  come  to  distrust  Calhoun  thoroughly  and 
to  believe  that  he  compassed  a  dissolution  of  the  Union.  This 
opinion  of  the  Senator  is  made  very  clear  in  the  report  of  a 
conversation  held  with  Representative  Stanton,  of  Tennessee, 
who  approved  the  address  to  southern  states.    After  urging  the 


C9  Ibid..  253-255,  257.  to  ibid.,  284-288. 


650  JAMES  K.   POLK 

admission  of  California,  Polk  told  Stanton  that  meetings  and 
addresses  would  weaken  the  South  and  add  to  the  strength  of 
the  northern  abolitionists.  A  gathering  of  members  from  any 
section  quietly  to  discuss  a  political  question  was  proper,  but 

I  told  him  that  I  could  not  avoid  the  suspicion  that  there  were  two 
or  three  individuals,  perhaps  not  more  than  one  (but  I  named  no  one 
[Calhoun?])  who  desired  to  have  no  set[t]lement  of  the  question,  but  Avho 
preferred  a  sectional  excitement  in  the  South  &  a  dissolution.  I  set  my 
face  against  being  involved  in  any  such  movement.  I  urged  the  necessity 
and  importance  of  going  to  work  in  earnest  in  Congress,  and  not  in  caucus, 
to  settle  the  question.  I  told  him  it  was  time  enough  to  think  of  extreme 
measures  when  they  became  inevitable,  and  that  that  period  had  not 
come.  I  told  him  that  the  people  everywhere  were  devoted  to  the  Union, 
and  that  it  would  be  a  heavy  responsibility  if  Southern  members  of 
Congress  should  prevent  an  adjustment  of  the  slavery  question  by  meet- 
ing in  caucus  &  publishing  addresses,  instead  of  meeting  in  Congress,  where 
their  constituents  had  deputed  them  to  act.  He  seemed  surprised  at 
these  views.  I  told  him  I  was  a  Southern  man,  and  as  much  attached 
to  Southern  rights  as  any  man  in  Congress,  but  I  was  in  favor  of  vindi- 
cating and  maintaining  these  rights  by  constitutional  means;  and  that 
no  such  extreme  case  had  arisen  as  would  justify  a  resort  to  any  other 
means;  that  when  such  a  case  should  arise  (if  ever)  it  would  be  time 
enough  to  consider  what  should  be  done.'i'i 

Hopes  and  fears  alternated  in  the  President's  mind  as  daily 
reports  came  to  him  of  the  debates  in  Congress  on  the  admission 
of  California.  At  a  cabinet  meeting  held  on  January  20  letters 
received  from  Commodore  Jones,  Consul  Larkin,  and  Paymaster 
Rich  were  read  and  discussed.  Each  reported  that,  on  account 
of  the  gold  rush,  veritable  anarchy  prevailed  and  some  form  of 
government  should  be  established  at  once.  Polk  directed  that 
these  letters  be  published  in  the  Union  in  the  hope  that  they 
might  influence  Congress  to  pass  the  California  bill.  He  feared, 
however,  that  no  bill  could  pass  which  did  not  include  the  Wilmot 
proviso ;  and  he  felt  bound  to  veto  any  measure  which  prohibited 


'■I  Ibid.,  289-291.  Polk  was  not  alone  in  believing  that  Calhoun  wished 
to  disrupt  the  Union.  "It  is  thought  here,"  wrote  Horace  Mann,  "by 
many  of  the  most  intelligent  men,  that  Mr.  Calhoun  is  resolved  on  a  dis- 
solution of  the  Union"  (Mann,  Life  of  Horace  Mann,  27.']). 


SLAVEBY  AND  TEEBITOEIAL  GOVERNMENTS  651 

slavery  south  of  36°  30'.  He  desired  the  immediate  admission  of 
California  and  thought  that  no  southern  man  ought  to  object  to 
its  admission,  but  he  feared  that  southern  extremists  led  by 
Calhoun  and  northern  extremists  led  by  Hale  and  Giddings 
would  prevent  an  amicable  settlement  of  the  question.  "I  stated" 
to  the  cabinet,  was  his  comment,  "that  I  put  my  face  alike  against 
southern  agitators  and  Northern  fanatics,  &  should  do  every- 
thing in  my  power  to  allay  excitement  by  adjusting  the  question 
of  slavery  &  preserving  the  Union."  Once  more  he  exhorted 
his  cabinet  advisors  to  use  their  influence  -with  members  of  Con- 
gress. His  efforts  failed  to  prevent  the  caucus  from  adopting 
Calhoun's  address  to  the  southern  states,  and  he  apprehended 
further  excitement  as  a  result  of  this  proceeding.'- 

The  southern  Whigs  were  not  ready  for  extreme  measures. 
This  fact  was  shown  by  their  support  of  an  address  presented 
by  Berrien  at  the  southern  caucus  as  a  substitute  for  the  one 
drawn  by  Calhoun.  On  January  22  Tooms  told  Crittenden  that 
California  could  never  be  a  "slave  country"  and  that  it  ought  to 
be  admitted  as  a  state.  "We  have,"  he  wrote,  "only  the  point  of 
honor  to  serve,  and  this  will  serve  it  and  rescue  that  country 
from  all  danger  of  agitation."'^  Even  some  of  the  extreme  ad- 
vocates of  the  "peculiar  institution"  had  little  hope  of  install- 
ing it  in  the  new  domain.  For  example,  the  IMobile  Tribune  said 
that  nothing  could  save  the  territories  from  becoming  free  states. 
If  necessary,  it  was  prepared  to  defend  by  extreme  measures 
"our  abstract  right  to  a  participation  in  them,"  yet  it  believed 
that  "the  victory  would  be  barren.""* 

In  order  to  facilitate  matters  and  to  avoid  certain  technical 
difficulties,  the  Senate  referred  the  California  question  to  a 
select  committee  of  which  Douglas  was  made  chairman.  On 
January  29  he  reported  a  bill  by  which  California  was  to  be 


T2  Polk,  Diary,  IV,  296-299,  306. 

"3  Coleman,  Life  of  John  J.  Crittenden,  I,  335. 

74  Quoted  in  Niles'  Reg.,  LXXV,  75. 


652  JAMES  K.  POLK 

admitted  as  a  state  and  New  Mexico  given  a  territorial  govern- 
ment. In  the  evening  he  called  to  tell  the  President  that  he  had 
strong  hopes  of  its  passage.  During  the  next  few  days  Polk 
conversed  with  various  southern  members  and  advised  them  to 
support  the  bill,  for,  as  he  told  them,  this  was  the  only  way  to 
allay  "geographical  excitement"  on  the  subject  of  slavery.'" 
However,  northern  members  attacked  certain  paragraphs  in  the 
bill  which  purposed  to  extend  laws  of  the  United  States  to  the 
proposed  state  and  territory.  They  charged  that  the  committee 
was  attempting  to  introduce  slavery  into  these  communities  by 
a  jugglery  of  words. 

The  end  of  the  session  was  approaching  and  those  who  did 
not  approve  the  Douglas  bill  endeavored  to  prevent  debate  upon 
it  by  urging  the  necessity  of  considering  the  general  appropria- 
tion bill.  In  this  they  were  outgeneraled  by  "Walker,  a  "dough 
face"  from  Wisconsin,  who,  after  consultation  with  Foote,  of 
Mississippi,  offered  an  amendment  which  joined  the  territorial 
government  bill,  as  a  rider,  to  the  appropriation  bill.  By  this 
amendment  tlie  Constitution  of  the  United  States  and  certain 
specified  laws  were  extended  to  the  territories,  and  the  President 
was  given  wide  discretion  in  selecting  the  laws  and  regulations 
to  be  enforced.'^"  The  introduction  of  the  "Walker  amendment 
gave  rise  to  an  animated  debate  on  constitutional  points,  and 
Webster  and  Calhoun  took  leading  parts.  It  is  unnecessary  here 
to  follow  this  debate,  yet  it  may  be  said  that  northern  members 
considered  the  amendment  to  be  an  instrument  for  smuggling 
slaver}^  into  the  territories  through  executive  action  and  judicial 
interpretation.  Their  charges  to  this  effect  had  more  real  founda- 
tion than  those  of  similar  purport  already  brought  against  the 
Douglas  bill.  There  was  a  momentary  excitement  among  Demo- 
crats due  to  a  rumor  that  Free  Soilers  and  Whigs  had  planned 
to  attach   the  Wilmot  proviso  to  the  Walker  amendment  and 

'-"Cong.  Globe,  30  Cong.,  2  sess.,  381.     Polk,  Diary,  IV,  312-313,  316. 
■!'■  Cong.  Globe,  30  Cong.,  2  seas.,  561. 


SLAVEBY  AND   TEEEITOBIAL   GOVEENMENTS  653 

thereby  to  force  the  President  either  to  accept  the  proviso  or  to 
veto  the  entire  appropriation  bill.  When  informed  of  this  rumor 
by  Venable,  of  North  Carolina,  Polk  announced  that  he  would 
veto  an  application  of  the  proviso  to  territory  south  of  36°  30', 
no  matter  in  what  form  it  might  be  presented  to  him.  In  a 
slightly  altered  form,  the  Walker  amendment  was  passed  by  a 
bare  majority  of  the  Senate  on  February  26;  on  the  following 
day,  by  a  vote  of  126  to  87,  the  House  passed  its  own  bill  by 
which  slavery  was  excluded  from  the  territories. 

Only  a  few  more  days  of  the  session  remained  and  nothing 
short  of  a  miracle  seemed  likely  to  break  the  deadlock  of  the 
two  houses ;  and  unless  some  adjustment  could  be  made  the  gov- 
ernment would  be  left  without  funds.  On  March  2  the  House 
rejected  the  Walker  amendment,  and  on  the  next  day — the  last 
of  the  session — a  conference  committee  of  the  two  houses  reported 
its  inability  to  agree  upon  any  plan  of  settlement.  The  appro- 
priation bill  would  now  be  lost  unless  the  Senate  should  consent 
to  eliminate  the  Walker  amendment.  Officially,  the  session  ex- 
pired at  twelve  o'clock  on  March  3,  but  the  Senate  indulged  in 
a  heated  debate — even  fist-fights" — until  daybreak  on  March  4 
without  coming  to  an  agreement.  Hunter,  of  Virginia,  was  ready 
to  let  the  government  go  without  funds  rather  than  sacrifice 
southern  rights,  while  Douglas  believed  a  government  for  Cali- 
fornia to  be  more  important  than  either. 

Polk  had  come  to  the  capitol  armed  with  a  message  with 
which  he  intended  to  veto  the  Wilmot  proviso  if  it  should  be 
attached  to  the  Walker  amendment.  Late  at  night  he  was  told 
that  the  House  had  voted  to  amend  the  Walker  amendment  by 
a  provision  which  declared  the  laws  of  Mexico  to  be  in  force 
until  altered  by  Congress.  The  effect  of  this  provision,  as  Polk 
at  once  saw,  would  be  to  sanction  the  law  by  which  Mexico  had 
abolished  slavery.  Buchanan,  Walker,  Marcy,  and  Toucy 
advised  him  to  sign  the  bill  if  it  should  be  presented  in  this 

77  Mann,  Life  of  Horace  Mann,  277. 


654  JAMES  K.   POLK 

form.  "They  drew  a  distinction,  which  I  did  not  perceive," 
wrote  the  President,  "between  the  amendment  in  this  form  and 
the  Wihnot  Proviso."  Mason,  on  the  contrary,  advised  him  to 
veto  the  bill,  while  Johnson  thought  that  he  had  no  right  to 
take  any  action,  since  his  term  of  office  had  expired.  ]\Iembers 
of  Congress  came  to  the  President  in  excitement  and  asked  him 
to  veto  any  bill  containing  the  House  provision.  After  telling 
them  that  he  had  already  decided  to  do  so  he  began  to  alter  his 
veto  message  so  as  to  meet  the  new  situation.  ' '  It  was  a  moment 
of  high  responsibility, ' '  says  the  Diary,  ' '  perhaps  the  highest  of 
my  official  term.  I  felt  the  weight  most  sensibly,  but  resolved  to 
pursue  the  dictates  of  my  own  best  judgement  and  to  do  my 
duty."  About  four  o'clock  in  the  morning  he  retired  to  his  hotel, 
and  two  hours  later  he  was  aroused  by  a  committee  from  the 
two  houses  of  Congress.  Having  reported  that  both  the  Walker 
amendment  and  the  House  provision  had  been  eliminated,  the 
committee  presented  for  his  signature  a  simple  appropriation 
bill  and  another  for  extending  federal  revenue  laws  over  Cali- 
fornia. He  signed  these,  although  he  had  some  doubt  that  he 
was  still  President  of  the  United  States;  the  appropriations 
were  saved,  but  California  and  New  Mexico  were  still  without 
governments.'^^ 

As  a  believer  in  territorial  expansion,  if  for  no  other  reason, 
Polk  was  sorely  disappointed  because  Congress  had  not  given 
governments  to  these  territories,  for  apparently  he  fully  believed 
that  the  Whigs  would  acquiesce  in  their  separation  from  the 
United  States.  He  had  some  reason  for  this  belief,  although  it 
is  evident  that  he  attached  too  much  importance  to  statenu-nts 
made  by  certain  members  of  this  party.  For  example,  wlicn  lie 
asked  Senator  Clarke,  of  Rhode  Island,  to  save  California  to  the 
Union  by  supporting  the  bill  for  admitting  her  as  a  state,  the 
Senator  replied  with  indifference :  "Let  her  go."  In  the  House, 
Alexander  H.  Stephens  tried  to  block  tlie  payments  to  Mexico  for 


'8  Polk,  Diary,  IV,  362-369.     Cong.  Globe,  30  Cong.,  2  sess.,  682-698. 


SLAVEEY  AND   TEllRITOBIAL   GOVEBNMENTS  655 

the  territories,  and  when  Buchanan  remonstrated  with  him  he 
answered  that  he  was  opposed  to  retaining  those  lands. '^^  Polk 
was  disposed  to  accept  these  utterances  as  indicative  of  the  Whig 
policy  because,  as  he  said,  the  "Federalists"  had  always  been 
averse  to  expansion.  As  if  to  cap  the  climax,  Taylor,  as  the 
two  men  rode  together  in  the  inaugural  procession,  stated  his 
belief  that  Oregon  and  Califonia  were  too  far  distant  to  become 
members  of  the  Union  and  that  it  would  be  better  for  them  to 
form  an  independent  government  of  their  own.  Doubtless  Polk 
was  not  surprised  to  hear  these  remarks  from  the  Whig  leader, 
nevertheless  he  thought  that  they  were  "alarming  opinions  to 
be  entertained  by  the  President  of  the  U.  S. "  and  he  hoped  that 
they  had  not  been  well  considered. 

Gen'l  Taylor  is,  I  have  no  doubt,  a  well  meaning  old  man.  He  is,  however, 
exceedingly  ignorant  of  public  affairs,  and,  I  should  judge,  of  very  ordinary 
capacity.  He  will  be  in  the  hands  of  others,  and  must  rely  wholly  upon 
his  Cabinet  to  administer  the  Government. so 

Such  was  his  opinion  of  a  successor  whom  he  had  never  met  until 
a  few  days  before  this.  He  did  not  foresee  that  Taylor  would 
develop  very  decided  views  on  the  territorial  question  and  that 
he  would,  in  effect,  adopt  Polk's  own  latest  policy  of  having  both 
California  and  New  Mexico  admitted  as  states. 


79  Polk,  Diary,  IV,  294,  300. 

so  Ibid.,  37.5-376.  Taylor's  attitude  toward  California  was  not  new. 
He  had  opposed  the  acquisition  of  this  counti-y  while  he  was'  fighting  in 
Mexico  (Taylor  to  Wood,  Aug.  23,  1846,  Taylor  Letters,  49). 


CHAPTEE  XXIII 

TARIFF,  INTERNAL  IMPROVEMENTS,  AND  THE 
INDEPENDENT  TREASURY 

Throughout  his  political  career  Polk  had  been  a  consistent 
opponent  of  protective  tariff,  and  of  internal  improvements 
undertaken  by  the  federal  government.  He  believed  the  so-called 
"American  Sj^stem"  to  be  decidedly  un-American — a  breeder 
of  extravagance  and  a  menace  to  the  constitutional  rights  of  the 
states.  Entering  Congress  at  the  same  time  that  John  Quincy 
Adams  became  President,  he  took  a  vigorous  stand  against  that 
administration,  particularly  against  its  advocacy  of  internal  im- 
provements. His  views  on  this  subject,  as  well  as  on  others, 
accorded  with  those  of  General  Jackson  with  whom  he  main- 
tained an  intimate  correspondence.^ 

In  his  first  annual  message,  Jackson  stated  his  opinions  con- 
cerning both  tariff  and  internal  improvements.  He  regretted 
that  nations  did  not,  by  common  consent,  see  fit  to  abolish  all 
trade  restrictions ;  as  they  did  not,  he  was  in  favor  of  adjusting 
the  tariff  in  a  "manner  best  calculated  to  avoid  serious  injury 
and  to  harmonize  the  conflicting  interests  of  our  agriculture,  our 
commerce,  and  our  manufactures."  He  urged  that  the  public 
debt  be  extinguished  at  the  earliest  possible  date  and  that  all 
revenue  not  otherwise  needed  be  applied  to  this  purpose.  As 
there  seemed  likely  to  be  a  permanent  surplus  revenue  after  the 
national  debt  had  been  paid  he  was  in  favor  of  distributing  this 
among  the  states,  since  internal  improvements  undertaken  by 


1  In  a  letter  to  Polk,  Jackson,  after  expressing  friendship  for  and 
approval  of  Polk,  stated  that  "1  am  sure  the  general  government  has  no 
right  to  make  internal  inij)rovements  within  a  state,  without  its  consent 
first  had  &  obtained"  (Jackson  to  Polk,  Dec.  4,  1826,  Polk  Papers). 


TABIFF  AND  INTERNAL   IMPROVEMENTS  657 

the  federal  goverument  were  considered  to  be  both  inexpedient 
and  unconstitutional.  All  loyal  adherents  of  the  President  ac- 
cepted this  announcement  as  the  party  program. 

Polk's  utterances  in  Congi'css  at  this  time  were  in  full  accord 
with  Jackson's  message.  On  December  30,  when  the  House  was 
discussing  the  expediency  of  distributing  among  the  states  the 
proceeds  from  the  sale  of  public  lands,  he  opposed  such  a  dis- 
tribution as  premature,  since  the  public  debt  had  not  yet  been 
paid.  After  it  had  been  paid,  he  favored  distributing  the  sur- 
plus among  the  states  rather  than  have  Congress  spend  it  on 
public  improvements.-  When  discussing  the  Maysville  road  bill, 
which  Jackson  vetoed  later,  Polk  expressed  himself  as  ' '  opposed 
altogether  to  this  system  of  appropriations  for  sectional  pur- 
poses. "  He  "  conceived  these  applications  to  be  most  pernicious 
in  their  tendencies,  and  unconstitutional  in  principle."  The 
country,  he  said,  "looked  to  the  present  Executive  for  the 
adoption  of  a  system  of  economy  and  retrenchment,"  a  system 
entirely  out  of  harmony  with  the  purposes  of  this  bill.  During 
the  same  session  a  proposal  to  allow  a  draw^back  on  rum  made 
from  imported  molasses  gave  him  a  chance  to  assert  that  he  Avas 
"upon  principle  opposed  to  the  whole  system  of  the  protecting 
policy  called  tariff. '  '^ 

Always  an  advocate  of  strict  economy,  Polk,  while  a  member 
of  congress,  did  not  hesitate  to  apply  this  rule  to  small  as  well 
as  to  large  expenditures.  At  the  risk  of  being  considered  "un- 
gracious" he  opposed,  in  1831,  a  resolution  for  giving  thirty 
cords  of  wood  to  the  suffering  poor  of  Georgetown.  The  fact 
that  Congress  was  the  legislature  of  the  District  of  Columbia  did 
not,  in  his  opinion,  entitle  it  to  give  the  national  revenue  to  the 
inhabitants.  Should  it  adopt  such  a  practice  "the  poor  of  the 
other  sections  of  the  country  had  nothing  to  do  but  to  come  and 
sit  down  here,  in  this  District,  and  apply  to  Congress  for  relief." 
The  resolution  was  passed,  but  a  year  later  he  succeeded  in 

2  Ahridg.  of  Deb.,  X,  594.  s  ibid.,  677-678,  XI,  67. 


658  JAMES  E.  POLK 

defeating  a  semi-philanthropic  project  to  pay  forty  thousand 
dollars  to  certain  persons  for  giving  instruction  in  silk  culture. 
It  was  absurd,  said  he,  to  appropriate  public  money  for  such 
purposes.* 

In  1832  Polk  was  made  chairman  of  the  Committee  of  "Ways 
and  Means.  In  this  position  his  most  difficult  task  was  the  man- 
agement of  Jackson's  war  on  the  bank,  but  he  had  also  to  super- 
vise all  questions  of  finance.  His  attempts  to  enforce  economy 
very  naturally  led  his  opponents  to  charge  him  with  arbitrary 
conduct.  In  1834  Adams  accused  him  of  attempting  to  force 
the  general  appropriation  bill  through  without  adequate  discus- 
sion, while  Lincoln,  of  Massachusetts,  charged  him  wdth  trying 
to  starve  the  opposition  into  submission.-^  Criticism  did  not 
deter  him ;  he  persisted  in  his  opposition  to  unnecessary  appro- 
priations and  in  many  cases  was  able  to  carry  his  point.  For 
example,  he  advocated,  and  successfully  carried,  a  reduction  in 
the  appropriation  for  the  Cumberland  road  from  $652,00  to 
$300,000."  This  Avas  a  triumph  for  economy,  and  a  damper  on 
internal  improvements  as  well. 

As  early  as  1832  Clay  became  interested  in  a  scheme  to  dis- 
tribute among  the  states  the  proceeds  from  the  sale  of  public 
lands.  Successive  bills  to  effect  his  purpose  met  with  disaster — 
one  by  the  President's  veto — and  during  the  session  of  1835- 
1836  another  distribution  bill  was  introduced.  It  passed  the 
Senate  and  was  brought  up  in  the  House  on  June  7,  1836.  A 
motion  made  to  refer  it  to  the  Committee  of  the  Whole  for  dis- 
cussion received  a  vote  of  97  to  96.  Polk,  who  was  then  Speaker 
of  the  House,  added  his  vote  to  the  minority  and  prevented  a 


4  Ibid.,  XI,  306-307,  691-693. 

5  "The  chairman  of  the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means,"  said  Lincoln 
on  April  25,  1834,  "came  into  this  House  when  we  had  got  only  to  the 
45th  line  of  this  bill,  with  the  declaration  that  he  was  determined  to  press 
this  bill  through  before  the  House  adjourned.  We  were  in  consequence 
kept  here  eight  or  nine  hours  without  refreshment,  and  exhausted  by  the 
fruitless  efforts  of  the  honorable  chairman  to  accomplish  his  purpose." 

0  Cong.  Globe,  23  Cong.,  1  sess.,  340,  347,  461. 


TARIFF  AND  INTERNAL  IMPROVEMENTS  659 

reference  to  the  committee.^  This  particular  measure  was  laid 
ou  the  table.  Another  bill  was  introduced  in  the  House  which, 
instead  of  giving  the  surplus  to  the  states,  proposed  to  "deposit" 
it  with  them  subject  to  recall.  It  passed  both  houses  in  this 
form,  and  while  everybody  knew  that  in  all  probability  the  money 
would  never  be  recalled,  the  modification  satisfied  Jackson's 
scruples  sufficiently  to  enable  him  to  affix  his  signature.  The 
money  was  to  be  deposited  in  four  installments,  beginning  on 
January  1,  1837. 

The  panic  of  1837  which  paralyzed  all  business  activities 
soon  after  Van  Buren's  inauguration  transformed  the  surplus 
into  a  deficit  and  created  a  demand  for  legislation  to  replenish 
and  to  safeguard  the  national  treasury.  The  Whigs  very  natu- 
rally advocated  a  restoration  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States, 
but  the  Democrats,  quite  as  naturally,  could  not  think  of  re- 
habilitating the  "monster"  which  they  had  so  recently  and  so 
thoroughly  crushed.  Neither  could  the  latter  party  rely  any 
longer  on  "pet  banks,"  for  these  too  had  gone  down  in  the 
general  crash. 

On  May  15  Van  Buren  issued  his  proclamation,  summoning 
Congress  to  meet  in  extra  session  on  the  first  Monday  in  Septem- 
ber. It  convened  on  the  appointed  day  and,  on  the  first  ballot, 
Polk  was  reelected  Speaker  over  his  Whig  rival,  John  Bell.  In 
the  message  which  was  submitted  on  September  5  the  President, 
after  calling  attention  to  the  financial  distress  of  the  nation, 
recommended  legislation  designed  to  separate  government  finances 
from  all  banks  and  to  make  the  government  the  custodian  of  its 
own  funds.  The  plan  which  he  proposed  was  known  officially 
as  the  "independent  treasury,"  but  it  was  more  frequently 
called  the  "sub-treasury."  Despite  the  vociferation  against  the 
continuance  of  the  policy  inaugurated  by  Jackson 's  ' '  specie  cir- 
cular," the  President  boldly  insisted  that  government  finances 


T  This  was  a  power  of  which  a  Speaker  "rarely,  if  ever,  avails  him- 
self," said  the  National  Intelligencer,  June  9,  1836,  in  criticizing  his  act. 


660  JAMES  K.   POLE 

sliould  be  conducted  on  a  hard  money  basis.  Nearly  a  month 
before  this  message  was  submitted  to  Congress,  General  Jackson 
learned  of  the  recommendations  which  Van  Buren  intended  to 
make,  and  his  approval  is  thus  expresesd  in  a  letter  written  to 
Polk : 

I  have  rec  'd  lately  some  very  pleasant  information  from  the  city — all 
is  harmony  and  the  object  of  the  Executive  is,  or  will  be,  to  separate  the 
Government  from  all  Banks — collect  &  disburse  the  revenues  by  its  own 
agents, — receipts  of  all  public  dues  in  gold  &  silver  coin,  leaving  the 
Banks  &  the  commercial  community  to  manage  their  transactions  in  their 
own  way.s 

Polk,  like  Jackson,  approved  the  sub-treasury  plan ;  on  the 
other  hand,  it  met  with  opposition  even  among  Democrats  in 
Tennessee.^  Judge  Catron  believed  that  the  government  should 
be  the  custodian  of  its  own  money,  for,  ' '  I  care  not  what  private 
Banks  you  put  it  into,  it  will  convert  the  keepers  into  Federalists 
in  principle  &  practice  in  a  few  years"  ;^''  but  his  solution  of  the 
financial  depression  was  a  large  emission  of  paper  money.  In 
the  letter  just  quoted,  he  stated  that  a  "Treasury  circulation 
must  be  adopted,"  and,  after  reading  Van  Buren 's  message,  he 
pronounced  the  President's  recommendations  "sound  in  prin- 
ciple, but  hardly  possible  in  practice."  The  people,  said  he, 
are  governed  by  habit  and  want  paper  money.  They  would  not 
be  able  to  understand  Van  Buren 's  plan,  and  the  "party  will  go 
down  with  it."    A  few  weeks  later  he  urged  Polk  to 


8  Jackson  to  Polk,  Aug.  6,  18.37,  Poll-  Papers. 

9  In  a  letter,  August  7,  informing  Polk  of  his  overwhelming  defeat  in 
his  race  for  Congress,  W.  C.  Dunlap  stat«d  that  every  candidate  for  the 
state  legislature  favored  some  kind  of  a  federal  bank.  James  Walker  in 
a  letter  to  Polk,  August  27,  stated  that  should  the  administration  adopt 
the  sub-treasury  plan  it  would  find  itself  in  a  minority  in  Tennessee  (both 
letters  in  Polk  Papers). 

10  "The  treasury,"  he  continued,  "dare  not  pass  from  the  majority, 
without  power  passing  with  it — the  Treasury  is  the  arm  of  power,  as  much 
in  this  Gov't  as  in  any  on  Earth;  the  placing  it  in  private  hands,  is  to 
raise  up  a  rival  power  in  the  place  of  the  ))0])ular  will — of  numbers,  whitdi 
will  govern  in  fact,  in  Congress,  &  out  of  it,  by  sops. ' ' 


TABIFF  AND  INTERNAL  IMPBOVEMENTS  661 

Strike  boldly — it  is  your  habit,  &  the  iiieaus  of  your  elevation;  it  is 
expected  of  you.  Go  for  30  or  40  millions,  to  be  circulated  fast  as  may 
be  by  the  Govt — go  for  20ties  &  over  in  gradations  of  tens.  Strike  out 
the  interest  feature — boldly  declare  that  the  farmers  will  hoard  the  notes 
bearing  5  per  cent.n 

Polk  did  not  adopt  Catron's  advice  to  strike  out  boldly  for  paper 
money.  He  agreed  with  Jackson  and  Van  Buren  in  supporting 
a  hard  money  policy,  although  his  position  as  Speaker  prevented 
him  from  taking  an  active  part  in  the  House  debates.  At  its 
session  of  1837-38  the  Tennessee  legislature  instructed  her 
United  States  Senators  to  vote  against  the  sub-treasury  bill ;  and 
Cave  Johnson  reported  that  although  he  was  heartily  in  favor 
of  the  measure,  the  people  did  not  understand  the  new  financial 
plan  and  consequently  were  opposed  to  it.^^ 

At  the  extra  session  of  Congress  a  bill  to  create  an  inde- 
pendent treasury  was  introduced  by  Silas  Wright,  a  close  friend 
of  the  President ;  it  passed  that  body  by  a  small  majority,  despite 
the  vigorous  opposition  of  both  Webster  and  Clay.  In  the  House 
it  was  laid  on  the  table  by  the  combined  votes  of  Whigs  and  con- 
servatives. Nothing  was  done  to  relieve  the  financial  situation 
except  to  postpone  payment  of  the  fourth  installment  under  the 
distribution  act  and  to  authorize  the  emission  of  $10,000,000  in 
treasury  notes  to  meet  the  present  emergency.  Van  Buren 
renewed  his  recommendation,  and  at  both  regular  sessions  of 
the  twenty-fifth  Congress  an  independent  treasury  bill  was  intro- 
duced, but  each  time  the  plan  was  rejected.  Not  even  a  letter 
from  "Old  Hickory"  in  which  he  admitted  the  iniquity  of  the 
"pet  banks"  that  he  had  selected  as  repositories  and  commended 
Van  Buren 's  plan,  had  weight  enough  to  influence  the  vote.^^ 

With  this  Congress  Polk  closed  his  career  as  a  legislator.  He 
was  fully  in  sympathy  with  the  financial  policy  of  the  adminis- 
tration although,  as  he  said  in  his  farewell  address,  "a  sense  of 


11  Catron  to  Polk,  Sept.  2,  Sept.  10,  Sept.  27,  1837,  Poll:  Papers. 

12  James  Walker  to  Polk,  Jan.  25,  1838;  Cave  Johnson  to  Polk,  March 
25,  1838,  PoR-  Papers. 

13  Jackson  to  Moses  Dawson,  Dec.  17,  1837  {Niles'  Beg.,  LIII,  314-315). 


662  JAMES  K.   POLK 

propriety"  had  precluded  him  from  taking  part  in  the  debates. 
The  fact  that  he  had  once  supported  Jackson's  state  bank  policy 
and  now  favored  a  divorce  from  all  banks  subjected  him  to 
severe  criticism  from  opposition  members  of  the  House.  Williams, 
of  Tennessee,  quoted  a  speech  made  by  Polk  during  the  session 
of  1834—35  as  the  best  argument  that  could  be  made  in  favor  of 
employing  state  banks  and  against  such  a  fiscal  agent  as  the 
independent  treasury. ^^  After  Polk  had  left  Congress  to  become 
governor  of  Tennessee  the  independent  treasury  bill  (but  not 
under  that  name)  passed  both  houses  of  the  twenty-sixth  Con- 
gress, only  to  be  repealed  by  the  victorious  Whigs  at  the  first 
session  of  the  Harrison-Tyler  administration. 

We  have  noted  elsewhere  that  Polk's  "Address  to  the  People" 
by  which  he  opened  his  canvass  for  the  governorship  of  Tennessee 
dealt  principally  with  national  issues.  It  was  an  able  state 
paper^'  and,  among  other  things,  expressed  his  views  on  the 
"American  System"  and  the  independent  treasury.  One  result 
of  protective  tariif,  he  said, 

was  to  take  the  property  of  one  man  and  give  it  to  another,  without  right 
or  consideration.  It  was  to  depreciate  the  value  of  the  productive  industry 
of  one  section  of  the  Union  and  transfer  it  to  another — it  was  to  make  the 
rich  richer  and  the  poor  poorer. 

Another  result  of  protection  was  the  accumulation  of  unneces- 
sary funds  in  the  national  treasury,  and  means  had  to  be  devised 
to  get  rid  of  the  money  without  low^ering  the  tariff.  ' '  This  plan 
was  soon  found  in  an  unconstitutional  and  gigantic  system  of 
internal  improvements,"  and  these  were  parceled  out  among 
communities  where  the  tariff  politicians  hoped  to  get  votes. 


14  "But  all  must  now  be  abandoned,"  said  Williams,  "for  the  sub- 
Treasury  scheme,  even  at  the  expense  of  a  political  somerset.  What,  Mr. 
Chairman,  is  this  much-talked-of  Sub-Treasury  bill?  It  is  sinijdy  to  sub- 
stitute individuals  in  the  place  of  banks  as  the  fiscal  agents  of  the  Gov- 
ernment. I  propose  to  adopt  as  my  own  Mr.  Polk's  speech,  delivered  at 
the  session  of  1834-5,  against  this  change.  It  is  an  excellent  argument; 
I  cannot  better  it;  let  it  speak  for  itself"  (Cong.  Globe  (Feb.  22,  1839), 
25  Cong.,  3  sess.,  App.,  372). 

1''  See  page  143  and  note. 


TARIFF  AND  INTERNAL   IMPROVEMENTS  663 

The  assumption  and  exercise  of  the  power,  by  Federal  authority,  to 
construct  works  of  internal  improvement  within  the  States,  constituted 
an  essential  branch  of  the  system  of  which  Mr.  Clay  was  the  reputed 
father  and  head,  and  to  which  the  popular  but  false  name  of  the  "Amer- 
ican System ' '  was  given.  It  was  an  essential  branch  of  the  falsely  called 
' '  American  System, ' '  because  it  was  the  great  absorbent,  the  sponge 
which  was  to  suck  in  and  consume  the  excessive,  unequal,  unjust  and 
oppressive  exactions  upon  the  people,  and  especially  upon  the  people  of 
the  planting  States,  levied  by  a  high  protective  tariff.  High,  unnecessary 
and  oppressive  taxes,  levied  by  a  high  protective  tariff — lavish  and 
wasteful  expenditures  of  the  surplus  money,  by  a  gigantic  system  of 
internal  improvement,  and  high  prices  of  public  lands,  that  emigration 
to  the  west  might  be  checked — the  laboring  poor  retained  in  the  manu- 
facturing districts,  in  a  state  of  dependence  on  their  richer  neighbors 
in  whose  employment  they  were,  constituted  Mr.  Clay's  far  famed  and 
miscalled  ' '  American  System. ' ' 

The  United  States  Bank,  said  he,  was  closely  allied  to  the 
American  System.  By  use  of  it  "Federalism"  saw  the  means, 
under  another  party  name,  to  accomplish  the  "dangerous  pur- 
poses" of  Alexander  Hamilton — "extending  the  power  and 
patronage  of  the  General  Government,  [and]  corrupting  the 
sources  of  Legislation."  Banks,  both  federal  and  state,  had 
"proved  to  be  faithless  fiscal  agents,"  and  therefore  he  now 
advocated  the  adoption  by  law  of  the  independent  treasury 
plan.^*' 

With  the  bank  controversy  of  the  Tyler  administration  which 
followed  the  repeal  of  the  independent  treasury  act,  Polk  had 
nothing  to  do.  His  friend  Catron  still  retained  his  belief  in  the 
virtue  of  paper  money  and  thought  that  the  Democratic  party 
could  regain  control  if  it  would  take  a  stand  in  favor  of  some 
sort  of  a  bank — something  like  the  one  proposed  by  Tyler,  which 
would  issue  paper  currency.  The  party,  said  he,  could  not  hope 
to  win  by  simply  "offering  nothing,"  and  the  sub-treasury  had 
always  been  ' '  an  absurd  shadow  "  ;  in  addition,  ' '  the  hard  money 
plan  is  a  theory — &  deemed  a  feeble  &  exploded  theory,  by  the 
people."^"      Uninfluenced    by    Catron's   arguments,    Polk   held 

16  Copy  in  pamphlet  form  in  Polk  Papers. 

17  Catron  to  Polk,  Jan.  2,  1842,  Polk  Papers. 


664  JAMES  E.   POLE 

fast  to  his  orthodox  opinions.  This  fact  is  evidenced  by  his  reply 
to  a  series  of  questions  propounded  by  a  group  of  persons  in 
Memphis  during  his  campaign  for  governor  in  1843.  He  was  in 
favor,  he  told  them,  of  a  sub-treasury  and  of  metal  money, 
although  he  did  not  object  to  a  limited  amount  of  paper  cur- 
rency if  issued  by  state  banks.  He  was  in  favor,  also,  of  a 
"moderate  tariff,"  but  for  revenue  purposes  only.^^ 

The  Democratic  platform  of  1844  said  nothing  about  tariff, 
except  to  reaffirm  the  very  general  plank  in  the  platform  of 
1840 ;  nevertheless  this  subject  formed  one  of  the  issues  of  the 
campaign.  The  compromise  tariff  arranged  by  Clay  and  Cal- 
houn in  1833  as  a  settlement  of  the  nullification  trouble  pro- 
vided for  biennial  reductions  until  1842,  after  which  it  was  to 
remain  at  a  uniform  rate  of  20  per  cent.  In  1842,  however,  just 
as  this  rate  was  about  to  go  into  operation,  a  new  act  was  passed 
which  abandoned  the  Democratic  revenue  basis  and  fixed  the 
rates  in  accordance  with  the  Whig  policy  of  protection.  In  addi- 
tion to  protective  tariff,  the  Whigs  desired  to  enact  Clay's  pet 
measure  of  distributing  among  the  states  the  money  derived 
from  the  sale  of  public  lands,  but  Tyler  blocked  this  by  insisting 
upon  retaining  the  so-called  safety-valve  proviso  which  had  been 
incorporated  into  the  distribution  law  passed  during  the  extra 
session  of  1841.^''  It  was  well  known  that  a  revival  of  the  policy 
of  distribution  and  internal  improvements  would  follow  Whig 
success  in  1844,  consequently  the  Democrats,  in  the  Baltimore 
platform,  declared  distribution  to  be  both  inexpedient  and  uncon- 
stitutional and  reaffirmed  the  declaration  of  1840  against  internal 
improvements. 

Absence  of  any  new  tariff  plank  in  the  Democratic  ])latfonu 
made  it  desirable  for  the  candidate,  Polk,  to  declare  his  views 
on  the  subject,  and  such  a  declaration  was  made  in  the  "Kane 
letter"  of  June  19,  1844.    As  noted  elsewhere,  he  expressed  his 


isEeply  dated  May  15,  1843.    Printed  in  Nashville  Union.  June  2,  184:5. 
m  This'safety-valve  provided  that  distribution  should  cease  whenever 
the  rate  sliould  be  raised  above  20  per  cent. 


TAEIFF  AND  INTERNAL   IMPROVEMENTS  665 

belief  in  revenue  tariff,  sufficient  "to  defray  the  expenses  of 
the  Government  economically  administered."  In  adjusting  it, 
he  believed  in  shaping  the  revenue  laws  so  as  to  afford  just  pro- 
tection to  the  interests  of  the  whole  Union,  "embracing  agri- 
culture, manufactures,  the  mechanic  arts,  commerce  and  navi- 
gation." In  other  M^ords,  he  adhered  to  the  historic  doctrines 
of  his  party — tariff  for  revenue,  with  incidental  protection.  To 
be  sure,  Cameron  and  others  may  have  tortured  this  letter  into  a 
promise  of  protective  tariff  in  order  to  delude  Pennsylvanians 
and  other  tariff  Democrats,  but  nothing  in  the  Kane  letter  itself 
warranted  such  a  construction. 

In  his  inaugural  address  President  Polk  reiterated  his  well- 
known  views  on  the  tariff.  After  quoting  from  his  ' '  Kane  letter ' ' 
he  stated  that,  when  levying  duties,  revenue  should  be  the  object 
and  protection  the  incident : 

To  reverse  this  principle  and  make  protection  the  object  and  revenue 
the  incident  would  be  to  inflict  manifest  injustice  upon  all  other  than 
protected  interests.  In  levying  duties  for  revenue  it  is  doubtless  proper  to 
make  such  discriminations  within  the  revenue  principle  as  will  afford 
incidental  protection  to  our  home  interests.  Within  the  revenue  limit 
there  is  a  discretion  to  discriminate;  beyond  that  limit  the  rightful  exercise 
of  the  power  is  not  conceded. 

Soon  after  he  had  taken  the  oath  of  office,  he  announced  to 
George  Bancroft  "the  four  great  measures"  of  his  administra- 
tion :  first  on  the  list  came  the  reduction  of  the  tariff ;  and 
second,  the  reestablishment  of  the  independent  treasury.""  Since 
Congress  does  not  convene  until  December,  his  attention  was 
first  of  all  directed  to  foreign  affairs ;  he  did  not,  however,  lose 
interest  in  these  party  measures,  even  in  the  midst  of  foreign 
complications. 

As  early  as  October  the  President  began  to  draft  the  part 
of  his  annual  message  relating  to  the  tariff  and  the  ' '  Constitu- 
tional Treasury"  as  he  preferred  to  designate  what  others  called 
the  independent  or  sub-treasury.     His  draft  when  submitted  to 


20  See  Schouler,  History  of  the  United  States,  IV,  498. 


66Q  JAMES  K.   POLK 

the  cabinet  was  approved  by  all  except  Buchanan.  The  Secre- 
tary of  State  approved  the  recommendation  to  abolish  the 
"minimum  principle"  and,  in  general,  that  of  substituting  ad 
valorem  for  specific  duties,  but  thought  that  specific  duties  should 
be  retained  on  certain  articles  such  as  iron,  coal,  and  sugar.-^ 
Polk  agreed  to  consider  Buchanan's  suggestions,  but  eventually 
he  decided  not  to  follow  them. 

As  submitted  to  Congress  on  December  2,  1845,  the  message 
invited  the  attention  of  that  body  to  "the  importance  of  making 
suitable  modifications  and  reductions"  in  the  existing  tariff 
rates.  All  duties,  he  said,  should  be  kept  within  a  "revenue 
standard,"  consequently  it  was  necessary  to  understand  dis- 
tinctly what  was  meant  by  that  term.  By  specific  illustrations 
he  showed  that  revenue  diminished  or  ceased  after  a  certain  rate 
had  been  reached,  and  the  point  at  which  it  began  to  diminish 
was  the  maximum  limit  of  the  revenue  standard.  No  rate  should 
go  beyond  this  point,  and  all  duties  within  the  revenue  standard 
should  be  no  higher  than  the  expenses  of  the  government  should 
make  necessary.  Rates  need  not  be  uniform,  for  discrimination 
within  the  revenue  standard  was  permissible,  but  such  discrimin- 
ation must  be  for  the  general  welfare  and  not  in  favor  of  a 
particular  industry  or  section. 

The  tariff  of  1842,  he  told  Congress,  violated  the  cardinal 
principles  which  he  had  laid  down,  because  its  object  had  been 
"protection  merely"  and  not  revenue.  Its  use  of  "minimums, 
or  assumed  and  false  values"  and  the  imposition  of  specific 
duties  had  benefitted  the  rich  and  worked  injustice  to  the  poor. 
Such  abuses  should  be  remedied,  and 

I  recommend  to  Congress  the  abolition  of  the  niininmm  ]u-iucij>le,  or 
assumed,  arbitrary,  and  false  values,  and  of  specific  duties,  and  the 
substitution  in  their  place  of  ad  valorem  duties  as  the  fairest  and  most 
equitable  indirect  tax  which  can  be  imposed.  By  the  ad  valorem  principle 
all  articles  are  taxed  according  to  their  cost  or  value,  and  those  which 
are  of  inferior  quality  or  of  small  cost  bear  only  the  just  proportion  of  the 


21  Polk,  Diary,  I,  85. 


TABIFF  AND  INTEBNAL   IMPROVEMENTS,  667 

tax  with  those  which  are  of  superior  quality  or  greater  cost.  The  articles 
consumed  by  all  are  taxed  at  the  same  rate.  A  system  of  ad  valorem 
revenue  duties,  with  proper  discriminations  and  proper  guards  against 
frauds  in  collecting  them,  it  is  not  doubted  will  afford  ample  incidental 
advantages  to  the  manufacturers  and  enable  them  to  derive  as  great 
profits  as  can  be  derived  from  any  other  regular  business.  It  is  believed 
that  such  a  system  strictly  within  the  revenue  standard  will  place  the 
manufacturing  interests  on  a  stable  footing  and  inure  to  their  permanent 
advantage,  while  it  will  as  nearly  as  may  be  practicable  extend  to  all 
the  great  interests  of  the  country  the  incidental  protection  whic*h  can 
be  afforded  by  our  revenue  laws.  Such  a  system,  when  once  firmly 
established,  would  be  permanent,  and  not  be  subject  to  the  constant  com- 
plaints, agitations,  and  changes  which  must  ever  occur  when  duties  are 
not  laid  for  revenue,  but  for  the  "protection  merely"  of  a  favored 
interest. 

Attention  was  next  directed  to  safe-guarding  the  government 
funds  after  they  had  been  collected.  Banks,  both  national  and 
state,  had,  in  his  opinion,  proved  to  be  unworthy  custodians; 
besides  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  never  intended  that  the 
funds  of  the  nation  should  be  turned  over  to  private  corporations 
to  be  used  by  them  for  profit  and  speculation.  Believing  that 
government  moneys  should  be  completely  separated  from  bank- 
ing institutions,  he  recommended  that  "provision  be  made  by 
law  for  such  separation,  and  that  a  constitutional  treasury  be 
created  for  the  safe-keeping  of  the  public  money."  The  money 
of  the  people  should  be  kept  in  the  treasury  of  the  people  in  the 
custody  of  agents  directly  responsible  to  the  government : 

To  say  that  the  people  or  their  Government  are  incompetent  or  not 
to  be  trusted  with  the  custody  of  their  own  money  in  their  own  Treasury, 
provided  by  themselves,  but  must  rely  on  the  presidents,  cashiers,  and 
stockholders  of  banking  corporations,  not  appointed  by  them  nor  responsi- 
ble to  them,  would  be  to  concede  that  they  are  incapable  of  self-government.22 

These  two  recommendations — for  a  revenue  tariff  and  for  a 
constitutional  treasury-— formed  the  keynote  of  Polk's  domestic 
policy.  He  may  have  been  less  brilliant  than  his  illustrious 
opponent,  but  few  will  now  deny  that  he  held  sounder  views  on 


Richardson,  Message!^,  IV,  40G-408. 


668  JAMES  K.   FOLK 

the  industrial  and  the  financial  needs  of  the  country.  His  policy 
was  simple  and  economically  sound ;  and  because,  under  it,  the 
business  of  the  country  was,  so  far  as  possible,  to  be  left  free  to 
seek  its  natural  channels,  little  positive  legislation  was  required. 
Clay,  on  the  other  hand,  like  Hamilton,  reveled  in  thauraaturgy 
and  legerdemain.  His  system  of  a  government  bank,  protective 
duties,  and  the  collection  of  revenue  to  be  distributed  among 
the  states,  was  highly  artificial ;  and  even  if  they  were  not  uncon- 
stitutional, surely  Polk  was  right  in  saying  that  they  had  never 
been  contemplated  by  the  framers  of  that  document. 

So  far  as  his  own  party  was  concerned  the  message  was  well 
received.  Cass  told  the  President  that  in  the  part  relating  to 
tariff  "You  have  struck  out  the  true  doctrine,  you  have  cut  the 
Gordian  Knot."  His  tariff  policy  was,  of  course,  highly  ac- 
ceptable to  southern  Democrats,  and  many  of  them  called  to 
express  their  approbation.  "We  Pennsylvanians, "  Cameron 
told  him,  "may  scratch  a  little  about  the  tariff  but  we  will  not 
quarrel  about  it";  Wilmot,  on  the  other  hand,  remarked  that 
"the  doctrines  on  the  tariff  were  the  true  doctrines  &  he  would 
support  them."-^  It  was  rumored  that  Secretary  Walker  had 
written  the  paragraphs  relating  to  the  tariff,  but  Polk  asserted 
indignantly  that  "the  tariff  part  of  the  message  and  every  other 
part  of  it  is  my  own."-* 

Without  waiting  to  see  whether  the  Van  Buren  independent 
treasury  would  prove  to  be  a  success  or  a  failure  the  triumphant 
Whigs  abolished  it  in  1841,  but,  nuich  to  their  discomfiture, 
Tyler  blocked  the  reestablishment  of  the  United  States  bank. 
After  the  election  of  1844  the  Democrats  carried  through  the 
House  a  bill  to  revive  the  independent  treasury,  but  as  it  failed 
in  the  Senate  the  whole  financial  question  went  over  to  the  Polk 
administration.  The  new  President,  as  we  have  seen,  made  it 
one  of  his  leading  measures  and  recommended  the  establishment 


23  Polk,  Diary,  I,  109-110.     Cameron,  despite  his  remark,  opposed  the 
tariff  bill  when  it  came  before  the  Senate. 
2-t  Ihid.,  124. 


TARIFF  AND  INTEENAL   IMPROVEMENTS  669 

of  a  ''constitntional  treasury"  which  was  simply  another  name 
for  the  independent  treasury.  In  following  his  advice  it  can 
not  be  said  that  Congress  actually  created  anything ;  all  that  was 
asked  and  all  that  was  done  was  to  authorize  the  executive  to 
collect  the  government  revenues  in  gold  and  silver,  and  to  deposit 
them  in  the  treasury  vaults  until  disbursed  in  the  course  of  ordi- 
nary business  transactions.  Congress  simply  made  the  govern- 
ment the  custodian  of  its  own  funds  instead  of  having  them 
deposited  in  banks. -^  When,  therefore,  on  March  30,  1846, 
Dromgoole,  of  Virginia,  presented  the  bill  which  had  been  pre- 
pared by  the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means,  the  title  merely 
authorized  the  building  of  fireproof  vaults  for  the  safekeeping 
of  public  money,  which  vaults  were  formally  declared  to  be  the 
' '  Treasury  of  the  United  States. ' '-''  The  requirement  that  metal 
money  alone  should  be  received  by  the  government  was  added 
later  in  the  form  of  an  amendment. 

Caleb  Smith,  of  Indiana,  at  once  opened  the  attack  upon  the 
bill  and  offered  an  amendment,  the  gist  of  which  was  to  author- 
ize the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to  deposit  government  funds 
in  "any  bank  or  banks  which  he  may  deem  expedient,  and  also 
to  receive  the  Government  dues  in  the  paper  of  specie-paying 
banks."  As  this  amendment  would  nullify  the  main  purpose  of 
the  proposed  law  there  was,  of  course,  no  prospect  that  it  would 
be  adopted.  It  served,  however,  to  make  the  issue  definite,  to 
align  on  the  one  side  those  who  believed  in  a  government  treasury 
and  hard  money,  and  on  the  other,  the  friends  of  banks  and 
bank  currency. 


25  The  same  may  be  said  of  the  Van  Buren  independent  treasury. 

26  "5e  it  enacted  ^-c.,  That  the  rooms  prepared  and  provided  in  the  new 
treasury  building  at  the  seat  of  Government  for  the  use  of  the  Treasurer 
of  the  United  States  .  .  .  and  also  the  fireproof  vaults  and  safes  erected 
in  said  rooms  for  the  keeping  of  the  public  moneys  in  the  possession,  and 
under  the  immediate  control  of  said  Treasurer  of  the  United  States;  and 
the  said  Treasurer  of  the  United  States  shall  keep  the  public  moneys  which 
shall  come  into  his  hands  in  the  Treasury  of  the  United  States  as  hereby 
constituted,  until  the  same  shall  be  drawn  therefrom  according  to  law" 
(Cong.  Globe,  29  Cong.,  1  sess.,  574). 


670  JAMES  E.   POLK 

Smith's  arguments  in  opposition  to  the  independent  treasury 
were  not  very  convincing.  He  stated,  erroneously,  that  the  Demo- 
crats had  not  made  the  subject  an  issue  in  the  recent  election ; 
that  Polk  and  other  Democrats  had  once  favored  state  banks ; 
and  that  the  Van  Buren  measure  was  a  "miserable  humbug" 
which  had  never  really  been  carried  into  effect.  On  the  other 
hand,  Grider,  of  Kentucky,  asserted  that  the  sole  purpose  of 
introducing  the  bill  was  to  redeem  party  pledges,  for  he  was 
certain  that  many  Democrats  did  not  approve  of  "reckless 
financial  experiments."  J.  R.  Ingersoll,  of  Pennsylvania,  saw 
nothing  in  the  measure  ' '  to  commend  it  to  respect ' ' ;  besides, 
everything  contained  in  the  bill  was  already  covered  by  the  law 
of  1789  which  had  created  the  Treasury  Department.  In  gen- 
eral the  arguments  against  the  bill  were  so  lacking  in  force — 
and  frequently  in  pertinence — that  Daniel,  of  North  Carolina, 
had  good  reason  for  concluding  that  the  Whigs  themselves  had 
"the  internal  conviction"  that  much  good  would  result  from  its 
passage. 

The  Democrats  had  small  need  for  arguments,  as  they  were 
certain  that  they  could  command  the  requisite  number  of  votes. 
They  maintained  with  justice  that  a  fiscal  agent  was  superfluous, 
and  that  the  government  was  most  competent  to  protect  and  dis- 
burse its  own  funds.  They  ridiculed  the  assertion  that  the  meas- 
ure was  a  device  to  draw  all  metal  money  into  the  coffers  of  the 
government,  leaving  the  people  with  nothing  but  "rag  money." 
Dromgoole,  who  made  the  principal  argument  for  the  bill,  denied 
the  charge  of  discriminating  against  banks,  for,  as  he  said,  they 
had  no  legitimate  claim  to  the  use  of  public  money.  On  April  2, 
after  Dromgoole  had  added  an  amendment  which  required  pay- 
ments to  the  government  to  be  made  in  gold  and  silver,  the  bill 
passed  the  House  by  an  overwhelming  majority.-' 

On  the  following  day  the  bill  was  received  by  the  Senate  and 
referred   to   the    Committee   on   Finance.     Nothing   more   was 


2T  122  to  66  {Cong.  Globe,  29  Coug.,  1  sess.,  595). 


TAIUFF  AND  INTEENAL   IMPIIOVEMENTS  671 

heard  of  it  until  the  twenty-second  of  April.  On  that  date  Web- 
ster asked  the  chairman,  Dixon  H.  Lewis,  when  it  was  likely  to 
be  reported  to  the  Senate  and  whether  the  connnittee  had  settled 
upon  any  amendments.  In  response  to  this  inquiry  Lewis  stated 
tliat  it  was  the  intention  of  the  committee  to  give  precedence  to 
bills  relating  to  warehousing  and  mints.  This  apparent  indiffer- 
ence to  immediate  action  on  one  of  the  "leading"  administra- 
tion measures  did  not  escape  the  watchful  eye  of  the  President. 
He  sent  for  Lewis  and  urged  him  to  give  precedence  to  this  and 
the  tariff  bill,  as  postponement  might  endanger  their  passage. 

I  then  told  him  [said  he]  that  I  had  great  anxiety  for  the  passage 
of  the  Constitutional  Treasury  Bill  and  the  reduction  of  the  Tariff,  which 
I  had  recommended  in  my  annual  message.  I  told  him  that  I  considered 
them  as  administration  measures  and  that  I  intended  to  urge  them  upon 
Congress  as  such,  and  that  I  considered  the  public  good,  as  well  as  my  own 
power  and  the  glory  of  my  administration,  depended  in  a  great  degree  upon 
my  success  in  carrying  them  through  Congress. 

Lewis  was  an  ardent  supporter  of  Calhoun,  and  the  President 
embraced  the  opportunity  to  read  him  a  lecture  on  the  way 
southern  men  were  jeopardizing  important  measures  by  petty 
opposition  to  the  confirmation  of  northern  appointments.  North- 
ern Senators,  he  said,  had  ratified  appointments  of  southern 
men,  and  there  was  no  good  reason  why  southern  Senators  should 
not  reciprocate.  To  Lewis's  complaint  that  Colhoun  and  his 
friends  had  been  turned  out  of  office,  Polk  replied  that  he  had 
made  his  appointments  without  reference  to  any  aspirant  for 
the  Presidency.  Being  "the  first  President  who  had  taken  bold 
ground  and  fully  satisfied  the  South  on  the  tariff,"  he  thought 
men  from  that  section  ought  "to  cease  their  opposition  upon  these 
small  matters  in  which  no  principle  was  involved,  for  the  sake 
of  enabling  me  to  carry  out  the  great  measure  which  involved 
principle. '  '"^ 

-^  Polk,  Diary,  I,  367-371.  Polk  believed  that  northern  men  attached 
more  importance  to  appointments  than  southern  men  did.  "I  reminded 
him  that  Mr.  Jefferson's  plan  was  to  conciliate  the  North  by  the  dispen- 
sation of  his  patronage,  and  to  rely  on  the  South  to  support  his  principles 
for  the  sake  of  these  principles." 


672  JAMES  E.   POLE 

Despite  the  President's  anxiety  the  bill  was  held  by  the  com- 
mittee until  the  eighth  of  June.  Lewis  then  reported  it  to  the 
Senate  with  sundry  amendments,  the  most  important  of  which 
postponed  for  six  months  the  operation  of  the  specie  clause. 
After  another  period  of  slumber  the  measure  was  brought  up  for 
consideration,  and,  after  three  days  of  debate,  it  was  passed  by 
a  small  majority  on  August  1,  the  day  after  the  President  had 
signed  the  tariff  bill.  The  House  concurred  in  the  Senate  amend- 
ments, and  the  constitutional  treasury  bill  became  the  law  of 
the  land. 

As  early  as  January  9,  1846,  the  erratic  McConnell,  of  Ala- 
bama, asked  leave  to  introduce  a  "bill  to  repeal  the  tariff  of 
1842,  with  all  its  iniquities,"  but  not  until  April  14  did  McKay, 
of  North  Carolina,  chairman  of  the  Committee  of  Ways  and 
Means,  report  a  revenue  bill  based  on  recommendations  made  by 
the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  Under  it,  all 
duties  were  to  be  ad  valorem.  Commodities  were  grouped  in 
schedules;  those  in  the  first  group  were  to  pay  100  per  cent, 
others  75,  30,  25,  etc.,  until  the  free  list  was  reached.  It  was  by 
no  means  a  free-trade  measure,  yet  it  was  attacked  as  such  by 
the  advocates  of  protection.  They  seemed  to  regard  the  tariff 
of  1842  as  something  sacred,  something  which  could  not  be  altered 
Avithout  prostrating  industry  and  ruining  the  country.  "We  are 
in  one  breath  told,"  exclaimed  Biggs,  of  North  Carolina,  "that 
if  you  do  not  protect  the  manufacturers  they  must  be  prostrated ; 
and  in  the  next  you  are  informed  that  by  your  protection  you 
diminish  their  profits.-" 

Opponents  of  the  measure  denounced  the  ad  valorem  prin- 
ciple and  charged  that  it  was  an  invitation  to  commit  fraud  in 
valuation.  They  ridiculed  the  claim  of  the  administration  that 
a  lower  tariff  would  produce  more  revenue.  "We  are  called  on 
now,"  said  Senator  Evans,  of  Maine, 


2«Cong.  Globe,  29  Cong.,  1  sess.,  ]022.  He  quoted  from  Clay  (1833) 
to  the  efifect  that  "In  general  it  may  be  taken  as  a  rule,  that  the  duty 
upon  an  article  forms  a  portion  of  its  price. ' ' 


TAEIFF  AND  INTERNAL  IMPEOVEMENTS  673 

to  rodiu'o  the  rates  of  duty,  not  bocause  too  imich  revenue  is  raised,  but 
because  there  is  too  little,  and  because  more  can  be  obtained  by  a  reduction 
of  the  rates.  Well,  sir,  I  commend  the  prudence  of  those  who  take  this 
view  of  the  subject.  Whether  they  may  be  able  to  demonstrate  it  in  a 
satisfactory  manner,  is  another  matter.ao 

Personal  abuse  of  the  President  was  not  wanting.  Gentry,  from 
his  own  state,  denounced,  in  the  House,  what  he  termed  "the 
great,  damnable,  and  infamous  conspiracy"  (Kane  letter)  by 
which  the  people  of  Pennsylvania  had  been  defrauded  out  of 
their  votes,  and  by  which  the  men  who  had  perpetrated  it  had 
reached  tlie  positions  they  now  occupy :  these  men  were  ' '  James 
K.  Polk  and  James  Buchanan. '  '^^ 

Seaborn  Jones,  of  Georgia,  was  selected  as  chief  spokesman 
for  the  House  Committee  of  "Ways  and  Means,  and  indirectly, 
for  the  administration.  All  sections  of  the  Union,  he  contended, 
would  be  benefited  by  a  revenue  tariff;  for  it  was  based  on 
justice  and  would  insure  stability  for  all  lines  of  industry.  ' '  Pro- 
tection," on  the  other  hand,  "operates  as  a  hotbed  in  bringing 
forth  exotics  which  the  soil  and  climate  would  not  naturally 
produce ' ' ;  and  the  fostering  of  special  industries  w^as  not  a 
legitimate  function  of  government.^-  Of  northern  Democrats, 
Wilmot,  of  Pennsylvania,  was  one  of  the  most  enthusiastic  sup- 
porters of  Polk's  tariff  policy.  He  branded  the  tariff  of  1842 
as  the  "  'bill  of  abominations,'  in  violation  of  the  genius  of  our 
institutions,  of  the  provisions  of  our  Constitution,  and  fatally 
subversive  of  the  rights  and  liberties  of  the  people."  He  favored 
a  "constitutional  tariff"  such  as  the  one  under  consideration, 
one  "which  would  grant  equal  protection  to  all,  exclusive 
privileges  to  none. '  '^^ 

On  July  3,  after  divers  amendments  had  been  rejected^*  and 
an  attempt  to  lay  the  whole  question  on  the  table  had  been 


30/btd.,  1090.  31  Ibid.,  1047.  32  7?,t(;.^  990-991.        33 /bid.,  1045. 

34  While  nearly  all  of  the  amendments  related  to  adjustments  in  rates, 
a  few  were  grotesque.  For  example,  Schenck,  of  Ohio,  wished  to  insert 
Polk 's  Kane  letter  in  the  bill,  and  Stewart,  of  Pennsylvania,  moved  to 
make  the  title  read:  "A  bill  to  reduce  the  duties  on  the  luxuries  of  the 


674  JAMES  E.   POLK 

defeated,  the  House  passed  the  tariff  bill  and  submitted  it  to  the 
Senate  for  approval.  On  learning  the  good  news,  Polk  recorded 
in  his  diary : 

I  Avas  much  gratified  to  hear  the  result,  as  this  was  one  of  the  leading 
and  vital  measures  of  my  administration.  It  Avas  in  truth  vastly  the  most 
important  domestic  measure  of  my  administration,  and  the  vote  of  the 
popular  branch  of  Congress,  Avhich  had  fully  endorsed  my  opinions  and 
recommendations  on  the  subject  of  the  tariff,  could  not  be  otherwise  than 
highly  gratifying.35 

The  House  bill  was  taken  up  by  the  Senate  on  July  6,  and 
after  two  readings  by  title,  Sevier,  of  Arkansas,  moved  that  it  be 
made  a  special  order.  Evans,  of  Maine,  endeavored  to  have  it 
referred  for  consideration  to  the  Committee  on  Finance,  but 
many  Democrats  contended  that  such  reference  would  cause 
unnecessary  delay.  During  the  debate  Clayton,  of  Delaware,  in 
an  attempt  to  outmanoeuver  the  administration  forces,  moved 
certain  amendments  and  instructions  which  would,  if  followed, 
compel  the  committee  to  consider  the  whole  bill.  He  was  not 
successful,  however,  for  Dixon  H.  Lewis,  of  Alabama,  whose 
"twenty  score  of  flesh""*"  was  a  host  in  itself,  promptly  re])orted 
the  measure  back  from  the  committee  with  a  request  to  be  excused 
from  its  consideration. 

As  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Finance,  it  devolved  upon 
Lewis  to  lead  the  debate  in  favor  of  the  bill.  The  belief  so  widely 
held,  said  he,  that  ad  valorem  duties  would  fail  to  produce  suffi- 
cient revenue  was  "one  of  those  axiomatic  errors  which,  upon 
examination,  will  be  found  to  be  wholly  fallacious";  even  under 
the  tariff  of  1842  such  duties  had  produced  more  than  half  of 
the  revenue.  Hannegan,  Bagby,  and  many  other  Senators  sup- 
ported the  measure ;  the  main  arguments  urged  in  its  favor  were 
the  abolition  of  the  minimum  and  specific  duties,  and  the  read- 
justment of  rates  upon  a  revenue  basis. 


rich,  and  increase  them  on  the  necessaries  of  the  poor;  to  bankrupt  tlie 
treasury;  strike  down  American  farmers,  mechanics,  and  workingmen;  to 
make  way  for  the  products  of  foreign  agriculture  and  foreign  labor  .  .  . 
etc."  ar,  Polk,  Diary,  II,  11. 

36  Adams,  Memoirs,  XII,  25.     Lewis  weighed  4'M)  pounds. 


TARIFF  AND  INTERNAL  IMPROVEMENTS  675 

Opponents  of  the  tariff  bill  consumed  more  time  than  did  its 
friends.  In  replying  to  Lewis,  Webster  attacked  the  policy  of 
relying  upon  ad  valorem  duties,  and  he  hoped 

to  show  to  the  Seuate  and  to  the  country  that  this  bill,  so  novel,  so  danger- 
ous, so  vicious  in  its  general  principles;  so  ill  considered,  so  rash,  and  I 
must  say  so  intemperate  in  many  of  its  provisions,  cannot  but  produce  in 
the  country  the  most  serious  and  permanent  mischief  if  it  should  become 
a  law.37 

"As  a  friend  of  the  Administration,"  Niles,  of  Connecticut,  pro- 
foundly regretted  the  introduction  of  the  bill,  and  "as  a  friend 
of  the  Administration  he  would  vote  against  it. '  '"*  Of  the  Demo- 
crats, Cameron,  of  Pennsylvania,  was  the  most  aggressive  in  com- 
bating the  measure;  but  his  charge  that  Pennsylvanians  had 
been  deceived  by  the  Kane  letter  came  with  bad  grace  from  his 
lips,  for  if  deception  had  been  employed,  Cameron  himself  had 
been  the  chief  offender.  Benton  did  not  approve  all  features  of 
the  bill,  yet  he  declared  himself  ready  to  vote  for  any  measure 
which  would  rid  the  country  of  the  tariff  of  1842. 

The  attitude  of  two  members  merits  special  notice,  for  the 
Senate  was  so  evenly  divided  that  the  fate  of  the  tariff  bill 
rested  in  their  hands.  Like  other  Democrats,  Haywood,  of  North 
Carolina,  wished  the  tariff  to  be  reduced,  but  he  maintained  that 
the  House  bill  would  effect  too  radical  a  change.  After  several 
attempts  to  amend  the  bill  had  failed,  he  broke  with  his  party 
and  resigned  his  seat  in  the  Senate.^''  Although  his  act  was 
severely  condemned  by  the  party  press,  the  President  believed 
him  to  be  sincere  and  conscientious.*** 


37  Cong.  Globe,  29  Cong.,  1  sess.,  1089.  38  iMd.,  1117. 

39  The  reasons  which  he  assigned  for  his  resignation  are  given  in  his 
"Address  to  the  People  of  North  Carolina"  (Cong,.  Globe,  29  Cong.,  1 
sess.,  App.,  1178  ff.). 

■to  Polk,  Diary,  IT,  48.  He  thought  that  the  Senator  might  be  piqued 
because  he  had  not  been  given  a  part  in  framing  the  bill,  yet  "1  believe 
him  to  be  an  honest  and  pure  man,  but  a  man  of  great  vanity  and  possess- 
ing a  good  deal  of  self  esteem.  ...  I  give  not  the  slightest  heed  to  the 
painful  insinuations  which  I  learn  this  evening  are  made  by  illiberal 
persons  as  to  the  motives  &  causes  which  have  induced  his  course." 


676  JAMES  K.  FOLK 

After  Haywood's  resignation  attention  centered  on  Senator 
Jarnagin,  of  Tennessee,  for  with  him  rested  the  power  to  pass 
or  to  defeat  the  "great  domestic  measure."  Jarnagin  was  not 
only  a  Whig  and  a  believer  in  protective  tariff,  but  in  his  home 
state  he  had  been  a  bitter  personal  and  political  opponent  of  the 
President.  On  the  other  hand,  the  legislature  of  Tennessee  had 
instructed  him  to  vote  for  the  administration  tariff  bill,  and  it 
remained  to  be  seen  whether  he  .would  follow  his  instructions. 
On  July  25  the  President  was  much  perturbed  by  a  report  that 
Jarnagin  had  threatened  to  resign ;  for  ' '  should  he  do  so,  and 
Mr.  Haywood's  successor  reach  here  in  time,  the  tariff  bill  will 
be  lost  by  one  vote. ' '  Polk  sent  for  Senator  Turney,  who  prom- 
ised to  ascertain  the  intentions  of  his  colleague.  Jarnagin  agreed 
to  remain  in  the  Senate  and  to  obey  his  instructions;  but  Polk 
was  not  wholly  relieved  from  anxiety,  for  Turney  informed  him 
that  manufacturing  interests  were  attempting  to  win  votes  by 
the  use  of  bribe  money  and  that  even  he  (Turney)  had  been 
offered  a  bribe." 

Jarnagin 's  position  was  a  most  unenviable  one.  Although 
he  thoroughly  disapproved  the  administration  bill,  his  instruc- 
tions required  him  to  support  it.  On  July  27  he  denounced  the 
measure  but  declared  his  intention  to  vote  for  it;  he  did  not, 
however,  believe  that  his  instructions  precluded  him  from  voting 
for  amendments  which  did  not  affect  its  main  purpose — the  abol- 
ishment of  the  minimum  and  specific  duties.  When,  therefore, 
Clayton  moved  a  reference  to  the  Committee  on  Finance,  with 
instructions  to  amend,  Jarnagin  voted  with  his  party.  Polk  took 
this  to  mean  that  he  would  break  both  his  pledges  and  his  in- 
structions. "Jarnegan,"  he  observed  in  his  diary,  "holds  tlie 
fate  of  the  Bill  in  his  hands  and  tliere  [is]  no  reliance  to  be 
placed  upon  him,"  and  he  regretted  the  folly  of  Haywood  in 
resigning  at  such  a  critical  moment.*-  But  the  President  was 
mistaken,  for  Jarnagin  yielded  the  "pound  of  flesh"  even  though 

41  Ibid.,  49-50.  ^  lUd.,  51. 


TARIFF  AND  INTERNAL  IMPROVEMENTS  677 

he  succeeded  in  making  the  operation  annoying  to  his  opponents. 
On  July  28  he  again  announced  his  intention  to  vote  for  the 
administration  tariff,  but 

I  shall,  when  the  question  conies  on  the  engrossment  of  the  bill,  transfer 
the  whole  responsibility,  as  far  as  I  am  concerned,  to  the  keeping  of  the 
representative  of  the  whole  people,  and  then  we  will  know  whether  it  be 
a  Democratic  measure  or  not. 

He  meant  of  course  that  on  incidental  questions  he  would  refrain 
from  voting  and  compel  the  Vice-President  to  save  the  measure 
by  his  casting  vote ;  this  done,  he  would  obey  his  instructions  and 
help  to  pass  the  bill.  He  kept  his  promise,-*^  and  the  bill  was 
passed  by  a  vote  of  twenty-eight  to  twenty-seven  after  an  amend- 
ment proposed  by  Webster  for  guarding  against  under-valuation 
had  been  adopted.  Before  the  final  vote  was  taken  Webster  pre- 
dicted that  the  measure  would  be  repealed  at  the  next  session, 
for  "it  is  as  impossible  that  the  sun  should  go  backward  and  set 
in  the  east,  as  that  the  people  should  suffer  the  principle  con- 
tained in  this  bill  to  prevail. ' ' 

Even  after  the  Senate  had  passed  the  tariff  bill  the  President 
was  pessimistic.  He  doubted  that  the  House  would  concur  in 
the  Senate  amendment.  A  report  that  certain  Democrats  from 
New  York  and  Pennsylvania  would  join  the  Whigs  in  opposing 
the  amendment  gave  him  "great  uneasiness."  They  did  vote 
with  the  Whigs  on  incidental  questions,  but,  due  to  fear  so  the 
President  thought,  they  joined  with  their  own  party  on  the  final 
vote.    Polk's  gratification  found  expression  in  his  diary: 

This  great  measure  of  reform  has  been  thus  successful.  It  has  given 
rise  to  an  immense  struggle  between  the  two  great  political  parties  of  the 
country.  The  capitalists  &  monopolists  have  not  surrendered  the  immense 
advantages  which  they  possessed,  and  the  enormous  profits  which  they 
derived  under  the  tariff  of  1842,  until  after  a  fierce  and  mighty  struggle. 


43  Writing  from  his  post  at  Naples  to  his  brother,  W.  H.  Polk  said  that 
he  had  trembled  when  he  read  that  the  fate  of  the  tariff  bill  depended  on 
"the  doubtful  honesty  of  Spencer  Jarnagin."  He  had  up  to  this  time 
believed  that  Jarnagin  would  sell  out  even  if  the  price  were  labeled  in 
plain  sight;  "his  rare  honestv  in  this  case,  is  to  me  wholly  inexplicable!  " 
(W.  H.  Polk  to  J.  K.  Polk,  Nov.  6,  1846,  Polk  Papers). 


678  JAMES  K.   POLK 

This  City  has  swarmed  with  them  for  weeks.  They  have  spared  no  effort 
within  their  power  to  sway  and  control  Congress,  but  all  has  proved  to  be 
unavailing  and  they  have  been  at  length  vanquished.  Their  effort  will 
probably  now  be  to  raise  a  panic  (such  as  they  have  already-  attempted) 
by  means  of  their  combined  wealth,  so  as  to  induce  a  repeal  of  the  act.^^ 

The  President  had  reason  to  be  gratified  with  the  passage  of 
this  important  party  measure.  It  not  only  dealt  a  severe  blow 
to  Clay's  "American  System,"  but  it  put  in  operation  a  tariff 
policy  which  Polk  had  advocated  ever  since  he  had  been  in  public 
life.  Much  to  the  disappointment  of  his  critics  no  industrial 
calamities  resulted  from  it,  and  the  act  was  not  repealed  as 
Webster  had  so  confidently  predicted.  Despite  the  scoffing  of 
Evans,  reduction  of  the  tariff  rates  was  followed  by  an  increase 
in  the  amount  of  revenue ;  it  became  redundant  in  1857  and  was 
still  further  reduced.  While  it  would  be  absurd  to  attribute  the 
prosperity  of  this  decade  to  the  operation  of  the  ' '  tariff  of  '46, ' ' 
no  longer  could  it  be  said  that  an  ad  valorem  revenue  tariff  would 
block  the  wheels  of  industry. 

The  reestablishment  of  the  independent  treasury  gave  addi- 
tional reason  for  gratification,  and,  like  the  tariff  bill,  it  caused 
none  of  the  disasters  which  its  opponents  had  prophesied.  With 
few  modifications,  the  "constitutional  treasury"  has  continued  to 
the  present  day,  and  it  has  done  much  to  extricate  national  reve- 
nue from  the  field  of  party  politics.  With  the  enactment  of 
these  two  measures  and  the  settlement  of  the  Oregon  question 
Polk  had  effected  three  of  the  four  items  of  his  administrative 
program.  There  was  no  longer  need  of  anxiety  for  the  "glory" 
of  his  administration,  even  though  Davis  had  talked  the  diplo- 
matic appropriation  bill  to  death. 

Having  faitlifully  complied  with  the  recommendations  con- 
tained in  the  President's  message,  Congress  believed,  apparently, 
that  the  law  of  compensation  entitled  it  to  a  free  hand  in  "pork 
barrel"  legislation.  Despite  the  heavy  drain  on  the  treasury  for 
military  purposes,  items  were  recklessly  added  to  the  river  and 


4*  Polk,  Diary,  II,  54-55. 


TAEIFF  AND  INTERNAL  IMPROVEMENTS  679 

harbor  l)ill  until  it  called  for  appropriations  amounting  to  nearly 
a  million  and  a  half  dollars.  Clay  himself  could  scarcely  have 
asked  for  a  more  cordial  endorsement  of  his  internal  improvement 
policy,  and  especially  from  a  Congress  controlled  by  Democrats. 
Polk  promptly  vetoed  this  bill,  and  his  message  to  the  House 
is  an  able  statement  of  the  Jeffersonian  doctrine  of  strict  con- 
struction. In  his  opinion,  the  measure  under  consideration  was 
both  unconstitutional  and  inexpedient,  and  parts  of  it  "a  disrep- 
utable scramble  for  the  public  money."  "It  is  not  questioned," 
said  he, 

that  the  Federal  Government  is  one  of  limited  powers.  Its  powers  are 
such,  and  such  only,  as  are  expressly  granted  in  the  Constitution  or  are 
properly  incidental  to  the  expressly  granted  powers  and  necessary  to  their 
execution. 

After  quoting  Madison's  rule  for  determining  the  scope  of  im- 
plied power,  Polk  maintained  that : 

It  is  not  enough  that  it  may  be  regarded  by  Congress  as  convenient  or 
that  its  exercise  would  advance  the  public  weal.  It  must  be  necessary  and 
proper  to  the  execution  of  the  principal  expressed  power  to  which  it  is  an 
incident,  and  without  which  such  principal  power  can  not  be  carried  into 
effect.  The  whole  frame  of  the  Federal  Constitution  proves  that  the 
Government  which  it  creates  was  intended  to  be  one  of  limited  and  speci- 
fied powers.  A  construction  of  the  Constitution  so  broad  as  that  by  which 
the  power  in  question  is  defended  tends  imperceptibly  to  a  consolidation 
of  power  in  a  Government  intended  by  the  framers  to  be  thus  limited  in 
its  authority. 

National  appropriations,  in  his  opinion,  should  be  confined  to 
national  purposes,  and  Congress  ought  to  refrain  from  exercising 
doubtful  powers.  He  censured  in  particular  the  present  attempt 
to  include  purely  local  items  by  a  jugglery  of  words.  ' '  To  call 
the  mouth  of  a  creek  or  a  shallow  inlet  on  our  coast  a  harbor  can 
not  confer  the  authority  to  expend  the  public  money  in  its  im- 
provement. "''•^  Although  he  did  not  consult  the  cabinet  on  the 
advisability  of  vetoing  this  bill,  he  believed  that  Buchanan, 
Marcy,  Bancroft,  and  perhaps  Walker,  would,  if  consulted,  have 

45  Richardson,  Messages,  IV,  460  flf. 


680  JAMES  E.  POLK 

advised  him  to  sign  it.**'  He  declined,  also,  to  sign  a  bill  for 
making  improvements  in  the  territory  of  Wisconsin,  but  his  veto 
message  was  not  submitted  until  the  following  December.'*' 

In  the  interest  of  economy  and  as  a  check  upon  political  job- 
bery the  President  put  his  veto  on  a  bill  to  grant  five  million 
dollars  in  land  scrip  to  persons  who  claimed  damages  for  French 
spoliations  prior  to  1800.  In  his  message  he  pointed  out  that 
this  question  had  often  been  discussed,  yet  no  former  Congress 
had  seen  fit  to  pay  these  claims,  even  when  there  had  been  a 
surplus  in  the  treasury.  Since  the  United  States  had  never  re- 
ceived anything  from  France  for  the  injuries  done  he  saw  no 
reason  for  the  assumption  that  our  government  had  become  re- 
sponsible to  the  claimants  for  aggressions  committed  by  a  foreign 
power.*^ 

As  frequently  happens  at  the  halfway  point  of  an  adminis- 
tration, the  autumn  elections  showed  a  decrease  in  Democratic 
strength.  Doubtless  the  main  cause  of  defection  was  the  unpop- 
ularity of  the  Mexican  War ;  but  the  Whigs  attributed  much  of 
it  to  abhorrence  of  the  "free  trade"  tariff,  although  that  law 
had  not  yet  become  operative.  Among  others.  Governor  Wright, 
of  New  York,  failed  in  his  canvass  for  reelection,  and  adminis- 
tration candidates  were  defeated  in  Pennsylvania.  With  his 
usual  delight  in  causing  the  President  discomfort,  Buchanan  at- 
tributed these  defeats  to  the  reduction  of  the  tariff".  Probably 
he  hoped  to  get  some  concessions  for  his  friends  in  Pennsylvania, 
but  instead,  Polk  told  him  that  he  would,  in  his  next  message, 
recommend  that  no  change  whatever  be  made  in  the  law  until 
it  had  been  given  a  fair  trial.  Wright's  defeat  had,  in  Polk's 
opinion,  been  caused  by  the  treachery  of  the  "Old  Hunkers" 
who  no  longer  deserved  to  be  called  Democrats ;  ' '  this  faction 
shall  hereafter  receive  no  favours  at  my  hands  if  I  know  it. '  '*** 


46  Polk,  Diary,  IT,  58.  4-  Richardson,  Messagea,  IV,  610  ff. 

48  Ihid.,  466  flf. 

40  Polk,  Diary,  II,  217-218.     In  a  letter  to  Henry  D.  Foster,  of  Penn- 
sylvania, Nov.  19,  1846,  Buchanan  said  that  he  had  always  disapproved 


TAEIFF  AND  INTERNAL  IMPliOVEMENTS  681 

When,  early  in  November,  the  President  began  the  prepar- 
ation of  his  second  annual  message,  the  war  estimates  of  Marcy 
were  so  large  that  doubts  were  expressed  in  the  cabinet  as  to  the 
ability  of  the  government  to  meet  its  financial  obligations.  In 
accordance  with  Democratic  tradition,  financial  ills  were  readily 
traced  to  "the  money  power,"  and  the  difficulty  in  floating  a  loan 
was  attributed  to  the  machinations  of  bankers  in  Boston  and 
New  York  who  were  endeavoring  to  force  a  repeal  of  the  inde- 
pendent treasury  law.  The  gloomy  Secretary  of  State  doubted 
that  the  war  could  be  conducted  on  a  hard  money  basis;  and 
although  he  had  advocated  the  independent  treasury,  he  was  now 
satisfied  that  the  government  could  not  finance  the  war  under  its 
operation.^" 

In  his  message  the  President  dealt  with  financial  questions  in 
very  general  terms.  It  was  too  early,  he  said,  to  estimate  the 
revenue  to  be  derived  from  the  new  tariff  law ;  but  by  the  simul- 
taneous abandonment  of  the  protective  policy  by  England  and 
the  United  States,  commerce  had  received  a  "new  impulse,"  while 
labor  and  trade  "have  been  released  from  the  artificial  trammels 
which  have  so  long  fettered  them."  The  present  tariff  law  had 
been  framed  in  accordance  with  sound  principles  and  conse- 
quently ought  not  to  be  disturbed.  In  order  to  meet  the  extraor- 
dinary expenses  of  the  war  a  revenue  duty  might  well  be  placed 
on  certain  articles  now  on  the  free  list,  but  it  should  be  repealed 
as  soon  as  the  needs  of  the  treasury  would  permit.  Walker,  in 
his  report,  recommended,  for  the  war  period,  a  special  duty  of 
twenty-five  per  cent  on  tea  and  coffee,  but  like  the  President,  he 
was  averse  to  making  changes  in  the  existing  tariff  law.^^ 


the  tariff  of  1846,  and  he  hopeil  that  a  modification  "will  be  effected  be- 
fore the  Manufacturers  &  Coal  Dealers  can  be  seriously  injured"  (Bu- 
chanan, Works,  VII,  117). 

50  Polk,  Diary,  II,  221. 

51  Richardson,  Messages,  IV,  498-502.  Walker's  Report  (H.  Ex.  Doc.  7, 
29  Cong.,  2  sess.).  "All  experience,"  said  Walker,  "is  against  the  pro- 
tective policy.  ...  It  is  as  unwise  and  unjust  as  it  is  repugnant  to  equal 
rights  and  republican  principles,  to  force,  by  legislation,  any  class  of  the 
community  to  buy  from  or  sell  to  another. ' ' 


682  JAMES  K.   POLK 

The  tariff  of  1846  remained  the  source  of  revenue  for  the 
remainder  of  the  administration,  for  this  Congress  and  its  suc- 
cessor steadfastly  refused  to  vote  additional  war  duties.  Never- 
theless, Walker  was  able  to  say  in  his  annual  report  of  December, 
1847,  even  while  renewing  his  request  for  duties  on  tea  and  coffee, 
that 

It  is  now  jiroved  that  a  tariff  for  revenue  not  only  yields  a  larger 
income  than  the  protective  system,  but  also  advances  more  rapidly,  in  a 
series  of  years,  the  prosperity  of  the  manufacturers,  by  the  augmentation 
of  their  foreign  and  domestic  market. 

In  like  manner  he  could  truthfully  assert  that,  instead  of 
paralyzing  industry  as  had  been  predicted,  the  independent  treas- 
ury and  hard  money  had  benefited  those  who  had  so  vigorously 
opposed  them : 

Domestic  manufactures  require  for  their  permanent  and  successful  oper- 
ation the  basis  of  specie,  checking  vibrations  and  inflations  of  the  paper 
system.  ...  If  our  manufacturers  desire  great  advantages  from  the  home 
market,  it  must  be  abundantly  and  permanently  supplied  with  a  large 
sjaeeie  circulation,  which  alone  can  sustain  that  market  for  a  number  of 
years,  and  prevent  those  calamities  which  follow  an  inflated  paper  cur- 
rency. A  home  market  for  our  manufacturers,  when  based  upon  specie 
and  low  duties,  is  solid,  permanent,  and  augmenting;  but  when  founded 
upon  paper  credits,  it  is  inflated  one  year,  only  to  be  depressed  the  next, 
or  some  succeeding  year — thus  depriving  the  manufacturer  of  any  well- 
assured  and  permanent  domestic  market. ^^ 

The  Whig  Congress  was  not  disposed  to  aid  the  administration 
by  voting  additional  war  revenue.  On  tlie  contrary,  the  Presi- 
dent was  certain  that  attempts  were  being  made  to  create  a  panic 
and  paralyze  public  credit. 

The  truth  is  [he  observed]  that  the  Whig  party  and  leading  presses, 
having  failed  to  defeat  the  Government  in  the  jirosecution  of  the  war  by 
the  "aid  &  comfort,"  they  have  given  to  Mexico  by  their  unpatriotic 
sentiments,  are  now  insidiously  attempting  to  produce  a  panic  in  the 
money  market  and  thereby,  if  possible,  to  break  down  the  Treasury,  and 
thus  compel  the  inglorious  withdrawal  of  our  army  from  Mexico.53 

52  H.  Ex.  Doc.  G,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.  "When  he  saw  the  original  draft  of 
this  report  Polk  wrote  that  "though  in  the  main  sound  in  its  doctrines. 
1  thought  some  parts  of  it  speculative,  and  perhaps  too  highly  wrought" 
(Diary,  III,  229). 

53  Polk,  Diary,  ]JI,  322. 


TAEIFF  AND  INTERNAL  IMPBOVEMENTii  683 

While  this  may  have  been  an  exaggerated  portrayal  of  Whig 
machinations,  the  intemperate  abuse  of  the  President  for  having 
"deliberately  plotted  the  war"  naturally  led  him  to  believe  that 
his  opponents  would  resort  to  any  means  of  crippling  his  admin- 
istration. 

If  Congress  could  embarrass  the  President  by  declining  to 
follow  his  recommendations,  he  was  equally  determined  to  thwart 
its  attempt  to  force  his  hand  on  the  question  of  internal  improve- 
ments. Late  in  July,  1848,  the  House  passed  a  civil  and  diplo- 
matic bill  which  contained,  in  the  form  of  a  rider,  an  item  for 
money  to  improve  the  Savannah  River.  Polk  well  knew  that 
the  object  was  to  compel  him  to  abandon  the  principles  of  his 
last  veto  message,  or  to  incur  the  odium  of  defeating  the  entire 
appropriation.  The  Senate  later  eliminated  the  obnoxious  item, 
but  before  this  had  been  done  Polk  outlined  in  his  diary  the  course 
which  he  intended  to  pursue : 

My  mind  is  made  up.  I  will  veto  the  Bill,  if  it  comes  to  me  with  this 
item  ill  it,  whatever  may  be  the  consequences.  I  will  do  so,  if  it  comes 
on  the. last  night  of  the  session,  and  if  I  am  over-ruled  by  two  thirds,  & 
Congress  should  adjourn  without  passing  the  Civil  Diplomatic  [Bill],  I 
will  issue  my  Proclamation  conv[en]ing  an  extra  session  of  Congress  for 
the  next  day. 

He  was  much  depressed  by  the  "want  of  patriotism"  displayed 
by  Whigs  and  bolting  Democrats,  both  in  the  matter  of  appro- 
priations and  in  their  refusal  to  create  governments  for  the  ter- 
ritories. "Whilst  I  deplore  this  state  of  things,  all  I  can  do 
during  the  remainder  of  my  term  is  to  adhere  undeviatingly  to 
my  principles  &  to  perform  my  whole  duty.  This  I  will  do  at  any 
hazard."  The  present  Congress,  in  his  opinion,  was  as  reckless 
and  extravagant  as  any  he  had  ever  known ;  the  success  of  its 
improvement  schemes  would  bankrupt  the  treasury.^* 

The  adjournment  of  Congress  did  not  relieve  the  President 
from  the  schemes  of  improvement  promoters,  for  the  Secretary 
of  State  now  presented  a  project  for  external  improvement.    He 


54  Polk,  Diarij,  IV,  35-36,  66. 


684  JAMES  K.  POLK 

called  Polk's  attention  to  the  provision  in  the  treaty  recenlly 
negotiated  with  New  Granada  whereby  American  citizens  had 
been  given  the  right  of  passage  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama. 
It  was  of  great  importance,  he  said,  that  a  railroad  or  canal 
should  be  constructed  there,  and  he  recommended  that  engineers 
should  be  ordered  to  make  a  survey.  Without  consulting  other 
members  of  the  cabinet  the  President  promptly  put  a  quietus 
on  Buchanan's  project.  If  the  government  could  make  the  sur- 
vey, said  he,  it  could  also  construct  the  works,  and  he  believed 
that  it  did  not  have  the  constitutional  authority  to  do  either. •'■'^' 

Polk's  aversion  to  internal  improvements  had  become  almost 
an  obsession,  and  during  the  month  of  October  he  spent  his  spare 
moments  in  formulating  a  more  thorough  expose  of  the  whole 
"American  System."  Originally  it  was  his  intention  to  incor- 
porate his  expose  in  a  veto  message,  for  he  fully  expected  that 
Congress  would  pass  another  internal  improvement  bill. 

Should  another  veto  become  necessary  I  desire  to  make  it  a  strong 
paper,  so  that  if  I  should  be  over-ruled,  as  I  may  be,  by  a  united  Whig 
vote  and  a  part  of  the  Democratic  members,  making  a  vote  of  two  thirds, 
I  may  leave  my  full  views  on  record  to  be  judged  of  by  my  countrymen 
&  by  posterity.  I  can  add  to  the  strength  of  my  veto  message  on  the 
same  subject  of  the  15th  of  December  last.  If  I  should  not  have  occasion 
to  use  it,  it  will  be  left  among  my  papers  at  my  death.  I  am  thoroughly 
convinced  that  I  am  right  upon  this  subject,  and  therefore  I  have  de- 
stowed  much  labour  in  preparing  a  paper  which  may  contribute  to  con- 
vince others  that  I  am  so. 

His  purpose,  as  he  recorded  in  another  place,  was  to  show  that 
the  "American  System"  consisted  of  several  closely  allied 
branches:  a  federal  bank,  protective  tariff,  distribution  of  the 
land  fund,  and  internal  improvements ;  that  the  system  liad  been 
overthrown  in  all  branches  except  the  last ;  and  if  this  should  be 


•'■--•"I  told  him  furthermore  that  if  any  improvement  Bill  should  during 
my  time  be  presented  to  mo,  I  should  certainly  veto  it,  and  that  if  I  were 
to  yield  my  sanction  to  his  proposition  it  would  be  argued  by  my  op- 
ponents in  Congress  that  while  1  denied  the  power  to  make  internal  im- 
provements, 1  was  exercising  the  power,  and  that  too  without  an  act  of 
Congress,  to  make  foreign  surveys  with  a.  view  to  make  foreign  improve- 
ments" (ibid.,  139-140).  How  different  from  the  attitude  of  a  later 
President,  who  could  boast  that  "I  took  the  canal!  " 


TABIFF  AND  INTERNAL   IMPIWVEMENT8  685 

permitted  to  survive,  all  the  others  would  soon  be  revived.'"'  One 
may,  or  may  not,  agree  with  his  views,  yet  there  can  be  no  doubt 
of  the  President's  own  belief  that,  in  demolishing  this  network 
of  special  privilege  which  luid  been  woven  by  Hamilton  and  Clay, 
he  was  performing  a  most  patriotic  service.  Those  who  have 
charged  him — and  justly  charged  him — with  being  a  strong  party 
man  have  failed  to  appreciate  his  conscientious  belief  in  the 
principles  of  his  party.  No  former  President — not  even  Jeffer- 
son himself — had  succeeded  so  well  in  putting  Jeffersonian  the- 
ories into  actual  operation.  He  was  grieved  by  the  thought  of 
retiring  without  having  crushed  the  last  remnant  of  the  system 
so  elaborately  constructed  by  Hamilton  and  Clay.  He  could  no 
longer  hope  for  reward  or  distinction  from  his  party,  yet  he  was 
quite  as  willing  as  he  had  been  in  1834  to  ply  the  oar  of  the 
' '  galley-slave '  '^^  in  promoting  the  principles  of  his  party,  because 
he  regarded  them  as  most  beneficial  to  his  country.  Even  if 
laborious  effort  to  indite  a  document  so  convincing  that  posterity 
must  heed  it  is  but  an  exhibition  of  personal  conceit,  still  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  he  was  impelled  by  patriotic  motives  and  by 
a  desire  to  save  his  country  from  what  he  considered  to  be  a  real 
and  serious  menace. 

On  the  advice  of  his  cabinet,  Polk  decided  not  to  leave  the 
promulgation  of  so  important  a  document  to  the  chance  passage 
of  an  internal  revenue  bill.  Yielding  to  their  judgment,  he  made 
it  a  part  of  his  last  annual  message.  The  message  is  well  written 
and  shows  a  firm  grasp  of  the  entire  subject.  It  deserves  careful 
reading,  for  it  is  distinctly  the  most  able  indictment  of  the 
''American  System"  to  be  found  among  our  public  documents. 
Although  the  historical,  and  perhaps  the  best,  part  of  the  mes- 
sage relating  to  this  subject  is  too  long  to  be  quoted,  a  few 
paragraphs  will  serve  to  indicate  the  conclusions  which  he  had 
reached : 


.^•6  Polk,  Diary,  IV,  144,  1.57-158,  167-168. 

57  ' '  Polk  worked  like  a  galley-slave  to  cram  down  his  report ' '  (Adams, 
Memoirs,  IX,  83). 


686  JAMES  K.  POLK 

The  several  branches  of  this  system  were  so  intimately  blended  to- 
gether that  in  their  operation  each  sustained  and  strengthened  the  others. 
Their  joint  operation  was  to  add  new  burthens  of  taxation  and  to  encour- 
age a  largely  increased  and  wasteful  expenditure  of  public  money.  It 
was  the  interest  of  the  bank  that  the  revenue  collected  and  the  disburse- 
ments made  by  the  Government  should  be  large,  because,  being  the  de- 
pository of  the  public  money,  the  larger  the  amount  the  greater  would  be 
the  bank  profits  by  its  use.  It  was  the  interest  of  the  favored  classes, 
who  were  enriched  by  the  protective  tariff,  to  have  the  rates  of  that  pro- 
tection as  high  as  possible,  for  the  higher  those  rates  the  greater  would  be 
their  advantage.  It  was  the  interest  of  the  people  of  all  those  sections  and 
localities  who  expected  to  be  benefited  by  expenditures  for  internal  im- 
provements that  the  amount  collected  should  be  as  large  as  possible,  to  the 
end  that  the  sum  disbursed  might  also  be  the  larger.  The  States,  being 
the  beneficiaries  in  the  distribution  of  the  land  money,  had  an  interest  in 
having  the  rates  of  tax  im])osed  by  the  protective  tariff  large  enough  to 
yield  a  sufficient  revenue  from  that  source  to  meet  the  wants  of  the  Gov- 
ernment without  disturbing  or  taking  from  them  the  land  fund;  so  that 
each  of  the  branches  constituting  the  system  had  a  common  interest  in 
maintaining  the  public  debt  unpaid  and  increasing  its  amount,  because 
this  would  produce  an  annual  increased  drain  upon  the  Treasury  to  the 
amount  of  the  interest  and  render  augmented  taxes  necessary.  The  oper- 
ation and  necessary  effect  of  the  whole  system  were  to  encourage  large 
and  extravagant  expenditures,  and  thereby  to  increase  the  public  patron- 
age, and  maintain  a  rich  and  splendid  government  at  the  expense  of  a 
taxed  and  impoverished  people. 

************* 

Under  the  pernicious  workings  of  this  combined  system  of  measures 
the  country  witnessed  alternate  seasons  of  temporary  apparent  prosperity, 
of  sudden  and  disastrous  commercial  revulsions,  of  unprecendented  fluc- 
tuations of  prices  and  depression  of  the  great  interests  of  agriculture, 
navigation,  and  commerce,  of  general  pecuniary  suffering,  and  of  final 
bankruptcy  of  thousands.  After  a  severe  struggle  of  more  than  a  quarter 
of  a  century,  the  system  was  overthrown. 

The  bank  has  been  succeeded  by  a  practical  system  of  finance,  con- 
ducted and  controlled  by  the  Government.  The  constitutional  currency 
has  been  restored,  the  public  credit  maintained  unimpaired  even  in  a 
period  of  a  foreign  war,  and  the  whole  country  has  become  satisfied  that 
banks,  national  or  State,  are  not  necessary  as  fiscal  agents  of  the  Govern- 
ment. Revenue  duties  have  taken  the  place  of  the  protective  tariff.  The 
distribution  of  the  money  derived  from  the  sale  of  the  public  lands  has 
been  abandoned  and  the  corrupting  system  of  internal  imjirovemcnts,  it  is 
hoped,  has  been  effectively  checked. 


TAIUFF  zlND  INTERNAL  IMPROVEMENTS  687 

Jt  is  not  (ioubtod  tliat  if  this  whole  train  of  measures,  designed  to  take 
wealth  from  the  many  and  bestow  it  upon  the  few,  were  to  prevail  the 
effect  would  be  to  change  the  entire  character  of  the  Government.  One 
only  danger  remains.  It  is  the  seductions  of  tliat  brancli  of  the  system 
which  consists  in  internal  improvements,  holding  out,  as  it  does,  induce- 
ments to  the  people  of  particular  sections  and  localities  to  embark  the 
Government  in  them  without  stopping  to  calculate  the  inevitable  conse- 
quences. This  branch  of  the  system  is  so  intimately  combined  and  linked 
with  the  others  that  as  surely  as  an  effect  is  produced  by  an  adequate 
cause,  if  it  be  resuscitated  and  revived  and  firmly  established  it  requires 
no  sagacity  to  foresee  that  it  will  necessarily  and  speedily  draw  after  it 
the  reestablishment  of  a  national  bank,  the  revival  of  a  protective  tariff, 
the  distribution  of  the  land  money,  and  not  only  the  postponement  to  the 
distant  future  of  the  payment  of  the  present  national  debt,  but  its  annual 
increase. 

I  entertain  the  solemn  conviction  that  if  the  internal-improvement 
branch  of  the  "American  System"  be  not  firmly  resisted  at  this  time 
the  whole  series  of  measures  composing  it  will  be  speedily  reestablished 
and  the  country  be  thrown  back  from  its  present  high  state  of  prosperity, 
which  the  existing  policy  has  produced,  and  be  destined  to  witness  all  the 
evils,  commercial  revulsions,  depression  of  prices,  and  pecuniary  embar- 
rassments through  which  we  have  passed  during  the  last  twenty-five  years.ss 

An  early  payment  of  the  national  debt  was  regarded  by  Polk  to 
be  of  snch  transcending  importance  that  he  was  loth  to  relinquish 
the  helm  without  having  made  a  beginning.  With  a  view  to  in- 
fluencing his  successor,  he  told  his  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  that 
he  desired,  if  possible,  to  purchase  government  stock,  "however 
small  the  sum  might  be " ;  and  as  soon  as  the  department  esti- 
mates had  been  submitted,  he  directed  Walker  to  purchase  half 
a  million  dollars'  worth. °^ 

Like  the  President's  message,  Walker's  report  was  an  ably 
written  document  and  a  strong  vindication  of  the  financial  policy 
of  the  Polk  administration.  The  predicted  disasters  had  not 
followed  in  the  wake  of  the  tariff  of  1846 ;  instead,  Walker  had 


5s  Richardson,  Messages,  IV,  657,  661. 

S9"i  informed  him  [Walker]  that  I  desired  to  do  this  supposing  it 
might  exert  some  influence  over  the  policy  of  my  successor.  I  deem  the 
speedy  payment  of  the  public  debt  of  great  national  importance.  If  1 
commence  its  payment  my  successor  may  dislike  to  take  the  responsibility 
of  reversing  my  policy  in  this  respect"  (Polk,  Diary,  IV,  162,  195). 


688  JAMES  K.  POLK 

the  satisfaction  of  informing  Congress  that  even  the  manufac- 
turers did  not  "desire  the  restoration  of  the  tariff  of  1842."  He 
came  out  boldly  as  an  advocate  of  free  trade,  and  although  his 
views  were  too  radical  for  joractical  purposes,  it  would  be  difficult 
to  find  a  better  statement  of  the  free  trade  theory.  After  an 
elaborate  argument  to  show  that  nations  as  a  whole,  as  well  as 
all  classes  within  them,  were  best  served  by  unhampered  trade, 
he  arrived  at  the  following  conclusions: 

Whenever  the  laws  of  nature  are  beyond  the  reach  of  man,  there  is 
perfect  order  under  the  direction  of  Almighty  power;  but  whenever  man 
can  disturb  these  laws,  discord  and  injury  are  sure  to  ensue.  .  .  .  The 
laws  of  political  economy  are  fixed  and  certain.  Let  them  alone  is  all  that 
is  required  of  man;  let  all  international  exchanges  of  products  move  as 
freely  in  their  orbits  as  the  heavenly  bodies  in  their  spheres,  and  their 
order  and  harmony  will  be  as  perfect,  and  their  results  as  beneficial,  as 
is  every  movement  under  the  laws  of  nature,  when  undisturbed  by  the 
errors  and  interference  of  m.an.60 

Even  though  the  President  declared  "Walker's  report  to  be 
' '  one  of  his  ablest  papers, ' '  his  own  remark  concerning  the  Secre- 
tary's  report  of  1847  was  applicable  to  this,  also — that  it  Avas 
"in  the  main  sound  in  its  doctrines"  but  "some  parts  of  it  specu- 
lative, and  perhaps  too  highly  wrought.""^  The  two  men  were 
in  substantial  agreement  on  the  fundamentals  of  economic  and 
financial  policy.  Polk,  however,  always  directed  his  attention  to 
the  attainable,  for  he  was  too  conservative  by  nature  to  indulge 
in  theoretical  discussions. 

The  specter  of  improvements — both  external  and  internal — 
haunted  the  President  to  the  closing  hours  of  his  official  term. 
In  January,  1849,  he  expressed  to  his  cabinet  a  determination  to 
veto  a  bill  pending  in  Congress  which  proposed  to  pay  Aspinwall 
and  others  $250,000  annually  for  twenty  years,  to  enable  them 
to  construct  a  road  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama.  He  opposed 
the  measure  first  of  all  on  constitutional  grounds;  in  addition, 


60  Walker,  Annual  EepoH,  Dec,  1848  (77.  Ex.  Doe.  7,  30  Cong.,  2  sess.). 
';i  Polk,  Diary,  III,  299,  IV,  224. 


TAKIFF  AND  INTERNAL   IMPEOVEMENTS  689 

he  regarded  it  as  "little  better  than  a  proposition  to  i)luiider  the 
Treasury.""  On  the  very  last  night  of  his  administration  he 
went  to  the  eapitol  armed  with  a  veto  which  was  to  be  applied  to 
any  internal  improvement  bill.  No  bill  of  the  kind  was  presented 
for  his  signature,  but  he  regarded  the  unused  veto  message  as 
' '  one  of  the  ablest  papers  I  have  ever  prepared. '  '"- 

Among  the  bills  signed  on  the  last  night  of  his  official  term 
was  the  one  Avhich  established  the  Department  of  the  Interior. 
"I  had  serious  objections,"  says  the  Diary,  "but  they  were  not 
of  a  constitutional  character  and  I  signed  it  with  reluctance." 
He  feared  that  such  a  department,  in  its  practical  operations, 
would  draw  power  from  the  states  and  extend,  unduly,  the  juris- 
diction of  the  national  government.  Had  he  been  a  member  of 
Congress,  he  would  have  voted  against  the  measure.**^  "Walker, 
therefore,  and  not  Polk,  deserves  the  credit  for  this  important 
achievement.  It  was  the  child  of  his  fertile  brain,''*  and  the 
passage  of  the  bill  was  due  in  no  small  degree  to  his  personal 
influence. 

Those  who  have  been  most  bitter  in  their  condemnation  of 
Polk's  foreign  policy  have  found  little  to  criticize  in  his  internal 
administration.  "When  he  withdrew  to  private  life  all  industries 
were  in  a  flourishing  condition,  and  not  even  the  victorious  Whigs 
cared  to  repeal  the  ' '  great  measures ' '  of  his  administration.  None 
except  Clay  was  fatuous  enough  to  dream  of  reviving  the  obsolete 
"American  System."*'^ 


62  Polk,  Diary,  IV,  314,  364. 
G-ilbid.,  871-372. 

64  Walker  had,  in  his  report,  urged  the  creation  of  such  a  department, 
and  it  was  his  hand  that  drafted  the  bill.  See  Vinton 's  statement  in 
Cong.  Globe,  30  Cong.,  2  sess.,  514. 

65  See  comments  on  his  Ullmann  letter  in  Schurz,  Henry  Clay,  II,  299. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

THE  ''POLK  DOCTRINE"  AND  MINOR  DIPLOMATIC 
QUESTIONS 

In  a  commencement  address  delivered  before  the  Yale  law 
school  in  1903,  Whitelaw  Reid  attached  the  name  of  ' '  Polk  Doc- 
trine" to  President  Polk's  declarations  concerning  European  in- 
terference in  American  affairs.  Although  Reid  himself  con- 
demned the  doctrine,  yet  the  very  name  given  to  it  acknowledges 
Polk's  important  contribution  to  the  great  American  policy  of 
resisting  European  intermeddling  with  the  affairs  of  the  western 
hemisphere.  Moreover,  despite  Reid's  criticisms  and  his  state- 
ment that  it  originated  ' '  in  an  intrigue  of  the  slave  power, '  '^  the 
Polk  Doctrine  has  been  approved  and  continued  by  the  American 
people ;  and  Presidents  chosen  by  the  party  which  overthrew 
slavery,  and  of  which  Reid  himself  was  a  leading  member,  have 
increased  rather  than  diminished  the  scope  of  its  application. 

Polk's  first  public  declaration  on  the  subject  appeared  in  his 
first  annual  message  of  December  2,  1845,  and  referred  to  Ore- 
gon ;  but  nearly  three  months  before  this  he  had  applied  the 
doctrine  to  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  and  certainly  not  in  the  interest 
of  slavery.  In  September,  1845,  Anthony  Ten  Eyck  was  sent  as 
agent  to  the  islands,  and  his  instructions  prepared  under  the 
President 's  order  contained  the  following  significant  paragraph : 

Your  mission,  under  existing  cirounistanees,  is  one  of  great  importance. 
The  United  States  have  a  deep  stake  in  the  continued  independence  of 
the  Hawaiian  Islands.  They  present  one  of  those  commanding  commercial 
positions  which  Great  Britain,  judging  from  her  past  history,  would  be 
anxious  to  annex  to  her  dominions.  To  promote  the  prosperity  and  secure 
the  independence  of  these  Islands,  is  therefore  the  clear  policy  as  well  as 


1  Reid,    Tlie   Monroe   Doctrine,   ihe    Polk.    Doctrine   a)i(l   the   Doctrine   of 
Anarchism,  7. 


THE  "POLK  DOCTEINE"  AND  MINOE  QUESTIONS         691 

the  duty  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States.  We  could  not  view  with 
indifference  their  transfer  to  or  their  dependence  upon  any  European 
Power.- 

This  is  a  noteworthy  addition  the  doctrine  of  Monroe :  acquisition 
of  the  islands  by  Great  Britain  coukl  hardly  be  regarded  as  col- 
onization, and  the  question  of  suppressing  representative  govern- 
ment was,  of  course,  not  involved.  The  reason  why  the  transfer 
could  not  be  viewed  with  indifference  was  that  it  would  affect, 
detrimentally,  the  commerce  of  the  United  States. 

It  was,  however,  the  Oregon  question,  and  his  desire  to  obtain 
California,  that  gave  the  President  the  best  opportunity  to  de- 
velop his  policy  of  resistance  to  foreign  influence  in  American 
affairs.  Pakenham's  rejection  of  his  offer  to  fix  the  Oregon 
boundary  at  the  forty-ninth  parallel  made  it  necessary  for  him  to 
make  recommendations  to  Congress,  and,  on  October  24,  he  dis- 
cussed the  subject  with  Senator  Benton.  He  told  Benton  that 
he  was  strongly  inclined  to  reaffirm  Monroe's  declaration  against 
permitting  foreign  colonization,  "at  least  so  far  as  this  Conti- 
nent is  concerned."     "I  remarked,"  said  he, 

that  Great  Britain  had  her  eye  on  that  country  [California]  and  intended 
to  possess  it  if  she  could,  but  that  the  people  of  the  U.  S.  would  not  will- 
ingly permit  California  to  pass  into  the  possession  of  any  foreign  mon- 
archy, and  that  in  reasserting  Mr.  Monroe's  doctrine,  I  had  California  & 
the  fine  bay  of  San  Francisco  as  much  in  view  as  Oregon. 

The  conversation  then  turned  to  Cuba  and  the  two  men  agreed 

that 

as  long  as  Cuba  remained  in  possession  of  the  present  Government  we 
would  not  object,  but  if  a  powerful  foreign  power  was  about  to  possess  it, 
we  would  not  permit  it.    On  the  same  footing  we  would  place  California.s 

There  was  of  course  nothing  new  in  Polk's  stand  on  the 
Cuban  question.  From  the  beginning  of  our  national  existence 
Cuba  had  been  regarded  as  essential  to  our  commercial  prosperity, 
and  consequently  within  the  sphere  of  American  influence.     His 


2  Buchanan  to  Ten  Eyck,  Sept.  10,  1845  (Buchanan,  Worlcs,  VI,  255  ff.). 

3  Polk,  Diary,  I,  71. 


692  JAMES  K.   POLE 

attitude  was  the  same  as  Jefferson's,*  that  its  possession  by  Spain 
might  be  tolerated,  but  that  it  must  not  pass  to  a  strong  maritime 
power.  Although  he  later  attempted  to  purchase  Cuba,  Polk  was 
not  desirous  of  acquiring  insular  possessions,  except  as  a  safe- 
guard to  American  interests.  This  fact  is  shown  by  his  refusal, 
a  short  time  before  his  conversation  with  Benton,  to  purchase 
from  Sweden  the  island  of  Saint  Bartholomew.  In  reply  to  the 
offer  made  by  the  king  of  Sweden,  the  President  directed 
Buchanan  to  state  that  ' '  the  acquisition  of  distant  insular  posses- 
sions, for  Colonial  dependencies,  has  never  been  deemed  desirable 
or  expedient  by  the  United  States."^  In  a  word,  Polk  was  not  an 
imperialist,  albeit  he  was  a  most  ardent  expansionist. 

Kumors  of  British  and  French  designs  on  California  induced 
Polk  to  take  early  steps  to  prevent  their  success.  Six  weeks  be- 
fore Congress  had  assembled  he  instructed  Buchanan  to  notify 
Thomas  0.  Larkin,  American  consul  at  Monterey,  that  the  Presi- 
dent could  not  view  with  indifference  the  transfer  of  California  to 
Great  Britain  or  any  other  European  nation,  for  "the  system  of 
colonization  by  foreign  monarchies  on  the  North  American  con- 
tinent must  and  will  be  resisted  by  ^he  United  States. ' '  The 
government,  he  said,  did  not  intend  to  interfere  between  Mexico 
and  California,  but  ' '  it  would  vigorously  interfere  to  prevent  the 
latter  from  becoming  a  British  or  French  Colony."*^  In  a  com- 
munication written  during  the  following  month  Slidell,  also,  was 
given  a  statement  concerning  the  policy  of  his  government.  After 
speaking  of  the  beneficial  results  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
Buchanan  said  that 

The  nations  on  the  continent  of  America  have  interests  peculiar  to 
themselves.  Their  free  forms  of  Government  are  altogether  different  from 
the  monarchical  institutions  of  Europe.  The  interests  and  independence 
of  these  sister  nations  require  that  they  should  establish  and  maintain  an 
American  system  of  policy  for  their  own  protection  and  security,  entirely 


4  See  Henry  Adams,  History  of  tlie  United  States,  IV,  342-343. 

5  Buchanan  to  Ellsvi'orth,  July  28,  1845  (Buchanan,  Works,  VI,  212). 

«  Buchanan  to  Larkin,  Oct.  17,  1845   (Buchanan,  JVorls,  VI,  275-276). 
The  original  is  in  the  Larkin  Papers,  Bancroft  Library. 


THE  "POLK  DOCTRINE"  AND  MINOR  QUESTIONS         693 

distinct  from  that  which  has  so  long  prevailed  in  Europe.  To  tolerate 
any  interference  on  the  part  of  European  sovereigns  with  controversies 
in  America;  to  permit  them  to  apply  the  worn-out  dogma  of  the  balance 
of  power  to  the  free  States  of  this  continent;  and  above  all,  to  suffer  them 
to  establish  new  Colonies  of  their  own,  intermingled  wdth  our  free  Re- 
publics, would  be  to  make,  to  some  extent,  a  voluntary  sacrifice  of  our 
independence.     These  truths  ought  everywhere,  throughout  the  continent 

of  America,  to  be  impressed  on  the  public  mind Liberty  here  must 

be  allowed  to  work  out  its  natural  results;  and  these  will,  ere  long, 
astonish  the  world.' 

So  far,  the  expression  of  the  President 's  sentiments  had  been 
confined  to  secret  instructions,  but  his  message  of  December  2, 
1845,  announced  to  Congress  and  to  the  world  the  policy  which 
he  meant  to  pursue.  He  told  Congress  that  certain  European 
nations,  in  order  to  check  the  territorial  expansion  of  the  United 
States,  were  attempting  to  extend  to  America  the  "balance  of 
power"  doctrine  which  had  long  been  maintained  in  Europe. 
But  the  United  States,  he  said, 

can  not  in  silence  permit  any  European  interference  on  the  North 
American  continent,  and  should  any  such  interference  be  attempted  will 
be  ready  to  resist  it  at  any  and  all  hazards. 

....  Existing  rights  of  every  European  nation  should  be  respected,  but 
it  is  due  alike  to  our  safety  and  our  interests  that  the  efficient  protection 
of  our  laws  should  be  extended  over  our  whole  territorial  limits,  and  that 
it  should  be  distinctly  announced  to  the  world  as  our  settled  policy  that 
no  future  European  colony  or  dominion  shall  with  our  consent  be  planted 
or  established  on  any  part  of  the  North  American  continent. s 

In  this  pronouncement  Polk  professed  to  be  reiterating  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  but  it  differed  in  two  particulars  from  the 
declaration  of  Monroe.  In  the  first  place,  Polk  forbade  any 
European  interference;  and  in  the  second,  he  spoke  only  of  North 
America.  His  statement  that  "we  must  maintain  the  principle 
that  the  people  of  this  continent  alone  have  the  right  to  decide 
their  own  destiny"  evidently  applied  only  in  cases  where  a  peo- 
ple desired  to  join  the  United  States,  for  his  views  with  respect 
to   Cuba  and   Hawaii  would   seem  to   preclude   a  transfer   of 

T  Buchanan  to  Slidell,  Nov.  10,  1845  (Buchanan,  WorVs,  VI,  295). 
8  Eichardson,  Messages,  IV,  398-399. 


694  JAMES  K.   POLK 

possessions,  even  with  the  consent  of  the  inhabitants.  In  each 
case  it  was  the  commerce  of  the  United  States  which  he  sought 
to  protect,  and  not  the  civil  rights  of  the  people  of  those  islands. 
Polk's  declaration  was,  also,  much  more  definite  than  that  of 
his  predecessor;  in  fact  it  was  a  contingent  declaration  of  war. 
Some  of  the  London  papers  were  severe  in  their  criticism  of 
the  President's  message.  They  perverted  it  into  a  declaration 
of  intention  to  absorb  all  of  North  America.  "The  President 
advises  Congress,"  said  the  Spectator, 

to  arm  and.  organize  the  militia  that  they  may  be  prepared  to  receive  all  com- 
munities already  settled  on  the  North  American  continent  into  the  bosom  of 
the  Union,  and  prevent  the  colonization  of  any  part  of  the  continent  by 
European  nations. 

Only  a  part  of  this  statement  was  true.  The  Times  professed  to 
see  in  the  message  not  merely  a  bar  to  future  colonization,  but 
"we  must  infer  from  the  language  of  the  President  that  exist- 
ing rights  and  settlements  are  held  by  a  questionable  tenure."^ 
There  was,  of  course,  no  occasion  for  this  inference,  for  Polk  had 
stated  explicitly  that  existing  rights  should  be  respected. 

On  January  14,  1846,  Senator  Allen,  chairman  of  the  Com- 
mittee on  Foreign  Relations,  asked  leave  to  introduce  a  joint 
resolution  relating  to  the  subject  of  foreign  interference  in 
American  affairs.  It  followed  closely  the  language  of  the  Presi- 
dent's declaration,  and  its  object  was  to  reenforce  that  declaration 
by  giving  it  the  formal  approval  of  Congress.  Calhoun  objected 
even  to  the  introduction  of  the  resolution  on  the  ground  that  a 
discussion  of  the  subject  would  stir  up  enmities  and  would  lead 
to  no  possible  good.  He  resented,  he  said,  such  outrageous  inter- 
ference as  that  undertaken  by  France  and  England  in  the  affairs 
of  Buenos  Ayres,  but 

the  great  question  presented  by  this  resolution  was,  whetlier  we  should  take 
under  our  guardianship  the  whole  family  of  American  States,  and  pledge 
ourselves  to  extend  to  them  our  protection  against  all  foreign  aggression. lo 


«  Quoted  by  Cass  in  Cong.  Globe,  29  Cong.,  1  sess.,  240. 
10  Cong.  Globe,  29  Cong.,  1  sess.,  197. 


THE  "POLK  BOCTBINE"  AND  MINOR  QUESTIONS         695 

Allen's  motion  for  leave  to  present  liis  resolution  was  sent 
to  the  table,  but  on  January  24  the  vote  was  reversed.  The  main 
supporters  of  the  resolution  were  Cass  and  Allen,  the  former 
asserting  that  the  President's  declaration  would  be  barren  of 
results  "unless  adopted  by  the  national  legislature."  We  could 
not,  he  said,  pernut  the  United  States  to  be  ' '  belted  round  by  the 
fleets,  armies,  and  territories"  of  England;  "Oregon  and  Cali- 
fornia, if  gained,  and  Mexico  influenced,  if  not  ruled,  would 
complete  the  circle"  of  British  domination.  In  opposing  the 
resolution,  Calhoun  characterized  it  as  "vaporing  bravado."  He 
deplored  the  attempt  to  lay  down  general  rules,  and  held  that 
each  question  should  be  settled  on  its  merits.  For  example,  the 
machinations  of  Great  Britain  and  France  in  Texas  should,  if 
necessary,  be  resisted  by  war,  for  they  ' '  would  have  as  much  right 
to  induce  a  member  to  go  out  of  the  Union  as  to  prevent  one 
coming  in."[!]  The  resolution  was  referred  to  the  Committee 
on  Foreign  Relations,  from  which  it  never  emerged ;  Polk 's  decla- 
ration, like  that  of  his  predecessor,  remained  a  mere  dictum  of 
the  executive. 

Throughout  the  year  1846  there  were  persistent  rumors  of 

European  designs  to  establish  a  monarchy  in  Mexico.    As  early 

as  January  17  McLane  wrote  from  London  that 

a  favorite  scheme  of  the  leading  powers  of  Europe  is  to  compose  the  Mexican 
troubles  by  giving  her  a  settled  monarchical  form  of  Government,  and  sup- 
plying the  monarch  from  one  of  their  o'wti  families. 

There  were  many  protests,  he  added,  against  Polk's  allusions  to 
the  Monroe  Doctrine. ^^  However  groundless  such  rumors  may 
have  been,  their  recurrence  could  hardly  fail  to  cause  apprehen- 
sion on  the  part  of  the  administration. 

In  March,  Buchanan  informed  Slidell  that  ' '  we  have  received 
information  from  different  quarters,  in  eorroberation  of  your 
statement^-  that  there  may  be  a  design  on  the  part  of  several 


11  McLane  to  Polk,  Jan.  17,  1846,  Polk  Papers. 

12  Slidell  had  written  on  February  6  that  "for  some  time  past,  rumors 
have  been  rife  of  the  establishment  of  a  monarchy  in  the  person  of  a 
foreign  prince"  {H.  Ex.  Doc.  60,  30  Cong.,  1  sess.,  58). 


696  JAMES  E.   POLK 

European  Powers  to  establish  a  monarchy  in  Mexico."  It  is 
supposed,  said  he,  that  tlie  clergy  would  welcome  such  a  change, 
and  that  continued  revolution  may  induce  the  people  to  accept 
it  as  a  means  of  security  and  protection.  "Indeed,  rumor  has 
already  indicated  the  King,  in  the  person  of  the  Spanish  Prince 
Henry,  the  son  of  Francisco  de  Paula,  and  the  rejected  suitor  of 
Queen  Isabella."  While  Buchanan  believed  these  rumors  to  be 
idle  speculations,  nevertheless  Slidell  was  instructed  to  use  the 
utmost  vigilance  in  ascertaining  whether  such  a  plot  really 
existed. 

Should  Great  Britain  and  France  attempt  to  place  a  Spanish  or  any 
other  European  Prince  upon  the  throne  of  Mexico,  this  would  be  resisted 
by  all  the  power  of  the  United  States.  In  opposition  to  such  an  attempt, 
party  distinctions  in  this  country  would  vanish  and  the  people  would  be 
nearly  unauimous.is 

Apparently,  the  President  did  not  believe  that  foreign  nations 
would  actually  attempt  to  set  up  a  monarchy  in  Mexico,  for  his 
diary  is  silent  on  this  subject.  Still,  he  was  ever  on  the  alert, 
and  determined,  if  necessary,  to  resist  such  an  attempt.  In 
December,  he  denied  Donelson's  request  for  a  leave  of  absence 
from  Berlin,  because  "a  project  has  been  suggested,  of  establish- 
ing a  monarchy  in  Mexico  and  placing  a  foreign  Prince  upon  the 
throne."  Although  Prussia,  said  he,  had  no  special  interest  in 
the  matter,  she  probably  would  be  committed,  therefore  Donel- 
son  should  be  in  Berlin  to  meet  the  issue.  Whatever  the  facts 
might  be, 

Should  such  a  project  be  attempted,  it  must  be  resisted  by  this  Govern- 
ment, at  any  hazard.  This  was  shadowed  forth  in  a  mild  manner  in  my 
late  message  to  Congress. !■* 

Rumors  of  the  Mexican  monarchy  proved  to  be,  as  Mark 
Twainsaid  of  the  report  of  his  own  death,  "greatly  exaggerated" ; 
but  in  asserting  that  he  would  resist  such  a  project,  Polk  can  not 


13  Buchanan  to  Slidell,  March  12,  1846  (Buchanan,  Worlcs,  VI,  404-405). 

14  Polk  to  Donelson,   Dec.   29,   1846,   "Polk-Donelson   Letters,"   Tenn. 
Hist.  Mag.,  Ill,  No.  1,  72. 


THE  "POLK  DOCTEINE"  AND  MINOE  QUESTIONS         697 

be  charged  with  inventing  a  new  doctrine,  for  this  case  at  least 
fell  clearly  within  the  declaration  of  Monroe  against  the  activities 
of  the  Holy  Alliance.  It  is  well  known,  of  course,  that  at  a  later 
date  France  was  compelled  by  the  United  States  to  withdraw  her 
support  from  the  Emperor  Maximilian. 

None  of  President  Polk 's  utterances  against  foreign  influence 
in  America  has  met  with  so  much  criticism  as  his  message  relat- 
ing to  Yucatan.  During  the  Mexican  war  this  department  main- 
tained, as  far  as  possible,  a  neutral  position  which  necessarily 
deprived  it  of  the  protection  of  Mexico.  In  March,  1848,  Justo 
Sierra,  Yucatanese  commissioner  in  Washington,  applied  to 
Buchanan  for  military  assistance,  stating  in  his  application  that 
the  white  inhabitants  were  threatened  with  extermination  by  the 
Indians.  Buchanan  and  Walker  were  in  favor  of  sending  them 
arms  and  ammunition,  and  after  some  hesitation  the  President 
consented  to  authorize  Commodore  Perry  to  supply  the  white 
inhabitants  with  ammunition,  if  he  could  be  assured  that  it 
would  not  find  its  way  to  other  parts  of  Mexico.^^ 

After  several  rather  unsatisfactory  conversations  with  both 
Buchanan  and  Polk,  Sierra,  on  April  25,  presented  a  formal 
communication  from  the  governor  of  Yucatan.  The  governor 
requested  aid  against  the  Indians  and  stated  that  the  people  of 
the  department  "were  ready  to  surrender  their  country  &  the 
sovereignty  over  it  to  any  Government  which  would  protect  & 
save  them  from  extermination."  He  stated,  also,  that  a  similar 
offer  had  been  made  to  Great  Britain  and  Spain.  Prospect  of 
foreign  domination  called  for  prompt  action,  and  Polk  informed 
his  cabinet  that 

we  could  never  agree  to  see  Yucatan  pass  into  the  hands  of  a  foreign 
monarch}'  to  be  possessed  and  colonized  by  them,  and  that  sooner  than  this 
should  take  place  the  U.  S.  should  afford  the  aid  &  protection  asked,  but 
that  this  could  only  be  done  by  the  authority  of  Congress.i6 

Without  delay,  the  President  began  the  preparation  of  a 
message  on  the  subject  of  Yucatan.     The  preliminary  draft  was 


13  Polk,  Diary,  III,  374.  ig  Ibid.,  433-434. 


698  JAMES   K.   POLK 

shown  to  the  cabinet  and  to  various  members  of  Congress,  all 
of  whom  approved  the  sentiments  which  he  had  expressed.  As 
submitted  to  Congress  on  April  29,  1848,  the  message,  after  call- 
ing attention  to  the  deplorable  conditions  in  Yucatan,  stated 
that  the  department  had  offered  to  transfer  the  "dominion  and 
sovereigny  of  the  peninsula"  to  the  United  States,  and  that 
similar  offers  had  been  made  to  both  England  and  Spain. 

Whilst  it  is  not  my  purpose,  [said  he],  to  reeonimend  the  adoption  of  any 
measure  ^\'ith  a  view  to  the  acquisition  of  the  ' '  dominion  and  sovereignity ' ' 
over  Yucatan,  yet  according  to  our  established  policy,  we  could  not  consent 
to  a  transfer  of  this  ' '  dominion  and  sovereignty ' '  either  to  Spain,  Great 
Britain,  or  any  other  European  power,  i^ 

While  the  president  alleged  that  he  was  restating  the  ' '  established 
policy"  announced  by  Monroe,  which  "applies  with  great  force 
to  the  peninsula  of  Yucatan,"  it  is  obvious  that  the  question 
under  consideration  was  not  covered  by  either  declaration  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine.  Monroe  had  spoken  of  colonization,  and  of 
forcible  interference  with  established  governments ;  Polk  asserted 
that  we  could  not  consent  to  a  transfer  of  "dominion  and 
sovereignty,"  even  at  the  solicitation  of  the  inhabitants.  But  to 
show  that  the  Yucatan  question  did  not  fall  within  the  purview 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  does  not  prove  that  Polk  should  not  have 
announced  his  own  much-criticized  doctrine.  Monroe  dealt  with 
the  threatened  dangers  of  his  own  time ;  was  it  presumptuous  in 
Polk  to  declare,  in  similar  manner,  his  policy  for  dealing  with 
new  phases  of  foreign  domination  ?  Indirectly,  there  was  a  close 
connection  between  the  Polk  Doctrine  and  that  of  Monroe.  The 
purpose  of  the  anti-colonization  declaration  of  Monroe  was  to 
shut  out,  for  the  future,  undesirable  neighbors;  this,  also,  was 
the  purpose  of  forbidding  the  transfer  of  Yucatan  to  any  Euro- 
pean nation.  In  neither  case  was  any  thought  given  to  the  wishes 
of  the  actual  oi'  the  prospective  inhabitants ;  the  sole  considera- 
tion was  the  welfare  of  the  United   States.     Moreover,   Polk's 


1"  Richardson,  Messages,  IV,  581-582. 


THE  "POLK  DOCTIUNE"  AND  MINOR  QUESTIONS         699 

announcement  regarding  Yucatan  was  quite  in  line  with  tliat  of 
his  predecessors  with  respect  to  Cuba,  and  the  degree  of  im- 
portance does  not  affect  the  principle  involved.  For  example, 
when  Secretary  Clay,  by  order  of  President  Adams,  notified 
France  and  other  powers  that  we  could  not  consent  to  the  occu- 
pation of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  "by  any  other  European  power 
than  Spain  under  any  contingency  whatever,"^*  he  was  thinking 
of  the  transfer  per  se  and  of  the  effect  upon  the  United  States, 
and  not  of  the  wishes  of  the  Cubans. 

In  his  message.  President  Polk  made  no  specific  recommenda- 
tions, but  left  it  "to  the  wisdom  of  Congress  to  adopt  such 
measures  as  in  their  judgment  may  be  expedient  to  prevent  Yuca- 
tan from  becoming  a  colony  of  any  European  power. ' '  There  was 
no  intimation  that  he  desired  to  take  permanent  possession  of 
the  territory  or  that  he  had  any  other  object  in  view  than  to 
prevent  it  from  falling  into  the  hands  of  a  foreign  nation ;  still, 
we  know  from  his  diary  that  he  was  ready  to  annex  the  depart- 
ment rather  than  see  it  become  a  possession  of  Great  Britain.^" 

As  soon  as  the  message  was  read  in  the  Senate,  Calhoun 
asserted  that  the  ' '  broad  and  dangerous  principle ' '  announced  in 
it  could  not  possibly  be  deduced  from  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  It 
was,  however,  referred  to  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations, 
from  which,  on  May  4,  Hannegan  reported  an  act  to  enable  the 
President  to  "take  temporary  military  occupation  of  Yucatan." 
The  debate  which  followed  elicited  widely  divergent  opinions, 
both  as  to  the  President's  meaning  and  the  expediency  of  occupy- 
ing the  territory.  It  is  unnecessary  to  dwell  on  this  discussion, 
for  before  it  had  proceeded  far  dispatches  arrived  bearing  the 
news  that  a  treaty  had  been  concluded  between  Yucatan  and  the 
Indians.     Calhoun's  remarks,  however,  are  worthy  of  note,  on 


isaay  to  Brown,  Oct.  25,  1825  (Am.  State  Pap.,  For.  Eel.,  V,  856). 

19  ' '  Mr.  Walker  was  in  favour  of  its  ultimate  annexation  to  the  United 
States,  &  Mr.  Buchanan  opposed  it.  I  concurred  with  Mr.  Walker  rather 
than  see  it  fall  into  the  hands  of  England"  {Diary  (May  6,  1848),  III, 
444-445). 


700  JAMES  K.  FOLK 

account  of  his  peculiar  interpretation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
It  consisted,  he  said,  of  friendly  declarations,  with  "not  a  word 
in  any  one  of  them  in  reference  to  resistance."  But  Polk,  he 
continued,  "seems  to  hold  these  declarations  as  imposing  a 
solemn  duty  on  him  as  Chief  Magistrate  to  resist  on  all  occasions ; 
and  not  only  to  resist,  but  to  judge  of  the  measure  of  that  re- 
sistance."-" As  construed  by  Calhoun,  the  sole  survivor  of 
Monroe's  cabinet,  the  famous  "doctrine"  became  a  harmless 
declamation — a  simple  statement  of  our  desires,  and  not  a  warn- 
ing to  the  European  alliance.  Hannegan,  the  chief  supporter  of 
the  bill,  disclaimed  any  desire  to  annex  Yucatan,  although,  like 
the  President,  he  was  ready  to  do  so  if  this  should  prove  to  be 
the  only  means  of  saving  it  from  British  domination.  That 
country,  in  his  opinion,  would  never  neglect  an  opportunity  to 
strengthen  her  hold  on  the  Gulf  of  Mexico :  ' '  Cuba  was  said  to 
be  the  key,  and  with  Yucatan  she  would  have  both  lock  and  key, 
and  control  the  whole  outlet  of  the  vast  Mississippi."  It  was 
control  of  the  Gulf  region,  and  not  the  desire  to  possess  additional 
southern  territory,  that  led  the  President  and  his  supporters  to 
resist  a  possible  extension  of  British  domination  over  the  depart- 
ment of  Yucatan.  British  activities  in  Texas  had,  justly  or  un- 
justly, convinced  Polk  that  England  was  ever  ready  to  deal  a 
blow  at  the  commercial  prosperity  of  the  United  States. 

Discussion  of  the  Yucatan  question,  and  of  the  alleged  attempt 
of  Great  Britain  to  make  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  a  "mare  clausum," 
naturally  revived  interest  in  the  destinies  of  Cuba.  That  island 
had  always  been  regarded  as  the  key  to  the  Gulf,  and  adminis- 
trations of  all  parties  had  agreed  that  its  control  must  never  pass 
to  a  strong  maritime  power.  As  noted  above.  Clay,  under  Adams' 
instructions,  had,  in  1825,  asserted  that  "we  could  not  consent 
to  the  occupation  of  those  islands  by  any  other  European  power 
than    Spain    under    any    contingency    whatever."      In   similar 


20  Printed  in  full  in  Calhoun,  H'orkfi,  IV,  454  flf. 


THE  "POLK  DOCTRINE"  AND  MINOR  QUESTIONS         701 

language  "Webster,  in  1843,  informed  the  United  States  consul  at 
Havana  that  his  government ' '  never  would  permit  the  occupation 
of  that  island  by  British  agents  or  forces  upon  any  pretext  what- 
ever," and  that  the  entire  naval  and  military  resources  of  the 
United  States  would  be  employed  to  prevent  it.-^ 

At  the  first  session  of  Congress  under  the  Polk  administration 
resolutions  were  offered  in  both  houses  for  the  purpose  of  author- 
izing the  President  to  purchase  Cuba,  provided  the  consent  of  the 
inhabitants  could  be  obtained.  Nothing  resulted  from  these  reso- 
lutions, for  more  pressing  questions  soon  absorbed  the  attention 
of  both  Congress  and  the  executive.  But  when,  in  1847,  certain 
British  statesmen  urged  their  government  to  seize  Cuba  as 
security  for  the  interest  on  Spanish  bonds  held  in  England,  the 
American  press  began  to  discuss  the  advisability  of  purchasing 
the  island.  For  example,  the  New  York  Sim  came  out  strongly 
in  favor  of  annexation.  It  stated  in  an  editorial  that  Spain 
would  sell  Cuba  for  $100,000,000,  and  that  the  Cubans  were  so 
eager  to  join  the  United  States  that  they  would  raise  the  neces- 
sary money  if  given  a  week's  notice (  !)--  There  is  no  evidence, 
however,  that  the  President  gave  serious  thought  to  the  subject 
until  tlie  summer  of  the  following  year  when  the  importance  of 
acquiring  the  island  was  urged  upon  him  by  John  L.  0  'Sullivan, 
editor  of  the  Democratic  Review  and  of  the  New  York  News. 

In  his  diary  for  May  10,  1848,  Polk  mentioned  a  visit  from 
0 'Sullivan  and  Senator  Douglas.  They  had  come,  apparently  at 
the  instance  of  the  former,  for  the  purpose  of  exhorting  the 
President  to  take  immediate  steps  to  buy  the  island  from  Spain. 
As  usual,  he  declined  to  give  them  his  own  views  on  the  subject, 
although  his  decision  had  already  been  made.  "Though  I  ex- 
pressed no  opinion  to  them,"  is  the  comment  in  his  diary,  "I 
am  decidedly  in  favour  of  purchasing  Cuba  &  making  it  one  of 


-1  Webster  to  Campbell,  Jan.   14,  1843   (Wharton,  Int.  Law  Digest,  I, 
372). 

22  Quoted  in  Niles'  Reg.,  LXXII,  338  (July  31,  1847). 


702  JAMES  K.  POLE 

the  States  of  [the]  Union."  A  few  weeks  later  he  wrote  that 
it  was  0 'Sullivan  "who  first  suggested  to  me  the  idea  of  pur- 
chasing Cuba."-^ 

Late  in  the  month,  when  consulting  his  cabinet  on  the  ad- 
visability of  making  an  offer  to  Spain,  Polk  emphasized  the 
danger  of  the  island's  falling  into  the  hands  of  Great  Britain. 
Walker  and  Mason  were  in  favor  of  making  an  offer,  and  were 
willing  to  go  as  high  as  $100,000,000.  Johnson  objected  to  in- 
corporating the  territory  into  the  Union,  while  Buchanan  feared 
that  any  agitation  of  the  subject  might  injure  the  party  in  the 
Presidential  election.-*  Two  days  later  Buchanan  received  an 
"important  despatch"  from  the  American  consul  at  Havana 
which  said  that  on  account  of  impending  revolution  the  Creoles 
were  in  favor  of  annexation.  0 'Sullivan  told  the  President  that 
an  agent  of  wealthy  Cuban  planters  had  informed  him  of  a 
scheme  of  his  employers  to  overthrow  Spanish  authority  for  the 
purpose  of  hastening  annexation.  0 'Sullivan  said,  also,  that  a 
distinguished  American  general,-'  now  in  Mexico,  had  agreed  to 
resign  his  commission  at  the  close  of  the  war  and  to  embark  for 
Cuba  with  discharged  American  troops.  But  Polk  Avas  too  cir- 
cumspect to  indulge  in  filibustering  schemes : 

I  at  once  said  to  Mr.  O 'Sullivan  that  if  Cuba  was  ever  obtained  by 
the  U.  S.,  it  must  be  by  amicable  purchase,  and  that  as  President  of  the 
U.  S.  I  could  give  no  countenance  to  such  a  step,  and  could  not  wink  at 
such  a  movement. 26 

When  consulted  on  the  subject,  Cass  expressed  himself  as 
heartily  in  favor  of  purchasing  Cuba,  but  Buchanan  still  main- 
tained that  the  proposed  acquisition  was  the  "gravest  &  most 
important"  question  that  had  ever  been  submitted  to  the  cabinet. 
At  the  next  meeting  he  predicted  that  Mar  with  England  and 


23  Polk,  Diary,  TIT,  446,  498.  The  fact  that  O 'Sullivan  was  a  "I^arn- 
burner''  ami  an  enthusiastic  supporter  of  Van  Buron  is  evidence  that  the 
project  was  not  prompted  by  a  desire  to  extend  the  shiveholding  area. 

2i  Ibid.,  468-469. 

25  Probably  Quitman.  20  Polk,  J)iarii.  Ill,  475-477. 


THE  "POLK  DOCTRINE"  AND  MINOR  QUESTIONS         703 

France  would  follow  an  attempt  to  acquire  the  island ;  but  Polk 
nevertheless  decided  that  R.  M.  Saunders,  our  minister  at  Madrid, 
should  be  instructed  to  buy  it  if  he  could.  Buchanan  i)etulantly 
demanded  specific  instructions  as  to  contents  of  the  dispatch  to 
Saunders.  Evidently  he  was  preparing  to  disclaim  responsibility 
in  ease  the  project  should  turn  out  to  be  politically  unwise. 

In  order  to  forestall  filibustering  schemes.  General  Butler 
was  instructed  to  prevent  our  troops  from  taking  part  in  a 
Cuban  expedition,  and  the  American  consul  at  Havana  was  told 
that  the  United  States  would  "preserve  national  faith  with 
Spain."  On  Walker's  suggestion,  it  was  decided  that  copies  of 
these  instructions  should  be  forwarded  to  Saunders  at  Madrid, 
with  directions  to  communicate  them  to  the  Spanish  government. 
Indeed,  Saunders  was  to  make  it  appear  that  the  presentation  of 
this  evidence  of  good  will  on  the  part  of  his  government  was  the 
main  object  of  his  interview  with  the  Spanish  minister ;  he  was 
then  to  say  that  the  United  States  would  make  an  offer  to  pur- 
chase the  island,  if  such  an  offer  would  be  agreeable  to  Spain. 
Walker's  happy  thought  caused  Buchanan  to  withdraw  his  ob- 
jections, and  he  announced  to  that  he  "would  cheerfully  prepare 
the  necessary  instructions  to  Mr.  Saunders. '  '-^ 

The  dispatch  to  Saunders,  in  which  Buchanan  had  incor- 
porated the  President's  views,  was  formally  approved  at  a  cabinet 
meeting  held  on  June  17,  1848.  He  stated  that  the  United  States 
had  no  reason  to  complain  so  long  as  Cuba  should  continue  to 
be  a  colony  of  Spain, 

But  we  can  never  consent  that  this  Island  shall  become  a  Colony  of  any 
other  European  power.  In  the  possession  of  Great  Britain  or  any  strong 
naval  power,  it  might  prove  ruinous  both  to  our  domestic  and  foreign  com- 
merce, and  endanger  the  Union  of  the  States.  The  highest  and  first  duty 
of  every  independent  nation  is  to  provide  for  its  own  safety;  and  acting 
upon  this  principle  we  should  be  compelled  to  resist  the  acquisition  of  Cuba 
by  any  maritime  State  with  all  the  means  which  Providence  has  placed  at 
our  command. 

27  Ibid.,  487. 


704  JAMES  E.   POLK 

Having  thus  definitely  stated  the  policy  of  his  government 
and  the  determination  to  enforce  it,  the  Secretary  of  State  pro- 
ceeded to  show  the  necessity  for  such  a  policy  and  to  give  reasons 
for  believing  that  American  interests  were  already  menaced  by 
the  designs  of  Great  Britain.  Incidentally,  these  reasons  had  an 
important  bearing  on  the  President's  recent  message  relating  to 
Yucatan.  Cuba,  said  Buchanan,  is  situated  between  Florida  and 
Yucatan,  and  its  possession  would  give  England  command  of 
both  inlets  to  the  Gulf.  In  time  of  war  she  could  effectively 
blockade  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi  and  sever  the  connection 
between  the  Gulf  states  and  those  on  the  Atlantic. 

As  reasons  for  believing  that  England  had  ambitious  designs, 
Buchanan  cited  first 

her  uniform  policy  throughout  her  jiast  history  to  seize  upon  every  valu- 
able commercial  point  throughout  the  world  whenever  circumstances  have 
placed  this  in  her  power. 

Under  the  mask  of  protector  of  the  Mosquito  Indians,  "she  is 
endeavoring  to  acquire  permanent  possession  of  the  entire  coast 
of  the  Carribean  Sea  from  Cape  Honduras  to  Escuda  de  Ver- 
agua" — and  this,  too,  in  violation  of  her  treaty  of  1786  with 
Spain.  By  a  similar  violation,  a  simple  permission  to  cut  log- 
wood and  mahogany  had  led  to  the  establishment  of  the  British 
colony  at  Belise.  She  had  taken  forcible  possession  of  the  har- 
bor of  San  Juan  de  Nicaragua  with  the  evident  purpose  of  obtain- 
ing control  over  all  communication  between  the  Atlantic  and 
Pacific  oceans.  Inability  of  Spain  to  pay  the  interest  on  securi- 
ties held  in  England  had  given  her  a  much  more  plausible  pre- 
text for  seizing  Cuba  than  she  had  for  assuming  the  protectorate 
of  the  Mosquito  Indians,  and  the  threatening  utterances  of  Lords 
Bentinck  and  Palmerston  indicated  a  disposition  to  make  use  of 
tliis  pretext.  Indeed,  the  recent  dismissal  of  the  British  minister 
at  Madrid  had  made  a  rupture  between  the  two  nations  almost 
inevitable;  should  it  come,  "no  doubt  can  be  entertained  that 
Great  Britain  would  immediately  seize  Cuba." 


THE  "FOLK  DOCTRINE"  AND  MINOR  QUESTIONS         705 

Saunders  was  then  told  that,  in  the  opinion  of  the  President, 
a  crisis  had  arrived  which  made  it  desirable  for  the  United 
States  to  purchase  the  island.  He  was,  therefore,  to  conclude  a 
treaty,  if  possible,  paying  as  a  maximum  the  sum  of  $100,000,000. 
He  was  instructed  to  make  the  offer  orally,  and  not  until  he  had 
made  it  plain  to  the  Spanish  government  that  the  United  States 
had  been  moved  wholly  by  a  desire  to  prevent  Cuba  from  passing 
to  another  power.-** 

The  hope-**  of  the  President  to  crown  his  work  of  expansion 
by  annexing  Cuba  to  the  United  States  was  doomed  to  disap- 
pointment, for  the  traditional  reluctance  of  Spain  to  part  with 
her  West  Indian  possessions  could  not  be  overcome.  After  an 
exasperating  delay  the  Spanish  foreign  minister  replied  that  it 
was 

more  than  any  minister  dare  to  entertain  any  such  proposition;  that  he 
believed  such  to  be  the  feeling  of  the  country,  that  sooner  than  see  the 
island  transferred  to  any  power,  they  would  prefer  seeing  it  sunk  in  the 
ocean. 

After  all  this  statement  amounted  to  a  pledge  that  Spain  would 
retain  Cuba ;  and  so  long  as  the  pledge  could  be  maintained,  it 
effected  the  main  purpose  which  Polk  had  in  view.  Fear  of 
British  control  of  the  Gulf  had  prompted  his  offer,  and  such 
control  could  not  be  obtained  so  long  as  Spain  retained  possession 
of  the  island. 

A  letter  dealing  with  Central  American  affairs,  similar  to 
the  one  sent  to  Saunders,  had  already  been  transmitted  to  Elijah 
Hise,  who  had  recently  been  made  charge  d'  affaires  at  Guate- 
mala. The  dissolution  of  the  Central  American  confederacy, 
said  Buchanan,  had  encouraged  British  encroachments  on  the 
Mosquito  coast,  therefore  Hise  was  to  promote  a  revival  of  the 

28  Buchanan  to  Saunders,  June  17,  1848  (Buchanan,  Works,  VIII,  90- 
102).    Polk,  Diari/,  III,  493. 

29  A  person  who  represented  himself  to  be  a  financial  agent  of  the 
Spanish  queen  told  Dallas  that  he  had  been  instructed  to  ascertain  whether 
the  United  States  would  be  willing  to  buy  the  island.  Apparently  his 
storv  was  pure  fabrication.    See  Polk,  Diary,  IV,  4-5. 


706  JAMES  K.   POLE 

confederacy.  The  Secretary  was  not  yet  prepared  to  say  what 
course  the  United  States  would  pursue  with  respect  to  tlie  British 
protectorate  over  the  Mosquito  Indians,  but 

To  suffer  any  interference  on  tlie  part  of  the  European  Governments 
with  the  domestic  concerns  of  the  American  Eepublies  and  to  permit  them 
to  establish  new  colonies  upon  this  continent,  would  be  to  jeopard  their 
independence  and  to  ruin  their  interests.  These  truths  ought  everywhere 
throughout  this  continent  to  be  impressed  on  the  public  mind.so 

Hise  concluded  a  general  commercial  treaty  on  the  last  day  of 
Polk's  term  of  office,  but  nothing  was  accomplished  in  the  way 
of  reuniting  the  Central  American  states.  The  Taylor  adminis- 
tration adopted  a  more  conciliatory  attitude  toward  England  the 
result  of  which  was  the  conclusion  of  the  well-known  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty  of  1850. 

Early  in  the  Polk  administration  an  event,  unimportant  in 
itself,  very  nearly  caused  a  break  in  our  diplomatic  relations 
with  Brazil.  On  October  31,  1846,  Lieutenant  Alonzo  B.  Davis, 
of  the  United  States  ship  Saratoga,  went  on  shore  at  Rio  Janeiro 
to  apprehend  deserters  from  his  vessel.  As  Davis  was  about  to 
take  them  to  his  ship,  the  Brazilian  police  interfered  and  im- 
prisoned both  Davis  and  the  sailors.  Henry  A.  "Wise  was  then 
minister  to  Brazil,  and,  to  use  his  own  expression,  he  played 
"old  Hickory  on  them"  by  demanding  the  immediate  release  of 
the  prisoners.  He  wanted,  he  said,  "to  make  these  Spanish  & 
Portugese  Mongrells  in  S.  America  understand  that  the  U. 
States  MUST  he  respected. "^'^  All  except  one  of  the  prisoners 
were  set  free,  and  the  affair  might  have  been  dropped  had  not 
Wise  and  Commodore  Rousseau  of  the  American  squadron  not 
wounded  the  pride  of  the  Brazilian  court  by  further  Jacksonian 
contempt  for  diplomatic  punctilio. 

A  fortnight  after  the  prisoners  had  been  released.  Wise 
ignored  an  invitation  to  the  baptismal  ceremonies  of  the  Imperial 
Infanta,  and  Commodore  Rousseau  neglected  to  fire  the  customary 


30  Buchanan  to  Hise,  June  3,  1848  (Buchanan,  Worls;  VIII,  78-84). 

31  Wise  to  J.  Y.  Mason,  Nov.  6,  1846,  Polk  Papers. 


THE  "POLK  DOCTBINE"  AND  MINOR  QUESTIONS         707 

salute.  A  little  later,  when  the  Emperor's  birthday  was  being 
celebrated,  Rousseau  neither  fired  a  salute  nor  hoisted  the  flag 
on  his  ship,  while  Wise  (not  invited  this  time)  made  a  speech 
on  shipboard  which  was  anything  but  complimentary  to  the 
Brazilians.  Brazil  now  requested  the  recall  of  both  men  and 
asked  for  an  apology  from  the  United  States.  The  apology  was 
claimed  on  the  ground  of  discourtesy  to  the  Emperor  and  the 
more  serious  charge  that  Davis  had  denied  the  sovereignty  of  the 
empire  by  resisting  the  police — conduct  which  had  been  approved 
and  supported  by  Wise. 

When  the  complaints  were  presented  in  Washington  by 
Lisboa,  the  Brazilian  minister,  Polk  instructed  Buchanan  to  say 
that  he  would  neither  apologize  nor  recall  Wise  and  Rousseau ; 
recall  of  the  minister  would  imply  dissatisfaction  with  his  con- 
duct, whereas  it  was  highly  approved  by  the  President.  Buchanan 
added,  how^ever,  that  since  Wise  had,  before  the  trouble  had 
arisen,  alSked  to  be  relieved,  the  President  would  grant  his  re- 
quest ;  Rousseau,  also,  would  soon  be  sent  to  another  port.  With 
this  understanding,  Buchanan  and  Lisboa  agreed  to  let  the  matter 
drop ;  but  the  Brazilian  government  recalled  Lisboa,  demanded 
an  apology,  and  declared  that  a  successor  to  Wise  would  not  be 
received  until  this  had  been  made. 

The  new  demand  for  an  apology  was  presented  by  the  charge 
de  affaires,  Leal,  in  the  summer  of  1847.  The  only  question  of 
importance  was  Lieutenant  Davis's  alleged  resistance  of  the  au- 
thority of  the  police  in  Rio  Janeiro,  and  everything  hinged  on 
whether  Davis  or  the  police  first  had  the  sailors  in  custody.  The 
evidence  seemed  to  show  that  Davis  had  apprehended  them  before 
the  police  arrived  on  the  scene.  While  it  was  admitted  that  the 
jurisdiction  of  any  nation  is  absolute  within  its  own  borders,  cus- 
tom permitted  naval  oificers  to  go  on  shore  to  arrest  their  own 
sailors.  As  this  was  all  that  Davis  had  done,  he  had,  in  Polk's 
opinion,  committed  no  "infractions  of  police  regulations,"  conse- 
quently Wise  was  justified  in  demanding  his  release  from  prison. 


708  JAMES  E.  POLE 

The  threat  to  reject  a  new  minister  was  resented  as  "dictating 
terms"  to  which  Brazil  "could  not  have  expected  submission"; 
but,  said  Buchanan,  "the  President  will  take  no  decisive  steps" 
until  he  shall  have  learned  that  Brazil  has  actually  refused  to 
receive  him.-*-  This  firm  but  reasonable  declaration  had  the 
desired  effect,  and  the  new  minister,  David  Tod,  was  received 
courteously  by  the  Emperor.  "Wise  returned  to  the  United  States 
filled  with  gratitude  for  the  man  whom  he  had  once  called  a 
"petty  tyrant"  and  whom  he  had  tried  to  goad  into  fighting  a 
duel.  "I  learn,"  wrote  the  President,  after  Wise  had  called  to 
pay  his  respects, 

that  he  returns  to  the  U.  S.  my  friend,  &  his  expressions  of  gratitude  to 
me  to-day  were  as  strong  &  decided  as  human  language  could  make  them, 
so  that  I  have  lived  to  conquer  the  hostility  of  at  least  one  of  my  political 
opponents  &  persecutors.  This  I  have  done  by  performing  my  duty  in  a 
magnanimous  and  liberal  manner. ss 

Zeal  of  naval  officers  to  protect  American  rights  nearly 
involved  the  government  in  difficulties  with  another  South 
American  state.  In  January,  1845,  Buenos  Ayres  attempted  to 
invest  Montevideo  with  an  absolute  blockade ;  and  because  this 
Avas  forcibly  violated  by  French  vessels,  a  United  States  naval 
officer,  G.  J.  Pendergrast,  demanded  exemption  for  his  own  ves- 
sels. The  authorities  at  Washington,  however,  held  that  an 
offense  committed  by  one  nation  did  not  entitle  another  to  dis- 
regard belligerent  rights,  and  the  officers  were  instructed  to 
respect  the  blockade. 

Before  this  question  had  been  adjusted,  British  and  French 
naval  officers  announced  a  blackade  of  the  whole  coast  of  Buenos 
Ayres  and  allowed  other  neutrals  only  forty-eight  hours  to  with- 
draw their  vessels  from  the  harbors.  Pendergrast  entered  a 
vigorous  protest  on  the  ground  that  neutrals-'^  have  no  right  to 


32  The  most  important  letter  (written  to  Leal  on  Aug.  30,  1847)  is 
printed  in  Buchanan,  Worls,  VII,  38S-404.  Nearly  all  of  the  correspond- 
ence relating  to  this  affair  may  be  found  in  Sen.  Ex.  Docs.  29,  35,  30  Cong., 
1  sess.  .i.-i  Polk,  Bianj,  III,  192. 

34  England  and  France  had  not  declared  war  on  Buenos  Ayres. 


THE  "POLK  DOCTRINE"  AND  MINOR  QUESTIONS         709 

establish  a  blockade,  and  that  even  a  belligerent  has  no  right  to 
declare  an  entire  coast  to  be  blockaded.  United  States  vessels 
were  given  time  to  discharge  their  cargoes  and  withdraw  from 
the  ports,  and,  since  no  seizures  were  made,  nothing  more  serious 
resulted  than  caloric  speeches  in  Congress.'^'^ 

On  December  12,  1846,  Benjamin  A.  Bidlack,  acting  without 
instructions,^"  concluded  a  commercial  treaty  with  New  Granada, 
one  article  of  which  provided  for  transit  across  and  guaranteed 
the  neutrality  of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama.  Doubtless  Bidlack 
was  moved  to  take  this  unauthorized  step  by  Buchanan's  letter 
of  June  23,  1845,  which  instructed  him  to  use  his  influence  to 
prevent  New  Granada  from  gi-anting  transit  concessions  to 
European  powers,  and  which  stated  that  "the  United  States 
have  strong  motives  for  viewing  with  interest  any  project  which 
may  be  designed  to  facilitate  the  intercourse  between  the  Atlantic 
and  the  Pacific  oceans. ' "'  Nevertheless,  the  arrival  of  the  treaty 
in  Washington  took  the  President  completely  by  surprise.  At 
first,  Polk  doubted  that  he  could  approve  this  "entangling 
alliance.  "^^ 

In  general  this  document  followed  the  usual  form  of  com- 
mercial treaties,  and  only  the  thirty-fifth  article  merits  special 
comment.     Among  other  things,  it  stipulated  that 

The  Government  of  New  Granada  guarantees  to  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  that  the  right  of  way  or  transit  across  the  Isthmus  of 
Panama  upon  any  modes  of  communication  that  now  exist,  or  may  be  here- 
after constructed,  shall  be  open  and  free  to  the  Government  and  citizens 


33  See  correspondence,  H.  Ex.  Doc.  212,  29  Cong.,  1  sess. 

36  While  this  treaty  was  on  its  v^^ay  to  Washington,  Buchanan,  on 
January  2,  1847,  authorized  Bidlack  to  negotiate  a  commercial  treaty. 
See  Buchanan,  Works,  VII,  183-186. 

3T  Buchanan,  Works,  VI,  180-181. 

38  "As  a  commercial  Treaty  it  was  liberal  &  in  all  respects  satisfactory, 
but  in  addition  to  its  commercial  provisions  it  contained  an  article  giving 
the  guaranty  of  the  U.  S.  for  the  neutrality  of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama, 
and  "the  sovereignty  of  New  Granada  over  the  territory.  Serious  doubts 
were  entertained  whether  this  stipulation  was  consistent  with  our  long- 
settled  policy  to  'cultivate  friendship  with  all  nations,  entangling  alliances 
with  none'  "    (Polk,  Diarti,  II,  3G3). 


710  JAMES  K.   POLK 

of  the  United  States,  [and  that]  ....  the  United  States  guarantee,  posi- 
tively and  efficaciously  to  New  Granada,  by  the  present  stipulation  the 
neutrality  of  the  before-mentioned  isthmus,  with  the  view  that  the  free 
transit  from  the  one  to  the  other  sea  may  not  be  interrupted  or  embarrassed 
in  any  future  time  while  this  treaty  exists;  and,  in  consequence,  the  United 
States  also  guarantee,  in  the  same  manner,  the  rights  of  sovereignty  and 
property  which  New  Granada  has  and  possesses  over  the  territoiy. 

The  treaty  was  to  remain  in  force  for  twenty  years,  and  then 
indefinitely,  unless  terminated  by  twelve  months'  notice  from 
either  party.^^ 

A  few  days  of  deliberation  overcame  Polk 's  scruples  regard- 
ing the  entangling  alliance  and  convinced  him  that  the  transit 
agreement  was  too  important  to  be  rejected.  On  February  10 
he  submitted  the  treaty  to  the  Senate  with  a  message  which  stated 
that  "the  importance  of  this  concession  to  the  commercial  and 
political  interests  of  the  United  States  can  not  easily  be  over- 
rated."   He  advised  ratification  because 

The  treaty  does  not  propose  to  guarantee  a  territory  to  a  foreign  nation 
in  which  the  United  States  will  have  no  common  interest  with  that  nation. 
On  the  contrary,  we  are  more  deeply  and  directly  interested  in  the  subject 
of  this  guaranty  that  New  Granada  herself  or  any  other  country. 

Besides,  the  purpose  was  commercial,  not  political,  and  it  was 
expected  that  England  and  France  would  join  in  the  guaranty. 
The  guaranty  of  sovereignty  was,  in  his  opinoin,  indispensable 
to  neutrality  and  to  the  protection  of  property  rights ;  and  as- 
surance of  New  Granada's  permanent  sovereignty  would  remove 
cause  for  jealousy  on  the  part  of  maritime  powers. ^°  Misgivings 
respecting  the  thirty-fifth  article  and  pressure  of  other  business 
caused  a  postponement  of  action  until  the  next  session  of  Con- 
gress, but  in  June,  1848,  the  Senate  finally  gave  its  approval. 
Although  the  extent  of  our  obligation  to  insure  the  "neutrality" 
and  the  "sovereignty"  of  New  Granada  has  been  subject  to  dif- 
ferent interpretations,  the  subsequent  history  of  this  treaty  is 


39  Malloy,  Treaties  and  Conventions,  I,  302  ff. 

40  Richardson,  Messages,  Jv,  511-513. 


THE  "POLK  DOCTEINE"  AND  MINOR  QUESTIONS         711 

not  within  the  purview  of  tlie  present  volume.'^  However,  it  may- 
be said  in  passing  that  a  forced  construction  of  the  thirty-fifth 
article  was  utilized  by  President  Roosevelt  to  prevent  Colombia 
from  suppi-essing  the  Panaman  insurrection  and  to  facilitate  the 
process  of  "taking"  the  canal  zone. 

In  the  last  year  of  his  administration  President  Polk  ap- 
pointed the  first  diplomatic  agent  ever  sent  from  the  United 
States  to  reside  at  the  capital  of  Ecuador  and  diplomatic  rela- 
tions were  opened  wtih  the  republic  of  Bolivia/-  In  both  cases 
assurances  were  given  that  foreign  interference  v/ould  be  re- 
sisted, and  emphasis  was  laid  on  the  identity  of  interests  of  the 
American  republics. 

One  of  the  last  diplomatic  events  of  Polk's  official  term  was 
the  ratification  of  a  postal  convention  with  Great  Britain.  Suc- 
cess in  its  negotiation  was  due  to  the  untiring  efforts  of  George 
Bancroft,  and  its  importance  consisted  in  removing  vexatious 
discriminations  against  United  States  mails.  Of  it  the  President 
said  in  his  diary : 

It  places  our  own  steamers  and  packets  upon  an  equal  footing  with  the 
Brittish  and  relieves  our  merchants,  naturalized  citizens,  and  others  from 
a  heavy  discriminating  charge  of  postage  on  letters  and  other  mailable 
matter  conveyed  in  American  vessels.  This  change  has  been  effected  by 
the  policy  of  the  administration.  Had  it  occurred  under  other  circum- 
stances &  when  so  many  other  great  events  had  not  been  crowded  into  a 
single  Presidential  term,  it  would  have  attracted  more  public  attention  and 
been  regarded  as  an  important  achievement.43 

It  was,  in  deed,  an  important  achievement,  for  it  established 
reciprocal  privileges  and  deprived  the  Cunard  steamers  of  a 
virtual  monopoly  in  carrying  the  mails.** 


41  See  Latane.  Diplomatic  EeJations  of  the  United  States  and  Spanish 
America,  182-188. 

42  Buchanan  to  Livingston,  May  13,  1848;  same  to  Appletoh,  June  1, 
1848  (Buchanan,  Worlfs,  VIII,  64,  74). 

43  Polk,  Diary,  IV,  271-272. 

44  See  Buchanan  to  Bancroft,  July  27,  1847,  in  which  he  speaks  of  the 
"conduct  of  the  British  Post  Office,  in  charging  the  same  postage  on 
letters  carried  on  our  steamer,  the  Washington,  to  Southampton,  at  the 


712  JAMES  E.  POLK 

Polk's  remark  concerning  the  postal  convention  applies 
equally  well  to  a  number  of  minor  diplomatic  achievements 
which  were  overshadowed  by  the  Mexican  and  Oregon  questions ; 
in  a  peaceful  period  they  would  have  attracted  more  attention 
and  redounded  more  to  the  credit  of  the  man  who  directed  our 
foreign  policy.  His  vigilance  in  safeguarding  American  inter- 
ests prevented  foreign  nations  from  gaining  additonal  influence 
on  this  continent.  While  the  original  Monroe  Doctrine  has  long 
ceased  to  have  any  practical  application,  the  "Polk  Doctrine" 
has  been  an  active  force  in  our  history  down  to  the  present  day. 
It  has  not,  indeed,  been  an  unmixed  blessing,  for  it  has  brought 
us  burdens  as  well  as  prestige.  But  whether  we  approve  or  con- 
demn the  doctrine,  it  was  Polk  who  first  declared  that  the  United 
States  would  not  permit  any  interference,  solicited  or  otherwise, 
in  American  affairs,  by  European  monarchies.  In  general,  his 
doctrine  has  been  indorsed  by  the  people  of  the  United  States. 


expense  of  the  United  States,  as  though  they  had  been  carried  there  by  a 
British  steamer,  at  the  expense  of  the  British  Government"  (Buchanan, 
Works,  VII,  375). 


CHAPTER  XXV 

CLOSE  OF  CAREER 

Despite  the  one-term  pledge  included  in  his  letter  accepting 
the  Presidential  nomination,  there  were  many  who  believed  that 
Polk  would  stand  for  a  second  term.  Some  of  the  Democratic 
leaders  feared  that  he  might  do  so,  while  certain  of  his  friends 
hoped  that  he  might  be  induced  to  accept  another  nomination. 
Both  fears  and  hopes  were  wholly  unwarranted,  for  the  Presi- 
dent never  swerved  from  his  determination  to  retire  at  the  end 
of  four  years.  Notwithstanding  Claiborne 's  disparaging  remark 
that  ''no  one  but  himself  dreamed  of  his  re-election,"^  nothing 
in  contemporary  documents  indicates  that  Polk  indulged  in  such 
dreams ;  on  the  contrary,  there  is  abundant  evidence  to  show  that 
he  longed  to  retire  from  public  life. 

As  early  as  December,  8145,  Senator  Benton  expressed  the 
belief  that  certain  Tennessee  politicians  were  planning  to  run 
Polk  for  another  term.  When  told  of  this  the  President  noted  in 
his  diary  that  there  was  not  the  slightest  foundation  for  such  a 
belief :  ' '  My  mind  has  been  made  up  from  the  time  I  accepted  the 
Baltimore  nomination,  and  is  still  so,  to  serve  but  one  term  and 
not  be  a  candidate  for  re-election."  In  January,  1847,  he  re- 
joiced "that  with  my  own  voluntary  free  will  &  consent  I  am 
not  to  be  again  a  candidate.    This  determination  is  irrevocable. '  '- 

During  the  course  of  his  administration  political  leaders  fre- 
quently suggested  to  the  President  that  he  ought  to  (sometimes 
must)  run  again.  On  all  occasions  his  answer  was  the  same — 
that  under  no  circumstances  would  he   again  be   a   candidate. 


1  Claiborne,  Life  and  Correspondence  of  John  A.  Quitman,  I,  235. 

2  Polk,  Diary,  I,  142,  II,  328. 


714  JAMES  K.  POLE 

In  1848,  when  commenting  on  Buchanan's  scheming  for  the  nomi- 
nation, the  President  wrote  in  his  diary : 

The  truth  is,  I  have  no  doubt,  though  I  cauuot  prove  it,  that  Mr. 
Buchanan  has  become  apprehensive  that  in  the  contest  for  the  nomination 
between  Gen'l  Cass,  Mr.  Woodbury,  and  himself  the  Democratic  party 
may  ultimately  be  forced  to  look  to  me  for  re-election.  He  knows  that  I 
have  no  such  views  &  that  I  have  constantly  declared  to  all  who  have 
introduced  the  subject  to  me  that  I  would  retire  at  the  end  of  a  single 
term,  but  notmthstanding  this  he  fears  that  a  state  of  things  might  arise 
in  which  the  party  might  require  me  against  my  will  to  be  placed  before 
the  country  for  re-election.3 

On  May  13,  1848,  the  second  anniversary  of  the  declaration 
of  war  against  Mexico,  the  President  read  to  Cave  Johnson  a 
letter  in  which  he  formally  declared  that  he  would  not  stand  for 
reelection.  It  was  addressed  to  Dr.  J.  M.  G.  Ramsey,  a  Tennessee 
delegate  to  the  Democratic  national  convention,  and  was  "to  be 
by  him  presented  to  the  convention  if,  as  has  been  often  sug- 
gested to  me  it  might  be,  my  name  should  be  brought  before  the 
convention  for  nomination."  Inasmuch  as  he  was  determined 
to  retire,  he  deemed  it  "proper  to  relieve  the  Convention  of  any 
embarrassment  which  the  presentation  of  his  [my]  name  might 
produce."  Subsequently  the  letter  was  shown  to  several  of  the 
delegates  who  had  stopped  in  Washington  on  their  way  to  Balti- 
more, and  to  personal  friends.  All  regretted  liis  determination  to 
retire.  Rhett,  of  South  Carolina,  and  Venable,  of  North  Caro- 
lina, went  so  far  as  to  say  that  Polk  could  carry  their  respective 
states,  but  that  Cass  would  be  unable  to  do  so.  While  he  could 
not  fail  to  be  gratified  with  such  expressions  of  approval,  the 
President  adhered  to  his  original  purpose,  and  his  letter  to 
Ramsey  was  read  to  the  convention  before  the  balloting  liad 
begun.* 

Not  only  did  the  President  decline  anotlier  nomination,  but 
from  first  to  last  he  had  refused  to  lend  his  influence  to  any 


3  Ibid.,  Ill,  354-355. 

4  Polk,  Diary,  IV,  448-463,  imssim.     The  letter  itself  is  printed  in  Jen- 
kins, Life  of  James  Knox  Folic,  307. 


CLOSE  OF  CAREER  715 

aspirant  of  bis  party.  Not  even  in  his  diary  does  he  express  a 
distinct  preference,  although  there  are  indications  that  he  prob- 
ably preferred  Cass.  He  made  his  appointments  and  shaped  his 
policies  with  a  view  to  the  success  of  his  own  administration. 
To  aspirants  and  to  the  public  he  made  it  clear  that  he  would 
affiliate  with  no  faction  of  the  party ;  he  would  support  the  can- 
didate chosen  by  the  representatives  of  the  people,  whoever  that 
candidate  might  be.  He  even  tolerated  the  Barnburners  until 
they  had  openly  seceded  from  the  party. 

The  Democratic  national  convention  assembled  at  Baltimore 
on  May  22,  1848,  and  its  greatest  difficulty  proved  to  be  the 
solution  of  a  knotty  problem  presented  by  the  delegates  from 
New  York.  Two  sets  of  delegates  from  this  state  appeared,  and 
each  claimed  the  right  to  seats  in  the  convention.  On  the  first 
day  the  credentials  committee  decided  tentatively  to  admit  neither 
faction  unless  it  would  agree  to  abide  by  the  nomination.  This 
decision  was  regarded  as  a  victory  for  the  Hunkers  and  as  advan- 
tageous to  Cass,  and  the  Barnburners  refused  to  submit  to  inter- 
rogations. "When  reporting  this  to  Polk,  J.  Knox  "Walker  wrote 
that ' '  Your  true  position  before  the  Convention  will  be  presented 
immediately  before  any  balloting. ' '  Two  days  later  he  reported 
much  bitterness  and  confusion,  and  that  the  convention  probably 
would  admit  both  delegations.'^  This  course  was  adopted  event- 
ually, as  the  convention  did  not  care  to  assume  the  responsibility 
of  deciding  between  the  two  factions. 

The  Barnburners,  who  favored  the  Wilmot  proviso,  were  dis- 
satisfied and  retired  from  the  convention.  They  met  at  Utica  in 
June  and  nominated  Van  Buren  for  President.  In  August,  at 
a  convention  held  in  Buffalo,  they  joined  with  Whigs  and  Aboli- 
tionists in  nominating  A^an  Buren  and  Charles  Francis  Adams  on 
a  "Free-soil"  ticket. 

The  secession  of  the  New  York  delegation  from  the  Baltimore 
convention  and  their  subsequent  affiliation  with  old-time  enemies 

5  Walker  to  Polk,  May  22,  24,  1848,  Folk  Papers. 


71(5  JAMES  K.   FOLK 

were  regarded  by  the  President  as  little  short  of  party  treason. 
He  lost  no  time  in  removing  from  office  B.  F.  Butler  and  other 
active  Barnburners.  When  news  of  the  nominations  made  at 
Buffalo  reached  Washington,  he  remarked  that  "Mr.  Van  Buren 
is  the  most  fallen  man  I  have  ever  known. ' '" 

Party  schism  and  ill  health  overcame  temporarily  the  iron 
will  of  the  President,  and  he  yielded  to  despondency — almost  to 
despair.  Schism  mean  the  probable  success  of  the  Whigs  and 
the  reversal  of  his  cherished  policies.  Ill  health  portended  an 
early  termination  of  his  earthly  career.  On  November  2,  his 
fifty-third  birthday,  he  confided  to  his  diary : 

It  will  be  21  years  on  to-morrow  since  my  father  died.  My  mother  is 
still  living;  Upon  each  recurrence  of  my  birthday  I  am  solemnly  im- 
pressed with  the  vanity  &  emptiness  of  worldly  honors  and  worldly  enjoy- 
ments and  of  [the  wisdom  of]  preparing  for  a  future  estate.  In  four 
months  I  shall  retire  from  public  life  forever.  I  have  lived  three  fourths 
of  the  period  ordinarily  allotted  to  man  on  earth.  I  have  been  highly 
honoured  by  my  fellow-men  and  have  filled  the  highest  station  on  earth, 
but  I  will  soon  go  the  way  of  all  the  earth.  I  pray  God  to  prepare  me  to 
meet  the  great  event. 

The  news,  a  week  later,  that  Taylor  had  probably  been  elected 
President  called  forth  another  melancholy  comment: 

Should  this  be  so,  it  is  deeply  to  be  regretted.  "Without  experience  in 
civil  life,  he  is  wholly  unqualified  for  the  station,  and  being  elected  by 
the  Federal  party  and  the  various  factions  of  dissatisfied  persons  who 
have  from  time  to  time  broken  off  from  the  Democratic  party,  he  must  be 
in  their  hands  and  under  their  absolute  control.  Having  no  opinions  or 
judgment  of  his  own  upon  any  one  public  subject,  foreign  or  domestic,  he 
will  be  compelled  to  rely  upon  the  designing  men  of  the  Federal  party  who 
will  cluster  around  him,  and  will  be  made  to  reverse,  so  far  as  the  Execu- 
tive can  reverse,  the  whole  policy  of  my  administration,  and  substitute 
the  Federal  policy  in  its  stead.  The  country  will  be  the  loose  [loser]  by 
his  election,  and  on  this  account  it  is  an  event  which  I  should  deeply 
regret." 

The  defection  of  the  Barnburners,  which  augured  Democratic 
defeat  in  November,  made  the  President  all  the  more  determined 


0  Polk,  Diary,  IV,  36-37,  67.  -  Ibid.,  177,  184-185. 


CLOSE  OF  CAREER  717 

to  achieve  new  victories  while  his  own  party  remained  in  power. 
During  the  summer  of  1848  he  busied  himself  with  what  proved 
to  be  a  hopeless  attempt  to  acquire  Cuba,  and  with  extending 
the  influence  of  the  United  States  in  South  and  Central  America, 

When  Congress  convened  in  December,  Taylor  had  been 
elected  and  there  remained  but  one  short  session  of  Democratic 
rule.  Polk's  four  great  policies^  had  been  carried  through  suc- 
cessfully, but  the  problem  of  slavery  in  the  Mexican  cession  still 
remained  to  be  solved.  Defeat  of  his  party  at  the  polls  did  not 
deter  the  President  from  urging  once  more  his  own  solution — 
the  extension  of  the  Missouri  Compromise  line.  His  persistency 
led  Collamer,  of  Vermont,  to  compare  him  with  the  lawyer  who, 
being  reprimanded  for  contending  against  the  opinion  of  the 
judge,  replied  that  he  "was  not  rearguing  the  case,  hut  damning 
the  decision. "° 

Judged  by  standards  of  the  period  which  was  just  closing, 
the  solution  offered  by  the  President's  message  seemed  both  nat- 
ural and  reasonable.  Even  so  shrewd  a  politician  as  Polk  did 
not  seem  to  realize  that  the  days  of  King  Compromise  were 
numbered  and  that  conscience  and  abstract  principles  had  be- 
come the  dominating  factors  in  the  slavery  question.  Influential 
leaders  of  both  North  and  South  were  now  more  interested  in 
constitutional  rights  than  in  rquare  miles  of  territory,  and  the 
rank  and  file  were  rapidly  falling  into  line.  To  be  sure  another 
compromise  law  was  recorded  in  the  statute  books  in  1850,  but 
Clay's  famous  omnibus  turned  out  to  be  Pandora's  box  in  dis- 
guise. During  the  debate  on  this  bill,  Calhoun  gave  warning  that 
disunion  would  surely  result  from  further  agitation  against 
slavery  on  the  part  of  the  North.  In  reply,  Seward  announced  his 
''higher  law"  doctrine  which  served  as  a  battle-cry  in  renewed 
onslaughts  upon  the  "peculiar  institution." 


8  California,  Oregon,  Tariff,  and  the  Independent  Treasury. 

9  Coleman,  Life  of  John  J.  Crittenden,  328. 


718  JAMES  K.   POLK 

Naturally,  Polk  was  chagrined  because  the  slavery  question 
remained  unsolved  at  the  close  of  his  administration,  and,  as  we 
have  seen  in  a  preceding  chapter,  he  left  "Washington  harboring 
the  fear  that  California  would  become  an  independent  state.^° 
Still,  he  had  little  cause  for  discouragement  on  account  of  failure 
in  this  particular.  The  most  ambitious  executive  might  well  be 
satisfied  with  the  achievements  of  his  administration. 

During  the  course  of  his  official  term  Polk  renewed  amicable 
relations  with  nearly  all  of  his  political  antagonists.  Bailie  Pey- 
ton was  the  first  to  seek  a  reconciliation,  and  in  September,  1845, 
in  response  to  an  inquiry,  the  President  said  that  he  "would 
receive  him  courteously  &  respectfully."^^  Peyton  was  subse- 
quently given  a  miltiary  appointment  during  the  war  with  Mex- 
ico. Wise,  as  we  have  seen,  was  completly  won  over  by  the  loyal 
support  which  the  President  gave  him  while  he  was  minister  to 
Brazil.  John  Bell  was  the  last  to  seek  a  renewal  of  friendly 
relations,  but  in  January,  1848,  he,  too,  offered  the  pipe  of  peace. 
As  the  two  men  had  not  spoken  since  the  Speakership  contest 
in  1835,  the  first  interview  was  somewhat  embarrassing,  especi- 
ally so  on  the  part  of  Bell.  The  President's  "manner  and  con- 
versation," however,  "soon  put  him  at  his  ease. "^^  "With  Clay, 
the  President  alwa^'s  maintained  cordial  personal  relations.  Clay 
was  a  dinner  guest  at  the  executive  mansion  on  several  occasions, 
and,  according  to  Foote,  he  tendered  his  services  to  the  Presi- 
dent in  overcoming  Whig  opposition  to  the  treaty  with  Mexico.^^ 

Polk  left  office  harboring  greater  resentment  for  individual 
Democrats  than  for  members  of  the  opposition  party.  Blair  and 
Benton  had  proved  themselves  to  be  "unprincipled,"  and  the 


10  See  above,  page  655.  n  Polk,  Diary,  I,  32. 

12  "I  said  to  him  that  I  was  glad  to  see  him,  and  that  so  far  as  I  was 
concerned  1  was  willing  to  let  bye-gones  be  bye-gones,  to  let  the  past  be 
forgotten,  and  to  renew  with  him  our  personal  intercourse.  He  said  that 
was  his  desire,  that  we  were  to  live  neighl^ors  when  we  retired  from  public 
life,  and  that  he  desired  to  be  on  terms  of  friendship.  I  expressed  similar 
desires  on  my  part"  (Polk,  Diary,  III,  284-285). 

13  Polk,  Diary,  passim.    H.  S.  Foote,  Casket  of  Beminiscences,  22. 


CLOSE  OF  CAEEEE  719 

"baseness"  of  Wilmot  could  not  "be  adequately  described.'" 
For  the  opposition  party  as  a  whole,  his  feelings  had  undergone 
no  change.    As  late  as  February  20,  1849,  he  recorded  that 

The  Whigs  &  abolitionists  in  Congress  pursue  me  with  a  malignity  and  a 
bitterness  which  can  only  be  accounted  for  because  of  their  chagrin  at 
the  success  of  Democratic  measures  during  my  administration. i^ 

Determined  to  uphold  Democratic  principles  so  long  as  the  power 
rested  in  his  hands,  he  went  to  the  capitol  on  the  last  evening  of 
his  official  term  prepared  to  veto  the  Wilmot  proviso  and  any 
internal  improvement  bill  that  might  be  presented.  As  we  have 
seen  in  the  preceding  pages,  he  was  not  called  upon  to  use  the 
veto  power,  although  Congress  would  in  all  probability  have 
passed  the  obnoxious  bills  if  the  President's  determination  to  veto 
them  had  not  become  known. 

The  delight  caused  by  the  thought  of  retirement  is  recorded, 
by  the  President  on  February  13,  1849,  the  fourth  anniversary 
of  his  arrival  in  Washington : 

I  am  heartily  rejoiced  that  my  term  is  so  near  its  close.  I  will  soon 
cease  to  be  a  servant  and  become  a  sovereign.  As  a  private  citizen  I  will 
have  no  one  but  myself  to  serve,  and  will  exercise  a  part  of  the  sovereign 
power  of  the  country.  I  am  sure  I  "will  be  happier  in  this  condition  than 
in  the  exalted  station  I  now  hold.i^ 

General  Taylor  arrived  in  Washington  on  February  23,  and 
immediately  an  annoying  question  of  etiquette  presented  itself. 
Buchanan  and  other  members  of  the  cabinet  were  planning  to 
call  upon  the  President-elect,  and  one  of  them  consulted  Polk 
concerning  the  propriety  of  their  doing  so.  Polk  and  Taylor  had 
never  met ;  but  since  their  relations  during  the  Mexican  war  had 
been  mutually  distrustful,  the  President  was  not  at  all  certain 
that  Taylor  would  call  upon  him  to  pay  his  respects.  He  told 
the  members,  therefore,  that  "if  my  Cabinet  called  on  Gen'l 
Taylor  before  he  called  on  me,  I  should  feel  that  I  had  been 


1*  Polk,  Diary,  IV,  227,  343-344. 
^^Ihid.,  331-332. 


720  JAMES  K.   POLK 

deserted  by  my  own  political  family."  All  except  the  Secretary 
of  State  agreed  with  the  President ;  Buchanan  threatened  to  dis- 
regard Polk's  wishes,  but  did  not  carry  out  his  threat.  Taylor 
removed  the  cause  for  embarrassment  by  calling  at  the  White 
House  on  February  26,  after  which  Polk  gave  a  dinner  in  his 
honor  and  treated  him  with  the  utmost  cordiality.^*'  As  they 
rode  to  the  capitol  on  inauguration  day,  Polk  found  his  successor 
to  be  well  meaning,  but  " exceedinglly  ignorant  of  public  affairs"  ; 
he  added  to  the  general's  difficulties  by  ahsconding  with  the  Ex- 
ecutive Journal  so  that  poor  Taylor  did  not  know  what  officers 
he  was  expected  to  appoint  !^^  When  reporting  to  Polk  this  joke 
of  the  season.  Cave  Johnson  said  that  the  new  President  knew 
less  about  public  affairs  than  even  his  opponents  had  believed. 

On  the  evening  of  March  5^*  Polk  boarded  the  steamboat  and 
began  his  journey  homeward.  In  response  to  invitations  from 
southern  cities,  he  traveled  via  Richmond,  Charleston,  and  New 
Orleans,  thence  up  the  Mississijjpi  river.  During  his  whole  Presi- 
dential term  he  had  suffered  much  from  chronic  diarrhoea,  and 
the  fatigue  of  the  journey  caused  its  recurrence  in  an  acute  form. 
Medical  attention  gave  temporary  relief,  and  the  ex-President 
reached  Nashville  much  weakened  yet  apparently  on  the  road  to 
recovery.  After  a  brief  rest  he  was  able  to  visit  his  mother  at 
Columbia  and  Mrs.  Polk's  mother  at  Murfreesborough. 

About  a  year  before  he  left  Washington  he  disposed  of  his 
home  in  Columbia  and  purchased  the  Nashville  residence  of  the 
late  Senator  Grundy.  It  was  renamed  Polk  Place,  and  under 
the  ijersonal  supervision  of  Mrs.  Polk  the  house  was  enlarged 
and   refurnished,   and   the   grounds   beautified.      The   President 


16/ftid.,  349-359. 

i""Tlic  old  Genl  himself  says  that  by  some  accident  or  mistake  you 
had  taken  off  the  Executive  Journal  &  therefore  he  had  been  dilitory  in 
presenting  his  nominations — he  could  not  know  what  offices  he  had  to  fill 
on  that  acct!"  (Johnson  to  Polk,  Washington,  March  17,  1849,  Folic 
Papers).  Johnson  remained  in  the  I'ost  Office  Department  for  a  few  days 
after  Taylor's  inauguration. 

18  As  the  4th  fell  on  Sunday,  Taylor  was  not  iiuiuguratcd  until  the  5th. 


CLOSE  OF  CABEEB  721 

longed  for  the  day  to  arrive  wlieu  he  might  put  aside  the  cares 
of  state  and  enjoy  the  quiet  of  a  private  citizen,  although  many 
of  his  utterances  indicate  that  he  believed  the  end  to  be  near. 

For  a  time,  after  his  arrival  in  Nashville,  he  was  more  cheer- 
ful. The  enthusiastic  welcome  accorded  by  his  neighbors  and 
the  interest  which  he  took  in  supervising  the  improvements  being 
made  at  Polk  Place  restored  temporarily  his  old-time  vigor. 
Whenever  he  undertook  the  performance  of  a  task  it  was  his 
habit  to  expend  his  energies  freely ;  and  in  his  present  state  of 
health,  his  storehouse  of  energy  was  rapidly  exhausted.  The 
labor  of  arranging  the  books  in  his  library  caused  a  recurrence 
of  the  malady  from  which  he  had  suffered  on  his  homeward 
journey,  and  it  was  soon  apparent  that  he  could  not  recover. 

The  Polk  family  as  well  as  Mrs.  Polk  were  Presbyterians,  but 
the  ex-President  was  not  a  member  of  any  church.  He  went 
regularly  with  his  wife  to  the  church  of  her  choice,  although  his 
preference  was  for  the  Methodist  denomination. '*'  A  few  days 
before  his  death  his  aged  mother  came  from  Columbia  bringing 
her  own  pastor  in  the  hope  that  her  son  might  accept  baptism 
and  unite  with  the  Presbyterian  church.  But  the  son  recalled  a 
promise  once  given  to  Reverend  McFerren,  of  the  Methodist 
church,  that,  when  he  was  ready  to  join  the  church,  McFerren 
should  baptize  him.=°  Having  thus  formally  embraced  Chris- 
tianity, he  felt  prepared  "to  meet  the  great  event.'"'  He  died 
on  June  15,  1849,  in  the  fifty-fourth  year  of  his  age.  He  was 
buried  in  the  garden  at. Polk  Place.  In  1893  his  body,  with  that 
of  Mrs.  Polk,  was  removed  to  the  grounds  of  the  state  capitol. 
On  his  tomb  is  the  following  epitaph,  prepared  by  A.  0.  P. 
Nicholson : 


10  "Mrs.  Polk  being  a  member  of  the  Presbyterian  Church  I  generally 
attend  that  Church  with  her,  though  my  opinions  and  predilections  are  in 
favor  of  the  Methodist  Church"  (Polk,  Diary,  I,  86). 

20  Chase,  History  of  the  Polk  Administration,  474-475. 

21  See  above,  page  716. 


722  JAMES  K.   POLK 

By  his  public  policy  he  defined,  established,  and  extended  the  boun- 
daries of  his  country.  He  planted  the  laws  of  the  American  union  on  the 
shores  of  the  Pacific.  His  influence  and  his  counsels  tended  to  organize 
the  national  treasury  on  the  principles  of  the  Constitution,  and  to  apply 
the  rule  of  freedom  to  navigation,  trade,  and  industry. 

This  eulogium  by  no  means  exaggerates  the  national  service 
rendered  by  President  Polk.  Indeed,  Nicholson  might  have  added 
that  he  had  made  the  American  continents  ' '  safe  for  democracy ' ' 
by  repelling  with  vigor  all  interference  by  Enropean  powers. 

Seldom  in  our  history  has  such  an  ambitious  and  so  varied  a 
program  been  carried  into  effect  in  the  brief  space  of  four  years. 
It  was  a  program  conceived,  for  the  most  part,  by  the  President 
himself,  and  his  dogged  persistence  was  an  important  factor  in 
procuring  the  legislation  necessary  for  putting  it  in  operation. 
And  yet,  as  Schouler  has  truthfully  said,  when  commenting  on 
the  ex-President 's  death : 

After  this  brief-spaced  decent  tribute  Polk's  name  was  seldom  pub- 
licly mentioned.  Over  the  fruits,  sweet  and  bitter,  which  his  adminis- 
tration had  cast  so  abundantly  into  the  lap  of  the  people,  there  sprang 
up  very  soon  sectional  quarrel  and  contention,  but  the  gatherer  of  those 
fruits  was  very  soon  forgotten. 22 

And,  in  a  great  measure,  he  remained  "forgotten"  notwith- 
standing the  fact  that  his  tariff  policy  led  to  prosperity ;  that 
his  "constitutional  treasury"  proved  to  be  successful;  that  his 
"Polk  Doctrine"  has  been  approved  and  extended;  and  that  his 
expansion  policy  added  over  five  hundred  thousand  square  miles 
of  territory  and  gave  the  United  States  free  access  to  the  Pacific. 
The  acquisition  of  Louisiana,  with  its  abundant  resources  and 
its  value  as  a  home  for  America's  surplus  population,  lias  com- 
monly been  accredited  to  tlie  stalcsinanship  and  farsightedness 
of  Thomas  Jefferson.  When  the  centennial  of  this  event  was 
celebrated  at  St.  Louis  in  1904,  Jefferson's  part  in  the  trans- 
action was  commemorated  by  medals  struck  in  his  honor.    At  a 


22  Schouler,  History  of  the  United  Slates,  Y,  127. 


CLOSE  OF  CAEEEE  723 

similar  exposition  held  in  San  Francisco  in  1915  to  celebrate  the 
opening  of  the  Panama  canal,  one  listened  in  vain  for  any  men- 
tion of  the  name  of  the  man  who  had  acquired  the  ground  on 
■which  the  exposition  was  being  held,  although  days  were  dedi- 
cated ofiEicially  to  many  individuals  who  had  contributed  little 
or  nothing  to  the  acquisition  of  the  canal  or  to  the  prosperity 
of  the  Pacific  coast.  Possibly,  many  who  attended  the  exposition 
could  not  have  answered  the  campaign  cry  of  1844,  "Who  is 
James  K.  Polk?"  And  yet,  every  one  who  is  familair  with  our 
history  knows  that  Louisiana  was  purchased  without  Jefferson's 
knowledge  or  consent,  and  that  a  vast  empire  (including  Cali- 
fornia) on  the  Pacific  coast  came  into  the  possession  of  the  United 
States  as  the  result  of  a  policy  conceived  by  President  Polk  and 
consummated  despite  vigorous  opposition,  both  at  home  and 
abroad. 

Why,  then,  has  this  man's  name  been  enveloped  in  compar- 
ative obscurity?  Why  has  he  not  received  full  credit  for  his 
achievements  ?  Undoubtedly  one  reason  is  that  he  possessed  little 
personal  magnetism,  while  his  uncompromising  independence  dis- 
satisfied all  factions ;  and,  consequently,  he  had  no  personal  fol- 
lowing to  sound  his  praises  and  perpetuate  his  memory.  The 
excerpt  from  Schouler,  above  quoted,  suggests  incidentally  a  more 
potent  reason,  although  Schouler  lays  the  chief  emphasis  on  the 
fact  that  Polk  was  "soon  forgotten."  As  he  says,  "there  sprang 
up  very  soon  sectional  quarrel  and  contention,"  and  unquestion- 
ably this  sectional  discord  had  much  to  do  with  attaching  odium 
to  the  Polk  administration  and  with  consigning  the  President's 
memory  to  oblivion. 

The  introduction  of  the  Wilmot  proviso  precipitated  a  real 
crisis  in  our  history.  The  debate  which  it  elicited  presented  new 
phases  of  the  slavery  question  and  rendered  the  sectional  conflict 
truly  "irrepressible."  The  determination  of  the  anti-slavery 
forces  to  exclude  the  institution  from  all  territories  called  forth 
a   counter-determination    on   the    part    of    the    South    that    the 


724  JAMES  K.   POLE 

"rights"  of  the  slaveholding  states  must  be  guaranteed  and  pro- 
tected. Henceforth  the  slavery  question  overshadowed  all  others. 
Little  thought  was  given  to  the  "sweet  fruits"  which  Polk  had 
gathered.  Debates  on  topics  wholly  unrelated  to  slavery  inevit- 
ably drifted  into  a  discussion  of  this  fatal  subject,  and  all  at- 
tempts made  to  solve  the  problem  increased  rather  than  dimin- 
ished sectional  bitterness. 

Since  the  conflict  at  first^^  concerned  the  territories  acquired 
from  Mexico,  Polk's  expansion  policy  was  represented  to  be  a 
conspiracy  to  extend  slavery.  But  the  President  was  not  even 
given  the  credit  usually  accorded  to  a  successful  conspirator,  for 
he  was  alleged  to  be  the  mere  tool  of  more  capable  intriguers. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  protagonists  of  slavery  had  no  gratitude 
for  the  man  who  was  charged  with  being  their  agent  in  the  plot 
to  extend  slavery.  His  unswerving  independence,  his  refusal  to 
approve  the  extreme  southern  program,  and  his  advocacy  of  an 
extension  of  the  Missouri  Compromise  line,  made  him,  in  their 
eyes,  a  traitor  to  southern  interests.  As  we  have  noted  elsewhere, 
Polk's  policy  of  compromise  was  the  policy  of  a  period  which 
had  just  closed.  Total  exclusion  of  slavery  from  the  territories 
had  become  the  watchword  of  one  of  the  parties  to  the  all-ab- 
sorbing contest;  unrestricted  admission  of  "slave-property"  was 
demanded  by  the  other.  As  the  advocate  of  the  traditional 
method  of  adjusting  the  slavery  question  Polk  satisfied  neither 
side,  and  he  w^as  charged  by  each  with  being  weak  and  tempor- 
izing. The  achievements  of  his  administration  and  his  valuable 
services  as  chief  executive  w'ere  obscured  by  the  focusing  of  public 
attention  on  the  slavery  question  in  its  new  and  more  acute  form. 
Leaders  of  more  extreme  views  won  the  approval  of  their  respec- 
tive sections.  Conservatives  like  Polk  were  remembered  only  to 
be  condemned.  In  the  earlier  histories  of  the  Mexican  War  the 
Avriters  have  derived  their  information  mainly  from  Whig  sources 


23  It  was  not  until  the  introduction  of  the  Nebraska  bill  in  1854  that 
territories  in  the  Louisiana  Purchase  were  included  in  the  discussion. 


CLOSE  OF  CABEEE  725 

and  from  distorted  accounts  written  by  dissatisfied  Democrats  like 
Senator  Benton.-*  Very  naturally,  therefore,  Polk  has  been  cari- 
catured as  tlie  pliable  instrument  of  the  slave  power,  and  little 
attention  lias  been  given  to  the  constructive  policies  of  his  admin- 
istration. More  recently,  however,  much  valuable  material  has 
been  made  available,  and  investigators  have  approached  the  sub- 
ject with  minds  unprejudiced  by  the  obsolete  sectional  contro- 
versy. They  have  found — and  it  is  believed  that  the  preceding 
pages  have  shown — that  Polk  was  neither  a  conspirator  nor  a 
weakling,  but  that  he  was  a  constructive  statesman,  an  unsually 
able  executive,  and  a  sound  patriot.  No  other  President  took  his 
task  more  seriously  nor  spent  his  energies  more  freely  for  his 
country ;  and  few,  indeed,  have  done  more  to  increase  the  power 
and  prestige  of  the  nation. 


2*  Especially  his  Thirty  Years '  View. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

PUBLIC   DOCUMENTS 

Abridgment  of  the  Debates  of  Congress  from  1789  to  1856,  edited  by  Thomas 
H.  Benton.     New  York,  1857. 

American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  Vol.  V.     Washington,  1858. 

Congressional  Globe.    Washington,  1834^1873. 

Executive  Register  of  the  United  States,  1789-1902,  compiled  by  Robert 
Brent  Mosher.    Baltimore,  1903. 

Hansard's  Parliamentary  Debates,  LXVII,  LXXIX.     Loudon,  1843,  1845. 

House  Executive  Documents 

212,  29  Congress,  1  sess. 
4,  29  Congress,  2  sess. 

6,  30  Congress,  1  sess. 

41,  30  Congress,  1  sess.      (Emory,   Notes   of   a   Military    Reconnois- 

sanee. ) 

60,  30  Congress,  1  sess. 

7,  30  Congress,  2  sess. 

House  RepoHs 

312,  23  Congress,  1  sess. 

Register  of  Debates  in  Congress.     Washington,  1834-1856. 

Senate  Executive  Documents 

1,  29  Congress,  1  sess. 

107,  29  Congress,  2  sess. 

1,  30  Congress,  1  sess. 

29,  30  Congress,  1  sess. 

35,  30  Congress,  1  sess. 

52,  30  Congress,  1  sess. 

65,  30  Congress,  1  sess. 

Tennessee 

House  Journal,  1839-40. 
House  Journal,  1841-42. 
Senate  Journul,  1839-40. 
Senate  Journal,  1841-42. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  727 

Texas 

Diplomatic  Currcspondencc  of  the.  Bepublic  of  Texas,  edited  by  George 
P.  Garrison.  3  vols.  //(■  Americau  Historical  Association,  Annual 
Report,  1907-1908.     Washington,  1908-1911. 

Treaties,  Conventiom,  International  Acta,  Protocols  and  Agreements,  be- 
tween the  United  States  of  America  and  Other  Powers,  1776-1909, 
compiled  by  William  M.  Malloy.     3  vols.     Washington,  1910. 


MANUSCRIPTS 

Buchanan,  James.     Papers:  Library  of  Historical  Society  of  Pennsylvania. 

Cralle,  Richard  K.     Papers:  Library  of  Congress. 

Crittenden,  John  J.     Papers:  Library  of  Congress. 

Green,  Duff.     Letters:  Library  of  Congress. 

Jackson,  Andrew.     Papers:  Library  of  Congress. 

Johnson,  Andrew.     Papers:  Libraiy  of  Congress. 

Larkin,  Thomas  O.     Papers:  Bancroft  Library,  University  of  California. 

McLean,  John.     Papers:  Libraiy  of  Congress. 

Piekce,  Franklin.     Papers:  Library  of  Congress. 

Polk,  James  K.     Papers:  Library  of  Congress. 

Polk,  Col.  William.     Papers:  Library  of  Congress. 

Trist,  Nicholas  P.     Papers:  Libraiy  of  Congress. 

Van  Buren,  Martin.     Papers:  Libraiy  of  Congress. 

Welles,  Gideon.     Papers:  Library  of  Congi-ess. 

PUBLISHED  DIARIES  AND   CORRESPONDENCE 

Adams,  John  Quincy.  Memoirs  of  John  Quinoy  Adam^,  comprising  por- 
tions of  his  dlani  from  1795  to  1848,  edited  by  Charles  Francis 
Adams.     12  vols.     Philadelphia,  1874-1877. 

Brown,  Aaron  V.  Speeches,  Congressional  and  Political,  and  Other  Writ- 
ings.    Nashville,  1854. 

Buchanan,  James.  The  Worls  of  James  Buclmnan,  comprising  his 
speeches,  state  papers,  and  private  correspondence;  collected  and 
edited  by  John  Bassett  Moore.  12  vols.  Philadelphia  and  London, 
1908-1911. 

Calhoun,  John  C.  Correspondence,  edited  by  J.  Franklin  Jameson.  In 
American  Historical  Association,  Annual  Report,  1899.  Washington, 
1900. 

Calhoun,  John  C.  The  Works  of  John  C.  Calhoun,  edited  by  Richard  K. 
Cralle.     6  vols.     New  York,  18.51-1870. 


728  JAMES   K.    POLE 

Heiss,  John  P.    "Papers,"  Tennessee  Historical  Magazine,  II,  No.  2. 

Laughlin,  Samuel,  H.    "Diary,"  Tennessee  Historical  Magazine,  II,  No.  1. 

Lincoln,  Abraham.  Complete  Works,  compiled  by  Jolui  G.  Nicolay  and 
John  Hay,  edited  by  Francis  D.  Tandy.     12  vols.     New  York,  1905. 

Polk,  James  K.  The  Diary  of  James  K.  Poll:,  edited  by  Milo  Milton  Quaife. 
4  vols.     Cliicago,  1910. 

' '  Polk-Donelson  Letters, ' '  Tennessee  Historical  Magazine,  III,  No.  4.  Let- 
ters of  James  K.  Polk  and  A.  J.  Donelson,  edited  by  St.  George  L. 
Sioussat. 

" Polk- Johnson  Letters,"  Tennessee  Historical  Magazine,  1,  No.  3.  Letters 
of  James  K.  Polk  and  Cave  Johnson,  edited  by  St.  George  L.  Sioussat. 

"Polk-Pillow  Letters,"  American  Historical  Eevieio,  XI,  No.  4.  Edited  by 
Jesse  Siddall  Reeves. 

Taylor,  Zachary.  Letters  of  Zachary  Taylor  from  the  Battle -Fields  of 
the  Mexican  War,  edited  by  William  K.  Bixby.  Rochester,  N.  Y., 
1908. 


NEWSPAPERS 
Baltimore 

Niles'  Weekly  Register. 
Sun. 

Nashville 

Democratic  Statesman. 

Daily  Bepublican  Banner.     Daily  and  triweekly. 

Union.     Semi  weekly  and  triweekly. 

Whig. 

San  Francisco 

Alta  California 

Washington 

Gazette. 

Globe. 

Madisonian. 

National  Intelligenoer. 

Spectator. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  729 


PEEIODICALS 

American  Historical  Magazine.  9  vols.  Nashville,  1896-1904.  Contains 
Mary  Winder  Garrett's  "Pedigree  of  the  Polk  Family,"  also  letters 
of  Jackson  and  other  statesmen. 

Democratic  Beview.     New  York,  1838-1859. 

AETICLES  IN  PERIODICALS 

Bourne,  Edward  G.  "The  United  States  and  Mexico,  1847-1848,"  Amer- 
icaii  Historical  Review,  V,  No.  3. 

SCHAFER,  Joseph.  "British  Attitude  toward  the  Oregon  Question,  1815- 
1846,"  American  Historical  Review,  XVI,  No.  2. 

SioussAT,  St.  George  L.  "Some  Phases  of  Tennessee  Politics  in  the  Jack- 
son Period,"  American  Historical  Review,  XIV,  No.  1. 

BOOKS  AND  PAMPHLETS 

Adams,  Ephraiji  Douglas.  British  Interests  and  Activities  in  Texas,  1838- 
1846.     Baltimore,  1910. 

Adams,  Henry.     History  of  the  United  States.     New  York,  1891-1898. 

Ambler,  Charles  Henry.     Thom<is  Ritchie.     Richmond,  1913. 

Bancroft,  Hubert  Howe.  History  of  California,  Vol.  5.  San  Francisco, 
1886. 

Benton,  Thomas  H.     Thirty  Years'  View.    New  York,  1862. 

Birney,  William.    James  G.  Birney  and  His  Times.    New  York,  1890. 

Chase,  Lucien  B.     History  of  the  Polk  Administration.     New  York,  1850. 

Claiborne,  J.  F.  H.  Life  and  Carrespondence  of  John  A.  Quitman.  2  vols. 
New  York,  1860. 

Coleman,  Ann  Mary  Butler.  The  Life  of  John  J.  Crittenden,  with  selec- 
tions from  his  correspondence  and  speeches.  2  vols.  Philadelphia, 
1873. 

Curtis,  George  Ticknor.  Life  of  Daniel  Webster.  2  vols.  New  York, 
1870. 

Curtis,  George  Ticknor.  Life  of  James  BucJianan.  2  vols.  New  York, 
1883. 

FooTE,  Henry  S.     Casket  of  Rem,iniscences.     Washington,  1874. 

Fremont,  John  Charles.  Memoirs  of  My  Life.  Chicago  and  New  York, 
1887. 


730  JAMES   E.    POLK 

Gallatin,  Albert.     TIw  Oregon  Question.     New  York,  1846. 

Garrison,  George  Pierce.     Westward  Extension.     New  York,  1906. 

Grant,  U.  S.     Personal  Memoirs.     2  vols.     New  York,  1885-1886. 

Gray,  W.  H.     A  History  of  Oregon,  1792-1849.     Portland,  1870. 

Hitchcock,  Ethan  Allen.  Fiftij  Years  in  Camp  and  Field,  edited  by 
W.  A.  Croffut.     New  York  and  London,  1909. 

HoLST,  Dr.  H.  VON.  The  Constitutional  and  Political  History  of  the  United 
States,  translated  by  Alfred  B.  Mason  and  Paul  Shorey.  8  vols. 
Chicago,  1881-1892. 

HoLST,  Dr.  H.  VON.  Verfassungsgeschichte  der  Vereinigten  Stouten  von 
Ameril-a.     -1  vols.     Berlin,  1878-1884. 

Howe,  M.  A.  De  Wolfe.  The  Life  and  Letters  of  George  Bancroft.  2 
vols.     New  York,  1908. 

Jay,  William.  A  Review  of  the  Causes  and  Consequences  of  the  Mexican 
War.     Pliiladelphia,  1849. 

Jenkins,  John  S.     The  Life  of  James  Knox  Poll:     Auburn,  1850. 

Jones,  Anson.  Memoranda  and  official  correspondence  relating  to  the 
Eepublic  of  Texas,  its  history  arid  annexation.  Including  a  brief 
autobiography  of  the  author.     New  York,  1859. 

Latane,  John  H.  Diplomatic  Eelations  of  the  United  States  and  Spanish 
America.     Baltimore,  1900. 

Learned,  Henry  Barrett.  Some  Aspects  of  tlie  Cabinet  Meeting.  Wash- 
ington, 1915. 

Mann,  Mary  Tylek.     Life  of  Horace  Mann.     Boston,  1865. 

Me.\de,  George  Gordon.  The  Life  and  Letters  of  George  Gordon  Meade. 
2  vols.     New  York,  1913. 

Meigs,  William  Montgomery.  The  Life  of  Thomas  Hart  Benton.  Pliila- 
delphia and  London,   1904. 

Nelson,  Anson  and  Fanny.  Memorials  of  Sarah  Childress  Polk.  New 
York,  1892. 

Parton,  James.     Life  of  Andrew  Jackson.     3  vols.     Boston,   187(). 

Phelan,  James.    History  of  Tennessee.     Boston,  1889. 

Porter,  Valentine  Mott.  General  Stephen  W.  Kearny  and  tlu  Coniiuest 
of  California.     Los  Angeles,  1911. 

Prentiss,  George  Lewis.    Memoir  of  S.  S.  Prentiss.    New  York,  1855. 

Beeves,  Jesse  Siddall.  American  Diplomacy  under  Tyler  and  Polk.  Balti- 
more, 1907. 


BIBLIOGBAPRY  731 

Reid,  Whitelaw.     The  Monroe  Doctrine,  the  Polk  Doctrine  and  the  Doc- 
trine of  Anarchism.     New  York,   1903. 

Ripley,  R.  S.     The  War  with  Mexico.     2  vols.     New  York,  1849. 

Rives,    George    Lockhart.      The    United    States    and    Mexico,    1821-1848. 
2  vols.     New  York,  1913. 

ScHOULER,  jAiiES.    Histor/i  of  the  United  States.    6  vols.    New  York,  1880- 
1899. 

ScHURZ,  Carl.     Life  of  Henry  Clay.     2  vols.     Boston  and  New  York,  1887. 

Scott,  Nancy  N.     A  Memoir  of  Hugh  Lawson  White.     Philadelphia,  1856. 

Scott,  Winfield.    Memoirs  of  Lieut. -General  Scott,  LL.D.    Written  by  him- 
self.    Usually  cited  as  Autobiography.     2  vols.     New  York,  1864. 

Shepard,  Edward  M.     Martin  Van  Buren.     Boston  and  New  York,  1889. 

Smith,  Ashbel.  Reminiscences  of  the  Texas  Republic.     Galveston,  1876. 

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INDEX 


Aberdeen,  Lord,  417;  and  Oregon, 
563,  574,  584. 

Abolition  vote,  279-280. 

Adams,  C.  F.,  "Free-soil"  nom- 
inee   (1848),  715. 

Adams,  J.  Q.,  46,  304;  opposes 
Polk,  44,  97,  122;  slavery  peti- 
tions, 109,  126;  opposes  annex- 
ation of  Texas,  117,  126;  de- 
clines to  attend  Polk's  inaugura- 
tion, 319;  supports  Polk's  diplo- 
matic appropriation,  443 ;  agrees 
with  Polk  on  "all  Oregon,"  443, 
590;   death,  545;  and  Cuba,  699. 

"Alabama  letters,"  271. 

Alexander,  A.  E.,  208. 

Allen,  E.,  357,  371. 

Allen,  William,  403,  561,  585;  on 
Oregon,  599;  resigns,  609;  de- 
sires congressional  ' '  Polk  Doc- 
trine," 694. 

Almonte,  J.  N.,  354,  445,  465. 

"American  System,"  Polk's  opin- 
ion of,  656  ff.;  defeated,  678; 
Polk's  able  message  on,  686;  ob- 
solete, 689. 

Ampudia,  Pedro  de,  411. 

Anaya,  P.  M.,  President  ad  interim, 
521 ;  appoints  peace  commission- 
ers, 522. 

Anderson,  Alex.,  Senator,  169,  271. 

Archer,  W.  S.,  313,  441,  581. 

Arista,  Mariano,  412. 

Armstrong,  Eobert,  152,  273,  286, 
574;  informs  Polk  of  election, 
283. 

Ashburton,  Lord,  boundary  mis- 
sion,  558. 


Aslimun,  George,  467. 

Astor,  John  J.,  556, 

Atchison,  David  R.,  346,  586,  596. 

Atherton,  C.  G.,  126. 

Atocha,  A.  J.,  advises  Polk  on 
Mexican  policy,  396-399,  465; 
472,  487;    suggests  bribery,  534. 

Aristain,  Miguel,  peace  commis- 
sioner, 522. 

Badger,  G.  E.,  631. 

Bagby,  A.  P.,  674. 

' '  Balance  of  power, ' '  opposed  by 
Polk,  693. 

Baldwin,  R.  S.,  631. 

Bancroft,  George,  works  for  Polk's 
nomination,  237  ff.,  272;  Secre- 
taiy  of  Navj',  298 ;  instructions 
to  Taylor,  375;  order  relating  to 
Santa  Anna,  439 ;  his  postal 
treaty  with  Great  Britain,   711. 

Bank  of  the  United  States,  asks 
for  recharter,  28;  sale  of  stocks, 
30. 

"Bank  war,"  importance  of,  26; 
Polk's  part  in,  26-46. 

Bankhead,  Cliarles,  British  minister 
in  Mexico,  506,  514. 

Baranda,  Manuel,  desires  peace 
with  United  States,  506. 

Barnburners,  convention  (1848), 
633 ;  removed  by  Polk,  643. 

Bayly,  T.  H.,  305. 

Beach,  Moses  Y.,  would  make  treaty 
without  authority,  538. 

"Bear  flag"  episode,  426. 


[733] 


INDEX 


"Bedford  letter,"  84. 

Bedinger,  Henry,  621. 

Bell,  John,  57,  174 ;  chosen  speaker, 
50 ;  Murf reesborough  speech,  53 ; 
his  "Cassedy  letter,"  58,  68, 
84,  105;  favors  U.  S.  bank,  84- 
85;  charges  Polk  with  partisan 
bias,  98 ;  denounces  Jacksonism, 
99,  130;  northern  tour,  123; 
never  a  real  Jackson  man,  130  ff. ; 
renews  friendship  with  Polk, 
718;  supporter  of  White,  63,  68. 

Benton,  Thomas  H.,  28,  33,  164, 
230,  236,  255,  262;  "insane," 
257,  264^265;  anti-Texas,  266; 
opposes  Tylorites,  288 :  on  Texas 
bill,  314;  advises  Polk,  403,  436, 
441,  466;  urges  expedition  to 
Mexico  City,  453 ;  declines  mili- 
tary appointment,  471;  breaks 
with  Polk,  476 ;  thirteen  day  de- 
nunciation of  Kearny,  477 ;  sug- 
gests ambulatory  commissioner, 
486 ;  on  Oregon  question,  560, 
576,  581,  594,  606,  631;  Califor- 
nia letter,  644;  on  tariff,  675; 
"unprliieipled,"  718. 

Berrien,  John  M.,  on  slavery,  622. 

Biddle,  Nicholas,  29,  32. 

Bidlack,  Benj.  A.,  his  treaty  with 
New  Granada,  709-711. 

Biggs,  Asa,  672. 

Birney,  James  G.,  nomination  for 
President,  263 ;  prefers  Polk  to 
Clay,  263;   and  free  trade,  281. 

Black,  James  A.,  584,  601. 

Black,  John,  384. 

Blackwell,  J.  W.,  138. 

Blair,  F.  P.,  hostile  to  Polk,  57, 
164;  instructed  by  Jackson,  265, 
268,  315;  sells  Globe,  333;  "un- 

.      principled,"  718. 

Blair,  John,   286. 
Bouck,  W.  C,  279. 


Bowlin,  J.  B.,  275. 

Bradford,  J.  O.,  114. 

Brady,  William,  56,  76. 

Briggs,  G.  N.,  95. 

Bright,  J.  D.,  634. 

BrinkerhofP,  Jacob,  587,  588. 

Brown,  Aaron  V.,  6,  64,  77,  174, 
209,  259,  320 ;  part  in  Texas  pro- 
gram, 220,  257;  instructs  Polk, 
253. 

Bro^vn,  Jacob,  killed,  429. 

Brown,  Milton,  205;  Texas  resolu- 
tion, 311,  314. 

Bro^vn,   Thomas,   195. 

Brownlow,  "Parson"  (W.  G.), 
124. 

Buchanan,  James,  164,  284;  Secre- 
tary of  State,  294,  400 ;  on  acqui- 
sition of  territory,  416,  423,  437, 
527;  drafts  project  of  treaty 
with  Mexico,  491;  rejects  Mexi- 
can peace  tenns,  518;  would  re- 
ject Trist's  treaty,  539;  sus- 
pected of  treachery,  549 ;  fears 
war  over  Oregon,  572,  578,  581; 

•  no  ' '  backing  out, ' '  607 ;  on  Ore- 
gon bill,  640 ;  on  tariff,  666 ; 
fears  war  over  Cuba,  702 ;  presi- 
dential aspirations,  714. 

Buena  Vista,  battle  of,  480. 

Burges,  Tristam,  83. 

Burke,  Edmund,  629. 

Burt,  A.,  621,  640. 

Butler,  A.  P.,  469,  648. 

Butler,  B.  F.,  234,  239;  declines 
war  portfolio,  295 ;  removed  by 
Polk,  643. 

Butler,  W.  O.,  471.  703;  succeeds 
Scott,  531. 

Bynum,  J.  A.',  129. 

Cadwalader,  George,  511. 


[734] 


INDEX 


Calhouu,  John  C,  7,  203,  231,  232, 
270,  308;  on  Jackson's  part  in 
abolition,  108 ;  Secretary  of 
State,  218,  562;  Texas  ""con- 
spiracy, ' '  220,  241 ;  suggested 
for  Polk's  cabinet,  289-  "na- 
tionalizes" slavery  and  aboli- 
tion, 311,  615;  desires  Califor- 
nia, 403;  declines  to  vote  on 
declaration  of  war,  415;  opposes 
lieutenant-general,  463;  "most 
mischievous  man  in  the  Senate, ' ' 
468;  opposes  war,  530,  623; 
urges  ' '  masterly  inactivity, ' ' 
560;  declines  British  mission, 
567;  "against  any  compromise 
line,"  624;  presidential  hopes, 
626;  seeks  pledge  from  Polk  on 
southern  governors  for  terri- 
tories, 636;  urges  veto  of  Oregon 
bill,  640;  address  on  slavery, 
649 ;  opposes  congressional ' '  Polk 
Doctrine,"  694;  interpretation 
of  Monroe  Doctrine,  700;  dis- 
union warning,  717. 

California,  one  of  Polk's  "great 
measures,"  351;  supposed  de- 
signs upon,  386 ;  Mexican  war 
"waged  for,"  391;  Kearny  sent 
to,  422;  conquest  of,  426;  gov- 
ernment, 644  ff.,  651,  654;  inde- 
pendence of,  655. 

Cambreleng,  C.  C,  292;  Polk 
"worse  than  Tyler,"  416. 

Cameron,  Simon,  on  tariff,  278, 
668,  675. 

Campbell,  R.  B.,  439. 

Campbell,  W.  W.,  591. 

Cannon,  Newton,  assails  Jackson 
and  Van  Buren,  118;  meets  Polk 
in  debate,  145  ff . ;  charges  against 
Jackson,  146;  last  message,  155. 

Carroll,  William,  42,  87,  122. 

Carson,  "Kit,"  473. 

Cass,  Le-n-is,  209,  216,  441,  585, 
598;  Texas  letter,  229;  cam- 
paigns for  Polk,  258,  275;  his 
"Nicholson  letter,"  630;  on 
tariff,  668 ;  desires  congressional 
"Polk  Doctrine,"  695. 


"Cassedy  letter,"  58,  68,  105; 
copy  of,  84. 

Castro,  Jose,  424,  427. 

Catholics,   279;    as  chaplains,   421. 

Catron,  John,  61,  252,  286,  302; 
favors  paper  money,  115,  660; 
on  constitutionality  of  Texas 
resolution,  314;  asserts  power  of 
Congress  over  slavery,  634. 

Cerro  Gordo,  battle  of,  481. 

Chapultepec,  battle  of,  485. 

Childress,  John  W.,  53,  77. 

Chilton,  Thomas,  38. 

Churubusco,  battle  of,  483. 

Cilley,  Jonathan,  121,  128. 

Claiborne,  J.  P.  H.,  119,  326. 

Clarke,  John  H.,  "Let  her  [Cali- 
fornia] go, ' '  654. 

Clay,  C.  C,  47,  68,  275. 

Clay,  C.  M.,  277,  280. 

Clay,  Henry,  78,  144,  151,  169,  189, 
205 ;  and  U.  S.  Bank,  29 ;  distri- 
bution bill,  102 ;  certain  of  nom- 
ination (1844),  212;  hopes  to 
avert  Texas  issue,  223;  anti- 
Texas  letter,  226,  262;  defamed, 
228,  273;  nominated  for  Presi- 
dent, 229;  claim  to  greatness, 
249;  embodiment  of  party,  251; 
vacillation,  263,  272,  277;  not 
defeated  by  Texas  issue,  281 ; 
God  thanked  for  his  defeat,  283; 
like  Hamilton,  668 ;  and  Cuba, 
699. 

Clayton,  A.  S.,  28. 

Clayton,  John  M.,  67,  592 ;  Clayton 
committee,  635;  Clayton  bill, 
637;  and  tariff,  674. 

Clifford,  Nathan,  539 ;  Mexican 
mission,  548,  550. 

Cobb,  Howell,  on  Oregon,  588. 

Coe,  Levin  H.,  166. 

Collamer,  Jacob,  on  Polk's  persis- 
tency, 717. 


[735] 


INDEX 


Colquitt,  W.  T.,  and  Oregon,  593, 
596. 

Contreras,  battle  of,  482. 

Cook,  D.  P.,  13. 

Conner,  David,  375;  bombards 
Vera  Cruz,  481. 

Corcoran,  W.  W.,  547. 

Couto,  Bernardo,  peace  commis- 
sioner, 522. 

Cramer,  W.  E.,  280. 

Crary,  I.  E.,  opposes  supreme 
court,  135. 

Crittenden,  John  J.,  223,  488,  585 ; 
Oregon  resolution,  592. 

Crockett,  David,  24,  62,  81 ;  opposes 
Tennessee  land  bill,  21  ff.,  23; 
splits  Jackson  party,  22;  and 
Polk,  22,  76. 

Cuba,  and  "Polk  Doctrine,"  691, 
700;  key  to  Gulf,  700;  proposed 
purchase  of,  701-705. 

Cuevas,  Gonzago,  peace  commis- 
sioner, 522. 

Cullom,  A.,  403. 

Cushing,  Caleb,  127. 

Dallas,  G.  M.,  nominated  for  Vice- 
President,  239. 

Daniel,  J.  R.  J.,  670. 

Davis,  Alonzo  B.,  imprisoned  in 
Brazil,  706. 

Davis,  Garrett,  on  "President's 
war, ' '  415 ;  Polk  a  usurper,  459 ; 
on  Oregon,  587. 

Davis,  Jefferson,  opposes  army  re- 
duction, 553 ;  and  Oi'ogon,  592, 
632 ;   on  slavery,  635. 

Davis,  John,  talks  Polk's  appro- 
priation bill  to  deatli,  443. 

Democratic  convention  (1844),  con- 
venes, 236;  attitude  toward  Van 
Buren,  236;  two-thirds  rule,  237; 
platform,   239,   562. 


Democratic  convention  (1848),  715. 

Democratic  groups,  259,  337. 

Derrick,  Wm.  S.,  493. 

Dickinson,  D.  S.,  470,  530;  for 
' '  popular  sovereignty, ' '  630. 

Dimond,  F.  M.,  384,  435. 

"Disputed  territory,"  377,  381, 
408-413,  415,  458,  517, 

Dix,  John  A.,  470;  on  Polk's  Ore- 
gon policy,  593. 

Donelson,  A.  J.,  35,  59,  88,  298, 
355,  360;  exposes  Bell,  122; 
favors  Polk  for  Vice-President, 
161;  on  Texas  issue,  231;  works 
for  Polk's  nomination,  240; 
charge  in  Texas,  308,  354;  de- 
sired as  party  editor,  332 ;  views 
on  expansion,  465. 

Douglas,  Stephen  A.,  275 ;  moves 
to  admit  Texas  as  state,  371;  de- 
feuds  Polk,  460;  and  Oregon, 
586,  589,  631;  and  California, 
648,  651,  653;  and  Cuba,  701. 

Doyle,  Percy  W.,  urges  Mexico  to 
make  treaty,  536. 

Dromgoole,  G.  C,  669-670. 

Duane,  Wm.  J.,  36. 

Eaton,  John  H.,  67. 

Eaton,  Mrs.  John  H.,  25. 

Election  frauds  (1844),  281. 

Elliot,  Capt.  Charles,  359,  361. 

Elmore,  F.  H.,  239,  567. 

Evans,  George,  on  tariff,  672,  674. 

Everett,  Edward,  unconstitutional 
to  amend  Constitution,  16;  on 
military  chieftain,  17;  in  Lon- 
don, 561. 

Ewing,  E.  H.,  591. 

Fairfield,  John,  290. 

l^isk,  Theophilus,  218,  229. 

Flagg,  A.  C,  291. 


[736] 


INDEX 


Flores,  J.  M.,  428;  leads  insurrec- 
tion in  California,  473-474. 

Florida  Purchase,  390,  402,  555, 
570. 

Floyd,  John,  report  on  Oregon, 
556. 

Foote,  Henry  S.,  and  slavery,  631, 
652. 

Foster,  E.  H.,  58,  153,  194,  199 ;  re- 
signs from  Senate,  168;  elected 
Senator,  208. 

Foster,  R  C,  176. 

"Frankland,"  state  of,  197. 

Freanor,  James  D.,  bearer  of 
treaty,  537. 

Frelinghuysen,  Theodore,  Whig 
candidate,  229. 

Fremont,  John  C,  423-426;  acts 
Avithout  authority,  425,  549;  his 
court-martial,  476. 

"Gag  rule,"  95,  107,  121. 

Gaines,  E.  P.,  430. 

Gales,  Joseph,  refuses  to  oppose 
peace  treaty,  547. 

Gallatin,  Albert,  on  Oregon  title, 
603. 

"Garland  forgery,"  278. 

Gayle,  John,  on  slavery,  632. 

Gentry,  M.  P.,  calls  Polk  "petty 
usurper, ' '  462 ;  denounces  Polk 
and  Buchanan,  673. 

Gerolt,  Baron,  379. 

Giddings,  J.  E.,  on  expansion,  587. 

GiUespie,  A.  H.,  388,  424,  473. 

Gillet,  E.  H.,  101. 

GUmer,  T.  W.,  217. 

Globe  (Washington),  unfavorable 
to  Polk,  57,  65. 

Gholson,  S.  J.,  119. 

Graham,  Daniel,  77. 


Granger,  F.,  182. 
Grant,  U.  S.,  429. 

Graves,  W.  S.,  121. 

Gray,  Eobert,  explores  Columbia 
Eiver,  556. 

Greeley,  Horace,  245. 

Green,  B.  E.,  392. 

Green,  Duff,  75,  222,  289. 

Greene,  C.  G.,  123-124. 

Grier,  Eobert  C,  339. 

Grider,  Henry,   670. 

Grundy,  Felix,  Polk's  preceptor,  4; 
48,  59,  67,  75,  85,  113,  118,  166- 
169. 

Guadalupe  Hidalgo,  treaty  of,  first 
project,  491 ;  negotiation  of, 
536;  signed,  537;  ratification, 
538  ff.,  551;  cabinet  divided  on, 
539;  proclaimed,  552. 

Guild,  Major,  87. 

Gurley,  H.  H.,  557. 

"Gwin  letter,"   86. 

Hale,  John  P.,  prefers  disunion  to 
slavery,   631. 

Hall,  A.  A.,  55,  68,  124,  129,  141 ; 
charges  Harris  with  abolition- 
ism, 149. 

Hamilton,  Alexander,  130. 

Hamilton,  James,  288. 

Hammet,  W.  H.,  seeks  Van  Buren  's 
views  on  Texas,  224. 

Hammond,   J.   H.,   94. 

Hannegan,  E.  A.,  229,  438,  601, 
633,  640,  674,  700;  Oregon  reso- 
lution, 586;  on  "Punic  faith," 
593. 

Hardin,  John  J.,  260. 

Hargous,  Louis,  508. 


[737] 


INDEX 


Harris,  J.  George,  editor  of  Nash- 
ville Vnion,  124,  27-i;  his  "buz- 
zard," 141,  150;  "abolitionist," 
149;  shot  by  Foster,  176;  de- 
nounces Harrison,  179;  retires 
from  Union,  201;   267,  302,  339. 

Harrison,  W.  H.,  nominated,  173 ; 
' '  Federalist ' '  and  ' '  abolition- 
ist,"  174;  carries  Tennessee, 
174;  his  "hospitality,"  178; 
"autocrat,"  179. 

Hawaii,  and  ' '  Polk  Doctrine, ' ' 
690. 

Hayes,  A.  C,  49,  56. 

Hayivood,  W.  H.,  313,  596;  re- 
signs from  Senate,  675. 

Heart,  John,  247. 

Heiss,  John  P.,  pre-nominatiou 
' '  guesses ' '  (1844) ,  234-235 ; 
manager  of  ' '  Polk  organ, ' '  333 ; 
excluded  from  Senate,  469. 

Herrera,  J.  J.  de,  overthrown,  395. 

Hickman,  John,  237. 

Hilliard,  H.  W.,  590. 

Hise,  Elijah,  in  Guatemala,  705. 

Hitchcock,  E.  A.,  510. 

Hoist,  H.  von,  on  Texas  boundary, 
364—366. 

Hopping,  E.  D.,  470. 

Horn,  Henry,  261. 

Houston,  Samuel,  271,  309,  355, 
404,  437,  553;  opposes  annexa- 
tion, 356. 

Howard,  T.  A.,  308. 

Hubbard,  Henry,  76,   161.  238. 

Hunt,  Memucan,  355. 

Hunter,  E.  M.  T.,  138,  653. 

Ibarra,  D.,  506. 

"Immortal  thirteen,"  194,  200- 
201,  204,  207. 

Independent  treasury,  659  ff.,  668. 

Ingersoll,  C.  J.,  402,  587. 


IngersoU,  J.  E.,  670. 

Interior,  Department  of  the,  cre- 
ated, 689. 

Irvin,  James,  260. 

Irving,  Washington,  308. 

Jackson,  Andrew,  born  leader,  7-8; 
vetoes  bank  bill,  29;  59,  74; 
opposes  White,  65,  67,  79,  81,  88, 
106 ;  breaks  with  Bell,  81 ;  faith 
in  Tennessee,  83,  88,  104,  119; 
' '  Gwin  letter, "  86 ;  dictates  Ten- 
nessee politics,  86-87 ;  mortified 
by  loss  of  Tennessee,  106;  per- 
sonal triumph,  ill;  specie  cir- 
cular, 112;  slandered,  113;  re- 
joices because  Polk  has  redeemed 
Tennessee,  152;  at  Polk's  in- 
auguration as  governor,  156;  on 
Oregon  question,  565 ;  urges  in- 
structions for  Senators,  177 ; 
praises  Governor  Polk,  188; 
favors  Polk  for  Vice-President, 
207;  Texas  letter,  220;  discon- 
certed by  Van  Buren's  letter, 
229,  232;  suggests  Polk  for 
President,  232,  243;  drops  Van 
Buren,  233,  244;  on  Polk's  abil- 
ity, 246;  on  Benton's  "in- 
sanity," 257,  264;  aids  Polk  in 
campaign,  264-265;  "let  Tiler 
alone, ' '  268 ;  induces  Tyler  to 
witlidraw,  270;  instructs  Hous- 
ton, 271;  tries  to  save  Blair, 
303;  prayers  for  Polk,  321;  last 
letter,  334  ff.;  on  tariff,  656;  on 
internal  improvements,  656; 
favors  independent  treasury,  660. 

"  Jacksoniana, "  state  of,  198. 

Jacksonism,  denounced,  130-134; 
criticism  of,  becomes  popular, 
135 ;  Polk 's  pai't  in,  135. 

Jackson,  Daniel,  129. 

Jackson,  Wm.,  94. 

Jarnagin,  Spencer,  194,  208;  his 
vote  decides  tariff  of  1846,  676- 
677. 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  7,  350,  402,  441, 
490,  553,  692. 


[738] 


INDEX 


Jcsup,   T.  S.,  -13-1. 

Johnson,  Andrew,  177,  186,  192, 
194,  236,  342;  moves  to  create 
' '  state  of  Fraukland, ' '  197. 

Johnson,  Cave,  36,  47,  51,  59,  76, 
114,  138,  174,  216,  230,  235,  259; 
ojiposes  political  persecution, 
153;  Avarns  Van  Buren  on  Texas 
issue,  225;  distrusts  Globe,  254; 
fears  disunion,  266,  275;  in 
Polk's  campaign,  274,  276;  Post- 
master General,  298. 

Johnson  Henry,  314. 

Johnson,   Eeverdy,    437,    596,    599. 

Johnson,  E.  M.,  85,  159,  213,  238. 

Jones,  Anson,  355,  368. 

Jones,  James  C,  selected  to  defeat 
Polk,  180;  ridicules  Polk,  182, 
184,  185;  defeats  Polk,  187; 
governor   of  Tennessee,  192. 

Jones,  J.  B.,  267,  302. 

Jones,  Seaborn,  on  tariff,  673. 

Jones,  Wm.  Carey,  336,  475. 

Kane,  J.  K.,  "Kane  letter,"  261, 
664,   673. 

Kearny,  S.  W.,  sent  to  California, 
422;  conquest  of  New  Mexico, 
4(=0;  California  expedition,  473- 
475. 

Kendall,  Amos,  "lying  machine," 
127  7wte  33;    164,  230. 

Kendall,  George  W.,  454. 

Kennedy,  Andrew,  on  "American 
multiplication  table,"  588. 

Kennedy,  John  P.,  denounces  Jaek- 
sonism,   132-133. 

King,  Preston,  three  million  bill, 
619. 

King,  T.  B.,  592. 
King,.Wm.  E.,  214,  301. 
Lane,  Joseph,  485. 
Larkin,  Thomas  0.,  386,  424,  549, 
692. 


Laughlin,  S.  H.,  56,  58,  81,  91,  104, 
155,  162,  170,  192,  200,  208,  228, 
274,  339;  works  for  Polk's  nom- 
ination, 235  ff.,  240. 

Lea,  Luke,  75. 

Leal,  F.  J.  P.,  Brazilian  charge,  707. 

Legare,  H.  S.,  219. 

Letcher,  E.  P.,  criticizes  Polk,  246, 
278  7iote  90,  286. 

Levin,  L.  C,  588. 

Lewis,  Dixon  H.,  212,  222,  615,  671; 
and  tariff,  674. 

Lewis,  W.  B.,  48,  52,  129,  268;  dis- 
missed, 333. 

Liberty  Party,  nominates  Birncy, 
263. 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  381;  criticizes 
Polk,  530. 

Lincoln,  Levi,  658. 

Linn,  Lewis  F.,  Oregon  resolu- 
tion, 558;    Oregon  bill,   560. 

Lisboa,  Caspar  J.,  complains  of 
Wise  and  Eousseau,  707. 

Lloyd,  Thomas,  331. 

Louisiana  Purchase,  403,  441,  555. 

McConnell,  F.  G.,  672. 

McDuffie,  George  E.,  amendment 
to  Constitution,  13;  bank  bill, 
27;  37,  39,  45,  441;  Texas  reso- 
lution, 262,  311;  Oregon  worth- 
less, 560. 

McKav,  J.  J.,  appropriation  bill, 
442;"  tariff  bill,  672. 

Mackenzie,  Alex.  S.,  mission  to 
Cuba,  439-440. 

McKintry,  John,  51. 

McLane,  Louis,  28,  36,  405,  548; 
British    mission,    567,    582,   584. 

McLane,  Eobert  M.,  451. 

McLean,  John,   63. 

Maclin,  Sackfield,  151. 


[739] 


INDEX 


Maiiguiii,  W.  P.,  "Whig-  but  a 
gentleman,"  336,  548;  on  "ex- 
ecutive organ, ' '  598. 

Manning,  R.  I.,  95-96. 

Marcy,  W.  L.,  296;  Secretary  of 
War,  298;  instructions  to  Tay- 
lor, 379-380;  disciplines  Scott, 
420,  449,  470,  494,  518. 

Marshall,  John,  112,  130. 

Marshall,  Thomas  F.,  275. 

Mason,  John  Y.,  218,  285;  Attor- 
ney General,  298;  and  Cuba, 
702. 

Mason,  E.  B.,  sent  to  command 
troops  in  California,  453 ;  gov- 
ernor of  California,  475. 

May,  W.  L.,  76. 

Meade,  George  G.,  difficulties  of 
warfare,  447. 

Medary,  Samuel,  238. 

Mejia,  F.,  410. 

Melville,  G.,  275,  281. 

Mercer,  C.  F.,  116. 

Merritt,  Ezekiel,  426. 

Methodists,  settle  Willamette  Val- 
ley, 558. 

Miller,  J.  L.,  237. 

Miller,   S.  F.,  271. 

Mississippi,  contested  election, 
119  ff. 

Missouri  Compromise,  on  extend- 
ing, 619;  "unconstitutional," 
621. 

Molino  del  Rey,  battle  of,  485. 

Monroe  Doctrine,  394,  575,  580, 
691,  693,  699;  as  interpreted  by 
Calhoun,   700. 

Monterey,  battle  of,  448. 

Montgomery,  John  B.,  426. 

Morehead,  J.  T.,  623. 


Mormons,  as  soldiers,  422. 

Moseley,  W.  A.,  591. 

' '  Mustang, ' '  see  Freanor. 

"Native  Americans,"  279-281. 

New  Granada,  treaty  with,  709- 
711. 

Nicholson,  A.  O.  P.,  113,  122,  174, 
272,  283;  appointed  Senator  by 
Polk,  176;  loyalty  doubted,  199, 
204. 

"Nicholson   letter,"   630. 

Niles,  John  M.,  585,  675. 

O'Connell,  Daniel,  126. 

Ol-egon,  American  title  to,  555-556, 
568,  579 ;  British  title  to,  555 ; 
joint  oeeupatiou  of,  556,  ended, 
fiOO;  "54°  40'  or  fight,"  563; 
England  cares  little  for,  583; 
Douglas  bill,  604;  British  offer, 
606;  treaty  signed,  609;  and 
slavery,  625 ;  government  bills, 
625,  632,  641. 

O 'Sullivan,  John  L.,  suggests  pur- 
chase of .Cuba,  701-702. 

Owen,  Robert  D.,  600. 

Pacheco,  J.  R.,  peace  negotiations, 
514,  516. 

Pakenham,  Richard,  Oregon  mis- 
sion, 562,  568,  570,  577,  581; 
signs  Oregon  treaty,  609. 

Palo  Alto,  battle  of,  429. 

Paredes,  Mariano,  President  of 
Mexico,  395  ;  proclaims  ' '  defen- 
sive war,"  412. 

Parrott,  W.  S.,  383,  389. 

Patterson,  Robert,  Tampico  expe- 
dition, 446;   449. 

Patton,  J.  M.,  93,  116,  121. 

Peel,  Sir  Robert,  on  Oregon  ques- 
tion, 564. 

Peiia  y  Peiia,  395;  President  of 
Mexico.  486,  521,  536;  advises 
ratification  of  treaty,  551. 


[740] 


INDEX 


I'eiidorgrast,  G.  J.,  trouble  in 
Buenos  Ayres,   708. 

Pew,  T.  J.,  85. 

Pevton,  Bailie,  72-73,  97,  111,  113, 
454,   718. 

Pickens,  F.  W.,  239,  567. 

Pico,  Andres,  473. 

Pico,  Pio,  427. 

Pillow,  Gideon,  233;  works  for 
Polk's  nomination,  235  ff.,  240; 
intrigue,  243,  289;  340,  446,  511; 
criticizes  Taylor,  455 ;  at  Cha- 
pultepec,  485 ;  denounced  by 
Trist,  526;  arrested  by  Scott, 
531 ;  denounced  by  Stephens, 
635. 

Pinckney,  H.  L.,  95. 

Polk,  Ezekiel,  his  "Toryism,"  2, 
273. 

Polk,  Jane  Knox,  1,  721. 

Polk,  James  K.,  ancestry  and  edu- 
cation, 1-4;  lawyer,  5;  mar- 
riage, 6;  personal  traits,  4,  7-9, 
25,  69,  139,  283;  republicanism, 
10,  18;  in  state  legislature,  5; 
enters  Congress,  6,  10,  12;  and 
majority  rule,  14,  17;  on  state 
rights,  18;  and  Jackson,  19,  21, 
30,  39,  65,  81-82,  86-88,  91,  104, 
134;  opponent  of  Adams,  19,  20; 
party  man,  20 ;  on  Committee  on 
Foreign  Affairs,  20 ;  and  six 
militia  men,  21;  minority  re- 
port on  U.  S.  Bank,  31  ff. ;  chair- 
man of  Committee  on  Ways  and 
Means,  37,  38,  41-42;  elected 
Speaker,  90,  93;  "unscrupulous 
partisan, "  91 ;  selected  to  re- 
deem Tennessee,  123-125,  140; 
and  party  press,  123,  274; 
phrenological  chart,  139 ;  victim 
of  discord  as  Speaker,  92  ff. ; 
"Jackson's  creature,"  92,  102; 
committee  appointments,  93,  101, 
116,  127,  136;  and  slavery  peti- 
tions, 94,  107,  109,  121;  de- 
cisions attacked,  96  ff.,  110,  122; 


decisions  praised,  103;  102,  115, 
118;  decides  Mississippi  election, 
119  ff. ;  "  glorious  infamy, ' '  120 ; 
last  terra  as  Speaker,  125  ff. ; 
scorns  "affairs  of  honor,"  129; 
vote  of  thanks  opposed,  136 ; 
farewell  to  House,  137;  "best 
Speaker,"  138;  and  White,  68 
ff.,  73,  76,  79,  88,  90;  attitude 
toward  Van  Buren,  164,  210,  213, 

217,  221,  232,  241,  292.  297,  338, 
633;  and  Bell,  50,  63  ff.,  68,  70, 
75,  85,  91,  96,  123,  659;  attitude 
toward  slavery,  191,  464,  612, 
614,  618-620,  627  ff.,  633,'  640, 
646;  begins  gubernatorial  cam- 
paign, 140 ;  denounced  by  press, 
141  ff.,  148;  "address  to  tlie 
pec^ile"  (1839),  142;  denounces 
Hamiltonism  and  defends  Jeffer- 
sonism,  143  ff. ;  political  consis- 
tency, 145 ;  elected  governor, 
150 ;  inaugural  address  as  gov- 
ernor, 156 ;  first  message  as  gov- 
ernor, 157;  and  banks  of  Ten- 
nessee, 169;  remedial  legislation, 
171;  denounces  Harrison,  183; 
defeated  by  Jones,  187;  doubts 
Nicholson 's  loyalty,  199 ;  no 
compromise  with  Bell,  199 ;  runs 
for  governor  (1843),  204;  favors 
pledging  candidates,  206 ;  de- 
feated, 207 ;  and  Vice-Presidency, 
161-164,    201,    207,    209,   213  ff., 

218,  233;  opposed  by  old  line 
Democrats,  214;  nominated  for 
Vice-President  by  Tennessee, 
159,  by  Mississippi,  315;  dis- 
trusts Blair,  214,  266,  300;  de- 
clines place  in  Tyler 's  cabinet, 
217;  Texas  letter,  227;  avail- 
ability as  candidate,  231 ;  sug- 
gested for  President  by  Jackson, 
232 ;  nominated  at  Baltimore, 
238-239 ;  reasons  for  nomina- 
tion, 240,  245  ff.,  251 ;  comments 
on  ability  by  Jackson,  246; 
' '  Wlio  is  James  K.  Polk  ?, "  248 ; 
claim  to  greatness,  249-251 ;  rep- 
resents younger  Democrats,  252, 
257;  party  organ,  252,  266,  299, 
331;    letter   of   acceptance,   258; 


[741] 


INDEX 


vicAvs  on  tariff,  260,  278,  662, 
665  ff.,  677;  ''Kane  letter,"  261, 
664,  673;  "no  pledges,"  268, 
284,  287,  300,  305;  slandered, 
237;  electoral  vote,  282;  loses 
Tennessee,  282;  informed  of 
election,  283;  determination  to 
be  President  in  fact,  287,  321; 
hamiony  difficult,  288  ff.,  311; 
declines  to  retain  Calhoun  in 
cabinet,  290;  frugality,  293; 
cabinet  appointments,  298,  322; 
"deception"  on  Texas  resolu- 
tion, 315  ff. ;  inauguration,  319 
ff. ;  letter  to  cabinet  appointees, 
325;  "political  martinet,"  326; 
executive  ability,  323  ff. ;  devo- 
tion to  duty,  327  ff.;  declines 
presents,  33i;  dismisses  Major 
Lewis,  333;  bench  breeds*  Fed- 
eralists, 336;  on  patronage,  18, 
341-349;  accepts  House  resolu- 
tion, 353;  announces  annexation 
of  Texas,  371;  does  not  antici- 
pate war,  376;  object  of  Slidell's 
mission,  385;  renews  friendship 
with  Benton,  385,  576;  desires 
California,  351,  386,  390,  402, 
418,  421,  427,  441,  552;  first  an- 
nual message,  393;  cites  Monroe 
Doctrine,  394,  575,  580;  appro- 
priation for  Mexican  territory, 
402;  seeks  Benton's  advice,  403, 
404,  422,  441,  453,  466,  471; 
aggressive  policy,  405;  war  mes- 
sage, 407,  414;  on  acquisition  of 
territory,  417,  423,  437,  439,  517, 
528,  541,  552;  opinion  of  Taylor, 
430,  435,  448,  454,  463,  467; 
plans  discord  in  Mexico,  436; 
permits  Santa  Anna  to  return  to 
Mexico,  439 ;  on  Mackenzie  mis- 
sion, 440;  views  on  Wilmot  Pro- 
viso, 443 ;  aversion  for  Scott, 
455,  467,  471,  532;  charges 
Whigs  with  treason,  457;  ample 
grounds  for  Avar,  458;  asks  Con- 
gress for  lieutenant-general,  464 ; 
deserted  by  Democrats,  464 ; 
peace  offer  to  Mexico,  466;  de- 
nounces generals  and  politicians, 
468;  criticizes  Calhoun,  468, 
627 ;  worst  day  of  his  life,  469 ; 


on  hook  warfare,  472;  breaks 
with  Benton,  475-476,  535; 
orders  Scott  to  continue  war, 
484;  decides  to  send  commis- 
sioner to  Mexico,  486  ff. ;  sends 
Trist  to  Mexico,  488  ff.;  views 
on  Scott  and  Trist,  501,  504,  527, 
532  ff. ;  army  to  live  on  country, 
519;  officially  condemned  by 
House,  530;  recalls  Scott  and 
Trist,  531 ;  urged  to  run  again, 
535 ;  on  unauthorized  diplomats, 
538;  on  submitting  Trist 's 
treaty  to  Senate,  538  ff. ;  views 
on  Buchanan,  541-542;  Trist  a 
"scoundrel,"  543;  fears  Ben- 
ton, 547;  on  army  reduction, 
553;  on  Oregon  question,  557, 
563,  567,  571  ff.,  600,  602;  mes- 
sage on  Oregon,  579;  refuses  to 
arbitrate  Oregon  question,  583; 
to  "look  John  Bull  in  the  eve," 
584,  601;  "hell  all  around 
him,"  598  7wte  79;  distrusts 
Buchanan,  608 ;  reason  for  Ore- 
gon policy,  610;  on  extension  of 
Missouri  Compromise  line,  628, 
632,  634,  636,  639,  642 ;  on  Union, 
629,  640,  642,  646,  651;  and 
"Barnburners,"  633,  643; 
' '  Polk  the  mendacious, ' '  635 ; 
no  pledge  on  territorial  gover- 
nors, 636;  signs  Oregon  bill,  641; 
on  California  government,  645 ; 
Calhoun  a  disunionist,  650;  fears 
independence  of  California,  655; 
on  "American  System,"  656, 
663,  678,  684,  686;  and  inde- 
pendent treasury,  660,  671; 
vetoes  "pork  barrel"  laws,  679; 
party  ' '  galley-slave, ' '  685  ;  fears 
Interior  Department,  689;  de- 
clines to  buy  Saint  Bartholomew, 
692;  not  an  imjierialist,  692; 
would  purchase  Cuba,  701-705; 
no  apology  to  Brazil,  707 ;  on 
treaty  with  New  Granada,  710; 
on  postal  treaty  with  Great 
Britain,  711;  on  reelection,  712 
ff.,  719;  on  vanity  of  life,  716; 
renewed  friendships,  718;  death, 
721 ;  achievements  unappreci- 
ated, 722-725. 


[742] 


INDEX 


"Polk  Doetrini?, "  named  by  Eoid, 
690;  applied  to  Hawaii,  690;  ap- 
plied to  Oregon,  691  ;  applied  to 
Cuba,  691,  703;  applietl  to  Cali- 
fornia, 692 ;  differs  from  Monroe 
Doctrine,  093 ;  denied  congres- 
sional sanction,  695 ;  and  Mex- 
ico, 695-698;  and  Central  Amer- 
ica,  706. 

Polk,  Samuel,  2. 

Polk,  Sarah  Childress,  personality, 
6;   Presbyterian,  721. 

Polk,  Col.  William,  3. 

Polk,  W.  H.,  195,  215,  340. 

Prentiss,  S.  S.,  defeated  by  Polk's 
casting  vote,  119  ff. ;  calls  Polk 
tool  of  party,  136;  Nashville 
speech,     276;     denounces     Polk, 

277. 

Preston,  W.  C,  169. 

Princeton  disaster,  217,  357. 

Quitman,  John  A.,  511,  531. 

Eamsey,  J.  M.  G.,  Polk's  letter  to, 
714. 

Eandolph,  T.  J.,  opinion  of  Trist, 
490. 

Eead,  John  M.,  336. 

Eeid,  Whitelaw,  on  "Polk  Doc- 
trine," 690. 

Rejon,  M.  C,  445,  465. 

Resaca  de  la  Palma,  battle  of,  429. 

Rhett,  R.  B.,  121;  favors  weak 
government,  135 ;  on  Oregon, 
588,  622;  on  Polk's  reelection, 
714. 

Rincou,  Manuel,  peace  commis- 
sioner, 522. 

Ritchie,  Thomas,  269,  302;  edits 
Polk  "organ,"  333;  excluded 
from  Senate,  469. 

Ritchie,  W.  F.,  237. 

Rives,  W.  C,  213,  597. 

Roane,   W.   H.,   239. 


[743] 


Robertson,  John,   101. 

"Roorback"  canard,  273. 

Roosevelt,      Theodore,      "takes" 
canal  zone,  711. 

Rosa,  Luis  de  la,  521,  536. 

Rousseau,  Commodore,  trouble  with 
Brazil,  706. 

Rucker,  W.  R.,  54,  77. 

Rush,  Richard,  290. 

Saint  BartholomeAv,  Polk  declines 
to  purchase,  692. 

Salas,  J.  M.,  445. 

San  Juan  de  Uliia  castle,  cap- 
tured by  Scott,  481. 

San  Pascual,  battle  of,  473. 

Santa  Anna,  Antonio  Lopez  de, 
397,  439;  says  Nueces  boundary 
of  Texas,  440;  dupes  Polk,  444 
ff.;  indirect  offer  of  peace,  465; 
declines  to  make  peace,  472; 
assumes  presidency,  481;  re- 
signs presidency,  485;  deprived 
of  command,  486;  proposes 
armistice,  515. 

Saunders,  R.  M.,  instructed  to  buy 
Cuba,  703-705. 

Sawtelle,  Cullen,  589. 

Sawyer,  L.,  122. 

Schenck,  R.  C,  460. 

Scott,  Winfield,  given  command  of 
army,  416;  indiscretion,  419- 
420;  sent  to  Mexico,  455;  gives 
military  plans  to  newspapers, 
467;  captures  Vera  Cruz,  481; 
defeats  Santa  Anna  at  Cerro 
Gordo,  481;  armistice,  483;  inso- 
lence to  Polk  and  Marcy,  495, 
513;  quarrel  with  Trist,  495- 
500,  513;  peace  with  Trist,  507 
ff.;  bribery,  510  ff.;  wishes  Trist 
to  make  treaty,  523;  arrests  Pil- 
low and  Worth,  531;  declines 
dictatorship,  550. 

Seddon,  James  A.,   621. 


INDEX 


Semple,  James,  561,  601. 

Sevier,  A.  H.,  163,  546;  Mexican 
mission,  548,  550;  on  Oregon 
question,  561,  586;  and  tariff, 
674. 

Seward,  W.  H.,  "higher  law"  doc- 
trine,  717. 

Shields,  James,  446,  511,  531. 

Shubrick,  W.  B.,  475. 

Sierra,  Justo,  seeks  aid  for  Yuca- 
tan, 697. 

Slacum,  Wm.  A.,  report  on  Ore- 
gon, 558. 

Slade,  W.,  120;  power  of  patron- 
age, 133. 

Slavery,  Polk's  attitude  toward, 
612-614,  618-620,  627,  633,  642; 
new  southern  doctrine,  625,  630, 
635. 

Slidell,  John,  Mexican  mission, 
385;  instructions,  390,  401;  re- 
jected by  Mexico,  404;  opposed 
by  Benton,  488. 

Sloat,  John  D.,  388,  426. 

Smart,  E.  K.,  632. 

Smith,  Ashbel,  370. 

Smith,  Caleb,  631,  669. 

Smith,  Justin  H.,  282. 

Smith,  J.  M.,  124. 

Smith,  Persifer  F.,  506. 

Soule,   Pierre,   504. 

Standifer,  James,  52. 

Stanton,  F.  P.,  649. 

Stephens,  Alex.  H.,  opposes  ex- 
pansion, 623;  calls  Polk  "men- 
dacious, ' '  635 ;  on  payments  to 
Mexico,  654. 

Stevenson,  Andrew,  47,  126. 

Stevenson,  J.  D.,  446. 

Stockton,  R.  F.,  389,  473;  usurps 
command   in   California,   474. 


Story,  Joseph,  6,  246. 

Storrs,  H.  R.,  14. 

Supreme  Court,  "British,"  135. 

Swartwout,  Samuel,  125.  127,  129. 

Taney,  R.  B.,  37,  111. 

Tappan,  Arthur,  174. 

Tappan,  B.,  315. 

Tariff,  Polk's  views  on,  260,  278, 
662,  665  ff.;  "Kane  letter," 
261;  R.  J.  Walker  on,  260,  688; 
Polk's  message  on,  666;  of  1846, 
672-677,  682. 

Taylor.  Zachary,  at  Fort  Jesup, 
364;  march  to  Rio  Grande,  408 
ff . ;  defeats  Mexicans,  429 ;  pro- 
moted, 430 ;  distrusts  Polk,  430, 
450,  455 ;  truce  at  Monterey, 
448;  letter  to  Gaines,  467;  de- 
cides to  accept  nomination,  479 ; 
quarrel  witli  Scott,  479 ;  wins  at 
Buena  Vista,  480;  reprimanded, 
480 ;  views  on  Scott  and  Trist, 
532;  would  not  mourn  I'olk 's 
death,  532 ;  indifferent  to  inde- 
pendence of  California,  655. 

Ten  Evck,  Authouv,  in  Hawaii, 
690.  ■ 

Tennessee,  land  question,  11-12, 
21 ;   election  of  Senators,  193  ff. 

Texas,  independence  recognized, 
112;  annexed,  314;  admitted  as 
state,  372 ;    boundary,  373  ff. 

Texas  Question,  origin  of,  219 ; 
Jackson's  letter  on  (1843),  220; 
Calhoun 's  ' '  conspiracy, ' '  220 ; 
Van  Buren  and  Clay  oppose  an- 
nexation of,  224^226;  Polk  urges 
"immediate  re-annexation"  of, 
227 ;  Cass  favors  annexation  of, 
229 ;  ' '  enigma, ' '  263 ;  issue  in 
1844,  281. 

Thompson,  Jacob,  467. 

Tliompson,  Waddy,  claims  credit 
for  treaties  with  Mexico,  457 
note  9. 


[744] 


INDEX 


Tliornton,  Edward,  50G,  512;  aud 
peace  nofjotiations,  522,  53t5. 

Thornton,  Capt.   S.  B.,  413. 

"Tliree  million"  bill,  4(\9. 

Tibbatts,  J.  W.,   238. 

Tod.   David,   in   Brazil,   708. 

Tod,  John  (!.,  3(U). 

Tooms,  Eobert,  591,  397,  651. 

Torrejon,  A.,  attacks  Thornton, 
413'. 

Toucey,  Isaac,  045. 

Trist,   Nicholas   P.,   peace   commis- 
sioner, 488;   at  Vera  Cruz,  493 
quarrel     with     Scott,     495-500 
peace    with    Scott,    507  ff.,    513 
fj'uava  marmalade,  509 ;    bribery, 
510  ff.;   peace  negotiations,  515- 
517,    522  ff.;    on   Nueces   bound- 
ary,  517;    decides   to    ig-nore   in- 
structions,   524;    sixty-five    page 
letter,    525,    533;    recalled,    518, 
520,  527  ;  ' '  impudent  scoundrel, ' ' 
543;   enfant  terrible,  544. 

Trist,  Mrs.  N.  P.,  and  peace  nego- 
tiations, 523-524. 

Turney,  H.  L.,  174,  189,  195;  criti- 
cizes Calhoun,  468;  urges  veto 
of  Oregon  bill,  640. 

Turney,  Samuel,  188,  196. 

Twiggs,  D.  E.,  511. 

Tyler,  John,  217,  228;  Texas 
treaty,  262,  308;  withdraws  from 
campaign,  270 ;  last  message, 
309 ;  selects  House  resolution, 
317;  tripartite  treaty,  558. 

Underwood,  J.  E.,  129,  631. 

Upshur,  A.  P.,  217,  562. 

Van  Buren,  Martin,  versus  White, 
60;  unpopular,  66,  78,  203,  208, 
215,  241 ;  nominated  for  Presi- 
dent, 85;  calls  extra  session,  116, 
659;  message  (Dec,  1838),  125; 
close     of     administration,     178; 


visits  Hermitage  (1842),  202; 
hostile  to  Polk,  209,  240,  245, 
252,  262;  nomination  expected 
(1844).  212;  anti-Texas  letter, 
224r-225,  338;  effect  of  his  let- 
ter, 229  ff.;  nomination  with- 
drawn by  Butler,  239;  "be- 
trayed," 243;  offered  British 
mission,  567;  nominated  (1848), 
633,  715;   "fallen  man,"  716. 

Van  Buren,   Smith,   295-296. 

Van  Ness,  C.  P.,  398. 

Venable,  A.  W.,  653,  714. 

Vera  Cruz,  captured  by  Scott,  481. 

Verplanck,  G.  C,  report  on  U.  S. 
Bank,  31. 

Voorhies,  Wm.  V.,  645. 

Walker,  I.  P.,  amendment,  652. 

Walker,  James,  48,  52,  70,  71,  77. 

Walker,  J.  Knox,  539. 

Walker,   Robert   J.,    163,   216,   242, 
259,     285,     290;     opposes     Van 
Buren,  226,  240;   on  tariff,  260, 
688;    on    aid    from    Tyler,    267 
"South  in   Danger,"   277,   616 
Secretary      of     Treasury,     298 
amendment,      313 ;       on      Texa 
boundary,     378 ;     on    acquisition 
of   territory,   423,   437,   465;    de- 
sires isthmus  transit,  491 ;  wants 
all    Mexico,    528;    Avould    reject 
Trist 's  treaty,   539;    on   Oregon, 
572;    "father"    of    Department 
of  the  Interior,  689;   and  Cuba, 
702. 

Ward,  T.  J.,  120. 

Ward,  T.  W.,  and  Oregon  ques- 
tion, 577. 

Watkins,  Tobias,  92. 

Watmough,  J.   G.,  42. 

Watterson,  H.  M.,  209. 

Webster,  Daniel,  130,  212,  585; 
Oregon  policy  a  riddle,  594;  on 
tariff  of  1846,  675;  on  Cuba,  701. 


[745] 


INDEX 


Welles,  Gideon,  236;  charges  in- 
trigue, 241;  on  Polk's  cabinet, 
324. 

Westcott,  James  D.,  459,  469,  635. 

Weston,  Nathan,  290. 

Whig  party,  origin  of,  84;  cam- 
paign in  Tennessee  (1840), 
172  ff.;  nominees  and  platform 
(1844),  229;  confidence  in  1844, 
248,  262;  difficulties,  263;  con- 
vention at  Nash\alle,  276;  tries 
to  "produce  panic,"  535;  op- 
poses peace  treaty,  546;  on  Ore- 
gon, 590. 

Wliite,  Hugh,  provokes  Wilmot 
Proviso,  442. 

Wliite,  Hugh  L.,  7,  21,  22,  60,  62 
ff.,  113,  150;  nominated  for 
President,  89 ;  "  bank  man, ' ' 
105;  "carries"  Tennessee,  106; 
plans  to  remove  him  from  Sen- 
ate, 166;   resigns,  168. 

"White  Whigs,"  84,  86. 

Whitney,  Reuben  M.,  and  U.  S. 
Bank,  31,  100,   110. 

Wiekliffe,  C.  A.,  25,  361. 

Wilde,  R.  H.,  44. 

Williams,  C.  H.,  quotes  Polk  in 
favor  of  state  banks,  662. 

Williams,  H.  C,  168,  285. 

Williams,  J.  L.,  208. 

Williams,    Sherrod,   257. 


Wilmot,  David,  "proviso,"  442, 
618;  on  tariff,  673;  "baseness," 
719. 

"Wilmot  Proviso,"  442,  469,  625; 
approved   by  House,   648. 

Winthrop,   R.   C,   587. 

Wise,  H.  A.,  94,  121,  126;  opposes 
Polk,  97,  117,  128;  denounces 
Kendall,  127;  plays  "Old  Hick- 
ory" in  Brazil,  706  ff.;  grati- 
tude to  Polk,  708,  718. 

Woodbury,  Levi,  on  importance  of 
Polk's  election  as  governor,  156; 
declines  British  mission,  567. 

Wool,  J.  E.,  451. 

Worth,  W.  J.,  411,  507;  takes 
Puebia,  482;  arrested  by  Scott, 
531. 

Wright,   H.  B.,  237. 

Wright,  Joseph  A.,  295. 

Wright,  Silas,  209,  224,  233 ;  forces 
White  to  resign,  168;  declines 
nomination,  239,  243;  279,  280; 
offered  cabinet  position,  291 ; 
488,  627;  independent  treasury 
bill,  661. 

Yell,   Archibald,   55,   354,   357. 

Yucatan,  and  "Polk  Doctrine," 
697-698. 

Yulee,  D.  L.,  469,  630. 

ZoUicoffer,  F.  K.,  80. 


[746] 


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